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harmatvani pakṣatvam. sañdeho hi na viśeṣaṇam. parāmarśapūrmaṇi liṅgadarśana-vyāptismaraṇādīnā tasya nāśāt. na upalakṣaṇam, avyāvarttikātāpatteh.

(b) nāpi sādḥaka-bādḥakapramāṇābhāvah, ubhayābhāvasya pratyekasattve api sattvāt. nāpi abhāvadvayaṇi tathā, bādḥakapramāṇābhāvasya vyarthatvāt, hradādeh, pakṣatve api bādḥa-hetvasiddhyāderāvaśyakatve anumityanutpādāt, nāpi sādḥakapramāṇābhāvah śrotavyonmantavya iti śrutyā samānaviśayaka śraṇānāntaraṇi manana bodhanāt. pratyakṣadrṣṭe apy anumānadarśanāt. eka liṅgāvagatē api liṅgāntareṇa tad anumānāt ca mantavyah ca upapattibhiḥ iti smaranāt.

(c) atha siśādḥayiśitasādḥyadharmādharmī pakṣah. tathā hi mumukṣoḥ śābdādātma-vagame api mananasya mokṣopāyatvena siddhiviśeṣānumitichayā ātmānumānam. Ata eva 'pratyakṣaparikalitamāpi arthamanumānena bubhutsante tarkarasikāh. na hi karaṇi drṣṭe citkāreṇa tamanumimate anumātārah', iti vācaspativacanayoḥ avirodḥaḥ anumit-sātdvirahābhayam tadupapattēh iti cet na. sandehavatparāmarśapūrvaṇi siśādḥayiśāyā api abhāvāt yogyatāyāśca anirūpaṇat, siśādḥayiśāvirahe api ghanagarjiteṇa meghānumānāt svakārana-dhīnatṛṭiyaliṅgaparāmarśabalena anpekṣitānumānadarśanāt ca

(d) ucyate-siśādḥayiśāviraḥasahakṛtasādḥakapramāṇābhāvō yatra asti sa pakṣah. yatra siśādḥayiśāviraḥasahakṛtaṇi sādḥaka pramāṇam yatrāsti sa na pakṣah. yatra sādḥakapramāṇe sati asati vā siśādḥayiśā yatra vā ubhayābhāvataḥ tatra viśiṣṭābhāvāt pakṣatvam, yadyapi pakṣatvasya kevalānvayitvāt nāsyā bhedakatvaṇi tathāpi pakṣapada-pravṛttinimittamuktam. (See *Gādādhari*) (The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office Varanasi India 1970) pp. 1079-1088.

⁵ Prameyakāryam hi pramāṇam. See *Nyāyabinduṭikā* by Dharmottara ed. by Sastri, S. N. (Meratha, India 1975) p. 184.

⁶ There is another type of negation in the Navya-nyāya which functions like the dagger function of symbolic logic. This is known as anyatarābhāva, if we symbolize the 'presence' by 1 and the absence 'o' then the truth-table of any anyatarābhāva would be as follows:

a	b	Absence of a-anyatara-b
1	1	0
1	0	0
0	1	0
0	0	1

It is clear that anyatarābhāva is nothing but the dagger-function.

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HOW INNOVATIVE IS THE ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA?

*The ālayavijñāna in the context of
canonical and Abhidharma vijñāna theory*

PART II

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III. THE ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA

Excursus on the 'Ālayavijñāna' as a 'Systematic' Innovation

It is clear that the issues which became problematic within Abhidharma discourse were of a systemic nature, i.e. they entailed aspects of experience which lay outside of the dharmic analysis of momentary mental processes, yet which were, for exegetical, doctrinal and empirical reasons, necessary for preserving the continuous potential for conditioning those very processes. When a whole series of related problems arises in this fashion predicated upon the same presuppositions, it suggests that they are entailed by those very presuppositions, which piece-meal solutions alone cannot fully resolve. The various concepts proffered by the various Abhidharma schools were simply *ad hoc*, since they addressed these issues separately, without either challenging their underlying presuppositions nor contextualizing them within a larger, more encompassing conceptual framework.

This was only accomplished when the *Yogācārins* fundamentally

restructured the theory of mind with the *ālayavijñāna* at its center, resulting in a bifurcated model of mind which depicted distinct, simultaneous and wholly interdependent types of mental processes: those of discrete, momentary cognition and an abiding, maturing and accumulating, yet subliminal, level of basal consciousness. This represents a systematic development of those aspects of *vijñāna* which had become marginalized within *dharmic* discourse, which at the same time explicates the relationship between the manifold functions and contextual nuances originally found commingled in the early notion of *vijñāna*.

The systemic nature of these problems and of the new theory of mind which addresses them suggests that what has taken place is nothing less than a 'paradigm shift' in Kuhn's sense of the word. These developments correspond closely to Kuhn's analysis of the dynamics of paradigm shifts in many respects: the model of mind centered on the *ālayavijñāna* represents a transformation of "some of the field's most elementary theoretical generalizations" through a "reconstruction . . . from new fundamentals" (Kuhn, 1970: 84f); this shift was instigated by a 'crisis' in the previous paradigm due to the number of "recognized anomalies whose characteristic feature is their stubborn refusal to be assimilated to existing paradigms" (97); the Abhidharmists' initial response to these anomalies was to devise "numerous articulations and *ad hoc* modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict," (78) each variation of which might express "some minor or not so minor articulation of the paradigm, no two of them quite alike, each partially successful, but none sufficiently so to be accepted as [a new] paradigm" (83); the "proliferation of versions of a theory," Kuhn observes, "is a very usual symptom of crisis" (71).

The various 'demonstrations' of the *ālayavijñāna* discussed below, which typically describe and defend the *ālayavijñāna* while demonstrating the inadequacy of alternative theories, also suggest Kuhn's description of a paradigm shift: since "paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute" (23), he says, "the decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms

with nature *and* with each other" (77). Hence the formal 'proofs' of the existence of the *ālayavijñāna* with their insistent critique of the traditional six *vijñāna* theory and its presupposition of serial functioning.

Having demonstrated a 'family resemblance' between the problems elicited by the presuppositions of Abhidharma, and their systemic nature stemming from exclusive reliance upon the *dharmic* discourse, it remains to outline exactly how the complex of notions surrounding the *ālayavijñāna* actually addresses these issues within a larger systematic framework, which at the same time harks back to the earlier constellation of features surrounding the canonical *vijñāna*. That is, we must describe the characteristics of this new paradigm of mind in some supporting detail.

But before we examine the *ālayavijñāna* in this fashion, the aim of this essay must be reiterated. Since I am attempting to understand the import of the *ālayavijñāna* system within the larger context of Buddhist *vijñāna* theory, I focus more upon its structural similarities with early *vijñāna* and its schematic relationship with contemporary Abhidharma than on the discrete rationales for its *initial* introduction (and for each step of its long development and systematization), which Schmithausen (1987) has recently addressed in painstaking detail.

These rationales are, of course, indispensable to any complete understanding of its long development¹⁴⁹ and we shall readily follow Schmithausen's basic chronological reconstruction. I would argue, however, that in the light of the systemic problems provoked by the *dharmic* theory as a whole, these rationales represent more the *occasions* for the origination and continual development of a new system of mind — as gradual refinements of a new paradigm — than its *overall significance* and *justification*; but just such an inquiry is, I believe, still a *desideratum*. Thus, I focus upon the disjunction, centering on *vijñāna*, between the synchronic *dharmic* analysis and diachronic *santāna* discourse on the grounds that when a number of hypotheses (of which the *ālayavijñāna* was only one) are put forth addressing similar concerns, their individual origins are overshadowed by the overall problematics to which they are all addressed; for such concepts may well be (and indeed often are) conscripted for purposes quite

remote from their originating context. Since the “proliferation of versions of a theory is a very usual symptom of crisis,” it is the exact nature of this crisis and the *Yogācārin* response¹⁵⁰ to it which are under consideration here.

*The ‘Yogācārabhūmi’, the ‘Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra’, and the Origins of the ‘Ālayavijñāna’*¹⁵¹

The *Yogācāra* conception of the *ālayavijñāna* developed considerably from one text to the next (following Schmithausen’s chronology) through an increasing systematization, along largely *Abhidharmic* lines, and with the continuous accretion of related functions, most of which were originally associated with the canonical notion of *vijñāna* and had become topics of controversy amongst the *Abhidharma* schools. It is this profusion of associated concepts and the detail of its systematic argumentation that now warrants our attention.

Although the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* is traditionally regarded as the first major *Yogācāra* text, the beginnings of the *ālayavijñāna* seem rather to be found within the voluminous *Yogācārabhūmi*, closely associated with the name of *Asaṅga*.¹⁵² In what Schmithausen takes to be its initial occurrence, and thus titles the ‘*Initial Passage*’,¹⁵³ the *ālayavijñāna* is portrayed as a kind of basal consciousness which remains uninterruptedly within the material sense-faculties during the absorption of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) and possesses in seed-like form the causal conditions for the future occurrence of cognitive processes in the traditional six modalities. These latter are now collectively designated as “arising” or “functioning” cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*) inasmuch as they intermittently arise, come forth, issue, occur, etc., in contrast to their more steady counterpart, the abiding, uninterrupted *ālayavijñāna*.¹⁵⁴ The *ālayavijñāna* here is closely aligned with bodily existence: it is that consciousness (*vijñāna*) which is necessary, along with heat (*uṣma*) and life-force (*āyus*), for maintaining bodily life and preventing death.¹⁵⁵ Nevertheless, this conception of the *ālayavijñāna* does little more than replace the *Sautrāntika* notion that the body is the carrier of the seeds during the absorption of cessation with a new and indeterminate form of mind, still unrelated

to the traditional six cognitive modes.¹⁵⁶ Nor is its status outside of the absorption of cessation clearly defined.

It is the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* that addresses these latter issues and, in few short passages, outlines the key developments in the *Yogācāra* model of mind, largely through explicating those *santāna*-related characteristics first found in the canonical notions of *vijñāna*. In a significant departure from its earlier role as a basal consciousness (*vijñāna*) that sticks closely to the body, what had been primarily a “physiological” *vijñāna* now assumes a distinctly “psychological” character: the *ālayavijñāna* not only functions in tandem with the six modes of cognition, but, more importantly, it underlies and supports them as their basis. All of them, moreover, may occur together simultaneously rather than serially.

First, the *sūtra* describes the *ālayavijñāna* as the mind that possesses all the seeds and which, as *vijñāna* in the early Pāli doctrines and *santāna* in the *AKBh* were portrayed, enters into the mother’s womb, appropriates the body, and increases and develops within *samsāric* existence:

In *samsāra* with its six destinies (*gati*), such and such beings are born as such and such a type of being. They come into existence (*abhinirvṛtti*) and arise (*upadyante*) in the womb of beings. . . . There at first, the mind which has all the seeds (*sarvabījakam cittam*) matures, congeals, grows, develops and increases¹⁵⁷ based upon the two-fold appropriation (*upādāna*), that is, (1) the appropriation of the material sense-faculties along with their supports (*sādhiṣṭāna-rūpindriya-upādāna*) and (2) the appropriation which consists of the predispositions toward profuse imaginings in terms of conventional usage of images, names and conceptualizations (*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā-upādāna*). Of these, both of the appropriations exist within the realms with form, but the appropriation is not two-fold within the Formless realm.¹⁵⁸

In the form of the two appropriations, the *ālayavijñāna* maintains an intimate and essential relationship with the animate body, while at the same time it transmits the predispositions or impressions stemming from past cognitive and conceptual experience. It is an ongoing basal consciousness which, like the organic processes used to describe it, is both produced by and preserves the impressions of its own past developmental processes. These twin appropriations (*upādāna*) reflect as well the double functions that appropriation (*upādāna*) played in

the early discourses and in the series of dependent origination which we observed above: “fuel, supply, substratum by means of which an active process is kept alive or going,” and so derivatively, “finding one’s support for, nourished by, taking up.” It represents a key link in one of the rebirth sequences within that series, as well as the active, affective sense of “attachment,” or “grasping,” a key psychological factor in perpetuating *saṃsāric* life. This dual character, as we shall see, is implicit in most of the important synonyms of the *ālayavijñāna*.

The *sūtra* continues:

This consciousness (*vijñāna*) is also called the appropriating consciousness (*ādāna-vijñāna*) because the body is grasped (*grhīta*) and appropriated (*upāta*, or *āta*) by it. It is also called the “*ālaya*” *vijñāna* because it dwells in and attaches to this body in a common destiny (*ekayogakṣema-arthena*). It is also called mind (*citta*) because it is heaped up (*ācita*) and accumulated (*upacita*) by [the six cognitive objects, i.e.:] visual forms, sounds, smells, flavors, tangibles and *dharma*s.¹⁵⁹

Although they also contain distinct affective implications, these synonyms reflect the primarily somatic nature of the type of basal consciousness which the early descriptions of the *ālayavijñāna* suggest. As such, they refer to functions traditionally attributed to *vijñāna* of preserving the continuity of (mostly embodied) individual existence throughout a lifetime and over many lives, as well as allowing for the continuous transmission of karma and *kleśa*, in the guise of the “mind which possesses all the seeds.”

But it is through its relationship with the traditional six cognitive processes that the *ālayavijñāna* is ‘heaped up’, signifying the important role that the *ālayavijñāna* plays within the momentary processes of mind and initiating its eventual integration into the synchronic Abhidharma analytic. In perhaps its most significant departure from the traditional psychology, these cognitive modes no longer occur conditioned solely by the concomitance of their respective sense organs and epistemic objects, but they occur supported by and depending upon the *ālayavijñāna* as well, with which they occur simultaneously:

The six groups of cognition (*ṣaḍvijñānakāya*) . . . occur supported by and depending upon (*saṃniśrītya pratiṣṭhāya*) the appropriating consciousness (*ādāna-vijñāna*). Of these, the visual cognition occurs supported by (*niśrītya*) visual forms (*rūpa*) and the eye furnished with consciousness (*savijñānaka cakṣus*). A discriminating mental

cognition (*vikalpaka manovijñāna*) with the same sense field occurs at the same time (*samakāla*) along with the visual cognition. . . .

If the conditions for a single visual cognition occurring simultaneously are present, then supported by and depending upon the appropriating consciousness only a single visual cognition occurs simultaneously. If the conditions for up to all five groups of cognition occurring simultaneously are present, then all five groups of cognition occur simultaneously.¹⁶⁰

In a further move away from the ‘somatic’ mind (*vijñāna*) of the *Initial Passage*, the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* also states that the *ādāna-ālayavijñāna* has its own epistemic object: the *ādānavijñāna* occurs with an imperceptible or unrecognizable cognition of the stable external world (*asaṃvidīta-sthira-bhājana-vijñapti*).¹⁶¹ Motivated perhaps by the usual cognitive definition of *vijñāna*, in which an object is a requisite condition for the occurrence of *vijñāna*, the object of the *ālayavijñāna* must be constantly present, but not so strong as to contradict its inactive nature within the absorption of cessation.

In sum, by redrawing the model of mind in this fashion, the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* initiates the reintegration of the diachronic dimension of *vijñāna* pertaining to *saṃsāric* continuity — rebirth, the maintainance of the animated body, and the perpetuation of karma in the form of seeds — with the synchronic analysis of mind focusing upon momentary cognitive processes. Though the details have yet to be filled in, the broad outline is clear. The two distinct dimensions of *vijñāna* occur simultaneously and mutually dependent upon each other: the continuous *ālayavijñāna* provides the constant support and basis for the supraliminal cognitive modes, while they in turn ‘heap up’ (*ācita*) and ‘accumulate’ (*upacita*) in the newly fashioned *citta*, the “mind with all the seeds” (*sarva-bījakam cittam*). The affective connotations of ‘attachment’ and ‘clinging’, implicit in the terms ‘*ādāna*’ and ‘*ālaya*’, and which will become the basis for yet further development, is only hinted at in the famous verse closing Chapter V:

The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle,
Like a violent current, flows with all the seeds;
I have not taught it to the ignorant,
Lest they should imagine [it] as a self.¹⁶²

The Ālaya Treatise of the 'Yogācārabhūmi': the 'Proof Portion'

The *Ālaya Treatise* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which consists of the *Proof Portion* and the *Pravṛtti* and *Nivṛtti Portions*,¹⁶³ further develops the concept of the *ālayavijñāna*, describing it in systematic Abhidharmic terms and elaborating in specific detail the mutually interactive relationship between these distinct levels of simultaneous mental processes. The systematization of the *ālayavijñāna* found in these chapters essentially completes the integration of the diachronic and synchronic articulations of *vijñāna* along the lines found in the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, and in addition develops a conception of subliminal afflictive mentation as a continuous, separate and discernable function of mind.

The conception of the *ālayavijñāna* in the *Proof Portion* is less detailed than in the later sections of the *Ālaya Treatise*, but displays marked development over that found in the *Initial Passage* and the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*.¹⁶⁴ It offers 'proofs' for the dimension or type of mental processes such as the *ālayavijñāna*, chiefly on the grounds that (1) the diachronic functions traditionally attributed to *vijñāna*, in particular the appropriation of the body at rebirth, throughout life, and during the absorption of cessation and the process of death, cannot be carried out by the six cognitive modes, and that (2) even such synchronic processes as immediate cognition are not fully tenable without the simultaneous functioning admitted by the new system centered upon the *ālayavijñāna*.

As for the diachronic functions of mind, the *ālayavijñāna* and the functioning cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*) are dichotomized on the basis of their originating conditions and along lines quite similar to those we first analyzed in the early Pāli materials: the *ālayavijñāna* is constant, because it occurs conditioned by past *saṃskāras* and is therefore also a karmically indeterminant resultant state (*avyākṛta-vipāka*), and it pervades the entire body; the functioning cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*), on the other hand, are momentary and intermittent, since they occur due to present conditions (the sense faculties, sense fields and attention), are experienced as wholesome or unwholesome and thus karmically determinant, and they are related to only their own respective sense bases.¹⁶⁵ For these reasons, none of the momentarily occurring

types of cognition can be the *vijñāna* which appropriates the entire body at birth or throughout life.

Much the same reasons are implicit¹⁶⁶ in the question of mutual seeding (*bijatvam . . . anyonyam*), which addresses the immediate infusion and continual transmission of the seeds from moment to moment. Since the cognitive processes which succeed each other are of such diverse qualities and may belong to radically divergent realms of existence, there is insufficient homogeneity between them for the seeds to be properly received or transmitted through the arising cognitions alone; thus, a continuous and neutral type of mentality capable of receiving all types of seeds such as the *ālayavijñāna* was deemed necessary.¹⁶⁷ This point implicitly raises the difficulties surrounding heterogeneous succession as discussed in the Abhidharma literature.

The *Proof Portion* advocates the simultaneous functioning of the *ālayavijñāna* and six arising cognitions on the grounds that the multifaceted nature of common cognitive and physical experience cannot be adequately explained either (1) without an underlying and simultaneous sentient basis such as provided by the *ālayavijñāna*, or (2) solely by the serial functioning of the arising cognitions, as in the traditional scheme.¹⁶⁸

The cognitive functions of the *ālayavijñāna* are also expanded and expressed in terms of the complex nature of conscious experience in general. Its functions are four-fold:

the perception of the world, the perception of this basis [i.e. the body], the perception "[This is] I," and the perception of the sense-fields. These perceptions are experienced as occurring simultaneously moment to moment. It is not tenable for there to be diverse functions like this within a single moment of a single cognition.¹⁶⁹

The *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* VIII 37.1 had already declared that the *ādāna-vijñāna* has an (implicitly) continuous, though all but imperceptible, perception of the enduring external world (*asaṃvidiṭa-sthira-bhājana-vijñapti*). To this is now added the constant sensations stemming from the *ālayavijñāna*'s bodily basis. Together with the normal perception of the sense-fields and a distinct sense of self-identity, of "[This is] I," we have the first glint of the full *Yogācāra*

model of mind, to be elaborated still further in succeeding texts. This last item, the sense of self-identity, alludes to a continuous but subliminal level of self-view which subsists until the later stages on the path. This was clearly adumbrated in the early Pāli materials, became problematic in the *AKBh*, and was then fully systematized only in the *Pravṛtti/nivṛtti Portions* and, more especially, in the *MSg*.¹⁷⁰

The subsistence of the impressions of (*vāsanā*) or dispositions toward (*anuśaya*) these afflictions became problematic, we shall remember, within the strictures of the *dharmic* analysis and the *Sautrāntikas* used the metaphor of seeds to refer to their continuing yet unobstructing presence (in addition to potential for karmic fruition). The conception of the *ālayavijñāna* has heretofore concerned primarily the seeds of *karma* without directly addressing the question of the latent dispositions. But once the 'somatic' emphasis of the *ālayavijñāna* is superseded by its psychological functions the whole perspective is changed, for the afflictive dispositions are much more psychologically active than the simple storage of the seeds of karma. This is because, however important the genesis of the supraliminal forms of mind may be, it is the presence of the afflictions themselves that most directly affect the *activity* of those forms, making them karmically unwholesome.¹⁷¹ Thus the presence of afflictive tendencies plays an essential role in the continual karmic activities that perpetuate *samsāric* existence as a whole. In terms of dependent origination, it is just the *samskāras*, represented by the afflictive activities, that lead to the fruit, a resultant *vijñāna*, here denoted the "ālaya" *vijñāna*.

While the closing verse of *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra V*. had only hinted at the affective nuances of the term 'ālaya' as 'clinging' and 'attachment', the *ASBh* (11.1, just prior to the *Proof Portion*) includes them in its 'etymological' explanation: "Because *dharmas* dwell (*āliyante*) there as seeds, or because beings grasp [it] as a self, [it is] the *ālayavijñāna*."¹⁷² Since the *ālayavijñāna* refers to *citta* in the *Yogācāra* view, this accords with traditional views that *citta* is often (mis)taken as a self.¹⁷³

This important aspect of the *ālayavijñāna* system will be further elaborated in the next important sections treating the *ālayavijñāna*, the *Pravṛtti* and *Nivṛtti Portions*, which constitute the remainder of the *Ālaya Treatise*.

The 'Ālaya Treatise': the 'Pravṛtti' and 'Nivṛtti Portions'

These portions of the *Ālaya Treatise* present the *ālayavijñāna* within a more systematic Abhidharmic framework, while at the same time portraying the metaphysical aspects of the *ālayavijñāna* much as *vijñāna* was portrayed in the early Pāli materials and in the *AKBh*: the continuity and cessation (or ultimate transformation) of the *ālayavijñāna* is virtually equated with the perpetuation and cessation of individual *samsāric* existence. The conception of the *ālayavijñāna* here represents the nearly complete systematic integration of the diachronic aspects of *vijñāna* with the synchronic *dharmic* analysis of mind focusing upon the momentary arising cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*). As such, it articulates within the more sophisticated Abhidharma milieu the relationship between those two distinct dimensions of *vijñāna* first discernable in the early Pāli materials.

In the *Nivṛtti Portion* the *ālayavijñāna* is virtually equated with the mass of accumulated karma, defilements (*samkleśa*), appropriations (*upādāna*) and spiritual corruptions (*dausthulya*) which keep beings entrapped in *samsāra*. Since it possesses all the seeds, the *ālayavijñāna* is the root of the defilements in this world: it is the "root of the coming-about (*nivṛtti*) of the animate world (*sattva-loka*) because it is what brings forth (*utpādaka*) the sense faculties with [their material] bases and the arising cognitions."¹⁷⁴ It is likewise the root of the inanimate world (*bhājana-loka*)¹⁷⁵ and the cause of the continuance of the afflictions (*kleśa-pravṛtti-hetu*).¹⁷⁶ The *ālayavijñāna* thus comprises those very elements which constitute and perpetuate *samsāric* existence.

When wholesome *dharmas* are cultivated, however, the *ālayavijñāna* comes to an end.¹⁷⁷ As the basis is revolved or transformed (*āśrayam parivartate*) the *ālayavijñāna* is eliminated (*prahīna*), and thus so are all the defilements, appropriations, and spiritual corruptions, and with them the cause of future rebirth.¹⁷⁸ In sum, the perpetuation and cessation of the *ālayavijñāna* is that of individual *samsāric* life itself, much as *vijñāna* was portrayed in the early Pāli texts.

The somatic and metaphysical aspects of the *ālayavijñāna* outlined so far are in basic agreement with traditional understandings of *vijñāna* and, although presented in more descriptive detail, represent little

substantive development over earlier *Yogācāra* treatments. What distinguishes the *Ālaya Treatise's* conception of the *ālayavijñāna*, above all, is its systematic description in terms of the major categories of Abhidharma metapsychology. The *ālayavijñāna* functions (1) in terms of its cognitive objects (*ālambana*) and associated mental factors (*samprayukta-caitta*), making it a veritable *vijñāna* in the traditional epistemic sense;¹⁷⁹ and (2) in terms of the processes of mind with which it is simultaneous (*sahabhāva*) and reciprocally conditioning (*anyonya-pratyayatā*), i.e. the six arising cognitions and a new level of afflictive mentation, the *manas*. These developments elaborate in Abhidharmic terms the basic structure first presented in the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*.

The *ālayavijñāna's* epistemic objects consist of the external world and the so-called "inner appropriations" (*adhyātman upādāna*), much as in the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*. The implications which these objects, and their mutual relationship, carry for the *Yogācāra* theory of mind can hardly be overstated. The inner appropriation comprises the sense faculties and "the predispositions toward attachment to the falsely discriminated,"¹⁸⁰ the latter representing the cognitive and affective patterns, the dispositions and complexes built up over time from previous errant and afflicted experience and upon which the continual perpetuation of *samsāric* existence chiefly depends. These subtly influence the *ālayavijñāna's* perception of the external world:

'the outward perception of the receptacle world whose aspects are undiscerned' (*bahirdhā-āparicchinnākāra-bhājana-vijñāpti*) refers to a continuous, uninterrupted perception of the continuity of the receptacle world based upon that very *ālayavijñāna* which has the inner appropriation as its object.¹⁸¹

This subliminal perception of the external world depends upon the sense faculties which directly sense the world as they are informed by the predispositions accumulated from the past (a process, in fact, which is not dissimilar to that of normal perception). In other words, this subliminal perception is based upon the *ālayavijñāna's* inner sources of knowledge or information, as it were, which consist of the sedimented impressions or propensities instilled by past experience and by which the *ālayavijñāna* itself is ultimately formed. This is

illustrated by the analogy of the flame of a lamp which illuminates the external objects surrounding it on the basis of its wick and oil;¹⁸² that is to say, cognition depends upon the material body and its mental or psychic fuel or substratum (*upādāna*).¹⁸³

Both the cognitive processes and the epistemic objects of the *ālayavijñāna* are barely perceptible,¹⁸⁴ and thus do not overwhelm or obstruct those of the surface, functioning cognitions. In the *Pravṛtti Portion*, these processes are carried out by the five omnipresent mental factors associated with mind, which are also subtle and hard to perceive, entail no further karmic result and are of neutral feeling tone.¹⁸⁵ The *ālayavijñāna* is, therefore, compatible with all types of supraliminal processes,¹⁸⁶ since their respective epistemic objects, feeling tones and karmic nature are quite distinct;¹⁸⁷ it constitutes, in effect, a second, relatively independent stream of mind.¹⁸⁸ It is important to note, however, that even though the *ālayavijñāna* always has an object and functions homogeneously (*ekarasatva*) from birth to death,¹⁸⁹ it is not considered a singular entity¹⁹⁰ since it cognizes its objects from instant to instant and so flows in a continuous stream of moments (*kṣaṇika-srotah-santāna-vartin*).¹⁹¹

The *ālayavijñāna* as portrayed here is a distinct *genre* of truly cognitive processes with three specific types of perceptual objects: (1) as a basal consciousness, it is deeply connected to bodily sensation and the material sense faculties; (2) as an evolving mind which grows and develops, built upon past experience, it retains various affective and cognitive dispositions and impressions; and, (3) based upon these first two, it dimly perceives the external world. This model of perception does not, in the main, deviate from widely accepted Buddhist formulas. All of it, though, takes place beneath the threshold of conscious awareness.

It is, however, the articulation of a fully interdependent relationship between the *ālayavijñāna* and the supraliminal arising cognitions that accomplishes the final reintegration of the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of *vijñāna*. This is achieved through extrapolating the Abhidharmic relations of simultaneity and mutual conditionality, previously reserved for *citta* and its mental factors (*caitta*), to the relationship between the two distinct processes of *vijñāna*, the

ālayavijñāna and the *pravṛtti-vijñāna*.¹⁹² Elaborating on the model first presented in the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, the *Pravṛtti Portion* articulates both the simultaneous functioning (*sahabhāva-pravṛtti*) of and mutually conditioning interaction (*anyonya-pratyayatā-pravṛtti*) between the *supraliminal* and the *subliminal* processes of mind — a conceptual development necessary in order to describe both the distinctive diachronic and synchronic phenomena of mind and their inseparable interaction. It is also deeply congruent with the early notions expressed in the formula of dependent origination.

As we first observed in the formula of dependent origination, the presence of consciousness (*vijñāna*) animating the body is a prerequisite for any cognitive processes whatsoever; in more developed Abhidharma terms, *vijñāna* has appropriated (*upātta*) the body. In the same way, the *ālayavijñāna* “provides a support” (*āśraya-kara*) for the momentary sense cognitions inasmuch as it too appropriates the sense faculties upon which the first five sense cognitions are based, while it directly supports both the mental cognition (*manovijñāna*), the sixth, and the new level of afflictive mentation, the *manas*.¹⁹³ This underlying dimension of mind, the *ālayavijñāna*, conditions the supraliminal processes of cognition, moreover, by bearing the specific causal conditions, the seeds, for them to occur at all — for without the conditioning provided by past experience and actions and transmitted within the deep structure of mind (i.e. the *ālayavijñāna*), there would be no *samsāric* life in the first place, endowed with these specific modes of cognition and the affective dispositions which accompany them.

As also depicted in the formula of dependent origination, the momentary cognitive activities are themselves instrumental in conditioning future rebirth and the perpetuation of *samsāric* life. Similarly, in the *Yogācāra* scheme the momentary processes of mind instill the generative causal conditions, the seeds and predispositions, for further existence through increasing and fattening the seeds for their own future arising,¹⁹⁴ and, even more importantly, by creating the conditions for the continued reproduction of the *ālayavijñāna*, the virtual medium of individual *samsāric* existence, in the future.¹⁹⁵ The *ālayavijñāna* grows and matures conditioned by just these supraliminal

activities of mind and so bears not just the simple imprint of the formative influences of its own generative history, but the structures of mind created thereby, that is, the “seeds” and “impressions” or “predispositions,” which are then capable of reproducing those same active processes.¹⁹⁶ The *ālayavijñāna* is thus depicted in terms of organic processes of growth and maturation constantly interacting with its environment by means of the diverse cognitive structures which have been built up (“heaped up”) or accumulated in the course of its own protracted development, and ultimately capable of producing the diverse fruits conditioned by these very processes — all reflecting the vegetative metaphors and analogies with which the whole system is largely described.

But this is not all. As we observed above, it is the afflictions accompanying actions which build up karmic potential and thus perpetuate the cycle of rebirth. And accounting for the persistence of these afflictions in a latent state until their final eradication far along the path also troubled Abhidharma thinkers. The *Pravṛtti Portion* develops upon the notion found in the *Proof Portion* of a distinct type of mind (*manas*) representing the subsistence of certain afflictions. It states that the *manas* which conceives “I-making” (*ahaṃkāra*) and the conceit “I am” (*asmimāna*) always occurs and functions simultaneously with the *ālayavijñāna*, which it takes as its object, thinking “[this is] I” (*aham iti*) and “I am [this]” (*asmīti*).¹⁹⁷ This type of mentation, moreover, is subliminal, since it occurs in higher meditative states without contradicting their wholesome karmic nature and it persists (until finally eradicated) accompanied at all times by the four afflictions which occur innately (*sahaja*): the view of self-existence (*satkāya-dṛṣṭi*), the conceit “I am” (*asmimāna*), self-love (*ātmasneha*) and ignorance (*avidyā*).¹⁹⁸

This new level of subliminal mentation is clearly conceived along the same lines, and for much the same reasons, as the *ālayavijñāna* itself. It addresses the incompatibility between the subsistence of latent dispositions until far along the path with the momentary occurrence of wholesome states. And, as with the *ālayavijñāna*, it describes an enduring, distinct, yet subliminal, locus of afflictive mentation capable of co-existing with the entire range of divergent supraliminal processes,

as a kind of continuous, unconscious self-centeredness. Like the *ālayavijñāna*, it represents not so much a departure *from*, as an explication *of* earlier notions.

The 'kliṣṭa-manas' in the 'Mahāyānasamgraha' (MSg)

It is the *MSg*, however, that fully systematizes the *kliṣṭa-manas* into the new model of mind, relying upon the same kinds of arguments adduced for the *ālayavijñāna*, a mixture of exegetical, systemic and logical reasonings. As discussed above in the *AKBh*, the *MSg* argues that there must be unobtrusive, subliminal afflictive mentation (*kliṣṭa-manas*),

because it is held that grasping to self (*ātmagrāha*) is present at all times, even in wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminate states of mind. Otherwise, the affliction of the conceit "I am" (*asmimānakleśa*) would be present [only in unwholesome states] because it is associated only with unwholesome states of mind, but not in wholesome (*kuśala*) or indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) ones. Therefore, since [it] is present simultaneously but not present associated (*samprayukta*) [with *citta*], this fault is avoided.¹⁹⁹

If there were not such unobtrusive mentation, Vasubandhu asks in his commentary to the *MSg*, "how would wholesome states such as giving, etc., occur since it is always associated with that [affliction]?"²⁰⁰ Therefore, there must be some locus of afflictive mentation unassociated with *citta*, but which nonetheless subsists until higher stages upon the path²⁰¹ and allows for the compatibility between momentarily wholesome states and the continued subsistence of the afflictive dispositions.

The stages of its eradication also serves to differentiate the temporary wholesome states of ordinary wordlings from those who are more advanced on the path.²⁰² It is whether or not this level of afflictive mentation is present that the absorption of non-apperception is distinguished from that of cessation.²⁰³ And without mentation like this, life in the realm of existence which corresponds to the absorption of non-apperception would be totally without the afflictions of self-view, etc., which would be tantamount to becoming an Aryan being.²⁰⁴ Therefore, there must be a locus of afflictive mentation which is not associated with mind and thus karmically indeterminate, yet which

continuously subsists and serves as the ever-present basis or source for the occurrence of the afflictions themselves.

With this final level of subliminal afflictive mentation, the system of mind centered upon the *ālayavijñāna* is now complete. What this systematic description of mind delineates is a simultaneous and symbiotic relationship between the relatively unchanging, *subliminal* and the strictly momentary, *supraliminal* processes of mind. They are constantly interacting and conditioning each other in an internally dynamically structured mind which as a whole increases, develops and matures, explicating the energetic inertia and generative power of *samsāric*, habitual behavior patterns, together with all of their attendant metaphysical ramifications. We have at last fully redrawn the map of the mind, without, however, changing the territory. For all of this was ultimately developed upon, though much more explicitly delineated than, the earliest functions of *vijñāna* within the early discourses and the formula of dependent origination.

Returning to the Source: The Defense of 'Ālayavijñāna' in the MSg

Whereas the *Pravṛtti* and *Nivṛtti Portions* are primarily descriptive, the *MSg*, like the *Proof Portion*, is largely a defense; it explicitly relates the *ālayavijñāna* to themes articulated within the older strata of Buddhist thought by adducing various *sūtra* and Abhidharmic texts and doctrines in support of both the *ālayavijñāna* and its accompanying level of afflictive mentation, the newly styled *kliṣṭa-manas*. The *MSg* thus serves as the capstone for the themes taken up in this essay, having provided the inspiration, the seed if you will, of its themes and structure.

The *MSg* discusses the role of the *ālayavijñāna* in the formula of dependent origination in two different fashions. It interprets the formula both as descriptive of simultaneous origination and as determinative of the various destinies in which sentient beings are born, that is, simultaneous conditioning and that which takes place sequentially.²⁰⁵ The second refers to the more usual twelve-membered formula. The first distinguishes the *dharmas'* various characteristics (*svabhāva-vibhāgika*) inasmuch as they occur depending upon the

ālayavijñāna, since (according to the commentary) it is the *ālayavijñāna* that differentiates the natures of those defiled *dharmas*.²⁰⁶ Within this momentary dependent origination the two kinds of *vijñāna*, the *ālayavijñāna* and the *pravṛtti-vijñānas*, are said to be reciprocally causal conditions (*hetu-pratyaya*) of each other,²⁰⁷ precisely articulating the major theme of this essay: the causal relations between these different aspects of *vijñāna*, especially as found in the formula of dependent origination.

The *MSg* and its commentaries also defend the *ālayavijñāna* by demonstrating how the various roles that *vijñāna* plays within the series of dependent origination cannot be accounted for by the intermittent and temporary functioning cognitions alone. First, none of the six transient types of cognition could serve as the *vijñāna* which is conditioned by the *saṃskāra* (*saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ vijñānam*), and which in turn gives rise to name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*), since they arise only momentarily and are intermittent.²⁰⁸ The point is that the *saṃskārā*, virtually all intentional activities, condition *vijñāna*, according to the *Yogācāra*, by infusing it with the impressions and seeds of those actions;²⁰⁹ the functioning cognitions cannot receive, retain or transmit such impressions or seeds. Similarly, existence conditioned by appropriation (*upādāna-pratyayo bhavaḥ*) would also be impossible without that same type of subsisting *vijñāna*.²¹⁰

The doctrine found in the early *sūtras* that *vijñāna* and name-and-form are mutually conditioning would also be impossible without the *ālayavijñāna*, according to the *MSg* and its commentaries. Assuming that this implies a constant, simultaneous interdependence, the *Upanibandhana* states that since "name" comprises the four non-material aggregates and "form" the embryo (*kalala*), the *vijñāna* which is the condition and support of these in a constant stream from moment to moment must be none other than the *ālayavijñāna*, for if the *vijñāna* found within the "name" elements refers to the functioning cognitions, what then, the commentary asks, would the *vijñāna* which conditions it stand for?²¹¹ Though this is not a likely rationale for the introduction of the *ālayavijñāna*, Schmithausen warns, it does provide, he says (176, very suggestive of Kuhn), "a more elegant solution" to the relationship between the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of

vijñāna within the formula of dependent origination, represented by *vijñāna* and name-and-form, respectively.²¹²

The further notion, found throughout the early discourses, of *vijñāna* as a sustenance or nourishment (*vijñānāhāra*) of life also lends credence to a type of mind such as the *ālayavijñāna*, since, according to Vasubandhu, this *vijñāna*-sustenance is what appropriates the body and thus prevents it from decaying and putrifying.²¹³

The *MSg* also cites several concepts proffered by various Abhidharma schools, which we have mentioned briefly above, claiming that these schools are in fact teaching the *ālayavijñāna* by different names (*paryāya*), i.e., the root-consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*) of the *Mahāsaṃghikas*, the aggregate that lasts as long as *saṃsāra* (*āsaṃsārikaskandha*) of the *Mahīśāsakas*, and the *bhavaṅga* of the *Sthaviravādins*, the present-day Theravādins.²¹⁴ Except for the *bhavaṅga-citta*, we lack sufficient historical materials to make any extended systematic comparison. Suffice to say that, as we have discussed at some length above, these concepts respond to the same general problematics within which the *ālayavijñāna* is also largely situated.

Finally, the *MSg* argues for a multi-layered model of mind on the grounds that the gradual process of purification, in which some of the causal conditions, the seeds, of defiled *dharmas* remain even after their purification has begun, would otherwise be unintelligible:

When the mind which counteracts the afflictions (*kleśa-pratipakṣa-vijñāna*) has arisen, all the other mundane cognitions (*laukika-vijñāna*) have ceased. It is not possible that the counteracting mind could, without the *ālayavijñāna*, possess the seeds of the afflictions and the secondary afflictions because it is liberated by nature (*svabhāva-vimukta*) and does not arise and cease simultaneously with the afflictions *and secondary afflictions. If there were no *ālayavijñāna*, then when a mundane cognition arises later, it would arise from what is without seeds, since the impression together with its support (*sāśrayam*) is non-existent, having long since passed away.²¹⁵

If there were no mind with all the seeds, this would entail the further consequence that when a supramundane moment of mind occurs in the Formless Realm, the other mundane *cittas* would be non-existent, that is, as the commentary points out, "when the counteractant (*pratipakṣa*) is present, then since all of the counteracted

(*vipakṣa*) have ceased, *nirvāna* without remainder (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāna*) would be attained naturally and without effort.”²¹⁶

But when the concept of the *ālayavijñāna* which contains all the seeds is accepted, the gradual process of purification and eradication of the accumulated results of karma and the embedded dispositions is coherent; and eventually the resultant consciousness is made absolutely seedless,²¹⁷ like the *vijñāna* found in the early Pāli texts. This process, however, takes place at a level far deeper and more profound than that of the momentary and intermittent cognitive modes.

CONCLUSION

The mass of materials, often mutually contradictory, treating the *ālayavijñāna* and its related concepts is weltering indeed, as Schmitausen's work (1987) has so radically demonstrated. One hesitates to make general statements about the *ālayavijñāna* without qualifying each one “in this text,” or even “in this section of this text.” In the wake of this well-advised circumspection,²¹⁸ however, the significance and import of such a complex concept as the *ālayavijñāna* remains elusive. This essay, as indicated in the introduction, is an attempt to interpret the *ālayavijñāna* through contextualizing it in relation to its canonical antecedents and Abhidharma contemporaries.²¹⁹

The fully elaborated *ālayavijñāna* system, (i.e. the eight modes of *vijñāna*, their respective functions, interrelations and various synonyms) accomplished what the other Abhidharma innovations failed to do: it provided in one fell swoop the keystone *dharma* capable of addressing the numerous conundrums created by the doctrine of momentariness through explicitly delineating and ultimately reuniting the diverse and disparate functions of the canonical notion of *vijñāna* within the context of the new Abhidharmic analytic. Throughout the corpus of texts describing the *ālayavijñāna*, it is explicitly argued that, in contrast to the six modes of intermittent and discrete ‘cognitive’ *vijñāna*, only the constant and relatively homogeneous “*ālaya*” *vijñāna* is able to perform the following roles either traditionally associated with *vijñāna* or newly distinguished within the Abhidharma milieu:

(1) It is the “*ālaya*” *vijñāna* that stations itself and grows and develops within *saṃsāric* existence;

(2) and conversely, whose purification, destruction and cessation is coterminous with the end of *saṃsāra*.

(3) The *ālayavijñāna* is the principle of animate existence conditioned by the past *saṃskāras*,

(4) which brings about rebirth through developing within the mother's womb,²²⁰

(5) and thereafter sustains the body throughout one's lifetime by continuously appropriating it,²²¹

(6) even during states otherwise devoid of conscious activity.²²²

(7) As the product of such *saṃskāras*, the *ālayavijñāna* is a resultant state (*vipāka*), and so *karmically* neutral and compatible with any of the supraliminal states of mind and all kinds of seeds, permitting heterogeneous succession between them.²²³

(8) The *ālayavijñāna* constitutes a distinctive, continuous²²⁴ and subliminal²²⁵

(9) nexus of karmic potential²²⁶ (*bīja*) and, in the closely related concept of “afflictive mentation” (*kliṣṭa-manas*), of persisting latent afflictions.

(10) Similar to that discernable within the early series of dependent origination, the *ālayavijñāna* and the supraliminal, cognitive activities of mind are mutually the cause and effect of each other,

(11) for the *ālayavijñāna* *simultaneously* supports, influences and interacts with, the active cognitive modes,

(12) while they in turn simultaneously infuse “seeds” and “impressions” (*vāsanā*) upon or into it.

(13) And last, its various functions and its relations with the supraliminal arising cognitions is described in terms of the momentary *citta/caitta dharma* analysis and thus significantly integrated into the Abhidharma system of causes, conditions and fruits.²²⁷

In short, the *ālayavijñāna* brings together and articulates within a single, unifying, synthetic conception of mind²²⁸ those diverse aspects of *vijñāna* first found commingled in the canonical doctrines and later bifurcated, and thus rendered problematic, within Abhidharma doctrine.²²⁹

The *ālayavijñāna* complex delineates a continuous, interactive and dynamic relationship between the subliminal level of mind, with all its

accumulated habits, experiences and knowledge, and the supraliminal level of ordinary perceptual and cognitive processes. Seen within the context of the problematics between continuity and momentariness *as a whole*, the *ālayavijñāna* is simply the most comprehensive attempt of all the concepts proffered²³⁰ to articulate a fully multi-tiered model of mind systematically integrated into and expressed in terms of the *Abhidharmic* analytic.

What was synthesized, in short, was the diachronic karmic relationship of cause and effect (*hetu-phala*) (represented by the seeds and, more indirectly, by the latent dispositions) with the notion of simultaneity. Karma now has a niche carved out for itself within the synchronic analysis of momentary processes of mind and is no longer bedeviled by questions of temporality, because the seed-support (*bijāśraya*) as the *hetu-pratyaya*, the causal condition,²³¹ exists simultaneously with the supraliminal active states of mind. The mind which has all the seeds represents then the totality of karma, of causal conditioning, subsisting within, indeed virtually constituting, the mental stream, and thereby supporting all of its intermittent and momentary cognitive and affective processes. In this fashion, the *ālayavijñāna* system provided for a more coherent theory of knowledge, memory, and apperception based upon the continuing influence of past experience symbolized by the seeds of karma and the growth and persistence of the latent afflictions. For the ingrained habits, inborn dispositions and accumulated experiences of the past may now play their essential role in influencing and informing the momentary functions of mind, without which ordinary knowledge, memory, even perception, would all be simply unintelligible.

Every moment of purposeful activity creates impressions which are indelibly imprinted upon the receptive, subliminal level of mind; likewise, the accumulated results of these experiences and impressions in turn provide, through the medium of such a constructed and impressed mind, the basis and support for the continued re-production of these very activities, influencing and conditioning them in what is, at bottom, a continuous feedback process. Fattening the seeds²³² until they reach fruition, increasing the impressions or propensities (lit. perfumations; *vāsanā*), the growth and development of *vijñāna* — all these vegetative metaphors point to a dynamic relationship in which

the two distinct dimensions of *vijñāna* are inseparably interactive, expressing a constructive synergy that supercedes and animates the simple metaphors of seeds, storage, and substratum, upon which it is all based. This is just to say that the living processes of body and mind occur under the sway of karma.

Articulating such a “dual layered” model of mind, the *ālayavijñāna* also represents probably the first systematic concept of an unconscious realm of mental activity radically differentiated from conscious mind, expressing and articulating the deep and ancient Indian insight that, as Eliade (1973: xvii) states,

the great obstacles to the ascetic and contemplative life arose from the activity of the unconscious, from the *saṃskāras* and the *vāsanās* — ‘impregnations,’ ‘residues,’ ‘latencies,’ — that constitutes what depth psychology calls the contents and structures of the unconscious.

By synthesizing the traditional, canonical conceptions of *vijñāna* with the newer *Abhidharmic* framework, the *ālayavijñāna* system generated a powerful new conception of mind, in all of its depth and diversity, for the *ālayavijñāna* expresses deep truths about the human condition, about our capacity to understand and to work with what we are — and what we are not. It indicates that the real obstacles to self-understanding and self-control, and the concerted efforts to develop them within our deeply implicated relationships with others, depends upon an appreciation of the continuing influence of past experiences without reference to which even the most mundane activity is ultimately unintelligible. Any attempt to direct our energies in such a deliberate fashion must take into account not only the effects of past cognitive and affective conditioning, but must also recognize this conditioning as a self-perpetuating energy actualizing in each instant. It is this understanding of what and who we are and do, moment to moment, that the *ālayavijñāna* attempts to conceptualize and articulate; and this is the unfathomable ground of being.

And it is unfathomable because ultimately the *ālayavijñāna* is built around or upon the metaphor of the seeds, of containing or storing the seeds, and even though it superseded these metaphors in its dynamic depth psychology, yet the ambiguity, the resonance, of its initiating metaphor remains. For the seeds are hard to get at; they are

not experiential data. They represent a temporal relation between cause and effect, a *karmic* relation, and as such are not real existents; yet they continue to exert causal influences through the conditioned structures of knowing and feeling, the propensities and dispositions built up by beginningless past experience. The seeds and the dispositions represent relationships and tendencies which cannot be expressed *Adhidharmically*, but only through metaphors or merely conventional or nominal expressions. Seeds then are simply ciphers, empty significations for unfathomable relations, in place of whose explication Vasubandhu constantly evokes secret "special powers" (*śakti-viśeṣa*).²³³

But a cipher is just a place holder whose main function is to be empty, a mathematical "zero" (*śūnya* in Sanskrit). But this zero, this cipher in the place of, or rather signifying, an in-principle specifiable cause and effect relation,²³⁴ is neither ontological nor logical, but primarily psychological. The seeds are part and parcel of the mental stream, where the unfathomable realm of karma functions moment to moment within the manifold processes of mind.

But if the seeds are merely ciphers, place-holders for the unknowable relations of cause and effect, what then is the *ālayavijñāna* inasmuch as it preserves all the seeds? It too then represents everything that goes on outside of the conscious mind, inaccessible to introspective analysis, but without whose basis, or at least the inference of such, no mental processes make any sense whatsoever.

So at another level, the *Yogācāra* interpretation of emptiness is that of the ultimate interdependence of mental processes, in flux between the known and the knower, conditioned by all past knowing. And this entire process is unthinkable without the basis of unknown knowing, which is the cipher of knowledge, the basis containing seeds, a mere metaphor of causal relation.

In this way, the epistemological inquiry of the *Yogācārins* led to an understanding of emptiness, of dependent origination, within the direct psychological processes of knowing, for actual knowing is itself based upon unknown relationships, on metaphorical, invisible, inferential yet inescapable, causal relations. But by saving this place for the pre-understandings of knowledge and experience, the *Yogācārins* have saved the explanatory project as a whole. The mind, knowing, and causal

relations in the world, can all be treated just as common sense dictates, just as the doctrinal tradition evolved with all its complexities requires, only now the whole project is based, epistemologically as well as ontologically, on emptiness, on utterly interdependent phenomena whose bottom line, which is the completely contingent and unfathomable basis of knowledge and being, cannot be got at. As the verse at the tail end of the *AKBh IX* warns: "Nobody but the Buddha understands in its entirety action (*karma*), its infusion, its activity and the fruit that is obtained."²³⁵

NOTES

¹⁴⁹ As is, of course, its integration with *citta-mātra* and the rest of the *Yogācāra* tradition, which is beyond the scope of this essay. It seems, however, that the *genesis* of the *ālayavijñāna* has no intrinsic relationship with *vijñapti-mātra* thought and that it is as equally compatible with the more traditional ontology as with that of the *Yogācāra* (Schmithausen, 1987: 32–3). This is certainly so for the *Yogācārabhūmi*: "Most parts of the *Yogācārabhūmi* . . . presuppose, more or less explicitly, the traditional ontology according to which dharmas (including material ones) are really existent, though impermanent and devoid of Self or Person," *ibid.*, n. 221, p. 297; see also 64, 89, 99, 203f. Moreover, while the *ālayavijñāna* is cited in support of *citta-mātra*, the reverse is not found, i.e. *citta-mātra* is not, to my knowledge, called upon in any of the standard "proofs" or demonstrations asserting the *ālayavijñāna*.

¹⁵⁰ "The novel theory seems a direct response to crisis" (Kuhn, 1970: 75).

¹⁵¹ The possible textual references to this section are much too numerous to cite fully and would in any case, given the *ālayavijñāna*'s long development, always inevitably be only partial. My aim here is only to outline the general development and central aspects of the *ālayavijñāna*. In addition to the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, the treatises most extensively discussing the *ālayavijñāna* include the following: the *Yogācārabhūmi*, of which several key portions found in the *Viniścayasamgrahani*, the so-called (following Schmithausen's nomenclature) *Proof Portion* (see Hakamaya, 1978, and Griffiths, 1986) and the *Pravṛtti and Nirvṛtti Portions* (see Hakamaya, 1979); the *MSg (MSg-L, MSg-N)*; *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*; the *Trīṃśikā-bhāṣyam*; the later compilation of Hsüan Tsang, the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, (*Siddhi*) also treats the *ālayavijñāna* extensively and more systematically from a slightly later, more developed, period.

Where the Sanskrit texts are no longer extant and thus absent in the notes, we have relied upon their Tibetan and Chinese translations. Since the Sanskrit terms found therein are all reconstructions, the usual asterisk has been dispensed with. I have utilized the most plausible suggestions for these terms found in the relevant studies, viz. in Hakamaya (1978, 1979); Lamotte (1935, *MSg-L*); Nagao (*MSg-N*); and Schmithausen (1978).

¹⁵² Schmithausen has stratified this text primarily according to its doctrinal content, dividing it into "pre-*ālayavijñāna*" sections, sections that sporadically refer to the *ālayavijñāna*, and those which quote from and thus post-date the *Samdhinirmocana*

Sūtra. Schmithausen (1987: 12–14); on *Asanga's* relationship to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, as author, editor or redactor, see Schmithausen (1987: 183f).

¹⁵³ *Yogācārabhūmi* manuscript 78b5 (Y-T dzi 172a6–8; Y-C 240c27ff); *nirodham samāpannasya cittacaitasikā niruddhā bhavanti / katham vijñānam kāyād anapakrāntam bhavati / tasya hi rūpīsv indriye <sv a> pariṇāteṣu pravṛttivijñāna-bijaparigṛhitam ālayavijñānam anuparatam bhavati āyatāṃ tadupatitidharmatāya*. Schmithausen (1987: 18, n. 146).

¹⁵⁴ These terms clearly distinguish between *vijñāna* as an abiding, indeterminate sentience and an active cognitive process, a distinction that several observant scholars of the Pāli materials have noted: Wijesekera (1964: 254f), interprets 'uppajjati', 'to arise', and when used with '*vijñāna*' to mean 'begin to function' in relation to a specific sense-organ, and Thomas (1935: 104) suggests that *vijñāna* "manifests itself through the six sense organs."

The term '*ālaya*' has two basic meanings, which fortuitously combine in this concept: *ālaya* is a nominal form composed of the prefix '*ā*' 'near to, towards' with the verbal root '*lī*', 'to cling or press closely, stick or adhere to, to lie, recline, alight or settle upon, hide or cower down in, disappear, vanish'. '*Ālaya*' thus means 'that which is clung to, adhered to, dwelled in, etc.', thus 'dwelling, receptacle, house, etc.' as well as an older meaning found within the early Pāli materials of 'clinging, attachment or grasping' (SED: 154, PED: 109). See also Schmithausen (1987: 24; 275, n. 137; 294, ns. 202–3). See *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, V. 3; *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, para. 33; *ASBh*, 11, 9; *MSg* I.3, I.11a; *TRBh* 18, 24–26; *Siddhi* 92; Schmithausen (1987: 275, n. 137; 294, n. 202g).

¹⁵⁵ S III 143; M I 296; *AKBh* I 28c–d; II 45a–b; Schmithausen (1987: 20f).

¹⁵⁶ As Schmithausen (1987: 30) observes, what this concept does here is "hypostatize the Seeds of mind lying hidden in corporeal matter to a new form of mind proper." See Schmithausen (18–33) for more extensive treatment of this necessarily greatly abbreviated account.

¹⁵⁷ *sarvabījakam cittam vipacyate sammūrchati vṛddhim virūddhim vipulatām āpadyate*. Tib.: *sa bon thams cad pa'i sems nam par smin cing 'jug la rgyas shing 'phel ba dang yangs par 'gyur ro*. Sanskrit reconstruction by Schmithausen (1987: 356, n. 508). This closely parallels passages found in canonical texts examined above; S III 53, D III 228: *viññānam . . . viddhim virūddhim vepullam āpajjeyya*. Also noted above (n. 11), this expression is used in an analogy between seeds and *vijñāna* in S III 54. See also notes 73, 80, 90.

The use of '*sarvabījakam cittam*' as a synonym of the *ālayavijñāna* is also found in *MSg* I.2: "The consciousness (*vijñāna*) containing all the seeds is the receptacle (*ālaya*) of all *dharma*s. Therefore it is called the *ālayavijñāna*." Also *ASBh*: 11.

¹⁵⁸ *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, V.2. '*gro ba drug gi 'khor ba 'di na sems can gang dang gang dag sems can gyi ris gang dang gang du . . . mngal nas skye ba . . . 'i skye gnas su lus mngon par 'grub cing 'byung bar 'gyur ba der dang por 'di liar len pa nam pa gnyis po rten dang bcas pa'i dbang po gzugs can len pa dang / mshan ma dang ming dang nam par rtog pa la tha snyad 'dogs pa'i spros pa'i bag chags len pa la rten nas / sa bon thams cad pa'i sems nam par smin cing 'jug la rgyas shing 'phel ba dang yangs par 'gyur ro // de la gzugs can gyi kham na ni len pa gnyi ga yod la / gzugs can ma yin pa'i kham na ni len pa gnyis su med do / This notion of a two-fold appropriation is elaborated in later parts of the *Pravṛtti Portion* (I.b A.1) of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and in the *Trisīkābhāṣya*, 19.7f. 18f., where it is styled the 'inner appropriation' (*ādhyātman upādānam*).*

¹⁵⁹ *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, V.3. *mam par shes pa de ni len pa'i nam par shes pa zhes kyang bya ste / 'di liar des lus 'di bzung zhing blangs pa'i phyir ro // kun gzhi nam par shes pa zhes kyang bya ste / 'di liar de lus 'di la grub pa dang bde ba gcig pa'i don gyis kun tu sbyor ba dang rab tu sbyor bar byed pa'i phyir ro // sems zhes kyang bya ste / 'di liar de ni gzugs dang sgra dang dri dang ro dang reg bya dang chos [mams kyi] kun tu bsags pa dang nye bar bsags yin pa'i phyir ro / (Emendation by Lamotte).*

We observed the 'etymology' of the term '*ālaya*' above. The other attribute of this type of *vijñāna*, '*ādāna*', is virtually synonymous with '*upādāna*', whose functions it clearly performs.

The etymology for '*citta*' is based upon the similarity of the term '*cita*', 'accumulated', with '*citta*', 'thought, mind', derived from the verbal root, '*ci*', 'to observe, understand, think'. The terms '*ācīta*' and '*cita*', deriving from the verbal root '*ci*' and '*ācī*', 'to accumulate, to heap up', simply mean 'heaped up, accumulated'. This explanation is found in the *AKBh* as well (*AKBh* II 34a): "It is *citta* because it accumulates . . . because it is heaped up with pure and impure elements" (*cinoti iti cittam . . . citam śubhāśubhair dhātubhair iti cittam*). Yaśomitra adds that the *Sautrāntikas* or the *Yogācāras* consider it *citta* because it is imbued with the impressions (*vāsanā*) (*Vyākhyā*, Shastri ed., 208: *vāsanāsanniveśayogena sautrāntikamatena, yogācāramatena vā*). Also *AKBh* I 16a; *MSg* I.6, 9; *TRBh* 3.2; Pāli passages touching on the meaning of *citta* include: D I 21, S II 95; *Visuddhimagga* II 452; see also *MSg-L* 4; *MSg-N* 92. Nagao (*MSg-N* 110) rightfully calls this a 'folk etymology'.

¹⁶⁰ *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* V.4–5. *len pa'i nam par shes pa de la rten cing gnas nas nam par shes pa'i tshogs drug po 'di . . . 'byung ngo // de la nam par shes pa dang bcas pa'i mig dang gzugs mams la rten nas / mig gi nam par shes pa 'byung ste / mig gi nam par shes pa [de dang than cig rjes su 'jug pa dus mshungs pa spyod yul mshungs pa nam par rtog pa'i yid kyi nam par shes pa 'ang 'byung ngo] // . . . len pa'i nam par shes pa de la rten cing gnas mas / gal te mig gi nam par shes pa gcig lan cig 'byung ba'i rkyen nye bar gnas par gyur na 'ang mig gi nam par shes pa gcig kho na lan cig 'byung ngo // gal te nam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga car gyi bar dag lan cig 'byung ba'i rkyen nye bar gnas par gyur na 'ang nam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga car lan cig 'byung ngo // (Emendations by Lamotte). The Sanskrit for much of this passage appears in a quote from this *sūtra* at *TRBh* 33.25–34.*

¹⁶¹ Sanskrit reconstruction by Schmithausen (1987: 385, n. 629) based upon the Chinese and Tibetan versions and consistent with *TBh* 21.11, *kārika* 3a: *asamviditaka-upādhi-sthāna-vijñaptikam ca tat*.

¹⁶² *ādānavijñāna gabhīrasūksmo ogho yathā vartati sarvabījo / bālāna eṣo mayi na prakāśi mā haiva ātmā parikalpayeyuḥ // Also found in *MSg* I.4; *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, para. 32; *TBh* 34; *Siddhi* 173.*

¹⁶³ We shall follow Schmithausen's (1987: 299, n. 226) terminology here, except that I have emended his "*VinSg ālay. Treatise*" to simply "*Ālaya Treatise*." Although the section of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in which these texts are found are no longer extant in their original Sanskrit, a nearly identical version of the *Proof Portion* is found in the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* (*ASBh*). It has been studied and translated into Japanese in *Hakamaya* (1978) and English in Griffiths (1986).

¹⁶⁴ Consistent with the aim and method of Schmithausen's major work he has analyzed the eight arguments or 'proofs' into four distinct strata based upon the conceptual development of and *ālayavijñāna* relative to other texts, specifically the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (within which the *Initial Passage* is found), the

Samdhinirmocana Sūtra, and the *Ālaya Treatise* within the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. (1987: 194–6). The first strata comprises the 'somatic functions' in Proofs # 1 (appropriation of the basis), # 6 (the multiplicity of bodily experience), # 7 (the mindless, *ācītaka*, absorptions), and # 8 (the gradual exiting of *viññāna* from the body at death) and substantially agrees with the conception of the *ālayaviññāna* found in the *Basic Section*, prior to the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*. Likewise for the second strata, consisting of Proof # 4, the possibility of mutual seeding. In these sections, the continuity of the *ālayaviññāna* is "not expressly stated, but it is unequivocally presupposed." (45). The third layer, Proof # 2 on simultaneous functioning of the arising cognitions and Proof # 3 on clear functioning of *manoviññāna*, presupposes the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* and is "decisively advanced over the situation met with in *Basic Section*" (195). The fourth layer is simply the fifth proof, the various functions (*karma*) of cognition, where "the concept of the *ālayaviññāna* as an actual perception goes not only beyond the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* but even beyond *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra V* and, as regards preception of one's corporeal basis, even beyond the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* as a whole. Hence, and also in view of the fact that it obviously presupposes the new *manas* . . . proof V represents rather a stage of development quite close to the *Pravṛtti Portion*" (196).

¹⁶⁵ *Proof Portion*, 1a. "the *ālayaviññāna* has past *saṃskāras* as its cause, while the arising cognitions, visual, etc., have present conditions as their cause. As it is taught in detail: 'the arising of the cognitions comes about due to the sense-faculties, the sense-fields and attention'. This is the first reason. (b) Moreover, the six cognition groups are experienced as wholesome or unwholesome. This is the second reason. (c) Also, none of the kinds of the six cognition groups are considered to be included in indeterminate resultant states. This is the third reason. (d) Also, the six cognition groups occur each possessing a specific basis. Of these, it is not right to say that whatever cognition occurs with such and such a basis would appropriate only that [basis] while the remaining ones are unappropriated; nor is it right [that they are] appropriated, being without an [appropriating] cognition. This is the fourth reason. And there follows the fault of appropriating the basis again and again. For instance, sometimes a visual cognition occurs and sometimes it does not occur; similarly for the remaining [cognitions]. This is the fifth reason." (ASBh: 12, 2f: *ālayaviññānam pūrva-saṃskāra-hetukam / cakṣur-ādi-pravṛtti-viññānam punar vartamāna-pratyaya-hetukam / yathōktam — indriya-ṣaṣṭaya-manaskāra-vaśād viññānānam pravṛtti bhavati iti vistareṇa / idam prathamam kāraṇam / (b) api ca kuśalākuśalāḥ ṣaḍ viññāna-kāya upalabhyante / idam dvitīyam kāraṇam / (c) api ca saṃnām viññāna-kāyānām sā jātir nōpalabhyante yā 'vyākṛta-vipāka-saṃgrhūta' syāt / idam tritīyam kāraṇam / (d) api ca pratiniyatāśrayāḥ ṣaḍ viññāna-kāyāḥ pravartante, tatra yena yena āśrayena yad viññānam pravartate tad eva tenōpāttaṃ syād avāśiṣṭasya anupātata iti na yujyate, upātata api na yujyate viññāna-virahitātayā / idam caturtham kāraṇam / (e) api ca punaḥ punar āśrayōpādāna-doṣaḥ prasajyate / tathā hi cakṣur-viññānam ekadā pravartate ekadā na pravartate evam avāśiṣṭāni / idam pañcamam kāraṇam /)*

¹⁶⁶ *MSg* 1.23 discusses this point in more detail: "There is infusing in what is stable, indeterminate, infusible and connected with infusing, not in another. This is the characteristic of impression (*vāsanā-lakṣaṇa*). [The *vāsanā* are infused in the *ālayaviññāna* and not in the six cognitive modes] because the six cognitions are not connected (*sambandha*) [to each other] and there is dissimilarity between their three distinctive aspects [i.e. their supports (*āśraya*), objects (*ālambana*) and attention

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(*manaskāra*); because two [succeeding] moments [of cognition] are not simultaneous [and so cannot infuse each other]." (*bṛtan lung ma bstan bsgo bya ba / sgo bar byed dang 'brel pa la / sgo byed de las gzhan ni min / de ni bag chags mshan nyid do / drug po dag la 'brel med de / tha dad gsum dang 'gal ba'i phyir / skad cig lhan cig med pa'i phyir /*)

¹⁶⁷ Proof # 4. "For what reason is it impossible for the six cognition groups to be each other's seeds? Because an unwholesome [*dharma*] occurs immediately after a wholesome one, a wholesome one immediately after an unwholesome one, an indeterminate one immediately after both of these. . . . These [six cognitions] cannot properly be seeds [of each other] in this way. Moreover, the mental stream occurs after a long time, having long been cut; for this reason too [the mutual seeding of the six cognitions] is not tenable." (*kena kāraṇena bījatvaṃ na sambhavati sarnām viññānakāyānām anyonyam / tathā hi kuśalānantaram akuśalam utpadyate, akuśalānantaram kuśalam, tadubhayānantaram avyākṛtam . . . na ca teṣām tathā bījatvaṃ yujyate / dīrghakāla samucchinna api ca santatiṣ cireṇa kālena pravartate, tasmād api na yujyate //*)

¹⁶⁸ ASBh Proof 2a: "because two cognitions actually do function simultaneously. Why is that? Because it is not correct that the cognitions of one who simultaneously desires to see [etc.], up to desires to know, occur one after the other from the beginning, because in that case [there would be] no distinction between attention, the sense faculties and the sense-fields [of each respective cognition]. (*tathā hi bhavaty eva dvayor viññānayor yugapat pravṛtiḥ / tat kasya hetoḥ / tathā hy ekatyasya yugapat draṣṭu-kāmasya yāvad viññātu-kāmasya ādita iaretara-viññāna-pravṛtir na yujyate tathā hi tatra manaskāro 'pi nirviśiṣṭā indriyam api viśayo 'pi //*)

Proof 6: For what reason would bodily experience be impossible if there were no *ālayaviññāna*? . . . the bodily experiences which occur in the body could not be manifold. But [they] are experienced [as manifold]. For this reason too there is an *ālayaviññāna*. (*kena kāraṇenāśaty ālayaviññāne kāyiko 'nubhavo na yujyate / . . . kāye kāyānubhavā upadyante 'nekavidhā bahunānāprakārās te na bhavyur upalabhyante ca / tasmād apy asty ālayaviññānam //*)

Nor, in fact, can the *manoviññāna*, the mental cognition which 'perceives' *dharma*s and the other cognitive processes, function clearly if it were not simultaneous with them (ASBh Proof 3): "For what reason is clarity of the mental cognition which follows upon visual cognition, etc., not possible if there is no simultaneous functioning of the cognitions? Because, when one remembers an object which has been perceived in the past, then the mental cognition which takes place is unclear, but the mind which takes place in regard to a present object is not unclear in this way. Thus, either the simultaneous occurrence [of the cognitions] is correct of [there is] lack of clarity of the mental cognition." (*kena kāraṇena astyām yugapat viññānapravṛtau manoviññānasya cakṣurādiviññāna-sahānucarasya spaṣṭatvaṃ na sambhavati / tathāhi yasmin samaye 'ūtam anubhūtam viśayam samanusrarati tasmīn samaye 'vispaṣṭo manoviññāna-pracāro bhavati na tu tathā vartamāna-ṣaṣṭaya manah pracāro 'vispaṣṭo bhavati / ato 'pi yugapat pravṛtir vā yujyate 'vispaṣṭatvaṃ vā manoviññānasya //*) Proof # 5 below also rests upon the multi-faceted nature of experience as an argument for the *ālayaviññāna*.

¹⁶⁹ ASBh Proof 5. *caturvidham karma — bhājana-vijñaptir āśraya-vijñaptir aham iti vijñaptir viśaya-vijñaptiṣ ca iti / etā vijñaptayah kṣane kṣane yugapat pravartamānā upalabhyante / na ca ekasya viññānasya ekasmin kṣane idam evam-rūpaṃ vyatibhinnaṃ karma yujyate //*

¹⁷⁰ S III 131 speaks of the "subtle remnant of the conceit 'I am', of the desire 'I am',

of the disposition toward 'I am', still not removed [from the Ariyan disciple]." (*anusahagato asmīti māno asmīti chando asmīti anusayo asamūhato*). A I 133 and M I 47 describes the final eradication of these tendencies in those who are liberated and have acquired perfect view. See notes 10, 11, 39, above.

¹⁷¹ *Pañcaskandha-prakarana-vaibhāṣya*, by Sthiramati: "The causes of *samsāra* are karma and *kleśa*; of these two, the *kleśa* are foremost . . . even the action (*karma*) which has projected rebirth (*punar-bhava*) will not produce rebirth if there is no *kleśa* . . . because they are foremost the *kleśas* are the root of origination." (Tib. Peking # 5567 Hi 52b3—6: 'khor ba'i rgyu ni las dang nyon mongs pa rnam so // de gnyis las kyang nyon mongs pa ni gso bo ste / . . . yang srid ba 'phangs pa'i las kyang nyon mongs pa med na yang srid pa 'byung bar mi 'gyur te / . . . de ltar na gso bo yin pa'i phyir nyon mongs nyid mgon par 'jug pa'i rtsa ba ste /)

¹⁷² *ASBh* 11.1.1. *āliyante tasmin dharmā bijataḥ, satvā vā āmagrāheṇa iti ālayavijñānam*.
¹⁷³ *AKBh ad I 39a—b: ahaṅkāra sannīśrayatvāc cittam 'āimā' ity upacaryate*. See Schmithausen (1987: 55, n. 386).

¹⁷⁴ 5.b) A.1. *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni / mdoṅ na kun nas nyon mongs pa thams cad kyi rtsa ba yin no // 'di ltar de ni sems can gyi 'jig rten 'grub pa'i rtsa ba yin te / dbang po rten dang bcas pa rnam dang / 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa rnam skyed par byed pa yin pa'i phyir ro // D.7a2f; P.8a4f; T.30.581a25f, 1010a13f.*

¹⁷⁵ 5.b) A.2. *snod kyi 'jig rten 'grub pa'i rtsa ba yang yin te / snod kyi 'jig rten skyed par byed pa yin pa'i phyir ro // ibid. D.7a2f; P.8a4f; T.30.581a25f, 1020a13f.*

¹⁷⁶ 5.b) C.2.(c) *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni nyon mongs pa rnam kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu. D.8a5f; P.9b5f; T.30.581c12f, 1020b15f.*

Therefore it is also the nature of the Truth of Suffering (*duhkha-satya*) and what brings about the Truth of the Origin (of suffering) (*samudaya-satya*) in this life, and it is also what brings about the Truth of Suffering in the future. 5.b) A.4 *de ltar na kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de nyid ni sa bon thams cad pa yin pa'i phyir da ltar gyi dus na sdug bsgal gyi bden pa'i rang bzhin dang / ma 'ongs pa'i dus na sdug bsgal gyi bden pa skyed par byed pa dang / da ltar gyi dus nyid ni kun 'byung ba'i bden pa skyed par byed pa'ang yin no // D.7a5f; P.8a6f; T.30.581b5f, 1020a20f.*

¹⁷⁷ *Nivṛtti Portion* 5.b) B.1: "One should understand that the *ālayavijñāna* which is the root of the defilements (*samkleśamūla*) ceases (*vinivṛta*) through the cultivation of wholesome *dharmas* like this." (*kun nas nyon mongs pa'i rtsa ba kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de ni 'di ltar dge ba'i chos bsgoms pas rnam par ldog par rig par bya'o.*) D.7b5; P.9a4; T.30.581b22f, 1020a28f.

¹⁷⁸ 5.b) C.1. "As soon as the basis is revolved, the *ālayavijñāna* must be said to have been abandoned (*prahīṇa*); because it has been abandoned, it must be said that all the defilements have also been abandoned. (5.b) C.2.) One should know that the revolution of the basis conflicts with and so counteracts (*pratipakṣa*) the *ālayavijñāna*. [From Chinese (T.30.581c8); Tib. reads: "one should know that the basis, which is the *ālayavijñāna*, is revolved by [its] enemy."] (a) The *ālayavijñāna* is impermanent and accompanied by appropriation (*sopādāna*), while the resolved basis is permanent and without appropriation because it is transformed by the path which takes true reality as its object. (b) the *ālayavijñāna* is accompanied by spiritual corruption (*daṣṭhulya*), while the revolved basis is forever removed from all corruption. (c) The *ālayavijñāna* is the cause of the continuance of the afflictions (*kleśa-pravṛti-hetu*) . . . while the revolved basis is not the cause of the continuance of the afflictions . . . (5.b) C.3.) As for the characteristic of the elimination (*prahāṇa*) of the *ālayavijñāna*, as soon as it is

eliminated the two aspects of appropriation are abandoned and the body remains like an apparition (*nirmāna*). [Ch. adds: Why is that?] Because the cause which makes suffering occur again in the future has been abandoned, the appropriation which creates rebirth (*punarbhava*) in the future is eliminated. Because all the causes of defilements (*samkleśa*) in this life have been abandoned, the appropriation of the basis of all the defilements in this life is eliminated. [From Ch. (T.581c21); Tib. reads: "all the spiritual corruptions of the defilements in this life are eliminated.] Free from all the spiritual corruption (*daṣṭhulya*), only the mere conditions of physical life remain. If this occurs, one experiences the feeling of the end of the body and the end of life." (5.b) C.1. *gnas 'gyur ma thag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa spangs par brjod par bya ste / de spangs pa'i phyir kun nas nyon mongs pa thams cad kyang spangs par brjod par bya'o // (2) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de'i gnas ni / gnyen po dang / dgra bos bsgyur par rig par bya'o // (a) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni mi rtag pa dang / len pa dang bcas pa yin la / gnas gyur pa ni rtag pa dang len pa med pa yin te / de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i lam gysis bsgyur ba'i phyir ro // (b) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni gnas ngan len dang ldan pa yin la gnas gyur pa ni gnas ngan len thams cad dang gan bral ba yin no // (c) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni nyon mongs pa rnam kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu . . . gnas gyur pa ni nyon mongs pa rnam kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu ma yin . . . (5.b C.3.) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de'i spangs pa'i mtshan nyid ni de spangs ma thag tu len pa rnam pa gnyis spong ba dang / sprul pa lta bu'i lus kun tu gnas pa ste / phyi ma la sdug bsgal yang 'byung bar byed pa'i rgyu spangs pa'i phyir / phyi ma la yang 'byung bar byed pa'i len pa spong ba dang / tshe 'di la kun nas nyon mongs pa'i rgyu thams cad spangs pa'i phyir / tshe 'di kun nas nyon mongs pa'i gnas ngan len *thams cad spong ba dang / gnas ngan len thams cad dang bral zhing srog gi rkyen du gyur pa tsam kun tu gnas so // de yod na lus kyi miha' pa dang / srog gi miha'** pa'i tshor ba myong bar byed de / ** Schmithausen (366) amends to: 'gnas len pa' following Ch.] D.8a3—b2; P.9b1—10a4; T.30.581c6—23, 1020b10-25. [**P.; D. reads: 'mihar']

¹⁷⁹ I.e. M I 292: *vijñānī . . . vijñānaṁ ti*. *AKBh* II 34a: *vijñānī iti vijñānam*. See also note # 225 below.

¹⁸⁰ They are quite similar to those found in the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*. The inner appropriations differ in that the *Sūtra*'s "predispositions towards profuse imaginings in terms of conventional usage of images, names and conceptualizations" (*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā*; *mishan ma dang ming dang rnam par rtag pa la tha snyad 'dogs pa'i spros pa'i bag chag len pa*) is replaced with "the predispositions toward attachment to the falsely discriminated" (*parikalpita-svabhāvābhiniवेशā-vāsanā*).

Pravṛtti Portion 1.b) A.1. "The inner appropriation (*adhyaṁtan upādāna*) means the predispositions toward attachment to the falsely discriminated and the material sense faculties along with their bases (*sādhiṣṭhānam indriya-rūpam*)." (*de la nang gi len pa ni kun brags pa'i ngo bo nyid la mgon par zhen pa'i bag chags dang rten dbang po'i gzugs so*) D.3b7f; P.4a8f; T.30.580a4f, 1019b1f.

¹⁸¹ 1.b) A.2. *de la phyi rol gyi snod rnam pa yongs su ma bcud pa num par rig pa ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa nang gi len pa'i dmigs pa gang yin pa de nyid la bren nas / rtag tu rgyun mi 'chad par 'jig rten dang snod kyi rgyun rnam par rig pa ste / D.4a1f; P.4b1f; T.30.580a7f, 1010b4f.*

¹⁸² 1.b) A.3. "Thus, one should know that the way the *ālayavijñāna* [occurs] in regard to the object of inner appropriation and the external object is similar to a burning flame which occurs inwardly while it emits light outwardly on the basis of the wick and oil." *'di lta ste / dper na mar me 'bar ba ni snying po dang snum gyi rgyus ni nang*

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du 'jug par 'gyur la / phyi rol du ni 'od 'byung bar byed pa bzhin du nang gi len pa'i dmigs pa dang / phyi rol gyi dmigs pa 'di la yang kun gzhi nram par shes pa'i tshul de dang 'dra bar lta bar bya'o // D.4a2f; P.4b2f; T.30.580a9f, 1019b5f.

¹⁸³ We shall remember that "upādāna" also means "fuel, supply, substratum by means of which an active process is kept alive or going." PED: 149. See note 25, above.

¹⁸⁴ 1.b) B.1. "Because it is difficult to discern (*duṣpariccheda*) even by the wise ones of the world, the object [of the *ālayavijñāna*] is subtle (*sūkṣma*)."
(*dmigs pa de ni 'jig ren gyi mkhas pa mams kyis kyang yongs su gcad par dga' ba'i phyir phra ba yin no*). D.4a3f; P.4b3f; T.30.580a13f, 1019b7f.

¹⁸⁵ a.b) A. "What is establishing the arising [of the *ālayavijñāna*] by association (*samprayoga-pravṛtti-vyavasthāna*)? This means that the *ālayavijñāna* is associated by association with the five omnipresent factors conjoined to mind (*citta-samprayukta-sarvatraga*): attention (*manaskāra*), sense-impression (*sparśa*), feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), and volitional impulse (*ceṭanā*). (B) These *dharma*s then are (1) included within [the category of] resultant states (*vipūka*); (2) are subtle (*sūkṣma*) because they are hard to perceive (*durvijñānatva*) even for the wise ones in the world; (3) are always functioning in the same manner regarding a single object (*ekāḷambana*). Moreover, among those mental factors (*caitta*) the feeling (*vedanā*) which is associated with the *ālayavijñāna* is: (4) neither exclusively pain or pleasure (*aduḥkhāsukha*); (5) and is [karmically] indeterminate (*avyākṛta*). The other mental factors (*caitta-dharma*) are also explained in just this way." (2.a) *de la mshungs par ldan pas 'jug pa nram par gzhag pa gang zhe na / (2.b) A.* 'di la kun gzhi nram par shes pa mshungs par ldan pas na sems dang mshungs par ldan pa kun tu 'gro ba lnga po yid la byed pa dang / reg pa dang / tshor ba dang / 'du shes dang / sems pa nram dang mshungs par ldan no // (B) *chos de dag kyang (1) nram par smin par bsdus pa dang / (2) 'jig ren gyi mkhas pa mams kyis kyang rtogs par dka' ba'i phyir phra ba dang / (3) gian du dmigs pa gcig la mshungs par 'jug pa yin no // sems las byung ba de dag las kyang kun gzhi nram par shes pa dang mshungs par ldan pa'i tshor ba gang yin pa de ni (4) gcig tu sdug bsngal yang ma yin bde ba yang ma yin pa dang / (5) lung du ma bstan pa yin no // de nyid kyis de las gzhan pa'i sems las byung ba'i chos mams kyang nram par bshad pa yin no // *P.; D. omits 'pa'i.' D.4b2f; P.5a5f; T.30.580a29f, 1019b16f. See also the treatment of this in TBh 19.3, note # 225 below.*

¹⁸⁶ 4.b) A.3. "the *ālayavijñāna* also occurs sometimes intermingled with the feelings of suffering (*duḥkha*), pleasure (*sukha*), and neither pain nor pleasure (*aduḥkhāsukha*), because, depending on the arising cognitions, [the *ālayavijñāna*] occurs depending on whatever feeling they are. Of these, amongst human beings, the gods of the Desire Realm, animals and some of the hungry ghosts, the stream of those feelings (*vedanā-santāna*) of the arising cognitions, either suffering, pleasure, or neither suffering nor pleasure, simultaneously occurs and functions intermingled with the innate (*sahaja*) feeling [of the *ālayavijñāna*], which is neither suffering nor pleasure. . . ." 4.b) A.4. "Sometimes the *ālayavijñāna* occurs simultaneously with wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminate mental factors (*cattasika-dharma*) which belong to the arising cognitions." 4.b) A.3. *kun gzhi nram par shes pa de yang res 'ga' ni bde ba dang / sdug bsngal ba dang / sdug bsngal yang ma yin bde ba yang ma yin pa'i tshor ba mams dang 'dren mar 'jug ste / 'jug pa'i nram par shes pa la bsten nas / tshor ba gang dag yin pa de dag de la bsten nas 'byung ba'i phyir ro // de la mi mams dang 'dod pa na spyod pa'i lha nrams dang / dud 'gro dang / yi dwags kha cig gi nang na ni lhan cig skyes pa'i*

ishor ba sdug bsngal yang ma yin bde ba yang na yin pa de dang / 'jug pa'i nram par shes pa'i tshogs kyi tshor ba bde ba'am / sdug bsngal ba'am / sdug bsngal yang ma yin / bde ba yang ma yin pa de dag gi rgyun 'dren mar lhan cig tu 'byung zhing 'jug go // . . . (4.b) A.4) kun gzhi nram par shes pa res 'ga' ni 'jug pa'i nram par shes par glogs pa'i sems las byung ba'i chos dge ba dang mi dge ba dang / lung du ma bstan pa mams dang lhan cig 'byung zhing 'jug ste / *P.; D. reverses the order: "bde ba yang ma yin / sdug bsngal yang ma yin." D.5b6f; P.6b5f; T.30.580c14f, 1019c17.*

¹⁸⁷ 4.b) B.1. *de liar na kun gzhi nram par shes pa ni 'jug pa'i nram par shes pa nram dang yang lhan cig 'byung zhing 'jug go // glo bur gyi tshor ba mams dang / glo bur gyi chos dge ba dang / mi dge ba dang / lung du ma bstan pa mams dang yang lhan cig 'byung zhing 'jug ste / de ni de dag dang mshungs par ldan pa yin par ni mi brjod do // de ci'i phyir zhe na / dmigs pa mi mshungs pa la 'jug pa'i phyir te / D6a4f; P.7a4f; T.30.580c26f, 1019c24.*

¹⁸⁸ The *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, paras. 38—9, explicitly defends the idea of two distinct types of mental stream within a single individual on the grounds that the two occur inseparably as cause and effect and because the stream of the resultant consciousness (*vipāka-vijñāna*) is infused (*paribhāvita*) by the arising cognitions. (*de gnyis ni rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po dang tha dad pa ma yin par 'jug pa nyid kyi phyir dang / nram par smin pa'i nram par shes pa'i rgyud la cig shos kyis kyang yongs su sgo bar byed pa'i phyir ro /*)

¹⁸⁹ We shall remember that the *bhavaṅga-citta* of the *Theravādins* is a neutral, resultant state and therefore capable of conditioning the occurrence of *dharma*s of all natures. See note 123 above.

¹⁹⁰ The following applies to the *Yogācāra* model of mind as well: "Just because they have different names does not mean that they are separate entities. The names, id, ego and superego, actually signify nothing in themselves, they are merely a shorthand way of designating different processes, functions, mechanisms, and dynamisms within the total personality." Hall, C., *A Primer of Freudian Psychology* (1961: 34f).

¹⁹¹ 1.b) B.2. *dmigs pa de ni rag tu yod pa yin te / lan 'ga' gzhun du 'gyur la / lan 'ga' gzhun du 'gyur ba ma yin no // 'on kyang dang po pa'i len pa'i skad cig la bsten nas / ji srid 'tsho'i bar du nram par rig pa* ro gcig pas 'jug par 'gyur ro // (3) kun gzhi nram par shes pa de ni dmigs pa la skad cig pa yin par blta bar bya ste / skad cig pa'i rgyun gyi rgyud kyis 'jug pa yin gyi / gcig pa nyid ni ma yin no // *P.; D. reads 'shes par rig'. D.4a4f; P.4b5f; T.30.580a15f, 1019b8f.*

¹⁹² *AKBh ad II 53Z: anyonyaphalārthena sahabhūhetuḥ. Vyākhyā* (Shastri ed. 307): *cittaṃ caittasya phalam, caitto 'pi cūttasya ity anyonyaphalam iti tena arthena sahabhūhetuḥ*. See note 56, above. The *Sautrāntikas* also considered body and mind interdependent. The *ASBh* also states that the concomitant cause is the necessary concomitance of anything, specifically of the *citta* and *caitta*, which cannot exist separately. (*ASBh* 37.6f: *sahāyanaiyam yena sahabhūhetur vyavasthāpitaḥ / bhūtāni bhautikam ca ity udāharanāmātram etad veditavyam, cūttacūttasikānām anyonyam avinābhāva niyamāt /*)

¹⁹³ 3.b) A.2. *de la ren byed pa ni kun gzhi nram par shes pas zin pa'i dbang po gzugs can mams la bsten nas / nram par shes pa'i tshogs lnga po dag 'byung bar 'gyur gyi ma zin pa dag las ni ma yin no // nram par shes pa'i tshogs lnga po dag gi gnas mig la sog pa dang 'dra ba yid dang yid kyi nram par shes pa'i gnas kun gzhi nram par shes pa yod na / yid dang yid kyi nram par shes pa yang 'byung bar 'gyur gyi med na ni ma yin*

no // D.5a1f; P.5b4f; T.30.580b12f, 1019b26. This is in some contradiction with MSg I.7a.2) which states that the *klišṭa-manas* is the simultaneous support (*sahabhū-āśraya*) of the *mano-vijñāna*.

¹⁹⁴ ASBh 11.9: "Increasing [or "fattening"] their seeds when the aggregates, etc. are present is called "impression." (*skandhādinām samudācāre tadbijaparipuṣṭir vāsānā iti ucyate*.)

¹⁹⁵ 3.b) b. de la 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa ni rnam pa gnyis kyi kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i rkyen gyi bya ba byed de / tshe 'di la sa bon yongs su brtas par byed pa dang / tshe phyi ma la de mngon par 'grub pa'i sa bon yongs su 'dzin pa skyed par byed pas so // (B.1.) de la tshe 'di la sa bon yongs su brtas par byed pa ni / ji lta ji ltar kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la brten pa 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa dge ba dang / mi dge ba dang / lung du ma bstan pa 'byung bar 'gyur ba de lta de ltar rang gi rten la rten de dang lhan cig skye ba dang 'gag pas bag chags sgo bar byed do // rgyu de dang rkyen des na 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa rnam kyang phyir zhing phyir zhing dge ba la sogs pa'i dngos pos shin tu brtas pa dang / shin tu sbyungs pa dang / shin tu 'od gsal ba dag tu 'byung bar 'gyur ro // (B.2.) de'i bag chags kyi rigs gzhan ni phyi ma la kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de dag nyid kyi rnam par smin pa yongs su 'dzin pa'i phyir 'jug par 'gyur ro // D.5a3f; P.5b7; T.30.580b17f, 1019b27f.

¹⁹⁶ Except for the explicit idea of rebirth, there is nothing unusual or mysterious about this process, nor even necessarily profound. Character traits, dispositions, memory, mental and physical skills, etc. (not to mention the stages of normal growth and development) are all processes of acquisition and learning that develop over extended periods of time, building up a repertoire of subroutines which exercise those very skills and dispositions, and form the basis upon which further skills and habits are practiced and acquired. And all of these subsist, moreover, relatively independently of, though continually conditioned by, the moment to moment processes of conscious perception. Merleau-Ponty (*The Structure of Behavior*: 13, as quoted in Varela, 1991: 174) puts it in much the same fashion.

Since all the movements of the organism are always conditioned by external influences, one can, if one wishes, readily treat behavior as an effect of the milieu. But in the same way, since all the stimulations which the organism receives have in turn been possible only by its preceding movements which have culminated in exposing the receptor organ to external influences, one could also say the behavior is the first cause of all the stimulations.

¹⁹⁷ 4.b) A.1.(a). kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni (a) res 'ga' ni 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa gcig kho na dang lhan gcig tu 'jug ste / 'di lta ste yid dang ngo // 'di ltar ngar 'dzin pa dang / nga'o snyam pa'i nga rgyal dang / rlom pa'i rnam pa can gyi yid gang yin pa de ni sems yod pa dang / sems med pa'i gnas skabs dag na yang dus rtag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang lhan cig 'byung zhing 'jug ste / de ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la nga'o snyam pa dang / bdag go snyam du dmigs shing rlom pa'i rnam pa can yin no // D.5a7f; P.6a5f; T.30.580b29f, 1019c6f.

¹⁹⁸ 4.b)B.4. gang sngar bstan pa'i yid gang yin pa de ni dus rtag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang lhan cig 'byung zhing 'jug ste / de ni yang dag par ma bcom gyi bar du dus rtag pa kho nar lhan cig skyes pa'i rang bzhin 'dra ba'i kun nas nyon mongs pa rnam pa bzhi po 'jig tshogs la lta ba'i kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / nga's snyam pa'i nga rgyal gyi kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / bdag lu chags pa'i kun nas nyon mongs pa

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dang / ma rig pa'i kun nas nyon mongs pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa yin par blta bar bya'o // kun nas nyon mongs pa mam pa bzhi po de dag kyang mnyam par bzhang pa dang / mnyam par ma bzhang pa'i sa la dge ba la sogs pa dag la 'gal ba med par 'jug pa dang / bsgrigs la lung du ma bstan pa yin par blta bar bya'o // D.6b5f; P.7b7f; T.30.581a17f, 1020a8f. See Schmithausen (1987: 325, n. 357) for the "intrusive" character of this section.

¹⁹⁹ MSg I.7a.6 (T.31.133c19—134a1; D.4048.4a4—b1: dge ba dang dang mi dge ba dang lung du ma bstan pa'i sems rnam la yang ngar 'dzin pa dus thams cad du kun tu 'byung bar dmigs pa'i yang phyir ro // gzhan du na ni mi dge ba'i sems kho no dang de mtshungs par ldan pas nga's snyam pa'i nyon mongs pa kun tu 'byung gi / dge ba dang lung du ma bstan pa dag la ni ma yin no // de'i phyir lhan cig 'byung bar kun tu 'byung ba dang / mtshung par ldan par < ma yin par > kun tu 'byung bas skyon 'di dag tu mi 'gyur ro /). This emendation, < ma yin par >, follows Lamotte (MSg-L: 21) based upon the three Chinese translations.

²⁰⁰ Bh 326a2—3; bh: 151b1f: (ji ltar sbyin ba la sogs pa dge ba'i sems 'byung bar 'gyur / de dang mtshungs par ldan pa las te). This passage actually comments on ignorance unaccompanied by other afflictions (*avidyā-āvenekī*), but the point still applies since it too "always obstructs the *citta* which attends the true object and is present at all times" (MSg I.7b: yang dag don la 'jug pa yi // sems kyi bgegs su rtag gyur dang / dus rnam kun tu 'byung ba de // ma 'dres pa yi ma rig 'dod).

The second major commentary to the MSg, the *Upanibandhana*, also comments on the ubiquity of self-grasping: "Wholesome states, too, are endowed with self-grasping, because one thinks 'I am practicing giving'. Self-grasping does not occur without ignorance. Since ignorance is a mental factor (*caitta*) too, it does not occur without a support (*āśraya*). But there is no other support except the afflictive mentation (*klišṭa-manas*). A wholesome *citta* cannot be the support of ignorance." (U 384c24—28; u 242b8—243a3: dge ba'i gnas skabs ni sbyin pa la sogs pa la ngar 'dzin pa dang ldan te / nga sbyin pa byed do snyam du ngar sems pa'i phyir ro / ngar 'dzin pa dang ldan pa ni ma rig pa med na mi 'byung ngo // ma rig pa yang sems las byung ba yin bas gnas med par mi 'byung ste / nyon mongs pa can gyi yid ma gtogs par gnas gzhan med do // dge ba'i sems ni ma rig pa'i gnus su mi rung ngo /)

²⁰¹ Similar ideas, as discussed above, are found in S III 29 where a subtle remnant (*anusahagata*) of the conceit and latent disposition to "I am" remains even in advanced disciples. *AKBh* V 19 (note 84, above) describes an innate and indeterminate view of self-existence both in the Desire Realm and in birds and beasts, in contrast to that which is deliberated and thus unwholesome.

Similar ideas are found in *Yogācāra* literature. "The innate (*sahaja*) view of self-existence (*satkāyadrsti*) in the Desire Realm is indeterminate, because it always occurs again and again and because it is not a support for harm to self or to others. That which is attachment through deliberation, however, is unwholesome." (Y Tib. Derge #4038, Shi 110b3—4: 'dod pa na sbyod pa'i 'jig tshogs la la ba lhan cig skyes pa gang yin pa de ni lung du ma bstan pa yin te / yang dang yang kun tu 'byung ba'i phyir dang / bdag dang gzhan la shin tu gnod pa'i gnas na ma yin pa'i phyir ro / rtag pas mngon par zhen pa gang yin pa de ni mi dge ba yin no /) The corresponding Chinese for this passage also mentions that birds and animals have this innate view of self-existence, in contrast to that which is deliberate. Y Ch. T.30.621c7. Schmithausen (1987: 440, n. 931).

²⁰² The ASBh states that the view of self-existence is also present even in Aryans and

Disciples who have reached the Path of Seeing (*ASBh* 62.3ff: *yām adhiṣṭāya utpanna darśanamārgasya api āryasrāvākasya asmimānaḥ samudācarati*). Cf. *Pravṛtti Portion*, 4.b) B.4, cited above.

The *Upanibandhana* asks where the latent afflictions which are to be eliminated by the path of cultivation would reside, if there were no *ālayavijñāna*, when the manifest afflictions are suppressed by one who has engendered the counteractant (*kleśa-pratipakṣa-vijñāna*) to them upon gaining the fruit of a stream-winner at the first moment in the Path of Seeing (*darśana-marga*), especially considering that they are in contradiction with the *pratipakṣa*, the counteracting mind. (U 391c26–29; u 256b3–5: *gal te kun gzhi nram par shes pa med na gang gyi tshe thog ma nyid du rkyun du zhugs pa'i 'bras bu la 'jug pa la mihong pas spang bar bya ba'i nyon mongs pa'i gnyen bo la ma skyes pa de'i tshe 'jig rten pa'i shes pa thams cad ni 'gags na bsgom pas spang bar bya ba'i nyon mongs pa'i bag la nyal gang du gnas par 'gyur / gnyen bo nyid mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi sa bon dang 'brel par ni mi rung /*)

²⁰³ MSg I.7a.4) “[If afflictive mentation did not exist] there would also be the fault that there would be no distinction between the absorptions of non-appreception (*asamjñi-samāpatti*) and of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), because one who is in the absorption of non-appreception is characterized by afflictive mentation while one who is entered into the absorption of cessation is not. Otherwise these two would not be distinguished.” (Tib: *nyon mongs pa can gyi yid de . . . med du zin na' du shes med pa dang / 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa bye brag med pa'i skyon du yang 'gyur te / 'di ltar 'du shes med pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa ni nyon mongs pa can gyi yid kyiis rab tu phyé ba yin gyis / 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa ni ma yin te / gzhan du na 'di gnyis bye brag med pa nyid du 'gyur ro /*) The commentary (U 384c4) states that it is the presence of afflictive mentation within the mental stream that differentiates an ordinary worlding from an Arya. Cf. *AKBh ad II 44d* (Poussin, 210; Shastri, 244): *evam enayoh samāpattyor . . . viśeṣaḥ . . . santiānato 'pi, pṛtagjanāryasantiānatvāt.*)

²⁰⁴ MSg I.8a.5) *gal te 'du shes med pa pa de na ngar 'dzin pa dang / nga'o snyam pa'i nga rgyal med na 'du shes med par skye ba thog thag tu nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa'i skyon du yang 'gyur ro /* Vasubandhu's commentary (Bh 326b7–11; Lamotte, 1935: 194) elaborates: “If there were no *kleśa-manas*, then it properly follows that there would be no self-grasping (*ātmagrāha*) amongst beings belonging to [the realm of] non-appreception (*āsamjñika*); [they] would no [longer] be ordinary worldings (*prthagjana*), [that is, they would be Aryans] and their mental stream (*santiāna*) would be temporarily free of self-grasping.”

The *Pravṛtti Portion*, I.4.b) A.1.(a), mentioned *manas* in connection with the absorption of cessation, stating that the *manas* “always occurs and functions with the *ālayavijñāna* in conscious states (*acittaka*).” See Schmithausen (1987: 481, n. 1232). ²⁰⁵ MSg I.19. The *Madhyāntavibhāṅgikā*, by *Stīramaitī*, calls these the *pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa* and the *samkleśa-lakṣaṇa*, respectively, viz. the momentary, simultaneous causality, such as pertains between the *ālayavijñāna* and the functioning cognitions, and the temporal, sequential causality, as depicted in the twelve-member formula. *ad MV* I.9–11. D. # 4032. 205a2f: *'dir ni skad cig brgyud mar 'jug pa 'jug pa'i tshan nyid du bshad ba'o // tshe rabs bzhan du 'jug pa'i jug pa ni kun nas nyon mongs pa'i mshan nyid du 'og nas 'chad do / . . . gcig ni rkyen gyi nram par shes / . . . kun gzhi nram par shes pa ste / nram par shes pa lhag ma bdun nams kyi rgyu'i rkyen gyi dangos pa'i rgyu yin pas rkyen gyi nram par shes pa'o* As cited in MSg-N, 149f.

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The *AKBh ad III 24d* discusses dependent origination as both momentary (*ksanikah*) and relating to the twelve members as distinct temporal states (*āvasthikah*). ²⁰⁶ The *Upanibandhana* relates these two types of dependent origination. The *ālayavijñāna* corresponds to the first, because it differentiates the nature of all defiled *dharmas* which are originated, while the second is the traditional twelve-limbed formula, ignorance, etc. which distinguishes the destinies through being the principle condition (*pradhāna-pratyaya*); this is because when the *samskāras*, etc. arise from the *ālayavijñāna*, they differ as to being meritorious, non-meritorious, or neutral because of ignorance, etc. (U 388c3–8; u 250b5–8: *kun gzhi nram par shes pas kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos kyi rang bzhin skye ba can thams cad nram bar 'byed par byed pa'i phyir ro / . . . lus sna tshogs 'grub pa la gso bo'i rkyen gyis rab tu phyé ba'i ma rig pa la sogs pa'i yan lag bcu gnyis te / kun gzhi nram par shes pa las 'du byed la sogs pa 'byung ba na ma rig pa la sogs pa'i dbang gis bsod nams dang / bsod nams ma yin pa dang / mi gyo ba tha daa pa'i phyir ro /*)

²⁰⁷ MSg I.27 explains that “these two cognitions (*vijñāna*) are mutually conditions of each other . . . through being always mutually the fruit and cause of each other.” (T.31.135b13–16; D.4048.7b5f: *nram par shes pa de gnyis ni gcig gi rkyen gcig yin te / . . . phan tshun 'bras bu'i dngos po dang / rgyu yi dngos por rtag tu sbyor*). MSg I.28: “In the first Dependent Co-arising these two cognitions are mutually causal conditions (*hetu-pratyaya*) of each other.” (T.31.135b17; D.4048.7b6f: *nten cing 'brel par 'byung ba dang po la nram par shes pa dag phan tshun du rgyu'i rkyen yin*). Hsüan Tsang's Chinese (T.31.135b17) explicitly states “two *vijñānas*,” while the Tib. indicates only the plural: “*nram par shes pa dag*.”

²⁰⁸ MSg I.33. U 392a12–16; u 257a2–5; *'du byed kyi rkyen gyis nram par shes pa mi rung ba'i phyir ro // zhes bya ba ni 'jug pa'i nram par shes pa nams la las kyi kun nas nyon mongs ba mi srid bar ston to / kun gzhi nram par shes pa med na (Der. 209b3) mig la sogs pa'i nram par shes pa 'dod chags la sogs pa dang lhan cig skyes pa 'du byed kyi rkyen las byung par 'dod na de yang mi rung ste / nram par shes pa'i rkyen gyis ming dang gzugs zhes 'byung ba'i phyir ro // mig la sogs pa'i nram par shes pa ni skad cig gyis 'jig pa'i tshul can yin pas 'gags nas yun ring ba'i phyir ming dang gzugs kyi rkyen du mi rung ste / nyes pa mang du 'gyur ro /*

²⁰⁹ *MVBh*, ad I. 10, states that the *samskāra* place the *karma-vāsanā* within the *vijñāna* (*samskārair vijñāna karma-vāsanāyāḥ pratistānāt*). The passages in *Yogācāra* texts which describe the *ālayavijñāna* as conditioned by the *samskāra* are legion: for example, in the *Proof Portion*, Proof # I.a., note 165, above.

²¹⁰ MSg I.33. The *Bhāṣya* states that this is because in the case of the *vijñāna* which is infused by *samskāras*, it is by the force of attachment or appropriation (*upādāna-bala*), that the predispositions (*vāsanā*) increase and existence arises. Bh 331b24–27; bh 159a4f: *len pa'i rkyen gyis srid pa yang mi rung ste / gang gi phyir 'du byed kyi yongs su bsgos pa'i nram par she pa len pa'i dbang gyis bag chags rgyas pas srid pa 'byung bas so /*

²¹¹ U393a29–b9; u 259b2–7: *de la ming ni gzugs can ma yin pa'i phung bo bzhi'o // gzugs ni nur nur bo'o // 'di gnyis kyi rkyen nram par shes pa gang yin pa skad cig gcig nas gcig du brgyud de gnas nyid du gyur ba de yang kun gzhi nram par shes pa las gzhan ma yin no // ming smos pas ni 'jug pa'i nram par shes pa bzung na nram par shes pa smos pas ci zhig gts'o bor bstan par bgyur /*

²¹² Schmithausen (1987: 169–177, ns. 1075–1145) discusses this “doubling” of

vijñāna and dismisses it as compelling reason for introducing a new type of *vijñāna* called "ālaya," since the *ālayavijñāna* is not mentioned in this context in earlier discussions on dependent origination in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and is not found problematical by other contemporary writers.

²¹³ The *Bhāṣya* further correlates the other non-material *āhāras* with the basic dimensions of mind within the *Yogācāra* scheme: the sensation-sustenance (*sparsāhāra*) with the six cognitive modes, and the sustenance which consists of mental volitions or motivational impulses (*manaḥsamcetanāhāra*) with mentation (*manas*). (Bh 332b14–20; bh 160b2–6: *mam par shes pa'i zas ni nye bar len ba dang ldan ba na ste / gang gis de blangs pa nyid kyis rten gnas pa ste / de las gzhan du na shi ba'i ro bzhin du rul bar 'gyur ro // de lta bas na rten la phan 'dogs par byed pa'i phyir rnam par shes pa'i zas nyid ni kha blang bar bya'o // de la reg pa'i zas ni rnam par shes pa'i tshogs drug gang yin ba'i'o / yid la sems ba'i zas ni yid kyis bsams pa'i'o // gzhan ba rnam par shes pa'i zas nyid du bstan pa gang yin ba ni sems med pa'i gnyid dang / brgyal ba dang / 'gog pa la snyoms par zhugs pa na rnam par shes pa drug ni 'gags par gyur na / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa med na lus blangs pa ni 'drul bar byed pa gzhan gang yin /*)

²¹⁴ MSg I.11b. *dge 'dun phal chen sde'i lung las kyang rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa zhes 'byung ste / rnam grangs des kyang de nyid bstan te / rtsa ba de la brien pa'i shing ljon pa bzhin no / (11.c) sa ston gyi sde'i lung las kyang 'khor ba ji srid pa'i phung po mams zhes 'byung ste / rnam grangs des kyang de nyid bstan te / la lar res 'ga' gzugs dang sems rgyun chad par snang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la de'i sa bon ni rgyun mi 'chad pa'i phyir ro / (11.d) 'phags pa gnas brian pa rnam kyil lung las kyang / srid pa'i yan lag lta ba dang / shes pa dang ni gtod pa dang / gyo ba dang ni rtogs pa dang / bdun pa 'jug par byed pa yi / zhes 'byung ngo / (12) de'i phyir gang shes bya'i gnas la len pa'i rnam par shes pa nyid dang / sems nyid dang / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa nyid dang / rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa nyid dang / 'khor ba ji srid pa'i phung po dang / srid pa'i yan lag tu bstan pa de ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ste / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i lam chen po btod pa kho na yin no /*

²¹⁵ MSg I.31.* "And secondary afflictions" in Ch. (T.31.135c19) only. (*nyon mongs pa'i ngyen po'i rnam par shes pa byung na de ma yin pa gzhan 'jig rten pa'i rnam par shes pa thams cad ni 'gags na / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa med par ngyen po'i rnam par shes pa de ni nyon mongs pa dang nye ba'i nyon mongs pa'i sa bon dang bcas par mi rung ste / ngo bo nyid kyis rnam par grol ba dang nyon mongs pa rnam dang lhan cig 'byung ba dang 'gags pa med pa'i phyir ro // kun gzhi rnam par shes pa med na / de'i 'og tu yang 'jig rten pa'i rnam par shes pa 'byung ba na bag chags de gnas dang bcas te 'das nas yun ring ste / med pa'i phyir sa bon med pa las skye bar 'gyur ro /*)

²¹⁶ MSg I.40. U 393c11–16; u 260b1–4: *de nyid na zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni gzugs med pa mams su 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems zag ba med pa de mngon du byed de de skyes ba na gang zag pa med pa de las gzhan pa'i sems 'jig rten pa 'byung ba de med par 'gyur te / 'gags pa na 'gro bas bsdus pa'i rnam par smin pa med pas 'gro ba de ldog pa nyid du 'gyur te / gnyen po mngon (D.212b3 and Ch.) sum du gyur na mi mthun pa'i phyogs thams cad spangs pa'i phyir sgrim mi dgos par phung po'i lthag ma med pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa thob par 'gyur ro /*

²¹⁷ MSg I.48. "Inasmuch as the weak, medium and strong [impression from having heard the *Dharma*] gradually increase (*vardhate*), so much does the resultant consciousness (*vipāka-vijñāna*) diminish and the basis is revolved (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*). When the basis is revolved in all aspects the resultant consciousness which possesses

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all the seeds (*sarvabijaka-vipākavijñāna*) also becomes without seeds and is also eliminated in all aspects." (T.31.136c24f; D.4048.1a4: *chung ngu dang 'bring po dang chen po ji lta ji lta bur rim gyis 'phel ba de lta de lta bur rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa yang 'bri zhin gnas kyang 'gyur ro // gnas rnam pa thams cad du gyur na rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa sa bon thams cad pa yang sa bon med par gyur pa dang rnam pa thams cad du spangs pa yang yin no*). MSg I.49. "When one is freed from the mundane passions (*laukikavitarāga*), the impressions of the unconcentrated stages (*asamāhitabhūmika-vāsanā*) gradually diminish, the impressions of the concentrated stages (*samāhitabhūmika-vāsanā*) gradually increase and the basis is revolved (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*)." ('*jig rten pa'i dod chags dang bral ba na / mnyam par bzhas pa ma yin pa'i sa'i bag chags 'grib ste / mnyam par bzhas pa'i sa'i bag chags 'phel nas gnas gyur pa bzhin no /*)

²¹⁸ Schmithausen (1987: 184): "from the historical point of view, scepticism seems to be justified as a matter of principle."

²¹⁹ A more extended interpretation of the *ālayavijñāna* in comparison with modern psychology has been attempted by this author elsewhere and so will not be discussed further here. (See the Waldron 1988, A Comparison of the *Ālayavijñāna* with Freud's and Jung's Theories of the Unconscious. *Annual Memoirs of the Otani University Shin Buddhist Comprehensive Research Institute*, 6: 109–150.)

²²⁰ There is a long passage describing the process of rebirth in the *Yogācārabhūmi* in which the resultant *ālayavijñāna* which possesses all the seeds is portrayed as merging with the newly congealed egg and sperm and, being thus established in the body, brings about actual reconnection of birth. (24, 1–10: *yatra tat sarvabijakam vipāka-samgrhītam āśrayōpādāt ālayavijñānam sammūrcchati . . . tasyām ca avasthāyām pratīṣṭhitam vijñānam baddhaḥ pratisandhir ity ucyate*). Schmithausen (1987: 127f). MSg I.34 argues that it must be the *ālayavijñāna* and not a mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) that coagulates in the womb, carrying with it all the seeds.

²²¹ *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, para. 34; MSg I.5. "the five material sense-faculties are appropriated by this [cognition] without perishing for as long as life continues." (T.31.133c1f; D.4048.3b4: *tsho ji srid par rjes su 'jug gi bar du des dbang po gzugs can lnga po dag ma zhis par nye bar gzung pa*). MSg I.35: no *vijñāna* other than the resultant *vijñāna* (*vipāka-vijñāna*, i.e. *ālayavijñāna*) can appropriate the material sense-faculties, because the other cognitions have individual, specific bases and are not constant. (T.31.136a13f; D.9a6: *dbang po gzugs can 'dzin par byed pa yang de las gzhan mam par smin pa'i rnam par shes par mi 'thad de / de ma yin pa'i rnam par shes pa gzhan rnam ni gnas so sor nges pa dang mi brian pa'i phyir ro*).

²²² *Proof Portion*, Proof 7 on the impossibility of *nirodha-samāpatti* without the *ālayavijñāna* (ASBh: 13, 13f); MSg I.50 "because it is also taught that 'even for those in the absorption of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) consciousness does not leave the body', it is correct that it is the resultant consciousness which does not leave the body." (T.31.137a2f; D.4048.11a6f: *'gog pa la snyoms par zhugs pa rnam kyang rnam par shes pa dang mi 'bral lo zhes gsungs pa'i yang phyir de ni rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa dang / mi bral bar rigs te*); MSg I.51–54 discusses reasons that it cannot be a mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) that occurs during this absorption; *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, paras. 22–32.

²²³ *Proof Portion*, Proof 1.c.; *Pravṛtti Portion* (2.b) B.1), 3) and 4.b) A.); MSg I.32 defends the *ālayavijñāna* in the context of purification on the grounds that it allows

for the coexistence of diverse seeds and states. It is said, for example, in *MSg* I.46, that supramundane *dharmas* can co-exist with mundane *dharmas* within the *ālayavijñāna* like milk and water. *MSg* I.62 succinctly states the general principle that “being indeterminate and unobscured (*anivṛtāvākrta*) is not in contradiction with being wholesome or unwholesome, while being wholesome and unwholesome are mutually contradictory.” (T.31.137c15f; D.4048.13a1: *ma bsgribs la lung du ma bstan pa ni dge ba dang mi dge ba dang gal ba med de / dge ba dang mi dge ba ni phan tshun mi mthun no*).

Generally speaking, the *ālayavijñāna*, together with all of the seeds, facilitates the immediate succession of many kinds of diverse states, whether between those of different karmic nature, wholesome, etc., or those between different realms of existence. This is the *Yogācāra* response, built upon the *Saurāntika* notion of seeds, to the tension between heterogeneous fruition (*vipāka-phala*) and homogeneous succession (*samanantara-pratyaya*).

²²⁴ *MSg* I.14. “it is present at all times” (T.31.134b28; D.4048.6a2: *dus thams cad du nye bar gras pa yin no*).

²²⁵ *TBg* 19, 5f parallels sections of the *Pravṛtti Portion*: *ālayavijñānam dvidhā pravartate / adhyātam upādānavijñāpito bahirdhā paricchinnākāra-bhājana-vijñāptitā ca*. Also *ASBh*: 21, 9f. *TBh*: 19, 14f explains “unperceived.” The cognitive nature and functions of the *ālayavijñāna* are also outlined: *TBh*: 18, 26: “it is a cognition since it cognizes,” (*vijñāti iti vijñānam*) which has aspects and an object since (19, 3f) “there ought not to be a cognition (*vijñāna*) without an aspect or an object” (*na hi nirālam-banam nirākāram vā vijñānam yujyate*). *TBh*: 19, 5–10 (3a–b) then describes much the same objects for the *ālayavijñāna* as the *Pravṛtti Portion* does, which are also subtle and unperceived, and concludes that indeed the *ālayavijñāna* is a type of cognition (*TBh*: 19, 26: *tatra ālayākhyam vijñānam ity uktam*), since it has the requisite associated mental factors (*vijñānam ca avāśyam caittaiḥ samprayuktam ity ato vaktavyam katamaiḥ katibhiḥ ca taccaittaiḥ sadā samprayujyate*), the five omnipresent ones (*sarvatraga*), as in the *Pravṛtti Portion*. They too have a neutral feeling tone and are karmically indeterminate (*TBh*: 21, verse 4a–b: *upekṣa vedanā tatra anivṛtāvākrtaṃ ca tat*), being resultant (*vipākatvāt*). See also *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, para. 36.

²²⁶ *ASBh*: 11: *sarvabījakam cittaṃ*. *MSg* I.2. “the cognition containing all the seeds is the receptacle (*ālaya*) of all *dharmas*,” (*chos kun sa bon thams cad pa'i / nmam par shes pa jun gzhi ste /*) etc. This is probably the most common synonym of the *ālayavijñāna*.

²²⁷ This is particularly so for such texts as the *Pravṛtti Portion* in which the *ālayavijñāna* is explained in terms of its objects (*ālambana*), associated factors (*samprayukta*), its reciprocal conditionality (*anyonya-pratyayatā*) and simultaneity (*sahabhāva*) with the six momentary cognitions. *MSg* I.28 describes the relationship between the *ālayavijñāna* and the ordinary cognitive modes in terms of the causal-condition (*hetu-pratyaya*) and the predominant condition (*adhipati-pratyaya*). The *ālayavijñāna*, together with all the seeds, is the causal condition of the momentary types of mind, while the appropriate sense-organs, etc., which directly condition the momentary cognitions themselves, comprise the predominant condition, etc. See note # 207 above.

²²⁸ Thus, the *ālayavijñāna* is not merely *ad hoc*, in the sense that it does not address only the single issue for which it was initially devised (the literal meaning of “*ad*

hoc”), i.e. the continuity of mind within the absorption of cessation, if Schmithausen’s analysis is well-founded, since it also (1) addressed many of the other problems that vexed Abhidharma theory; and (2) is at the center of a systematic innovation in the theory of mind, resulting in a complete paradigm shift; and moreover, (3) it expresses a self-conscious return to, or at least rearticulation of, authoritative canonical doctrines which had become marginalized by Abhidharma doctrine. It may perhaps be just old wine in new bottles, but this too argues against a purely *ad hoc* nature, since the “dogmatical and exegetical factors” (Schmithausen, 1987: 182) leading to its articulation, in addition to appeals to empirical experience, constitute multiple and overlapping grounds for just such an innovative structure of mind, the very opposite of *ad hoc*.

²²⁹ Only from this perspective can one approach such doctrinally dense passages as that in the *ASBh*, “Fattening the seeds when the aggregates, etc. are present is called “impression” (*vāsana*). It is called “having all the seeds” (*sarvabījakam*) because it is endowed with the seeds for the arising of just those aggregates, etc. Since *dharmas* dwell (*āliyante*) there as seeds, or since beings grasp [to it] as a self, [it is called] the *ālaya-vijñāna*. Because it is formed by past action [it is] the resultant consciousness (*vipāka-vijñāna*). Because it appropriates personal existence (*ātmabhāva*) again and again during the rebirth-connection, [it is] the appropriating consciousness (*ādānavijñāna*). Furthermore, it is called mind (*citta*) since it has accumulated (**cita*) the impressions of all *dharmas*.” *ASBh* 11, 9–14 (T.31.701a26–b3; D.4053.9b4–6): *skandhādīnām samudācāre tadbijaparipustir vāsana ity ucyate. sarvabījakam teṣām eva skandhādīnām utpattibijair yuktavā. āliyante tasmīn dharmā bijataḥ, satvā vā ātmagrāhena ity ālayavijñānam. pūrvakarma nirmītarvāt vipākavijñānam. punaḥ punaḥ pratisandhibandhe ātmabhāvopādānād ādānavijñānam. tat punar etac cittaṃ ity ucyate, sarvadharmavāsana cīttatvāt*. This last **citta* is read as ‘*cita*’, ‘accumulated’ on the basis of Hsüan Tsang’s Chinese (“*chi chi*,” T.31.701b2f) and the Tibetan (*bsags pa*, D.4053.9b6).

²³⁰ The Yoga school of Patañjali also discussed various issues and concepts similar to those presented herein. None of these schools, however, fully differentiated a distinct, simultaneous and interactive type of mind on the level of complexity of the *ālayavijñāna*. See Eliade (1973: 36–46) and La Vallée Poussin (1937b) for similarities and comparisons.

As for the other, mostly minor or unfortunately insufficiently preserved schools who proposed such concepts, the *MSg* I.11 asserts the following concepts are synonyms (*pariyāya*) of the *ālayavijñāna*: the ‘root-consciousness’ (*mūlavijñāna*) of the *Mahāsāṃghikas*; the ‘*skandha* which lasts for as long as *samsāra*’ (*āsamsārika-skandha*) of the *Mahīśāsakas*; the *bhavaṅga-citta* of the *Śhāvira* (the *Theravādins*). See notes 140, 214, above; also *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, paras. 18–20, 35.

Of these, *Theravādin* Abhidhamma, as least in its commentarial stage, offers the most comparable concepts to those found affiliated with the *ālayavijñāna* complex, as we have noted above. The *bhavaṅga-citta*, though intermittent and not simultaneous with the supraliminal cognitive modes, functions as a neutral ‘buffer-state’ allowing the succession of heterogeneous elements and serving as an immediate condition for cognitive processes. There is also the *abhisankhāra-viññāna*, with the dual characteristics of cause and effect, i.e. as a constructive and a constructed type of consciousness conditioned by the *sankhāra*, whose reversal and cessation is the end of *samsāra*. It is

also used to interpret canonical passages referring to seeds, thus bearing some resemblance to the *ālayavijñāna*, although Collins (1982: 208) specifically warns that “one should not think that this construction-consciousness refers to some special type or level of consciousness which is different from the ordinary element *viññānā*. It is, rather, a means of describing that ordinary element.” These concepts, however, unlike in the *Yogācāra*, remain relatively unrelated to each other. See note 125, above.

²³¹ *Yogācārabhūmi* 61, 17 (T.30.292a1; D.4035, 31a5; P.5536.35a3): *bijam hetupratyayaḥ*; 110 (T.302a19f; D.4035.57a2f; P.5536.66b8): *bijam pratyayādhiṣṭhānam ādhiṣṭāya hetupratyayaḥ prajñāpyate*; *Yogācārabhūmi-viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (T.30.583b21f; D.4038.13b1f; P.15b5f): “What is the causal condition? The two, the material sense faculties together with their bases and *vijñāna*, are called, in short, ‘that which possesses all the seeds.’” (*de la rgyu'i rkyen gang zhe na / dbang po gzugs can rten dang bcas pa gang yin pa dang / rnam par shes pa gang yin pa 'di gnyis ni mngon nas sa bon thams cad pa zhes bya'o.*)

The *ASBh*: 35 (D.4053.26a4–6), in explaining *hetupratyaya*, states that the *ālayavijñāna* has two aspects, the resultant and the constructive. The first is the causal condition of that which has taken birth. The second should be seen as the causal condition of that which arrives through effort and of the other *ālayavijñāna* in the future. The constructive *ālayavijñāna* is, moreover, impressed (“perfumed,” *vāsita*) by the arising cognitions which are present in this life. (*ālayavijñānam punar dvididham – vaipāṅkikam ābhisamkārikam ca / tatra (a) vaipāṅkikam upapattiprātilambhikānām hetupratyayaḥ / (b) ābhisamkārikam prāyogikānām āyatām ca ālayavijñānāntarasya hetupratyayo dṛṣṭavyaḥ / ābhisamkārikam punar ālayavijñānam tajjānmika pravṛttivijñāna-samudācārāvāsitaṃ veditavyam*) This is a very similar to the dual nature of the *abhisamkhāra-viññāna* of the *Theravādin* Abhidhamma, as discussed above.

PSkPBh, P.5567.45b5: “The causal condition is the impressions which abide in the *ālayavijñāna*.” (*rgyu'i rkyen ni kun gzhi nram par shes pa la gnas pa'i bag chags te.*) Sthiramati, the author of the *PSkPBh*, after explaining the other conditions, the objective condition (*ālbana-pratyaya*), the predominate condition (*adhipati-pratyaya*), and the homogeneous antecedent condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*), comments on the traditional conditions for the occurrence of a sense-cognition, i.e. the object, an unimpaired sense-organ and appropriate attention, adding that “the causal condition is not mentioned since it always exists and is hard to discern.” (45b8: *rgyu'i rkyen riag tu gnas pa dang / shes par dka' ba'i phyir ma smos so*). This bears comparison to the *Theravādin* Abhidhamma doctrine, mentioned above (note 123, *Visuddhimagga* XV.39), that the *bhavaṅga-citta* is also one of the conditions for the arising of a cognition.

²³² *ASBh* above. *Pravṛtti Portion* (3.b) B.1). Mizuno (1978: 403) cites a passage from the *Hsien-yang-sheng-chiao-lun* (T.1602.31.481a) in which *saṃjñā* arises dependent on the seeds of the *ālayavijñāna*.

²³³ In addition to its central place in describing the seeds and perfumations within the *AKBh*, such expressions (along with *sāmarthya*) are used throughout the *Yogācāra* literature. To cite a few: (1) *MSg* I.16: “the *ālayavijñāna* which is arisen in such a way that it has the special capacity for the [defiled *dharmas*] to arise (*utpāda-śakti-viśeṣaka*) is called “having all the seeds” (*sarvabijakam*)” (*gang de 'byung ba'i mthu'i khyad par can kun gzhi nram par zhes pa de / de bzhin du 'byung ba la sa bon thams cad pa zhes hya'o*); (2) *ad MSg* I.16, u 249b1: “‘Propensity’ means ‘special power’”

(*bag chags zhes bya ba ni nus pa'i khyad par te*); (3) *ad MSg* I.16, bh 154a3f: “‘Having the special power for them to arise’ means being connected with having the special power for producing those defiled *dharmas*. ‘Having the power to produce them’ also means ‘having all the seeds’. . . . Since [the *ālayavijñāna*] has the power for producing all the *dharmas*, it is called ‘having all the seeds’” (*de 'byung ba'i mthu'i khyad par can zhes bya ba ni kun nas nyon mong pa'i chos de dag nams bskyed pa'i nus pa khyad par can gyi sbyor ba dang ldan pa ste / de bskyed ba'i nus pa dang ldan pa yang sa bon thams cad pa zhes brjod do / . . . kun gzhi nram par shes pas chos thams cad skyed pa'i nus pa yod ba'i phyir / des na nus ba dang ldan las sa bon thams cad pa zhes brjod do /*); (4) Vasubandhu defines the *ālayavijñāna* as “a consciousness having the special power (*sāmarthya* or *śakti viśeṣa*) to produce those [*dharmas*]” (*ad MSg* I.14, bh 153a5f: *de skyed pa'i nus pa'i khyad par can gyi nram par shes pa*).
²³⁴ *MSg* I.11 “All the seeds are considered to have six characteristics: [they are] momentary (*kṣanika*), simultaneous (*sahabhūka*), they continue in an uninterrupted stream (*samūhānavṛti*, or *samūhānavṛtta*), are determinate (*niyata*), require conditions (*pratyaḥpekṣa*) and are completed by their own fruit (*svaphala*).” (*sa bon nram pa drug tu 'dod / skad cig pa dang lhan cig 'byung / de ni rgyun chags 'byung bar 'dod / nges dang rkyen la ltos pa dang / rang gi 'bras bus bsgrubs pa'o /*)
²³⁵ *AKBh* IX (Poussin, 300; Shastri, 1232): *karma tadbhāvanām tasyā vṛtilābham phalam / niyamena prajānāti buddhādanyo na sarvathā //* Also, Stcherbatsky, 1976: 76. *Visuddhimagga* XIX.17: “The succession of kamma and its result . . . is clear in its true nature only to the Buddha’s Knowledge of Kamma and Its Result.” See also A II 80 and the *Milindapañhā* (*Miln.* 267; 189 in Pāli) where the fruition of kamma (*kammavipāka*) is considered incomprehensible (*acintiyā*).

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TOM J. F. TILLEMANS

DHARMAKĪRTI AND TIBETANS ON ADRŚYĀNUPALABDHIHETU*

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The project to study Buddhist epistemology by using indigenous Tibetan sources seems to have two major orientations nowadays. The first, broadly speaking, seeks to describe the long and tortuous process by which the Tibetans themselves assimilated the philosophy of Dharmakīrti. Here there is a constellation of questions, ranging from purely factual matters like the history of transmission of the *Pramānavārttika*, *Pramānaviniścaya* etc., to philological and philosophical points, such as the history of certain intra-Tibetan debates on key Dharmakīrtian notions. So long as one does not attempt to *evaluate* these Tibetan debates as to their accuracy or fruitfulness in elucidating Dharmakīrti's thought, one can treat them as purely Tibetan events, and indeed one can even quite justifiably go a long way in investigating this part of Tibetan philosophical history without preoccupying oneself very much with Dharmakīrti's actual works. The result is what one could term a purely tibetological approach.

The second orientation is evaluative in nature and does therefore presuppose an understanding of Dharmakīrti's own system: one shuttles back and forth between the indigenous Tibetan commentaries and the original Indian texts (in Sanskrit where available), seeking to use Tibetan materials to gain a deeper understanding of Dharmakīrti's own thought. The question then inevitably arises as to what kind of understanding of Dharmakīrti we can get in this manner. Here there is no one simple answer. Sometimes Tibetans do give us valuable pieces of specific historical information on the Indian debates figuring in Dharmakīrti's works, such as identifying Śvārasena as being the proponent of the *śadlakṣaṇahetu* doctrine against which Dharmakīrti repeatedly argued.¹ More frequently, however, the Tibetan contribution to our understanding of Dharmakīrti does not concern specific historical figures, facts, or events, but rather what I have termed elsewhere "internal history," and where the essential procedure is not unlike what David Seyffort Rugg, if I understand him correctly, would explain as systematical

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hermeneutics.² In short, the Tibetan commentators often attribute ideas to Dharmakīrti which are implied or presupposed by the whole system of his thought, although Dharmakīrti himself may never have subjectively entertained such ideas, or if he did, it was in a highly condensed, or even perhaps sometimes a dimly understood fashion.

Let us very briefly mention a few of the important Tibetan contributions to understanding Dharmakīrti, contributions where the Tibetans are largely proceeding by systematical hermeneutics, rather than by rigid adherence to Dharmakīrti's words.

1. The notion of *tshad ma'i skyes bu* ("person of authority") which figures in the exegesis of *Pramānavārttika* ("PV") II.³
2. The differentiation between the various types of universals (*sāmānya*), some of which should be acceptable to a Dharmakīrtian, and others of which should be totally unacceptable.⁴
3. The formulation of the so-called "reasons/inferences from authority" (*yid ches pa'i rtags; yid ches pa'i rjes dpag*). Dharmakīrti in PV I and PV IV, in keeping with Dignāga, had explained that citations from scriptures could be used for certain sorts of inferences. Tibetan commentators then speculated on just what the formal reasonings (*prayoga*) in such inferences should look like, and what degree of probative status scriptural inferences had vis-à-vis other types of inferences, a problem which led to the infamous *luñ gnod byed/luñ gegs byed* debate between Sa skya pas and dGe lugs pas over the question of whether a scripture (*luñ = āgama*) could really serve to invalidate (*gnod byed = bādhaka*) a thesis, or whether it could at most conflict with the thesis, or more literally speaking, "impede it" (*gegs byed = pratibandhaka*). Some Tibetan commentators (such as dGe 'dun grub pa [1391–1474] in his *Tshad ma rigs pa'i rgyan*), maintained that the debate had historical Indian proponents (viz. "disciples of Dignāga"), but they never actually identified these "Indian thinkers", and it seems more likely that the debate is better viewed as an important contribution to systematical hermeneutics, albeit one which was dressed up as an historical pseudo-event.⁵

In what follows we shall take up another Tibetan contribution to understanding Dharmakīrti, namely, the development of two signifi-

cantly different types of reasoning for the non-apprehension of putative states of affairs, in other words, two different types of *anupalabdhihetu* (*ma dmigs pa'i gtan tshigs*). As is well known by now, the standard account of *anupalabdhihetu* which we find in Dharmakīrti's works and those of later logicians is that the absence of a perceptible type of entity (*dr̥śya*) is proven when that entity is not apprehended: it would be apprehended if it were present in a certain spot, but in fact it is not apprehended, and thus it is absent. It is repeatedly stressed, however, that if the entity is not perceptible (*adr̥śya*), that is, if it is the type of thing, like a spirit (*piśāca*), which is not empirically accessible to ordinary beings, then merely not apprehending it does not prove its absence at all. This type of argument from non-apprehension is thus fallacious.

This much should be relatively ho-hum for any Dharmakīrtian scholar. What is not obvious at all for someone relying on only the Indian texts is that, following Tibetan exegesis on Dharmakīrti, there was a use of *adr̥śyānupalabdhi* which was fully probative. In other words, Tibetans recognized two equally valid, but different types of *anupalabdhihetu*, viz. the familiar *dr̥śyānupalabdhi* (*snañ ruñ ma dmigs pa*), non-apprehension of a perceptible thing, and a specific, well-circumscribed use of *adr̥śyānupalabdhi* (*mi snañ ba ma dmigs pa*), non-apprehension of an imperceptible thing. Dharmakīrti thus supposedly recognized a type of *adr̥śyānupalabdhihetu* which could not be assimilated to the frequently criticized fallacious use, but which actually was a valid reason for proving a certain type of negative proposition. As we shall see below, at least one modern writer, Ernst Steinkellner, recognized that Dharmakīrti sometimes spoke of inferences based on *adr̥śyānupalabdhihetu* as being means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), but for Steinkellner (or rather, to be fair, for Steinkellner in 1967 when he published his translation of the *Hetubindu*⁶), a negation of the *adr̥śyānupalabdhi* sort was only hypothetical (*hypothetisch*) and not as real (*echt*) as the usual *dr̥śya* sort. Significantly, Tibetans made no such distinction, and I believe they were probably better off in not doing so. At any rate, following the Tibetan scholastic, both sorts of valid *anupalabdhihetu* were of equal status, and led to negations and hence to inferential *pramāṇas* which were equally full-fledged and equally authoritative.

Let us now look at typical Tibetan examples of the valid sort of *adr̥śyānupalabdhihetu*. We first take up the version of Tsoñ kha pa

(1357—1419) as found in his short work on logic, *sDe bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gñer yid kyi mun sel* p. 48:

mdun gyi gzi 'dir sa za bskal don du soñ ba'i skyes bus sa za yod nes kyi tha snyad don mthun mi 'jug par sgrub pa la sa za bskal don du soñ ba'i gañ zag gis sa za ma dmigs pa bkod pa lta bu / "It is like stating [the reason] that someone for whom spirits (*sa za = piśāca*) are inaccessible entities (*bskal don = viprakṛṣṭārtha*) does not apprehend a spirit, in order to prove that a person for whom a spirit is an inaccessible entity will not apply a correct *vyavahāra* (= *tha sñad don mthun*) that a spirit is certain (*nes = niścaya*) to be present in the place in front."

This basic idea is given in the form of various *prayogas* ("formal reasoning") in dGe lugs pa *rTags rigs* texts; *prayogas* and definitions are also given, with various modifications, by Sa skya pa writers such as Go rams pa bSod nams señ ge (1429—1489), Glo bo mkhan chen bSod nams lhun grub (1456—1532) and gSer mdog Pañ chen Śākya mchog ldan (1428—1507). To avoid overly burdening the text here we shall present these variants in our notes (see n. 7). To begin our discussion, then, here is the formal reasoning given by a later scholar, Yoñis 'dzin Phur bu lcog (1825—1901), who, in his monastic textbook on *rTags rigs*, presents an elaborate dGe lugs pa version of the *prayoga*:

mdun gyi gzi 'dir chos can / sa za bskal don du soñ ba'i gañ zag gi rgyud la sa za nes pa'i dpyad śes don mthun med de / sa za bskal don du soñ ba'i gañ zag gi rgyud la sa za dmigs byed kyi tshad ma med pa'i phyir / "The topic [is] 'with regard to the place in front'. In the [mind]-stream of someone for whom a spirit is an inaccessible entity, there is no correct subsequent cognition (*dpyad śes don mthun*) ascertaining a spirit there [in front], because in the [mind]-stream of someone for whom a spirit is an inaccessible entity there is no means of valid cognition (*tshad ma = pramāṇa*) which apprehends a spirit there."⁷

This type of reasoning is classified by Phur bu lcog and others as

a *mi snañ ba'i rgyu ma dmigs pa* "non-apprehension of the cause with regard to something imperceptible." In effect, the later Tibetan schoolmen have transposed some categories which we find in the usual Dharmakīrtian classifications of *dr̥śyānupalabdhihetu* onto the rather special case of *adr̥śyānupalabdhihetu*. Thus the logical structure of the above reasoning is very similar to what *Pramāṇavārttika* I, k. 4 termed *hetvasiddhi* and what the *Vādanāyā* termed *kāraṇānupalabdhi* — in the usual example of this sort of reason one proves that there is no smoke in such and such a place because its cause, viz. fire, is not there. The point in the Tibetan example of the *adr̥śyānupalabdhihetu* is that the cause of a correct subsequent cognition (*dpyad śes*) must be a *pramāṇa*, and in the case of cognizing inaccessible entities like spirits, ordinary beings simply do not have such *pramāṇas*.

Now, the initial temptation might well be to object that anyone, Tibetan or not, who speaks positively of an *adr̥śyānupalabdhihetu* as being a valid reason like *dr̥śyānupalabdhihetu* has, *ipso facto*, understood nothing about Dharmakīrti's system. After all, didn't Dharmakīrti explicitly say in the second chapter of *Pramāṇaviniścaya* k. 32cd and *Nyāyabindu* II, 27 that "in the case of inaccessible things (*bskal pa = viprakṛṣṭa*) absence is not certain (*bskal pa mams la ni / med par nes pa yod ma yin = viprakṛṣṭeṣu . . . abhāvaniścayābhāvaḥ*)"? Here, so it would be argued, what was meant was that various existent things could be inaccessible to our perception, i.e. literally "remote" (*viprakṛṣṭa*), because of their subtle natures, or their distance from us in time or space. Such inaccessible entities would be *adr̥śya*, and indeed simply not seeing them would not give any certainty that they were non-existent. Thus, tolerating or advocating an *adr̥śyānupalabdhihetu* would run completely counter to Dharmakīrti.

I have in fact heard this objection voiced, and indeed not so long ago. But is it cogent? I don't think so. What the Tibetans are advocating as being a valid *adr̥śyānupalabdhihetu* is not at all like this fallacious use. The Tibetans in the above type of example are not seeking to establish the certainty that a thing which does not lend itself to being perceived is absent, rather they are establishing the simple absence of any certainty, or of any cognition which is certain about presence or absence of *viprakṛṣṭārtha*. In short, they accept the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*'s idea of absence being uncertain in

the case of *viprakṛṣṭārtha*, and then they go one step further: they give valid reasons to prove that there is no certainty with regard to the presences or absences of *viprakṛṣṭārtha*. It is, thus, this type of reason which is the acceptable sort of *adrśyānupalabdhi*: an *anupalabdhihetu* which, like all such reasons, proves a negative proposition, but in this case what is being negated is the existence of an ascertaining cognition.

In fact, there are some difficult passages in Dharmakīrti's second chapter of the *Pramānaviniścaya* and in the *Pramānavārttikasvavṛtti* which are probably best interpreted as supporting the Tibetans on this matter. We shall first translate these passages and then attempt to superimpose upon them the idea of an acceptable *adrśyānupalabdhihetu*, one which is as valid — no more, no less — as *drśyānupalabdhihetu*.

Pramānaviniścaya II, 23.24—23.27 (ed. Steinkellner):
bskal pa'i yul la mñon sum dan rjes su dpag pa med pa de ni yod pa'i śes pa dan sgra dan tha sñad 'gog pa'i 'bras bu can yin te / de dag ni dmigs pa sñon du 'gro ba can yin pa'i phyir ro “The fact of there being no perception or inference with regard to inaccessible objects (*bskal pa'i yul* = *viprakṛṣṭaviśaya*) results in negating cognition of, speech about and action directed towards present things, for these [three] are preceded by apprehension (*dmigs pa* = *upalabdhi*).”

Much of the rest of the *Pramānaviniścaya* passage also figures in the *Pramānavārttikasvavṛtti* ad k. 3 — the relevant Sanskrit text will be given below. First of all, however, let us cite PV I k. 3. This is the verse which Tibetan writers themselves, be they dGe lugs pa or later Sa skya pa, will take to be the main Indian source for a twofold classification of valid *anupalabdhihetu* into *adrśyānupalabdhi* (*mi snañ ba ma dmigs pa*) and *drśyānupalabdhi* (*snañ ruñ ma dmigs pa*):

*apavṛttih pramānānām apavṛttiphalā 'sati / asajjñānaphalā kācid dhetubhedavyapekṣayā //*⁸
 “Non-activation of *pramānas* results in [one's] not acting towards that which is not present. Some [non-activation], by relying on specific features of the reason, results in cognition of an absence.”

We now can present the *Svavṛtti* ad k. 3 (The words of the *kārikā* are indicated in bold script.):

*apavṛttih pramānānām anupalabdhiḥ apavṛttiphalā 'sati / sajjñānaśabdavyavahārapratīṣedhaphalā / upalabdhipūrvakatvāt teṣām iti / . . . asajjñānaphalā kācid dhetubhedavyapekṣayā / hetur anupalabdhiḥ / bhedo 'syā viśeṣaṇam upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasattvam / . . . evam anayor anupalabdhyoḥ svaviparyayahetvabhāvabhāvābhīyām sadvyavahārapratīṣedhaphalatvaṃ tulyam / ekatra saṃśayād anyatra viparyayāt / tatrādyā sadvyavahāraṇiṣedhopayogāt pramāṇam uktā / na tu vyatirekadarśanādāv upayujyate / saṃśayāt / dvitīyā tv atra pramāṇam niścayaphalatvāt / “Non-activation of *pramānas*, i.e. *anupalabdhi*, results in [one's] not acting towards that which is not present. That is to say, it results in negating cognition of, speech about and action directed towards something present, for these are preceded by apprehension (*upalabdhi*). . . . Some [non-activation], by relying on specific features of the reason, results in cognition of an absence. *Anupalabdhi* is a logical reason (*hetu*). Its specific feature is the qualifier that presence meet the conditions of [amenability to] apprehension. . . . Thus both these [types of] *anupalabdhi* are the same in their resulting in negating action (*vyavahāra*) directed towards something present, either through a lack of [valid] logical reasons for [affirming] a thing itself or through the existence of [valid] logical reasons for negating [it]. For, in the first case, there is doubt, while in the second, there is negation. The first of them is said to be a *pramāṇa* in that one uses it to negate action directed towards something present. But it does not serve to prove exclusion, etc., for doubt remains. The second, however, is a *pramāṇa* for this [proof of exclusion], for it results in certainty.”⁹*

Some remarks on the salient points of Dharmakīrti's thought as reflected in the above passage.

A. The first half of PV I k. 3 speaks of both *adrśya*- and

drśyānupalabdhihetu, but the emphasis is on the former. Thus, an *adrśyānupalabdhi* results in no cognition of presence of certain types of entities, nor can we legitimately speak of them or act on the knowledge that they are there. *Pramānaviniścaya* and the *Pramānavārttikasvavṛtti* speak of the non-existence, or non-activation (*apravṛtti*), of *pramānas* “resulting” in a negation of cognition, etc. This idiom “resulting” is not to be taken in a purely causal way, but rather in a logical sense, meaning “establishing” or “proving.” In other words, the non-existence of *pramānas* is a reason which establishes the conclusion that there is no cognition, etc. of presence. Indeed, Śākyabuddhi, in commenting on the *Svavṛtti* tō k. 3, makes it clear that we are dealing with a process of reasoning, i.e. two types of *anupalabdhihetu* which have different conclusions.¹⁰

Pramānavārttikaṭīkā D. 13a7:

yod pa dgag pa'i gtan tshigs ni bltar mi ruñ ba mi dmigs pa'o (/) med pa sgrub pa'i gtan tshigs ni dmigs pa'i mtshan ñid kyi gyur ba mi dmigs pa'o / “The logical reason which negates presence is [one by] *adrśyānupalabdhi* (*bltar mi ruñ ba mi dmigs pa*). The logical reason proving absence is that of *anupalabdhi* of what has the character of being apprehendable (*dmigs pa'i mtshan ñid kyi gyur ba = upalabdhi lakṣaṇa*.)”

B. Only some kinds of *anupalabdhi*, namely *drśyānupalabdhi*, lead to a certainty that an object is absent, but nonetheless, both *adrśya-* and *drśyānupalabdhi* are to be classified as *pramānas*. This fact that both are *pramānas* is clearly brought out in the latter part of the *Svavṛtti* passage, and I think that we have to take the passage as meaning that both are equally full-fledged *pramānas*. Let me take this up by examining a modern *pūrvapakṣa* in some detail.

Ernst Steinkellner, in a long note to his 1967 translation of the *Hetubindu*, had discussed the passage in the *Svavṛtti* and had concluded that the negation spoken about in connection with *adrśyānupalabdhi* was only “hypothetical” (*hypothetisch*), and that it was *drśyānupalabdhi* which would have the status of a full-fledged and real (*echt*) negation.¹¹ The result, according to Professor Steinkellner, was as follows: “Since by means of this

non-apprehension one does not obtain any certain knowledge, Dharmakīrti also concedes that we should not regard it to be a *pramāna*.”¹² According to Steinkellner’s reading of Dharmakīrti, it was supposedly only *drśyānupalabdhi* which would elicit certainty (*niścaya*) and which would definitively prove of some putative entity that “it is not there,” or in other words, “It is not present” (*Es ist nicht; Es ist nicht vorhanden*). The former type, viz. *adrśyānupalabdhi*, would lead to doubt about some entity’s absence and could only prove at most that “it is not so that it is there” (*Es ist nicht, dass es ist*). I think that the point is best interpreted somewhat differently. In what follows I will try to present my reasons.

First of all, a “hypothetical” negation, or what is worse, a “hypothetical” or somehow inferior type of *pramāna*, is an extremely puzzling notion, and we would be better off if we could avoid burdening Dharmakīrti’s system with something that we can hardly understand. Thus, our interpretation obviously would make considerable gains in simplicity and elegance if we could do as the Tibetans and speak of both the *adrśyānupalabdhi* and the *drśyānupalabdhi* mentioned in k. 3 as being equally full-fledged inferential *pramānas* involving equally full-fledged real negations.

Secondly, from a logical point of view, can we, or could Dharmakīrti, reasonably make a difference between “It is not there” and “It is not so that it is there?” Perhaps a difference could be discerned by a sophisticated modern logician, but one would have to have a rather acute concentration for any such supposed difference to become apparent. Do we really want to impose on Dharmakīrti some complicated logical structures which would make a distinction between *Es ist nicht* and *Es ist nicht, dass es ist*? I think the answer is that if we can avoid it, we had better not complicate an otherwise formally simple seventh century logic.

Thirdly, there seems to be Indian evidence in support of the Tibetan interpretation. Karṇakagomin, who essentially follows Śākyabuddhi, may well give us a clearer idea of how to take the occurrences of the terms “doubt” and “certainty” in the *Svavṛtti* passage. These commentators even anticipate the objection that the “doubt” spoken about in the *Svavṛtti* would make it impossible for *adrśyānupalabdhi* to be a real *pramāna*, and then they go on to explain, in reply, that *adrśyānupalabdhi* is a *pramāna* in one

respect and not in the other: in particular, it is a *pramāṇa* for denying cognition of, speech about and action directed towards presences (*sajjñānaśabdavyavahārapraṭiṣedha*), but it is not a *pramāṇa* with regard to absences or exclusion (*vyatireka*), for in this respect (and I would stress *only in this respect*) doubt persists.¹³ In short, instead of speaking about *adrśyānupalabdhi* in a general way as something lesser or “hypothetical” leading to doubt, the commentators seem to support the view that we need to make precise distinctions specifying the exact propositions for which it is a *pramāṇa* and those for which it is not. This is certainly in keeping with the Tibetan approach which distinguishes where *adrśyānupalabdhi* is a *pramāṇa* and where it is not.

Fourthly, according to indigenous Tibetan texts, the proposition which is being proven is that for such and such a person, there is no correct subsequent cognition or no *pramāṇa* of an imperceptible thing in front of him (. . . *ñes byed kyi dpyad śes don mthun med pa*; . . . *ñes byed kyi tshad ma med pa*), or that this person cannot reasonably maintain or act upon the proposition that such a thing exists in a specific place (*yod ces dam bca' mi rigs pa*; *yod ñes tha sñad mi 'jug pa*). This is a credible interpretation of *sajjñānaśabdavyavahārapraṭiṣedhaphalā*. Instead of taking Dharmakīrti to mean that *adrśyānupalabdhi* serves to establish a proposition like “It is not so that it is there,” the Tibetan scholastics argue that this type of *anupalabdhi* is proving that we ordinary beings cannot *know* or *say* that an imperceptible thing is present. And that is something quite different. After all, proving “We do not know whether *X* is there” is definitely not the same thing as proving “It is not so that *X* is there.”

Lastly, I can imagine the following doubt à la Steinkellner: If you say Dharmakīrti and his commentators maintain that *adrśyānupalabdhi* is a real *pramāṇa*, there must then actually be some proposition with regard to which it is in fact certain. Which one? Given our Tibetan-style interpretation of Dharmakīrti's words *sajjñānaśabdavyavahārapraṭiṣedhaphalā* and *sadvyavahāraṇiṣedhopayogāt*, the doubt is, fortunately, quite easily resolved. *Adrśyānupalabdhi* would be a perfectly good negation and a perfectly good *pramāṇa*, as good as *drśyānupalabdhi*, and would even yield a type of certainty, although, of course, not one concerning absences of putative objects. The specific proposition that is being

proven by an *adrśyānupalabdhihetu*, namely the denial that there is cognition, etc. of presence, would be just as certain as the *sādhyā* of the usual *anupalabdhihetu* where one proves absence of smoke when there is no fire.

C. Are there any other passages in Dharmakīrti's works, or in the works of other Indian authors, which clearly show an acceptance of a *fully probative adrśyānupalabdhihetu*? Probably not. Or at least, very few. Apart from the discussion in the *Svavṛtti* concerning k. 3, the similar passages concerning PV I k. 198–202 and the borrowings from the *Svavṛtti* in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II, there are not many other sources, at least as far as I can tell. There is, however, one passage in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 276–277, which deserves mention and which is interpreted by some Tibetans, such as rGyal tshab rje and dGe 'dun grub pa, as speaking about the two types of *anupalabdhi*.¹⁴ But the grounds provided by k. 276–277 for imputing recognition of a fully probative *adrśyānupalabdhihetu* are quite slim, and one would only take these verses in that sense if one had already been convinced by the discussion concerning PV I, k. 3. As for other Indian authors, it is, of course, impossible for us to check everywhere, but certainly this second type of *anupalabdhihetu* is not nearly as developed or as clear as it is in the Tibetan literature. There is of course always the possibility that the term, or even an example of the *prayoga*, might crop up now and again in other Indian authors' works, but, provisionally at least, it seems to me unlikely that there are other very important Indian sources. It is interesting to note that 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa Ņag dbaṅ brtson 'grus (1648–1721), who in his *rTags rigs* text almost invariably cites numerous Indian textual sources for the various logical notions which he discusses, in this case only seems to cite k. 3, k. 200, the *Svavṛtti* passage to k. 3 and a small passage from the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.¹⁵ These sources have either already been discussed by us or are very similar to the passages which we have taken up. 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa gives nothing other than that. One can probably conclude that other Indian sources, if there were any, were either unknown to this great Tibetan scholar, or seemed to him so brief, obscure or inconclusive as to be not worth mentioning.

Let us now sum up our discussion of the Tibetan contribution to understanding Dharmakīrti's use of *adrśyānupalabdhi*. Although

Indians like Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin did shed some light on the otherwise obscure passages of the *Svavṛtti* and the *Pramānaviniścaya*, Tibetan scholars undoubtedly went much further, their major contribution being that they gave definitions of this type of *hetu* and explicitly formulated the *prayogas* at stake, and thus showed clearly the exact procedure for arriving at an inferential *pramāna* based on an *adrśyānupalabdhihetu*. It is especially this explicit formulation of the *sādhya*, *hetu*, etc. which is lacking in Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin, and which gives us so much trouble if we base ourselves only on the Indian sources.

Finally, what information can be gleaned about the indigenous Tibetan developments concerning *adrśyānupalabdhihetu*? Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182–1251), in the section of his *Rigs gter rañ 'grel* (p. 240.1.4ff.; f. 146bff.) concerning *anupalabdhi*, conspicuously did not even speak of a valid *adrśyānupalabdhihetu*. gTsañ nag pa brTson 'grus señ ge (12th C.)¹⁶ and Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290–1364) in their commentaries on the *Pramānaviniścaya* passage which we cited above (and which largely resembles the key passage from the *Pramānavārttikasvavṛtti*) did speak of an *adrśyānupalabdhihetu*, but they gave explanations which did not go much further than the *Svavṛtti* and Śākyabuddhi's *Ṭikā* on PV. Significantly, they did not give the *prayogas*, and their explanations are little more than paraphrases of Dharmakīrti.¹⁷ The same holds for 'U yug pa Rigs pa'i Señ ge's (13th C.) commentary on *Pramānavārttika*.¹⁸

By the 14th and 15th centuries, however, texts of the dGe lugs pa school gave detailed interpretations of PV I k. 3, definitions of the *adrśyānupalabdhihetu* as well as illustrative *prayogas*, often with an elaborate discussion of the fine points of the wording of these reasonings.¹⁹ Equally, the Sa skya pa *Rigs gter* tradition by this time must have had their own definitions and *prayogas*, although their general treatment was certainly different from that of the dGe lugs and even seems comparatively simpler. An idea of the Sa skya pa / Rigs gter ba position can be gained from the *rTags rigs* of Glo bo mkhan chen (1456–1532), which is the earliest Sa skya pa text in this genre of literature which we possess. (It is true that other sources inform us of the existence of 14th Century Sa skya pa *rTags rigs* texts — such as that of g.Yag ston

Sañs rgyas dpal [1348–1414] —, but these are, at present at least, unavailable.) By comparing Glo bo mkhan chen's *rTags rigs* and passages in rGyal tshab rje's *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* (see our n. 7), it is clear that Glo bo mkhan chen's position on *adrśyānupalabdhihetu* reflects an earlier Rigs gter ba view, one which was already known to rGyal tshab (1364–1432) and which the dGe lugs pa scholar had attempted to refute in his *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed*. Other Sa skya pas — notably, Śākya mchog ldan (1428–1507)²⁰ — also adopted the same formulations which had earlier been the target for rGyal tshab rje's refutations, so that it seems that by the time of Śākya mchog ldan and Glo bo mkhan chen, a distinctive Sa skya pa / Rigs gter ba view on the definitions and *prayogas* of *adrśyānupalabdhihetu* had been relatively well established for some time.

It also seems likely that this Rigs gter ba position constituted a significant addition or modification to the system of Sa skya Paṇḍita. As we saw above, Sa pañ did not speak about *adrśya* in his discussion on *anupalabdhihetu*, confining himself to the *drśya* variety, all of which would suggest that although he probably knew about the existence of such a type of reasoning from Indian commentaries, he attached little philosophical significance to *adrśyānupalabdhihetu*. It is interesting to note that both Glo bo mkhan chen and Śākya mchog ldan cited a key passage from *Rigs gter rañ 'grel* which spoke *only* of *drśyānupalabdhi*; they then argued that Sa pañ, in this passage, *must* also have intended to include the *adrśya* variety. It is clear that for these authors, too, Sa skya Paṇḍita's omission was problematic, and it is difficult to resist the impression that they sought to incorporate a later philosophical debate into Sa pañ's *Rigs gter*.²¹ We might well hypothesize then that the major Tibetan developments on *adrśyānupalabdhi* took place in the context of the dGe lugs pa-Sa skya pa dialectic, around the fourteenth century. And if we can offer hypotheses about when things happened, we might go one step further and speculate as to where. It would not be at all surprising if it turned out that these developments in logic centered around the celebrated monastery of gSañ phu (s)Ne'u thog, which had both dGe lugs pa and Sa skya pa colleges and which was a decisive influence in the development of these respective logical traditions.²²

NOTES

* The present article was first prepared for a panel on Tibetan developments of Dharmakīrti's thought, which was part of the International Association of Tibetan Studies Congress in Oslo 1992. My thanks to Ernst Steinkellner and Georges Dreyfus for comments and to Helmut Tauscher for photocopies of 'U yug pa's text.

¹ The attribution to Īśvarasena of the doctrine of the "logical reason possessing six characters" (*ṣaḍlakṣaṇahetu*), albeit a very reasonable hypothesis, seems to be unconfirmed by any specific Indian sources. It is, however, corroborated in the indigenous Tibetan commentary on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* by rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen, where Īśvarasena is explicitly named in connection with the *ṣaḍlakṣaṇahetu* doctrine. See Steinkellner (1988), n. 47.

² See Ruegg (1985). See also Tillemans (1990) Vol. I, p. 16ff.

³ The matter has been explored by Steinkellner and others. See Steinkellner (1983) and the Introduction to Tillemans (1993).

⁴ The unacceptable, or completely non-existent, type of universal which Dharmakīrti is supposedly refuting, is one which is substantially existent (*rdzas yod*) and is a different object from its particulars (*spyi don gzan*). Tibetan commentators stress, however, that there are universals which are simple mental constructs and have at least conventional existence. In other words, it is argued that Dharmakīrti recognized the mental *apoha* (*blo'i gzan sel*), or more exactly speaking, the *don spyi*, "object-universal," which figures so prominently in dGe lugs and Sa skya exegesis. This notion of a *don spyi* is used to great advantage in explaining Dharmakīrti's thought, although it is not clear that the term *don spyi* (= **arthasāmānya*) itself ever explicitly figured in this exact use in Dharmakīrti's or even in other Indian logician's works. Cf. the use of the term *don spyi* / *don gyi spyi* in Vinītadeva's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* ad *Nyāyabindu* I, 5. See e.g. the characterization in the context of the definition of *kalpanā* (p. 41.9–11 ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin): *śes pa gañ la rjod pa dañ 'drer ruñ ba snañ ba yin te / don gyi spyi'i ni don gyi rnam pa śes bya ba'i tha tshig go /*.

Undoubtedly what is much more speculative is the dGe lugs pa idea that Dharmakīrti accepted a fully real universal which was in essence identical with its particular (*rañ gi gsal ba dañ no bo gcig*). The justification of attributing this type of universal (i.e. *spyi dños po ba* "real universal") to Dharmakīrti's system is much less clear than the case of the *don spyi*, and it certainly solicited long and intricate debates amongst Tibetans themselves, so much so that it would be presumptuous for us to take sides in the context of this mini-résumé. For a fuller development, see Dreyfus (1991) pp. 237–328 and Dreyfus (1992). Suffice it to say here that this dGe lugs pa version of *sāmānya* may well give us a highly fertile and radically different way of reading Dharmakīrti's statements on *apoha*.

⁵ See Dreyfus (1991), p. 773ff.; Tillemans (1990), p. 27, n. 75; Tillemans (1993), pp. 12–15. The debate turns on the interpretation of PV IV k. 95ff. Here is k. 95: *taiprastāvāśrayatve hi śāstram bādhakam ity amum / vaktum artham svavācāsyā saḥoktiḥ sāmānyadr̥ṣṭaye //* "Indeed, in order to state this point that a treatise can invalidate (*bādhaka*) when it is the basis for the discussion,

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[Dignāga] spoke of these [authoritative words] together with one's own words so as to show similarity [between the two]."

⁶ I should remark that Steinkellner, during the discussion following the presentation of this paper in Oslo in August 1992, made it quite clear that he no longer holds this view of the matter.

⁷ *Yoñs 'dzin rtags rigs* pp. 33–34. Cf. also the usual textbook definition of *adr̥śyānupalabdhihetu* which we find in dGe lugs pa logic manuals. *Yoñs 'dzin rtags rigs* p. 33: *de sgrub kyi ma dmigs pa'i rtags yañ dag kyañ yin / rañ ñid kyi rtags kyi de sgrub kyi dgag bya'i chos su brtags pa'i don de spyir yod kyañ / rañ ñid de sgrub kyi phyogs chos can du soñ ba'i gañ zag gi tshad ma la mi snañ ba de / khyod de sgrub kyi mi snañ ba ma dmigs pa'i rtags yañ dag gi mtshan ñid /* "The defining characteristic of *x* being a valid *adr̥śyānupalabdhihetu* for proving [a proposition] *P* is as follows: *x* is a valid *anupalabdhihetu* for proving *P*. And although the entity which is imagined as the property to be negated when proving *P* by this reason does in general exist, it does not appear to the *pramāṇa* of the person for whom there would be a *pakṣadharmā* for proving *P*."

It is interesting to note that the Sa skya pa *rTags rigs* (stemming from the *Rigs gter* tradition) seems to have adopted a more rudimentary definition, one which lacks the numerous provisos which are to be found in the dGe lugs pa versions and which were obviously designed to eliminate the absurdities which would be raised in debates. The *rTags rigs* of Glo bo mkhan chen gives the following definition and *prayoga* (ed. Onoda [1992]) p. 204: *bsgrub chos yod ñes 'gog pa la tshul gsum tshañ ba de mi snañ ba ma dmigs pa'i mtshan ñid yin / dper na / mdun gyi gzi 'dir śa za yod ñes ma yin te / de ltar tshad mas ma dmigs pa'i phyir zes pa lta bu'o //* "The defining characteristic of an *adr̥śyānupalabdhihetu* is 'that which satisfies the three characters for refuting that the *sādhyadharmā* is certain to exist.' For example, it is like saying: 'It is not certain that a spirit exists/is present here in front, because it is not so apprehended by a *pramāṇa*.'" The dGe lugs pa writer, rGyal tshab rje (1364–1432), was clearly aware of this version and rejected it as inadequate. See *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* Vol. I p. 20: *mdun gyi gziñ śa za yod pa ma yin pa dañ / yañ yod ñes ma yin pa dañ / yod ñes kyi bcas śes don mthun mi 'jug ste śa za tshad mas ma dmigs pa'i phyir zes pa mi snañ ba ma dmigs par 'dod pa mi rigs te / de lta na der śa za med ñes su thal / de yod na dmigs su ruñ ba la de ma dmigs pa'i phyir /* "It is not correct to accept as *adr̥śyānupalabdhi* that a spirit in front does not exist, or is not certain to exist, or that a correct subsequent cognition ascertaining existence does not occur, because the spirit is not apprehended by a *pramāṇa*. In such a case, it would follow absurdly that the spirit here is certain to be non-existent, for if it existed it would be apprehendable, but it is not apprehended." rGyal tshab's objection thus turned on the need to include the phrase *śa za bskal don du soñ ba'i gañ zag gi ñor / rgyud la* ("For someone for whom a spirit is an inaccessible entity") in the *prayoga*. He rejected the version without this phrase as leading to the absurd consequence that the spirit would be absent/non-existent. The point, as developed further on by rGyal tshab rje, was that if the spirit existed, at least the Buddha would have a *pramāṇa* apprehending it, and would be certain of its existence. Therefore if we say that there is

absolutely no *pramāṇa* apprehending a spirit in front of us, this is tantamount to saying that the spirit is non-existent. In short, rGyal tshab rje was aware of a tendency to omit the proviso *śa za . . . gañ zag gi ñor* and to understand the *prayoga* as something like "It is not certain that a spirit is present/existent here in front, because there is no *pramāṇa* apprehending such a spirit." For our purposes, it is important to point out that this version which rGyal tshab had rejected was precisely the one which was later adopted in Glo bo mkhan chen's *rTags rigs*, and probably represents the basic Sa skya pa / Rigs gter ba view.

The Sa skya pa Śākya mchog ldan (1428–1507) also omits the specification concerning *śa za bskal don du soñ ba'i gañ zag gi ñor*. See his *Kun bzañ chos kyi rol mtsho* f. 5b 1–3 (p. 198). Go rams pa, curiously enough, seems to have had a somewhat vacillating position. He put forth two quite different, and virtually incompatible, versions of the *prayoga* in his PV commentaries. In his *Kun tu bzañ po'i ñi ma* f. 3b 4–5 (p. 197), composed in 1474, he gives a version which resembles that of the dGe lugs pa: *śa za skal don du soñ ba'i gañ zag gi ñor / mdun gyi gzi 'di(r) chos can / śa za yod ñes min te / śa za tshad mas ma dmigs pa'i phyir / zes bkod pa'i tshe / śa za tshad mas ma dmigs pa de chos can / de ltar sgrub pa'i gtan tshigs yañ dag yin te / de sgrub kyi tshul gsum tshañ ba'i gtan tshigs yin pa'i phyir /*. His other version, in the *Kun tu bzañ po'i 'od zer*, follows more strictly the wording of k. 3. The result, however, looks quite similar to the type of "misconception" which rGyal tshab rje had earlier attacked. *Kun tu bzañ po'i 'od zer* f. 64b 2–3 (p. 32): *skal don śa za'i bum pa lta bu la bstan bcos la sogs pa'i tshad ma rnams ni mi 'jug pa de chos can / gzi 'ga' tu med pa ste / skal don de la yod ñes kyi tha sñad mi 'jug par go bar byed pa'i 'bras bu can yin te / gzi 'gar skal don yod ñes ma yin par sgrub pa'i tshul gsum tshañ ba'i phyir /*. In his commentary on *Rigs gter*, however, he clearly sides with rGyal tshab's version. He first of all states that "most Tibetans" (*bod phal cher*) formulate the *prayoga* as simply *mdun gyi gzi 'dir chos can / śa za yod ñes kyi dpyad śes don mthun mi 'jug* (i.e. the version which rGyal tshab criticizes), and then he argues that the provision *śa za bskal don du soñ ba'i gañ zag gi ñor* must be added. See his *Tshad ma rigs gter gyi don gsal byed* f. 101a–b.

⁸ Cf. PV Tib.: *tshad ma rnams ni mi 'jug pa // med la mi 'jug 'bras bu can // gtan tshigs bye brag la ltos nas // 'ga' zig med śes 'bras bu can //*. Cf. the commentary on the first half of this verse in dGe 'dun grub pa 's *Tshad ma rnams 'grel legs par bśad pa* p. 6: *gsum pa la gñis / mi snañ ba ma dmigs pa / snañ ruñ ma dmigs pa'i rtags so // dañ po ni / śa za bskal don du soñ ba'i gañ zag gi śa za dmigs pa'i tshad ma rnams ni mi 'jug pa chos can / mdun gyi gzi 'dir śa za bskal don du soñ ba'i gañ zag gi ñor śa za yod ñes kyi bcad śes mi 'jug par sgrub pa'i 'bras bu can te rtags yañ dag yin te / de sgrub kyi tshul gsum yin pa'i phyir /* "To the third [i.e. *anupalabdhī*] there are the following two [divisions]: *adrśyānupalabdhī*- and *drśyānupalabdhī*ṅga. As for the first: Take as the topic the non-activation [or non-occurrence] (*mi 'jug pa = apravṛtti*) of *pramāṇas* which apprehend spirits by people for whom spirits are inaccessible entities; this results in (*'bras bu can = 'phalā*), or in other words, is a valid logical reason for establishing that for a person for whom a spirit is an inaccessible entity, there

will not occur (*mi 'jug pa = apravṛtti*) a subsequent cognition ascertaining that there is a spirit there in front; this is because the [reason] is a triply characterized one for establishing that [proposition]."

⁹ See Karnakagomin's *Pramānavārttikasvavṛttikā* (34.18–27) on the above-cited passage from *Pramānavārttikasvavṛtti* (Words and phrases from the *Svavṛtti* text are highlighted in bold print): *ekatreyā adrśyaviśayāyām anupalabdḥau sattvasya saṁśayāt tato niścayātmakah sattvavyavahāro nivartata eva / saṁdigdhas tu sattvavyavahāro na nivartate / anyatra tu drśyānupalabdḥau viparyayād iti saṁśayaviparyayo niścayaś tasmāt / asattvasya niścayād ity arthah / yady adrśyānupalabdḥau saṁśayah katham sāmānam ity āha / tatrādyetyādi / tatra dvayor anupalabdhyor madhye ādyādrśyānupalabdhiḥ pramāṇam uktā sadvyavahāranisedhe upayogāt vyāpārāt / kva tarhi tasyā aprāmānyam ity āha / na tv ityādi vyatirekasyābhāvasya darśananiścayaḥ / ādigrahaṇac chabdo vyavahāras ca gṛhyate / saṁśayād yato nābhāvaniścaya upadyate / tasmān na pramāṇam / dvitīyā tv iti / drśyaviśayā 'nupalabdhiḥ / atreti vyatirekadarśanādau niścayaphalātvān niścaya eva phalam asyā iti kṛtvā /*. Cf. also the translation and explanation of the passages from the *Svavṛtti* in Hayes and Gillon (1991), who do not, as far as I can tell, accept the possibility of a valid *adrśyānupalabdhi*hetu.

¹⁰ For arguments in favour of the name "Śākyabuddhi" rather than "Śākyamati," see p. v. of Inami et al. (1992).

¹¹ Steinkellner (1967) p. 157, n. **: "Hypothetisch' in dem Sinne, dass die Negation hypothetisch ist, weil ihr ein Objekt nicht gesichert werden kann." See also *ibid.* p. 158, n. ***: "Echt' in dem Sinne, dass Dharmakīrti nur dieser Nichtbeobachtung Massgeblichkeit bei der Erkenntnis des Nichtvorhandenseins zuspricht."

¹² Steinkellner (1967) p. 158, n. **: "Da mit dieser Nichtbeobachtung keine sichere Erkenntnis zu erhalten ist, räumt Dharmakīrti auch ein, dass man sie nicht als Erkenntnisinstrument ansehen muss."

¹³ Here is the relevant passage from Karnakagomin with the words of the *Svavṛtti* reproduced in bold print: *yady adrśyānupalabdhihetu saṁśayah katham sāmānam ity āha / tatrādyetyādi / tatra dvayor anupalabdhyor madhye ādyādrśyānupalabdhiḥ pramāṇam uktā sadvyavahāranisedhe upayogāt vyāpārāt / kva tarhi tasyā aprāmānyam ity āha / na tv ityādi vyatirekasyābhāvasya darśananiścayaḥ / . . . saṁśayād yato nābhāvaniścaya utpadyate / tasmān na pramāṇam /* "[Objection:] If there is doubt in the case of *adrśyānupalabdhi*, then how can this [type of non-apprehension] be a *pramāṇa*? [Dharmakīrti] replies: 'The first of them' etc. Of them, in other words of the two *anupalabdhi*, the first or *adrśyānupalabdhi* is said to be a *pramāṇa* in that one uses it (*upayoga = vyāpāra*) to negate action directed towards something present. [Objection:] In what respect is it then not a *pramāṇa*? [Dharmakīrti] answers: 'But it does not' etc. It does not serve to prove, or ascertain, exclusion, i.e. absence. . . . This is because doubt remains, i.e. it is because no certainty of absence is produced. And thus it is not a *pramāṇa*."

¹⁴ See *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* Vol. 2, p. 377.

¹⁵ In his discussion on *adrśyānupalabdhi*hetu (*rTags rigs* pp. 270–280), 'Jam

dbyañs bžad pa briefly quotes the *Pramānaviniścaya* (*rTags rigs* pp. 273, 277), PV I, k. 3 (pp. 270, 277), PV I, 200 (p. 279) and parts of the *Svavṛtti* passage which we cited (pp. 278, 279, 279–280).

¹⁶ On gTsañ nag pa's dates, see van der Kuijp (1989), p. 2.

¹⁷ See Bu ston's *rNam ñes tikā* f. 121b 1ff. (p. 252).

¹⁸ See 'U yug pa's *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel pa rigs pa'i mdzod* f. 103–5.

¹⁹ For Tsoñ kha pa, see *sDe bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gñer yid kyi mun sel*, pp. 47–48. See rGyal tshab rje's *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed*, Vol. I p. 20ff.; mKhas grub rje's *rNam 'grel tik chen* f. 37b (p. 690). For some idea of the debates on the wording of the *prayoga*, see n. 7.

²⁰ See n. 7.

²¹ Cf. *rTags rigs* of Glo bo mkhan chen (ed. Onoda [1992] p. 201): *de yi don Rigs pa'i gter las /*

chos kyi grags pas sbyor ba yi // sgo nas gsum du ñes par mdzad //

ces dañ /

*dgag rtags mtha' dag snañ ruñ ma dmigs par 'du ba'i phyir / dpe gcig gi steñ du gtan la dbab tu ruñ bas gcig tu 'dus la / sgrub rtags kyi sbyor ba dpe gcig la sbyor du mi ruñ ba'i phyir gñis su phye bas sbyor ba'i sgo nas gsum du grañ ñes pa yin no //**

žes gsuñs so // 'di ltar na / mi snañ ba ma dmigs pa yañ 'dir bsdus pa yin no //
*Rigs gter rañ 'grel f. 146b 3–4. Śākya mchog ldan also attempts to add *adrś-yānupalabdhi en filigrane* in the above-mentioned passage of Sa skya Pañḍita. See *Tshad ma rigs gter gyi rnam bśad* pp. 665–666: *'dir mi snañ ba ma dmigs pa'i gtan tshigs ma bśad pa dañ / goñ du sgrub byed kyi dbye bar yid ches pa'i gtan tshigs ma bśad pa gñis kyi dgoñs pa bṛtag par bya dgos la /*

²² This monastery, founded in ca. 1073, was located not far from Lhasa in the gTsañ phu valley on the eastern bank of the sKyid chu River. For its history and importance, see van der Kuijp (1987) and Onoda (1992) pp. 13–22.

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A REVIEW ESSAY

FOOD IN INDIA

R. S. Khare (ed.) *The Eternal Food: Gastronomic Ideas and Experiences of Hindus and Buddhists*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992.

The cultural landscape of India, from the earliest Vedic period to contemporary times, is littered with food. As a biological necessity, as an economic commodity, as the primary ingredient of ritual and social transactions, as a medium of social and familial interaction, as a marker of social boundaries, as a principle of classification, and as a focus of ethical concerns of both religious virtuosi and common people, food has always been and continues to be at the heart of Indian ritual practice, social behavior, common etiquette, and theological speculation. The Vedic sacrifices, often involving the killing of a sacrificial victim, just as their vegetarian counterparts in modern temples, are essentially offerings of food to the gods. Eating the leftovers of these divine meals provides a major point of contact with the divine for sacrificers and devotees alike (Wezler 1978). In a contemporary celebration of the cowherd god Kṛṣṇa in the region of Braj, the central attraction is the "mountain of food" (*annakūṭa*) created and consumed by the devotees (Toomey 1992). Every Indian life-cycle rite is celebrated with a feast. Food links the dead with the living in periodic *śrāddha* oblations. Food links the Buddhist and Jaina monks with the laity and the Hindu *saṃnyāsins* with the common folk in the ritual of daily begging — the giving and the receiving of food.

Issues relating to food — what one is permitted to eat, how one should prepare it, when and how much one should eat, from whom one can accept it, with whom one can eat — these are central questions both in the legal literature of *dharmaśāstra* and in the minds of ordinary people. An ancient Vedic text uses food and eating to classify all reality — food and eaters of food, that's all there is!¹ A similar thought is echoed in the famous creation hymn of the *R̥gveda* (10.90.4) when it divides all things into those that

eat and those that do not eat. While fasting is the most common penitential act of ordinary people, ambivalence toward, and even fear of, food is a hallmark of most traditions of Indian asceticism (Olivelle 1991).

The cultural construction of food that transforms it from a nutritional necessity to a medium of thought and communication is, of course, a common human phenomenon. Anthropologists have long recognized that food habits encode social structures and relationships, and that the study of food is an important key to understanding a society. The food habits of people living in simple societies — the so-called primitive cultures — have been a constant focus, therefore, of ethnographic and anthropological inquiry. Until recent times, however, we have not seen a similar scholarly interest in the cultural use of food in what is commonly regarded as the “major” religious and cultural traditions, even though the cultural obsession with food is even more marked in them than in simpler societies. The anthropologist Mary Douglas in many of her writings has pioneered the application of anthropological categories and methods to the study of complex societies, including the contemporary (Douglas 1984 [1966], 1982 [1970]). Her “Deciphering a Meal” (in Douglas 1975), a structural study of the modern British meal, and “The Abominations of Leviticus” (in Douglas 1982), an analysis of ancient Jewish food prohibitions, are exemplary in pointing out how detailed and careful analyses of food habits can be as fruitful for the study of complex cultures as they are for that of simpler societies.

The historian Caroline Walker Bynum (1987), likewise, has shown how the study of food can open new avenues of inquiry into the religious history of medieval Europe. Bynum has drawn our attention to the close relation between food and women; men may be involved in the production of food, but it is usually women who convert food into a meal. At least within the family, food is one social product over which women have control. In pregnancy and lactation, women transform their own body as food for their offspring. These unique experiences make food a stronger symbol and experience for women than it is for men. Food, Bynum has shown, permitted medieval women to gain some form of control over their selves and their circumstances, often through extraordinary means such as the refusal to take food at all. Phenomena

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related to food and fasting play a more central role in the claim to holiness of female saints than they do in the lives of their male counterparts. Bynum's work demonstrates how important the study of food is for understanding the lives and histories of women in medieval Europe; but its importance surely applies as well to other times and to other parts of the world.

If ever there was a doubt as to the power of food as a medium of expression and control even in modern urban and technological societies, the recent increase of “food disorders” — anorexia and bulimia — to epidemic proportions should lay it to rest. Anorexia has also permitted interesting parallel studies between modern fasting girls and pre-modern anorexic saints and thrown significant light on the cultural creation of food, as well as of holiness and sickness (Bell 1985). Such anthropological and historical studies of food in the West should provide fruitful models for the study of the rich Indian materials.

R. S. Khare, whose recently edited book *The Eternal Food* (Khare 1992) is the catalyst for this essay, has been a pioneer in the study of food in India. In two early works on the subject (Khare 1976a, 1976b), Khare argued convincingly for the need to combine detailed anthropological work with the study of the Hindu religious and cultural attitudes toward and cosmological speculations regarding food. “Foods for the Hindus represent essentially two interrelated dimensions — as a nutriment for remaining alive and as a cultural principle of cosmological creation” (Khare 1976b, 119). These two aspects of food — bodily nutrition and cultural construct — are inextricably intertwined. Khare contends, correctly I believe, that even the most practical nutritional and economic issues relating to food, such as malnutrition and the efficiency of production and distribution, cannot be dealt with adequately in isolation from the cultural conceptions and attitudes toward food prevalent among the people.

In an attempt to synthesize the various cultural conceptions of food in India, Khare (1979b, 136) presents the following useful model of what he regards as the four central “food cycles” in Indian culture (Figure 1).

These four cycles, where the larger subsumes the smaller, include within their scope all of reality from gods and creative principles to organic and inorganic matter. None of these cycles is




Fig. 1. A Hindu Model for the Major Modes of Food Circulation.

completely independent of the others. The ritual, the social, the economic, the medical, and the nutritional are seen here as inextricably intertwined in practice, thought, and attitudes, and all these dimensions have some connection with the "spiritual" quest of liberation. Good and proper food not only creates a good body (medicine) but also a good mind (yoga). What you eat both reflects what you are and determines what you will be (Khare 1992, 27–52; White 1992). What one eats both demarcates one's social boundaries and demonstrates one's spiritual aspirations.

Carol Brekenridge's (1986) important paper "Food, Politics and Pilgrimage in South India, 1350–1650 A.D.," for example, demonstrates the close connection between food offerings to gods (cycle III) and the political economy of the region (cycle II). Rich and powerful people donate food to the temple at Tirupati. After it is offered to god, however, this food is recycled as "divine leftovers" and distributed among various segments of the population.

For a number of reasons, this substantial economy of divine leftovers had considerable cultural and political significance. First, by contributing to the diet of the deity, the donor partook of the deity's royal authority. By receiving and controlling the most significant share of these leftovers, the donor publicly established his leadership over his constituency, whether it was a family, caste, sect, lineage, or little kingdom. In subsequently redistributing his share to his followers, dependents, and kinsmen, a donor would gain the superiority associated with asymmetric food transactions between human beings. By allocating this redistributive privilege to other powerful *local* persons and institutions (such as monasteries, feeding houses, and sects), he could increase his *horizontal* networks in the complex political economy of Tirupati while cementing his more diffused prestige with pilgrims, transients, and the needy, who were the last links in the chain of food consumption at Tirupati (Brekenridge 1986, 38. Original italics).

The aim of his recently edited volume, Khare eloquently argues, is to go beyond the particular customs, rules, and meanings of food and to discover the underlying "gastrosemantics" of Indian civilization. Gastrosemantics, according to Khare (1992, 44, n. 2),

may be generally defined as a culture's distinct capacity to signify, experience, systematize, philosophize, and communicate with food and food practices by pressing appropriate linguistic and cultural devices to render food as a central subject of attention. To refer to the cultural depth and density of meanings foods invoke, I will employ "gastrosemantics."

The frame of reference for the study of Indian gastrosemantics is what Khare perceives as the Hindu ideological conception of food. Khare recognizes that this conception is neither simple nor unequivocal; it is semantically dense and multilayered.

[Food] is a moral (i.e., dharma-ordained) substance, a semiotic field, and a comprehensive "discourse". . . . Thus if food expresses the cosmic truth, showing its ultimate control by the dharma-based principles of cosmic creation and maintenance, it also expresses itself with intricate social-ritual (and karma-dharma) distinctions, classifications, and customary actions, releasing discourses on meaningful action concerning how food, body, and self need to be handled in each other's terms to achieve the Hindu goal of liberation. However, this picture remains incomplete unless we also note that, despite such elaborate schemes, food still retains for the Hindu unpredictable (even mysterious) consequences, and thus requires ever more vigilance in its handling. This character of food is in some important ways a "limitless field" where language, speech, and action continuously work in each other's terms. Once we become used to approaching food within such an expanding paradigm of significance and interpretation, we

will see how often major rituals centrally locate "food acts" and "events" because they extend and even magnify what speech and action want to convey (Khare 1992, 6).

The papers included in the volume² largely exemplify this approach. Aklujkar, Toomey, and Moreno explore the diverse ways food is used as ritual substance and devotional image and metaphor. Aklujkar examines food imagery in the writings of several medieval Marathi saints — Jñānadeva, Nāmadeva, Ekanātha, and Tukārāma — while Toomey and Moreno study the uses of food in the Kṛṣṇa rituals of Braj and in Śaiva temple rites of South India, respectively. All these essays demonstrate how *bhakti* practice and rhetoric often subvert and invert many of the accepted meanings and rules of food, a theme taken up also by Ramanujan. White examines the relationship between food and caste boundaries, focusing on the anomalous status of the so-called "dog-cookers" of Hindu mythology. Seneviratne's essay deals with the aesthetic and experiential aspects of the Sri Lankan meal, demonstrating how the aesthetic is intertwined there with the medical, moral, and the spiritual dimensions of food. Ramanujan's contribution attempts to collect a variety of Indian food images from the ancient Upaniṣads down to modern times and to examine how these images are related to social reality and medical knowledge. The *bhakti* subversion of food images is exemplified in this poem of Basavaṇṇa cited by Ramanujan (1992, 237):

Milk is left over
from the calves.
Water is left over
from the fishes,
flowers from the bees.

How can I worship you,
O Śiva, with such offal?
But it's not for me
to despise leftovers,
so take what comes,
lord of the meeting rivers.

For the Marathi saints also, god is as eager to eat his devotee's

leftovers (*ucchiṣṭa*) as the devotees are eager to eat divine leftovers (*prasāda*; Aklujkar 1992, 106). Ramanujan's collection of images is rich and delightful. Consider this story about the Parsi immigration to Gujarat (Ramanujan, 1992, 238):

When the Parsis first came to Gujarat, the king didn't want them to settle there. He had already too many people in the kingdom. So he sent the Parsi community a diplomatic, symbolic message: a full glass of milk, to indicate the glass could contain no more. The Parsis poured a spoonful of sugar into it and stirred it, and sent back the glass of milk: indicting that, like sugar, they would mix with the population, take no extra space, and sweeten it all. The king was pleased and persuaded. The Parsis came to stay.

The connection between food and sex is, of course, well known. An old and famous Upaniṣadic text, for example, connects food with semen and eating with sexual intercourse:

Man, Gautama, is in fact a fire. . . . In that very fire gods offer food. Semen springs from that oblation. Woman, Gautama, is in fact a fire. . . . In that very fire gods offer semen. The fetus springs from that oblation.³

Ramanujan (1992, 238–40) offers several delightful modern examples, many that would bring delight to the hearts of all Freudians. I cite but one, the story of the celibate Praneshacharya's initiation "into the four things all animate beings share: food, sex, fear, and sleep," by a young woman named Chandri:

Touching full breasts he had never touched, Praneshacharya felt faint. As in a dream, he pressed them. The strength in his legs ebbing, Chandri sat the Acharya down, holding him close. The Acharya's hunger, so far unconscious, suddenly raged, and he cried out like a child in distress, "O Amma!" [Mother] Chandri leaned him against her breasts, took the plantains out of her lap, peeled them and fed them to him. Then she took off her sari, spread it on the ground, and lay on it hugging Praneshacharya close to her, weeping, flowing in helpless tears (Ramanujan 1992, 240).

Cultural historians cannot but applaud the approach advocated by Khare that calls on anthropologists to examine the broader cultural, ideological, and historical contexts within which the subjects of their study are located. In many areas of cultural analysis, historians and Indologists have benefited enormously from the ethnographic labors and theoretical insights of social-anthropologists. In an age when disciplinary boundaries are becoming increasingly irrelevant, anthropologists themselves have begun to

realize the value of historical, textual, and philosophical studies of ancient and medieval India for their descriptive and interpretive undertakings.

It is here that some criticism can be leveled at the manner the "Hindu ideology" of food is portrayed in Khare's work. Perhaps unintentionally,⁴ Khare reifies the category "Hindu" and treats it as an unchanging essence whose attitude toward food can be discovered by examining texts, rituals, and ethnographic data from widely different regions and periods of time. He speaks of "the Hindu world," "the Hindu food," "the Hindu system," "the Hindu gastrosemantics" (Khare 1992, 28–29), and so forth, as if "the Hindu" is a univocal and uniform reality. Accordingly, Khare asserts, for example, that "within the Hindu world, one should eat only enough to live" (Khare 1992, 31), and speaks about "the popular Hindu intuition concerning the absence of opposition between spirit and matter" (Khare 1992, 33). Sometimes Khare's "Hindu" appears to have strong Advaita overtones: "Hindu's self (microcosm) is only a projection of the Ātman (the universal self). Cosmos, including food, is visualized within this Self (macrocosm). One's self is a reflection of Self" (Khare 1992, 29). At one point Khare (1992, 41) explicitly asserts the unity of the Hindu perspective:

The pervasive unifying logic of the Hindu food derives from the nature of the Hindu's cosmology. The Creator of the Hindu universe is a yogi, a conjoiner. Like him, food's cosmic place and meanings are therefore held self-evident and indisputable; they are found one with the rest of the cosmic moral order.

The problem I raise is rather simple: is there a single food ideology which can be termed "Hindu" and which remains constant across time, regions, and sects? Is the Hindu conception of "self" consistent and uniform? The answer clearly is no. There is no single Hindu attitude toward food, as there is no constant or consistent Hindu view of self. Surely, Hindus subscribing to the Bhakti traditions or to cosmologies based on Sāṃkhya-Yoga would dispute Khare's assertion that the "Hindu's self is only a projection of the Ātman." I do not mean to imply by this that there are no continuities within the various cultural attitudes toward food found in India across time, space, castes, and sects. But a history of the cultural creation of food in India has to go beyond these generalities.

The deep historical, sectarian, and regional differences in food habits and attitudes are as much a part of the history of food in India as the obvious continuities. Ramanujan (1992, 222), in his contribution to Khare's volume, appears to sense this problem in his remarks on the synchronic tendency of anthropology and on the need for historical study: "My concern here is synchronic; I wish someone would explore the social history of these images and ideas."

An interesting counterpoint to Khare's reification of "Hindu" is Brian K. Smith's (1990) seminal article "Eaters, Food, and Social Hierarchy in Ancient India: A Dietary Guide to a Revolution in Values." The Vedic classification of reality into eaters and food, as Smith demonstrates, far from being an early example of the romanticized vision of universal oneness, is in reality a practical observation regarding a dog-eat-dog world, where the big fish do indeed eat the small fry. The Vedic rites and ritual knowledge were primarily directed at winning this war for naked power. How to become the eater rather than the food, the big fish rather than the small? This is the quest of the priestly writers of the Brāhmaṇas and even of some of the authors of the Upaniṣads.

Thomas Szasz once wrote that "In the animal kingdom, the rule is, eat or be eaten: in the human kingdom, define or be defined."⁵ In Vedism, the two clauses of Szasz's aphorism were collapsed; social classes were defined in terms of eaters and food. A natural world categorized into dominating feeders and dominated food was reprojected as the paradigm for the "natural" order of the social world. . . . The eater is superior to his food, in society as well as in nature. . . . The nature of the social life is described more specifically in terms of the interrelations between the social classes or *varṇas*. Society's classes, like nature's, are divided into eaters and food (Smith 1991, 186–87).

Kṣatriyas and all the lower classes are thus food for Brahmins. Kṣatriyas in turn eat the common folk, Vaiśyas, but they may not eat Brahmins! Smith sees the changes in the food metaphors (purity, for example, rather than power) and the rise of vegetarianism that took place at the conclusion of the Vedic period as harbingers of a revolution in values related to the rise in importance of ascetic traditions.

Ascetic attitudes toward food, of course, are themselves not uniform and have changed over time. In my article on food and the Indian ascetic (Olivelle 1991), I examined some features of those

attitudes as reflected in the ancient ascetic literature. By and large, the Indian ascetic traditions viewed food with extreme ambivalence. Ascetics attempted to minimize their contact with and efforts at procuring food, and precisely because of that concern they were obsessed with food. The extent to which an individual has freed himself from food was often viewed as an indicator of his or her advance in holiness.

This criterion is nowhere more evident than in Jainism. Paul Dundas, in his "Food and Freedom: The Jaina Sectarian Debate on the Nature of the Kevalin" (1985), has addressed the theological debate between the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras on the question of a liberated individual's (*kevalin*), especially a Tīrthaṅkara's, relationship to food. Did (and does) a *kevalin* or a Tīrthaṅkara experience hunger? Śvetāmbaras answer in the affirmative, and their position "is that there is nothing about eating and hunger which is fundamentally at variance with the attainment of omniscience" (Dundas 1985, 177). Dundas points out that this theological position underscores the Śvetāmbara view of the Tīrthaṅkara's salvific mission and his involvement with the world. A tangible manifestation of this attitude is the Śvetāmbara practice of placing food offerings in front of the images of the Tīrthaṅkaras.⁶ Digambaras, on the other hand, deny the possibility that an omniscient person, especially a Tīrthaṅkara, could feel hunger or be dependent on food. The Jaina example of fasting unto death is clearly linked to the perception that food is the final link of a person to the world. And contrary to Khare's (1992, 31) assertion that among Hindu ascetics "there is no provision for death by starvation," religious suicide by fasting was clearly not limited to Jaina ascetics (Olivelle 1978).

The Jaina debate, and similar controversies regarding the status of a *jīvanmukta* ("a person liberated in this life") within the Brāhmanical tradition, point to an interesting dichotomy within the Indian religious traditions regarding the perfect individual. He/she is either a person for whom everything is food (Vedic paradigm) or a person who does not need, and is therefore beyond the realm of, food (Digambara paradigm). In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (3.8.8), within which the former paradigm is often dominant, we already see evidence of the emerging new paradigm; speaking of the Imperishable, Yājñavalkya says: "It does not eat anything; and no one eats it!"

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In an interesting way this ties up with the way medieval ascetics divided the world into those who cook and those who do not, in obvious contrast to the Vedic "food and eaters of food." Ascetics who do not cook are superior to but dependent on the householders who cook and who are obliged to share their food with those who do not cook. A medieval text remarks:

If a man ignores those who do not cook and feeds people who do cook, all his labor with regard to divine and ancestral rites will be in vain.⁷

Feeding those who do not cook (read religious mendicants!) becomes the central obligation of those who are permitted to cook within this new culinary ethic. Hyperbole is heaped upon hyperbole in medieval works that extol the virtues of giving food to ascetics:

One should first pour water on the ascetic's hand, then give the almsfood, and finally pour water on his hand again. That almsfood is equal to Mount Meru, and that water is comparable to the ocean.

Viṣṇu himself eats in the house of a man where an ascetic eats. The triple world eats in the house of a man where Viṣṇu eats.

The pouring of water while giving almsfood has been ordained to satiate the gods and ancestors. They become sated indeed when that food is given. Even if a man gives the entire earth, it would not equal the merit of preparing almsfood and giving it to a mendicant, who is an image of Viṣṇu.⁸

A significant aspect of the history of food in India that most studies have almost totally neglected is the relationship of food to women. I have already alluded to Bynum (1987), whose studies have shown admirably the urgent need for relating the study of food to the lives of women. This is true in India, I believe, as it is in Europe. Did the women of India use their power over food to control what Bynum calls "their self and their circumstances" the way medieval European women did and modern anorexic women in the west continue to do? Khare (1992, xii) is sensitive to this issue and recognizes the need for more focused study of food in the lives of Indian women:

The accounts in this book recognize the woman's presence and role in an implicit way, essentially by context of discussion and by level of idealization. . . . However, this is *no* substitute for more systematic studies of the subject of women and food within South Asian societies and cultures (original italics).

We know that in India, as in Europe, women did and do most of the domestic cooking. We know that it is women who look after the ritual purity of the food and the hearth. We know that it is the women of the household who undertake most of the weekly, monthly, and annual fasts, often for the benefit of the entire family. Yet, a book such as that of Bynum on the role of food in the lives of women in medieval or modern South Asia remains yet to be written.

The numerous studies of ways humans use food both as a commodity and as a cultural construct point to a central principle: food in human societies and cultures is a heavily encoded substance. It carries multiple levels and dimensions of meaning, all of which even those who speak this coded language may be unable to articulate verbally or even to bring to the level of reflective thought. How can we decode the language of food? Where can we find the uncoded or precoded message?

If language is a code, where is the precoded message? The question is phrased to expect the answer: nowhere. In these words a linguist is questioning a popular analogy. But try it this way: if food is a code, where is the precoded message? Here, on the anthropologist's home ground, we are able to improve the posing of the question. A code affords a general set of possibilities for sending particular messages. If food is treated as a code, the messages it encodes will be found in the pattern of social relations being expressed. The message is about different degrees of hierarchy, inclusion and exclusion, boundaries and transactions across boundaries. Like sex, the taking of food has a social component, as well as a biological one. Food categories therefore encode social events (Douglas 1975, 249).

This is both the challenge and the reward of studying food: rhetoric, images, attitudes, etiquette, practices, habits, prohibitions, prescriptions, feasts, and fasts — all these bear messages about society. They can indeed tell us more about a society than almost any other single element of a culture. Khare's writings, as well as the conference he has organized and the books he has edited, have provided important impetus and direction to the exploration of this subject within Indian history and society. But we have barely begun to scratch the surface of this enormous and enormously important subject within the complex Indian society and its long history.

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NOTES

- ¹ *Satapatha Brāhmana*, 11.1.6.19; on this question see Smith 1991.
- ² This volume resulted from a conference on "Food Systems and Communication Structures" organized by Khare and the late M.S.A. Rao and held in Mysore in 1985. Besides two contributions by Khare ("Food with Saints: An Aspect of Hindu Gastrosemantics," and "*Annambrahman*: Cultural Models, Meanings, and Aesthetics of Hindu Food"), the volume contains articles by D. G. White ("You Are What You Eat: The Anomalous Status of Dog-Cookers in Hindu Mythology"), V. Aklujkar ("Sharing the Divine Feast: Evolution of Food Metaphor in Marathi Sant Poetry"), P. M. Toomey ("Mountain of Food, Mountain of Love: Ritual Inversion in the *Annakūta* Feast at Mount Govardhan"), M. Moreno ("*Pañcāmirtam*: God's Washings as Food"), H. L. Seneviratne ("Food Essence and the Essence of Experience"), and our lamented colleague A. K. Ramanujan ("Food for Thought: Toward an Anthrology of Food Images").
- ³ *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, 6.2.12–13; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 5.7–8.
- ⁴ I say "unintentionally," not merely to be polite. Khare is clearly aware of the changing attitudes toward food in Indian history, as when he discusses the problem later-day vegetarians face when confronted by the Vedic practice of animal sacrifice and meat eating: Khare 1992, 20, n. 7.
- ⁵ T. Szasz, *The Second Sin* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press), p. 200.
- ⁶ For a broader study of food habits, both domestic and ritual, within the Jaina communities of North India, see Mahias 1985. Mahias' study, unfortunately, is very detailed in ethnographic description but lacks interpretive depth. She does not address in any detail the types of questions or issues raised by Khare or Dundas.
- ⁷ Yādava Prakāśa, *Yatidharmasamuccaya* (ed. P. Olivelle. New York: SUNY Press, 1995), 6.309.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.306–307, 313–314.

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THE EXAMINATION OF CONDITIONED ENTITIES AND THE
EXAMINATION OF REALITY

Nāgārjuna's Prajñānāma Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XIII,
Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa XIII, and Candrakīrti's
Prasannapadā XIII

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In this essay I will briefly introduce the ideas in the Thirteenth Chapter of Nāgārjuna's (ca. 200 CE)¹ *Prajñānāma Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, Bhāvaviveka (Bhavya)'s (ca. 500-570 CE) commentary *Prajñāpradīpa*, and Candrakīrti's (ca. 600-650 CE) *Prasannapadā*,² and present translations of the chapters from Candrakīrti's and Bhāvaviveka's commentaries. Nāgārjuna's and Candrakīrti's Sanskrit texts are from La Vallée Poussin's edition with De Jong's critical notes,³ and the Tibetan versions are from the Peking and Derge *bsTan 'gyurs*. For the translation of Bhāvaviveka's text, I compared six different versions, three from the Peking, Derge, and Cone *bsTan 'gyurs*, and the three contained in Avalokitavrata's *Ṭika* in each of the *bsTan 'gyurs*. All significant discrepancies are noted. Avalokitavrata's commentary was of great help for understanding difficult passages in Bhāvaviveka. Further, for this work I consulted the **Akutobhayā*, Buddhapālita's **Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, the commentaries in Chinese attributed to Qing Mu (Piṅgala) and Sthiramati, and several later Tibetan commentaries. The **Akutobhayā* and Buddhapālita's **Vṛtti* predate the other Indian commentaries, but I will not deal with their interpretations in detail here. Briefly, Buddhapālita's **Vṛtti* uses the consequence (*prasāṅga*) reasoning criticized as insufficient by Bhavya but endorsed by Candrakīrti. I do not feel that Qing Mu's commentary, translated by Kumārajīva in ca. 400 CE, is a translation of the **Auktobhayā* on the grounds of the syntactic differences, and especially if the digression in the thirteenth chapter on interdependent origination (T 1564.18b - 19a) is part of an original Indian or Central Asian document rather than Kumārajīva's explanation. There are only thirteen chapters of Sthiramati's commentary extant, and they are generally difficult reading and perhaps poorly translated. The comments on the thirteenth chapter do not present significant alternative interpreta-

tions in relation to Bhavya and Candrakīrti. The Tibetan commentaries are from a much later historical period, and constitute an entire body of literature and philosophical development, analysis of which goes beyond the limit of this short introduction to a single chapter in the sixth and seventh century Indian commentaries.

The Buddhist theories of "emptiness" and "emptiness of emptiness" are explained and applied in this chapter. Emptiness refers to the lack of a permanent and unchanging self-nature in persons and things from the point of view of ultimate truth. Emptiness of emptiness means that the empty quality of persons and things is itself not a permanent, unchanging quality or thing. The latter assertion, one of the main points of the chapter, indicates that being ultimately empty of self-nature does not negate relative existence.⁴

This chapter is presented in relative terms and conditioned, linguistic conventions, yet it is concerned with the ultimate reality. This can be so because "... the idea of origination in conditioned dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*), [which embraces all the conditioned factors of the world,] is two-faceted since it evidently relates to both truth-levels, that of the surface (*saṃvṛti*) and transactional usage (*vyavahāra*) and that of ultimate reality (*paramārtha*)."⁵ His Holiness the Dalai Lama explains that "... there is no distinction between conventional and ultimate phenomena ... [but] this is not to say that phenomena does [sic] not exist at all."⁶ Again, in the words of His Holiness, "... an understanding of emptiness does not contradict the conventional reality of phenomena."⁷ Therefore, Nāgārjuna, Bhāvaviveka, and Candrakīrti, the great expositors of Buddhist emptiness, also stress the reality of persons and things. Further, in their exposition of emptiness in this chapter, Nāgārjuna and his commentators state that the very unreality of persons and things enables them to operate.⁸

The Sanskrit title of chapter thirteen used by Candrakīrti is *Saṃskāra Parīkṣa*, "The Examination of Conditioned Entities."⁹ Here, "conditioned entities" means all constituents of reality, the "relative" world (*saṃvṛti*). The chapter is therefore concerned with the analysis of the world, the mind, ethics, and so on. However, when other commentators read the chapter and translated the title, they rendered it *De kho na nyid brtag pa* (**Tattvaparīkṣa*), "The Examination of Ultimate Reality."¹⁰ The chapter can thus be thought of as the examination of all conditioned entities, or relative truth, or it may be thought of as the examination of reality, meaning ultimate truth. In fact, there is only one topic under investigation in this chapter, and it happens to have two descriptions, relative (*saṃvṛti*, *saṃskāra*), and ultimate (*paramārtha*, *tattva*). This is

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explicitly stated by Avalokitavrata, a commentator on Bhāvaviveka's work, who says that "... teaching the unreality of conditioned entities is teaching reality."¹¹

Buddhist literature uses literary devices that demonstrate non-attachment to emptiness as a thing with a self-nature,¹² an important component of the rhetoric of negation in Madhyamaka theory.¹³ Candrakīrti describes the Madhyamaka epistemology in terms of a technical distinction in Sanskrit grammar, the implicative (*paryudāsapratīṣedha*) and non-implicative negations (*prasajyapratīṣedha*) of nouns and verbs.¹⁴

These literary devices and theories of negation appear in the earliest Buddhist scriptures, and were adopted by Nāgārjuna many centuries later. The story of building a raft to cross the raging torrents of this world is told in the Pāli *Vinaya* literature¹⁵ and the warning against pathologically reifying the teaching of emptiness as a vehicle or methodology as a "raft" to cross the ocean of *samsāra* appears in the *Dharma* literature. The *Papañcasūdanī* II (109) in the *Majjhima Nikāya* relates that the Buddha said "I speak of getting rid of ... neither perception nor non-perception – this is to get rid of the desire for calm and vision." Similarly, in the *Majjhima Nikāya* I (260) it is written that "[e]ven if this view of yours is purified thus, do not cling to it."¹⁶ Thus, even in the early *Vinaya* and *Dharma* teachings Buddhists were admonished not to apprehend the ultimate reality as a thing with a permanent and unchanging self-nature.

Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti compare emptiness to a medicine that cures the afflictions. This medicine, like a modern chemotherapeutic agent, must be neutralized or abandoned before it turns into an affliction worse than the disease and kills the patient. Similarly, in verse 13.8 Nāgārjuna warns that those who adopt the view of emptiness are incurable; holding onto the fact of the non-reality of persons and things is destructive.¹⁷ Candrakīrti explains with the story of a worker promised no wages for his work who, having finished the work, makes the mistake of an implicative negation by assuming that "no wages" refers to a thing besides mere absence of wages, and subsequently asks for wages called "no wages."¹⁸ Bhāvaviveka makes the same point by asserting that the non-existence of emptiness is like "the light of a butter lamp making clear the absence of a pot in a room, but it not making non-existence [of a pot]. It is not that if the [pot] does not exist, [its absence] would exist."¹⁹

Avalokitavrata,²⁰ using the ancient example, explains that the situation is like a traveller who wishes to cross a river on a raft, and, after crossing, abandons the raft and goes on his way. So, too, the person who wishes

to cross the river of views of entities relies on the view of emptiness as if it were a raft; after crossing the river of views of entities, he abandons the view of emptiness, like the raft, and goes on the path of non-abiding *nirvāna*.²¹ The hindrances or obstacles are specifically stated: "... the two extremes of conceptually constructed emptiness and non-emptiness are the obstacles to the practice of *Prajñāpāramitā* for the yogi abiding in non-conceptually constructed wisdom."²² Though the epistemological value of the ultimate was expressed differently over the centuries, the basic message is clear – Buddhists do not deny relative reality, and do not reify the ultimate.

It is true that only well-educated Buddhists had access to these texts and ideas in their full forms, and that the percentage of well-educated Buddhists in historical Asian cultures was relatively small. Still, in spite of the problems of accessibility, the Buddhist path to enlightenment includes philosophical perspectives. This singular function of Buddhist theory has been misunderstood as mere abstract philosophy, with no goal-orientation. Such is not the case, for these passages and all of the theoretical literature have the "... genuinely philosophical [subject-] matter of the spiritual and soteriological import of logic and epistemology."²³ Active analysis – to the limits of one's education and intellectual capacity – of the nature of persons and things, and here of conditioned entities and the ultimate reality, helps in the effort to understand the reality status of persons and things, and to progress on the path to enlightenment.²⁴

NOTES

¹ Nāgārjuna reportedly enjoyed the patronage of a Śātavahana king, in a time of radical changes in Buddhist theory, practice, and social interaction. See Ruegg (1981). See Vidya Dehejia. *Early Buddhist Rock Temples: A Chronology*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (1972); James Heitzman. *The Origin and Spread of Buddhist Monastic Institutions in South Asia 500 BC–300 AD*. South Asia Seminar Student Papers, Number 1, Department of South Asia Regional Studies, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania (1980); Gregory Schopen. "Doing Business for the Lord: Lending on Interest and Written Loan Contracts in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 114.4 (1994); Susan L. Huntington. *The Art of Ancient India: Buddhist, Hindu, Jain*. New York: Weatherhill (1985). Bhāvaviveka (ca. 500–570 CE) lived during a period of dynamism and growth of Buddhism in the Gupta dynasty, and is known for his criticism of Buddhāpālita (ca. 480–500 CE). Candrakīrti (ca. 600–650 CE) lived in the Post Gupta period, in the first half of the seventh century, perhaps under King Harṣa (ca. 609–647).

² L. de la Vallée Poussin. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*. St. Petersburg: Imprimerie de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences (1913). There is much scholarship regarding the philosophical

earlier commentator on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*. Bhāvaviveka is described as the founder or primary philosophical theorist of the Svātantrika position, and Candrakīrti the primary philosopher of the Prāsaṅgika. See the many studies on the debate between, and historical and philosophical development of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika in Jeffrey Hopkins. *Meditation on Emptiness*. Doctoral Dissertation. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms (1973); Donald S. Lopez. *A Study of Svātantrika*. Ithaca: Snow Lion (1987) esp. 55–81, 66–68, 78; David Seyfort Ruegg. *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz (1981); José Ignacio Cabézon. "The Prāsaṅgikas' Views on Logic: Tibetan dGe lugs pa Exegesis on the Question of Svātantras," Unpublished manuscript, Carleton College (In this paper Cabézon cites the debate between Bhāvya and Candrakīrti in defense of Buddhāpālita in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, chapter one, and the extensive but much later Tibetan commentaries on this issue); William L. Ames. "Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* – A Translation of Chapter One: 'Examination of Causal Conditions,' (*Pratyaya*)," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 21 (1993): 209–259; Tom T. J. Tillemans. "Tsong kha pa et al. on the Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti Debate," Shoren Ihara & Zuiho Yamaguchi (eds.) *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies*, Narita 1989, Vol. 1. Narita: Narita Shinshoji (1992): 315–326; Tadasi Tani. "Rang rgyud 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur [Hypothetical Negative/Indirect Reasoning (*prasaṅga*) with the Implication of Independent Direct Proof (*svatantra*)] [Tibetan Commentators' Meta-Interpretations on Dharmakīrti's Interpretations of *prasaṅga*]," Shoren Ihara & Zuiho Yamaguchi (eds.). *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies*, Narita 1989, Vol. 1. Narita: Narita Shinshoji (1992): 281–302; et al. The debate regarding the differences between Bhāvaviveka the Svātantrika and Candrakīrti the Prāsaṅgika is discussed in great detail in these sources.

³ See Ruegg, p. 9.

⁴ *Samsāra* and *nirvāna* are also described as inseparable, and are often poetically described as being of a "single flavor" (*ekarasa*). This term is found in *Mahāyānasūtras*: the *Dasabhūmika*, the *Laṅkāvatāra*, the *Saṃdhinirmocana*, and other *sūtras*, which were very possibly available to Nāgārjuna. See the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, etc. In Nāgārjuna's system persons and things come into existence in dependence on causes and conditions. This topic appears in the introductory verses to the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, and is discussed throughout the entire text, particularly in chapter one, chapter twenty-four, and chapter twenty-six (see LVP 556.6). See the explanation in Ruegg, pp. 42–47, where the ultimate is described as "... of course the sole truth. ... Yet the relative level is not to be dispensed with ..." (Ruegg 42).

⁵ Ruegg, p. 43. In this quotation I take Prof. Ruegg's gloss of *prattiyasamutpāda* from the preceding page in his text.

⁶ H. H. Dalai Lama. "A Survey of the Paths of Tibetan Buddhism," *Cho Yang: The Voice of Tibetan Religion & Culture* 5. Dharamsala: Department of Religion and Culture, Central Tibetan Administration of H. H. the Dalai Lama (1992) 10–29.

⁷ H. H. Dalai Lama. "A Survey of the Paths of Tibetan Buddhism," *Cho Yang: The Voice of Tibetan Religion & Culture* 5. Dharamsala: Department of Religion and Culture, Central Tibetan Administration of H. H. the Dalai Lama (1992) 10–29. For discussions on this and related points, see Keiji Nishitani. *Religion and Nothingness*. Berkeley: University of California Press (1982); Keiji Nishitani. "Nihilism and *Sūnyatā*," Nathan Katz (ed.). *Buddhist and Western Philosophy*. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers (1981): 379–420; see a related precise discussion on how Indian and Tibetan scholars wrestled with one of the problems of realities and non-realities in Georges Dreyfus. "Universal in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism," Shoren Ihara & Zuiho Yamaguchi (eds.). *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International*

Association for Tibetan Studies, Narita 1989, Vol. I. Narita: Narita Shinshoji (1992): 29–46. For further references, note the works cited in these sources and in the sources cited in the bibliography.

⁸ These ideas are discussed in much detail in brahmanical literature, in Buddhist *Abhidharma* literature, in the Buddhist Svātantrika Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka theories, and in the Prāsāngika literature. See bibliography, James Duerlinger. “Reductionist and Nonreductionist Theories of Persons in Indian Buddhist Philosophy,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 21 (1993): 79–101, et al.

⁹ *Samskāraparīkṣa*. The term *samskāra*, lit., “conditioning factors;” has the meaning of *samskrta*, lit., “conditioned entities.” See F. Edgerton. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary* 2. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (1972) 542–43; Jacques May. *Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*. Adrien-Maisonneuve (1959) n. 108.

¹⁰ *De kho na brtag pa. Tatva, de kho na*, MVY 1707, 7539. This variation is found in the commentaries by Bhāvaviveka, Buddhapālita, in the **Akutobhaya*, and the in the numerous Tibetan commentaries. *De kho na brtag pa*. Anonymous, **Akutobhaya*. D. T. Suzuki. *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition* Vol. 95. Tokyo: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute (1961): 68a; Buddhapālita. **Buddhapālita-mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*. D. T. Suzuki. *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition* Vol. 95. Tokyo: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute (1961): 246a4; Bhāvaviveka. **Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti*. D. T. Suzuki. *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition* Vol. 95. Tokyo: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute (1961): 182b5. The Chinese translations do not include this discrepancy; all commentaries render the title of this chapter as *guan xing pin*, **samskāra parīkṣa*. M. M. Takakusu & Kaigyoku Watanabe (eds.) *Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo*. Tokyo: Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo Kanko Kai (1924–1929): 30.1–3.

¹¹ P Avalo 321a1 ff.

¹² These devices convey meaning very well and at the same time raise a number of difficult interpretive questions. For example, some of the descriptive anecdotes in Nāgārjuna’s text are taken from Buddhist literature written years and even centuries before Nāgārjuna’s time, and from different literary genres. Further, Candrakīrti and Bhavya use the same anecdotes in their work, many centuries after Nāgārjuna. If religious teachings remain constant over centuries and in different cultural contexts, there is no problem. However, this seems not to be the case. For example, Nakamura asserts that the concept of *nirvāna* in early Buddhism was very different from that in subsequent centuries. See Hajime Nakamura. *Gotama Buddha*. Tokyo: Buddhist Books International (1987) 39–46, 57–65.

¹³ The full scope of what is negated by the Madhyamikas is detailed in many sources. See Jeffrey Hopkins. *Meditation on Emptiness*, Robert Thurman. *Tsongkhapa’s Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence*, the discussion and texts cited in José Ignacio Cabézon. “Book Reviews,” in *The Pacific World: Journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies* 8, New Series (Fall 1992): 100–102, et al.

¹⁴ See K. V. Abhyankar. *A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar*. Baroda: Oriental Institute (1977) 244, 272; see Pāṇini and commentaries, 1.4.57; 3.3.19; for an example of *prasajya* negation in Sanskrit literature, see Mallinātha’s *Sanjivinitika* on Kalidāsa’s *Raghuvamśa* in Ācārya Narayan Ram. *Raghuvamśa*. Delhi: Namaya Sagar (1948) p. 102.22 (commentary on *sargaḥ* 4, *śloka* 72): *nañāḥ prasajyapratīśedhe ‘pi samāsa isyate*. There are many other examples of shared vocabulary in the literary, grammatical, and philosophical traditions, including several others in the *Raghuvamśa*; see *Sanjivinitika* on *sargaḥ* 6, *śloka* 25: *bhāvaśūnyayā*; on *sargaḥ* 6, *śloka* 29: *nisargaṭāḥ svabhāvato*. This shows that Kalidāsa, Candrakīrti, and Bhāvaviveka, who lived in the same era, were writing in the conventions of literary Sanskrit of the day, though on different topics. For philosophical applications, see B. K. Matilal. *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*. The Hague: Mouton (1971) 162–164; R. Thurman. *Tsong Khapa’s Speech of Gold in the Essence*

of True Eloquence. Princeton (1984) 166–173, 376–381; Y. Ejima. *Development of Madhyamika Philosophy in India: Studies on Bhāvaviveka*. Nagaoka, Japan (1979) 495–500; Y. Kajiyama. “Bhāvaviveka and the Prāsāngika School,” in S. Mookerjee (ed.). *The Nava-Nalanda Mahavihara Research Publication I*. Nalanda: Mahavihara (1957).

¹⁵ A raft, in Pali a *kulla*, used as follows. “... [The Buddha] vanishing from the hither bank of the Ganges, reappearing on the further bank together with the order of monks. ... See! People tie their rafts – but crossed over are the wise.... Then the Lord addressed the monks, saying, ‘Monks, it is by not understanding and not penetrating the four *ariyan* truths that there is this long running-on and faring on both for me and for you.... Therefore, monks, if the *ariyan* truth of ill is understood ... [cause, cessation, and path to cessation] ... then cut off is the craving for becoming, destroyed is the conduit for becoming, there is not now again-becoming.’ Not seeing the four *ariyan* truths as they really are, Long is the journey fared-on in birth after birth; When these are seen, removed is the conduit for becoming, The root of ill cut off, there is not now again-becoming.” *Mahāvagga* VI in I. B. Horner (tr.). *The Book of the Discipline (Vinaya-Piṭaka)* IV. London: The Pali Text Society (1982): 314–315.

¹⁶ E. Conze (ed.). *Buddhist Texts Through the Ages*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row (1964): 88–90; 225–226.

¹⁷ For semantic, diagnostic, and therapeutic parallels between Buddhist and medical theories, see Kenneth Zysk. *Asceticism and Healing in Ancient India*. New York: Oxford University Press (1991).

¹⁸ Tsong Khapa (1357–1419) explains non-implicative negation: “... the scriptural references ... teach intrinsic realitylessness in their actual [non-implicative] negation of intrinsic reality, the rational cognition negative of intrinsic reality cognizes intrinsic realitylessness in its actual negation of intrinsic reality, and the reason negative of intrinsic reality proves intrinsic realitylessness in its actual negation of intrinsic reality. These (facts) must be accepted, and one must not assert that the scriptural references have no subject, the cognition has no object, and the reason has no probandum.” R. Thurman. *Tsong Khapa’s Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence*. Princeton (1984) 167.

¹⁹ *Prajñāpradīpa*, P189a7.

²⁰ P Avalo 342b7 ff.

²¹ *Mi gnas pa’i mya ngan las ‘das pa, apratiṣṭhitanirvāna*.

²² P Avalo 343a2 ff.

²³ “... [O]ne trend in the Tibetan schools was to conceive of epistemology – i. e., *ishad ma*, or *Pramāna*-studies – as a secular science, comparable to grammar, etc ... [I]t is still a typical stance of many Tibetans who maintain strong separation between the meditational-yogic aspects of Buddhism – which they take as being quintessential – and its logico-philosophical speculations, which they take as being by and large of little or no religious value.” Tom T. J. Tillemans. *Persons of Authority*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag (1993): 2, see Preface, 1–24; see R. R. Jackson. “The Buddha as *Pramāṇabhūta*: Epithets and Arguments in the Buddhist ‘Logical’ Tradition,” in *Journal of Indian Philosophy* (1988): 10–12; W. L. Ames. “The Notion of *Svabhāva* in the Thought of Candrakīrti,” in *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 10 (1982): 161–177.

²⁴ In his introduction to Hegel’s “Lectures,” P. C. Hodgson remarks that Hegel’s work attempts to ‘ground both theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge,’ and to ‘interrelate the theoretical and the practical ...’ This ‘speculative’ philosophy is ‘reflection upon reflection.’ Hegel states: “Speculative philosophy also grounds aesthetic, religious, and historical experience. In grounding religious experience, it does not produce a theology in the traditional ‘metaphysical’ sense of the word.”

of supersensible entities." Peter C. Hodgson (ed.). *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion – One Volume Edition: The Lectures of 1827*. Berkeley: University of California Press (1988): 12.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- BHSD F. Edgerton. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*, vol. 2. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (1972).
- CAvalo Avalokitavrata. *Prajñāpradīpaṅkā*, in the *Co Ne Tanjur*. Stony Brook, New York: Institute for the Advanced Studies of World Religions (Microfiche): vol. 21.
- CBhavya Bhāvaviveka. *Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyakvṛtti*, in the *Co Ne Tanjur*. Stony Brook, New York: Institute for the Advanced Studies of World Religions (Microfiche): vol. 18.
- DAvalo Avalokitavrata. *Prajñāpradīpaṅkā*, in K. Hayashima, J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi and Y. Ejima (eds.). *Sde Dge Tibetan Tripitaka Bstan 'gyur*. Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kando Kyokai (1977–79): vol. 5.
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- LVP L. de la Vallée Poussin. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*. St. Petersburg: Imprimerie de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences (1913).
- May Jacques May. *Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyama-*

- PAvalo Avalokitavrata. *Prajñāpradīpaṅkā*, in D. T. Suzuki (ed.). *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition*. Tokyo and Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute (1961): vol. 97.
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APPENDIX

- *PRAJÑĀPRADĪPAMŪLAMADHYAMAKAVṚTTI 13: *SĀMSKĀRAPARĪKṢA'
*PRAJÑĀPRĀDĪPA 13, "THE EXAMINATION OF REALITY"²

Now, by answering refutations³ and with independent inferences,⁴ I will write the thirteenth chapter in order to show that in a particular aspect⁵ conditioned entities lack self-nature.

In regard to:

That which is deceptive is false (13.1a)

and so on, false [is said] because it is the object of wrong knowledge, because of the deception of the common person by means of the self, and so on⁶ which have the ultimate reality as object.⁷ In this connection, false is the indicated term, and deceptive is the indicatory term.⁸

The Blessed One spoke thus. (13.1b)

[The Blessed One said thus] in a *sūtra*. The word "thus" (*iti*) means that which was taught. What is it that the Blessed One proclaimed in the *sūtra*? It is stated in both a *Śrāvakayāna*(*sūtra*):

It's like this: Those things which are conditioned are false and deceptive. Oh Bhikṣus! It's like this: Non-deceptive *nirvāna* is

GEORGE DREYFUS

CAN THE FOOL LEAD THE BLIND? PERCEPTION AND THE GIVEN IN DHARMAKĪRTI'S THOUGHT

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The nature of perception is directly related to the question of the given in the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition, especially in the writings of Dharmakīrti (600–660 Ad.)¹ and some of his major Indian and Tibetan commentators. Due to their philosophical importance, the questions of whether objects of knowledge are given to experience and whether knowledge is reducible to experience are central in Dharmakīrti's tradition. In this essay, I delineate two distinctive answers to these questions among Dharmakīrti's commentators. One is a revisionist trend associated with Dharmottara (750–810), and the other is a more literal interpretation associated with the Tibetan polymath Sa-skya Paṇḍita (1182–1251). Whereas the former seeks to coordinate perception and conception through modifying the understanding of perception, the latter struggles with the problem raised by Dharmakīrti's system without modifying its basic terms.

The general lines of Dharmakīrti's philosophy are well known and need not be belaboured here. Briefly, like his model Dignāga, Dharmakīrti is essentially preoccupied with questions regarding the nature of knowledge, or, rather, its Indian equivalent *pramāṇa* (*tshad ma*). Whereas his Hindu opponents tend to present a realist theory, which allows a liberal diversity of *pramāṇa*, Dharmakīrti offers a more restrictive view in accordance with his anti-realism. The interpretation of the word *pramāṇa* reflects itself the debate among Buddhist and Hindu thinkers. For Buddhists, *pramāṇa* means "valid cognition,"² whereas for most Hindus, this word refers to "means of valid cognition" in accordance with its grammatical (instrumental) form.³

Dharmakīrti's view about the nature and types of valid cognition is based on a principled ontological distinction between real individual objects, called *svalakṣaṇa* (*rang mtshan*), and conceptual constructs, called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (*spyi mtshan*). Conceptual constructs are fictional properties, agreed upon universals, that we project onto reality despite their not being part of the fabric of reality. The main function of the distinction between real things and constructs is to support an epistem-

ology that differentiates and limits knowledge (or, valid cognition) to two types, perception (*pratyakṣa, mngon sum*)⁴ and inference (*anumāna, rjes dpag*). These two types of cognition are distinguished not only on the basis of their modes of apprehension but mostly on the basis of their objects: whereas perception relates to real individuals through experience, inference apprehends unreal conceptual constructs on the basis of reasoning. Explaining knowledge in this way connects the ontological and epistemological levels of Dharmakīrti's system. Real individuals are apprehended only by perception, which thus provides an accurate cognitive link to reality. Inference, which is distorted, proceeds to conceptualize objects by superimposing fictional properties onto reality on the basis of the knowledge provided by perception. In this way inference provides accurate guidance, despite its being unreliable in and of itself.

This system seems at first sight to offer a straight-forward empiricist epistemology according to which knowledge is reducible to the apprehension and internalization of what is given to the senses. This essay argues that depicting Dharmakīrti as an empiricist, as suggested by several modern scholars,⁵ is incorrect. It is true that Dharmakīrti's epistemology is empirically inclined. Like his Nyāya opponents, Dharmakīrti gives primacy to perception among the forms of knowledge. Moreover, Dharmakīrti holds that the only other form of knowledge, inference, is valid only due to its reliance on perception. Hence, perception does form the foundation of Dharmakīrti's theory of knowledge. This does not mean, however, that Dharmakīrti is an empiricist, at least in the strict sense of the word. That is, Dharmakīrti does not subscribe to what Wilfrid Sellars calls the Myth of the Given, which I take to be the defining characteristic of empiricism strictly understood.

According to this myth, some elements of reality are given to us in their immediacy with absolute authority. Certain knowledge events possess an authority of their own by virtue of the sheer givenness of what they apprehend. Sellars puts it this way:

The idea that observation 'strictly and properly so-called' is constituted by certain self-authenticating episodes, the authority of which is transmitted to verbal and quasi-verbal performances when these performances are made 'in conformity with the semantic rules of the language' is, of course, the heart of the Myth of the Given. For the *given*, in epistemological tradition is what is *taken* by these self-authenticating episodes.⁶

We know certain things directly, with absolute authority. Verbal statements then are just ways to communicate what we know in isolation from conceptual schema, or to speak like some contemporary thinkers in the privacy of our minds.

In this essay I argue that Dharmakīrti and his tradition do not subscribe to the Myth of the Given and, hence, are not empiricist. In order to show this, I analyze the role of memory (*smṛti, dran pa*)⁷ in the theory of perception defended by Dharmakīrti and his tradition. This may at first seem a rather surprising topic to introduce in this discussion, for it is well known that memory is almost universally excluded from being a *pramāna* among Indian epistemologists.⁸ Dharmakīrti is no exception,⁹ and repeatedly argues that memory is not valid in the technical sense of the term since it is not non-deceptive, the defining characteristic of *pramāna* for Dharmakīrti.¹⁰ Thus, it may seem that memory must be irrelevant to perception, which is universally accepted as a *pramāna*. This view, I argue, is mistaken, for perception crucially relies on memory in order to provide knowledge.

The exclusion of memory from being a *pramāna* is a consequence of the generally accepted understanding of the notion of *pramāna*. Contrary to the Western concept of knowledge which refers to an endurable quality possessed by the knowing person, the Indian term *pramāna* (as well as other related terms such as *jñāna* and *pramā*) depicts a mental event that cognizes the object as a momentary knowledge-event. Knowing is understood as a phenomenological process made of transitory mental states that last the duration of the particular mental mode, much like a mood comes and goes. Each mental state is a moment of awareness that takes stock of its object. Once this mental state has passed, the person is left with only the traces of the knowledge-event, memory. The consequence of this momentary conception of knowledge is that memory is not a *pramāna*. Since it merely recalls a knowledge-event, it is not an instrument of knowledge. It can only repeat the cognitive results achieved by previous cognitions. Moreover, *smṛti* understood in this epistemological sense is notoriously unreliable. We cannot rely on a mere recollection, for it brings no certainty concerning the object we remember. Thus, it does not satisfy the requirement that cognitions be non-deceptive and, hence, is not valid.

The exclusion of memory from being valid is not unique to Dharmakīrti's system. It is a basic assumption shared by almost all Indian epistemologists. In Dharmakīrti's system, however, the exclusion of memory from the sphere of validity creates great difficulties. My point here is to examine those areas of difficulty by investigating the articulation of memory and perception. I show that given Dharmakīrti's theory of perception, it is difficult and yet necessary to exclude memory from the sphere of validity. Perception in isolation cannot provide useful knowledge unless it is supplemented by perceptual judgments, which

are nothing but memories induced by previous experiences. Hence, memory, is necessary to perception. And yet, it is not valid!

Dharmakīrti himself does not seem to ever face squarely this tension. The task of clarifying the role of memory and its difficult articulation with perception has been left to his followers. After briefly summarizing Dharmakīrti's treatment of the question, I turn to two distinctive currents within his tradition. First, I examine Dharmottara's attempts to solve this problem. This analysis uncovers important and surprising conceptual revisions to the system. I suggest that this is the starting point for a long process of modifying Dharmakīrti's system which has continued in Tibet. After briefly examining this revisionist current, I examine a more orthodox attempt by Sa-skyā Paṇḍita to find in the reflexive function of awareness a solution consistent with Dharmakīrti's original system.

DHARMAKĪRTI'S VIEW IN CONTEXT

Let us begin by briefly summarizing Dharmakīrti's theory of perception¹¹ in preparation for examining its relation to memory. Dharmakīrti's view is that perception is both free from conceptuality and undistorted.¹² To understand the implications of this view, let us place it within the context of the Nyāya philosophy, which serves as the dominant account of perception in classical India.¹³ This will allow us to understand the reasons for Dharmakīrti's necessary and yet unenforceable rejection of the validity of memory.

To greatly simplify, Nyāya thinkers distinguish two stages in the perceptual process: the first is a bare contact with the object in its sheer givenness. At this stage, we do not understand the nature of the object confronting us but just see, for example, a lump. The second stage is the subsequent articulation of reality through a perceptual judgment¹⁴ that understands the object as it is. We now see the lump as, for example, a jar by categorizing the bare object (the lump) under its proper universal (being a jar). In opposition to the first inarticulate moment, this second moment is propositional, for "it is a logical complex analyzable into constituent elements and relations."¹⁵ It is not, however, verbal, but merely provides the perceptual basis for linguistic formulations, which fall outside of the perceptual realm. The Nyāya call this form of perception determinate (*savikalpaka, rtog pa dang bcas pa*),¹⁶ as distinguished from the first stage, the mere sensing of the object, which is called indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka, rtog pa med pa*). The doctrine of determinate perception is an expression of the

realism¹⁷ of this school. It is the central element in the Nyāya theory of perception and one of the main points of contention with Buddhist¹⁸ epistemologists.

Dharmakīrti's theory of perception must be seen as a response to and a modification of this account of perception, which is rather convincing from a common sense point of view. Since he holds that there are no real universals,¹⁹ Dharmakīrti cannot accept the existence of determinate perception. And yet, he still thinks of perception within the Nyāya framework. This leads him to hold that perception can only be indeterminate, and hence lacks any categorization or articulation. This view is a direct consequence of Dharmakīrti's anti-realism. It raises, however, enormous difficulties for his fundamental task, the defense of an epistemology embodying Buddhist principles.

Initially Dharmakīrti's account of the validity of knowledge in a world of individuals describes the negative nature of conceptual knowledge (the famous *apoha* theory),²⁰ which is an explanation of how conceptual knowledge is possible in the absence of real universals. Dharmakīrti also attempts to demonstrate that conceptual knowledge has practical validity, despite being inherently distorted. Practical validity, however, must be grounded on an unproblematic form of knowledge, which is perception in Dharmakīrti's system. Hence, Dharmakīrti's epistemological program must elaborate a credible alternative to the generally accepted Nyāya account of perception, showing that perception can provide unproblematic knowledge of a world of particulars.

This task is made particularly difficult by Dharmakīrti's logical and yet problematic refusal of the Nyāya determinate form of perception and his view that perception does not articulate reality. For Dharmakīrti, perception is necessarily non-propositional. Articulation is exclusively conceptual and does not bear on perception. Therefore perception is limited to a bare sensing which does not directly produce any useable information. Hence, the epistemological status of perception, i.e., its status as a valid cognition, is problematic. Let me explain this.

Dharmakīrti understands the notion of valid cognition in relation to the world of practical concerns. He holds that a cognition is valid if, and only if, it is non-deceptive (*avisamvādi, mi slu ba*) with respect to the practical function performed by some real thing. For example, my perception of a fire is a non-deceptive if, and only if, it allows me to correctly identify the object in relation to the practical purposes such as burning, cooking, etc., that it can perform. In short, the validity of a cognition is based on its practical ability to lead us towards successful practical actions.

This practical understanding of epistemological validity, however, is difficult to apply to perception, for achieving a practical purpose depends on correctly categorizing the object we encounter. This requires that the correct description be applied to the object, and hence falls in the conceptual realm. For example, we see a lump and apply the concept of jar. It is only once the correct description has been applied to the lump that it can become an object of practical appropriation. Successful categorization of the object is not produced by perception itself, which only puts us in touch with the bare object (the lump) existing moment by moment. It is the conceptual thought subsuming the object under an appropriate universal (being a jar) that makes the perception part of the practical world.

Since the epistemological status of perception involves success in practical endeavours and since this success relies on conceptuality, it seems that perception can only be a form of knowledge in dependence on conception. This conclusion is not, however, acceptable to Dharmakīrti, for it completely undermines the foundational role of perception in his system. It furthermore threatens to make his account circular, for the epistemological support of conceptuality was supposed to lie in perception, the unproblematic foundation of knowledge. This foundation, however, can never be secured since the epistemological validity of perception seems to rely on the collaboration of concepts. It is here that we can see the important and yet unacknowledged role of memory in Dharmakīrti's theory of perception.

THE HIDDEN ROLE OF MEMORY

According to Dharmakīrti's system, the judgments that categorize perceptions and allow us to act successfully are forms of memory in two different but related ways: they apprehend an object which has been apprehended by perception previously but which is already gone (due to the momentary nature of reality). These judgments also subsume an individual under an already conceived (and unreal) universal category.²¹ Dharmakīrti describes such recollective consciousnesses as relative cognitions (*samvṛtijñāna*, *kun rdzob shes pa*),²² and excludes them from validity. He says:

[We] do not accept relative cognitions [as non-deceptive] because they apprehend that which has [already] been apprehended.²³

Dharmakīrti does not spell out what he means by "relative cognition." The term itself, which in Buddhist tradition often has the connotation

of obscurity, indicates that such cognitions are not the "real thing," that is, they are not valid. His direct disciple Devendrabuddhi is more explicit.²⁴ He explains that "relative cognition" means memory, which is conventional (*samvṛti*, *kun rdzob*) because it obscures the clear vision of reality.²⁵

As stated earlier, the exclusion of memory from the sphere of validity is common among Indian epistemologists, although such exclusion takes on very different meanings for different traditions. For the Nyāya system, which holds that perceptual judgments are propositional, the exclusion of memory is unproblematic. Perceptual judgments are not forms of memory because they apprehend and categorize objects as we perceive them in the present. Memories are different, for they merely repeat the categorization already achieved by perceptual judgments described as determinate perceptions. Hence, they are not valid.

This exclusion is harder to maintain for Dharmakīrti, who includes what the Nyāya describe as perceptual judgments in the category of memory. Thus, the exclusion of memory has much larger consequences for Dharmakīrti than for the Naiyāyika, for the category of memory is much more inclusive in the former's system. For Dharmakīrti, describing as memory what Nyāya describes as determinate perception is an essential point. It is a way to refute the Nyāya account, thus opening the door to his own view. Judgments that are held by the Nyāya to be perceptual are shown to be memories of past objects. As such they cannot be valid. In this way Nyāya realism is undermined. Including such judgments in memory and excluding them from epistemological validity ensures for Dharmakīrti the validity of his philosophy of perception, which in turn reflects and supports his anti-realist ontology.

Dharmakīrti's account of perception presupposes that the epistemological status of perception can be secured independently of memory. This, however, is difficult, since perception can be a form of knowledge if, and only if, it has the capacity to bring about successful activity. Since this requires adequate categorization and since perception cannot articulate its object, it appears that perception cannot be valid in isolation. Dharmakīrti might be obliged to grant some validity to memory after all! But this is not possible either, for memory is almost universally excluded from validity among Indian epistemologists. To admit the validity of memory would be, for Dharmakīrti, tantamount to acknowledging that his epistemological enterprise has failed. What can he do?

As he is essentially preoccupied by negative considerations such as defending Dignāga's system and refuting the Nyāya philosophy,

Dharmakīrti largely ignores these questions. He asserts the validity of perception, excludes judgments from validity by including them in memory, and neglects to explain how perception can be the foundation of knowledge despite its seeming reliance on conceptual elaboration. Faced with mounting criticism from their philosophical adversaries, his followers cannot avoid this issue. Much of the later development of the Buddhist philosophy of perception consists of their attempts to solve this problem. I will not describe these developments in detail,²⁶ but I will mention just two different roads taken by commentators.

One approach attempts to solve the difficulty by transforming the terms of the problem. This revisionist current, found in some of Dharmottara's texts, makes various attempts to formulate a richer epistemology. It is also found in other Indian commentators such as Śaṅkarānda and Mokṣakaragupta (eleventh-twelfth century). This trend is continued in Tibet by rNgog Lo-tṣā-ba bLo-ldan shes-rab (1059–1109),²⁷ Phywa-pa Chos-kyi-seng-ge (1182–1251)²⁸ and the dGe-lugs-pa tradition, all of which present perception as a form of propositional knowledge despite its being non-conceptual. The second, more orthodox, current attempts to find a solution without transforming the meaning of Dharmakīrti's basic terms. Here, I will examine a view elaborated by Sa-skya Paṇḍita (henceforth Sa-pan), one of Dharmakīrti's foremost commentators. But let us start with the more revisionist views of Dharmottara which seem to mark an important stage in the transformation of Buddhist epistemology.

DHARMOTTARA'S UNORTHODOX SOLUTIONS

Dharmottara²⁹ struggles with the problems raised by Dharmakīrti's theory of perception. In particular, he is troubled by the contradiction between perception's foundational role and its seeming dependence on conception. How can perception be valid if its reliability depends on perceptual judgments, which are conceptual and hence in principle not valid (since they are not inferential)? After describing the problem, he offers the following distinction as a solution:

A conceiving [consciousness induced] by the power of a perception conceives that [we] see a thing, not that we conceptualize [it]. Moreover, seeing is what is done by perception, it is the function of perception. Accordingly, the nature of conceptual cognition [of] a hidden thing is to conceptualize, not to see. Experience establishes that the function of conceptual cognition is to conceptualize. Therefore, [in the case of a judgement, such a conceiving consciousness] leaves aside its own function and exhibits that of perception. From [that it follows] that only a perception is a valid cognition with respect to the thing towards which the conceiving consciousness has become perceptual.³⁰

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Dharmottara's solution is based on a distinction between the functions of perception and conception. Whereas the function of perception is to see an object, the function of conception is to conceive of a momentarily hidden object. Our perceptual experiences are cases of seeing objects, not of conceiving of them. Therefore, a perceptual judgment conceives that we see an object, not that we conceive of it. The perceptual function of seeing is thereby taken over by conception making the object directly available to us.

This account shows that perception is valid despite the fact that its object is made available to us only through the intervention of conceptions in the form of perceptual judgments. Dharmottara concludes further that in this case only perception is valid. This is so because conception assimilates the object seen by perception and carries it over to the conceptual domain by assuming the function of perception. Dharmottara argues that, since such a conception is not carrying out the function proper to the conceptual domain, the validity of the whole experience is entirely due to the perception.

Dharmottara must reach this conclusion to avoid accepting the Nyāya idea of a determinate perception. For, the Nyāya accepts bare perception as valid, but also holds the judgment that follows to be valid in its own right. Dharmottara's solution, however, is hardly satisfactory because it assumes rather than establishes a distinction in the functions of perception and conception. It presupposes that conceptual cognitions function to conceptualize, i.e., conceive, construct, imagine, etc., following the Buddhist repudiation of realism. Since the objects conceived of by thought are not part of reality, they must be constructed or imputed.

According to the Nyāya, objects conceived of by thought are real, for the function of thought is not limited to imagining, but is closely linked with reality. Thought is able to understand the general and abstract aspects of reality, which are not accessible to bare perception. Without this, human knowledge would be reduced to the bare sensing of particulars.

Due to their commitment to a sparse ontology, Buddhist epistemologists cannot agree with the rather convincing Nyāya account of human experience as a combination of perception and conception. Their philosophy privileges the particular over the general: reality is made up of a plurality of elements, and generality is, at best, the result of atomic aggregation (when it is not a figment of our imagination). This emphasis on the particular expresses itself on the epistemological level, where perception is valued over conception. These two levels (ontological and epistemological) of the system are inseparable. Nevertheless, they pull

in different directions. Whereas ontology favors a policy of sparsity, in which the general is given inferior status, epistemology requires that we consider general characteristics as well.

This situation can give rise to two attitudes: we might choose, as do the Naiyāyika, not to sacrifice the integrity of the epistemological level and to pay the price of a crowded ontology. Or, like the Buddhist, we might refuse to pay this price and try to patch things up when it comes to epistemology. There, thought is allowed a limited validity as inference but is denied any other role. Thought infers the real but does not apprehend it, because it is deprived of any direct access to it. Therefore, Dharmottara must deny that in the perceptual process thought has any validity of its own.

Another difficulty with Dharmottara's explanations is that they, even more than Dharmakīrti's, assume that conceptions and perceptions work together. For a conception to assume the function of a prior perception, it must be possible for conceptions and perceptions to operate in relation to exactly the same object. For example, I see an object which I categorize as a fire. In order for this categorization to have any relevance to the perceptual experience, it must relate to the seen object. This, however, is impossible since for Dharmakīrti conceptions cannot apprehend the objects of perception.

Contrary to their Brahmanical adversaries, for whom different types of valid cognition coalesce (*pramāṇa-samplava, tshad ma bslad pa*),³¹ Dharmakīrti and his followers are committed to a radical dichotomy between the two types of valid cognition (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā, tshad ma rnam par bzhaḡ pa*). This is a direct consequence of the ontological dichotomy between real specifically characterized (*svalakṣaṇa, rang mtshan*) and conceptual generally characterized phenomena (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa, spyi mtshan*).³² Perception can only apprehend real individuals and conception only unreal constructs.

Since no epistemological link between perceptions and conceptions is in principle possible in Dharmakīrti's system, the only possible link between the two must be causal. Categorization of an object as a fire, for example, is epistemically relevant to the real fire because it is induced by the experience of the real object. Such an explanation, however, cannot account for the coordination between perceptions and conceptions. It cannot guarantee that our concepts are in touch with reality. The simple fact that I think "this is a fire" after seeing an object does not ensure that I have indeed seen a fire. I can have such an idea after seeing a red patch. Nor does my seeing a fire ensure that my idea factually applies to the fire I have seen. Such an experience could have

given rise to wrong ideas such as "this is a cold object" or "this fire is permanent."

What is required is that my perception and conception of fire cognitively bear on the same real object. Such an epistemic coordination between perception and conception, however, is impossible in Dharmakīrti's system, predicated as it is on a strict dichotomy between these two types of valid cognition on the basis of their having different objects. Dharmottara sees the problem quite well and makes several attempts to solve it. I will mention briefly two attempts which I find puzzling, but the lengthy discussion of which would take us away from our main topic.

First, Dharmottara tries to bridge the gap between perception and conception by making a distinction between the object held (*grahya, gzung ba*) and the object conceived (*adhyavasaya, zhen pa*).³³ The held object is the object directly held by a cognition. It is understood in terms of appearance.³⁴ An individual momentary thing is the held object of perception, while an unreal concept is the held object of conception. Insofar as we are aware, however, we do not perceive things as being momentary and we do not believe our thinking to bear only on fictitious concept. Rather, we think that we relate to a stable reality and conceive of our ideas as applying to real things. These objects of practical concern are what Dharmottara terms the conceived objects of perception and conception, respectively.

Dharmottara attributes a conceived object to perception, an idea that even his Tibetan followers, who often take him as their main source,³⁵ will not adopt. It seems difficult to accept that perception, which is non-conceptual, has a conceived object. Why does Dharmottara have such a singular view? I think that he is attempting to bridge the gap between conceptions and perceptions by asserting that they have different held objects but similar conceived objects, thus establishing the unity of the cognitive process, in which both types of cognition relate to the same object, albeit in different ways.³⁶ In this way Dharmakīrti's radical dichotomy is saved, and reinterpreted as applying to the direct objects of cognitions. Moreover, the epistemological status of perception can be established on the basis of a minimal level of coordination between perceptions and conceptions. Both can be said to bear on the same object because they both, at least indirectly, cognize the same conceived object.³⁷

In what I take to be a second attempt at bridging the gap between conception and perception, Dharmottara proposes an even more puzzling view. In this case his solution is to reintroduce the distinction

between determinate and indeterminate perception, the same Nyāya view Dharmakīrti spent so much time criticizing!³⁸ In an answer to an opponent, Dharmottara explains how perceptions can lead to practical activities. The opponent assumes that perception is the mere holding of objects present in the perceptual ken without determination, devoid of understanding and practically ineffective. Dharmottara answers:³⁹

Ideas such as "this," [i.e.,] "this leads to happiness, that leads to suffering," are ascertained as perception. [For] when something is determined, the person who establishes a practical convention determines the proximate object as leading to happiness. That which is said to lead to happiness or suffering is the object of application ... Such an application must have ascertainment. [The] opponent thinks that because perception does not [ascertain anything], it [cannot] engage [in practical activities]. Master [Dharmakīrti responds that] this is true for the things that are subsuming or subsumed. In order to show that both determinate and indeterminate perceptions are causes of application [in practical activities], the master said "this fault is not present." There are two types [of case in which] there is no object of application: sometimes, a perception does not take [anything] as its object of application due to its not [being able] to ascertain the nature [of the object]. [At other times], indeterminate perception does not take [anything] as object of application due to the lack of proximity of a previously seen activity (i.e., due to the lack of habituation) ... Accordingly, determinate perception separately ascertains the location, time, and aspect [of the object. Moreover, the cognition which is produced by the power of indeterminate [perception] ascertains that which is held by perception.⁴⁰

This passage is quite puzzling, for it seems to reintroduce the idea of determinate perception which Dharmakīrti so abundantly refuted. It is therefore difficult to interpret such a passage. One must wonder how seriously Dharmottara can propose a type of perception which so clearly contradicts Dharmakīrti's theory of perception.⁴¹ Such a view might not even reflect his own opinion. In any case, it shows the difficulty that Dharmottara has in accounting for the relation between perception and conception.

Although his formulation is surprising and problematic, Dharmottara's intention seems to be here again to establish greater unity between perceptions and conceptions. To do so, he differentiates two types of perception: determinate and indeterminate (*savikalpika*, *rtog pa can* – *nirvikalpika*, *rtog pa med pa can*). Although Dharmottara is not very explicit about how the distinction is drawn, we can assume that determinate perceptions identify their object as this or that (or at least immediately contribute to their identification), whereas indeterminate perceptions can only sense their objects and produce later judgements. For example, the perception present in the experience of perceptual reduction does not induce any certainty in us at the time of the experience. It is only afterwards that we are able to recollect the object (i.e., its touch as it was experienced at that time).

Determinate perception is able to determine indirectly the nature and function of the object it perceives. For example, I see a round object which I identify as a pot. This ascertainment is due to perception itself. It requires previous acquaintance with the nature and the function of the object. Nevertheless, one could argue that the identification of the object is not due to the conception following the perceptual experience but to the perception itself, which leads us to successful action.

SA-PAN'S SOLUTION

Later Indian and Tibetan thinkers have continued to reflect on this problem and come up with their own solutions, which are often continuations of Dharmottara's efforts. Tibetan epistemologists such as rNgog and Phywa-pa propose that perception is not restricted to the apprehension of bare particulars, but grasps an already articulated object.⁴² Again, this solves the problem by changing its terms. Perception is no longer a direct contact between mind and external reality that is distinguished from conceptual mediation by its non-propositional character. Rather, it is an articulated apprehension of reality which is psychologically unmediated by concepts. Since perception apprehends a categorically loaded reality, and since it is similar in function to conception, the validity of perception and its coordination with conception are no longer problematic.

To accept this view, however, entails a radical transformation of the tenets of Dharmakīrti's system. Under the influence of the Indian Paṇḍita Śākya Śrībhadrā (1182–1251), Sa-pan notices the discrepancy between the Tibetan epistemologies of his day and Dharmakīrti's system. His famous *Tshad ma rigs gter* is an attempt to expose these distortions and recover the original system.⁴³ In this text Sa-pan returns to Dharmakīrti's original idea that perception provides an unarticulated view of bare momentary objects. Sa-pan attempts to find solutions to the problems we have noticed in Dharmakīrti's account of how perception and memory relate.

According to Sa-pan, the problem with perceptual knowledge stems from our necessary reliance on conceptual thinking, which is a result of our inability to relate to things as they are. Unlike noble beings,⁴⁴ ordinary beings cannot operate by the power of meditative concentration. Instead, they relate to reality through concepts they construct on the basis of their experiences. This necessarily entails distortions. Sa-pan describes this situation:

The valid cognitions of ordinary beings engage in [desirable activities] and withdraw [from undesirable ones] solely by ascertainment. Noble beings [absorbed in] non-conceptual states are said to act by [the power of] concentration.⁴⁵

Buddhist philosophers do not see our reliance on distorted concepts as an insurmountable limitation to the human condition, but as the result of the ignorance (*avidyā*, *ma rig pa*) that dominates our minds. Noble beings, who have eliminated this ignorance or are in the process of doing so, can enter non-conceptual states in which their actions arise spontaneously attuned to reality. This type of activity, which prefigures the unfathomable way in which a Buddha relates to reality, is a direct and undistorted relation to reality.

In the absence of an unmediated link to reality, ordinary beings act by relying on conceptual constructs. Inasmuch as these creations relate successfully to reality (and are not totally imaginary), they proceed through judgments of the type "this blue pot is beautiful," etc. The nature of such judgments are the subject of contention between the different epistemologies. The Nyāya school takes them to be another form (determinate) of perception. Tibetan realists take these judgments to conceptualize the cognitive content already present in the perceptual act. Sa-pan understands these judgments, which are induced by perceptions, to introduce new epistemic content by ascertaining (i.e., conceptually categorizing) their objects.

For Sa-pan, ordinary knowledge is achieved by applying the proper concept to the reality given to us by perception. It is not achieved by mere perception but requires active categorization on our part. Accordingly, perception does not determine the situation cognitively understood, but brings about certain forms of conceptual activity in which we apply or withdraw concepts we have previously learned. These forms of memory are necessarily conceptual. For example, the judgement "this blue pot is beautiful" does not come about just by mere acquaintance with the object but requires a conceptual elaboration in which concepts are formed by excluding contrary assumptions such as "this is not blue," "this is not a pot" and "this is not beautiful."⁴⁶ This conceptual activity is not arbitrary, for it arises within the limitations imposed by experience, but it does not reflect directly reality. Our assertions and negations, which constitute our knowledge, are based indirectly on the reality we perceive. In other words, the truth of our conceptions is based on their being connected with perception.

This epistemology of perception leads to a major difficulty. Perception gives the object as it is, but is not able to determine what it is. Conception

but does not see it. Knowledge of the external world necessitates both seeing and conceiving and, therefore, requires the cooperation of these two cognitive elements, which are powerless in isolation. This cooperation is, however, problematic in Dharmakīrti's system in which perception and conception relate to entirely different objects. How can the two work together cognitively? Sa-pan answers through a pithy metaphor:

Sense consciousness is like the fool who sees. Conceptions is like a blind skillful speaker. Self-cognition is like [a person] with complete senses, who introduces one to the other.⁴⁷

Perception is like the fool; it sees objects but is unable to characterize them. This job is performed by conception, the blind and clever person skilled in describing what she does not see. The cooperation between the two requires an intermediary because perception and conception do not apprehend the same objects. Sa-pan finds this intermediary in the reflexivity of apperception, or to put it in Dharmakīrtian terms, self-cognition (*rang rig*, *svasamvitti*).

Apperception⁴⁸ is the factor of mind that ensures the transparency and immediacy of our mental states. When we are aware of something, we are at the same time cognizant of our awareness. This self-presenting is not objectified, for we are not aware of ourselves in quite the same way as we are aware of external objects. Nevertheless, our own experiences do not go unnoticed, and are integrated into the continuity of our conscious life, without any necessary mediation. We do not have to think that we experience, for we are unthematically aware of this fact. Although we might not know the full implications of our experiences, we can be aware of them. It is also undeniable that we perceive a continuity in these experiences that goes well beyond the perceived stability of various objects. According to Buddhist epistemologists, this subjective continuity is not due to a supposed transcendental unity of a self,⁴⁹ but to the reflexive and self-presenting character of our mind.⁵⁰

This reflexive factor, self-cognition or apperception, functions in Sa-pan's interpretation as the pivot and warrant that ensures that conceptions operate on the objects given to perceptions, thereby indirectly keeping thinking in touch with reality. Since apperception inheres in perception as well as in conception, it can act as an intermediary without breaking the restriction imposed on the number of allowable types of knowledge (two, i.e., perception and inference). Apperception realizes the aspects of both types of cognition and keeps track of the epistemic continuity between them. We know that a conception applies to the

seen object because apperception ensures that the concept is induced by the appropriate perception.

Thus according to Sa-pan, the final word in Dharmakīrti's system is apperception, which links perception and cognition. Apperception ensures the union of the two components of knowledge, dumb perception and blind conception, by keeping track of the continuity of our psychic life.⁵¹ Perception is unable in and of itself to bring about ordinary knowledge, which cannot be reduced to experience, contrary to what empiricists argue. To produce knowledge, perception requires the cooperation of perceptual judgements, which are memories. Under the guidance of apperception, perceptual judgements can help perception by remembering previously learned concepts in appropriate ways. In this way, apperception is the warrant of our ordinary knowledge about the world; it is indubitable. Although we can be mistaken about the nature of the objects of our perceptions, we cannot be mistaken in our immediate awareness of our experiences.

For Sa-pan, the final answer to the question about the feasibility of knowledge in the absence of real universals is apperception. For Sa-pan, it is the self-presenting nature of conceptual mental events that guarantees their objectivity. For, although there is no correspondence between concepts and reality, thought is not arbitrary but causally grounded in reality through perception. A mere causal link or association of ideas, however, is not sufficient to ensure objectivity. Something stronger is needed to warrant the link between perception and conception. If Sa-pan is right, Dharmakīrtians find this link in apperception, which ensures the unity of our psychic life.

NOTES

¹ E. Frauwallner "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasiens* (1961) 5: 137-141. As usual in ancient India, Dharmakīrti's exact dates are difficult to establish.

² Throughout this work I use the word "valid" to mean correct or right in accordance with *Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*: "Valid implies being supported by objective truth ..." This colloquial use should not be confused with the more technical distinction made by modern logicians who distinguish validity from soundness. Similarly, I use "cognition" less to refer to a process through which knowledge is acquired than to imply a momentary mental state which apprehends an object. In doing so I am following the current scholarly usage in Buddhist Studies. I reserve "correct cognition" to translate *samyagjñāna* (*yang dag pa'i shes pa*).

³ For a discussion of this question, see: Nandita Bandyopadhyay, "The Buddhist Theory of Relation between Pramā and Pramāna," *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, VII, 1 (1979).

⁴ Although there are four types of perception, in this essay I focus on sense-perception,

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which I take to be paradigmatic of Dharmakīrti's conception of perception. For more on the four types of perception, see: M. Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 25-8 & Y. Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy* (Kyoto: Kyoto University, 1966), 44-56.

⁵ For example, B. K. Matilal, *Perception* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 389.

⁶ W. Sellars, *Science, Perception, and Reality* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1963), 169.

⁷ This essay understands memory as a form of recollection, in accordance with the usage among Indian epistemologists. Although such an understanding of memory may not be adequate to the Buddhist tradition as a whole, it captures quite adequately what Indian epistemologists mean by *smṛti*.

⁸ Jain, Vedānta and Prāsangika seem to be the only schools that assert the validity of memory. The former hold that memory is valid because it realizes something new, namely, the pastness of its object. Udayana convincingly shows, however, that this is a confusion since the pastness of the object is not remembered but experienced in the present. See: B. K. Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality* (Delhi: Motilal Bamar-sidass, 1985), 208. The latter two have a different view of validity than most other schools and one could question whether they are really committed to epistemological inquiry. They do not understand the validity of a consciousness as the determination or obtention of an ontologically privileged object but in terms of non-contradiction. Accordingly, memory is valid because it is not contradicted by any other items of knowledge. Sinha, *Indian Psychology* (Delhi: Motilal, 1969, 1986), III, 13. See also Dzong-ka-ba, *Byang chub lam rim chen mo* (Dharmasala: Shes rig par khang, no date), 397 and 405.

⁹ This exclusion of memory under its different forms (identification, recognition, recalling) is found in Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇa-vārttikam*, II, 3, 5. cd, III, 174, 185-9, 236, 498 & 503.

¹⁰ In PV II: 1 Dharmakīrti says: "Valid cognition is that cognition [which is] non-deceptive (*avisamvādi, mi bslu ba*). Non-deceptiveness [consists] in the readiness [for the object] to perform a function." (*tshad ma bslu med can shes pa/ don byed nus par gnas pa ni/mi slu sgra las byung ba yang/ mngon par 'dod pa ston phyir ro// pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam arthakriyasthiti/ avisamvādanam śabde 'py abhiprāyanivedanād//*).

¹¹ Dharmakīrti's definition of perception is a refinement of Dignāga's description of perception as being free from conception (*kalpanāpodha, rtog pa dang bral ba*). See: Hattori, *Dignāga*, 25. There is disagreement among both traditional and modern scholars on how much Dharmakīrti's restriction of perception to cognitions which are unmistakable (*abhānta, ma 'khrul ba*) represents a modification of Dignāga's view. See: Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* (New York: Dover, 1930, 1962), S. Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux* (Delhi: Motilal, 1935), & R. Hayes, *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988).

¹² See: Y. Miyasaka ed., *Pramāṇa-vārttika*, *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971-2), III, 300. cd. I have not followed Miyasaka's order of chapter (which is Prajñākaragupta's) and have preferred the traditional order to Devendrabuddhi, adopted by Frauwallner and Steinkellner as well.

¹³ Here I present a mere sketch of the Nyāya view, leaving out the complexities of without its historical developments. For a more detailed account, see: C. D. Bijalwan, *Indian Theory of Knowledge* (New Delhi: Heritage, 1977), 72-8.

¹⁴ What Buddhists describe as ascertaining consciousnesses induced by perception (*mngon sum gyis 'dren pa'i nges shes*).

¹⁵ J. Mohanty, *Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth* (Delhi: Motilal, 1966, 1989), 29. A.

perceptual judgment is not a proposition for it is not a sentence or an abstract self-sufficient entity (as a proposition). It cannot even be explained by linguistic analysis and requires the recollection of the experience. Nevertheless, it possesses a certain logical complexity which is lacking in the first stage of perception.

¹⁶ I translate *savikalpaka* as determinate when this word is used to designate a perceptual judgment in the Nyāya system. Taken in a strictly Buddhist context, this word would be translated as conceptual. Since this translation would lose track of the Nyāya important distinction between perceptual and verbal judgments, I have preferred to use "determinate" when *savikalpaka* is discussed according to the Nyāya sense of the word.

¹⁷ This word can be used in various ways. Here, I use it in relation to the problem of universals. A realist such as a Naiyāyika is the proponent of the reality of universals and is opposed by anti-realists such as Dharmakīrti or Ockham who deny it. Also refer to a realist view of perception according to which perception has unmediated access to the external world (this is also the Nyāya view). This view is opposed by the representationalist (Dharmakīrti as a Sautrāntika) and the phenomenalist (Dharmakīrti as a Yogācāra), who both deny that perception can apprehend directly external objects.

¹⁸ I will use the word "Buddhist" as referring to the school of logic and epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. This is not to say that this school was the only Buddhist school debating the problem of knowledge in India. For example, Candrakīrti refuses Dignāga's description of perception as non-conceptual and propounds a view similar to Nyāya ideas (described below). See: Hattori, *Dignāga*, 87. It remains true, however, that Dharmakīrti's tradition gained wide acceptance among Buddhist philosophers and was often taken by the critiques of Buddhism as representing Buddhist views in logic and epistemology.

¹⁹ Dharmakīrti can be described as a conceptualist according to whom universals are conceptual and, therefore, not real. In his system, only individuals are real. For a description of Dharmakīrti's anti-realism and its reception in Indo-Tibetan traditions, see: Georges Dreyfus, "Universals in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism; a Conceptual Evolution," in *Tibetan Studies* (Tokyo: Naritasa Institute, 1992), I, 29–46.

²⁰ For a study of this difficult topic, see: M. Hattori, "Apoḥa and Pratibhā", M. Nagatomi, B. K. Matilal, J. M. Masson, E. Dimock, *Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Festschrift in Honor of Danie H. H. Ingalls* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980), 61–73, & S. Katsura, "Jñānaśrimitra on Apoḥa," Matilal, *Buddhist Logic*, 171–181. Also "Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on Apoḥa," a forthcoming response to Herzberger, *Bharthari and the Buddhists* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986). See also: Mookerjee, *Doctrine*, Kajiyama, *Introduction*, & Hayes, *Dignāga*. For a view of some Tibetan interpretations, see: A. Klein, *Knowledge and Liberation* (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1986). For a study of its evolution, see: Georges Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti's Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations* (Albany: Suny, forthcoming).

²¹ This double aspect of the recollective function parallels the double meaning of universals and exposes the close link between the issue of the status of memory and anti-realism in Buddhist epistemology. Several (but not all) Buddhist thinkers such as Mokṣākaragupta and Sa-pan consider that there are two types of universals: the horizontal universal (*tiryaglakṣaṇam sāmānyam, thad ka'i spyi*), which is a property such as cowness horizontally shared by individuals, and the vertical universal (*ūrdhvatlakṣaṇam, gong ma'i spyi*), which unifies the moments existing within the same continuum. See: Kajiyama, *Introduction*, 58.

²² The word *saṃvṛti* usually means conceptual in Dharmakīrti's system. Here, however, its meaning is more restricted and refers to a conceptual cognition that is not involved in an inferential process. The source for this usage is in Dignāga's discussion of pseudo-perceptions (*pratyakṣābhāsa, mngon sum ltar snang*), *PSS*, P: 14.b.2-3. See also: Hattori, *Dignāga*, 28, 180–1.

²³ *grhītagrahaṇān neṣṭam sāmṛtaṃ dhīpramaṇata/gzung ba 'dzin phyir kun rdzob ni/ mi 'dod blo ni tshad ma nyid/ Miyasaka de., PV, II: 3.ab.*

²⁴ Devendrabuddhi, *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'ka' 'grel*, "Pramāṇa-vārttika-pañjikā, P: 5717, *Che*, 3.b.8–4.a.3.

²⁵ According to Candrakīrti, the word *saṃvṛti* can have one of the following three connotations: a) it can mean term (*vyvāhāra, tha snyad*) and is then equivalent to worldly convention; b) it can also mean inter-dependence; c) however, the most usual connotation (or etymology) of *saṃvṛti* is: "that which entirely obstructs reality." Candrakīrti, *Mūlamadhyamakavṛttiprasannapadā, Dbu ma rīsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba*, P: 5260, 'a, 492.10. Although a remembering cognition appears to be a true means of gaining access to reality, in fact, it is not. It is a distorted (being conceptual) form of cognition which, unlike inference, does not provide any new information. Such a conceptual cognition has no validity of its own, but merely duplicates the information provided by valid cognition.

²⁶ For a description of this, see: Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality*.

²⁷ rNgog is the main instigator of scholastic studies in Tibet. Nephew of Atīśa's disciple, rNgog Legs-pa'i-shes-rab who had founded in 1073 the monastery of gSang phu ne'u thog, rNgog was one of the foremost translators of the second spread (*phyi dar*) of Buddhism in Tibet. He also established a new tradition of logic and epistemology in Tibet. See: L. van der Kuijp, *Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1983), 31–2. S. Onoda, "The Chronology of the Abbatial Successions of the Gsang Phu Sne'u Thog Monastery," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 33 (1989) 203–213.

²⁸ L. van der Kuijp describes Cha-ba as a non-sectarian thinker mostly associated with the Ka-dam-pa. "Phya-pa Chos-kyi-seng-ge's Impact on Tibetan Epistemological Theory," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5 (1978), 355–369, 357.

²⁹ Dharmakīrti's first commentators Devendrabuddhi and his disciple Śākyamati (seventh century A.D.) did not add much to the original system. They offered literal commentaries and have been described by Stcherbatsky as constituting the school of literal exegesis. Śāntarakṣita, Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta (eighth century A.D.) developed more independent interpretations of Dharmakīrti's system to respond to the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā criticisms. See: Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, 39–47.

³⁰ *gang gi phyir mngon sum gyi stobs kyis byung ba'i zhen pas ni don mthong ba'i nyid du zhen par byed kyil/ rtog par byed pa nyid du ma yin no/ mthong ba yang don mngon sum du byed pa zhes bya ba mngon sum gyi byed pa yin no/ mam par rtog pa yin te 'di ltar don lkog tu gyur pa mam par rtog pa ni bdag nyid rtog par byed kyil/ mthong ba ma yin no zhes rtog pa'i bdag yid yin par ni myong ba las nges pa yin no/ de bas na rang gyi byed pa btang ste mngon sum gyi byed pa ston par byed pa las don gang la mngon sum du song ba'i zhen pa yod pa der mngon sum 'ba' zhid tshad ma yin no/ Dharmottara, *Rigs pa'i thigs pa'i rgya cher 'grel ba (Nyāya-bindu-ṅka)*, D: 5730, *We*, 46.b.4-6.*

³¹ Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, II, 301–8. The realist idea can be summarized in the following way: since there are not two different types of existents, the different types of cognition do not relate to different kinds of object. Instead, they relate in different ways to the same real things that make the world.

³² This epistemological dualism in turn reinforces the basic ontological typology, which acts to support the traditional Buddhist doctrines of impermanence, dependent arising, and selflessness.

³³ See: Dharmottara, *Tshad ma rnam par gnes pa'i 'grel bshad, Pramāṇa-Viniścaya-ṅka*, (DVT) D: 4229, *Dze*, 79.a.4-6.

³⁴ Dharmottara, *PVT*, D: *Dze*, 38.b.4-6.

³⁵ This is particularly true of rGyal-tshap, who takes Dharmottara as the main authority on logic and epistemology. The importance of Dharmottara is also clear in

the earlier stages of the Tibetan tradition. rNgog and Phywa pa give to Dharmottara and his revisionist positions a role that partly explains their differences with Dharmakīrti's original system.

³⁶ The question of whether Dharmottara succeeds in his enterprise will require further studies. It seems, however, highly problematic, for, Dharmottara does not seem to succeed in explaining the cooperation between perception and conception, which his account presupposes.

³⁷ Mokṣākaragupta seems to offer a similar view when he distinguishes between directly held objects (*grāhya*, *gzung ba*) and indirectly determined objects (*adhyavaseya*, *nges pa*) of valid cognitions. Perception holds a momentary object directly, and determines a universal indirectly. In this way, perception and conception are coordinated by way of their objects. Kajiyama, *Introduction*, 58.

³⁸ Dharmottara, *PVT*, D: *Dze*, 83.a.1–b.1.

³⁹ Dharmottara, *PVT*, D: *Dze*, 82.b.4–83.a.1. I am grateful to Helmut Krasser from the University of Vienna for kindly drawing my attention to this passage.

⁴⁰ 'di ni bde ba sgrub pa'o/ 'di ni sdug bsngal sgrub pa'o zhes 'di'o zhes mngon sum nyid du nges te/ yongs su bcad na tha snayad du byed pa'i skyes bu bde ba sgrub par byed pa nyid du nye ba'i don yongs su gcod pa yin no/ bde ba dang sdug bsngal sgrub par byed pa dag ces bya ba ni 'jug pa'i yul ston pa'o/ ldots 'jug par byed pa de la yang nges par byed pa nyid kyis khyab pa yin no/ mngon sum la ni yod pa ma yin pa'i phyr 'jug par byed pa ni ma yin no zhes bya ba nipa rol po'i bsam pa'o/slob dpon gyis kyang khyab par bya ba dang khayb par byed pa byed pa'i dngos po de bden yang/ rtog pa med pa dang rtog pa dang bcas pa'i mngon sum dag 'jug pa'i yan lag nyid du khyad par med par bstan pa'i phyr skyon 'di med de zhes bya ba gsungs so/ 'di la 'jug pa'i yul mi gnas pa ni mam pa gnyis te/ de'i dus na nye ba'i rang bzhin ma nges pa'i phyr mngon sum gyis 'jug pa'i yul du byed pa ni mi nus pa'am/ gal te bya ba byed pa nyid sngar mthong ba nye ba ma yin pa'i phyr mam par rtog pa med pa'i mngon sum gyis ma nges pas 'jug pa'i yul du mi byed/ ldots 'di ltar mam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i mngon sum gyis yul dang dus dang mam pa so sor nges pa gtan la phebs pa hin la/ mam par rtog pa med par yang de'i rjes su byed pa de'i stobs kyis skyes pa'i gtan la phebs pa'i shes pas mngon sum gyis gzung ba nges par byed pa yin no/ Dharmottara, *Explanation*, D: *Dze*, 83.a.1–b.1.

⁴¹ A possible interpretation would be that Dharmottara is referring to the fact that certain perceptions induce judgments that take over their perceptual functions, while others require further investigation. The problem of the coordination between perception and judgment then remains.

⁴² This view presupposes a modification of several key points of Dharmakīrti's system, the first and foremost being a transformation of his stance on universals. Dharmakīrti's conceptualism is replaced by a moderate realism that admits the reality of properties which exist in dependence on their instances. See: Dreyfus, "Universals in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism." This view has been adopted by the dGe-lugs-pa tradition despite the opposition of Sa-skyā scholars such as gSer-mdog Pañ-chen Śākya mChog ldan (1428–1509 Ad.) and Go-ram-pa bsod-nams seng-ge (1429–1489 Ad.). For a study of this debate, see: Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality*.

⁴³ *Tshad ma rigs gter*, in the Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa sKya Sect (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968), V. 155.1.1–167.1.6., (*Tha*, 1.a–99.a).

⁴⁴ *Ārya (phags pa)*, i.e., the persons who have obtained direct realization into the four noble truths.

⁴⁵ so so skye bo'i tshad ma ni/ nges pa nyid las 'jug ldog byed/ 'phags pa rtog pa bral ba mams/ ting nge 'dzin las byed par gsungs/ Sa-pan, *Rigs gter*, 17.a.4–5.

⁴⁶ As I argue elsewhere, the negative nature of conceptions should not be understood psychologically. That is, it is not a subjective process of elimination revealed by

an introspective analysis in which we examine whether we actually eliminate a super-imposition when we conceive of an object. Rather, the negative nature of conceptions in epistemological. It is revealed to an analysis concerned with the justification of the cognitive status of conceptions. What is relevant in this respect is not the subjective process, but the way in which we learn concepts. The introspective analysis is flawed because it does not realize that we use mostly concepts we are already acquainted with. These concepts have already been determined negatively and are used through habituation. See: Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality* (forthcoming).

⁴⁷ dbang shes lkugs pa mig can 'dra/ rtog pa long ba smra mkhas 'dra/ rang rig dbang po tshang ba yis/ gnyis po de'i brda sprod byed/ Sa-pan, *Treasure*, 6.a.5.

⁴⁸ The term was coined by Leibniz to distinguish the reflective knowledge that we have of our mental states from perception, which is the representation of outer things. See: S. Körner, *Kant* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 61. It is important to keep in mind, however, that here apperception does not necessarily imply a separate cognition. For Dharmakīrti, apperception is not introspective or reflective, for it does not take inner mental states as its objects. It is the self-cognizing or self-presenting factor of every mental episode which brings us a non-thematic awareness of our mental states.

⁴⁹ There is a striking similarity here with Sartre's description of reflexivity as a unifying element to argue for a non-egological (i.e., selfless) model of consciousness. Sartre attempts to correct what he perceives as one of the greatest limitations in Husserl, his insistence on a transcendental ego. For Sartre, the unity of mental life is the result of consciousness's awareness of itself. Mind is aware of other objects, and in the process reveals its presence. This self-awareness is not, however, thematic. That is, we are not aware, except in cases in which we reflect on ourselves, of being aware of things. Nevertheless, we are cognizant of our mental states. This is what Sartre describes as non-positional self-consciousness, i.e., a mental state that does not set itself up as object, but rather becomes aware of itself through being aware of an object. J. P. Sartre, *La Transcendance de l'Ego* (Paris: Vrin, 1927, 1985).

⁵⁰ rGyal-tshab describes self-cognition as the basis of denomination of the person as subject. It is due to this reflexive factor of the mind that we apprehend things thinking "I cognize this and that." *bsTan bcos tshad ma rnam ngs kyi ſika chen dgongs pa rab gsal*, Collected Works (Delhi: Guru Deva), VIII.172.1–2.

⁵¹ Although Dharmakīrti does not explicitly express this view, he suggests it, particularly in PV III: 489–503 when he discusses of the role of self-cognition in bringing about the impression of length in phonemes by keeping track of the individual moments of hearing.

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 Yuktidīpikā. 1967. Edited by Ram Chandra Pandeya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

ABBREVIATIONS:

Ki	Praśastapādabhāṣya, ed. Jetly
Ny	Praśastapādabhāṣya, ed. Jetly and Parikh
Vy	Praśastapādabhāṣya, ed. G. Sastri
WI	Praśastapādabhāṣya, ed. Bronkhorst and Ramseier

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IS THERE A DEVADATTA IN THE HOUSE?
Nāgārjuna's Vīgrahavyāvartanī and the Liar Paradox

I. INTRODUCTION

In the *Vīgrahavyāvartanī* Nāgārjuna claims that all things are void, and that he is asserting no proposition. He acknowledges that the statement (*vacana*) of his teaching counts as some kind of thing, and that this statement is thus void.¹ To be void is to lack intrinsic reality. What lacks intrinsic reality is not real. Therefore, it seems to follow – and Nāgārjuna's words appear to confirm it – that when he says 'All things are void,' he is not expressing any real view. If he were, then he would be expressing the view that his own expression of a view is unreal – that is, the view that he is not really expressing any view.

Is it really as simple, and absurd, as this? Many interpretations have been, and are, advanced about the meaning of Nāgārjuna's claims. Some consider that he offers a logically impregnable argument; some, that he offers no argument. Nāgārjuna himself certainly appears to say that he is saying nothing, especially in the *Vīgrahavyāvartanī*. 'I have no proposition,'² he says. Because there exist no things to be apprehended he neither affirms nor denies.³ 'I negate nothing, and there is nothing to be negated.'⁴ When he denies that things have any intrinsic reality, he says, his denial does not in fact establish any absence of intrinsic reality.⁵ It may therefore seem to be only a ghost of a denial.

Nāgārjuna's teaching that all things are void has seemed to many, in his own time and since, to involve him in something like the Liar Paradox (the sort of paradox involved in denying what one is saying). This interpretation will seem natural (although it will be contested below) most especially if 'void' is taken to imply 'false' when it is applied to a proposition. If all things are void, then all propositions are false, including the proposition that all things are void. A comparable result follows if 'void' is taken to imply 'meaningless' when applied to a proposition: what Nāgārjuna means is meaningless.

Much of the modern literature on Madhyamaka proceeds from the assumption that Madhyamaka does indeed declare all propositions false

or meaningless, and seeks to rescue Nāgārjuna from self-refutation or self-stultification by suggesting how he can be offering such a doctrine without advancing any proposition (which is what some of his statements appear to be doing). Some modern defenders of Madhyamaka have supposed that, when he says that he has no proposition, he means quite literally that he has no argument to advance, and have been inclined to see his move as a desperate way of escaping the Liar Paradox. If he were unable to advance a proposition without falling foul of his own claim that all things are void, he might simply renounce all claim to be asserting anything, justifying his renunciation by the appeal to the disappearance of all separate things in the corrosive glare of ultimate truth. This would destroy all his opponents' arguments, and his own as well. Nothing that he said could be on any better footing than anything that anybody else said. Like Samson pulling down the temple, or Sherlock Holmes hurtling in a fatal embrace with Moriarty to his death in the Reichenbach Falls, Nāgārjuna would be demolishing his opponents at Pyrrhic cost.

This article is addressed to the limited and specific purpose of showing that such interpretations are unnecessary; the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* can be read without making the assumption that *śūnya* means 'false' or 'meaningless' when applied to propositions. This purpose can be achieved without examination of the complex issues inhering in the interpretation of Nāgārjuna's major work, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, and without necessarily proving correct one out of all the possible interpretations of the real meaning of Madhyamaka philosophy. The method will be to set up the hypothesis that, whatever the real meaning of Madhyamaka philosophy, it is one that does not read 'void' (*śūnya*) as implying 'false' or 'meaningless,' and thus does not commit Nāgārjuna to the Liar Paradox; after discussion of the context in modern scholarly literature, this hypothesis will be set to work by examining the passages in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* which most appear to support the contested interpretation. It must be emphasized, and the point will bear repetition, that the exercise is not intended, and within this scope cannot be expected, to demonstrate the correctness of just one interpretation of the real meaning of Madhyamaka philosophy, and it is not a study of the *Kārikās*.

There is no doubt that the Liar Paradox has loomed over the study of Madhyamaka and in some ways shaped the purposes of much of the scholarship in the field. It is therefore an appropriate starting-point here; it would be well to be clear what it is from which Nāgārjuna's modern exegetes often wish to rescue him. If we decide that what Nāgārjuna

asserts is a denial of itself, what follows? The proposition in question is a case of the Eubulides form of the paradox: 'This sentence is false,'⁶ which appears on examination to be true if it is false and false if it is true. If a sentence denies itself, what can we say about it?

The problem is complex and has been much discussed.⁷ One way of taking the Liar Sentence leads to the conclusion that it has no truth-value. A sentence which declares some proposition to be true or false cannot be assigned a truth-value if it does not adequately identify the proposition. For example, the sentence 'The proposition is true' (or 'false') does not, by itself, identify what is referred to by its subject and therefore does not by itself have any truth-value, any more than does a nonsense sentence. To give it one, we must be able to supply the proposition. 'The proposition *p* is true' (or 'false') can be given a truth-value if we know what *p* is.

The Liar Sentence ('This sentence is false') declares a proposition to be false. Let the proposition thus declared to be false be *p*. Thus the Liar Sentence says: '*p* is false.'

The truth-value of this cannot be judged until we supply a specification of *p* in a determinate form capable of being judged true or false. We know what *p* means. It means '*p* is false.' We can therefore (as a first step in an obviously doomed quest) substitute this for the symbol '*p*', and we obtain: "'*p* is false' is false.'

No truth-value can yet be assigned to this, however. It is necessary to make a further substitution for *p*, and we obtain: "' '*p* is false' is false' is false.'

To put it another way, Fp is equivalent to $F(Fp)$, which is equivalent to $F\{F(Fp)\}$, which is equivalent to $F[F\{F(Fp)\}]$.

A specification of *p*, capable of being assigned a truth-value, thus lies at the latter end of an infinite series. There exists no term which is at the latter end of an infinite series (or the series would not be infinite). Therefore the Liar Sentence does not allow the specification of a proposition in a form in which it can have a truth-value, and the Liar Sentence cannot be said to be true, or false; no truth-value can be assigned to it. Therefore, if Nāgārjuna actually means his claim that 'All things are void' in a sense which commits him to the Liar Sentence, he is not saying anything profound, or self-guaranteeing (as his modern supporters sometimes maintain). He is simply uttering a sentence to which no truth-value can be assigned.

On the other hand, it can be argued that the Liar Sentence implies a contradiction.⁸ One way of making the contradiction explicit is to add to the Liar Sentence the otherwise unspoken 'illocutionary' element

of assertion;⁹ it can be turned into: 'I assert that *p* is true and that it is false.' This is contradictory, whether or not *p* means anything. Any philosophy which commits itself to the Liar Paradox therefore produces an undesirable result.

Whether or not he could deploy the technical concepts of logic, Nāgārjuna was no doubt as much aware of this undesirability as are modern scholars. It is not plausible to claim that Nāgārjuna deliberately refutes himself or argues for a contradiction; on the contrary, he rejects both the conjunction and the bi-negation of *p* and $\neg p$. Many have supposed that in one way or another Nāgārjuna sought to offer the doctrine that all propositions are false (or meaningless) without actually asserting any proposition. The view to be defended here is that it is possible to make sense of Madhyamaka (at least, in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* – the *Kārikās* must be put on one side) without resorting to such a supposition.

II

At the risk of repetition, it is necessary to emphasize the limits of what can be attempted here. Nāgārjuna has attracted a remarkable quantity of scholarly interest, and numerous interpretations of Madhyamaka ideas have been offered. There is no consensus, and it is probably fair to describe the present state of opinion about the meaning of his philosophy as in disarray. Now, to isolate for study a particular problem in the interpretation of *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, which is in view here, requires that many issues in Madhyamaka studies of engrossing interest to many scholars must be set on one side, and at least some assumptions must be arbitrarily made; such assumptions may lack conviction for a majority of those who have studied the *Kārikās* closely, for no one interpretation commands majority allegiance. All that can be done within the present limits is to make as few assumptions as possible about the Madhyamaka context, and to appeal for a willing suspension of disbelief.¹⁰

Here are some ways of understanding Madhyamaka's *sūnya* doctrine, selected not to map the whole field of interpretation but to provide context for the present discussion:

1. *Sūnyatā* entails that all propositions are false or meaningless. Therefore, to avoid the Liar Paradox, when Nāgārjuna negates all propositions, his act of negation must not be understood to commit him to the assertion of any proposition. (It is the chief purpose of what follows to show that this interpretation can be avoided.)

2. There is no reality whatsoever. The universe contains no things, no events, and no propositions. Nothing ever happens. (This interpretation is just as disastrous for Nāgārjuna as is No. 1. It commits him to saying that he is not saying anything,

that he is not delusively appearing to say anything, and that nobody is making the mistake of believing him to be saying anything. Quite simply, nothing is happening. This interpretation must be shown to be implausible as well as No. 1 if Nāgārjuna is to be rescued from paradox.)

3. Absolute reality transcends language and concepts, so that no propositions can capture ultimate truth.

4. On the level of conventional truth, things exist. On the level of ultimate truth, nothing whatsoever exists.

5. On the level of conventional truth, phenomena can be treated as manifestations of immutable essences. On the level of ultimate truth, immutable essences do not exist. Phenomena are merely manifestations of other phenomena. (There are problems in deciding exactly what this means, but they are no greater than the problems in deciding exactly what many philosophies mean.)

Whatever assumptions may be made here about the character of Madhyamaka doctrine, they must be assumptions which obviate the first two interpretations, which would commit Nāgārjuna to refuting himself ('This sentence is false' or 'meaningless'; 'This sentence does not exist'). This object is secured by adopting as a working assumption the proposition that 'voidness', for Nāgārjuna, means the same thing as the Buddhist principle of conditional origination, *pratītyasamutpāda*, and that this principle entails at least that phenomena exist.

The first part of this proposition is scarcely debatable; we are obliged by Nāgārjuna's own repeated and explicit claims to recognize the close identification of 'voidness' with *pratītyasamutpāda*, conditional origination. As Nāgārjuna says,

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe |
(MMK 24.18ab)

We declare that conditional origination is *śūnyatā*.

The significance of this important verse has been much discussed, but the identification of 'voidness' with the original Buddhist doctrine of conditional origination is here quite clear. Whatever is meant by the concept of conditional origination, it is meant by Nāgārjuna when he speaks of voidness. This identification is a cardinal principle of the *Kārikās*, and it recurs throughout the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. It is not a metaphor or a *façon de parler*.

To say that all things are void is thus not a statement about the conditions of knowledge or about the truth-value of propositions. It is the ontological claim that all things originate conditionally, in dependence. Let us stipulate, for the purpose of this exercise, that the origination of things is equivalent to the manifestation of phenomena.

This has the effect of making unnecessary the first two interpretations listed above. In saying that all things are void, Nāgārjuna is not

that phenomena are manifested, not that propositions are false or meaningless. Further, if phenomena are manifested, however relatively or conditionally, at least something is happening in the universe, and that something may in principle serve as a trace or sign of a true proposition. (Interpretation No. 2 is thereby avoided.)

As far as possible, it is desirable to avoid commitment to any one of interpretations 3, 4 or 5, which cannot be explored without tackling issues of contention. The recent interesting contribution by T. Wood seems to stop short of the extreme nihilism of interpretation 2,¹¹ but it would not be easy without detailed analysis to assess it in relation to other interpretations such as those of C. Oetke or D. Seyfort Ruegg, noted below.

My own preference is for No. 5, but there is no space here to attempt a justification or full explanation. It offers, at least, a way of understanding the often-overlooked identification of Madhyamaka with the Middle Way, *madhyamā pratipad*.¹² The *Kārikās* can be read as an attempted demonstration that, for any phenomenon whose manifestation can be affirmed on the level of conventional truth, rigorous analysis proves both that such a manifestation requires the existence of a specific immutable essence, and that such an immutable essence cannot exist. The conclusion from this is not that phenomena are non-existent, but that their real substrata can never be found (they are absent or infinitely deferred, so to speak). Phenomena are dependent upon each other rather than upon real substrata. 'Dependent' means 'unreal', and 'unreal' does not mean either 'existent' or 'non-existent', although of course either may be affirmed as a provisional way of negating the other – Nāgārjuna frequently claims that things, such as his own propositions, do not exist, but at appropriate points he also *denies* that things do not exist.

Obviously these observations are inadequate as a demonstration of the correctness of interpretation No. 5 in the list above; they raise many problems. For the purpose of what follows, it is enough to stipulate that, whatever 'void' means in Madhyamaka, it does not mean 'false', 'meaningless' or (without qualification) 'non-existent'.

Let us turn to the concepts employed in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. There are various terms designating statements or expressions of belief which need to be kept distinct in order to avoid confusion. In the first place, the term 'view' or 'philosophical view' will be used here to refer to philosophical statements or doctrines (*darsāna, vāda*) in general. It is a broad category. It is needed in order to discuss the interpretation noted above, according to which *sūnya* means 'false' and Nāgārjuna rejected

any sort of philosophical claim. 'View' will here mean philosophical claims in general.

Within this broad category, it is necessary to identify the narrower one of 'speculative views' (*dr̥ṣṭi*), which Madhyamaka consistently rejected, whether or not it rejected all views whatsoever.¹³ (These can be considered to include views which hypostatize concepts, treating them as independently real things.)

Again, 'proposition' or 'thesis' (*pratijñā*) designates a proposition advanced in argument. In the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, Nāgārjuna denies that he has any *pratijñā* (*nāsti ca mama pratijñā*). D. Seyfort Ruegg has argued that in Madhyamaka, this term sometimes refers to propositions in general but, in the relevant parts of Nāgārjuna's discussion as well as in some later Madhyamaka contexts, is limited to propositions postulating the existence of real things.¹⁴

The concept of a proposition is very complex when we seek to analyse the argument in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. We must distinguish (a) between *pratijñā* in the sense of proposition in general and *pratijñā* in the sense of a proposition which postulates the existence of any independently real entities; (b) between 'proposition' as an event on the empirical plane, a concrete utterance, and 'proposition' as abstract content; and (c) between 'proposition' as we understand it and whatever nearest equivalent might exist in Nāgārjuna's thought. Here, the word 'proposition' will be used to refer to the abstract content of a statement, the normal usage, as distinct from a concrete utterance; it will also be used to translate Nāgārjuna's *pratijñā*. Context should indicate which is which. But we need to be aware that Nāgārjuna did not work with any consistent clear distinction between the abstract and concrete meanings, and his usage of *pratijñā*, for reasons which will be discussed below, often tends to make of it a concrete entity on the same plane as objects of sense. It nevertheless seems desirable to use the word 'proposition' for *pratijñā* because it is the normal translation, and it best captures the appropriate range of connotations.

An important topic in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* is negation. Is Nāgārjuna employing a special sort of negation distinct from ordinary denying? Since Nāgārjuna's time, there has been much discussion of the meaning of negation in Madhyamaka teaching, among *mādhyamikas* as well as among modern scholars. For the purpose of understanding Madhyamaka, the subject is obviously important and deserves close attention. Its pervasiveness in the scholarly literature demands that it should be documented here. (It must be recalled, though, that, as is claimed here, for the particular purpose of resolving the superficially apparent

contradictions in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, the exploration of Madhyamaka varieties of negation is a red herring. There is in fact no need to appeal to any unusual sense of negation.)

One way of justifying the claim that Nāgārjuna negates all views without asserting one of his own (even the view that some particular proposition is false) would be to associate it with the claim that the truth, according to Buddhism, is ineffable. Some modern commentators on Madhyamaka have seen it as a way of pointing towards an absolute which transcends verbal constructions rather than as a philosophical teaching.¹⁵ The notion of *sūnyatā* as an absolute will not be accepted here. On the other hand, it is true enough that the eirenic tradition in Buddhism, which disapproved of polemical debate as an obstruction on the path to salvation, deserves to be recognized as a possible influence upon the style of Madhyamaka; D. Seyfort Ruegg has emphasized the contribution of this tradition.¹⁶

However, these considerations cannot diminish the need to apply the normal standards of logical analysis to the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*'s claim that Madhyamaka asserts the universality of voidness apparently without the use of any proposition. Most of the scholarly discussion has been directed to the logical character of Nāgārjuna's rejection of all speculative views (*drṣṭi*) or his denial that he offers any proposition (*pratijñā*).

From the time of Bhāvaviveka onwards, mādhyamikas claimed for themselves a special type of negation, *prasajyapratishedha*, which denied a proposition without implying the affirmation of any alternative proposition whatsoever, even its contradictory, in contrast to *paryudāsapratishedha*, negation that implied the truth of some alternative. Some Tibetan scholars argued that Nāgārjuna, in applying his negation to all views, had propounded no doctrinal system of his own (*svamata*), advanced no propositional thesis (*pratijñā*); others, notably Tson kha pa and his pupil mKhas grub rje, argued that this could not be true.¹⁷

Many modern scholars have been ready to accept as correct the claim that Nāgārjuna asserted no philosophical claims. La Vallée Poussin, for example, wrote: 'Le-Mādhyamika ne parle jamais en son nom propre; il n'a pas de système'.¹⁸ T. R. V. Murti's study of Madhyamaka gave impetus to the interpretation of Nāgārjuna that holds him to negate all views without offering any of his own. 'Every thesis is self-convicted'; Nāgārjuna 'has no tenet of his own' and does not maintain any point of view in polemic. 'Negative judgment is the *negation of judgment*, and not one more judgment. It is on a higher plane of self-consciousness.'

'Negation of positions is not one more position.'¹⁹ Hence in Murti's view Nāgārjuna negates all the views of other schools, committing himself to none of his own.

B. K. Matilal's writings offer several comments on the issue. In *Logic, Language and Reality* he argued that Nāgārjuna is not philosophically uncommitted; he sees metaphysical questions as 'only pseudo-questions' about 'pseudo-concepts'; so they are empty of essence.²⁰ In his later work, *Perception*, Matilal interprets Nāgārjuna's repeated denial of intrinsic reality (*svabhāva*) to all things (*bhāvas*) as entailing the denial of certainty or meaning to all theses.²¹ Madhyamaka's rejection of all statements is a form of 'commitmentless denial'.²² Nāgārjuna however is not guilty of asserting propositions which would thus fall victim to themselves, for 'the rejection of a position need not always amount to a counter-position'.²³ In a late article, Matilal compared Madhyamaka negation to deconstruction, and suggested that Madhyamaka asserts propositions, deletes them, and lets the deleted propositions and the deletions stand together.²⁴

Also relevant is a debate between Stafford Betty and David Loy. The former claimed that Nāgārjuna made an attempt to evade the Liar Paradox by claiming to have no view, but his denial of all assertions, if it means anything, amounts to an assertion itself and is thus contradictory,²⁵ the latter defended Nāgārjuna, claiming that the voidness which is true of all things is not a matter of true or false, right or wrong, but a condition that transcends the polarity or rightness and wrongness.²⁶

D. Seyfort Ruegg does not subscribe to the view that Nāgārjuna advanced no propositions, but he has contributed to the discussion of negation in Madhyamaka doctrine; he suggests that the concept of a 'neustic' component in a sentence, the illocutionary element 'I believe that ...' which is usually understood as part of the meaning of an utterance, offers a guide to the character of *prasajya* negation: it is a denial of the neustic 'I believe that ...', so that the speaker denies that he asserts the content of the proposition, without implying the assertion of its falsity.²⁷ This interpretation of madhyamaka negation is rejected by Kartikeya Patel, who argues that Nāgārjuna's negation of all propositions makes sense if it is seen as belonging to the 'dialogical/conversational' universe of discourse, as opposed to the 'argumentative/systematic'; in the former, propositions are entertained but not asserted argumentatively.²⁸

To treat Madhyamaka negation as a 'performative' negation of the neustic content of a statement is not to accept the conclusion, espoused by so many writers, that Nāgārjuna asserts no propositions at all. This

conclusion has been contested by D. Seyfort Ruegg in two important articles appearing in 1983 and 1986.²⁹ Though sometimes neglected, they demand attention.

Ruegg maintains that Madhyamaka does not refrain from offering any thesis. In claiming to offer no *pratijñā* Nāgārjuna was referring only to those propositions (i.e., propositions presupposing the reality of entities) which his doctrine showed to have no truth-value. In its context, 'I have no *pratijñā*'

means that he asserts no thesis or proposition positing the existence of a *bhāva* (positive, negative, both positive and negative, or indescribable). It does not imply, however, that he has nothing of philosophical significance to say himself, nor that he denies all content to the *sūtra* teachings which he proposes to explicate.³⁰

Here we find a clear distinction between *pratijñās*, which Nāgārjuna does not have, and other sorts of proposition, which he does have.

The mādhymika view about *pratijñās* asserts that they cannot be applied to entities:

What the Madhyamika achieves, then, by means of his *prasaṅga*-type reasoning is the dissolving or deconstruction of all propositional theses postulating substantial entities (*bhāva*), rather than their refutation (involving the setting up of a counter-thesis and the holding of a counter-position within the framework of binary alternatives).³¹

So statements about entities are dissolved by Madhyamaka reasoning, but other sorts of statements may stand.³² Madhyamaka was not a school of thought without any teachings (*darśana*, *vāda*, etc.)

Ruegg's interpretation of Madhyamaka principles provides one sort of reason for denying that Nāgārjuna refrains from asserting anything. A different sort of reason is offered by nihilist interpretations. For Ruegg, the teaching of *śūnya* dissolves all dichotomies, so that there is no thing (*bhāva*) which can be described as existing or not existing, and Nāgārjuna asserts nothing that implies the existence or non-existence of any concrete thing. For the proponent of a nihilist interpretation, on the other hand, things ultimately do not exist, and it is for this reason that no assertion can be made about anything.

An objection might be that Nāgārjuna often enough rejects negative statements as well as positive – for any entity *x*, *x* neither exists nor does not exist. However, the nihilist interpretation can be defended if it is assumed that, in the view of Madhyamaka, to attach any predicate whatsoever to *x* (even 'does not exist') is to say something *about* a given entity whose existence is presupposed. Thus for a subject *x* and a predicate *F*, it is possible to claim that $\neg(Fx)$ and also $\neg(\neg(Fx))$ and also $\neg(Fx.\neg Fx)$ and also $\neg(\neg\{Fx\}.\neg\{Fx\})$ if there is absolutely no

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the effect that he is bald, or not bald, or anything else) can in a sense be consistently denied. It has proved tempting to see the Madhyamaka conclusion as the product of this logic. It was perhaps Richard Robinson who first identified the interpretation as a coherent logical argument, and the point is familiar in the scholarly literature.³³ T. Wood has recently deployed the argument for a nihilist interpretation at length,³⁴ and in various places C. Oetke has identified Nāgārjuna's voidness doctrines as a denial of the existence of all things *in ultimate reality* (*paramārthataḥ*); he raises the question whether this implies that Nāgārjuna can have no intelligible argument.³⁵

III

At this point, let us take stock. Nāgārjuna asserted that all things (which, in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, he acknowledged to include his own statement) are void, and he denied that he had any proposition (*pratijñā*). This, right from the beginning, appeared disconcertingly close to the Liar Paradox, and critics condemned it on that score as a self-defeating argument. Down the centuries, students of Madhyamaka have examined the nature of Nāgārjuna's rejection of speculative views and of the later mādhymika concept of *prasaṅga* negation in quest of an understanding of his meaning which might make better sense.

On the epistemological interpretation of the voidness doctrine, number 1 in the list, all propositions must be negated because they are void (and hence false); Nāgārjuna negates them, but his negation is of a special sort, such that he does not offer any counter-proposition of his own which would thus fall victim to the Liar Paradox.

There are alternative interpretations, which treat the voidness doctrine as a teaching about the ontological status of entities rather than about the conditions of knowledge. In one type of alternative, *śūnyatā* implies that nothing can be stated about things, which are neither existent nor non-existent, because all dichotomies are dissolved. In another, Nāgārjuna advances no proposition about any thing (even the proposition that it does not exist) because there are no things to serve as subjects for statements.

This, very broadly, is the context of current thought about the problems of negation raised by the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. Here the purpose is to look at this text (not at early madhyamaka in general), with a view chiefly to show that the concepts of *śūnyatā* and *pratijñā* do not entail that Nāgārjuna was really trying to say that he was not saying anything.

IV

In applying this interpretation, it is useful to apply a distinction between two senses of any word designating a statement or sentence, which may oscillate in actual usage according to context. In the first sense, a sentence belongs to the conceptual plane; it is not an entity or event specifiable by place and time; it is abstract. This is the usual sense of 'proposition'. As such it may be said to be true or false. In the second, a sentence is a particular event, an utterance, a concrete occurrence involving the use of a writing instrument or the lungs, throat, tongue etc. (as stated in *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 1a).³⁶ It can be described as happening or not, but not as true or false. (This sense, 'utterance', appears to correspond substantially to the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*'s use of *vacana* or *vacas*.) Keeping the distinction in mind will make it easier to recognize that, according to Nāgārjuna, utterance-events are unreal, but this does not compromise their capacity to convey real meanings. Unreality is not simple non-existence. It is, we assume here, a sort of provisional, relative or dependent existence.

This distinction between abstract propositions and utterance-events is one that may be useful to us in analysing Nāgārjuna's thought, specifically in allowing us to see how he can be making an unreal (but not totally non-existent) utterance which successfully asserts the real content of a proposition, but this does not mean that he had it clearly in mind himself. What he is more likely to have had in mind, and what needs to be understood if we are to make sense of his claim that he has no proposition, is not the notion of a proposition in the abstract, a meaning, but the notion of a mind-object. For Buddhism, mind is a sixth sense and its objects are things just as are objects of the other five senses. It is just for this reason that he is obliged to treat his own conceptions as unreal things, on the same plane as the rest of the furniture of the universe. This fact has important implications for his attitude to negation, as we shall see. It complicates his reply to a critic who objects to his doctrine of voidness on the assumption that what is negated must exist.

Such a critic may well be a naiyāyika; it may be that Nyāya teachings supplied a major source of the objections refuted in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, and that Nāgārjuna was involved in polemical exchanges with proponents of this school.³⁷

It is reasonable to presume that the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* was written later than the *Mūlamadhyamakārikās*, which is the *locus classicus* of Madhyamaka doctrine, and that in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (whose title means 'dispelling of strife') Nāgārjuna sought to dispose of objections

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which had been provoked by, or which could be foreseen to, the message of the *Mūlamadhyamakārikās*. The *Vigrahavyāvartanī* consists of seventy verses, each followed by the author's own commentary (indicated here by the notation 'a'). The first twenty verses (with their commentaries) consist entirely of words put into a rhetorical opponent's mouth, voicing a series of objections to the Madhyamaka teaching that all things are void. From the twenty-first onwards, Nāgārjuna rebuts these objections one at a time. It is important to recognize this structure. Each verse of Nāgārjuna's own argument is to be seen, not necessarily as a development of the thought in the preceding verse, but often as a reply to a new objection which has been advanced earlier, without reference to the preceding verse. It may be that the objection addressed by a given verse has already been essentially refuted, but in turning to each new objection Nāgārjuna seeks to make a fresh rebuttal in order to administer the *coup de grâce*.

The first two verses taken together accuse Nāgārjuna of committing himself to a paradox.

- I. If there exists nowhere any intrinsic reality (*svabhāva*) of any things (*bhāva*) whatsoever, then your statement is without intrinsic reality, and is in no position to attack³⁸ intrinsic reality (*sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāva-ścet / tvadvacanam asvabhāvaṃ na nivartayituṃ svabhāvam alam //*).
- II. But if this statement does have intrinsic reality, then your former proposition³⁹ is falsified. There is a discordance, and you must state a special justification for it (*atha sasvabhāvam etad vākyam pūrvā hatā pratijñā te / vaiśamikatvaṃ tasmin viśeṣahetuḥ ca vaktavyaḥ //*).⁴⁰

Madhyamaka teaches that all things (*bhāva*) are void (*sūnya*); that is, they lack intrinsic reality (*svabhāva*). Nāgārjuna's statement to this effect is included in all things, because it depends upon events taking place in the chest, throat, lips, tongue and so forth (1a). (Thus, at the outset, it is clear that Nāgārjuna is discussing the *concrete* sense of his statements as utterances, *vacana*; Nāgārjuna's own statement is a *bhāva*.) So, in the eyes of this rhetorical opponent, it condemns itself. 'Lacking intrinsic reality' does not mean 'false', but the opponent is taking it to mean 'non-existent', which is just as good for the purpose of convicting Nāgārjuna of self-contradiction: just as 'a non-existent fire cannot burn and non-existent water cannot moisten' (*Vigrahavyāvartanī* 1a), Nāgārjuna's statement cannot produce any effects. On the other hand

if Nāgārjuna's statement is taken as existent (and therefore capable of denying the reality of things), it contradicts itself; there is a discordance. By this is meant (as will later be confirmed) that the statement of the character of all things does not itself accord with that character; a statement to the effect that all things have a character *C* must itself have the character *C* since it is a thing, but this condition is not fulfilled, and the discordance must be specially justified.

These objections go straight to the heart of the paradox, and it is important to see how Nāgārjuna rebuts them. We might expect that, if a void statement is non-existent and therefore presumably incapable of achieving anything, Nāgārjuna would be anxious to deny that his own statement is void. However, in verse XXI he contentedly accepts that his statement is void, like everything else. In verse XXII he replies to the complaint that his statement would need to have intrinsic reality, but would then contradict itself, and it is in this reply that we must expect to find the key to Nāgārjuna's defence. What he says here is that voidness is the name for the dependent nature of things (*yaśca pratītyabhāvo bhāvānām śūnyateti sā proktā*); what is dependent by nature (*pratītyabhāvo*) lacks intrinsic reality (*svabhāvatva*). He thus identifies voidness squarely with the primal Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*).

In the commentary to this verse, he first accuses the opponent of not clearly distinguishing the meaning of voidness (*śūnyatārtham ca bhavān bhāvānām anavasāya*). This accusation must be heeded; if Nāgārjuna's contemporaries misunderstood, we must make sure that we understand the misunderstanding. Nāgārjuna continues: because all things are dependent (a teaching which no Buddhist could deny), they lack intrinsic reality. If they had intrinsic reality they would not be dependent. So they are void, and Nāgārjuna's statement is void. But it is not thereby invalidated, and this is the capital point for our purpose:

Just as things like carts, cloth or pots, in spite of being dependent and devoid of intrinsic reality, can still carry out their functions of transporting wood, grass or earth, containing honey, water or milk, and protecting from cold, wind or heat, even so this statement of mine, in spite of being dependent and void of intrinsic reality, can carry out its function of demonstrating that things are devoid of intrinsic reality.

This should be clear enough. The mādhyamika dictum 'All things are void' is a statement about the ontological status of things. It does not mean that all propositions are false, or meaningless; nor does it mean that Nāgārjuna is refraining from advancing, though in principle he could advance, any proposition. As Nāgārjuna explains, to say that a statement is void and lacks intrinsic reality is to say that it is dependent. Nāgārjuna's utterance is devoid of intrinsic reality, but his words still

'carry out their functions.' We are surely entitled to conclude that the voidness of Nāgārjuna's utterance does not deprive him of the right to assert any philosophical views.

It is also important to notice that what Nāgārjuna says here is inconsistent with extreme radical nihilism, of the sort which denies that anything whatsoever is happening in the universe. There are indeed phenomena, even though they lack real basis. Therefore Nāgārjuna does not incur the difficulties of one who says 'Nothing is happening, so I am not speaking and this sentence does not exist.'

What the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* tells us, then, is that the dependence of a statement upon the material conditions of its creation, its lack of real substance, does not prevent it from doing its job and expressing a proposition. Therefore Nāgārjuna's statement 'all things are void' does not contradict itself.

Verse XXIII introduces the image of an unreal man, produced by artifice or magic (*nirmitaka; māyāpuruṣa*), successfully suppressing (*pratiśedhayeta*) another unreal man. Even though both are unreal, the suppression of one by the other actually occurs. Even so, a void statement can produce a rebuttal (*pratiśedha*) of the intrinsic reality of things. (Here we observe again the assimilation of propositions, mind-objects, to things in the world: one argument *quasi*-physically assails another just as one man assails another.) Nāgārjuna thereby invites us to think of the status of things in the world, which are void and dependent, as delusive (like a magical conjuration), not as totally non-existent. (An apparition in a dream is not real but can really express a proposition, with real consequences.)

Verse XXIV is addressed to the complaint in verse II that Nāgārjuna's statement, to be effective, would have to be non-void, and therefore false. This can now be simply rejected. The statement does not have to be non-void; it can be, and is, void like everything else, and there is no discordance. A statement declaring the character of all things shares that character (i.e., the character of being void).

At this point we need to turn to the next objection. Verse III, following up the accusation that Nāgārjuna is trapped in a paradox, deals with the possibility that Nāgārjuna might wish to evade his dilemma by claiming that his statement can be compared to somebody producing silence by saying 'Let there be no sound' (*mā śabdavaditi*). By producing a sound, one might prevent subsequent sound from being produced. Similarly, says the opponent, Nāgārjuna might think that his statement can establish the voidness of all things. But this would not work, because if all things are void Nāgārjuna's statement is void; so that statement, being non-

existent (*asat*), cannot be compared to the (existent) injunction: 'Let there be no sound'. This objection clearly is made without reference to the replies by Nāgārjuna to the previous objections, in which he made clear that 'void' does not mean 'totally non-existent'.

In his reply to this, in verses XXV–XXVIII, Nāgārjuna does not simply repeat himself. He takes the opportunity to sort out the relationship between the ontological status of denial and denied. The example of a sound preventing other sounds is anyway inappropriate, because it is a case of something with a given character (that of sound) denying the existence of anything with that same character (which indeed would be self-refuting), whereas Nāgārjuna's statement, which is void, denies the existence of anything with the (different) characteristic of intrinsic reality (XXV).

If a void statement denied things being void (i.e., being itself void, asserted that all things are not void), it would tend to establish their having intrinsic reality; that would be contradictory (XXVI).

A statement with a character *C* is quite consistent when it denies that reality has character not-*C*; an unreal man (a magical apparition) may consistently deny that a certain unreal woman is real; the unreal man denies reality, tending to establish unreality (XXVII).

The opponent's argument claiming the example (*hetu*) of the injunction 'Let there be no sound' for the conclusion that Nāgārjuna's thesis at least must be non-void is actually guilty of begging the question (*sādhyasama*). This is because, if everything is void, the opponent cannot assume as premise that 'Let there be no sound' is real in order to prove that real things exist; Nāgārjuna's proposition can carry out its function but it is still void, as everything is.⁴¹ All things are void, and the words 'Let there be no sound' are void. The ultimate truth cannot be taught without reference to the conventional truth – that is, by using void statements (XXVIII).

Nāgārjuna then turns to the objection voiced in verse IV. This again is an objection to an imagined defence which we will learn Nāgārjuna does not actually want to make.

The imagined defence is that Nāgārjuna's denial of the reality of things cannot be denied. If all things are void, then it might be urged against this claim that it destroys itself, because it makes itself void, unreal. But, on this same supposition, the counter-argument is itself void. In order to discredit Nāgārjuna's statement, it has to declare it void, thereby accepting its truth; at the same time it declares itself void and discredits itself. The opponent cannot reject Nāgārjuna's statement without accepting it.⁴²

Against this imagined defence, the opponent tersely retorts: 'It is your proposition which is rendered defective by virtue of its own specific character, not mine' (*evam tava pratijñā lakṣanato dūsyate na mama*). That is, it is Nāgārjuna who actually claims the voidness of his own and everybody's proposition. The opponent does not claim it; he merely points out that one who claims it must accept that his own proposition is void.

This objection is again made without reference to Nāgārjuna's explanation that voidness does not prevent things or statements from carrying out their functions. So far as the objector is concerned, voidness is a fatal flaw, and his purpose is to prevent Nāgārjuna from imputing this flaw to him.

It is in the light of this specific attack on the Madhyamaka thesis that we must assess Nāgārjuna's defence in verse XXIX, the one in which he claims to have no proposition:

If I had any proposition, then I would be liable to this defect.
But I have no proposition, so the defect does not affect me'
(*yadi kā cana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved doṣaḥ /
nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ ||*).⁴³

A proper understanding of this claim to have no proposition requires attention to the context of the opponent's objection. Nāgārjuna is dealing with the charge that his voidness dictum is 'defective by virtue of its own specific property' (*lakṣanataḥ*). A *Lakṣaṇa* is the specific characteristic by which a thing can be distinguished. The alleged defect is that of declaring all things to be void, while itself having the specific character of being a *pratijñā*. The opponent accuses Nāgārjuna of advancing a concrete thesis, while he himself does not; he merely points out the self-contradiction resulting from Nāgārjuna's proposition.

The commentary, XXIXa, shows how the reply to this objection should be understood. Nāgārjuna acknowledges that, if he were advancing a real proposition in order to attack the reality of all things, his argument would be defective. However, what he is asserting does not in ultimate truth have the specific character of being a proposition, because ultimately there are no real specific characters of anything. 'When all things are void, brought to perfect resolution, perfect purity of nature, how can there be any proposition? How can anything find purchase upon the specific character of a proposition?' (*sarvabhāveṣu śūnyeṣvatyantopaśānteṣu prakṛtivivikteṣu kutaḥ pratijñā / kutaḥ pratijñālakṣanaprāptiḥ*).⁴⁴ That is, seen from the point of view of ultimate truth, *paramārthataḥ*, there exist no distinct and specific entities. On the level of conventional truth,

samvyavahāra, one has to resort to the use of terms presupposing the separate reality of propositions and other things, but ultimately there is no question of one thing affecting another, one argument attacking another. There is, ultimately, no discrete entity with the *lakṣaṇa* of a *pratijñā*. The identification of entities as if they were independently real belongs to the plane of conventional truth.

Proponents of the view that the *sūnya* doctrine entails that all views are false might suppose that Nāgārjuna is claiming that other people advance propositions, which are all defective, while he somehow demonstrates this fact to us without advancing any proposition of his own. On the contrary, he is pointing to the unreality of *all* propositions.⁴⁵

Verses V and VI introduce the objection that the entities denied by Nāgārjuna in his statement that all things are void must presumably be first apprehended by one of the means or criteria of knowledge before they can be denied; but if all things are void there can be no such thing as apprehension. In Verse XXX Nāgārjuna replies that, if there were apprehension of something, it would indeed be appropriate to affirm or deny it; but in fact there is no actual apprehension, so there is neither affirmation nor denial (*tasmān na pravartayāmi na nivartayāmi*).⁴⁶ Following verses refute the validity of the criteria of knowledge (*pramāṇas*). Again, we must recognize that Nāgārjuna's argument proceeds from the absence of intrinsic reality in things. Apprehension of something is a concrete event and as such is void, so one cannot make any statement about it, affirming or denying its existence. This does not mean that void events, such as utterances, cannot serve as vehicles for true propositions.

Verse IX introduces another objection: it argues, in effect: if all things are void, then the name 'absence of intrinsic reality' is void. If 'absence of intrinsic reality' is void, there is no such thing as absence of intrinsic reality. Therefore there is such a thing as intrinsic reality.

If there were no intrinsic reality of phenomena, then the very name "absence of intrinsic reality" itself would not exist, for there is no name without an object. *yadi ca na bhavet svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ niḥsvabhāva ityeva / nāmāpi bhaven naivaṃ nāma hi nirvastukam nāsti //*.

Though this argument looks trivially sophisticated, it has legitimacy from the principle that a mind-object has the same sort of reality or unreality as a physical thing, being an object of sense. Nāgārjuna's reply, in verse LIX, is that since all things are void, the label 'absence of intrinsic reality' being a thing is itself void: it is not a real entity.⁴⁷

So the criticism fails because it simply mistakes what Nāgārjuna says: he has already admitted that the name 'absence of intrinsic reality' is not real; but this admission, for reasons already explained, in no way disables Nāgārjuna's argument: a meaning can be successfully conveyed by utterances which are void. So Nāgārjuna's statement that he has no proposition is not a doomed attempt to escape self-refutation (the view that all views are false is false); it means that no concrete expressions of views are real. But these expressions nevertheless do their job.

It is now easier to deal with certain passages (in verses LXIII and LXIVa) which depend upon unfamiliar theoretical assumptions.

Here we confront a principle which was espoused by Nyāya philosophy and not rejected by Nāgārjuna. It appears in the objection voiced in verse XI: one cannot negate something that does not exist; Nāgārjuna negates intrinsic reality; therefore intrinsic reality exists. 'By virtue of the act of negation itself, the intrinsic reality of all things is not negated' (*pratiṣedhasambhāvād eva sarvabhāvasvabhāvo 'pratiṣiddhah*).

The Naiyāyikas maintained the existence, not only of those things whose reality one affirms, but also of those things whose reality one denies. Whatever one negates must exist in order to be negated, to be available for negation. It is not possible to negate any non-existent thing.⁴⁸

It is perhaps not surprising that Nāgārjuna accepted this assumption. As was noticed before, Madhyamaka thought envisaged affirmation and denial as *quasi*-physical relationships between entities; a disputant could not assail, repel or dispose of an object that was not there. To refute *svabhāva* ('refute' being a transitive verb with a substantive as object) was to admit its substantial existence. It was perhaps not easy for him, in his philosophical environment, to distinguish between 'I deny *svabhāva*' (implying its existence) and 'I deny that *svabhāva* exists'; his attempt to formulate his sense of the distinction was a pioneering effort not taking a form familiar to us.⁴⁹

In verse LXIII, Nāgārjuna turns to the objection that, since there is no name without a thing (that is, if something can be referred to it must exist), then if Nāgārjuna negates the application of the name 'intrinsic reality' to entities, it must belong to something nevertheless. This objection raises no real problem for Madhyamaka, he claims, for a reason that is very simply stated: 'I negate nothing, for there is nothing to negate.'⁵⁰ That is, no act of rebutting or assailing takes place involving a disputant and an object of attack, because there is

no negating of an object; there is only the denial *that* something is the case. No real substantive is required as the object of the verb.

It is verse LXIV and its commentary, though, which have perhaps most contributed to the impression that in some sense Nāgārjuna is seeking to divest himself of the responsibility for saying that all things are without intrinsic reality, while at the same time attempting to claim the credit due to one who says this. Such an acrobatic feat, if it is actually performed, looks suspiciously like the Liar Paradox.

The objection which is here rebutted is the one advanced in verse XII, which is to the effect that, if intrinsic reality does not exist, it is without words that it is to be negated. Here reappears the doctrine that what is negated must be existent. No significant negation can be expressed that is not of something that exists. The rebuttal of what does not exist requires no utterance: *ṛte vacanāt pratiśedhaḥ sidhyate hy asatah*.

Nāgārjuna's reply is that the words (with which he denies intrinsic reality) 'make known that it is non-existent, but do not attack it' (*atra jñāpayate vāg asad iti tan na pratinihanti*).

Here, for the reader convinced that *sūnya*, applied to propositions, means 'false' or 'meaningless', it might appear that Nāgārjuna informs us of the non-existence of intrinsic reality without actually asserting an argumentative denial of it, since the assertion of argumentative denials would contradict the doctrine of voidness. On this reading, he seeks to evade the Charybdis of contradiction by embracing the Scylla of silence. Of course, a silence which says out loud that it is silence is self-contradictory; Nāgārjuna has already been over this. What then does he mean?

The answer, by now, is not difficult. He means that he is not a real disputant attacking a real object; rather, there is no disputant and no object to attack (*pratinihan*). Both are unreal.

In the commentary to this verse Nāgārjuna makes a distinction. In saying that things lack intrinsic reality, Nāgārjuna's statement does not have the effect of depriving all things of intrinsic reality (lit. 'does not *make* all things to be necessarily devoid of intrinsic reality': *na niḥsvabhāvān eva sarvabhāvān karoti*); what it does, rather, is (given that there is no intrinsic reality) to *make known* that things lack intrinsic reality (*kiṃtvasati svabhāve bhāvā niḥsvabhāvā iti jñāpayate*).⁵¹

This is further explained by the example of a response to a person who claims, erroneously, that Devadatta is in the house. 'Somebody tells him in reply: "He is not" (*nāstīti*).' This statement 'He is not' does not have the effect of depriving Devadatta of existence (lit. 'does not

make Devadatta non-existent', *na ... devadattasyāsadbhāvam karoti*).⁵² Nāgārjuna's statement that things lack intrinsic reality is like this response.

The distinction between 'making' something so and 'making known' that something is so may wrongly suggest to some interpreters that (for whatever reason) Nāgārjuna refrains from asserting a true proposition *p*, but, although he does not assert that *p*, his words somehow make *p* known nevertheless.

This sort of interpretation might seem appropriate if one were influenced by the belief that *sūnya* means 'false' when applied to statements. One might imagine that Nāgārjuna has in mind an action comparable to nudging somebody's elbow and pointing through the window to 'make known' that it is raining, without incurring the responsibility of asserting that it is raining. But, if it actually is raining, what is wrong with asserting the fact? A temptation may then arise to suppose that, according to Madhyamaka, all assertions are false or meaningless, and that to avoid the Liar Paradox Nāgārjuna must contrive to produce effects in the minds of his hearers by a special technique which does not involve asserting anything.

Now, it is quite true that the nudge and the pointing finger can indeed be compared to the technique of *reductio ad absurdum*, deployed repeatedly in Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* – the protagonist does not advance an independent argument of his own but points out something which his opponent can see without changing his point of view. However, this similarity does not license us to jump to conclusions. The employer of *reductio ad absurdum* is not refraining from making any assertions out of a belief that all assertions whatsoever are false or meaningless.

The temptation to see the Liar Paradox looming like Banquo's ghost behind the verses of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* should be resisted. Verse LXIV and its commentary do not mean that Nāgārjuna forgoes the right to make any assertion.

The use of *karoti* clearly suggests the assumption that subject and object of a verb must be on the same plane of reality. The statement 'N attacks M' has the effect, if true, of making M an object of attack. Similarly, 'A denies the *svabhāva* of B' entails that A's statement somehow deprives a real B of its pre-existent *svabhāva*.

Given the tradition in which he was working, the terms available to Nāgārjuna to express the notion of denial tended to carry with them the implication of a relationship between real things (A attacks B). By contrast, Nāgārjuna wishes to say that intrinsic reality is of itself

non-existent; it does not require any attack to make it so. He is therefore merely registering a fact, not depriving something of reality.

Given this interpretation of verse LXIV, it is clear that Nāgārjuna is not claiming to be saying nothing yet somehow gaining credit for letting truths be known by a sort of content-free 'nudging and pointing', which would hardly be convincing. He means that the opponent's attack fails because his, Nāgārjuna's, denial of intrinsic reality to all things does not imply an assertion of the positive existence of any intrinsic reality anywhere.

At this point, it is legitimate to conclude that Nāgārjuna's repudiation of propositions does not commit him to the Liar Paradox, or to an evasion of it by resort to an unusual sense of negating (that is, to interpretation No. 1 as listed above). The passages so far considered are those which appear most like self-denying statements; there are others, particularly in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, but they can be dealt with on the lines developed here. In the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, Nāgārjuna asserts that all speculative views (*dr̥ṣṭi*) are void, and that even those whose view is that all is void are hopelessly lost;⁵³ he also says that the Buddhas never really preached any doctrine.⁵⁴ This means that doctrines which insist upon any concepts (even 'voidness' itself) as names of separately instantiated real things necessarily miss the point, for things are unreal.

So Nāgārjuna does not deny that an assertion can capture a truth. On the contrary, some propositions are true, and can be conveyed by utterances. These utterances, however, are not real because, like all supposedly concrete things and events, they lack intrinsic reality. Whatever is meant by this lack of intrinsic reality, it does not mean that they are incapable of carrying out the function of asserting the content of propositions. (As interpretation No. 5 in the list above would claim, they have the shadow-existence of all void things, which are provisional, relative, dependent, *pratītyasamutpanna*.)

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NOTES

¹ *Vigrahavyāvartanī* XXIa; 'And just as this statement of mine is void because of its being devoid of an intrinsic nature, so also are all things void because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature.'

² *Vigrahavyāvartanī* verse XXIX: *nāsti ca mama pratijñā*; see E. H. Johnston and A. Kunst, eds., *The Vigrahavyāvartanī* of Nāgārjuna, with the author's commentary, in K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston and A. Kunst, *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna*, Delhi (Banarsidass) 1978 (reprint of text with translation of Bhattacharya), p. 29.

³ *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, XXX.

⁴ *Vigrahavyāvartanī* LXIII: *pratiśedhayāmi nāham kimcit pratiśedhyam asti na ca kimcit*.

⁵ *Vigrahavyāvartanī* LXIV, LXIVa. The denial does not render entities void of intrinsic reality; it somehow 'makes known' that they are void. Nāgārjuna has appeared to some scholars to be trying to avoid the responsibility of advancing a philosophical proposition (for propositions do not exist) and yet to produce the same effect as if he had done so – eating his cake and having it. The actual meaning of this verse is discussed further below.

⁶ The Eubulides form must be distinguished from the more familiar Epimenides form ('Everything a Cretan says is false'), which introduces the type of statement whose paradoxical character is contingent upon facts external to the sentence.

⁷ See for example the various papers in the special issue of the *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, vol. 13 No. 2 (1984) on 'Truth-value Gaps, Truth-value Gluts, and the Paradoxes'.

⁸ See particularly T. Parsons, 'Assertion, Denial and the Liar Paradox,' *Ibid.*, pp. 137–152.

⁹ J. Lyons, *Semantics*, vol. II, Cambridge (C.U.P.), 1977, pp. 749f., 768f., 802f. citing R. M. Hare, 'Meaning and Speech Acts', *Philosophical Review* vol. 79 (1970): to negate the assertion of a proposition is 'performative' negation of its 'neustic' force.

¹⁰ For brief discussion of Madhyamaka arguments see I. W. Mabbett, 'An Annotated Translation of Chapter XVI of Candrakīrti's Prasannapada', *Journal of Ancient Indian History*, Vol. 15 Pts 1–2 (1984–85), 47–84, and 'An Annotated Translation of Chapters XII and XIV of Candrakīrti's Prasannapada', *Journal of the Department of Pali*, University of Calcutta, Vol. 4 (1987–88), 113–146.

¹¹ Thomas E. Wood, *Nāgārjunian Disputations: a philosophical journey through an Indian looking-glass*, Honolulu (University of Hawaii Press), 1994.

¹² See MMK 24. 18cd; cf. MMK 15.7.

¹³ 'What the Mādhyamika has disowned, then, is any thesis, assertion or view (*dr̥ṣṭi*) that posits the existence of some kind of *bhāva* or *dharma* possessing a *svabhāva*, and not all philosophical statements, doctrines and theories (*darśana*) without distinction': D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Does the Mādhyamika have a Thesis and Philosophical Position?', *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology: Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and Language*, ed. B. K. Matilal and R. D. Evans, Dordrecht (Reidel), 1986, pp. 229–237 at p. 233.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 232f.

¹⁵ See E. Conze, *Buddhism, its Essence and Development*, Oxford (Cassirer), 1957, p. 125; Jaspers, cited by Oetke, 'Rationalismus', pp. 2f.; S. Betty, 'Nāgārjuna's Masterpiece – Logical, Mystical, Both or Neither?', *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 33 No. 2 (1983), pp. 123–138 at pp. 133–135; K. Bhattacharya, ed. and tr., *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (Vigrahavyāvartanī)*, Delhi (Motilal Banarsidass) 1978, p. 24, n. 3.

¹⁶ D. Ruegg, 'On the Thesis and Assertion in the Madhyamaka/dBu ma', in

Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy, ed. E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher, Wien (Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien), 1983, pp. 205–241 at pp. 211f., n. 17.

¹⁷ Ruegg, 'Thesis and Assertion', esp. p. 216, and idem, 'Does the Mādhyamika have a Thesis and Philosophical Position?', in *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology: Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and Language*, ed. B. K. Matilal and Robert D. Evans, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster/Tokyo (Reidel), 1986, pp. 229–237, esp. at p. 233.

¹⁸ L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Le Bouddhisme*, 1909, p. 197; cited by Oetke, 'Rationalismus', p. 2.

¹⁹ T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, London (Allen and Unwin), 1955, pp. 136, 145, 155, 161.

²⁰ *Language, Logic and Reality*, p. 304.

²¹ B. K. Matilal, *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*, Oxford (Clarendon), 1986, p. 48.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 66. Matilal cites J. Searle here for the concept of illocutionary negation: N's rejection of views is illocutionary, not a self-invalidating assertion.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

²⁴ Idem, 'Is *prasaṅga* a Form of Deconstruction?', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 20 (1992), pp. 345–362 at p. 361.

²⁵ Stafford Betty, 'Nāgārjuna's Masterpiece – Logical, Mystical, Both or Neither?', *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 33 No. 2 (1983), pp. 123–138, esp. p. 128f.

²⁶ David Loy, 'How Not to Criticize Nāgārjuna: a Response to L. Stafford', *Ibid.*, vol. 34 No. 4 (1984), pp. 437–450 at p. 439.

²⁷ Ruegg, 'Thesis and Assertion', p. 238; Ruegg, 'Does the mādhyamika have a thesis?', p. 235f.

²⁸ Kartikeya Patel, 'The Paradox of Negation', *Asian Philosophy* vol. 4 No. 1 (1994), pp. 17–32.

²⁹ Ruegg, 'Does the mādhyamika have a thesis?' and 'On the Thesis and Assertion'.

³⁰ Ruegg, 'Does the mādhyamika have a thesis?', at p. 232. See also Ruegg, 'On the Thesis and Assertion', and Galloway, 'Some Logical Issues', pp. 9, 26f. n. 5, where the attribution of a distinction to Ruegg does not seem exact.

³¹ Ruegg, 'On the Thesis and Assertion', p. 212 n. 17.

³² Ruegg's argument is addressed to the history of mādhyamika thought as a whole, not specifically to the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. The evidence cited for the currency of a narrow usage of *pratijñā* consists of two sets of passages in the *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti, one set described as very clearly referring to 'a propositional thesis postulating an entity', and the other using the term in the more general or neutral sense (Ruegg, 'On the Thesis and Assertion', p. 213).

It will be argued here that, in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, Nāgārjuna's claims to be advancing no *pratijñā* can be understood by making the distinction between propositions as things, *bhāva* (which have no *svabhāva* and are ultimately unreal) and as abstract views or teachings, *darśana*, *vāda* (which Mādhyamaka advanced). Nāgārjuna could claim to have no *pratijñā* in the first sense, without prejudice to his claim to teach truths in the second sense.

³³ See R. Robinson, 'Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuna's System', *Philosophy East and West*, vol. VI No. 4 (1957), pp. 291–308, especially p. 302; cf. B. Galloway, 'Some Logical Issues in Mādhyamaka thought', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 17 (1989), pp. 1–35.

³⁴ T. E. Wood, *Nāgārjunian Disputations: a philosophical journey through an Indian looking-glass*, Honolulu (University of Hawaii Press), 1994.

³⁵ C. Oetke, 'Die Metaphysische Lehre Nāgārjunas', *Conceptus*, vol. 56 (1988), pp. 47–64; idem, 'Remarks on the Interpretation of Nāgārjuna's Philosophy', *Journal*

of *Indian Philosophy*, vol. 19 (1991), pp. 315–323 at p. 317: there is much to be said for the interpretation of Nāgārjuna's teaching according to which 'on the level of the highest truth there is nothing of any kind'.

³⁶ *uraḥ-kañḥauṣṭha-jihvā-dantamūla-tālu-nāsikā-mūrdha-prabhṛtiṣu yatneṣu*.

³⁷ On the complex relative chronology of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* and the *Nyāya Sūtras* see J. Bronkhorst, 'Nāgārjuna and the Naiyāyikas', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 13 (1985), pp. 107–132. Nāgārjuna knew an early version of the *Nyāya Sūtras*; a later version of the latter knew the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*. The mutual accusations of self-contradiction advanced by Nāgārjuna and his Naiyāyika opponents are discussed by Roy W. Perrett in 'Self-Refutation in Indian Philosophy', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 12 No. 3 (1984), pp. 237–263; see pp. 250–255.

³⁸ *nivartayati* can be translated as 'deny' or 'repel'. As noted above, Nāgārjuna regards ideas as objects on the same plane of reality or unreality as physical objects. Therefore the objection that the voidness thesis merely voids itself has to be perceived in quasi-physical terms: the voidness thesis is alleged to deprive itself of the power to void things. Hence 'repel' catches the sense better, though not usually applied in English to a refuted argument. (This point is owed to C. Oetke, *personal communication*.)

³⁹ 'Proposition' here translates *pratijñā*, on the meanings of which *vide supra*. In verse I, the Mādhyamaka dictum is appropriately called a *vacana*, utterance, because the opponent is pointing to its lack of reality as a specific and independently real thing. In verse II, the argument is that, if the utterance is not void, it contradicts the meaning or content of an abstract proposition (hence *pratijñā*), but Nāgārjuna does not think of *pratijñā* purely as an abstract meaning; he thinks of it as a weapon or victim of attack, like a physical object.

⁴⁰ Betty, *loc. cit.*, p. 128, summarizes verses I–II and Nāgārjuna's reply. Cf. Loy, 'How not to criticize Nāgārjuna', p. 439, claiming that in fact the opponent cannot criticize Nāgārjuna's claim without accepting it.

⁴¹ Outside the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, or at least outside Mādhyamaka, *sādhyasama* clearly has a meaning very like 'begging the question', and this interpretation is followed here. Nāgārjuna's use of the expression is however often taken in another sense, and the issue is not entirely clear. See D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Thesis and Assertion', *op. cit.*, p. 210; B. K. Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality*, Delhi (Motilal Banarsidass), 1985, pp. 47f.; K. Bhattacharya, 'Note on the interpretation of the term *sādhyasama* in Mādhyamaka texts', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* vol. 2 Nos. 3/4 (1974), pp. 225–30. At *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* 4.8–9 the expression can be understood to mean something like 'begging the question', and Candrakīrti takes it in this way. However, the interpretation of these verses is problematic.

⁴² Cf. Loy, *loc. cit.* p. 439; *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* IV.8–9.

⁴³ For the gloss on this verse by mKhas grub rje, see Ruegg, 'On the Thesis and Assertion', p. 219. On this verse see also Oetke, 'Rationalismus', pp. 22–26 (Nāgārjuna makes no proposition, not as a matter of contingent fact, but because in ultimate truth all things are non-existent and therefore there are no such things as utterances of propositions by anybody); idem, 'Remarks', p. 320; Matilal, 'Is *prasaṅga* a Form of Deconstruction?' at p. 355.

⁴⁴ The terms used here, which are scarcely susceptible of a literal translation, have clear echoes from Prajñāpāramitā literature; see K. Bhattacharya *et al.*, *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna*, *op. cit.*, pp. 23f (note). The rather monistic language used at this point lends itself somewhat to a Vedānta-type concept of an absolute (as indeed Bhattacharya himself takes it), but this is not the only possible interpretation.

⁴⁵ C. Oetke has emphasized that the reason why Nāgārjuna has no proposition is the same as the reason why nobody has: 'Remarks on the Interpretation of Nāgārjuna's Philosophy', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 19 (1991), pp. 315–323 at p. 320.

⁴⁶ On verse XXX see Ruegg, 'On the Thesis and Assertion', pp. 207, 220, where discrepant constructions appear, the commentary to the text shows that in fact *pratyakṣādibhir arthais* belongs in the protasis.

⁴⁷ LXa: *na hi vyaṃ nāma sabbhūtam iti brūmah*; 'We do not say that it is a real thing.'

⁴⁸ On Nyāya negation, see B. K. Matilal, 'Reference and Existence in Nyāya and Buddhist Logic', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 1 (1970), pp. 83–110; idem, *Logic, Language and Reality*, Delhi (Motilal Banarsidass), 1985, pp. 77–112; Dinesh Chandra Guha, *Nyāya System of Logic (Some Basic Theories and Techniques)*, Varanasi, 1968, pp. 112f.; K. Bhattacharya, *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna*, p. 13.

⁴⁹ This point is substantially owed to comments by C. Oetke, *personal communication*.

⁵⁰ *Vigrahavyāvartanī* LXIII: *pratiśedhayāmi nāhaṃ kimcit pratiśedhyam asti na ca kimcit*. On the gloss on this verse by mKhas grub rje, see Ruegg, 'Thesis and Assertion', p. 221 (read '63ab' for '64ab'): there is no *negandum* 'established by self-nature ... an unreal ... māyā-like negandum and negator are accepted.'

⁵¹ Sāṅkṛtyāyana's reading is: *kintv asatsvabhāvo bhāvānām asatsvabhāvānām iti*: Johnston and Kunst, p. 48 n. 12.

⁵² For the var. lec. see Johnston and Kunst, p. 49 n. 1.

⁵³ *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* XII.8: *sūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭinām proktā nihsaraṇaṃ jinaiḥ | yeṣāṃ tu sūnyatādrṣṭis tān asādhyān babhāṣire*.

⁵⁴ *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* XXV.24: *na kva cit kasya cit kaścid dharmo buddhena deśitah*. See also *ibid.* IV.8–9; XVIII.6, 8; XXIV.13.

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THE BUDDHA AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Collins's annotated translation of the *Aggañña-sutta* (hereafter AS) in the 1993 volume of this journal restores the text to life. To those, like myself, who do not read Pali he has pointed out indeterminacies of meaning which previous translations had disguised. He shows that at certain key points the Pali text is ambiguous and offers us enough linguistic information to choose our own preferred reading. Over-trenched positions defended by heavy artillery have in recent years led the debate on the meaning of AS into a dead end. Collins' annotations open several possible escape routes and offer us much food for thought. But his final flourish – the second appendix at pp. 387–9 headed 'Is there a 'social contract' in AS?' – spills further mud on an already murky issue. The first two sections of this note give reasons why, in relation to these three pages alone, we should bury Collins rather than praise him. In the remaining sections I try to be more constructive. I offer a lawyer's reaction to AS along with speculations about the legal and political context against which the Buddha delivered his satirical barbs.

COULD THE BUDDHA HAVE USED THE PHRASE *SOCIAL CONTRACT*?

We do not know much about North Indian law during the Buddha's lifetime, but the limited evidence suggests that, as in all other contemporary legal systems, there was no general conception of contract. It knew instead a wide range of discrete legal institutions all of which (to a modern western analyst) depended on the idea of 'promise'. These included hire of specialist skills, buying and selling of livestock, alienation of land, deposit of goods for safe-keeping and engagement to marry. If the Buddha had wanted to insert a legal metaphor into his account of the origin of kingship, if he had wanted to explain a nebulous political abstraction in terms of a familiar legal concept, he would have had to compare the king's relations with his subjects to one of these particular contracts. Should we think of Mahāsammata as a hired specialist, like the laundry man, the doctor or the prostitute? Should he be seen as a left-luggage attendant, accepting the people's sovereignty on deposit? Or was he viewed as the fiancé of his people,

espoused to a marriage that could never be entirely consummated? Had the Buddha used one of these legal metaphors we would have been unimpressed. The phrase 'social contract' weaves a beguiling spell over the intellect which is lacking in coinages such as 'social prostitution' or 'social laundrette'. Is it pedantic to insist that because the Buddha would not have used the phrase, we should avoid applying it to him? In my discipline of legal history it is not. The use of metaphors like 'social contract' provides us with important data. Their explicit appearance in discussions of legitimation intended for a general audience demonstrates how far legal technicalities have infiltrated popular speech and shows the extent of popular knowledge about law. For centuries after the rediscovery of *the Digest* European lawyers laboured to produce a general concept of contract. In Shakespeare's lifetime the general public still talked in terms of debt and trespass. That Hobbes could use contractual language (the phrase 'covenant of every man with every man') and be understood by his contemporaries helps us pinpoint the moment of change.

Another argument against the anachronistic use of 'social contract' is that it makes the comparison of legal metaphors more difficult. Such comparisons are commonplace within European culture. That Locke uses the metaphor of a trust while Hobbes uses the metaphor of a contract has long been recognised as pinpointing important differences between their theories. Hobbes emphasises that the terms of the agreement between king and people is for them to decide, provided only that the king can preserve the peace. By using contract as his model, he downplays the revolutionary implications – not every breach of a contract entails the right of rescission. Locke emphasises that the terms of the agreement are partly predetermined: 'natural rights' constrain the possibilities, just as the law of trusts constrains agreement to a greater extent than the law of contract. By using the trust model, Locke upgrades the revolutionary implications – any breach of trust by the trustee renders him liable to be deposed by a Chancery judge. Since they drew their metaphors from the same legal system, Hobbes and Locke could at least understand each other. To talk of a social contract in cultures unfamiliar with the 18th century common law of obligations is a high-risk strategy. If I tried to explain the Chinese 'mandate of heaven' by appealing to the post-classical Roman Law on mandate, I would be rightly derided. To apply the phrase 'social contract' to non-western cultures (or, indeed, to European cultures before the 17th century) is to risk the same fate.

The social contract is a political theory which uses a legal metaphor. Part of the attraction of the metaphor for Hobbes was its novelty: had

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 he been writing now he might have developed a 'quantum theory' or a 'chaos theory' of the origins of the state. For Hobbes and Locke the legal referent in the metaphor was creative: the details of the law of contract suggested new ways of thinking about society. Let us call them 'strong social contract' theorists. Since the Buddha lacked a general theory of contract he could not have been a strong social contract theorist. The many commentators who refer to AS as incorporating a social contract must be using it in a weaker sense which drops the legal referent altogether and substitutes a vague notion of 'popular consent to the emergence of the state'. But Hobbes (1651: 641) is explicit: his theory is about more than popular consent:

'This is more than Consent or Concord; it is a real Unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by Covenant of every man with every man ...'

By all means let us call AS a 'popular consent' political theory. But if we call it a social contract, even a 'weak social contract', our attention will be misdirected. The contract metaphor portrays the bond between subject and state as legalistic, as absolute and unbreakable:

'Of a strange nature is the suit you follow, yet in such rule that the Venetian law cannot impugn you as you do proceed.' (Shakespeare 1600 IV i 178)

while a popular consent theory portrays it as mutable and contingent. Using Weber's terms, the social contract implies formal-rational authority, while popular consent implies traditional and charismatic authority. The former is a historical development out of the latter. Evans-Pritchard talks of:

'... the substitution of a rational economic system for a system in which exchange of goods was not a mechanical but a moral transaction, bringing about and maintaining human, personal relationships between individuals and groups.' (Mauss 1925: ix)

This substitution was taking place in North India between about 800 BC and 300 AD. The Buddha lived during a period when the obligation to match a gift with a return gift was not a simply expressed legal obligation but a complex and highly personalised equation:

'The gift is thus something that must be given, that must be received and that is, at the same time, dangerous to accept. ... The nature and intention of the contracting parties and the nature of the thing given are indivisible.' (Mauss 1925: 58-9)

If the king is supported by popular consent, it is because he has earned it by generosity to his people and by the force of his own personality. By the time *Manusmṛiti* was written, what had applied to all contracts now applied solely to the relationship between king and subjects. Tambiah quotes the words of Paul Mus:

In the terminology of the Brahmana, (the king's) subjects became part of him or other selves of him, while he enjoyed them as his proper food. Magically and juridically, such was the foundation of his right to levy taxes. (Tambiah 1976: 34)

Mauss' legal anthropology links these Indian developments to Melanesian and Pacific North Western systems of gift-exchange. When we talk of political theory in cultures where contract has not acquired the impersonality of a market transaction, we could avoid confusion and honour Mauss' classic work by speaking of a 'social potlatch'.

SHOULD WE IMPOSE THE PHRASE *SOCIAL CONTRACT* ON THE BUDDHA?

We might justify talking of a Buddhist social contract by invoking classificatory convenience. The argument would go like this: 'We have a well-defined category called social contract into which certain western theories from the 17th century onwards can be placed. AS, despite being non-western and two millennia earlier, fits the category so well that convenience outweighs anachronism.' I disagree with the first premise. The social contract is not a well-defined category of political theory. Being told that so-and-so is a social contractarian barely gets us started in understanding his theory. Is the contract a hypothetical event taking place behind a veil of ignorance (Rawls) or a real event in the pre-Columbian history of the Americas (Locke)? If the king breaks his side of the contract, should the people rise up in justified rebellion (Rousseau) or content themselves with the thought that life without a king would be even worse (Hobbes)? To which state institutions are the people consenting? Are they agreeing to a sanctioning mechanism for pre-existent laws (Hobbes, more or less¹) or to a code of legal rules which may not be accompanied by a sanctioning mechanism (Glaucon in *The Republic*)? These questions (and it is easy enough to ask more²) are not concerned with the paint scheme and trim in which a theory is turned out – they go to its essence. My general claim, therefore, is that the social contract is too vague a term even for the discussion of western political theory. My specific claim is that in relation to early India it is particularly inappropriate.

To talk of a Buddhist social contract implies that the Hindu myths about the origin of kingship do not invoke notions of popular consent to monarchy. Had it been otherwise we would talk of 'shared early Indian concepts'. And indeed the *Mahābhārata* legend (at XII.59) emphasises divine will rather than human consent: it is Vishnu and the ancient rishis who appoint the first king. If we judge ancient Indian political theory in terms of how near it came to inventing democracy, we have

now completed our task: 'Popular consent is closer to democracy than divine will; Buddhism is better than Hinduism. Q.E.D.' But we might prefer to judge ancient Indian political theory in its own terms: how successful were the various solutions put forward to its overriding constitutional problem? In India, as in China and in almost all the ancient world, political theory and constitutional law dealt with one single issue. Given the political preeminence of the king (or emperor or sultan), who can restrain him from evil and encourage him to do good? The Buddha put it most succinctly – 'Who is the rāja's rāja?' – half a millennium before Juvenal's better known version (A III 149; cf. Juvenal 'Satires' vi 347). And to this question the *Mahābhārata* legend offers an intriguing answer: the ancient rishis kill the tyrant Vena and create Pṛthu the new king, laying down the conditions under which he will be allowed to rule. One group of citizens, in other words, acts as 'guarantors of the constitution': they are Supreme Court and Army combined since they both judge and enforce complaints against the king. Assuming that these rishis represent the Brahmin caste, the myth amounts to a flexing of Brahmin muscle in the king's face. AS approaches the problem differently. Rather than setting up a body to force the king to do good, we ensure that a king is chosen who will never want to do evil. Mahāsammata is a Platonic philosopher-king, and the very word 'rāja' means 'He brings joy to others according to Dhamma' (#21)³. I shall return to this issue, since the Buddha's position is more complex than I have indicated. My point for the time being is this. If, with Collins, we are looking for 'justifications of defiance to a king perceived to be unjust' (p. 389), then the *Mahābhārata*, which is not even a weak social contract myth, gives us stronger justifications than AS, which is. The *Mahābhārata* gives us a precedent for armed rebellion, while AS leaves us to infer what to do with a king who has failed to meet Dhamma's high standards. Social contract analysis, even in its weak form, misses the point of the Indian material.

'THE BUDDHA WAS ONLY JOKING'

The first two sections have outlined why I am unhappy with Collins' 'conceptual issue of what kind of contract the AS story envisages' (p. 387) and why I would prefer to ask 'what limitations on royal power does the AS story propose?' I hope, nonetheless, that he and I can agree on the general nature of the enterprise in which we are engaged. It is, is it not, to establish what precisely is 'Buddhist' about AS. How did the Mahāsammata myth serve to advance the Buddha's

grand plan? For Gombrich the myth is a shaggy-dog story, setting up a punch-line that punctures Brahmin pretensions. It fits into the Buddha's grand plan as yet another powerful attack on the pretensions of caste. The origin of kingship is simply one facet of the origin of varṇa and 'the positive statements in the myth are ... not meant to be taken seriously.' For Tambiah the humour in the myth does not indicate 'take none of this seriously' so much as 'A joke or two will help my audience get the point'. Behind the mockery directed at Brahmanical beliefs Tambiah finds a countervailing Buddhist account. One aspect of the Buddha's grand plan, then, is the provision of political and constitutional ideas. I am unclear where Collins stands between these extremes. On the one hand, the serious intent of AS 'was as moral commentary rather than as a "myth of origins = charter for society"' (p. 314). On the other hand Mahāsammata is a sufficiently serious invention that we should ask what kind of social contract his appointment represents.

These problems in interpreting AS are caused by the serious implications of humour. Gombrich assumes that in a text which is primarily a satire on Brahmins, no elements of the text are to be taken seriously. But we are surely not supposed to laugh at the 10 commandments in #5 or the analysis of the effects of karma in #27–#30? Collins invokes the alliance of levity and seriousness, but it is rather the alternation of levity and seriousness which scores the biggest laughs. I picture the Buddha expounding #18 to #20 absolutely deadpan. Vaseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja are walking a step behind him nodding their heads and trying to remember it all. 'Wow!' mutters Bhāradvāja, *sotto voce*, 'the Sākyamuni's really getting stuck into the human sciences tonight!' And then the Buddha, equally deadpan, moves on to #21–#25 and knocks them dead. As the howls of laughter die down and as the audience pick themselves up off the ground, Vaseṭṭha asks 'By the way, Blessed One, were you serious about that Mahāsammata stuff?' To which the Buddha replies. ... What we really need is an analysis of the N.E. Indian sense of humour in the 5th century BC graded on a scale from crude buffoonery to subtle irony, with appendices showing regional variations among Sakyans, Magadhans, male adult celibates and enlightened beings. Failing that, it may be that we are trapped in the relativism against which Gombrich (1992: 159–161) warns us. Given our ignorance about the context in which AS was delivered (and I include the legal and political ideas of the time as well as what was considered funny), the text itself may have no objective or inherent meaning for us, though it did when preached to Vaseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja. But the last thing on my mind is to join Gombrich and Collins in their romps through literary theory. Only by

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 piecing together more of AS' context can we hope to retrieve its objective meaning, and in this endeavour both Gombrich, with his Vedic parodies, and Collins, with his substrate of *Vinaya* imagery, have made notable contributions.

DANḌA AND MANU IN THE AGGAÑÑA-SUTTA

Collins describes this question of context, of the shared 6th century cultural vocabulary and repertoire of stories, as 'one of the most difficult but most pressing tasks of Indology' (p. 311). I would add that the legal and political context has scarcely been examined at all: legal historians of India speculate airily about the Vedic period and pontificate knowledgeably about developments from the 1st century BC onwards. But the 6th to the 2nd century BC, when India's cities and states were forming, remains undiscussed. Perhaps I can usefully act as an *agent provocateur* by capering about on the Indologists' turf making wild assertions about early Hindu law. As I understand it, the composition of the *dharmasāstra* -s, and *Manusmṛti* in particular, between 100 BC and 100 AD, was Hindu orthodoxy's reaction to the unwelcome legal developments that accompanied the rise of cities, empires and writing. Whole areas of law which the Brahmins thought should be under their control had slipped into royal control. And this royal law was open to Buddhist influence, since kings and Buddhists shared an affinity with cities and with long distance trade. The 'conservative counter-revolution' of resurgent Hinduism, as Selvanayagam (1992: 59) calls it, was so successful that we no longer possess any complete royal code of laws from the 3rd century BC. But portions of this corpus have been preserved in Buddhist texts (especially in *Vinaya* commentaries), in the Aśokan inscriptions and in the present text of the *Arthasāstra*. The Buddhist influences that can occasionally be discerned in *Manusmṛti* itself (Hopkins 1923: 244; Glucklich 1982: 59) are presumably the result of its incorporation of such arthasāstric material. To discover the legal and political theories prevalent during the Buddha's youth we must peer through this comparatively unknown law of kings and Buddhists into the *terra incognita* beyond. Two names (or Demi-Gods, or abstractions) stare back at us from this unknown land: those of Daṇḍa and Manu. Daṇḍa, says Sen-Gupta (1953: 38) 'meets us at the very threshold of early law'; the whole concept, says Derrett (1976: 602), 'is certainly ancient'. Manu's antiquity is more problematic. P.V. Kane (1968: 1.1: 306) tells us that in the *Ṛg-veda*, which as oral texts must precede the 6th century, Manu usually stands for humanity in general,

but is occasionally used to identify an individual sage. The texts which link Manu as first king and Manu as first promulgator of law cannot be proved to be older than the Buddha. Five centuries later we find Manu legends edited into the Sanskrit written compendia. The *Mahābhārata* distinguishes Manu Svayambhuva (the author of *dharmasāstra*) from Prācetas Manu (the author of *arthaśāstra*). The Supreme Being, it says, composed 100,000 ślokas on dharma, which Manu Svayambhuva promulgated; later Uśana and Brhaspati composed śāstras based on Manu. Kautilya's *Arthaśāstra* identifies the first king as Manu the Vaivasvata. It mentions Uśana and Brhaspati as the founders of schools of law equally as prestigious as Manu's school. But did these Manu legends circulate widely as oral texts in the 6th century BC? I shall assume that they did, and that the names Daṇḍa and Manu are as much as we know of the pre-Buddhist context in which the Buddha preached AS.

Neither Daṇḍa nor Manu is mentioned by name in AS. The question, then, is whether it is helpful to think of AS as a sermon preached against them – an *Anti-Daṇḍa* and *Anti-Manu sutta*. Glucklich makes a strong case for Daṇḍa as the link between science and social theory:

In sum, Daṇḍa is the symbol for the instrumental role of chaos and violence in the world: both in the body politic and in the cosmos as a whole ... his is ... the instrumental force that makes farming, ruling, sacrificing and even marriage efficacious. (1988: 122)

We flatter our local political arrangements (the microcosm) by linking them to global processes (the macrocosm). In Europe we think of such linkage as appealing to 'natural law', but I hasten to add that this term is even less useful for comparative purposes than 'social contract'. Pre-Buddhist India thought of Daṇḍa as the breaking of the egg which makes the omelette possible. It is the act of creative violence which operates as the motor both of cosmic cycles in the natural world and of cycles of crime and punishment in the social world. In the social world it is the king who wields the big stick of state punishment. Is this compatible with the virtue of non-violence (*ahimsā*)? If a pre-Buddhist king was concerned about ordering the infliction of a violent punishment, he could shuffle responsibility onto Daṇḍa: 'I'm a nice guy, as you all know. It is the demi-God Daṇḍa, acting through me, who is responsible.' Brahmans developed a special ritual to allay any doubts that the king himself might feel:

During the royal consecration sacrifice (Rājasūya), after the king has had the dice cast in his hand, they ... silently strike him with sticks (Daṇḍa) on the back – by beating him with sticks they guide him safely over judicial punishment (Daṇḍabhada):

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whence the king is exempt from punishment' (SB 5.4.4.7). ... By being struck, the king becomes *adaṇḍya* – free of punishment, despite the intrinsic violence of his office. ... The Rājasūya establishes here the paradigmatic identification of king and Daṇḍa. ... The result is stated in the *Manusmṛiti* and other texts which assert that the king is the embodiment of Daṇḍa. (Glucklich 1988: 109–111)

We can read AS as offering kamma as an alternative to Daṇḍa. As Marx converts Hegel's idealism into materialism, so the Buddha converts the mythological Daṇḍa into the scientific process of kamma, understood as 'cause and effect'. It is kamma which explains each stage of the cosmic cycle described in #10 to #19. It is kamma which organises heaven and hell, good and bad rebirths, as the just deserts for a human life, and the Buddha emphasises that it operates untainted by considerations of caste (#27–#30). At the political level, incipient humans know just enough to mimic the operation of kamma by appointing Mahāsammata to wield the stick of punishment (#20). But Mahāsammata, unlike the pre-Buddhist kings, has no escape from the consequences of inflicting violent punishment. In Duroiselle's profound words: '... tout acte de violence, si justifiable soit-il, a sa rétribution' (1905: 149). This is not spelt out in AS itself, but it is made clear enough in the *Mūgapakkha jātika* (Ja. #538). Nor does the Buddha offer any coronation ceremonies to rival the Rājasūya. Possibly this is hinted at in the name 'Mahāsammata': a 'Great Elect' king appointed by the people stands in implicit contrast to a 'Divine King' anointed by the Brahmans.⁴

If Mahāsammata is the 'Great Uncrowned' prototype of kingship, what is his relationship to Manu the first king and law-giver of pre-Buddhist myth? Medieval Sri Lanka, apparently drawing on Dhammapala's *Vimānavatthu* commentary, regarded them as identical: Manu Vaivasvata was Mahāsammata's surname (Geiger 60: 112; cp. Malalasekera 38: 566). Has the commentary tradition got it wrong again, or is it explaining another of the Buddha's jokes? I believe that the legend of Manu the first king and law giver was sufficiently well-known to the Buddha's contemporaries that Mahāsammata the first king would be recognised as a parody of him. 'Big Cheese who Got the Job' or 'Great Civil-Servant' is the Buddha's jocular reference to Manu, as we might refer to Adam as 'Great Ancestor who Lost a Rib'. This identification sheds light on a crux in #18. Collins explains on p. 369 that *mariyāda* can be translated either as 'a boundary between fields' or as 'a set of rules'. The sentence he translates as 'Let us now divide up the rice and set up boundary-lines' could equally well mean 'Let us now divide up the rice and agree to a set of rules'. This is where Manu's code of laws has got to. In the Buddha's satire on the Manu legend, the first king is appointed by the people rather than by God, and the first set

of laws is agreed by the people rather than promulgated by the king. Social contract enthusiasts will be delighted that this reading reveals two social contracts for the price of one. #18, as Collins explains, marks the triumph of settled intensive agriculture over hunter-gathering and slash-and-burning. In the first social contract the rice-farmers get together to divide the productive land between them and agree a set of rules on ownership, theft and inheritance. This is the Platonic type of social contract (laws but no sanctions):

The pain of being hurt by someone stronger outweighs the pleasure in hurting someone weaker. People who had experienced both agreed neither to commit injustice nor tolerate it, and this is the beginning of legislation and contracts between men. ... But anyone strong enough to break the contract with impunity would be mad not to do so. ('Republic' 358E-359B)

and in #19 the disadvantages become obvious. With laws but no specialist law-enforcer the whole community must share in the bad kamma engendered by punishment. As Collins points out, accusation and punishment are listed as evils along with stealing and lying. The solution is to appoint Mahāsammata as a specialist law-enforcer. He is 'to criticise, accuse and banish' or, to invoke the word that the Buddha seems deliberately to have avoided, he is to wield *Danda*, the rod of punishment. #20 gives us the second, Hobbesian, social contract: Mahāsammata the great elect and Leviathan the great fish-monster are both avatars of Manu, the primal punisher.

HOW DOES AS FIT INTO THE BUDDHA'S GRAND PLAN?

AS is a myth which explains the origin of kingship in terms of a devolution from superhuman to merely human. How does it fit into the Buddha's grand plan? At this stage we must widen the ambit of discussion to include AS' neighbour in the Pali recension the *Cakkavattisihanāda sutta* (hereafter CSS). CSS describes the further devolution of human society into a 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short' existence which culminates in a *bellum omnium contra omnes* and a new social contract between the few survivors. This is followed by the birth of Metteyya, the next Buddha, emphasising that together AS and CSS describe a full cycle of history. Far in the past our ancestors were 'made of mind, feeding on rapture, providing their own light' (#10). Far in the future our descendants will have a life expectancy of 10 years, get married at the age of 5 and kill each other with whatever they can lay their hands on (CSS #18-#21). Wedged precariously in the present, we humans inhabit a chronological 'Middle Earth'. We admit, reluctantly, that we are not

immortal. In these suttas the Buddha reminds us that impermanence extends from our lives to our social institutions and to the definition of our species. The suttas fit into the grand plan as an illustration of impermanence. But they also contain a specific message about how the process of cause and effect can be halted. AS explains how kingship inevitably emerges through the scientific processes of kamma. Sentient beings will sooner or later get greedy, and will set off, as a kammic consequence, a downward spiral that can only be halted by appointing a king. CSS emphasises that the appointment of a king is only a temporary palliative. The downward spiral will continue unless the king can act as the perfect embodiment of dhamma. To label such a king as a constitutional monarch who reigns 'with dhamma as his overlord' (A i 109) is only half the story. A cakkavatti king, the only kind who can stem humanity's downward spiral, must be as enlightened about cause and effect as a Buddha. Such kings may have existed in human history, but they have hardly been common. Humanity's further descent towards self-destruction is, therefore, inevitable. Gombrich (1988: 84) finds this pessimism inconsistent with the rest of the Buddha's grand plan and regards CSS as either apocryphal or heavily interpolated. To me it illustrates the combination of suffering and impermanence, two of the three conditions which characterise existence, whether or not a Buddha has appeared in this world.

Can we go any further? Was the provision of constitutional law and political philosophy part of the Buddha's grand plan? Did he make any contribution to solving the ancient world's 'problem of total power' (Gokhale 1966: 20)? Gombrich answers all these questions in the negative:

Buddhism produced no parallel to the execution of Charles I; and the reason for that is yet again the reservation of its higher practice to monks and nuns. (1988: 86)

I entirely agree that the main thrust of the Buddha's grand plan is to signpost the path to *nibbāna* and to prod us lazy and deluded creatures a few steps further along it. But omniscient Buddhas get asked to explain matters that, strictly speaking, are irrelevant to the pursuit of enlightenment. When he finds a lay supporter having trouble with a haughty daughter-in-law, the Buddha steps in and sorts it out (A iv 91). When King Pasenadi drops in for a chat after a hard day in court, the Buddha provides a sympathetic ear to his complaints (S i 74; A v 67; S i 89) and meditates afterwards on their implications (S i 115). Kingship was, after all, his family trade, and the temptation to divert his energy into showing how to do it properly must have been hard to resist. Indeed the best argument for Gombrich's position is that in the tenth

of the *Māra Sutta* -s (S i 115) the Buddha resists Māra's temptation 'to exercise governance righteously, without smiting nor letting others slay'. It was not part of the grand plan that the Buddha should give a personal demonstration of dhammic kingship. But lecturing kings on the subject of dhammic kingship is another matter. The Buddha's grand plan was, in my view, a triptych: the main panel preaches the pursuit of nibbana to those prepared to make the sacrifices of celibacy and homelessness. Two side panels offer instruction appropriate to the laity and to kings. To lay supporters he gave advice ranging from moral instruction (D iii 189) through practical marriage guidance counselling (A iv 91; A ii 57) to an analysis of business failures (A ii 249). To kings he preached the rājadhama, the constitutional law, which we can summarise as follows.

When he agreed to take the community's burden of punishment onto his own back, Mahāsammata made a Faustian bargain. For present gain (the rice-tax) he risked horrific kammic consequences in the future. That he is punishing on behalf of the state is no excuse: in the eye of kamma state violence is no better than private violence. A Buddhist king only has two options. The first is to sit back and enjoy his brief span of glory. It was the merit accumulated in previous lives that got him the throne: the demerit acquired while on the throne merely gives the wheel a further spin. The second option is to aspire to be a cakkavatti. The necessary preliminary step is to rule in accordance with dhamma, paying special attention to equality of treatment (*sama*). Thereafter the king must engage in a programme of mental discipline leading towards the acquisition of the cakkavatti's penetrating vision into the complexities of cause and effect. While the monk's mental discipline is defined by *Vinaya* and meditation, the king's mental discipline is the avoidance of the four *agati*. Only when he has purged himself of subjectivity, when he has learned to operate at the centre of the social world without greed, anger, fear or favour, will he gain the insight that a cakkavatti needs. When his actions and policies are the result of utterly objective thought processes, then his subjects will be inspired to good behaviour by his example. Courts and punishments will become redundant.

What kind of political philosophy is this? It recalls Marx by the way it situates the contemporary state on a continuum extending backwards and forwards through time. It recalls Mao Zedong by its refusal to distinguish between state and private violence: all power comes through the barrel of a gun. And, if we substitute the phrase 'vanguard party' for 'king', it recalls Lenin by urging rulers to achieve merciless realism through

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mutual self-criticism. I would not push these parallels too far. Marx would dismiss Buddhist rājadhama as bourgeois ideology, while the Buddha would dismiss dialectical materialism as a wholly misguided ontology. Perhaps the parallels are merely what you get when two world views which are each historicist and concerned primarily with other issues deal with law *en passant*. But at least it makes a change from the social contract! Buddhist political theory is a small field and for the last century the social contract has cast a shadow right across it. Who knows what exotic new plants will sprout in the sunlight once we have chopped it down?

NOTES

¹ The prime concern of the Leviathan is to punish and end quarrels. But Hobbes does allow that the Leviathan can act as legislator. There are no common standards of good and evil 'save from the arbitrator whom men, disagreeing, shall by consent set up and make his sentence the rule thereof.' (1651: 635)

² As Lessnoff does in the passage quoted by Collins at p. 387. Lessnoff's distinction between bilateral and multilateral relies on technicalities of the law of contract. It is therefore inappropriate for analysing 'weak social contracts' based merely on popular consent. For an exhaustive account of thirteen ways in which western social contract theories disagree with each other, see Klenner (1988). Another recent work which summarises legal approaches to the social contract is Kelly (1992: 96-9, 128-31, 168-72, 208-219).

³ Mediaeval Europe also indulged in *nirukti* etymologies: 'Kings get their name from ruling (*reges a regendo vocati*) ... and he who does not correct (*qui non corrigit*) ... does not rule. Thus the name of king is held through doing right, and is forfeited by doing wrong.' St. Isidore 'Etymologiae' 9.3, quoted in Kelly (1992: 96)

⁴ There are, I admit, references in the canon to 'annointed kings' [as for example at A iii 151]. This is noise rather than message. It is part of everyday life which the Buddha mentions rather than a practice which he advocates. A relevant thought experiment: can we imagine the Buddha devising a coronation ceremony?

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THE LION'S ROAR ON THE WHEEL-TURNING KING:
 A RESPONSE TO ANDREW HUXLEY'S 'THE BUDDHA AND
 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT'

1. SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

I imagine most journal articles, if not quite falling still-born from the press like Hume's *Treatise*, don't have much of a lifetime. One might say of their writers, as Samuel Beckett said of humanity, 'They give birth astride a grave, the light gleams for an instant, then it's night once more'. In 'The Discourse on What is Primary' (= DWP), published in vol. 21 pp. 301–93 of this journal, I struggled to bring forth what I thought was a reasonable argument for accepting the conventional attribution to the *Aggañña Sutta* (= AS) of a Social Contract theory, given a specific analysis of what such a contract meant. Now Andrew Huxley plays the Beckettian midwife: 'Astride of a grave and a difficult birth. Down in the hole, lingeringly, the grave-digger puts on the forceps'. Well, I'll let the idea die, but I want a gravestone on which is written, in flashing neon lights: No More Social Contract Talk!

But perhaps it's only appendicitis, a case for local surgery, and perhaps Huxley is a Socratic midwife, helping me to produce something else. I accept the criticisms of DWP Appendix 2 made by Huxley in sections #1–2 of his 'The Buddha and the Social Contract'. The wording on p. 388 of DWP – 'it does seem reasonable ... to see the Buddhist story as analogous to' one form of Social Contract theory (= SCT) – perhaps escapes his first point, that the Buddha could not have used such a legal metaphor since as far as we know there was no such theory of law in ancient India. But it does not escape his second, that there is no precise SCT in European/American tradition for it to be analogous to. On p. 389 I say that 'in practice the contract theory remained unused', and that 'there seems to have been little if any use of the contract theory ...', which both imply that the attribution of SCT to the *Aggañña Sutta* is more than just an analogy. His patient attention to the detail and nuance in 'the comparison of legal metaphors' used in political theory offers more promising avenues for our understanding of these matters; and it seems to me that he establishes successfully in the first two sections

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that 'Social contract analysis, even in its weak form, misses the point of the Indian material' (p. 411). His question at the start of section #3, 'what limitations on royal power does the AS story propose?' seems a good alternative; but any answer to that question or others like it must take explicitly into account and explain (as I think Huxley does not fully accept) the extensive irony, intertextual references, and word-play with which the 'Fall of the Original Saṃgha' parable is told. Or at least argue that they are not present, or not relevant.

2. MANU AND MAHĀSAMMATA (= MS)

DWP was intended 'to encourage rather than foreclose discussion' (p. 302), and in that spirit I shall offer some comments here on the spectacle of Huxley 'capering about on the Indologists' turf making wild assertions about early Hindu law', as well as on what he says in #4 and #5 about early Buddhism, AS and other Buddhist texts. I fear, however, that we cannot 'agree on the general nature of the enterprise in which we are engaged', viz. an attempt 'to establish what precisely is "Buddhist" about' AS, and ask 'how did the MS myth serve to advance the Buddha's grand plan'. I prefer to avoid setting precise boundaries to what is 'Buddhist', whether in relation to AS or for any other purpose. Huxley, like Gombrich (92), is happy to speak of 'the Buddha' and his 'intentions'. With less courage, perhaps, I think any attempt to get back to 'What the Buddha [really] Taught' is, for almost all purposes, pointless speculation about what we cannot know. To do such a thing is, I believe, merely to announce what are one's own predilections within the gamut of things we can and do know to have existed in historical (i.e. post-Aśoka) Buddhism. The Introduction to DWP set out the socio-historical milieu in which I think AS originally circulated (or better, as I said, 'some oral ancestor of our written text', p. 323), and offered arguments for the claim that this milieu was pre-Mauryan North India. I also tried to sketch out what seems to me to be the social perspective and literary tone of the text as we have it, and tried to suggest ways in which that perspective and tone should condition any interpretation of it. I have no further historiographical intentions.

My comments will concentrate on three points:

- (i) Huxley's suggestion that in AS MS 'would be recognised as a parody' of Manu;
- (ii) the idea that karmic retribution is inevitable for any violence, including 'legal' punishment by kings; in this section I will discuss this only in historical relationship to AS, returning to it more

systematically in #4 below, 'Making sense of Kings and Karma'; and

- (iii) his analysis of AS in relation to the *Cakkavatti-sihanāda Sutta* (= CSS). My reply to the latter will take the form of an extended analysis of that text in #3.

In regard to the first point, Huxley says (p. 414), cautiously, 'the texts which link Manu as first king to Manu as first promulgator of law cannot be proved to be older than the Buddha'. This is true; but although the extant *Manusmṛti* dates from some time after the Buddha, the figure of Manu is certainly known to pre-Buddhist Brahmanical texts, and connected with the promulgation of laws. In the Veda Manu is referred to as the 'father' of mankind, a theme taken up later by Aśoka and found in two of the later Buddhist texts discussed below: Vv-a 19 states that Manu 'has the position of father of (all) beings (*sattānaṃ pituṭṭhāniyo*), while Sadd 507 prefers 'mother and father of (all) human beings' (*manussānaṃ mātāpituṭṭhāne ṭhito*). The earliest extant Brahmanical *dharma* texts, which are either contemporary with or earlier than the Buddha, refer to Manu as an authority on specific *dharma* rules (see Kane 68: 306, 317). In general, of course, the view that Buddhist texts should be seen as engaged in conversation and contest with Brahmanical (and other) ideas is precisely what I was trying to argue by using Burghart's notion of competing hierarchical models, and what Gombrich was trying to argue in his paper by adducing Vedic texts as referents of the AS's satire. But in making such an argument one must have specific textual or other grounds; Gombrich and I identify texts, in Brahmanical and Buddhist traditions, and date them. I am happy to accept that Manu the Law-giver *might have* been known to the original audience(s) of AS. But without further and more precise textual evidence or other data, one cannot be confident of that, and still less that it would have been apparent to anyone listening to AS that MS was 'a parody' of Manu. I have even less (in fact, no) confidence that there was a widespread notion of *daṇḍa* as part of an 'act of creative violence which operates as the motor both of cosmic cycles in the natural world and of cycles of crime and punishment in the social world' (p. 414); this needs much more argument and evidence than is given either by Huxley or by Glucklich in the article on which he relies.

What is the relationship, in later Theravāda Buddhist texts, between MS and Manu? There are two possibilities: they can be the same person, or different people. The latter is amply attested in an article by Huxley, 'When Manu met Mahāsammata', to be published in a

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future issue of this journal, alongside a joint article by the two of us on 'The Post-canonical Adventures of Mahāsammata'. As evidence for their being the same, in his reply to DWP Huxley cites on p. 415 Geiger (60: 112), which refers to undated Sinhalese exegetical texts, and makes reference to the commentary on the *Vimānavatthu* (probably 6th. c.: Norman 83: 137) as evidence that 'Manu Vaisvasvata was MS's surname'. (*Vaivasvata* is a patronymic used of Manu in Sanskrit texts from the time of the *Atharva Veda*, and very commonly in the Epics.) The commentary on the *Vimānavatthu* seems to be the earliest explicit identification of the two figures; Vv-a 19 gives various *nirukti*-s (Rhys Davids's 'fanciful etymologies'; see DWP p. 316) in exegesis of the word *manussā* (= human), including this: 'those in the world (*lokiyā*) say (people) are (called) "human" (*manussā ti*) because they are the offspring of Manu' (*Manuno apacca-bhāvena*). It adds 'he is called "MS" in the Teaching' (*So sāsane Mahāsammato ti vuccati*). Opposing people 'in the world' to those 'in the Teaching' is a standard way for Pali texts to refer to people outside and inside what we would call 'Buddhism'. On occasion the phrase 'in the Teaching' refers only to ordained members of the Monastic Order. (The explanation of *manussā* as being from Manu is given without further comment at Khp-a 123, a commentary on the *Maṅgala Sutta* attributed to Buddhaghosa, in the 4th–5th centuries.)

In general terms, the association between the lineages of Manu and MS is early and ubiquitous. The Buddha's family, the Sākyaans, are said to be descended from the lineage of Okkāka in the canonical *Ambaṭṭha Sutta* (D I 92); MS is said to be the lineage ancestor of the Sākyaans in the early Chronicles (Dīp II, Mhv II), which themselves draw on earlier historical sections of commentarial texts. In Brahmanical texts, throughout the Epics and Purāṇas, Manu is seen as the ancestor of the Ikṣvāku lineage (the Sanskrit term corresponding to Pali Okkāka). Buddhaghosa's commentary on the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta* passage (Sv 258) says that there were three Okkāka lineages descended from MS; the sub-commentary on this text connects MS and Manu. This commentarial text (*ṭīkā*) is traditionally attributed to a Dhammapāla. If this is the earlier commentator, as De Silva (70) thinks, he is perhaps 6th. c.; if not, as is more likely (Warder 81: 198–203, Norman 83: 148–9), he is to be dated anywhere between the 8th. and 12th. centuries. It says (392):

There was a powerful king called MS, born into the family of the Sun (*ādicca-kula*), a man of flawless excellence.
(He was) the eye of the world, his good qualities blazing like rays, he shone like a second Sun, dispelling the darkness.

Out of his concern for the world he set up boundaries (or: limits, *mariyādā*) among people;¹ once they were established, people could not transgress them. Illustrious, brilliant, guardian of the boundaries (*sīmā*) among people, (they) call this primordial great hero 'Manu'.

These verses are repeated in the final, cosmological chapter (*Lokasaṅgṭhiti*) of a 13th/14th c. compilation called *Sārasaṅgaha*, or sometimes *Sāraththa-saṅgaha*, whose account of the dissolution and reappearance of the world draws on that given in the *Visuddhimagga* (419 = XIII 54), which itself develops the 'origin myth' of AS. The first two of the verses are cited in a 19th c. Burmese text, which includes material from earlier sources, translated by Maung Tin and Luce as *The Glass Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma* (23; see p. 37; this passage is discussed further in our 'Post-canonical Adventures'). They are also found, printed as prose, in the *Rājādhirāja-vilāsini*, a eulogy of the Burmese king Badon (reigned 1781–1819), translated by Maung Tin (14) as 'The Manifestation of the King of Kings'.

Manu and MS are connected elsewhere. The *Mahābodhivaṃsa* (perhaps 10th c., Norman 83: 141) refers to the Sākya family as 'the lineage of the Sun's son Manu, known/honored as (that of) MS' (*divasakara-sūnu-Manuvamse Mahāsammataḥhisammate Sākya-kule*, p. 13). The 12th c. grammar compiled in Burma, the *Sadda-nūti*, gives various *nirukti*-s for the name Manu, in the same manner as the *Vimānavatthu* commentary, and like it says that Manu is called MS 'in the Teaching'. In Sri Lanka, kings Parakkamabāhu VI (15th c., EZ III 67) and Bhuvanekabāhu VII (16th c., EZ III 247) claimed ancestry from 'MS named Manu Vaivasvata'. In the 18th c. King Kīrti Srī Rājasimha had a copper plate engraved with a record of his meritorious deeds for a monastery at Medawala, in which he claimed descent from Manu Vaivasvata (EZ V 475); in a Katikāvata edict (Nandapala pp. 97, 167) he claimed to be born in the Solar dynasty (*sūrya-vaṃsa*). Earlier in the edict he called Parakkamabāhu I, his predecessor as king and issuer of a Katikāvata, 'a scion of the lineage of MS born of the Solar race' (Nandapala's rendering of Sinhala *Mahāsammataḍi paramparāyāta sūryavamsōdbhuta*, pp. 93, 162); a claim Parakkamabāhu had himself made (ibid. 37, 127; cp. Mhv LVVII 121).

The second point, introduced by Huxley on p. 415, citing Duroiselle, is central to his analysis of AS: that karmic retribution is inevitable for any violence, such that kings, in the administration of justice, necessarily incur bad karma. This is, I think, an extremely important issue, consideration of which is essential in making any sense of ideas about kingship, law and social order in Pali texts when seen as a

whole. Huxley cites perhaps the most extreme example of this idea: the *Mūgapakkha Jātaka*, also known as the *Temīya Jātaka*. This story has been referred to by Gombrich (88: 70) and Carrithers (83: Chapter 3). I have translated parts of it, and discussed it at length in Collins (ms. Chapter 6.2). As I shall sketch briefly below, taking the *imaginaire* of traditional Pali texts as a whole, the idea that legal punishment constitutes bad karma for the punisher is in constant tension with the idea that there can be a Buddhistically 'good' king. But there is absolutely nothing in AS to suggest that MS is thought of there as incurring bad karma. Once again, as I claimed and exemplified in my Introduction to DWP (pp. 317ff.) any claim of inter-textual reference, whether between two or more Buddhist texts or between them and the texts of others, requires evidence. It is true that, as pointed out in my notes to AS #19.1 and 22.1, accusations of and punishments for wrongdoing are included in the category of 'bad things' (*pāpaka*, *akusala*); but it is going too far, in my opinion, to see in this any suggestion that MS will be punished for his activity, and certainly much too far to speak of his 'Faustian bargain' (p. 418).

3. THE CAKKAVATTI-SIHANĀDA SUTTA

The third issue on which I want to comment is crucial to Huxley's positive argument in #5: his reading of the *Cakkavatti-sihanāda Sutta* (= CSS), 'The Discourse (containing) the Lion's Roar on the Wheel-turning (king)'. To offer what I believe to be, at least in part, a new interpretation of this well-known text is my main reason for writing this article. He draws from CSS the idea that a cakkavatti (= CV) must develop 'penetrating vision into the complexities of cause and effect' (p. 418), a vision which makes him 'as enlightened about cause and effect as a Buddha' (p. 417). This I find wholly unconvincing. The forms of cause and effect in the two cases are quite different. A Buddha has insight into Dependent Origination (*paticca-samuppāda*); CSS tells the story of a king who fails to act as a CV should, and so sets in motion, through what I see as a deliberately farcical series of events, a process of degeneration which leads to the conditions we now live in (and which will degenerate further). The idea that a CV knows about cause and effect is Huxley's extrapolation from this part of the story; a real CV knows what will lead to what. I cannot give here as linguistically detailed a reading of CSS as I did of AS, but I will discuss the the story in what I hope will be enough detail to demonstrate both the implausibility of Huxley's interpretation, and again (as with AS)

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the sophistication of which Pali texts are capable, but with which they are seldom credited. Section numbers are those of the PTS text; Rhys Davids's (21) and Walshe's (87) translations both use them, so what I say below can be checked there. Readers will find the paragraphs which follow more comprehensible if they have a copy of a translation (better still, the text) open beside them as they read through my reading of the *Sutta*.

Huxley is right, I think, to infer from the fact that CSS is redacted next to AS in the *Dīgha Nikāya* that they are connected, and to see them both as 'illustrating suffering and impermanence' (p. 417). There are other reasons for seeing such a connexion, as I shall argue below. This link between the two *Sutta*-s, when joined with the fact that the two stories are incompatible on a realist level² would seem to indicate that they are better taken as parables – in which there is a conscious suspension of disbelief in the face of a known fiction³ – than as simple aetiological myths. I agree with Huxley, against Gombrich, that there is no need to assume that 'either the whole text is apocryphal or at least it has been tampered with' (88: 84). I also disagree with Gombrich's view that 'the myth is set in an inappropriate frame' (88: 83; cf. Walshe 87: 600–1, 603). Of course in an oral culture, story-motifs may often be found in other combinations in other contexts; but one must still analyze particular motifs in particular texts, and attempt to understand those particular texts in their given, as-redacted-to-us form (cf. DWP pp. 312–3). The opening and closing sections, to be sure, are quite separate from the intervening narrative: in #1 the Buddha instructs monks on self-reliance and on the need for meditation. Of the two closing sections, #27 repeats part of #1, and #28 lists values of ordinary life: long life, beauty, happiness, pleasure (*bhoga*, which I think includes here, as in #6–7, the sense of royal rule, tribute- or tax-extraction), and strength; and juxtaposes to them quite other things (all parts of the Path) as parallel goods for members of the Monastic Order. There are other lexical and thematic parallels between these sections and the parable⁴. I view the story of decline and revival – of the enormously long time span from the time of the earliest kings, living as righteous CVs for 80,000 years, through the Armageddon when humans live for only ten years, and back again to a life of 80,000 years at the time of the future Buddha Metteyya – as an elaborate way of giving narrative form to a sense of the futility of temporal goods. What I call in my forthcoming book the ironic touch (Collins ms. Chapter 6.5b and c), which I see here and in other *Sutta*-s of the *Dīgha* collection (such as the *Mahāśudassana*, which is structurally similar to CSS in more

than one way), depicts life in time, however good or bad, as slightly absurd; and thereby its contrary, timeless nirvana, as the only serious thing in the long run. I suggest that the intention (at least in part) of the long-drawn-out sequences of decline and revival, in all their detailed specificity, numerical and otherwise, as of the humor and irony of the parable, is – as of so many works of art worldwide – to induce in the audience a sense of detachment from, or at least a (briefly) non-involved perspective on the passage of time.

This is what I see as the structure of CSS (section headings are my own):

Prologue (#1)

The Buddha counsels monks to make themselves and the *Dhamma* their refuge; they are not to stray from their customary terrain (*pettika visaya*, literally their ‘patrimonial grounds’), which is the Four Foundations of Mindfulness. *Māra*, god of death and desire, cannot get at them if they stay there. This motif is found elsewhere, exemplified by means of Aesop-style animal fables (S V 146ff., Ja II 109; cp. Mil 367–8): just as, for example, a quail who strays from her customary terrain can be caught by a falcon, but not if she does not, so monks should concentrate on their own experience (in meditation), where they cannot be caught by *Māra*. In CSS the motif is exemplified by a different kind of fable, where kings who inherit kingdoms from their fathers either do or don’t maintain their heritage of Wheel-turning rule. The parallel here is perhaps also alluding to the standard term referring to monks as the ‘Buddha’s sons’ (*Buddha-puttā*). The Buddha concludes *kusalānam dhammānaṃ samādāna-hetu evaṃ idaṃ puññaṃ pavaddhati*, which here can be rendered (in Walshe’s translation, 87: 395) ‘it is just by the building up of wholesome states that this merit increases’, but later will have the lay-oriented sense of ‘it is by doing Good Deeds ...’. (I shall return to this point.)

Act One (#2–8) – ‘Conquest and Government by *Dhamma*’

‘Once upon a time there was a king called *Daḥhanemi* ...’. The name means ‘Strong-tire’, which would seem a deliberately witty designation for a Wheel-turning King. He is a CV and *dhamma-rāja*, who has conquered the four corners of the earth, and rules over it without the need for punishment (*adaḍḍena*) or violence (*asatthena*, literally ‘without the sword’). When he sees his Wheel-Gem slip from its place in the sky, he knows he is soon to die, and so renounces the world and enjoins his son to rule. He remarks ‘I have enjoyed the pleasures of

human life (*bhuttā ... me mānusakā kāmā*), now it is time to seek the pleasures of life in the heavens’ (*dibbe kāme*, D III 59–60). When he ‘goes forth from home to homelessness’, the Wheel-Gem disappears.

When the son finds out that the Wheel-Gem has disappeared, he is unhappy. He goes to his father, now a ‘king-sage’ (*rājisi*), and asks, rather pathetically, what has happened to it. His father tells him that the Wheel-Gem is not his patrimonial heritage (*pettika dāyajja*); he must earn it by becoming a CV himself. He must ‘turn in the turning (or, the Wheel) of the Wheel-turning King’ (*cakkavatti-vatte vattāhi*). The puns here are untranslatable: the verb *vattati* can also mean to be, to proceed (perhaps something like ‘live and move and have one’s being’); *vatta* can mean service, customary duty. The father then spells out what the Wheel-turning Duty is, and the son successfully follows his advice, as do the next seven generations⁵. All this takes rather a long time, since we learn in #14 that each lived for 80,000 years. In the son’s rise to CV status, he first follows his father’s advice regarding the internal government of his kingdom in #5, and the Wheel-Gem reappears. He sees it and his shock of recognition is expressed with the optative *assaṃ nu kho ahaṃ rājā cakkavattīti*. This must be translated with some modal verb: ‘I may be a CV king’ (= perhaps I am), or probably better ‘I must be a CV king!’ (= the evidence is undeniable). I read this text with students regularly, and never fail to think of the Ugly Duckling’s more assertive ‘I am a Swan!’

The CV’s manner of extending his kingdom by external conquest in #6 is rather remarkable, as was noted by the Rhys Davids. He sets the Wheel-Gem in motion, and follows it everywhere ‘along with his four-fold army’ (elephants, cavalry, chariots and foot-soldiers). In each of the four quarters when it comes to rest he makes camp, ‘along with his four-fold army’, as the text takes care to repeat. All the enemy kings (*paṭi-rājāno*) come to him and say ‘Come, Great King, welcome, Great King, it’s yours (i.e. take possession of this territory), Great King, give us your orders (or: instruction, *anusāsa*)’. The king recites a shortened version of the standard Five Precepts of Buddhist morality: one should not kill, steal, misbehave sexually, lie or drink intoxicants; and he adds ‘(continue to) govern as you did before’. (The Pali is *yathābhuttaṃ bhūñjatha*, and this phrase, though terse and abstruse, is important in the analysis of the *Sutta* as a whole, as I shall argue below⁶) And so ‘the enemy kings become client kings’ (*anuyuttā*). This strikes me as obvious and superb deadpan humor: one suspects the realities of ancient Indian warfare probably weren’t like this. As two footnotes in Rhys Davids say:

In this parody on the ordinary methods of conquest all the horrors and crimes of war are absent. ... To enjoy this paragraph as it deserves the reader should bear in mind the kind of method of which it is a parody, the laws that would be made, say, by an Assyrian or Hun conqueror (21: 63-4).

Tambiah (76: 46) agrees, though rather less assuredly: 'one cannot help but wonder whether this account of the rolling celestial wheel is not meant to be at least partly an ironical commentary and a parody of the mode of warfare by force and blood and stratagem practised by the kings of that time'. If the *Sutta* were to be performed as a drama in modern dress I would have the King as a Mafia boss along with his sons and a crowd of hit-men, strolling calmly into opponents' territory and asserting his power by carefully worded homilies on Catholicism and family values. The irony here was already introduced in #2, by juxtaposing a description of the CV as having sons who are 'valiant, crushing enemy armies' with the statement that he rules 'without punishment or violence'. Perhaps too the standard epithet for a CV (found in #2 and frequently), as 'having obtained stability in his [own] country' might be construed in similar fashion as an ironic euphemism.

The commentary to this passage is doggedly but revealingly realist.⁷ It pictures the scene as follows: when the CV has camped in the territory of other kings, and they have been told that 'the Wheel of an enemy (*para-cakka*) has come', they do not gather their troops for a fight, since they know no-one can prevail against him by force of arms. The Wheel-Gem has the name 'Enemy-Subduer' (*Arindama*), since because of it all the CV's enemies are brought to submission (*arī asesā damatam upenti*). The kings come, each with a gift of money appropriate to the wealth of his kingdom, and make obeisance to the CV's feet, declaring themselves to be his servants. The commentary asks whether, after the CV's sermon, everyone took his advice, and answers that since not everyone takes the advice of a Buddha, how then would everyone take that of a (mere) king? Only the wise did so.

Act Two (#9-18) 'Paradise Lost'

How to get from the Golden Age to life as we know it, in the present day? By a Fall, naturally: but the story in CSS is completely different from that in AS. That parable told of Mankind's Fall from an immaterial and blissful existence to embodied social life, by means of a series of infractions of the *Vinaya* rule (the apostasy of the Original Community). CSS constructs a story around a slightly elaborated version of the well known Ten Paths of Bad/Good Deeds (*a/kusala-kamma-pathā*). This is

appropriate, since they are a set of moral rules for laity; this parable, unlike that of AS, is exclusively concerned with lay people (from the king down), right up until its last two sections (#25-6), when the future Buddha Metteyya arrives and creates a Monastic Order into which the CV king Sankha is ordained. AS mentions the Ten Bad/Good Deeds, in #5-6 (summarised in #27-30, as they often are, into the three categories of Deeds of Body, Speech and Mind), but there they are part of the framing story of the narrated present, not of the parable in the narrated past (in CSS also in the narrated future).

Earlier I said that I find this story to be classically farcical. What I mean is this: sections #9-13 depict a king who at first fails to perform the Wheel-turning King's Duty, and then seeks to make up for his error but succeeds only in aggravating the situation, by performing just a part of his Duty. Once the initial move has been made - where this (unnamed) king governs 'according to his own ideas' - even apparently well-intentioned actions have disastrous results. Subsequently, in sections #14-18, once the deterioration has set in, each new generation sees one or more further vices arise to join the others. The logic of the degeneration is very skilfully handled: a close look will reveal in it the theme of kingly punishment as bad karma, the idea Huxley sees, wrongly in my view, in AS.

In section #5 part of the Wheel-turning Duty of a CV is said to be giving money to the poor.⁸ In #9-10 the miscreant king (the *Vinaya* would call him the 'first offender', *ādi-kammika*) realizes that his country is not prospering as it did before, and is then prepared to learn the Wheel-turning Duty from his ministers (not, this time, from his father: perhaps there is an implicit parallel admonition that the monks are not to learn from any teacher other than their 'father', the Buddha). But although he subsequently guarantees social order as they prescribe, he fails to give money to the poor. With poverty thus widespread, one of his subjects takes something deliberately⁹ from another; he is brought before the king, who asks if it is true that he stole something; the man replies that it is. When the king asks why, the thief replies that he cannot live otherwise. The king then gives him money and urges him to use it to support himself and his family, to start up a business¹⁰ and to give as alms to ascetics and brahmins in order to go to heaven. This is all, of course, good Buddhist advice for the laity: the king, one might say, is doing his best at this point. The same sequence of events happens again with another person; and in #12 people start to conclude - with perfect farcical logic - that the way to get money is to steal and have the king find out. A third person is brought before

the king because of theft, but now the king's reaction is different. He reasons with himself: 'if I give money to whomever commits theft, then theft will increase. How about if I make sure to prevent this man (from doing it again, by) destroying him completely – (by) cutting off his head!' He then orders his men to tie the man's arms tightly behind his back, shave his head, parade him in public to the sound of drums, and take him outside the city for execution. And so they do. The king here might be taken to be adding, as it were, insult to injury: no king in ancient India, with the possible exception of Aśoka (Norman 90 #26), did without capital punishment, but the cruel manner in which the punishment is carried out here perhaps indicates rage (or frustration) on the king's part. When Pali texts consider real kings, as opposed to fantasy ancestors, their attitude is that punishment should fit the crime, and above all that the king (or other judge) should not pass judgement in anger (see Collins ms. Chapter 6). At this point the king's recently acquired good intentions are giving way to a partial renewal of his former self-willedness.

To understand the next episode requires seeing in it the strictest interpretation of *karma*: 'tout acte de violence, si justifiable soit-il, a sa rétribution'. I shall call this below the non-negotiable, context-independent view of karmic morality: that is to say, judicial execution is simply murder. This is exactly what Prince Temiya says in the *Mūgapakkha Jātaka*, where he recalls going to hell for 80,000 years because of twenty years spent as a king (a fact confirmed by the narrative voice). In CSS it is a reversed form of this view which leads other people – once again, with perfect logic, indeed rationally, given the suspension of belief required if the whole 'Just So' narrative is to work – to imitate the king: *not* by taking the law into their own hands and punishing thieves, but by murdering the victims from whom they steal (presumably to avoid detection). The text gives no indication that their acts of murder are to be evaluated any differently from the king's. Thus they begin to attack villages and small towns (*gāmā, nigāmā*: prudently, not royal cities), and to commit highway robbery. The narrative voice offers no judgement on them, but merely brings the episode to a close by stating that because of the sequence of events, from the king's not giving money to the poor down to the inception of murder, the length of life (*āyu*) and beauty (*vaṇṇa*- a main theme of AS) of these people decrease, and while they live for 80,000 years their children live only 40,000 years.¹¹

It is Huxley's claim that – by implication *only* – the meaning of this episode is that a real CV will know enough about cause and

effect not to set the whole process in train. But this is to read into the text something wholly extraneous, which is not implied by any choice of words or events in the text. It is indeed significant that the degenerative process here, as repeatedly in #14–19, is expressed in language – with locative absolutes – reminiscent of other formulations of cause and effect in Buddhism, notably the 'short version' of the *Paticca-samuppāda* list: CSS's *adhanānam dhane ananuppadiyamāne ... pānātipāto vepullam agamāsi*, 'wealth not being given to the poor ... murder became widespread', recalls *imasmim sati idaṃ hoti*, 'this being, that is' (see Collins 82: 106 and n. 6). But it is nowhere suggested that this is a verbal or conceptual connexion available to any actor within the story; it is, rather, a dramatic irony available to the audience: we know something the characters do not. Just as in AS, as I have argued, a monastic audience may be thought to have smiled at the text's choice of language recalling their Rule, so here audiences may be thought to have appreciated the wit of placing two things they knew well, the Ten (Paths of) Bad/Good Deeds and the language of causal theory, in a wholly unexpected narrative setting.

What I am calling the logic of the degeneration is particularly subtle in the account of the Ten Bad Deeds (as I shall call them from now on). Their normal order is: 1. murder (*pānātipāta*), 2. theft (*adinnādāna*), 3. misbehaviour in sex (*kāmesu micchācāra*), 4. lying (*musāvāda*), 5. harsh speech (*pharusā vācā*), 6. malicious speech (*pisunā vācā*), 7. frivolous speech (*sampha-palāpa*), 8. covetousness (*abhijjā*), 9. ill-will (*vyāpāda*), and 10. wrong view (*micchā-ditthi*) (nos. 1–3 are of the body, 4–7 of voice, 8–10 of mind). So far, 2 has led to 1, by a clear (if farcical) narrative logic. In section #14 another thief, in the 40,000 year generation, avoids the king's punishment by the obvious expedient of lying when asked if he had committed theft; thus 2 and 1 lead, 'rationally', to 4. In #15, now among a 20,000 year generation, another person's being taken to the king and accused of theft constitutes the arising of malicious speech (6); in #16 the variation in beauty now evident leads some men to covet (8) the wives of others (their own, one must assume, having been chosen for them without regard for beauty). The rest of the list now arises, in generations living for increasingly short periods of time. This happens without narrative incident, but careful attention can reveal an underlying design in the sequence. Once covetousness, embodied in the form of adultery, has arisen, harsh speech and gossip (5 and 7) arise, presumably about the adulterers; next come covetousness (8, repeated) and ill-will (9) (these often appear as a pair, and the repetition of 8 along with 9 might be taken to be generalizing

the vices of adultery and harsh speech/gossip, which were the last two stages); then, perhaps since none of these vices cares much about veracity, wrong view (10) arises.

At this point, the Ten Bad Deeds have all arisen: we have arrived close to life as we know it, although at this time people are living for 10,000 years. The text then adds some more forms of misconduct, until in #18 human life decreases to 100 years, the symbolic (if to our eyes exaggeratedly long) 'full life' assumed in most early Indian texts (Collins 82: 44–7). They are: improper desire (*adhamma-rāga* – the commentary [Sv 853] specifies incest), iniquitous greed (*visama-lobha*), and 'wrongfulness' (*micchā-dhamma* – said by the commentary to refer to homosexuality, of both genders); then lack of respect for mother, father, ascetics and brahmins, and for elder members of one's family. In #18 the whole degenerative process is recapitulated in a long sequence of locative absolute phrases: so given the initial act of theft, a representative selection of all human vices arises, beginning with the Ten Bad Deeds, in a 'falling-domino' sequence.

Act Three (#19–26) 'Things Will Get Worse Before They Get Better'

If one wants to pull this text apart and speculate on the separate existence of its constitutive elements, one could say that one such element ends in #18. A tragi-comic Fall story has led, without any one person or stage being wholly to blame, to the present state of humanity. The next part, leading to the arrival of Metteyya, could then be seen as a reworked 'separate story' with elements from the 'Metteyya saga' as found in Sanskrit and later Pali texts. Our text, however – which is what is before us to interpret, in the first instance as a whole – continues in #19 with a resolute *bhavissati ...so samayo*, 'There will be a time', clearly intended to parallel the opening word of #2, *bhūtapubbam*, 'Once upon a time'.¹² Act Two portrayed a sequence analogous to 'Dependent Origination' in the degenerative sense; here, analogously to its constructive sense (where the cessation of each member is the condition for the non-arising of the next), Act Three depicts the growth of the Good Deeds which parallel the Bad Deeds of Act Two, arriving back (but forward in time) to a stage where human life lasts 80,000 years.¹³ There is a subtle form of realism here, albeit one expressed through a markedly unrealistic narrative. I have said that the sequence of vices up to #18 has brought the tale close to life as we know it. But such a pessimistic account of the present state of things would be by itself inaccurate, unrealistic: for however scarce and fitful, Good Deeds paralleling the Bad do in fact exist amongst us. So in order to reach a

nadir where no Good Deeds at all are found, the story has to go beyond the narrated present. And so we are taken to the point I have called Armageddon, where human life lasts ten years and is lived (mixing the Bible and Political Science) in the conditions of a Hobbesian 'war of all against all'.

Gombrich (88: 84) argues against a too-literal interpretation of this *Sutta*, which is the only early text in which this motif is found:

From the rest of what we know of him, we cannot think that the Buddha believed that one day people would literally be no more than ten years old and go hunting each other like beasts. This casts doubt back on the seriousness of the first half of the myth. ...

But here we are back among the ambiguous subtleties of 'seriousness', through which I tried to tread a careful path in the Introduction to DWP. As mentioned earlier, I do not think one should proceed here by means of speculation about the Buddha as an historical individual. It is certainly true that the character of 'the Buddha' in Pali texts is not usually depicted as believing this kind of thing: indeed this particular detail is found nowhere else. What is this text doing, then? The answer, I think, is something like this: just as the Buddha's parable goes away from the present, back into the past, to account for the existence of everyday, present human vices, so too it must go away from the present, off into the future, to account for the complete absence and then re-arising of everyday, present human virtues. In a larger perspective this parable has the perfectly serious intention of suggesting that, in the long run, the life of monasticism oriented towards timeless unconditioned nirvana, is the only serious thing: all else, all conditioned life in time, is ultimately madness and mayhem. It seems to me quite normal that a parable expressing that view should depict conditions which are – both in the Golden Age of virtuous CV kings conquering and ruling without violence and in the future Hobbesian Armageddon – altogether unrealistic and 'insane'. They constitute an impeccably accurate *metaphorical* representation of the moral chaos of temporality, from which nirvana offers deliverance.

#19 begins: 'There will be a time, monks, when the children [sc. descendants] of these people [i.e. the present generation] will live for ten years (only)'. At this time 'girls will be ready for marriage at 5'.¹⁴ The next sentences refer to the poor quality of food at this time, and in so doing might echo one of the motifs of AS. Six 'flavors' (*rasāni*) will then disappear from the world: ghee, cream, oil, honey, molasses and salt. The commentary tells us that these are 'the best [or, the first, primary] flavors' (*agga-rasāni*) in the world. In AS #11 and thereafter,

when the first foodstuffs appear, they look like ghee or cream, and taste like honey. CSS continues 'the best/primary of foods will be coarse grain (*kudrūsako aggamaṃ bhojānaṃ bhavissati*)¹⁵, whereas now the best/primary are rice, meat and milk-rice'. If the reference were caught by an experienced listener, it would reinforce the 'reader-response' that we are in the never-never land of parable again. Next the text refers by name to the Ten Good and Bad Deeds: the Good will completely disappear, the Bad will 'shine out brightly'. 'Even the word "Good" will not exist among [these] people – how could there be someone who does good?' In #19 and #20 the additional Bad Deeds added to the Ten in #17 are mentioned again; no-one will recognise anyone as their mother, etc. (and so presumably have the 'improper desire' mentioned earlier) and they will also be violent to each other, like hunters are nowadays to deer.

There follows a Seven-day War, during which most people will kill each other like animals, but a few will avoid the violence by going into hiding. When the war is over, they will emerge and reflect that their distress 'is due to our (doing) bad deeds' (*akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ samādāna-hetu*). This is exactly the same phrase (with the negative prefix *a-*) as the Buddha used in the Prologue (repeated in the positive form in #22). The survivors then set out consciously to do Good Deeds, which the text lists in the standard order of the Ten, given above, with the addition of 'respect for one's mother', etc., as before. Thereby length of life and beauty will increase, until people live for 80,000 years. This part of the story is told simply by cataloging the Good Deeds and enumerating all the increases of age in a numerical list. I have suggested elsewhere that other Buddhist texts use the method of listing names and numbers without narrative embellishment to induce a sense both of temporal depth and temporal disengagement (Collins, ms. Chapter 3.4.b).

The final sections #23–26, tell of the CV Saṅkha and the future Buddha Metteyya. For present purposes there is no need to recount the story; readers may consult the text or translations. I do, however, wish to point out two things. First, when the text reaches the time when human live for 80,000 years, it mentions that 'girls' will be marriageable at 500 years of age. This idea is found in the later elaboration of the Metteyya story in the *Anāgatavaṃsa*, which I have elsewhere called Metteyya's Millenium;¹⁶ there is such an emphasis on sensory pleasure and beauty in that text that it seems possible describe this motif (women sexually active for best part of 75,000 years) there as a 'delicately suggested eroticism'. In CSS #23 something of the same thing may perhaps be

present. The idea here parallels that in #19, of girls being marriageable at 5 at the worst point of human degeneration; if there is eroticism there, it is bizarre or repellent. More important, however, is a possible nuance introduced into #23 by an intertextual reference to the only other place in the Canon where the motif occurs. This is in a short but powerful *Sutta* (A IV 136–9 at 138) which deals with a teacher in the past called Araka. (Other texts say that this was a former life of the Buddha; see DPPN s.v.) In his time too, people lived for 80,000 years, with 'girls' marriageable at 500.¹⁷ But the burden of Araka's teaching, and that of the *Sutta*, is that nonetheless life is short: 'for those who are born, there is no immortality'. The text has seven vivid similes – life is like, inter alia, a drop of dew on a blade of grass in the morning, a bubble on water in the rain, a cow being led to slaughter – which make it, according to the *Visuddhimagga* (237 = VIII 35), an appropriate vehicle for the Meditation on Death. If I am right that the overall point of CSS is to produce a sense of distanciation from the passage of time, such an intertextual reference, if intended, would be appropriate. The parallel between the nadir of human existence in time, when life lasts ten years and girls marry at five, and the zenith of Saṅkha's utopia, where they live for 80,000 years and 'girls' marry at 500, could then be seen to suggest that however much life might be like hell or heaven on earth, in both cases time is short: the turmoil of *samsāra*, bad or good, is always a lesser orientation than the peace of nirvana, the only permanent (because timeless) happiness.

The second point I want to make here is to note the correspondence between the CVs Dalhanemi in #2ff. and Saṅkha in #23–6 (where the formulae about the CV's Seven Jewels, his conquest and rule without violence, etc., are repeated), which does more than simply repeat the opening theme at the end. The two cases are effectively equidistant from the Buddha's narrated present; both contain the 'miracle' of non-violent social order and inter-kingdom relations, which the narrated present does not: but in some ways the narrated future outdoes both the past and the present. Saṅkha's reign is described in even more utopian terms than Dalhanemi's, and Metteyya's Millenium is said to go one up on Siddhattha's achievement: the latter has a Monastic Community of several hundred, Metteyya will have one of several thousand.¹⁸ But once again, I take the point to be that no matter how good human life was, or how much better it might get, the monks' inheritance (the tradition passed on anew by all Buddhas) is the one they have, now, from the Buddha, in the narrated present: they should not stray from their customary terrain, meditation, into the carnival

of *samsāra*¹⁹, but look outside the temporal domain of past, present and future altogether. It may well seem odd, indeed unacceptable, to the dour-faced and humorless positivism with which these texts are usually read (despite the Rhys Davids' notes and introductions to their translation), that the earliest text-place where a reference to the future Buddha is found should be a humorous parable whose main burden is to relativize and diminish all temporal goods, past, present and future. But that, I submit, tells us more about modern scholarly vision than it does about the creative possibilities open to the redactors of early Buddhist texts.

Epilogue (#27–8)

In #27 the Buddha repeats word-for-word most of #1: that the monks are to make themselves and the *Dhamma* their refuge, and not stray from their customary terrain, the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, lest they be caught by Māra, god of death and desire. #28 begins with the ante-penultimate sentence of #1: in Walshe's rendering 'Keep to your own preserves, monks, to your ancestral haunts'. But in between this and a slightly reworded version of the final two sentences from #1 comes something else, a list of five qualities or achievements which are re-defined in a particular way for monks. Before I look at that, however, perhaps it might be best for me to turn to the commentary's understanding of the structure of the *Sutta* as a whole. Readers who may think what I have said is all the product of an over-excited modern imagination may like to know what was thought of the text in the 4–5th centuries A.D. If the tradition is to be believed, Buddhaghosa was only translating and editing what earlier Sinhalese commentaries had said; and the commentarial analysis would certainly have influenced, if not wholly determined, how the text was understood (at least in educated circles) throughout traditional Theravāda Buddhism.

Earlier I gave Walshe's version (87: 395) of the last sentence of #1 and #28, *kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ samādāna-hetu evaṃ idaṃ puññaṃ pavaddhati*: 'it is just by the building up of wholesome states that this merit increases'. He chooses 'wholesome' for *kusala*, 'merit' for *puñña*. The semantic fields of these two terms overlap;²⁰ they can be used as synonyms, with an unspecific positive sense, but they can also be distinguished, in that what is in a specific sense 'meritorious' must have a karmic result, but what is 'wholesome' need not. That is, 'merit', in the specific sense, is within the realm of rebirth, whereas what is 'wholesome' need not be: this latter is the category of good deeds and states which are performed or occur without attachment, and so do not

entail a karmic result. Thus the sentence can be taken as referring either to good deeds and good rebirth circumstances, or to deeds and states which, by engendering no result, conduce to the escape from rebirth. The commentary (Sv 847–8) glosses the phrase *evaṃ idaṃ puññaṃ pavaddhati* (it reads *vaddhati*) as *tattha duvidhaṃ kusalaṃ vaṭṭa-gāmi ca vivatta-gāmi ca*, 'here the Good [lit. 'what is wholesome'] is of two kinds, that which leads to rebirth, and that which leads to escape from rebirth', and continues:

the highest point [or: end-point] of the Good leading to rebirth in the human world is the good fortune and wealth of a Wheel-turning (king)' [*vaṭṭa-gāmi-kusalassa pariyoṣānaṃ manussa-loke cakkavatti-siri-vibhavo*; there is clearly a play on the words *vaṭṭa*, rebirth, and *vatti*, the Turning of the Wheel-turner]. The end-point of the Good leading to escape from rebirth is the Path, Fruits (of the Path) and Nirvana.

It states that the latter will be dealt with at the end of the *Sutta* (and picks up on this in the commentary on #27), and that the story which begins in #2 is told in elucidation of the former, here specified in terms of the mutual love and care of children and parents.

The transition from the narrative concerning the Good of rebirth in #2–26 back to the generalized admonition to monks concerning the Good of the escape from rebirth, with which the *Sutta* began in #1, is effected in #28 by re-interpreting as monastic practices and virtues five qualities or achievements which usually refer to the world of rebirth: length of life (*āyu*), beauty (or appearance: *vaṇṇa*), happiness (*sukha*), enjoyment (*bhoga*), and strength (*bala*). Readers should consult a translation for the details of the monastic interpretation: at first sight the parallels may seem arbitrary, but in fact each has its own specific appropriateness. I want to look more closely at the list, in two ways: with regard to the links between these words and the parable, and with regard to other places in the Canon where something close to this list of five things occurs. First, links between #28 and the parable:

- (i) *āyu*, 'long life' – implicit in *na ... tena raññā ciraṃ jīvitabbaṃ* in #3–8, 'the king does not have long to live'; explicit throughout the account of the Fall in #14ff. and the Recovery in #21ff. (The pairing of *āyu* and *vaṇṇa*, as in these sections, is very common).
- (ii) *vaṇṇa*, 'beauty/appearance' – explicit throughout the account of the Fall in #14ff. and the Recovery in #21ff.; and in #16 where humans become differentiated in beauty/appearance (a possible reminiscence of AS).
- (iii) *sukha* 'happiness' – explicit in #5, where the CV learns what conduces to his *sukha*; and in #10–11, where the miscreant king gives money to thieves, with advice that giving it as alms will have

- a happy (karmic) result (*sukha-vipāka*); implicit in #23–26 in king Sankha's utopia (and Metteyya's Millenium).
- (iv) *bhoga*, 'enjoyment/rule' – explicit in #2, concerning 'human' and 'divine pleasures'; and in #6–7, in the CV's final statement in his sermon to the opposing kings '(continue to) rule as you did before'. Note 6 above dealt with matters of translation in respect of the phrase *yathābhuttam bhunjatha* in #6; note that the personal and private 'enjoyment' of kings, to be regulated by the five Precepts, is blended with their official, public role as rulers and tax-extractors (the latter leads to the former in a direct, literal way); in #19 implicit in the comparison of 'best foods' (*aggam bhojanam*).
- (v) *bala*, 'strength' – although this word is not found in CSS before the end of section #28 in the compound *Māra-bala* 'the force [= army] of Māra, that is to say after its appearance in this list, the idea is implicit throughout the humorous description of the CV conquering with an inactive 'four-fold army', merely by giving sermons; the parallel between a Buddha and a CV, though not standardly elaborated in terms of military imagery, does implicitly contrast the physical strength of a king with the spiritual strength of a Buddha, and hence by implication the monks and nuns who follow his example.

Secondly, there are a number of other texts where something close to this list appears. They fall into two groups. First are a number of places where a lay-follower gives food to monks, and is said thereby to give four of the above things (excluding *bhoga*). One such case is Vin I 221 (they are the first four in a list of ten), where a brahmin gives *yāgu*, rice-gruel; at A II 63–4 the four items occur alone, where a woman is said to give *bhojana*, food (which is close to *bhoga* in one of its meanings in CSS); and at A III 42 any giver of food, *bhojana*, is said to confer five qualities, which are the four in question here plus *paṭibhāna*, which means something like the capacity for inspired speech (cf. MacQueen 81). The other group consists in three occurrences (A II 35, III 36; It 89) of some verses in which forms of the word *agga* occur 11 times in 8 lines. The verses conclude prose sections, slightly different in the three cases, which also use forms of *agga* repeatedly – a sophisticated reader or listener might perhaps again catch in the CSS usage some echo of AS. One part of these verses has 'for those who give gifts to what is best/primary,²¹ the best (of) merit increases, (and there is, as a result) to the best/highest degree long life, beauty, fame, reputation, happiness and strength' (*aggasmim dānam datatam aggam puñnam pavaddhati / aggam āyu ca vaṇṇo ca yaso kitti sukham balam*; i.e. the four in CSS

with an additional two). My point in adducing these parallel texts is to suggest that the grouping of these five qualities or achievements in the Epilogue is a known quantity, at least to an experienced audience. Thus the links with, or traces in the parable which the terms draw out here in #28, as in the case of the Ten Bad/Good Deeds and the syntactic style of causation-language in #9–18, would give pleasure to an audience perceiving them thus connected retrospectively to motifs in an unexpected narrative setting.

The structure of the *Sutta*, then, as discerned by the commentary and slightly extended by myself, is this: it starts with a standard admonition to monks concerning the practice of the Path. The (deliberate) ambiguity in the sense of the words *kusala* and *puñña* – as conducing to good fortune in the world of rebirth and/or to escape from it – in the sentence concluding the homiletic Prologue allows two things: (i) first a long story (a drama in three Acts) recounting the tragi-comic moral chaos of the world of time and rebirth, from the highest good fortune of the CV to the lowest degradation of human life imaginable, told as an elaborate parable to induce distanciation from temporal goods; and then (ii) the Epilogue, in which a familiar list of qualities – temporal goods beginning with 'long life' – is explicitly re-interpreted in such a way that monastic practice, oriented towards timeless nirvana, is seen to be the only really serious thing in the long run (and the *Sutta* certainly gives full expression to the long run of time).

I conclude from this analysis of CSS that Huxley's attempt to interpret AS in the light of it, although in principle a good suggestion, fails in his particular reading. CSS does not preach a Buddhist form of constitutional law and monarchy, in which the 'king must be as enlightened about cause and effect as a Buddha'. It tells a witty story, by turns pleasantly farcical and fearsomely imaginative, with some familiar doctrinal motifs in an unexpected narrative setting: the whole thing as a disbelief-suspending morality tale. *Eheu fugaces*.

4. MAKING SENSE OF KINGS AND KARMA

In Huxley's account of CSS he raises a theme I want to address further here, albeit only as a summary of a longer version given elsewhere (Collins, ms. Chapter 6). This is the idea, which he does not take any further, that some Buddhist texts view kings as necessarily and unavoidably wrongdoers: in the words of Duroiselle cited a number of times already, 'tout acte de violence, si justifiable soit-il, a sa rétribution'. This is obviously not an idea which a socially institutionalized ideology

such as Pali Buddhism could promulgate exclusively; how could kings support that, and in what way might it support them? There must be some other way(s) in which Pali texts speak of kings – and indeed there are (see below). It seems to me useful, in order to understand how two diametrically opposed evaluations of kingship can coexist, to make a distinction in the application of karmic evaluation. One can distinguish between

- (i) a non-negotiable, context independent view of it (= NN/CI), where, for example, killing is wrong in any circumstances whatsoever; and
- (ii) a negotiable, context-dependent view (= N/CD), where, to use the same example, murder is wrong but judicial execution is not.

In relationship to violence and karma these two stances result in the two opposed evaluations of kingship.

According to (ii), N/CD, the ordinary activity of a king can be governed by *dhamma*, and so there can be such a thing as a *dhamma-rājā*, even in the conditions of the real world where violence is necessary. I have discussed texts of this kind (Collins, ms., Chapter 6), under the heading 'Recipes for a Good King': the Ten Duties of a King (*dasa rājadhammā*), and the Four Wrong Courses (to avoid) (*agati*), and the like.²² In relationship to judicial punishment the requirements are that the king should not pass judgement in anger, and that the punishment should fit the crime (*ibid.*).

According to (i), NN/CI, to be a king in the real world – which demands as a minimum that he guarantee social order, punish criminals, and provide defence against attack, all of which require violence – is to commit wrong, to offend against *dhamma*. When this position is expressed in texts, it can result in two different forms of representation: first, of kingship as by necessity involving wrongdoing, from which future bad consequences flow (this is the position, most uncompromisingly, of the *Mūgapakkha Jātaka*); second, of a fantasy world in which royal rule is possible without violence. This is the world which the CVs of CSS #2–8 and #23–6 inhabit, one which permits the institution of kingship without violating the stricter, ascetics' NN/CI view of *karma*.

In the Introduction to DWP I argued, following Gellner, that the two specialists in power in pre-modern, agrarian societies – kings and clerics, whom he calls thugs and legitimators – always and everywhere lived, to use Gunawardana's (79: 344) phrase, in antagonistic symbiosis; to put the point as Le Goff (88: 21) does, clerics could always and everywhere both contest and justify royal power²³ The attitudes to kingship I have delineated show how Buddhist texts can do both. They can contest royal power by insisting on *karma* as NN/CI; in that case they engage kings

in an ideological status contest in which their own victory is certain. They can justify royal power, *either* by giving lists of virtues which a real king can possess, and thereby construing his action according to the N/CD view of *karma*; *or* by dreaming up a non-violent utopia in which kingship is possible without abandoning the NN/CI view. How does one fit the farcical elements in CSS for which I have argued here, and the satirical elements in AS for which I argued in DWP, into such a picture? I suggest that, from the macro-sociological, *longue durée*, world-historical perspective, one can view Buddhist monks (and nuns), perhaps indeed all world-renouncers, as being court jesters, clowns. That is, they are structurally situated to say things to and about kings which others cannot (e.g. 'you're going to die, you know! And soon!' 'And what about the First Precept?!'); but their position is such that saying them is permissible, an acceptable and accepted part of the civilizational *status quo*. Despite the antagonism between monks and kings, which could and certainly did lead to conflict, their structural symbiosis as power-holders in agrarian societies meant that the moral, on occasion even satirical commentary on the demands of everyday life to which world-renunciatory asceticism could give voice was in the long run supportive of kingship rather than subversive of it.

NOTES

¹ Here and in the next verse I render *loka* as 'people', a sense it regularly has, either in place of or as well as the usual 'world'.

² Compare, for example, their different accounts of the origin of lying, AS #19–20, CSS #14. Other Pali texts contain yet other versions: cf. the *Cetiya-jātaka* (Ja III 455ff., no.422). Here and throughout abbreviations for Pali texts follow the Critical Pali Dictionary. references to the Visuddhimagga give the PTS page number and the Harvard Oriental Series chapter and section number.

³ Cf. DWP p. 314; and Kermode (67: 39ff.).

⁴ The most obvious is the phrase *kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ samādāna-hetu*, or close variants of it, given in #1, #5, #21 and #28; as discussed below in the text, the differences between #1 and #27–8 consist in a list of five things in #28, all of which have lexical and thematic parallels in the intervening story, and some minor changes in the last sentence occasioned by this list.

⁵ The Rhys Davids made an egregious error in translating this section (21: 62–3), repeated, sadly, by both Ling (81: 117) and Walshe (87: 397). (It was correctly translated by Franke 13: 262.) The text plainly, in simple Pali, has the father tell the son to consult ascetics and Brahmins (*samana-brāhmaṇa*) for religious advice, and to do what they say. The translations reverse this, and have it that the king is to give such advice to them! It is likely that this slip has misled those who rely on translations, both on this particular point and on the general tenor of the text's characterization of the CV.

⁶ The Rhys Davids (21: 64; cf. Ling 81: 118) have 'Enjoy your possessions as you have been wont to do', but refer in a note to their version of the *Mahāsudassana Sutta*

(10: 203, D II 173) which has 'eat as ye have eaten', stating in a footnote that they take this to mean 'Observe the rules current among you regarding clean and unclean meats' (which, however, as they point out, is something expressly argued against elsewhere in early Pali texts). The CSS footnote also refers to Franke's German translation of CSS (13: 263, mentioning the Rhys Davids's earlier rendering), which has 'ihr sollt so essen, dass man es Essen nennen kann', adding in a footnote 'und nicht Fressen, d.h. lebt mässig', 'eat so that people will be able to call it "eating" and not "Gluttony" [or: voraciousness], that is to say live moderately [or soberly]'. He connects the idea here with the virtue, found elsewhere in Buddhist texts, of being moderate in eating (*bhojane mattaññā*). No doubt it was this which influenced Warder's textbook on Pali language to render the phrase (74: 132 n. 3) as 'eat according to what is eaten, in moderation'. Walshe (87: 281, 398) has 'Be moderate in eating', giving what he sees as the 'literal' sense in a note as 'eat according to eating'.

Apart from the Rhys Davids' rendering in CSS referring to 'possessions', their note and all the other translations take the verb *bhuñj* as to eat, although quite why food consumption should be relevant in this context is not clear to me. The Rhys Davids refer in their CSS note to S I 10, which 'has a similar play on the various meanings of *bhuvā*'. In that text, the two senses of *bhuñj* in question are to eat and to enjoy (sexually) (see Collins: 92: 229). It is not clear to me whether the Rhys Davids were aware of a third sense of *bhuñj*, to rule, raise taxes. This, to my knowledge, has only been seen explicitly by Warder (70:166), who – contrary to the later rendering in his (74) Pali textbook – has 'you should rule (collect taxes) in moderation'. It is the latter two of the three senses I have given for *bhuñj* which seem to me to be most in play in CSS – the phrase marks a transition from the personal morality of the Five Precepts to the public behaviour of a king, who 'eats' the fruit (= taxes) of his kingdom, and is 'husband of the earth' (*bhū-pati, mahi-pati*, etc.); that is, he 'enjoys' it as a husband does a wife (he also, of course, 'enjoys' the women of his harem sexually). The adverb *yathābhuttam* is difficult; it seems to me that the rendering 'as it has been eaten', in the (un-obvious) sense of 'in moderation' must be wrong. I suggest that it means 'as it (i.e. the kingdom) has been eaten/enjoyed/taxed (by you previously)': that is, the phrase as a whole means '(continue) to govern as you did before'. This becomes thereby not a moral duty being imposed on or recommended to the enemy-turned-client kings by the CV, analogous to the Five Precepts, but an example of the CV's own moral behavior. That is, he does not depose the kings he defeats and install someone else in their stead, which was standard practice among Indian kings; nor does he intend to unseat them and collect taxes himself. If there is moderation here it is on the part of the CV, whose non-violent conquest is followed by his graciously allowing kings to rule on, as clients or vassals rather than enemies. The commentary here (see next note for reference) understands the situation to concern taxes: after the enemy kings have bid him welcome, the CV 'does not say "bring me annual taxes of such-and-such an amount" (*etakam ... anuvassam balim*), nor does he take away (tax-) revenue (*bhoga*) from one (king) and give it to another; rather, with wisdom appropriate to the fact of his being a *dhamma-rāja* he prohibits murder, etc., teaching *dhamma* in a smooth, sweet voice ...' (i.e. recommends the Five Precepts, and ends with *yathābhuttam bhuñjatha*). All three senses of *bhuñj* are relevant to the verb and adverb here in #6, and are taken up by the re-interpretation of *bhoga* in in the Epilogue (#28).

⁷ The CSS commentary here (Sv 851) refers to the commentary on the *Mahāsudassana Sutta* given earlier (Sv 620ff = Ps IV 3219ff.; cp. Mhv 71–2).

⁸ Just what realism there is here, if any, is a matter for debate. Certainly it is commonly said that kings in premodern, agrarian states attempt to form an alliance

– the 'barons' of medieval Europe. (For MS in this light, see the conclusion to 'Post-canonical Adventures'.) Largesse to the poor, or at least the rhetoric of it, could be part of such a strategy.

⁹ *Theyya-samkhāta*: see note #20.2 in AS.

¹⁰ *Kammante payojehi*: see note #24.1 in AS.

¹¹ The PTS text of #14, following certain mss., contains a reference to lying, which as the Rhys Davids point out (21: 67 n. 1) should be omitted; lying is only 'invented' in the next generation.

¹² If CSS and AS are juxtaposed deliberately, as Huxley suggests and I have agreed, one might notice the parallel between this abrupt change of temporal focus and that in AS #10, *hoti kho so ... samayo*.

¹³ The arithmetic in both Acts is somewhat impressionistic in places. In some texts (in Pali, for example, the *Māleyyadevatthera-vathu*), the sequence of lengthening lifetimes actually surpasses 80,000, reaching millions of years. But in such circumstances people don't realize the importance of old age and death, and so are negligent in their religious duties; and so the length of life diminishes again, back to 80,000, when Metteyya arrives (Collins 93: 87).

¹⁴ The word for 'marriageable' is *alampateyya*, a word found in the Canon in only two other places, one of which is in section #23 of this text. I postpone discussion of it until then.

¹⁵ On *kudrāsaka* see Homer (38: 83 n. 4) [= BD1]

¹⁶ For an explanation and defence of the use of this term in relation to Metteyya see Collins (ms., Chapter 5).

¹⁷ There are other analogies between these two texts: for example, in CSS #23 there are only three afflictions – desire, hunger and old age – and at A IV 138 only six: cold and heat, hunger and thirst, urination and defecation.

¹⁸ This 'improved' quality of Metteyya's Dispensation, which is greatly elaborated in the *Anāgata-vaṃsa*, is one reason for describing it as a 'Millennium'; see Collins (ms. Chapter 5).

¹⁹ For Metteyya's time as a 'constant carnival', see Collins (ms., Chapter 5).

²⁰ I discuss this in Collins (ms. Chapter 1.2.b.), drawing on Premasiri (76).

²¹ The commentary at It-a II 110 confirms that the locative *aggasmim* is here the indirect object of *dadatam*, from *dā*, to give; 'best/primary' here, it says, are the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṃgha.

²² The Ten Duties are: Almsgiving, Morality (keeping the Precepts), Liberality, Honesty, Mildness, Religious practice, Non-anger, Non-violence, Patience and Non-offensiveness (*dāna, sīla, pariccāga, ajjava, maddava, tapas, akkodha avihimsā, khanti, avirodhana*). The Four Wrong Courses are 'doing what ought not to be done and not doing what ought to be done, out of zeal (desire) [*chandasa*], hate, delusion and fear' (Vism 683 = XXI 55), transl. Nānamoli (75: 799).

²³ I try to articulate a more complex position in Collins (ms. General Introduction); but the simple dichotomy between contesting and justifying is enough for my purposes here.

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CHIEN-HSING HO

HOW NOT TO AVOID SPEAKING
– A Free Exposition of Dignāga's *Apoha* Doctrine

PROLOGUE

Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophers' attitude toward language is notoriously negative. The transcendental reality is often said to be ineffable. One's obsession to apprehend the truth through words is an intellectual disease to be cured. Attachment to verbal and conceptual proliferation enslaves oneself in the afflictive circle of life and death. Nevertheless, no Buddhist can afford to overlook the significance of language in preaching Buddhist *dharma*s as well as in day-to-day transactions. The point is not that of keeping silence. Rather, one should understand and use language in such a way that one alludes to the unsayable reality and somehow escapes the bewitchment of language. Perhaps with this realization in mind, Mahāyāna Buddhist metaphysicians had fostered the *penchant* for using, at the sentential level, denials, negations and paradoxes to couch their views. In a similar vein but mainly at the word level, Dignāga (ca. 480–540 A.D.) the Yogācāra epistemologist¹ offered us a theory of language known as *apoha* doctrine in his landmark work *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (henceforth PS).² It is the purpose of this article to construe the doctrine.

In his epistemology Dignāga accepted only non-conceptual perception (*pratyakṣa*) as the genuine means of knowing that reveals actuality. For him, inference (*anumāna*) and verbal cognition (*śābda*) are both fictional plays by dint of concepts. It is understood that, by introducing the notion of *anyāpoha* (exclusion of others) into his theory of *śābda*, Dignāga intended to show that *śābda* is not intrinsically different from *anumāna*. Both means of knowing hang on conception, which acts in the *apoha* manner. As such, neither is capable of delivering the true form of what there is.

Now if the verbal net cannot catch the transcendental real, would one then be shut within one's private world where meaningful communication

when the percept is taken as private, discrete sense data *absolutely* distinct from each other. That, however, is not Dignāga's position. On the contrary, his *apoha* doctrine tells us how words can negatively indicate the real, and how – insofar as their use does not impose on the real what is not there – words can be faithful to reality.

In what follows I shall first sketch Dignāga's theories of perception and of inference, focusing on issues pertinent to the rest of the article. My reading of the theories differs significantly from some received interpretations. I will then discuss the *apoha* doctrine in some details, relating it to inference and clarifying certain key notions. I will highlight its relative merits against some other approaches in its interpretation of the way a word signifies its object. Then, a section is devoted to what I call demonstrative *apoha*. Towards the end of the article, I shall briefly mention certain problems concerning language and suggest that Dignāga's *apoha* theory shows a way as to how, despite the deficiency of language, not to do away with speech. As the discussions proceed, incidentally, my exposition would finally go beyond the boundary of the text. I thereby make no claim for hermeneutic accuracy.

1. PERCEPTION

In discussing Dignāga's views on perception, two interrelated notions demand our attention: the notion of what there is in reality and that of what is directly and entirely perceivable. The former refers to the real things in the world, while the latter that which forms the very object of senses. Dignāga, speaking of sense-perception (*indriya-jñāna*) and its object, indicates the two notions in the following verse:

S1: A thing (*dharmin*) of many forms (*rūpa*; aspect) cannot be known entirely [viz. in all its aspects] by the sense. That form (*rūpa*) which is experienced as it is and which is ineffable is the field-of-operation (*gocara*) of the sense.³

The term "*dharmin*" is usually used – together with "*dharma*" – by Dignāga in his theory of inference, and belongs to the category of *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* (common-appearance). But I think here it stands for the notion of what there is in reality.⁴ When Dignāga argues in the *apoha* chapter of PS that a class-word (*jāti-śabda*), say "lotus", does not express its particulars (*bheda*; *vyakti*), such as lotuses, he is denying the sayability of real, concrete things. Now, while Dignāga said little about reality it can be just these concrete things as lotuses, cows and

so on that constitute for him the totality of the real (external) world, although they are presented to one only through perception, but not thought or talk. Perhaps, ultimately one simply cannot say how the structure of the world is. But if one can say anything at all, given that, as I shall show, in Dignāga there is no rift between the transcendental (the perceptual) and the conventional (the conceptual),⁵ the concrete things should be *said* to be what there are in reality.⁶

For Dignāga, a genuine perceptual episode is devoid of conception (*kalpanā*). This means that it is free from any conceptual thought which is expressible by the five kinds of words: arbitrary words (*yadr̥cchā-śabda*), class-words, quality-words, action-words and substance-words. An opponent may say that a blue thing, as a *dharmin*, qualified by the quality-character (*guṇa*) blue, as a *dharma*, can be expressed by the word "blue", and so on. But Dignāga seems to hold that transcendentially (*paramārthataḥ*) there is no difference between a quality-character, or a class-character, and its bearer. A *dharmin-dharma* differentiation is, indeed, a construction. After all, one does not see any difference between a cow and its character of being a cow!⁷

As a matter of fact, we cannot perceive a real thing in all its aspects. One may see just the front side of an elephant, for instance. In elucidating the nature of perceptual experience, our primary concern should be that which is directly and entirely perceptible or our second notion. Dignāga, I believe, used the troublesome term "*svalakṣaṇa*" for the notion. The term may be translated as self-appearance or appearance-in-itself and understood as the non-conceptually perceivable form of a real thing. A self-appearance is ineffable, yet, when it is perceived, it is known entirely.

Significantly, one should understand the notion of *svalakṣaṇa* in terms of the objective field – or rather its focus – of perceptual experience, rather than of atoms or gross things. When one sees a forest at a distance, the *svalakṣaṇa* concerned would be its visible form as a whole (*sāmānya*), though the forest is actually composed of many trees.⁸ Analogically, one may expect that when a swaying green guava is perceived, the *svalakṣaṇa* be an integral whole containing guava-class, green-quality, swaying-action, etc. and their bearers, all in a conceptually undifferentiated state.

At one place in the *apoha* chapter, Dignāga holds that when one conceptually cognizes an object, e.g., a jug, as a character-bearer, with its characters of, say, being white, earthen, real and odorous, etc., one does not cognize the characters individually, rather one is aware of them as an undifferentiated whole.⁹ I suspect that Dignāga is here

unknowingly shifting from the case of conceptual cognition toward that of perception. For if any inner distinction is not possible, one cannot use words to designate the bearer by expressing its characters. It would be like *svalakṣaṇas* which are said to be ineffable. The unanalyzable nature of the percept leads one to assert its ineffability. Later in the chapter, Dignāga denies the existence of a unified complex entity (**samudāya*).¹⁰ But such an entity turns out to be one whose relation to its character can be articulated as that of identity or difference. Problems arise as soon as we *conceive* a self-characterized object as an effable conglomerate of effable components and ask whether it is different from or the same as its components. It is in this light, I think, we should understand Dignāga's notion of conventional existent (*samvṛti-sat*).

My interpretation of the two notions may suggest the presence of a 'gap' between a real particular and its *svalakṣaṇas*. However, the problem does not occur here only. When one turns her whole body rightwards one sees the scene before turn leftwards. This is for all epistemologists to explain. A *svalakṣaṇa* is nothing other than a thing's (or things') own (*sva*) appearance as the thing bodily presents itself to a perceptual experience. The 'gap' may cease to exist if due attention is paid to the actual experiential context, and I believe Dignāga did do so.¹¹ *Svalakṣaṇas*, then, are no privileged entities standing in-between the inner mind and the outer corporeal world. Neither are *svalakṣaṇas* point-instants or piece-meal sense-data, nor do they form a private world of colored shapes or shaped colors.

To give a phenomenalist account of the theory is to overlook some fundamental differences between the Buddhist's conceptual background and that of a Western phenomenalist and his allies. There is in Mahāyāna Buddhism neither the Cartesian dualism nor any 'para-mechanical' theory.¹² "Don't think, but look!", Dignāga – I suppose – would have approved wholeheartedly this Wittgensteinian dictum.¹³ After all, one cannot *perceive* a membrane-like appearance with something else lurking behind or a bundle or discrete *quale*-pieces, without the dint of *kalpanā* in relation to a highly hypothetical scientific causal theory.

A few more notes to end the section:

- (i) For Dignāga, a sense has an apprehending (*grāhaka*) ability (*śakti*) capable of perceiving.¹⁴ It is no passive receptor of incoming sense-stimuli.
- (ii) Dignāga seems to hold that self-awareness (*svasamvitti*), which occurs simultaneously with its object, a first-order perceptual experience, may know the object as desirable or otherwise. This means,

pace phenomenologists, affective or volitive elements are there from the outset of a perceptual episode.¹⁵

- (iii) S1 indicates that a sense-perception is necessarily perspective. A real thing presents itself to different senses, in different orientations and so on, while each such presentation as a *svalakṣaṇa*, being brought into relief by its background, can be seen as three-dimensional. Merleau-Ponty so speaks from his phenomenological standpoint: "Thus there is a paradox of immanence and transcendence in perception. Immanence, because the perceived object cannot be foreign to him who perceives; transcendence, because it always contains something more than what is actually given."¹⁶ The *transcendence* suggested in S1 predicates the existence of things and aspects external to consciousness.

2. INFERENCE

In Dignāga's logic, one seeks for a genuine logical reason (*hetu*) to establish an inference. The three characters a reason must have to be genuine are as follows:

- (i) The reason must belong to *pakṣa*, the subject about which an inference is made.
- (ii) It must belong to at least one *sapakṣa*, i.e., that which is similar to *pakṣa* by possessing *sādhya*, the property whose belonging to *pakṣa* is to be inferred.
- (iii) It must not belong to any *vipakṣa*, i.e., that which is dissimilar from *pakṣa* by not possessing *sādhya*.

Once the reason at hand is confirmed to have the characters, it is presumably established that the subject of inference possesses *sādhya*. Dignāga's stock example is the inference wherein one, knowing that sound is produced, infers that sound has the property of impermanence.

Dignāga's emphasis, indeed, is on the third character. A genuine reason establishes what is to be inferred by excluding all *vipakṣas* such that the *pakṣa* to which the reason belongs is not that in which the *sādhya* concerned does not reside. The latter point is what is meant when we say that the subject possesses *sādhya*. In the above example, the presence of the property-of-producedness (= *hetu*) in sound leads to the knowledge that sound is not where the property-of-impermanence (= *sādhya*) is absent.

Why did Dignāga not take the second character to be that the reason is present *only in sapakṣa*? For Dignāga, as the extension of things

having the property of *hetu* can be unlimited, it is not necessary to confirm such a character. Besides, Dignāga might think that a universal affirmative proposition in the form "All A's are B's" may seduce one to imagine an essential relation between *hetu* and *sādhya*. Dignāga's negative approach certainly dilutes the temptation of giving an eidetic and/or a causal explanation of the relation. What seems neglected by scholars is that his logic differs significantly from inductive logic. An inductive method by itself does not tell one when to start or what to observe, yet Dignāga's logic may begin with the question: does the *pakṣa* possess the *sādhya*, and why so, or the like? Further, such a method does not tell one when to end, but for Dignāga one can rest the confirmation of a *hetu*'s having the third character simply on the non-observation of its being present in any *vipakṣa*.¹⁷ The process of confirming a *hetu* in respect of the three characters, known as 'inference for oneself', is a reason-seeking process with a negative and conjectural tone. A reason residing in a *pakṣa* is disqualified mainly when one reminds oneself of or observes a counter-example.¹⁸ In such a logic there is virtually no need of observing and inducing many instances.

An empiricist prefers an inductive method. For him the world is a depository of discrete empirical data without any intrinsic relation therebetween. One just needs to glean data here and there and generalize them to form an empirical law. That Dignāga did not opt for the method together with its skeptical leaning, may suggest that he did not view reality as a great bundle of scattering raw-materials. Actually, Dignāga did not categorically deny the existence of class-character (*jāti*). He did deny the existence of a common-appearance take as an indivisible real entity residing in and *ontologically distinct from* a plurality of particulars. Yet there may be ineffable concrete class-characters so knit with their bearers that they cannot be distinctly known as substantial entities, and that they appear particularized.¹⁹ They are rather perceived as non-different from their bearers. And then a *svalakṣaṇa* is not something bare.²⁰ In any case, it seems certain that although Dignāga rejected the possibility of perceiving commonness, he did not thereby sail on the same boat with the inductivist.

3. EXPRESSION AND APOHA

Just as a logical reason establishes what is to be inferred by excluding things that do not possess the inferable property (*sādhya*), a word expresses its own object (*artha*) by differentiating it from objects that

are expressed by its contrary words.²¹ To cite some verses from the *apoha* chapter:

- S2: That which is expressed (*abhidheya*), bearing many features, cannot be known entirely by a word. In accordance with an intrinsic relation, the knowing (*gati*) [through the word] brings on an effect of differentiation (*vyavaccheda*).²²
- S3: Verbal cognition ... tells its own object (*svārtha*) by excluding others.²³
- S4: A word expresses just things (*bhāvān*) that are qualified by the preclusion of others.²⁴

When criticizing the *tadvat* approach (see below), Dignāga stresses that the meaning (*artha*) of a word should be general (*sāmānyam*).²⁵ Later, it appears that what he has in mind there – besides a word-type (*śabda-sāmānya*) – is preclusion of others.²⁶ Then, for Dignāga the *artha* of a word is an *apoha*. However, Dignāga seems to understand the term "*svārtha*" differently. For Dignāga the own object (*svārtha*) of a sense or a perception is a *svalakṣaṇa* (refer to note 8). But what is the own object of a word or a verbal knowing? A general word can only express an object in that aspect with which it is intrinsically related through an exclusion which determines what the aspect would be. Since a word, incapable of expressing particulars (*bheda*),²⁷ cannot have intrinsic relation with particulars, its *own* object should be a referentially meant individual as such and in that aspect as determined by an exclusion. Such an object – call it the meant thing as such – is something generic (It differs from the *abhidheya* of S2 in that the latter is of many determinable aspects). However, if a word is used to express a perceived particular, the latter would become a thing qualified by exclusion; in a derivative sense this – call it the meant thing – can also be a *svārtha* as a thing (*vastu*; *bhāva*) qualified by preclusion.²⁸ To have a clear surview, let me make the following distinctions:

1. The thing to be meant (or expressed) = the thing to be qualified by exclusion of others = the ineffable particular.
2. The meant thing = the perceived thing as verbally qualified by an exclusion.
3. The meant thing as such = the thing referentially meant as such and qualified by an exclusion.
4. The (negative) 'meaning' (*artha*) = the exclusion as a qualifier.

For example, the word "rose" is meant to express particular roses but actually expresses just the meant rose as such and as qualified by

the exclusion of things other than roses. But when it is used to denote a perceived rose, the latter becomes a meant rose, but not as such. Note that the notion of a meant thing as such is resorted to here just because there is no proper designation of particulars in the doctrine. The *expressive* relation between a word and a particular can only be *thought*, not perceived. Consequently, the relata concerned must become something generic.

Being meaning-like, an *apoha* mediates a word's signifying relation to its referent. Being negative in character, it is hardly representable. On the whole, to know the signification of the word "tree" is to know that the word does not refer to non-trees, while to know that of the name "Delhi" is to know that the name does not refer to places other than Delhi.

I now tentatively suggest the three characters the word "tree" should bear to be a genuine sign with respect to a particular tree:

- (i) The word "tree" is used to express the particular tree.
- (ii) It expresses at least a thing qualified by a conceptual tree-appearance (*pratibhāsa*), one that is evoked in one's mind when one hears the word.
- (iii) It never expresses things qualified by appearances – other than the tree-appearance – that are associated with its contrary words. This is a way of saying that it is never applied to what is dissimilar.

Here, (iii) may be rephrased as: It expresses a thing by precluding things qualified by other appearances, or it expresses a thing qualified by the preclusion of non-trees. By emphasizing the third character, then, we can transfer our talk about how a word refers to its object through the medium of a positive meaning (here *pratibhāsa*) to that about how a word refers to the object through exclusion. Through *apoha* negation, the word "tree" generates – in respect of a particular thing – the knowledge that the thing expressed by the word is different from things other than trees.²⁹

In a smoke-fire inference, we infer from seeing smoke present on a hill to fire's presence on the hill. In the usage of the word "tree", the word denotes its referent through its meaning which determines the referent. We are not sure whether wherever smoke is there *must* be fire, so we can only base the inference on the non-observation of smoke's being present where fire is absent.³⁰ Similarly, we are not sure whether everything denoted by the word "tree" *must* be determined by the appearance it evokes. We can only base the signification of the word on the non-observation of its application to non-trees. We should thus understand the third character. As in the case of inference, however,

the second character should not be wiped off. For without the notion of tree-appearance such an exclusion of non-trees may make no sense.³¹

Meanwhile, if the second character is re-defined to signify a universal affirmation, then the word "cow" may generate – *positively* – the knowledge that the thing denoted by it is a thing determined by a cow-appearance. On the other hand, one may attend to the resemblance one supposedly finds among things of the same class, then the – *positive* – knowledge would be that the denotatum is a thing bearing a cow-resemblance. Further, a Naiyāyika, who posits *jāti* (universal) and takes it as the ground for application of a word (*pravṛtti-nimitta*) as well as an *artha*, might affirm both P1 and P2:³²

- P1: (x) (x has the difference [*anyonyābhāva*] from the possessors of the absence [*atyantābhāva*] of U-resemblance or μ \equiv x has μ)
- P2: (x) (x has the absence of the difference from U \equiv x has μ)
– where ' μ ' stands for a universal, and 'U' for the class of things in which μ may be said to inhere.

And so the thing denoted by "cow" is just a particular cow possessing cowhood. All the three positive versions entice us to believe that a particular is primarily expressible. Dignāga would certainly deny P1 and P2. After all, a double negation does not amount to an affirmation.

In the *apoha* chapter of PS, Dignāga puts forth a series of arguments to show that a class-word such as "lotus" expresses neither particulars (*bheda*) or a class-character (viz., a genus) nor the character's relation to a particular or a particular possessing the character, and concludes that a class-word, as well as a quality-word, etc., signifies its own object by means of preclusion of others.

Dignāga argues that it is his doctrine that satisfactorily explains some common fact about usage of words. For example, if we use the words "blue" and "lotus" to express a blue lotus the two words should be co-referential (*sāmāna-adhikarānya*). Yet, none of the alternative approaches, according to Dignāga, can explain the fact. The *tadvat* (character-bearer) approach is, indeed, the most promising and Dignāga made much effort to repudiate it. If – as followers of the approach have it – the words "blue" and "lotus" co-refer to blue lotuses through directly expressing the quality blue and the lotus-hood respectively then, the latter being their very own – use the term "expressee" for that which is expressed – expressees (*sva-abhidheya*), one fails to see how they can co-referentially encompass the class of blue lotuses. The basic problem, if I am not mistaken, is that once a character and its bearer

are considered as distinctive and substantial entities, it is difficult to see how a word can refer to the bearer through directly expressing the character as its very *artha*.

The vantage of the *apoha* approach seems to rest on the non-substantial nature of preclusion. Here, the words "blue" and "lotus", while differing in what they exclude, become converged (*samudita*) at one place, i.e., a blue lotus, and so are co-referential.³³ Unlike a class-character, an exclusion does not stand on a word's way to its referent, it rather facilitates the word's 'going' toward the referent by setting the latter in relief. Words refer to their common object just like crows alighting upon a pillar. A pillar is erected in an *empty space* and crows find no difficulty alighting on it. Similarly, a referent is made in relief through *exclusion* so that words can refer *toward* it. The *tadvat* approach would be like crows to alight on a small circle on the ground above which may lay a net (signifying a character) – by no means an easy thing.

That even under this negative approach a word cannot really reach a particular is indeed an apohist assertion. On the other hand, the approach prevails by bringing the real into relief and by not imposing on it what is actually not there, viz., universal. The paradox here is that though the *apoha* doctrine highlights the ineffable nature of reality, it turns out to show the best way for an expression to approximate reality.

4. THREE WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING OF LANGUAGE

Here are three approaches accounting for the way a word signifies its object:

- (1) The essentialist approach: a word expresses its object through the medium of an abstract sense, separated from a 'private' mental image, or through a universal inhering in all its referents.
- (2) The descriptive approach: a word expresses its referent through the medium of a conceptual appearance – such as *pratibhāsa* – or through certain resemblance one finds among its referents.
- (3) The de-substantial approach: a word expresses its referent through the medium of a preclusion of objects to which it is never applied.

I understand that both Frege and the Naiyāyika follow the essentialist approach. The former appealed to the notion of sense (*Sinn*) while the latter that of universal (*jāti*), both signifying highly substantial or abstract entities. A Fregean sense is an abstract ideal entity which determines for a given word a referent. A word is related to its referent via a sense, yet

how the relation is determined by the sense is not properly explained by Frege himself. Someone may know of Jawaharlal Nehru only as a deceased former prime minister of India but use the name "Nehru" to refer to him successfully. Yet the sense of the name, expressible by the phrase "a deceased former prime minister of India," does not pick out Nehru uniquely. Again, while for Frege a referent is not an ingredient of meaning, it may be argued that to know the sense of a word one needs to know its referent. This is most obvious in the case of token-reflexive words like "today", "I" and demonstratives.³⁴ The problem with Frege seems to be that he made too sharp a distinction between a word and its sense as well as between the sense and the referent.

It may be said that the meaning of the word "cow" corresponds to the mode of presentation of the universal cow-hood. But there are problems related to the notion of universal. Wittgenstein, for instance, has convincingly pointed out that among things referred to by a general word we see only resemblances overlapping and criss-crossing but not any commonness.³⁵ A Naiyāyika would find it difficult to counter the view.

The second approach, which seeks to offer a faithful description of the way a word is used – in the actual context of experience – to express its object,³⁶ may have support from common sense. Here, the notion of *pratibhāsa* claims our attention as that which *appears to* one's mind when one uses a word. A *pratibhāsa* is altogether conceptual, imaginal and representative. It re-presents generically the non-conceptual forms (*ākāra*) of a number of one's previous perceptual episodes of the same kind of object. As such it has an imaginal aspect with a perceptual bearing. One, indeed, cannot brush away an imaginal appearance and look for a purely objective, ideal and self-identical entity called "sense". But then is a *pratibhāsa* something private?

A private entity would here be an entity that *real-ly* exists in consciousness and is incapable of recurrence. Besides the perceptual bearing concerned, the fact that we cannot have a simultaneous access to two – appearing at different moments – *pratibhāsas per se* evoked by the same word surely makes impossible our confirmation of the recurrence of a self-same *pratibhāsa*. Yet, what is first of all not possible is the confirmation, not the recurrence. But is not a *pratibhāsa* a real phase of consciousness, which is admittedly in a perpetual flux? For Dignāga whatever is real is primarily non-conceptually known, yet this 'image' has a conceptual aspect as well.³⁷ Since a conceptual construct as *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is unreal, a *pratibhāsa* would not exist

in the mind as something real. Again, Dignāga attributed to *apoha*, as a conceptual item, the feature of being permanent (*nitya*).³⁸ This also makes room for understanding a conceptual *pratibhāsa* as recurrent. It now turns out that a *pratibhāsa* is neither purely objective nor purely subjective. Without further complicating the issue, we may phenomenologically reckon it as a – on the whole – recurrent appearance existing intentionally, but not real-ly, in consciousness.

With the notion of *pratibhāsa* one may think that the use of a word consists in applying to what is similar, and this application is determined by a word-evoked *pratibhāsa*. Were it the case, Dignāga contends, “then from [hearing] the word “tree” there would be no doubt about the appearance (*pratibhāsa*) of a *śimsapā* or of other [kinds of trees] in respect of a certain thing; yet, there would be doubt about just the appearance of earthness or that of substance-hood, etc.”³⁹ A conceptual tree-appearance does not by itself tell whether the tree concerned is earthen or not; yet, by attending to things “tree” does not apply to, one knows that the tree is made – not of fire but – of earthen elements, and so no doubt would arise regarding the appearance of earthness, and so on.

But why if one adopts the proposed approach there would be no doubt about the conceptual appearance of a certain kind of trees? Hearing the word “tree” might evoke a conceptual appearance of a particular kind of trees showing their specific nature, yet it is a fact that uncertainty always arises as regards the specific nature of the denotatum of a generic expression. Another problem is that we are not sure whether the tree in question must be determined by a certain given appearance, for not even a generic appearance can cover no more and no less than what we conventionally call trees. If we come across a new species of trees, the proposed approach may prevent us from calling them trees, although we observe in them features to which the contrary words of “tree” are *all the more* inapplicable. As the appearance then requires an interpretation for its determining function, it cannot by itself determine a given object as denotable by “tree”.

Now if actuality is a world of differences, an expression cannot represent to us the subtle – internal – differences of the class of things it conventionally refers to. Yet from an attention to the things’ – external – differences from others our knowledge about their general nature arises. This point, together with the predicament of the first two approaches, suggests the relevancy of our third approach. This approach alone brings to light the facts that words as well as their own *arthas* are interdependent, that a word derives its own *artha* from the

latter’s differentiation from the *arthas* of many other words. Note that the approach does not dispense with the notion of *pratibhāsa*, as it too conveys an idea of the meant as such. Yet the *apoha* preclusion prevails. Given a word-type, a *pratibhāsa*, a *svārtha*, there is correlatively an *apoha* that precedes to determine it.

To think is to posit, to objectify, to abstract, to separate and to construct, etc., or, in one word, to substantiate. One asks: “What is the meaning of a word?” or “What is the *artha* of a word?” Questions like these produce in us a mental cramp – we felt that there must be something substantial over there in an ideal space or in the objective world that functions as the meaning or *artha*. The essentialist approach is very much such a substantiation of meaning, whereas the descriptive approach is just half way to it. This may explain why Dignāga denied even the existence of resemblance.⁴⁰ The substantiation leads to various sorts of intellectual attachments, which may become obstacles to religious realization. Besides, one then fails to see the contextual, temporal and correlative nature of language and so even fails to understand the functioning of language. The *apoha* approach, instead, seeks to de-substantiate meaning by stressing the negativity embedded in the way a word signifies its object. An expression consists not in saying what a thing is but in saying what it is not.

5. DEMONSTRATIVE APOHA

So far I have focused on class-words and quality-words, which, for Dignāga, are too generic to pick up a particular object. But can a demonstrative like “this” or “that” properly express a perceptual particular?

I think token-reflexive words – like “now”, “you” and including demonstratives – should be classified, together with proper names, under the title of arbitrary words (*yadr̥cchā-sabda*; words devoid of a meaning), for they are all used *seemingly* to denote their objects without the medium of a concept under which a class of things are subsumed. A proper name itself may be said to take the role of a character and is attached to its object. So, in our previous example, the proper name “Nehru” can be used successfully to refer to just an individual, for it is different from names like “Indira Gandhi”, “Rajiv Gandhi”, etc. However, for Dignāga the reference of a proper name is factually effected through an *apoha* procedure.

Unlike a proper name, a demonstrative can be used freely to refer to any perceived object without any previous name-giving act or knowledge of such an act and is not supposed to continue to be associated with its

referent for some time. While it is true that a demonstrative reference does not explicitly involve meaning that mediates the reference in the way that of a general term does, we still can say that a demonstrative has two meanings, one generic, the other specific. The generic meaning of, for instance, "this" is, or corresponds to, the sense that embodies the general character of being a directly intended object in one's visible front (in the case of a visual perception).⁴¹ Its specific meaning on a given occasion of utterance is the sense that conceptually determines a perceived object in one's front as an intended particular within a particular location. We may call the latter sense a demonstrative sense.

What is this demonstrative sense? It may simply determine a percept as a barely intended object at a certain place. It does not tell us anything specific about its characters and its relations to adjoining things. Its corresponding meaning, then, seems too impoverished to say what the percept is. A demonstrative seems to function as a replacement of one's primitive unlearned behavior of pointing to something with a finger. Then, a demonstrative directs our attention to a certain visible thing by telling us the direction of seeing the thing rather than by directly denoting it. And we know from experience that in many cases the hearer may even fail to know what the speaker means to indicate. All this suggests that the expressive function of a demonstrative is rather limited.

One usually uses a demonstrative when its referent is perceptually present. Such a conceptually perceived object can certainly bridge the alleged gap between a self-appearance and a full-fledged common-appearance. The question is whether general words alone need *apoha* operation and a demonstrative "is immune to *apoha* negation because the demonstrative does not denote its object through a shared property, but does so directly."⁴²

There are reasons for saying that a demonstrative is not immune to *apoha* negation: first, a demonstrative sense is still a conceptual entity and for Dignāga *apoha* operates in tandem with conception; secondly, even proper names may also be said to denote their objects without a shared feature or a meaning, yet they are undisputedly prone to *apoha*.⁴³ It seems to me that a demonstrative, say "this", expresses a particular by differentiating it from those conceptually-perceptually co-present objects which are not presently indicated by the demonstrative. This *indicatum*, no longer a thing to be meant, is then a thing qualified by the exclusion of things other than *this*.

To impose *apoha* on the perceptually co-present objects is not to withdraw or eliminate them. Instead of positively determining the

indicated object, the preclusion induces us *not to determine* it by directing our attention to its differences from the surrounding objects (*the others*). We rather become more aware of the relation between the two kinds of object and are less inclined to substantiate the indicated object. We may call such a preclusion *demonstrative apoha*. The *apoha* so understood, further, takes care of the fact that even with the aid of a pointing finger a demonstrative generates uncertainty as to what its *indicatum* is. One may say that a demonstrative has the three characters: (i) it is used to indicate a particular in one's front, (ii) it connotes a demonstrative – both generic and specific – meaning, and (iii) it effects a *demonstrative apoha*.

The above discussion applies to token-reflexives in general. Here I am tempted to quote a set of theses of Donn Welton's as the phenomenologist outlines the dialectic relation between language and perception:

- 1.1 A This is a This only in terms of a That which is not a This.
- 1.2 If a This is a Here it is such only in contrast to a There which is not Here.
- 1.3 If a This is a Now it is such only in contrast to a Then which is not a Now.
- 1.4 A This which is Here and Now and which is not a That which is There and/or Then is such according to a What.⁴⁴

A Today is a Today only in contrast to a Yesterday, a Tomorrow, etc., while an I is an I only in contrast to a You, a He etc. So, one simply cannot use the word "I" this way: "Yes, I am perceiving my self and going to use the word "I" to denote it. Since my self is *in toto* different from yours – well, I doubt whether you have it – only I know how "I" means my self and so the meaning of the word "I" is private, no way accessible to you!" One should be told that the word "I" makes sense *only* when it differentiates its own object from other objects expressed by "you", "he", etc. The meanings of "you", "he", etc., delimit that of "I" such that one's ego-sense – if any – as the presentation of one's self (or consciousness) would be ineffable if it is something unique, but if it is effable it would be intersubjectively knowable.⁴⁵ If my understanding is correct – that is, not incorrect – there is in Yogācāra Buddhism no room for pure subjectivism or private language.

Finally, taking a demonstrative sense and a demonstrative *apoha* together, a demonstrative may be said to negatively indicate its referent. Similarly, a general word negatively indicates its particulars in that it,

through *apoha* and *pratibhāsa*, tells the direction – its *svārtha* = what the particulars have in common – of perceiving them. As is suggested, the negativity involved therein rather facilitates the reference of a word to its particulars. By dint of a conceptual perception with an explicit or implicit use of a demonstrative, the word “picture”, preceding to set its object in relief, goes forward to express a meant particular picture qualified by the exclusion of other *arthas* as well as by a demonstrative *apoha*. The phrase “(This is) picture” would mean “(This – not that – is) not non-pictures.” One observes here a certain ‘homomorphism’ that connects together a word-*apoha*, an *artha-apoha* ... and an *apoha*-particular (see fn. 19).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

For Dignāga words are mutually dependent and never atomic. Meaning (*artha*) of a word results not from an abstract determination of intention, but from the meaning’s and the word’s correlation with and differentiation from other meanings and words in a web of language and in the latter’s attempt to net reality. This, so to speak, negative holism is further moulded by his views that a sentence is the primary linguistic unit, that word meaning is derivative. Further, the complexity and strength of the *apoha* doctrine seem to consist in its multiple functions: (i) it shows the negative indicatibility as well as positive ineffability of the real; (ii) it sheds light on the interdependency of words and meanings, while accounting for certain linguistic facts underlying the expressive capacity of language; (iii) it de-substantiates the notion of *artha*, dispensing with universals, and so provides a way of escaping the spell language casts on our mind.

In a conceptual awareness we may determine the thing *X as X*. Now with the *apoha* alternative, we may determine it *as not Y, Z, etc.* Such a negative determination, it seems, somewhat dilutes the conceptual content of the awareness and thereby approximates a non-conceptual perception. For, we never perceive an object in isolation and it is through our seeing the background that an object is brought into relief (as a three-dimensional whole). It may then be suggested that with the *apoha* theory Dignāga had already bridged the alleged gap between pure perception and conception.⁴⁶

A related point is that the difference between the realm of *svalakṣanas* and that of conventional existents, i.e., spatio-temporal things properly designated by a class-word is just that between what is negatively indicatable and what is taken as positively describable. Were *svalakṣanas*

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sensory *quale*, given that the *apoha* theory shows a way of saying the unsayable, Dignāga should have taught us how to transfer our talk about physical objects to that about sense-data.⁴⁷ Were actuality a world of *absolutely* discrete and unique particulars, the general nature of the real things would not even be verbally knowable through precluding others. One would either remain in silence or engage oneself in purely meaningless talks. Significantly, Dignāga re-understood the expressive function of language with his *apoha* doctrine, while keeping in view the integrity and utility of ordinary language.

Dignāga’s *apoha* doctrine has been labeled as a form of nominalism. I have three minor objections to this practice: (i) As already said, Dignāga might accept the existence of inexpressible particularized class-characters; (ii) Wittgenstein, defending that what he was doing is not nominalism, says that “[n]ominalists make the mistake of interpreting all words as *names*, and so of not really describing their use ...”⁴⁸ I am sure Dignāga did not make the mistake, for his doctrine did tell us the use of words and he did not equate words with names as ‘mere tags’; (iii) Dignāga is a nominalist in that he rejected the objective existence of universals as distinct from concrete particulars, but then many – probably all anti-essentialists – would be nominalists too and the peculiarity of his approach is not thereby highlighted. On my part, I think if a labeling is required – as we feel so when we do philosophy – notions like de-substantialism and negative holism are better choices.

We tend to look at language as consisted of scattered names without intrinsic correlation there-between. This nominalization goes hand in hand with entification as such a notion of language drives us to think of the world we live in as a depository of discrete substantial entities, each of which can be captured and represented by a word. We further engage ourselves in abstract thinking to expose universals and essences hidden from concrete matters. Yet, all the entification and abstraction lead to the rift between ourselves and the ever-changing concrete world we live in, as if we were – to use Wittgenstein’s metaphor – in a fly-bottle where we take reflections as reality. Ignorance and distress are the main symptoms of such a bondage.

On the other hand, language conforms to the pattern of convention, something past and common; yet we want to talk about what has not been heard before, about what is special to the present situation. Reality, sadly, eludes our talk.

All in all, shall we then eliminate language? Early Wittgenstein advised his readers to take his propositions as a ladder for climbing up, then throw away the ladder and keep silence.⁴⁹ But this *detachment* from

language is at its root just an *attachment*, for it substantiates language as a whole into a 'thing' to be avoided. It fails to note the relationship between language – in its indicative, evocative and even natural forms – and actuality; an arrow sign, a gesture, a smile, a flower in the hand, tracks and a cloud can be as signitive as written scripts or spoken sounds, and to detach from all this is to isolate oneself, making life life-less. Moreover, given the homology between speech and thought one would be prohibited even to think. Instead, we should remain in language to transcend language, striking a middle path between attachment to and detachment from language.

We need not throw away the ladder but just keep it there. We need not forsake language but just need to use language in a way without being, so to speak, used by language. One way out is to understand a word-type as that which is differentiated from other word-types⁵⁰ and understand a word's signifying its own *artha* as done through precluding other *arthas*. We are then declined to substantiate the word, its meaning and the real thing, and there is no need for positing universals.⁵¹

This is basically Dignāga's way out. Unlike Ābhīdharmic thinkers, he did not conceive real *dharmas* as individually specifiable, nor did he consider conceptual entities, like words and meanings, analytically independent. A word as a word-*apoha* is not a substantial entity. It, being differentiated from other words, negates even itself to refer toward its object, the reference being effected through differentiating the object from others. Here inter-dependent words and meanings play on the field of ineffable *sva-lakṣaṇas*, trying to mimic the texture of actuality. It seems unlikely that such a negative holism would go hand in hand with sensual atomism.

To couch Buddhist tenets Dignāga's *anyāpoha* doctrine may appear insufficient to a Buddhist metaphysician, who would rather appeal to negations, denials and paradoxes, etc. Yet this doctrine is precisely what we should expect from Dignāga as an epistemologist, as it has shown us a way as to how, despite the limitation of language, not to avoid speaking.

NOTES

¹ I am of the opinion that Dignāga did not take over the Sautrāntika atomism and theory of momentariness. While one may view Dharmakīrti, Dignāga's most distinguished successor, as a Sautrāntika-Yogācārin, I shall consider Dignāga just as a Yogācārin. Dignāga's non-idealistic position in PS is no reason for proving his Sautrāntika leaning.

² This work was partially reconstructed into Sanskrit by Muni Jambūvijaya and compiled in *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa* ed.

Jambūvijaya, Śrī Jain Ātmānand Sabhā, Bhavnagar, Part I, 1966, Part II, 1976 [abbr. NCI and NCII]. I am also indebted to Masaaki Hattori's *Dignāga, On Perception* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968) and Richard P. Hayes' *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988) for the English translations of the *pratyakṣa* chapter and (partially) the *apoha* chapter of PS respectively.

³ Dharmīno 'nekarūpasya nendriyāt [viz. na indriyāt] sarvathā gatih, svasaṃvedyam anirdeśyam rūpam indriyagocarah NCI-tiṣṭhānī, p. 104. Cf. translations given by Hattori (1968: 27) and Hayes (1988: 138).

⁴ It is implied in S1 that this *dharmin* can at least be perceived in *some* of its forms. Then, we should take the two occurrences of the term "rūpa" as expressing the same kind of item, not that the first refers to a *dharma* as a *sāmānya-rūpa* (common-form), while the second a *sva-rūpa* (self-form). Refer to fn. 22. Since such a thing cannot be perceived entirely, our access to it would be partially conceptual. This may be the reason as to why Dignāga uses "dharmin" here.

⁵ For Dignāga a conceptual episode, by being aware of itself, is to be deemed as non-conceptual as well. See Hattori (1968), pp. 27, 95.

⁶ This can also be the reason why Dignāga uses the word "dharmin".

⁷ Vācaspati thus interprets the Buddhist view: "Class and other characters are not non-conceptually apprehended as piecemeal (*piṇḍavivekena*). Indeed, class and its bearer, action and its bearer, quality and its bearer ... do not appear as distinctive." Vācaspati Mīśra, *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyā Tīkā*, ed. Paṇḍit Śrī R. S. Drāviḍ (Varanasi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Sansthan, 2nd edn. 1989), p. 135.

⁸ *Tatrānekārthajanyatvāt svārthe sāmānyagocaram*. NCI-tiṣṭhānī, p. 104. Cf. Hattori (1968), pp. 26, 89. This very verse gives evidence to my reference to the notion of what there is in reality. I think the term "aneka-artha" may just mean many gross things, but not atoms in aggregation. In any case, if the atoms can only be thought but not perceived, their existence may need to be conceptually posited and so they may not be considered as real as *svalakṣaṇas*.

⁹ Hayes (1988), p. 268.

¹⁰ Hayes (1988), p. 282. Two verses before, (in verse 15) Dignāga mentions that a blue lotus as a complex entity (**samudāya*) is expressed by the compound word "blue-lotus". See NCII p. 630. So, even the complex entity itself is effable. It is just an expressible object (*abhidheya*), which, as a *dharmin*, bears many features/*dharmas* (See S2 in sec. 3).

¹¹ The fact that Dignāga did not characterize perception with the adjective "non-erroneous" (*abhrānta*) has received a phenomenalist reading. But the phenomenalist's notion of experience, saturated with classical physiological-psychological assumptions, suffers from the tension of an unbridgeable dichotomy between subjectivism and objectivism, between an in-itself *in me* and an in-itself *in itself*. One would do well by returning to a pre-scientific original experience: "We must discover the origin of the object at the very center of our experience ... and we must understand how, paradoxically, there is *for us* an in-itself." M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 71. A *svalakṣaṇa*, paradoxical as it is, is a perceptually experienceable in-itself.

¹² "The notion [that *impressions* occur in perception] derives from a special causal hypothesis – the hypothesis that my mind can get in touch with a gate-post, only if the gate-post causes something to go on in my body, which in its turn causes something else to go on in my mind. Impressions are ghostly impulses, postulated for the ends of a para-mechanical theory." See Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson & Company, 1949), p. 243.

¹³ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953, 3rd edn. 1967), p. 31.

¹⁴ Hattori (1968), p. 45.

¹⁵ This reminds us of the Buddhist notion of *vedanā*. The term "*vedanā*" has been translated by some as feeling (i.e. mere emotion) on the ground that it is either pleasing or unpleasing (or indifferent), and by some others as sensation on the ground that a *vedanā* occurs prior to (conceptual) cognition (*sañjñā*). This discrepancy shows how strongly scholars are under the spell of Western traditional way of thinking. Can a freshly arising perception not be pre-cognitive and affective? Merleau-Ponty (1962: 24) quotes K. Koffka with approval: "An object looks attractive or repulsive before it looks black or blue ..." Incidentally, since a Dignāean perception is non-conceptual, it can also be pre-cognitive.

¹⁶ Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, trans. by James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 16.

¹⁷ Shōryū Katsura has noted this difference. See his 'Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on Apoha', in *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition: Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference*, ed. by E. Steinkellner (Vienna, 1991), p. 140.

¹⁸ I say "mainly" because it is also necessary that the reason occurs in at least a *sapakṣa*.

¹⁹ Dignāga meant to say that even if *jāti* exists, we cannot know it distinctively. See Hayes (1988: 246). According to Tom Tillemans, Tibetan Buddhists speak of an "exclusion of the other, which is a *svalakṣaṇa* object." Since Dignāga replaced universal by the notion of *apoha*, one can just take a particularized character as such an exclusion, which is *not different* from a *svalakṣaṇa*. Significantly, there would then be a 'homomorphism' between *apoha* as a *svalakṣaṇa* and *apoha* as an *artha*. See Tillemans, 'Identity and Referential Opacity in Tibetan Buddhist Apoha Theory' in *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, ed. B. K. Matilal and Robert D. Evans (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), p. 215.

²⁰ A *svalakṣaṇa* is neither a bare bearer nor a sheer character, but that which is prior to the conceptual bearer-character (or *dharmin-dharma*) differentiation. This explains why the notion of class-character is *not completely* out of place here.

²¹ For an exposition of what contrary words would be in a given case, refer to Hayes (1988), pp. 205–212.

²² *Bahudhāpy abhidheyasya na śabdāt sarvathā gatiḥ, svasambandhānurūpyeṇa vyavacchedārthakārya asau*. Hayes (1988), p. 306, fn. 51; cf. NCII p. 630, verse 12. The structural semblance between this verse and the verse cited as S1 is noteworthy. It is obvious that since a certain aspect of the *abhidheya* can be known by a given word, the phrase '*na ...sarvathā*' should – in S1 as well as S2 – mean 'not entirely, but just some.'

²³ NCII p. 607, verse 1; Hayes (1988), p. 300, fn. 1.

²⁴ Hayes (1988), p. 308, fn. 72.

²⁵ NCH p. 629, verse 9.

²⁶ See Dignāga's commentaries on verse 36 in Hayes (1988: 299) and on verse 14 in NCII p. 630.

²⁷ The reasons are: (i) particulars are unlimited in number, and (ii) the word is errant in respect of any given particular. See Hayes (1988), pp. 255–7. Cf. the commentary on verse 35: "And since [the word] does not express particulars (*bheda-anabhidhāna*), there is no errancy in respect of its own object" (NCII p. 650) – this indicates that a word's own object is not a particular. Cf. Katsura (1991), pp. 138–139: "I would like to take '*svārtha*' as referring to the perceptual object itself which is something real in our external world. Even in that case ... a name designates its own object, i.e. *svalakṣaṇa*, by excluding others ..."

²⁸ In her *Bhartrhari and the Buddhists* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), p. 191, Radhika Herzberger directs our attention to an untraced fragment of

Dignāga's, where it reads: "Thus the *artha* of a word is a thing (*vastu*) qualified by preclusion (*nivṛtti*) but not merely preclusion." See also NCII p. 548. I think this '*artha*' should mean '*svārtha*'.

²⁹ Or the knowledge ... from things in the extension of its contrary words. So, the excluded things are *svārthas* [i.e., meant things as such] of the contrary words.

³⁰ See Katsura (1991), p. 140.

³¹ One can say as well that a word excludes things to which the word is not applicable and so makes no mentioning of the notion in question.

³² I follow Matilal in using 'difference' for '*anyonyābhāva*' and 'absence' for '*atyantābhāva*'. See Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985, 2nd edn. 1990), p. 147; also p. 153, fn. 1.

³³ This discussion and the alighting crow metaphor below figure in verse 14 of the *apoha* chapter and its commentary. See NCII p. 630.

³⁴ It is important, for example, that we attend to the modes under which items like the day of uttering "today", the place of saying "here" or an object indicated by "this" are presented in the actual context where one uses the words expressing them. These modes cannot be represented by some unique description.

³⁵ Wittgenstein (1967), p. 32.

³⁶ Hence the term "descriptive". Cf. Wittgenstein's remarks: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only *describe* it" and "Philosophy simply puts everything before us ... For what is *hidden* ... is of no interest to us" (my emphasis). *Ibid.* pp. 49–50.

³⁷ This aspect constitutes part of what I have called the meant thing as such. An image might be non-conceptually knowable, but it is then not *imagined* but *perceived*.

³⁸ See Hayes (1988), p. 300.

³⁹ NCII p. 650, the commentary on verse 34.

⁴⁰ See Hayes (1988), p. 246.

⁴¹ For this understanding of the two kinds of meaning I mainly rely on David W. Smith's article 'Husserl on Demonstrative Reference and Perception', in *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, Hubert Dreyfus (eds.) (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982), p. 197.

⁴² Herzberger (1986), p. 170. For Herzberger a demonstrative *directly* denotes a spatio-temporal object, which is neither a *svalakṣaṇa* nor a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. For a text-based criticism of her views, refer to Katsura (1991).

⁴³ Though a proper name has a generic meaning in that it refers to a plurality of *pudgalas* in a temporal sequence, the word "this" too has a generic meaning.

⁴⁴ Donn Welton, *The Origins of Meaning* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), p. 318. Welton understands a What as a pre-linguistic aesthetic sense constitutive of the appearances or object of perception.

⁴⁵ Wittgenstein (1967: 120) is bold enough to claim, "if as a matter of logic you exclude other people's having something, it loses its sense to say that you have it."

⁴⁶ The notion of demonstrative *apoha*, though not discussed by Dignāga, also helps to set up the link. In any case, Dignāga did talk about conceptual perception.

⁴⁷ In his *Ch'ü-yin-chia-she-lun (Upādāyaprajñāptiprakaraṇa)*, Dignāga contends that the elements of the visible, the audible, etc., are substantially real and *expressible*, whereas entities like a composite whole, being mental constructions, are nominally real and ineffable. According to Hidenori Kitagawa, one may cast doubt on the authorship of the text as its views deviate from that shown in PS. See Kitagawa, 'A Study of a Short Philosophical Treatise ascribed to Dignāga' in his *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan, 1965), p. 436.

⁴⁸ Wittgenstein (1967), p. 118.

⁴⁹ Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961, 2nd edn. 1971), p. 151.

⁵⁰ Dignāga applied the *apoha* method to the word (*śabda*) as well as to its reference. Refer to Ole Pind, 'Dignāga on Śabdāsāmānya and Śabdaviśeṣa', in Steinkellner (1991), pp. 269–275. A word-type is then a word-*apoha* as a negative conceptual item rather than a word-universal as an objective real entity.

⁵¹ Indeed, Dignāga also applied the *apoha* method at the sentential level. However, he was there more concerned with the notion of *pratibhā* as an intuitive comprehension, which flashes upon one's mind when one understands a sentence. Hence, I would skip the issue.

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GREGORY SCHOPEN

THE SUPPRESSION OF NUNS AND THE RITUAL MURDER OF THEIR SPECIAL DEAD IN TWO BUDDHIST MONASTIC TEXTS

The compilers of the various Buddhist monastic codes that we have appear to have been very anxious men. They were anxious about – even obsessed with – maintaining their public reputation and that of their order, and avoiding any hint of social scandal or lay criticism.¹ They were anxious about their body and what went into it; and they were anxious about women.² They appear, moreover, to have been particularly anxious about nuns, about containing, restraining and controlling them. At every opportunity they seem to have promulgated rules towards these ends. Some scholars, seeing the resulting maze of legislation, have taken it to suggest that the monks were very much in charge, and have suggested that the order of nuns was never more than a marginalized minority which had little, if any influence, in the Buddhist community as a whole.³ Obviously that is only one reading. That same body of legislation could, in fact, be read to suggest something like the very opposite. The mere existence of such rules might rather suggest that at the time our monastic codes were compiled the order of nuns was a force of considerable consequence, if not an actual powerful and potentially competitive rival in the world that the compilers of the *vinayas* were trying to construct.

Certainly, when we move outside of texts and look – in so far as we can – at actual monastic communities in India, nuns and groups of nuns do not appear to have been a marginalized minority without influence. During the period from at or before the beginning of the Common Era up until the 4th or 5th Century – the period during which I would place the final redaction, if not the composition, of all the monastic codes as we have them⁴ – donative inscriptions from a significant number of Buddhist sites show clearly that approximately the same number of nuns as monks – and sometimes more – acted as donors⁵ This donative activity would seem to suggest, if nothing else, that nuns during this period had equal and sometimes superior access to private wealth.⁶ This parity, moreover, is taken for granted by the monastic codes themselves: the Pāli, Mūlasarvāstivādin and the Mahāsāṅghika-lokottaravādin *Vinayas* all, for example, have rules to govern situations in which nuns – exactly like monks and lay brothers

and sisters – donate monasteries, land for monasteries, permanent alms, meals, *stūpas*, etc., to the monastic community, and they all assume that nuns had the financial means to do so.⁷

The fact alone that sizable numbers of individual nuns – and some groups – could and did act independently as donors, and had the means to do so, added to the fact that some of these nuns had their own disciples and significant ecclesiastical titles, might well have raised the possibility in the minds of anxious men that these nuns might also act independently in other ways as well, that, for example, their private wealth and energies might well be channeled towards more independent religious projects and away from sites or *stūpas* which appear to have been under the control of monks, and which were in part an important source of revenue for them.⁸

Alas, some of this must remain for now at least another example of the sort of “exciting tale” I have been said to author elsewhere.⁹ I sketch these possibilities only as a prelude to an attempt to make some sense of two otherwise even stranger tales, in two different *Vinayas*, of violence and aggression directed first by monks towards nuns and their special dead; then by nuns towards monks and each other – all of it passing without sanction or censure. It may be, in fact, that these two tales are in part about the ritual murder by monks of the special dead claimed by groups of nuns. We shall see.

The first of our tales – and the hardest still to interpret – has been available in translation for a long time. It forms the frame story for the 52nd *Pācittiya* rule in the Pāli *Bhikkunīvibhaṅga* and was translated in 1942 by I.B. Horner.¹⁰ I give here another translation not so much because I can improve on hers – her translation of the Pāli *Vinaya* as a whole remains, in spite of enormous problems, a remarkable achievement – but simply to highlight and nuance certain elements of vocabulary that are used.

On that occasion the Buddha, the Blessed One, was living in Vesālī, in the Great Grove, in the Hall of the Peaked Dwelling.

At that time as well the Venerable Kappitaka, the preceptor (*upajjhāya*) of Upālī, was living in the cemetery. And at that time too a comparatively great nun among the nuns of the group of six had died.¹¹ When the nuns of the group of six had taken that nun out, had cremated her near the Venerable Kappitaka's *vihāra*, and had made a *stūpa*, they went there and lamented at that *stūpa*.

The Venerable Kappitaka, then, was annoyed by the noise. Having demolished that *stūpa* he scattered it around (*taṃ thūpaṃ bhinditvā pakiresi*).

The group of six nuns talked among themselves saying “the *stūpa* of our noble one was demolished by this Kappitaka (*iminā kappitakena amhākaṃ ayyāya thūpo bhinno*). Come, we are going to kill him!”

Another nun reported this matter to the Venerable Upālī. The Venerable Upālī reported this matter to the Venerable Kappitaka. The Venerable Kappitaka, then, having left the *vihāra*, remained in hiding.

The group of six nuns went, then, to the Venerable Kappitaka's *vihāra*. When they got there and had covered the Venerable Kappitaka's *vihāra* with rocks and clods of earth, they departed saying “Kappitaka is dead.”

Then, however, when that night had passed, and when the Venerable Kappitaka had dressed in the morning and taken his bowl and robe, he entered Vesālī for alms. The nuns of the group of six saw the Venerable Kappitaka going around for alms, and having seen him spoke thus: “This Kappitaka is alive. Who now has told of our plan?”

The group of six nuns then heard that it was certainly the Noble One Upālī who had told of their plan. They verbally abused and reviled the Venerable Upālī saying “How is it, indeed, that this barber, this low born dirt wiper will tell of our plans?”

Those nuns who were decorous (*appiccha*) were critical saying “How is it, indeed, that nuns of the group of six will verbally abuse the Noble One Upālī?” ...

The Blessed One said: “Is it true in fact, Monks, that nuns of the group of six verbally abuse Upālī?”

“It is true, Blessed One.”

The Buddha, the Blessed One, upbraided them saying “How is it, indeed, Monks, that the group of six will be verbally abusive. This will not, Monks, inspire devotion in those who have none... therefore, monks, nuns should proclaim this rule of training: whichever nuns were to verbally abuse or revile a monk – this is an offence involving expiation.”

The vocabulary here seems largely and at first sight to be straightforward, but it almost immediately reveals our awkward ignorance about the realia of Buddhist monasticism. The text tells us that Kappitaka lived in a or the *susāna* – in Sanskrit *śmaśāna*. This is usually – really as a matter of convention – translated as “cemetery”, but sometimes as “burning ground”, although we know next to nothing about the precise nature of such a place or the range of activities or kinds of depositions that took place there. Our text, and others, suggest that corpses were cremated there; while other monastic texts seem to indicate that whole, uncremated bodies were left there – as well as food for and the possessions of the deceased – but they were not buried.¹² Then there is the question of the definite or indefinite article: is our text referring to a or the cemetery? The archaeological record makes it certain that Buddhist monastic communities had what would seem to qualify as cemeteries – Bhojpur would be an early example; Kānheri a large and late one.¹³ There is too the term *vihāra*: Kappitaka's *vihāra* is in the cemetery. The term *vihāra* is – again conventionally – translated as “monastery”, but even a quick reading of Buddhist monastic literature will show that the word is used to designate a very large and wide range of types of dwelling places. The compiler of our tale could almost certainly not have had in mind the sort of thing still visible at places like Nālandā since he suggests a group of nuns could seal it over with rocks

and dirt all in a days work. Moreover, although it is virtually certain that a significant number of Buddhist monastic complexes where intentionally sited near, in or on top of old, protohistorical graveyards¹⁴, there is little evidence to suggest that they were established in still functioning *susānas* or *śmasānas*; and although literary sources very rarely suggest that a *vihāra* was at least close enough to a cemetery to be off-putting¹⁵, they far, far more commonly indicate that cremations at least took place well away from the monastic residence: like our text, descriptions of monastic funerals in both Pāli and Sanskrit commonly use a verb like *nīharitvā*, *abhīnirhr̥tya* or *nītvā* – all of which mean ‘to take away’ or ‘remove’ – in their accounts of the initial parts of the procedure.¹⁶ Finally, in terms of realia, it should be noted that, like Kappitaka’s *vihāra*, the exact nature of the *stūpa* erected for the deceased nun is not clear. In her translation of the text Horner renders the term *thūpa* simply as “tomb”, and although elsewhere she uses the term *stūpa* in her brief discussion of the text, about all that can be said with certainty is that our author or compiler understood it to be something that could be destroyed by a single person in a very short period of time.

If there is considerable uncertainty about ‘things’ in our text, the same can be said about persons. If, for example, the Monk Kappitaka were any more obscure he would be virtually unknown. Outside of our text, a monk named Kappitaka appears to be referred to in only one other place in the entire Pāli Canon. The *Petavatthu* refers to an elder by that name, but the latter has little in common with our Kappitaka except for the name and there is no reason – in spite of the commentarial tradition – to assume that the two are necessarily the same.¹⁷ As for the deceased nun, she is so obscure as to not have a name, unless *mahatarā* – a strange reading – might be a corrupt version thereof. *Mahatarā*, which I have translated as “comparatively great”, Horner renders by “an older nun”, and adds in a note: “... perhaps a leading nun.” But in his very spare critical apparatus Oldenberg clearly doubts even the reading and suggests “read, *aññatarā*?”, which of course would produce the even less specific “a certain nun” or “some nun”.

The imprecision of our Pāli text in regard to place and person occurs as well in regard to the action of Kappitaka: we do not know precisely what he did, why he did it and – most importantly – what it meant. At first sight the phrase *taṃ thūpaṃ bhinditvā pakiresi* appears, again, to be straightforward and I have conservatively translated it “having demolished that *stūpa* he scattered it around.” But, although the verb *bhīdati* in Pāli can mean ‘destroy’ or ‘demolish’, its basic sense seems to be ‘to break, break apart, split’, and the same verb

in Sanskrit ranges from ‘to split, cleave’ to ‘transgress, violate, open, disturb’. Moreover, there is no stated object for the verb *pakiresi*, “scattered”. I have supplied “it”, and Horner translates: “The Venerable Kappitaka... having destroyed that tomb, scattered (the materials).” In light of these considerations it is possible to arrive at what from at least our point of view would be an altogether more sinister translation: “Having broken open (or violated) that *stūpa* he scattered (its contents) around.”

The question why he did it also remains. If the text had said that the nuns’ activities disturbed or negatively affected Kappitaka’s profound meditations, then we might see here an epic struggle between two competing styles of religiosity, the contemplative and the devotional. But of course it says no such thing. The text in fact passes no judgment on what the nuns had done in building a *stūpa* for their deceased fellow nun – they had, after all, only done what the Buddha twice elsewhere in the Pāli Canon instructed monks to do.¹⁸ Nor does the text indicate any disapproval on the part of even Kappitaka in regard to the activities the nuns engaged in at the *stūpa*: it is not mourning *per se* that he reacts to, but its volume. Kappitaka’s reaction, moreover, is not one of moral outrage or indignation. He was said to be simply “annoyed” or “bothered” – *ubbālha*. The same verb is used elsewhere in the Pāli *Vinaya*: monks are said to be “bothered” or “annoyed” by animals and “creeping things” and “demons” (*pisāca*); or ‘mosquitoes’; the Buddha himself is said to be “annoyed” by the unruly monks of Kosambī – but he does not then go out and smash them, nor do any of the monks act similarly.¹⁹ Both Kappitaka’s reaction and his actions may seem out of context, if not altogether out of control. The compilers of our text, however, give us no indication that they thought so.

In the same way that our text passes no judgment on the initial activities of the nuns in regard to the *stūpa*, it also passes no judgment on Kappitaka’s destruction of it, leaving us to surmise that it too was sanctioned. In fact, in the entire tale the compilers of this document find fault only in the nuns’ verbal abuse of Upāli after he has betrayed their plans – verbal abuse of a monk appears therefore, to have been considered far more serious than attempted murder and what might look to us like the desecration of a grave. The only outrage at the latter in particular that I know of is in I.B. Horner. She clearly did not approve. She – in spite of the text’s silence – says: “Kappitaka’s indecent and selfish behavior is symptomatic of the extremely low state to which monkdom could fall at that time” – without, unfortunately, ever making it clear when that was. She also refers to “the horror felt by these

[nuns of the group of six] at the dishonor done to their dead.”²⁰ But since the text itself again says nothing of the sort this must simply be the projection onto another time and another place of modern western sensibilities. The text itself says nothing about how the nuns felt. It gives no indication that they were horrified or angry or outraged. They appear to be simply resolute: ‘that monk did this and we must kill him.’ If anything, this looks like an old fashioned (?) blood feud or – being biblical, which at least would put us closer to the desired time frame – an eye for an eye. Putting such a construction on the text, however, would seem to require that the first murder was of a dead person.

Clearly, the more carefully one looks at this text the more curious it becomes, and when we look elsewhere in the Pāli Canon for aid in understanding it, or in determining what the intentional destruction of a *stūpa* might have meant, we get only equally obscure hints. There are – as far as I know – only two other texts in the Canon that seem to talk about the destruction of a *stūpa*, though one of them occurs several times. The latter occurs at least twice in the *Dīgha-nikāya* and once in the *Majjhima*, and in all three places the statement that is of interest is repeated two or three times.²¹ This statement is the concluding part of the description of the sorry state of the Community of “the Nigaṇṭhas, the followers of Nātaputta” – a religious group that competed with the Buddhists – following Nātaputta’s death. This community, the text says, was divided and at each others’ throats:

Even the lay disciples of the white robe, who followed Nāhaputta, showed themselves shocked, repelled and indignant at the Nigaṇṭhas, so badly was their doctrine and discipline set forth and imparted, so ineffectual was it for guidance, so little conducive to peace, imparted as it had been by one who was not supremely enlightened, and now wrecked as it was of his support and without a protector.

“... wrecked as it was of his support and without a protector” is Rhys Davids’ translation of ... *bhinna-thūpe appaṭisarane*, to which he adds the note: “... lit. having its stūpa broken – a metaphor, says the Com[mentar]y, for foundation (platform, *paṭiṭṭhā*).”²² Various other renderings have been given of the phrase which vacillate between the metaphoric and literal meaning of the terms: “... with its support gone, without an arbiter” (Walshe); “... deren Kuppel geborsten, die keine Zuflucht gewährt” (Neumann); “... the foundations wrecked, without an arbiter” (Homer); “... its shrine broken, left without a refuge” (Nānamoli and Bodhi); etc.²³ Here then, however nuanced, the expression *bhinna-thūpa*, “a broken or demolished stūpa”, seems to have no reference to the desecration of a grave, or anything like that. It seems rather to refer to the destruction of the central focus and – significantly – the support,

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refuge or shelter of a religious community or group. Nānamoli and Bodhi in a note added to their translation already cited give a statement that they attribute to the Commentary: “the ‘shrine’ and ‘refuge’ are the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, who is now dead.” But this ignores the *bhinna*, “broken or wrecked”. When the qualifier is allowed in it seems almost unavoidable to suggest that if the *stūpa* is Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, then the broken or wrecked *stūpa* – not the *stūpa* itself – signifies that he is truly dead. The necessary corollary of this is, of course, that as long as the *stūpa* is not demolished Nātaputta remains alive and – importantly – his community has a continuing shelter and refuge.²⁴

Seen in this light – which is admittedly dim – Kappitaka’s actions too take on a different significance: he did not desecrate a tomb, he killed a ‘person’ who was a religious focus of the group of nuns; he destroyed their refuge and support. This is an act which it seems would have been understood to involve or precipitate the kind of chaos and disarray that befell the Nigaṇṭhas when Nātaputta’s *stūpa* was destroyed. Kappitaka cut at the root of their community. Note that a form of the same verb that produced the qualifier applied to Nātaputta’s *stūpa* (*bhinna*-) is used to express Kappitaka’s action (*bhinditvā*) – he did to the nun’s *stūpa* exactly what was said to have happened to Nātaputta’s.

The second text that seems to refer to the destruction of a *stūpa* is in its Pāli version both obscure in sense and uncertain in reading. The text in question makes up the 35th Sekhiya Rule in the Pāli *Pātimokkha* and, on the surface at least, seems to deal with monks playing with their food. The text in the Pāli Text Society edition reads:

*na thūpato omadditvā piṇḍapātaṃ bhūjissāmīti sikkhā karaṇīyā.*²⁵

Straining to make some kind of natural sense of this, and depending almost entirely on the interpretation of the commentary, Rhys Davids and Oldenburg translate this as:

‘Without pressing down from the top will I eat the alms placed in my bowl.’ This is a discipline which ought to be observed.

And Horner:

‘Not having chosen from the top will I eat almsfood,’ is a training to be observed.²⁶

It is probably fair to say that neither the commentator nor our modern translators were very sure about what this meant. Nor is it altogether clear that the compilers of the *Vibhaṅga* did – they essentially just restate the rule. There is, moreover, in regard to *thūpato*, taken to mean “from the top”, a whole series of variants: *dhūpakato*, *thupato*, *thutho*; *thūpikato*, *thūpakato* – and this list is certainly not complete.²⁷ There

is a distinct possibility that both the correct reading and the meaning of the rule were lost by the time the Pāli manuscripts we have were written.

Interpreted as it generally has been this rule would seem to have little to offer to our discussion. But at least one other interpretation has been suggested, one that several variants in the Pāli manuscript tradition and at least one set of thoroughly unambiguous parallels also would seem to support. André Barea, for example, has seen in this rule an interdiction against making a *stūpa* with ones food then demolishing and eating it (“les Theravādin . . . interdisent de faire un *stūpa* avec la nourriture puis de le démolir et de le manger”).²⁸ He has also said that the Theravādins shared this rule with the Mūlasarvāstivādins. But in Mūlasarvāstivādin sources there are much less serious doubts about the readings for this rule and virtually none about how it was generally understood. The one verifiable Gilgit manuscript reading for this rule in the Mūlasarvāstivādin *Prātimokṣasūtra* is:

*na stūpākṛtim avamṛdya piṇḍapātam paribhokṣyāma iti śikṣā karaṇīya.*²⁹

We will not eat alms food after having crushed that which has the form of a *stūpa* – this is a rule of training that must be followed.

The Tibetan renderings of this differ somewhat – as they frequently do – depending on where they are found. In the Derge edition of both the *Prātimokṣa-sūtra* and the *Bhikṣuṇīprātimokṣa-sūtra* we find:

mchod rten 'dra bar bcos te zas mi bza' bar. . . .³⁰

We must not eat food forming it like a *stūpa* . . .

But in the *Vinayavibhaṅga* the same rule appears as

mchod rten 'dra ba bcom ste zas mi bza' bar. . . .³¹

We must not eat food destroying that which has the form (or is like) a *stūpa* . . .

And in the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinayavibhaṅga*

mchod rten 'dra bar sbrus te zas za bar mi bya bar. . . .³²

We must not eat food kneading it like (or into the form of) a *stūpa* . . .

It can be seen here that if *bcos te* (“forming”) is not simply a graphic error for *bcom ste* (“destroying”) – and there is a good chance that it is – then the Tibetan translators wavered in regard to how best to translate *avamṛdya*. Since the latter can mean not only ‘crush’ or ‘destroy’ but also ‘rub’, the same verb can by extension even account for *sbrus te*, “knead”. When Guṇaprabha restated our rule in *sūtra* form in his *Vinayasūtra* he did so as *na stūpākṛtyavamardam*, “not (eating after) crushing (food) having the form of a *stūpa*”; this in turn was translated

into Tibetan as *mchod rten 'dra bar byas te mi gzhom mo*, “not (eating after) destroying (food) that was made into the form of a *stūpa*”, and glossed by Dharmitra in his commentary *zan la mchod rten gyi dbyibs 'dra bar byas te gzhom zhing bza' bar mi bya'o*, “making food into the likeness of the form of a *stūpa* he must not destroy and eat it.”³³

A number of niggling details will have to be worked out here, but the important point for us is that Mūlasarvāstivādin texts in both Sanskrit and Tibetan make it all but absolutely certain that this tradition – over a long period of time, Guṇaprabha may have written as late as the 7th Century; Dharmamitra still later – understood our rule to interdict forming food into the shape of a *stūpa*, then crushing or demolishing and eating it. This virtual certainty may well support Barea’s interpretation of the Pāli text – we will have to return to this – but by itself it does not necessarily allow us to establish a link between it, Kappitaka’s action and the wrecked *stūpa* of Nātaputta. The Mūlasarvāstivādin *Vinayavibhaṅgas*, however, I think, will.

The possibility has already been suggested that the compilers of the Pāli *Suttavibhaṅga* that we have did not understand our rule, and it has been noted that the explanatory or frame story found there does little more than restate the rule itself. Barea, however, has noted that this is not the case in the Mūlasarvāstivādin *Vibhaṅga*, but I cannot agree with him when he characterizes the elements of the Mūlasarvāstivādin frame story as “en fait bien pauvres et de peu d’intérêt.”³⁴ There are in fact two Mūlasarvāstivādin frame stories – one in the *Vinayavibhaṅga* and one in the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinayavibhaṅga* – and although in many ways similar they are both of interest. They establish a clear and coherent – if somewhat unexpected – understanding of the rule, and they both associate the destruction of a *stūpa* – however ritualistic or symbolic – with aggression by one religious group against another.

Vinayavibhaṅga

(Derge 'dul ba Nya 257b.7–258a.4)³⁵

A certain householder living in Śrāvastī was very devoted to the naked ascetics (*gcer bu pa = nirgrantha*). When at a later time he had become devoted to the Blessed One, and had invited the community of monks to a meal in his other house (*khyim gzan du*), he distributed flour (*phyedag*) there and the group of six kneaded it (*sbrus te = avamṛdya*)³⁶ and arranged it (*rnam par bzhas go = vyavasthāpita*) like a *stūpa*. He distributed split pieces of radish and they were also stuck into that flour arranged like the central pole of a *stūpa*. He distributed cakes and they too were arranged like umbrellas on top of that radish. Then the monks of the group of six said: “Nanda, Upananda!”³⁷ This is the *stūpa* of Pūraṇa, Pūraṇa gone to hell.” Then destroying (*bcom ste*) and eating it they said: “Nanda, Upananda! The *stūpa* of Pūraṇa, Pūraṇa gone to hell is broken (*rdib bo = bhinna*)!”

When the householder heard that he said: “Noble Ones, although I am rid of that form of evil view you persist in not being rid of hostility (*zhe sdang = dveṣa*).”

The monks of the group of six sat there saying nothing.

The monks reported this matter to the Blessed One and the Blessed One said: "Henceforth, my disciples should recite thus this rule of training in the Discipline: 'we must not eat food destroying that which has the form of (or is like) a *stūpa*. So we should train!"

Note here first of all that unlike what we see in the Pāli *Vinaya* this frame story makes perfect – if, again, somewhat unexpected – sense of our rule: for the Mūlasarvāstivādin *vinaya* tradition it is not simply a rule about food, it is a rule about ritual aggression through the use of food. This frame story gives some interesting and precise details in regard to what making the form or likeness of a *stūpa* from ones food entailed³⁸; it indicates that crushing and eating such a *stūpa* was perceived as an act motivated by hostility, hatred or aggression, and that its avowed purpose and end was to do to a named person's *stūpa* what was said to have happened to the *stūpa* of Nātaputta and what Kappitaka is said to have done to the *stūpa* of the dead nun. As Nātaputta's *stūpa* is said to have been "broken" (*bhinna*), and Kappitaka is said to have "demolished" (*bhindivā*) that of the dead nun, so when the group of six have destroyed and eaten the *stūpa* formed from food they declare "the *stūpa* of Pūraṇa... is broken" (*rdib ba = bhinna*) – all three use forms of the same verb.

Secondarily it might be noted that the *Vibhaṅga* text employs in one passage the whole range of verbs or meanings which occurs in the various Tibetan translations of the actual rule: "knead", "form", "destroy". In so doing it seems to make explicit what is implied in the rule: that forming food into the shape of a *stūpa*, destroying it and eating it are *all* forbidden. It is, moreover, difficult to avoid the conclusion that the procedure described was anything other than what we might call an act of ritual or sympathetic magic or causation. Notice that in the text once the *stūpa* is formed, and before it is demolished, the monks are made to verbally declare "This is the *stūpa* of Pūraṇa." This formal verbal declaration was presumably – given the power of verbal declarations of several sorts in India – thought to make it so. It is the *stūpa* of Pūraṇa not a *stūpa* made of food, that is likewise declared to have been broken at the end of the procedure. Finally, the fact that the procedure is aimed at the *stūpa* of Pūraṇa is also of interest since this same *stūpa* is referred to as well elsewhere in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*. In a text that is found in two slightly different versions in both the *Sanḅhabheda-vastu* and the *Kṣudraka-vastu*, for example, we read that on one of their periodic visits to hell Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana see Pūraṇa there undergoing some fairly uncomfortable tortures. Pūraṇa says to them:

O Noble Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, when you return to the world you must tell my fellow practitioners (Tib. *tshangs pa mtshungs par spyod pa rñams*, but Skt *śrāvakā*) that I said this: "... whenever you pay reverence to my *stūpa* then my suffering becomes intolerably severe – hereafter you must not do it! (*khyed kyi ji lia ji liar nga'i mchod rten la brjed pa byas pa de lia de liar nga la sdul bsngal ches mi bzad par gyur gyis / phyin chad ma byed par thong zhig ...; yathā yathā ca śrāvakā stūpakārān kurvanti tathā tathā tīrvavedanāṃ vedayāmi ... mā tasya stūpakāraṃ kariṣyatheti*).³⁹

Found in a Buddhist text this passage would seem to be an instance of preaching to the converted. The fact that it is repeated, and that the *Vibhaṅga* and – as we will shortly see – the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinayavibhaṅga* both take aim at this same *stūpa* would seem to suggest that, for reasons that I cannot explain, the compilers of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* saw or cast Pūraṇa and the *stūpa* of Pūraṇa in the roles of major competitor, rival or threat.⁴⁰ In addition this passage would seem to establish in an even more explicit way the 'principle' that what is done to the *stūpa* of someone who is dead directly affects the dead person him or herself. This in turn implies in yet another way that to destroy someone's *stūpa* is to definitively destroy his or her person. The *Bhikṣuṇī-vinayavibhaṅga* takes this out of the realm of implication.

Bhikṣuṇī-vinayavibhaṅga
(Derge 'dul ba Ta 321b.7–322a.4)

The nuns of the group of twelve were then making their way through the country side and came to the house of a farmer. When they had shaken out their robes there, and washed their feet and hands, they got ready to eat. Naked ascetics (*gcer bu pa*) had also assembled then in the other house (*khyim cig shos su*) and they too then got ready to eat.

The group of twelve then, with derisive intentions, having made in their food a *stūpa* which they named Pūraṇa (*kha zas la rdzogs byed ces bya ba'i mchod rten byas nas*), and sticking a radish into it as the central pole, said to the naked ascetics: "This is the *stūpa* of your teacher" (*'di ni khyed kyi ston pa'i mchod rten yin no zhes smras nas*). Then breaking chunks from that *stūpa* and eating them they said in unison: "The *stūpa* of Pūraṇa is demolished" (*zhig go = (?) bhinna*).

The naked ascetics were then aggrieved, and having become dejected they said weeping: "Today our teacher is truly dead" (*de ring bdag cag gi ston pa dus las 'das pa lia zhes zer ro*).

The Blessed One said: "One must train such that... we must not eat food kneading it like (or into the form of) a *stūpa*!"

The frame story here from the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinayavibhaṅga* has obvious similarities with that cited above from the *Vibhaṅga*, although they are by no means identical. There is a small piece of evidence that in this case the latter may have been derived from the former. In the text of the *Vibhaṅga* it is said that the monks were invited to a meal in the householder's "other house", but in this text there is only one. It is only in the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinayavibhaṅga* that there is reference to two

houses, and only there that the reference to the “other” makes any sense. It looks as though the compilers of the *Vibhaṅga*, in adapting the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinayavibhaṅga* story, may have mechanically taken over the reference to the “other” of two houses without noticing that it did not fit in its new context.⁴¹

The text in the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinayavibhaṅga*, however, seems to make it even more clear than in the *Vibhaṅga* that what is being described is a ritual procedure: the *stūpa* is formed; then named; then declared to be what it had been named. When it has been torn apart and eaten, the nuns then publicly and “in unison” declare that what had been created is now demolished; that is to say that the same thing happened to it as was said to have happened to the *stūpa* of Nātaputta, and that Kappitaka is described as having done to the deceased nun’s *stūpa*. The verb in this case too was very probably the same. But the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinayavibhaṅga* text – as we have already intimated – also goes beyond this. It makes perfectly explicit what the destruction of a *stūpa* entailed, what it was understood to mean. When the *stūpa* of Pūraṇa is declared demolished the naked ascetics are made to say: “Today our teacher is truly dead.” To destroy one, is to kill the other, and that – it would seem – is the point of the whole procedure. To judge by the words put into the mouths of the naked ascetics, moreover, it would appear that the compilers of this *vinaya* thought that their ‘readers’ would think that such a procedure actually worked. Naked ascetics are also not the only ones to express such sentiments in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*.

Having come this far we are almost back to the frame story for the 52nd *Pācittiya* rule in the Pāli *Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga* that we started with. A parallel for it might simply summarize what we have seen along the way. When, however, we look for a parallel for this rule in the *Mūlasarvāstivādin Bhikṣuṇī-vinayavibhaṅga* it is not there. The 52nd *Pācittiya* in the Pāli tradition dealt – as we have seen – with the verbal abuse of monks by nuns. It seems at some stage to have come to form a pair with its 51st *Pācittiya* which requires nuns to ask permission of the monks before entering a monk’s residence, an *ārāma* or *vihāra*. According to Waldschmidt’s tables the same two rules in the same relative order as in the Pāli also occur in the *Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣas* of the Dharmaguptas and Sarvāstivādins, but neither occur in that of the *Mūlasarvāstivādins*.⁴² There is, however, in the *Mūlasarvāstivādin Kṣudrakavastu* – a very rich and little studied collection of odds and ends that sometimes have a prominent place in other *vinayas* – an account which is similar to, though not the same as, the frame story about Kappitaka attached to the 52nd *Pācittiya* in the Pāli *Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga*

and, curiously, it delivers a ruling which is parallel to that found in the Pāli’s 51st *Pācittiya*. It does, indeed, in many respects summarize or recapitulate most of what we have seen.

Kṣudrakavastu
(Derge 'dul ba Da 172b.2–174b.5)

The Buddha, the Blessed One, was staying in Śrāvastī, in the park of the Jetavana.

When the Venerable Phalguna had died, then the nuns of the group of twelve, after collecting his bones (*rus*), built a *stūpa* with great veneration at a spacious spot. They also attached umbrellas and banners and flags to it, and adorned it with perfume and flowers, and assigned to it two nuns who spoke sweetly. Every day they provided earth and water and incense and flowers there. Then they gave to those monks who came there from other countries the washing of hands and had them pay reverence to the *stūpa* with flowers and incense and the singing of verses.

Once the Venerable Udakapāna was moving through the countryside with a retinue of five hundred and arrived at Śrāvastī. Now, since *arhats* do not enter into knowledge and vision without focusing their mind (*dgong pa*), when he saw that *stūpa* from a distance he thought to himself: “Since this is a new *stūpa* of the hair and nails of the Blessed One I should go and pay reverence!”⁴³

They went there and the two attendant nuns gave them earth and water for washing their hands and feet. Then the monks paid reverence to the *stūpa* by presenting flowers and incense and the singing of verses. Having paid reverence there with the retinue of five hundred Udakapāna left.

Not very far from that *stūpa* a nun, the Venerable Utpalavarṇā, was sitting at the root of a tree for the purpose of spending the day. Having watched them she said: “Venerable Udakapāna, you should focus your mind when you pay reverence to someone’s *stūpa*!” (*khyed kyis su'i mchod rten la phyag bgyis pa dgongs shig*).

The Venerable Udakapāna thought to himself: “Why would the Venerable Utpalavarṇā say ‘Venerable Udakapāna, you should focus your mind when you pay reverence to someone’s *stūpa*!’?” Having thought that he said: “There is something here I should concentrate on.” When that thing entered into his mind, and he saw that the *stūpa* was a *stūpa* of the bones of the Monk Phalguna, he was infected with a passion that was totally engulfed by hostility and went back and said to the Venerable Utpalavarṇā: “When an abscess has appeared in the teaching you have sat there and ignored it!” (*bstan pa la chu bur byung na khyod 'di na 'dug bzhin du yal bar bor ro zhes byas pa*).

She sat there saying nothing.

The Venerable Udakapāna said then this to his pupils and disciples: “Venerables, those who are fond of the Teacher and would spare him (*ston pa la sdug pa dang phangs par byed pa gang yin pa de dag gi*...) must on that account tear out and pull down every single brick from this heap of bones and bone chunks!” (*rus pa dang rus gong gi phung po*).

Since that was a large group they, tearing out every single brick from that heap of bones and bone chunks and throwing them away, demolished that *stūpa* in the snap of a finger. The two attendant nuns were crying and ran hurriedly to the retreat house and told the nuns. When the nuns of the group of twelve, and others who were not free of commitment to and feelings of affection for Phalguna, heard that they sat there crying and said: “Our brother is as of today truly dead!” (*bdag cag gi ming po deng gdod shi ba lta zhes*...). And the Nun Sthūlanandā said: “Sisters, who has revealed this?”

The other nuns said: “It occurs to us immediately, although we do not actually know, that the Noble Utpalavarṇā was sitting there and that she...”

Sthūlanandā said: "Seeing that she has entered the order from among barbers and is therefore naturally inferior it is clear to me from what little has been said that this is her doing. Seeing too that the Blessed One has well said 'one who defames the assembly is not to be allowed in the midst of the assembly' how could there therefore be any considerations in regard to her?"⁴⁴ Come – we must go!"

Being totally engulfed by anger and taking up weapons and needles and daggers of hard wood they went to kill her. . .

The rest of the text – although of considerable interest in other regards – adds little that is germane to our specific interests here and is in any case too long to cite in its entirety. Utpalavarnā sees the group of twelve coming and, realizing their intentions, she wraps herself in a protective mantle and enters into the meditative state of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*). They attack her and leave her for dead. When she rouses herself from her meditative state she sees that she is badly punctured and goes to the monks' *vihāra*. They ask what has happened to her and when told they themselves become angry and they make an ordinance (*khriṃs*) forbidding all nuns to enter the Jetavana. Mahāprajāpatī comes and is turned away. The Buddha, although he already knows why, asks Ānanda why Mahāprajāpatī no longer comes to see him and Ānanda tells him about the ordinance. The Buddha, although he does not forbid the making of such ordinances⁴⁵, then promulgates a rule that nuns must ask permission to enter a *vihāra*, as a part of which he requires that the monks, when asked for permission, must in turn inquire of the nuns if they are carrying concealed weapons! – "Sisters, having some grudge, are you not carrying weapons and needles? (*sring mo dag 'khon can mtshon cha dang khab dag 'chang ba ma yin nam zhes dris shig*).

This Mūlasarvāstivādin tale about, in part, the Monk Udaḥapāna is both clearly like and clearly different from the Pāli tale about, in part, the Monk Kappitaka. Their similarities and differences may both be informative. What is perhaps most generally striking about both is that in neither case is the behavior of their respective monks anything like the main focus of the text. In both it is simply a narrative element in a larger story, an introductory device which allows the compilers to tell the main story which gave rise to the rule they presumably want to deliver. In neither is any judgment passed on the monk's behavior, and in both the unedifying and definitionally, if not doctrinally, perplexing picture of an infuriated *arhat* or irascible senior monk – the preceptor of the monk both traditions centrally associate with the *Vinaya* – is allowed to stand. We will have to return to this.

In terms of details, the first point that might be noticed is that although the compilers of both texts use the term *stūpa* or *thūpa* they clearly

did not have in mind the same thing: in the Pāli text the *thūpa* appears to have been a small, relatively insubstantial construction – it could be destroyed by one man in a short time – in or near a cemetery; in the Mūlasarvāstivādin text the *stūpa* was at least more substantial – it took five hundred men to destroy it, although they made quick work of it – it was made of brick and sited "at a spacious spot." The *stūpa* in each was also the object of different kinds of activity and had different clientele: the Pāli text presents its *thūpa* as a focal point for mourning – at least no other forms of activity are mentioned – and it draws, apparently, only local nuns; the *stūpa* in the Mūlasarvāstivādin text, on the other hand, is clearly the focal point of cult activity – although this too may have included mourning – had two attendant nuns assigned to it, and drew, apparently, monks from far away ("monks who came there from other countries" are explicitly mentioned). Differences of this sort are, of course, almost chronically 'explained' by chronology, but here – as in many other cases – they might be explained as well by cultural geography. We admittedly know little about any cult of the local monastic dead in Sri Lanka, though the Pāli commentaries – as I have pointed out elsewhere – seem to suggest some resistance to it.⁴⁶ Moreover, what little we know about *stūpas* for local monks in Sri Lanka suggests that they were insubstantial affairs. Long ago Longhurst reported in regard to what he had seen in Sri Lanka that "the *stūpas* erected over the remains of ordinary members of the Buddhist community were very humble little structures"; Richard Gombrich, more recently, that "small *stūpas* (closer to molehills than mountains) cover the ashes of monks in Sri Lanka to this day."⁴⁷ In communities accustomed to this sort of thing the architectural detail suggested by the story of Kappitaka would have made narrative and cultural sense – 'readers' of the text in Sri Lanka could have easily envisioned what was said to have occurred. But the same account probably would not, perhaps could not, have been written on the subcontinent. There things seem to have been very different very early.

Although the situation is somewhat better than it is in regard to Sri Lanka, still we are very far from fully informed about the cult of the local monastic dead in India proper. What is clear, however, is that from our earliest datable evidence *stūpas* for the local monastic dead could and did take impressive and substantial monumental form. *Stūpa* no.2 at Sāñcī, for example, which contained the inscribed reliquaries of several local monks, was 47 ft. in diameter and 29 ft. high. It was provided with a crowning umbrella which raised its height to 37 ft, was made of carefully cut and finished stone, and eventually surrounded by a sculpted

railing.⁴⁸ This very substantial construction – which could have easily taken five hundred men to dismantle – is, moreover, not late: it stands at the very beginning of the series of known *stūpas* of this sort. Bénisti has argued that the carvings on the rail of *Stūpa* no.2 predate Bharhut and that they go back to the first half of the 2nd Century B.C.⁴⁹ There is general agreement that they are very early, but since the *stūpa* itself must already have been in existence before the railing was erected that would make it even earlier – although by how much is not clear. To judge by the inscriptions on the rail this *stūpa* – like that of Phalguna – attracted people and gifts from other regions or ‘countries’. Likewise, some of the inscribed *stūpas* of the local monastic dead at Bhaja are both substantial and very early. Carved from the living rock, they are – or were when complete – at least 15 to 20 ft high, and some of these have been assigned to the late 3rd Century B.C.E.⁵⁰ These and other examples would seem to suggest that the Pāli tale told on the continent might well not make very good cultural sense, whereas the monks of central or western India would have no difficulty in understanding the details of the story of Udakapāna. There need not necessarily be, therefore, any chronological gap between the two tales, and it may well only be that each is simply telling its story in a language of detail adapted to its local environment.⁵¹ The important point for us, however, is that in both a monk was allowed to destroy without censure or blame an important focus – however that was understood – of the activities of a group of nuns.

The individual monks who did the deed in the two tales also have some things in common, though here too the specific details differ. Both were not just monks, they were monks with disciples and therefore senior monks. One is specifically said to have been an *arhat*, the other a cemetery-dweller. But above all else, they have in common the fact that they are virtually unknown elsewhere. Kappitaka may be referred to nowhere else in the Pāli Canon; Udakapāna is so obscure that I probably do not even have his name right. In Tibetan the name occurs as *chu 'thung*, but I have not been able to find an attested Sanskrit equivalent for this and *Udakapāna is simply a wild guess. Since in Tibetan the name seems to mean something like “a drink of water”, it is not impossible that it might be connected with the Pāli name Udakadāyaka, “provider of water”, carried by two monks and a nun – all equally obscure – in the *Apadāna*. But this too is a wild guess.⁵² This obscurity of the main actors may point in at least two directions. Given the enormous degree of standardization of both personal and place names that the ‘editing’ process seems to have imposed on both the Pāli and Mūlasarvāstivādin

Vinayas – the latter in fact contains a set of rules telling monks exactly how to do this – the strikingly non-standard nature of our characters’ names may point to the relative authenticity of the account. But it is equally possible that there might have been some unease in ascribing the actions described to a Śāriputra or Maudgalyāyana, so the choice of characters we find may be connected to an attempt to avoid indelicate questions. Ironically this would also have lessened the authority of the model.

Obscurity of character, however, does not just mark the main actors – the deceased are equally unknown. In the Pāli text the *stūpa* was built for the remains of an apparently nameless nun. In the Mūlasarvāstivādin text the *stūpa* contains the bones of a monk who appears to have been named Phalguna, that is if I am right in thinking that the Tibetan *gre las skyes* is an alternative translation of the second element of the name Mūlaphalguna which occurs in the *Cīvaravastu*. The monk so named there – and only there as far as I know – may be the same as Moliya-Phagguna in Pāli sources. The latter is described as excessively close to the nuns and their staunch defender; and Mūlaphalguna as “fondly looked after by the nuns”. Although much remains uncertain here, if the *Kṣudrakavastu* account is referring to this same monk then he was, indeed, an important figure for groups of nuns, though he, typically, receives little attention in monastic sources.⁵³

Curiously, the only role occupied by individuals of any standing elsewhere in monastic literature is that of *révélateur*, and in both texts these are precisely the individuals who are the objects of the censored attacks, both verbal and actual. Upāli is, of course, in both traditions one of the most prominent of the Buddha’s immediate disciples – it was he who is said to have preserved the whole of the *vinaya*. In the Pāli tradition Utpalavarnā is almost equally eminent and is said to have been “one of the two chief women disciples of the Buddha”⁵⁴ In the Mūlasarvāstivādin *Vinaya* she has a more checkered career – she is rebuked by the Buddha for showing off her magical powers, for example – but is still well known.⁵⁵ As a kind of final inversion, note that whereas the obscure characters in both the Pāli and Mūlasarvāstivādin tales have clear roles, the roles of the well known characters are ambivalent – in both cases they start what the compilers seem to have seen as the real trouble. Both, incidentally, are also slurred for their low birth or inferior social status. This is, however, the only indication that I know that would suggest that Utpalavarnā was of low caste origin.

When we turn to the explicit motives behind Udakapāna’s action it is clear that they are not. Although Udakapāna expresses himself

much more verbally than Kappitaka, this is not difficult since the latter does not say anything. But what Udakapāna says is itself difficult to interpret. He is described as extremely angry, but the narrative leaves the impression that this might be because he was hood-winked by a bunch of nuns. Apparently referring to the *stūpa* he says "an abscess has appeared in the teaching", and clearly referring to the *stūpa* calls it a "heap of bones and bone chunks." But if this strong talk is based on a disapproval of the Monk Phalguna the text, as we have noted, gives no indication of this, and he presumably could not – if he knew his *vinaya* – be objecting to the erection of a *stūpa* for a deceased monk: this is elsewhere explicitly allowed with rules provided to govern it, and narratively described.⁵⁶ Perhaps the most significant thing Udakapāna says is in his exhortation to his disciples to tear the *stūpa* down. They should do it, he says, because they "are fond of the Teacher and would spare him." But spare him from what? It can only be, it seems, from a loss of veneration as a result of what was meant for him being 'misdirected' towards something else: "a heap of bones and bone-chunks." Notice that those concerned with the *stūpa* of Phalguna are described as having "feelings of affection" (*mdza' ba 'dod chags*) for him, and Udakapāna's monks are exhorted to act because they are "fond of the Teacher" (*ston pa la sdug pa . . . byed pa*). The conflict, it seems, is about competing loyalties, if not affections. And the real point that this narratively made is that from the monks' point-of-view it is a very dangerous conflict, because even an *arhat* can, if he is not careful, be lead astray. The whole text turns in a sense on the fact that Udakapāna thought he was worshipping a *stūpa* of the Buddha.⁵⁷

The *stūpa* of Phalguna – erected, maintained and promoted by the nuns – appears, therefore, as a potentially dangerous competitor to the *stūpa* of the Buddha and the monks' response is a brutal one, one that we view differently than the nuns are reported to have. Where we would see the destruction of a monument, they – confirming much of what has been said above – are presented as seeing the death of a person. When the nuns are informed of the destruction of Phalguna's *stūpa* they say almost exactly what the followers of Pūraṇa said when the nuns ritually demolished his *stūpa*: "Our brother is as of today truly dead!" He too in fact appears to have been ritually murdered.

It is not just our analysis, then, that links the rule about food and the text concerning the *stūpa* of Phalguna: they are linked by a shared key statement. The end result of the ritual manipulation of food triggers exactly the same exclamation as the end result of the actual destruction of the *stūpa*. But if one is ritual, so too must be the other, at least in

meaning. They both moreover effect a definitive change in one thing by manipulating another: in the one case the destruction of kneaded food destroys a person; in the other case this is effected by the destruction of an arrangement of bricks; in both cases the person destroyed is – from our point-of-view – already dead. Here I think it is important to note that both kneaded food and arranged brick are also employed in brahmanical rites for manipulating the 'dead'. The most obvious, perhaps, is the use of balls of rice to 'be' the dead in the *sapinda* ritual; or the use of brick in the fire altar to reconstitute the dismembered Puruṣa. The pattern runs deep.⁵⁸

But our texts also intersect or link up with another Indian pattern as well, this one more specifically Buddhist. It has been argued elsewhere on the basis of both archeological and epigraphical sources that the *stūpa* of the Buddha was – to use again the formulation of the late Professor Bareau – "more than the symbol of the Buddha, it is the Buddha himself"; it is the living Buddha.⁵⁹ It has also been suggested that this must apply as well to the *stūpas* of local monks like those of Gobhūti at Bedsa or the Elder Ampikīnaka at Bhaja.⁶⁰ But if this is correct, if the *stūpa* is the living person, then it would seem that as a necessary corollary such a 'person' must also be subject to death. If, in other words, a *stūpa* could live it also – by necessity – should be able to die or even, indeed, be murdered. Our texts, it seems, explicitly establish this. They confirm, if you will, from yet another angle that *stūpas* were thought to be living by showing that it was also thought that they could be killed. And they show as well that this conception was a monastic one found in decidedly monastic sources.⁶¹

Then there are the compulsory caveats and 'final' conclusions. It may not be too difficult to assent to the suggestion that the Pāli account of the destruction of the nameless nun's *stūpa* be read in light of the more explicit Mūlasarvāstivādin text, and to see in it that the destruction of her *stūpa* meant both the destruction of her and the suppression by a monk of a focal point for the activities of the group of nuns which sought it and her out, the destruction – if you will – of either an actual or potential organizational center. We have, after all, the repeated reference elsewhere in the Pāli Canon to fragmented religious groups who are characterized as having their "*stūpa* broken or demolished", *bhinna-thūpa*. There may, however, be more resistance to reading the Pāli rule about food in light of the Mūlasarvāstivādin 'parallel.'

The Mūlasarvāstivādin understanding of the rule in question may indeed be 'late'. At least one person has in fact asserted that this Mūlasarvāstivādin reading "is clearly a later derivation which was

produced by mistaking the first member of the compound [*stūpākṛti*] *stūpa* as 'a tope'. But this observation is based on a rather confused presentation and analysis of purely philological data and the very questionable assumption that there was an *ur* or 'original' text of such rules, rather than a number of competing versions.⁶² Moreover, the data could as easily be argued the other way around. Sylvain Lévi, for example, has shown that in other cases where other *vinaya* traditions are confused or garbled, or where the sense of a term appears to have been forgotten, that sense has been accurately preserved in the Mūlasarvāstivādin tradition.⁶³ We could very well be dealing with a similar case, especially if the Mūlasarvāstivādin interpretation can indeed be linked to old Indian patterns. The confusion in the manuscript tradition for the Pāli rule has already been noted, as has the fact that the compilers of the Pāli *Vibhaṅga* seem no longer to have known what it meant – at least they give no explanation.⁶⁴ Over against this stands the Mūlasarvāstivādin tradition in considerable contrast. It has everywhere understood the rule in the same way – in its two *Prātimokṣas*, in both the *Bhikṣu-* and *Bhikṣunī-vinayavibhaṅgas*, even in Guṇaprabha's *Vinaya-sūtra* and its four commentaries. It has, moreover, consistently given an interpretation of the rule that is clear and in conformity with both its readings and with texts like the tale of Phalguna's *stūpa* found elsewhere in its *vinaya*. Ironically, even if the Mūlasarvāstivādin interpretation would turn out to be relatively 'late' it would still give us a consistent Buddhist interpretation of a difficult text that would otherwise remain all but meaningless, an interpretation, moreover, that would be much closer in time and culture to the compilers of the Pāli Canon than anything that could be produced in Modern Europe or America – the latter leaves us with little more than a seemingly silly rule about monks playing in their food. Moreover, in assessing the Mūlasarvāstivādin interpretation of the rule it must always be kept in mind that we have an extant manuscript containing this rule that predates anything we have for the Pāli by six centuries or more. The Gilgit manuscript of the Mūlasarvāstivādin *Prātimokṣa* contains in fact – as far as I know – the earliest attested form of this rule in an Indian language, and there are at least two comparatively early manuscripts from Central Asia ascribed to the Sarvāstivādins which have very similar readings.⁶⁵

Finally, we might conclude by trying to place the Pāli tale of the nameless nun's *stūpa* and the Mūlasarvāstivādin account of the *stūpa* of Phalguna in the context of what else has been said – or not said – about *stūpas* elsewhere in the literatures they come from. Both the Pāli Canon and the Mūlasarvāstivādin *Vinaya*, for example, explicitly mandate the

erection of *stūpas* by monks for deceased fellow monks, but in neither is there – as far as I know – a similar statement in regard to nuns. This omission is also narratively or hagiographically highlighted in at least the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*: when the Monk Śāriputra dies he gets a *stūpa*; when the Monk Kāśyapa dies he too gets a *stūpa*; when the Monk Ānanda dies he gets two – he also refers to the *stūpas* of the others when, on the point of dying, he describes himself by saying "I am alone, isolated, like the remaining tree in a forest of *stūpas*." When, however, Mahāprajāpatī – the seniormost nun and in a sense the foundress of the order of nuns – dies, she gets none, and the funeral proceedings, which are elaborately described, are entirely in the hands of the monks.⁶⁶

The Pāli tale of the nameless nun's *stūpa* and the Mūlasarvāstivādin account of the *stūpa* of Phalguna are the only references I know in either *vinaya* to *stūpas* built for or by nuns, and in both cases these *stūpas* are destroyed by monks who receive no censure for their acts. Generally speaking the attitude towards such destruction in Buddhist literature is firm and unequivocal: "to destroy a *stūpa* is a grave offence which could be committed only by men who have no faith in the law."⁶⁷ If the interpretation of the *prātimokṣa* rule proposed above is correct even the purely symbolic or ritual destruction of the *stūpa* of a 'heretic' is strictly forbidden to both monks and nuns. Moreover, apart from the two *stūpas* built by nuns that we have studied here, the only other *stūpas* whose destruction is contemplated or referred to are, in fact, those of 'heretics' or members of rival religious groups. If by nothing else, then, nuns are by association, at least, classified with such groups.

It is clear from the references to the *stūpa* of Nātaputta in the Pāli Canon that the destruction of a group's *stūpa* was associated with that group's disarray and loss of an organizational center. It is clear as well from the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* that the *stūpa* of a monk was a source of revenue and support for his fellow-monks: what was given to it belonged to them.⁶⁸ The actions of the Monks Kappitaka and UdaKapāna would, then, have left the two groups of nuns involved with neither an important means of support nor an organizational focus. Such actions would not have been just ritual murder, but in fact something more akin to the political assassination of a group's special dead. That such actions did occur in Buddhist India may account, far better than does historical accident, for the fact that nowhere in either the archeological or epigraphical records do we find an instance of a *stūpa* having been built for a nun. It is perhaps unlikely that once having built such structures, and having had them pulled down, groups of nuns

would have continued doing so knowing that this would be again for them – as it must now be for us – the end.⁶⁹

NOTES

¹ See G. Schopen, "On Avoiding Ghosts and Social Censure: Monastic Funerals in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*", *JIP* 20 (1992) 1–39, esp. 17ff.

² There is as yet no good study of food in the various *vinayas*, but the potential of such can be glimpsed in what has been done in studies of food in other Indian contexts: see, for example, R.S. Khare, ed., *The Eternal Food: Gastronomic Ideas and Experiences of Hindus and Buddhists* (Albany: 1992); P. Olivelle, "Food in India", *JIP* 23 (1995) 367–80 and the sources cited in this review of Khare. In spite of a growing list of monk bashing papers, there is still not a good study of the complex monastic attitudes towards women either.

³ This position – still influential – was very early in place; see H. Oldenberg, *Buddha: His Life, His Doctrine, His Order*, trans. W. Hoey (London: 1882) 381. Very recently it has been said: "The findings of Paul [D.Y. Paul, *Women in Buddhism: Images of the Feminine in the Mahāyāna Tradition*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: 1985)] and Lang [K.C. Lang, "Lord Death's Snare: Gender-related Imagery in the Theragāthā and the Therīgāthā", *Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion* 2.2 (1986)] would suggest that, in the period prior to the composition of *Apadāna*, Buddhist women were decidedly marginalized"; J.S. Walters, "A Voice from the Silence: The Buddha's Mother's Story", *History of Religions* 33.4 (1994) 370 – Here, as I think Walters suggests, this position is in part maintained so as to cast "The Mahāyāna" in a supposedly more favorable light.

⁴ See G. Schopen, "Deaths, Funerals, and the Division of Property in a Monastic Code", in *Buddhism in Practice*, ed. D.S. Lopez (Princeton: 1995) 473–502; esp. 475–77.

⁵ G. Schopen, "On Monks, Nuns and 'Vulgar' Practices: The Introduction of the Image Cult into Indian Buddhism", *Artibus Asiae* 49.1/2 (1988/89) 153–68; esp. 163–65; the findings here seem now to be confirmed by P. Skilling, "A Note on the History of the Bhikkunī-saṅgha (II): The Order of Nuns after the Parinirvāṇa", in *Pāli & Sanskrit Studies. Mahāmākat Centenary Commemorative Volume and Felicitation Volume presented to H. H. The Supreme Patriarch on the Occasion of his 80th Birthday*, ed. P. Bodhiprasiddhinand (Bangkok: 1993) 208–251, esp. 211–16; 229 and n. 167. I cannot account for the assertion in A. Hirakawa, *A History of Indian Buddhism. From Śākyamuni to Early Mahāyāna*, trans. P. Groner (Honolulu: 1990) 226, that at Sāñcī "the names of many more nuns than monks are recorded." He cites no source and my own count indicates the numbers were about equal: 129 monks and 125 nuns.

⁶ On the private means of Buddhist monastics see most recently G. Schopen, "Monastic Law Meets the Real World: A Monk's Continuing Right to Inherit Family Property in Classical India", *History of Religions* 35.2 (1995) 101–23.

⁷ See G. Schopen, "The Ritual Obligations and Donor Roles of Monks in the Pāli Vinaya" *JPTS* 16 (1992) 87–107.

⁸ Two of the three main *stūpas* at Sāñcī contained the remains of deceased monks: *Stūpa* no.2 was built for the deposit of the remains of several local monks, no.3 for those of Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, and at least the *Mūlasarvāstivādin* tradition explicitly declares "that which is given to the *stūpa* of a disciple belongs indeed to his fellow-monks" (see G. Schopen, "Ritual Rights and Bones of Contention: More on Monastic Funerals and Relics in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-Vinaya*", *JIP* 22 (1994) 31–80, esp. 56ff. See also the second version of the *Vinaya-uttara-grantha*,

Derge 'dul ba Na 260b.5: *nan thos kyi mchod rten la bsngos par gyur pa ni shi ba'i yo byad pas na bgo bar bya'o*: "Since what is dedicated to the *stūpa* of a disciple (*śrāvaka*) is (a part of) the estate of the deceased (*mṛtapariṣkāra*) it should be distributed (among the monks)" – It has been said that "the *Vinaya-uttara-grantha*, just like the Pāli *Parivāra*, is an appendix to the *Vinaya*" and that "this work tells us nothing new" (A.C. Banerjee, *Sarvāstivāda Literature* (Calcutta: 1957)99); neither assertion, however, has yet been demonstrated and the latter is far from true. Here the *Uttaragrantha* has assimilated what is given to the *stūpa* of a deceased *śrāvaka* to his estate. This, of course, means in turn that the rules that apply to the latter (which are detailed, for example, at GMs iii 2, 120.3ff and digested in the *Ekottarakarmaśataka*, Derge bstan 'gyur, 'dul ba Wu 221b.3–7) now apply to the former as well.). This same *Vinaya* also lists as one of the eight categories of "acquisitions" (*lābha*) or revenue that which is offered at "The Four Great Shrines", i.e. those at the sites of the Buddha's birth, awakening, first teaching and *parinirvāṇa* – see MSV: GMs ii 2, 113.8, and note that these four are not relic or mortuary *stūpas* and therefore, technically, not subject to the rules that govern *stūpas* of the Buddha.

⁹ R. Gombrich, "Making Mountains without Molehills: The Case of the Missing *Stūpa*", *JPTS* 15 (1991) 141–43. Notice, however, that in a characteristically fine paper which revisits the question of the role of nuns in early and medieval Sri Lanka Gunawardana uses some of the same sort of language for some of the same reasons: he notes the economic independence of women in Sri Lankan inscriptions; and refers to "the independent spirit displayed by nuns", "the concern shared by some monks about this situation", and the "challenge" this presented (R.A.L.H. Gunawardana, "Subtle Silk of Ferrous Firmness: Buddhist Nuns in Ancient and Early Medieval Sri Lanka and their Role in the Propagation of Buddhism", *The Sri Lanka Journal of the Humanities* 14 (1988, but 1990) 1–59). It is ironic that whereas in most areas of Buddhist studies interpretation, analysis and conjecture frequently go far beyond their available evidential base, the study of the history of the order of nuns in India has yet to fully use even the rich textual data that has accumulated over the years. In 1884 Rockhill published a translation of the *Mūlasarvāstivādin Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa* (W.W. Rockhill, "Le traité d'émancipation ou Prātimokṣa Sutra traduit du tibétain", *Revue de l'histoire des Religions* 9 (1884) 3–26; 167–201); in 1910 Wieger translated both the *Dharmaguptaka Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa* and extracts of its *Vibhaṅga* (L. Wieger, *Bouddhisme Chinois 1: Vinaya: Monachisme et discipline; Hinayana, Véhicule inférieure* (Paris: 1910), reprinted in 1951); in 1920 appeared C.M. Ridding and L. de la Vallée Poussin, "A Fragment of the Sanskrit Vinaya. Bhikṣuṇī-karmavacana", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1 (1920) 123–43; the important study of E. Waldschmidt, *Bruchstücke des Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa der Sarvāstivādin. mit einer Darstellung der Überlieferung des Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa in den verschiedenen Schulen* was published in Leipzig in 1926; then followed significant work on Mahāsaṅghika texts dealing with nuns; G. Roth, *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya, including Bhikṣuṇī-prakīrṇaka and a Summary of the Bhikṣu-prakīrṇaka of the Ārya-Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravādin* (Patna: 1970); A. Hirakawa, *Monastic Discipline for the Buddhist Nuns. An English Translation of the Chinese Text of the Mahāsāṅghika-Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya* (Patna: 1982); É. Nolot, *Règles de discipline des nonnes bouddhistes* (Paris: 1991); etc. Little of this and similar work has made its way into more general works and we still get studies like that of R. Pitzer-Reyl's which, in spite of its title *Die Frau im frühen Buddhismus* (Berlin: 1984), is based almost exclusively on Pāli or Theravādin sources.

¹⁰ *Pāli Vinaya* iv 308–09; Horner, *BD* iii 343–44.

¹¹ "The Nuns of the group of six", *chabbaggiyā*, are of course the female counterparts to "the group of six monks", the latter being described in T.W. Rhys Davids & W. Stede, *The Pāli Text Society's Pāli-English Dictionary* (London: 1921–25) 273 as "a set of (sinful) Bhikkhus taken as exemplification of trespassing the rules of the *Vinaya*"

(the Dictionary makes no reference to the nuns' group!). The *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* has an exact counterpart to the Pali's group of monks who are called *ṣaḍvārgika*. Edgerton, *BHSD* (New Haven: 1953) 538, says: "In Pali they seem to be represented as followers of the Buddha, though very imperfect ones, often transgressing rules of propriety. In *BHS*, at least in Divy., they seem to be heretics from the Buddhist standpoint" - the last sentence here must be corrected. In the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* and in the *Divyāvādāna* (much of which appears to have been borrowed from the former) there can be no doubt that the *ṣaḍvārgika* monks were Buddhists. Interestingly, the *Mūlasarvāstivādin* counterpart to the Pali's group of six nuns is called, as we will see, "the group of twelve", *dvādaśavargīya*, making them, presumably, twice as bad (here too Edgerton, 273, needs to be corrected and supplemented, though he does recognize that they cannot be "heretics"). The members of both groups, male and female, appear as stereotypical rogues, scoundrels, tricksters, deviants, and sometimes downright nasty customers, but they are always represented as regular members of the order, and some of their stories provide some of the finest humor in both *Vinayas*. At the same time, though, the compilers of the various *vinayas* seem to have used these groups or individuals belonging to them to articulate and work out some of the most disturbing and highly charged issues that confronted them. (For a representative sampling of passages from the *Pāli Vinaya* in which the group of six occurs see the references given in *DPPN* i 926; J. Dhiraśekera, *Buddhist Monastic Discipline. A Study of its Origin and Development in Relation to the Sūtra and Vinaya Pitakas* (Colombo: 1982) is one of the few works that gives serious consideration to the group; see 46, 135, 150-51 (nuns), 164-70. For references to the group or individuals belonging to it in *MSV* see *GMs* iii 1, 8.4; iii 2, 98.9; 117.8; *GMsSA* 36.14, 37.19, 39.7, 40.13, 41.13, 43.4, 53.24; *Derge* 'dul ba Nya 257b.7; Ta 123a.5, 321b.7; *Tog* 'dul ba Ta 6a6, 8b.4, 11a.2, 91b.7, 151a.4, 304a.3, 332a.4, 337b.2, 346b.1 - all references here are to the beginning of the texts in which the group or its members appear.)

¹² *Pāli Vinaya* iii 58.11 = *Horner*, *BD* i 97 = *MSV*: *Tog* 'dul ba Ta 332a.4ff; *Pāli Vinaya* iv 89.17 = *BD* ii 344 = *MSV*: *Derge* 'dul ba Ja 154b.2ff; etc. (Note that when a *MSV* text is joined to a Pāli text by equal marks this does not imply that it is an exact equivalent, but only that it is more or less parallel or broadly similar.)

¹³ See G. Schopen, "An Old Inscription from Amarāvati and the Cult of the Local Monastic Dead in Indian Buddhist Monasteries", *JIAS* 14.2 (1991) 281-329.

¹⁴ See G. Schopen, "Immigrant Monks and the Proto-Historical Dead: The Buddhist Occupation of Early Burial Sites in India" forthcoming in a *Festschrift* for Professor Dieter Schlingloff.

¹⁵ See, for example, *MSV*: *GMs* iii 1, 223.7-224.12.

¹⁶ See *JIP* 20 (1992) 27 ns. 31-33.

¹⁷ See *DPPN* i 524 s.v. Kappitaka Thera.

¹⁸ References at *JIAS* 14.2 (1991) 281n.1.

¹⁹ *Pāli Vinaya* i 148-149 = *Horner*, *BD* iv 196; *Pāli Vinaya* ii 119 = *Horner*, *BD* v 163 (here translated by "pestered"); *Pāli Vinaya* i 353 = *Horner*, *BD* iv 505.

²⁰ I.B. Horner, *Women under Primitive Buddhism. Laywomen and Almswomen* (London: 1930) 158.

²¹ J.E. Carpenter, ed. *The Dīgha Nikāya* (London: 1911) Vol. III, 117-18; 209-10; R. Chalmers, *The Majjhima-nikāya* (London: 1898) Vol. II, 244.

²² T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha* (Oxford: 1921) Part III, 111-12n.1; also 203-04.

²³ M. Walshe, *Thus Have I Heard. The Long Discourses of the Buddha* (London: 1987) 427; 480; K.E. Neumann, *Die Reden Gotamo Buddhos. aus der Mittleren Sammlung Majjhimanikāyo des Pāli-Kanons* (München: 1922) III, 52-53; I.B. Horner, *The Middle Length Sayings* (London: 1959) Vol. III, 30-31; Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli &

Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha* (Boston: 1995) 853, 854.

²⁴ There are of course a number of problems with the Pāli passages about the *stūpa* of "the *Nigāṇṭha Nātaputta*", not the least of which is whether this refers to the Jains. A.L. Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas* (London: 1951) 75, suggests it does not, but refers rather to the death and community of Gosala, a founding figure of the Ājīvakas, another group competing with the Buddhists (cf. K.R. Norman, "Observations on the Dates of the Jina and the Buddha", *The Dating of the Historical Buddha / Die Datierung des historischen Buddha* (Göttingen: 1991) 300-12; esp. 301). If it does refer to the Jains, then there is the problem of the *stūpa* in Jainism (see P. Dundas, *The Jains* (London/New York: 1992) 188; 97-98; K.W. Folkert, "Jain Religious Life at Ancient Mathurā: The Heritage of Late Victorian Interpretation", in *Mathurā. The Cultural Heritage*, ed. D.M. Srinivasan (New Delhi: 1988) 102-12), and this will involve the further questions of the relative age and exact nature of Jain *nisidhis* (see A.N. Upadhye, "A Note on *Nisidhi* (Nisīdiya of Khāravēla Inscription)", *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 14 (1932-33) 264-66). None of this will, however, affect the basic interpretation of the passages: regardless of which religious group is being referred to, the fact remains that the compilers of the Pāli texts used the expression *bhinnā-thūpa* to characterize the destruction of the central focus of a competing religious group and that group's fragmentation. There is in fact a great deal of confusion about other religious groups in 'early' Buddhist literature (see, for example, C. Vogel, *The Teachings of the Six Heretics* (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XXXIX.4) (Wiesbaden: 1970); D. Schlingloff, "Jainas and Other 'Heretics' in Buddhist Art", in *Jainism and Prakrit in Ancient and Medieval India. Essays for Prof. Jagdish Chandra Jain*, ed., N.N. Bhattacharyya (New Delhi: 1994) 71-82). Note, finally, that the one Sanskrit parallel to the Pāli passages that I have noticed has - as it has been reconstructed - a different reading; see V. Stache-Rosen, *Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im älteren Buddhismus II. Das Saṅgītisūtra und sein Kommentar Saṅgītiparyāya* (Berlin: 1968) Teil 1, 45.

²⁵ *Pāli Vinaya* iv 192.15 - see also Sekhiya 30, ... *chabbaggiyā bhikkhū thūpikāṃ piṇḍapātāṃ paṭiganhanti*, which is also problematic, but ignored here in spite of its similarity.

²⁶ T.W. Rhys Davids & H. Oldenberg, *Vinaya Texts* (The Sacred Books of the East, XIII) (Oxford: 1885) Part I, 63 and n.2; *Horner*, *BD* iii, 130.

²⁷ The first three variants are cited from *Pāli Vinaya* iv 374 (the only edition that is available to me), the last two from H. Matsumura, "A Lexical Note on the Vinaya Literature: *Stūpa* in the Śāikṣa Rules", *WZKS* 33 (1989) 57 (I cite this paper here and below with some hesitation since it seems that one cannot be sure whose work appears under this author's name - see Professor Becher's postscript to K. Wille, *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Vinayavastu der Mūlasarvāstivādin* (Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland. Supplementband 30) (Stuttgart: 1990) 173-74; this 'author' has made the same sort of unacknowledged 'use' of material from my Canberra dissertation: 'his' paper entitled "The *Stūpa* Worship in Ancient Gilgit", *Journal of Central Asia* 8.2 (1985) 133-47, for example, is almost entirely based on texts I refer to or cite and translate in that dissertation; cf. G. Schopen, *The Bhaisajyaguru-sūtra and the Buddhism of Gilgit*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Australian National University, 1978, pp. 148-50; 298ff; 315. The inane comments, however, are entirely his own.)

²⁸ A. Bureau, "La construction et le culte des stūpa d'après les vinayapitaka", *BEFEO* 50 (1960) 271.

²⁹ A.C. Banerjee, *Two Buddhist Vinaya Texts in Sanskrit. Prātimokṣa Sūtra and Bhikṣukarmavākya* (Calcutta: 1977) 51.10, but in light of Matsumura, *WZKS* 33 (1989) 49.

³⁰ *So sor thar pa'i mdo*, Derge 'dul ba Ca 18b.7; *Dge slong ma'i so sor thar pa'i mdo*, Derge 'dul ba Ta 23a.5.

³¹ 'Dul ba rnam par 'byed pa, Derge 'dul ba Nya 258a.4.

³² *Dge slong ma'i 'dul ba rnarn par 'byed pa*, Derge 'dul ba Ta 322a.4.

³³ R. Sankrityayana, ed. *Vinayasūtra of Bhadanta Guṇaprabha* (Singhi Jain Śāstra Śikṣapīṭha. Singhi Jain Series – 74) (Bombay: 1981) 63.4; 'Dul ba'i mdo, Derge bstan 'gyur, 'dul ba Wu 49b.2; 'Dul ba'i mdo'i rgya cher 'grel pa, Derge bstan 'gyur, 'dul ba Yu 16b.7.

³⁴ Bareau, *BEFEO* 50 (1960) 272.

³⁵ There is—to use an expression he himself applies to the translation of another – a “queer translation” of this passage in Matsumura, *WZKS* 33 (1989) 49–50, where he has completely misunderstood the structure of the first part of the text.

³⁶ So *TSD* 1755², citing *Mahāvvyutpatti*.

³⁷ Nanda and Upananda are the names of the first two monks of the group of six in *MSV*. But they are often – as here – compounded and used as a vocative at the head of an exclamation by the group of six. E.B. Cowell & R.A. Neil, *The Divyāvadāna. A Collection of Early Buddhist Legends* (Cambridge: 1886), index, 682, recognize something of this ejaculatory function when they say “Nandopananda, in exclamation (Gemini!)”.

³⁸ Compare the instructions for making “miniature” *stūpas* of the Buddha out of a lump of clay in Y. Bentor, “The Redactions of the *Adbhutadharmaparyāya* from Gilgit”, *JIABS* 11.2 (1988) 21–52; esp. 40, 41, etc. Although going in two different directions, and having quite different ends, the two practices appear to be based on the same sort of thinking: by making a model or miniature of the thing – whether in clay or food – one makes the thing itself.

³⁹ *MSV*: Tog 'dul ba Ta 354b.6; *GMs* iii 4, 239.14 = *GMsSB* ii 264.14.

⁴⁰ The traditions about Pūraṇa are as confused as are the traditions about other ‘heretical’ teachers – see *BHSD* 351 for references, and the sources cited above n.24, end.

⁴¹ Although this is obviously only one case, it is perhaps sufficient to suggest that the relationship between the *Bhikṣu* - and *Bhikṣūnī-vinayavibhaṅga*s in the Mūlasarvāstivādin tradition differs – at least in part – from that posited, but not yet proven, for the Pāli *Bhikkhu*- and *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga*s; cf. O. von Hinüber, “Sprachliche Beobachtungen zum Aufbau des Pāli-Kanons”, *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 2 (1976) 27–40, esp. 34 [=O. von Hinüber, *Selected Papers on Pāli Studies* (Oxford: 1994) 69]. But note also that there is a Tibetan tradition, starting, it seems, with Bu-ston, that the *Bhikṣūnī-vinayavibhaṅga* is not a Mūlasarvāstivādin text “(but has been taken over) from the Āgama of another sect by mistake”; C. Vogel, “Bu-ston on the Schism of the Buddhist Church and on the Doctrinal Tendencies of Buddhist Scriptures”, *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hinayāna-Literatur*, Hrsg. H. Bechert (Göttingen: 1985) Erster Teil, 104–10. At this stage of our knowledge it is possible to neither confirm or deny this, however.

⁴² Waldschmidt, *Bruchstücke des Bhikṣūnī-Prātimokṣa der Sarvāstivādins*, 61 (3.1.A); the references in both C. Kabilsingh, *A Comparative Study of Bhikkhunī Pāṭimokkha* (Varanasi: 1984) 124, and Hirakawa, *Monastic Discipline for the Buddhist Nuns*, 285, n.104, seem to have gone awry.

⁴³ Arhats getting themselves into awkward situations by not focussing their mind (*asamanvāhṛtya*) before they act is something of a narrative motif in *MSV* (see *GMs* iii 1, 79.3ff) and literature associated with it (cf. *BHSD*, s.v. *asamanvāhṛtya*; for a discussion of the problem in scholastic literature see P.S. Jaini, “On the Ignorance of the Arhat”, in *Paths to Liberation. The Mārga and Its Transformation in Buddhist Thought*, ed. R.E. Buswell, Jr. & R.M. Gimello (Honolulu: 1992) 135–45). References to *stūpas* of the hair and nails of the Buddha (*keśanakhastūpa*) are also frequent

in *MSV*: *GMs* iii 2, 143.12; 3, 98.4; Derge 'dul ba Ta 7b.2, 137a5, 138a.4, 157a7, 185b.1, 293a.4, .6, etc.

⁴⁴ One of the characteristics of the group of six monks and the group of twelve nuns in the *MSV* is that they – far more than other ‘good’ monks and nuns – quote ‘scripture’ (i.e. passages from the *vinaya*) to justify their actions or make a point (for some examples see *MSV*: Tog 'dul ba Ta 154a.2, 346b.7; *GMs* iii 2, 101.7; *GMsSA* 43.27). The obvious incongruity of this could hardly be unintentional and was almost certainly a source of some amusement for both the compilers and their readers.

⁴⁵ For other texts in the *MSV* which deal with local monasteries making their own ‘ordinances’ and some of the problems this could create see Tog 'dul ba Ta 107a.4–108a.6; 318a.1–319a.6 (that the Sanskrit being translated by *khirms su bya ba* or *khirms su bca' ba*, “to make an ordinance”, was *kriyākāraṃ kr-* is made relatively certain by Guṇaprabha’s restatement of Ta 107a.4–108a.6 at Sankrityayana, *Vinayasūtra* 9.22, but with a better reading at P.V. Bapat & V.V. Gokhale, *Vinaya-Sūtra and Auto-Commentary on the Same* (Patna: 1982) 42.13). Evidence for the compilation of local monastic ordinances comes from several places. The earliest such compilation that I know was found among the 3rd Century A.D. Kharoṣṭhī documents that Stein recovered from Niya, Śāca and Lou-lan (see A.M. Boyer, E.J. Rapson, & E. Senart, *Kharoṣṭhī Inscriptions. Discovered by Sir Aurel Stein in Chinese Turkestan* (Oxford: 1927) Part II, 176 (no.489); T. Burrow, *A Translation of the Kharoṣṭhī Documents from Chinese Turkestan* (London: 1940) 95 (no.489) – the document is headed *bhichusaṃgasa kriyakara*, “Regulations for the community of monks”, and since only the beginning has been preserved it is impossible to know how long it was. It is likely, though now hard to tell, that a sadly fragmentary inscription from Amarāvati which has been assigned to the 5th/6th Century, also contained local monastic ordinances (see R. Sewell, *Report on the Amaravati Tōpe and Excavations on Its Site in 1877* (London: 1880) 63–66). For Sri Lanka see the references to inscriptions given by N. Ratnapala, *The Katikāvatas. Laws of the Buddhist Order of Ceylon from the 12th Century to the 18th Century* (München: 1971) 7 ns. 13–18 (following earlier Sri Lankan usage Ratnapala calls these “Vihāra katikāvatas” as opposed to “Sāsana katikāvatas”); for Tibet see T. Ellingson, “Tibetan Monastic Constitutions: The Bca'-yig”, in *Reflections on Tibetan Culture. Essays in Memory of Turrell V. Wylie*, ed., L. Epstein & R.F. Sherburne (Lewiston: 1990) 205–29; etc.

⁴⁶ See G. Schopen, “The Stūpa Cult and the Extant Pāli Vinaya”, *JPTS* 13 (1989) 91 n.9, end.

⁴⁷ A.H. Longhurst, *The Story of the Stūpa* (Colombo: 1936) 14; Gombrich, *JPTS* 15 (1991) 142.

⁴⁸ J. Marshall, A. Foucher & N.G. Majumdar, *The Monuments of Sāñchī* (Delhi: 1940) Vol. I, 79; Vol. III, pls. LXXIff.

⁴⁹ M. Bénisti, “Observations concernant le stūpa n°2 de sāñchī”, *Bulletin d'études indiennes* 4 (1986) 165–70, esp. 165.

⁵⁰ There is a fine old photograph of some of these *stūpas* in H. Bechert & R. Gombrich, *The World of Buddhism. Buddhist Monks and Nuns in Society and Culture* (London: 1984) 64 (6); for the inscriptions and dates see Schopen, *JIABS* 14.2 (1991) 293–94.

⁵¹ For what might be another case of the adaptation of a canonical *vinaya* text to local architectural traditions see G. Schopen, “The Monastic Ownership of Servants or Slaves: Local and Legal Factors in the Redactional History of Two Vinayas”, *JIABS* 17.2 (1994) 145–73.

⁵² *DPPN* i 368.

⁵³ For Moliya-Phagguna see *DPPN* ii 674 and in particular *Majjhima* i 122 ff; for Moliya-phagguna *BHSD* 437 (Edgerton says of him: “evidently same as Pāli Moliya-

Phagguna; like him a friend of the nuns"); in the *Cīvaravastu* (GMs iii 2, 143.15), where the "group of twelve" is explicitly mentioned in association with him, the name is translated by *khums stod*.

⁵⁴ DPPN i 418–21.

⁵⁵ BHSD 125; also the passages cited and summarized in J.L. Panglung, *Die Erzählstoffe des Mūlasarvāstivāda-Vinaya. Analysiert auf Grund der tibetischen Übersetzung* (Tokyo: 1981) 123, 140; 159–60; 193; Ét Lamotte, *Le traité de la grand vertu de sagesse* (Louvain: 1949) T. II, 634–36; 844–46; in the *MSV Bhikṣuṇīvinayavibhaṅga* she is declared to be the foremost of those possessed of miraculous power (Derge 'dul ba Ta 295a5); she is, finally, the only nun clearly identifiable, or even visible, in early Buddhist art (see the good photograph of a "panel" from Swat illustrating "The Buddha's Descent at Sankissa" in V. Dehejia "Aniconism and the Multivalence of Emblems", *Ars Orientalis* 21 (1991) 563, fig.9.

⁵⁶ Schopen, *JIP* 22 (1994) 31–80.

⁵⁷ Though it is not formally parallel, the text at *MSV*: GMs iii 2, 49.1–51.6 in which the Buddha prescribes a distinct and identifiable form of robe to distinguish Buddhist monks from members of other religious groups seems to be addressing at least a part of the same issue that our text may be. That text says that it was the usual practice of Bimbisāra to dismount from his elephant whenever he saw a monk or nun and to venerate their feet. Once he did this in view of others to an Ājīvaka that he mistook for a Buddhist monk, much to the consternation (*sandighdhamanas*) of devout Buddhists. When this is reported to the Buddha he points out that the problem here is that the Ājīvaka "appropriated as his own the veneration intended for one who had seen the truths" (*dr̥ṣṭasatyasyāntikād vandanā svīkṛteti*). However, in neither case do the texts indicate that there was a conscious deception: the Ājīvaka did not claim to be a Buddhist, nor did the nuns of the group of twelve present their *stūpa* as a *stūpa* of the Buddha. But in both cases similarity provided an opportunity for confusion and the 'misdirection' of veneration.

⁵⁸ For the *sapīṇḍa* especially see D.M. Knipe, "Sapīṇḍikaraṇa: The Hindu Rite of Entry into Heaven", in *Religious Encounters with Death. Insights from the History and Anthropology of Religions*, ed., F.E. Reynolds & E.H. Waugh (University Park & London: 1977) 111–24. – It is worth noting that the compilers of *MSV* were well aware of brahmanical funeral practices; see Tog 'dul ba Ta 377a.2ff which refers to two sons performing *śrāddha* (*shing biang ba*) for their deceased father, and GMsSB ii 34.14ff which refers to the giving of five *piṇḍas* at the site of the cremation of a dead relative (*pañca piṇḍān datvā* – this text is also of interest because it contains what may be a very early – comparatively – reference to depositing the post-cremation bones in the Ganges: *asthīnām bhasmanām ca karparakam pūrayitvā gangāyām prakṣipya ...*)

⁵⁹ Bateau, *BEFEO* 50 (1960) 269. For the archeological and epigraphical evidence see G. Schopen, "Burial 'ad sanctos' and the Physical Presence of the Buddha in Early Indian Buddhism. A Study in the Archeology of Religions", *Religion* 17 (1987) 193–225.

⁶⁰ See Schopen, *JiABS* 14.2 (1991) 281–329; esp. 299–301.

⁶¹ There is also evidence that Indian Buddhist images, like *stūpas*, could both live and, significantly, die; see G. Schopen, "The Buddha as an Owner of Property and Permanent Resident in Medieval Indian Monasteries", *JIP* 18 (1990) 181–217; esp. 203; and 'dead' *sūtras* and other texts were also handled like 'dead' Buddhas; see, for example, A.F.R. Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature found in Eastern Turkestan* (Oxford: 1916) 1ff.

⁶² Matsumura, *WZKS* 33 (1989) 59. The idea or assumption of an *ur* text has probably nowhere been more influential than in studies of the *prātimokṣa* where virtually all the energies have been directed towards finding a hypothetical 'original'

of the various rules. This has frequently been done by forcing disparate versions together and rejecting those that cannot be so forced as 'late' or 'corrupt'. The whole procedure is in need of reappraisal and may be particularly unsuitable for the *Sekhiya/Saikṣa* rules. The latter are frequently described as the most "disparate" or "divergent", but this is only a negative and misleading way of saying that it is in these rules that the individual orders express and define themselves most individually. This, I should think, would make them not less, but more valuable. Matsumura's argument – in so far as he has one – is very much of the *ur* variety. He tries to force a good deal of material together which probably should not be and in doing so ignores or questions what would otherwise appear to be clear.

⁶³ See, for example, S. Lévi, "Observations sur une langue précanonique du bouddhisme", *JA* (1912) 495–514; esp. 510.

⁶⁴ cf. some of the cases in D. Schlingloff, "Zur Interpretation des Prātimokṣasūtra", *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 113.3 (1964) 536–51.

⁶⁵ Matsumura, *WZKS* 33 (1989) 72–73 cites both. The more sure of the two reads: *na stūpākāraṃ piṇḍapātam paribhokṣyāma iti*. He says "the meaning of the whole sentence is not very intelligible", but it seems to me to be perfectly straightforward: "we will not eat alms food having the shape of a *stūpa*." He also says that the Chinese translation of the Kāśyapa *Prātimokṣa* gives the rule as "not to eat making a shape of [a] tope." The Mūlasarvāstivādin understanding of the rule is, therefore, not an isolated one. (Incidentally, the Chinese translations "like a well" that he cites might be accounted for by a confusion somewhere in the transmission that transformed *stūpākāra* into *kūpākāra*.)

⁶⁶ For the death of Śāriputra see *MSV*: Tog 'dul ba Ta 354a5–368a5 (Schopen, *JIP* 22 (1994) 45–56; Schopen, in *Buddhism in Practice*, 491–94); for Kāśyapa, Tog 'dul ba Tha 463b.4–465b.7 (J. Przyłuski, "Le nord-ouest de l'Inde dans le vinaya des mūlasarvāstivādin et les textes apparentés", *JA* (1914) 522–28, from the Chinese); for Ānanda, Tog 'dul ba Tha 467b.2–470b.7 (Przyłuski, *JA* (1914) 529–35); for Mahāprajāpati, Tog 'dul ba Ta 167a.6–172b.3 – Walters, *History of Religions* 33.4 (1994) 358ff makes an interesting argument to the effect that at least in the *Apadāna Mahāprajāpati* is being presented as "the female counterpart of Buddha" or "the Buddha's counterpart". If that is the case then it is particularly interesting that the equation is not complete in at least one significant way: neither in the *Apadāna* nor elsewhere in canonical literature, in so far as I know, is there any reference to a *stūpa* for *Mahāprajāpati*. (The text Walters is referring to is now available in translation: J.S. Walters, "Gotamī's Story", in *Buddhism in Practice*, 113–38; it gives evidence of some possible contact with the *MSV* text, especially in regard to the 'sneezing' incident which in both occasions Mahāprajāpati's decision to enter *parinirvāna* – Walters fudges his translation here by rendering *vandiya* and *vandasi* as "bless" and misses the fact that this is a rebuke of Mahāprajāpati similar to the one addressed to the trees that drop their flowers on the Buddha in the Pāli version of the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* (V.3. The absence of any reference to *stūpas* for women 'saints' is also noticeable in, and creates some problems for, the interesting study of R.A. Ray, *Buddhist Saints in India. A Study in Buddhist Values and Orientations* (New York/Oxford: 1994). 101–23.

⁶⁷ Bateau, *BEFEO* 50 (1960) 253. Also, among many other possibilities, see L. de la Vallée Poussin, "À propos du Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa d'Āryadeva", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* 6.2 (1931) 412 where he says in regard to the destruction of a *stūpa*: "On sait que ce sacrilège est un des cinq *upānantaryas*, un des cinq péchés quasi mortels: c'est détruire le corps même du Bouddha."

⁶⁸ Schopen, *JIP* 22 (1994) 68.

⁶⁹ I hasten to add, though, that much remains to be seen. The accounts treated here are drawn from only two *vinayas*, the Pāli (often said to be the earliest) and

the Mūlasarvāstivādin (equally often said to be the latest). But the chances of there being similar or related accounts in other *vinayas* is very good. In fact, J. Silk in a not yet published paper entitled "The Yogācāra Bhikṣu" refers to what seems to be just such an account in the *Dharmaguptaka Vinaya* (T. 1428(XXII) 766c 3–10). More may well show up.

ABBREVIATIONS

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ANDREW HUXLEY

WHEN MANU MET MAHĀSAMMATA

The most remarkable of the post-canonical adventures of Mahāsammatā (= MS, as before) is his sponsorship of S.E. Asian legal literature. This legend is to be found in the *dharmathats*, the law texts, of Burma, Siam and Cambodia. Scott (1882: 504) gives an admirably brusque resumé of what happened when Manu met MS:

Buddhist law as it was administered in Upper Burma dates from the beginning of the now existing world. The first crime was theft; the first punishment was a scolding, speedily followed by a thrashing; and the first judge was MS, elected by vote of the people to be ruler over them. No doubt there were written laws then, but they have not come down to us. The written code in use was given to the world by Manu, originally a cow-herd, but afterwards a minister. He found them written in large characters on the walls of another world, to which he was transported when in an ecstasy. These laws formed the first code.

Our legend yokes two culture heroes, MS and Manu, together in one narrative. Such profligacy is a feature nowadays associated with pulp genres – 'Godzilla meets King Kong!', 'Spiderman and the Incredible Hulk combine forces!', 'Paul McCartney and Michael Jackson duet!' – and betrays a desperate need for new angles to refresh an old plot. When our legend was first told (probably between the 9th and the 12th century) other considerations must have been paramount. Scholars have now been discussing what these considerations were for more than a century. Is the meeting between Manu and MS a conscious S.E. Asian attempt to amalgamate Hindu and Buddhist themes? Or a frank statement that the *dharmathats* derive their contents from the Hindu *Manusmṛti* with the Buddhist MS nodding his approval? Our choice of interpretation will depend on our identification of Manu: is he the Vedic Manu, the first human being, and the first authority on how humans should behave? Or is he Manu the Hindu lawyer, the author of the *Manusmṛti*? European scholarship has, in general, chosen the latter option. It would be quixotic to argue that they are entirely wrong. To suggest that the Manu of our legend (whom I shall call the Burmese Manu) has no connection whatever with the author of *Manusmṛti* (whom I shall call the Hindu Manu) would be implausible: it would entail the astonishing coincidence that two neighbouring cultures coincidentally chose the same name for their legal culture-hero. But how exact is the identification? How much more than their name do they have in

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ANDREW HUXLEY

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common? I shall demonstrate that many aspects of the Burmese Manu's career are un-Hindu. Could he have drawn these from an indigenous or Buddhist source while simultaneously taking his name from a Hindu source? These questions are associated with a legal historical question on which I also disagree with the mainstream. They think that S.E. Asian law owes a profound debt to the *Manusmṛti*, while I think that the debt, though significant, has been greatly exaggerated. Since I have summarised these disagreements elsewhere (Huxley 1995: 56–73), I shall eschew legal history. This paper is confined to literary appreciation of a widespread S.E. Asian legend.

Forchhammer was the first European scholar to consider the legend. He believed that Indian law was introduced to the ports of Burma before the 10th century by Indian colonists (1885: 106). From this period date 'the few mythical legends preserved in Burma regarding the Indian Manu, the self-existent' (1885: 94). The S.E. Asian legend of Manu meeting MS was constructed in the 1630s because 'tradition maintained tenaciously the connection of Manu with the secular law literature' (1885: 77). Forchhammer's chronology can no longer be maintained, since we now have several references to the legend which predate the 1630s. His successors have moved Forchhammer's analysis back by four centuries. Lingat (1973: 267), for example, sees the early version of the legend in entirely brahmanical terms:

'They gave MS a counsellor, the hermit Manu, who plays in his court the role that the *pradvivaka* does in the *dharmasāstras*.'

And he understands it (1950: 296) as a description of the introduction to S.E. Asia of Hindu law:

'... the success this childish tale met in Burma, Siam and Cambodia where it prefaces all codes of laws, affords sufficient proof that our religious authors were good psychologists. ... In brief, it is the Hindu system of law that is introduced.'

Tambiah's contribution (1973: 142) is to graft an impressively wide thesis in comparative politics onto the received interpretation of the legend developed by Forchhammer and Lingat:

The shift in myth revolves around a central point: in Hindu society the Brahman is 'superior' to the King, legitimates his power, and interprets law (*dharmā*); in the Mon-Burmese (and Siamese) version, it is the King who, if not the maker of laws, is still the fountain of justice and a Bodhisattva himself; and the Brahman works for the Buddhist King as his subordinate functionary. Herein lies a basic difference in the ideological armatures of Indian and Southeast Asian polities.

In this interpretation the myth is clear, simple and univocal: Manu is a *pradvivaka*, a Hindu lawyer, a Brahman. In my view these assumptions

have been too easily made. I propose an alternative view of the myth as murky, complex and ambiguous.

Ambiguity and complexity always follows the simultaneous introduction of literacy and a new religion. Any attempt to describe the old oral religion runs into the inevitable problem that the written evidence has been contaminated by the culture that came with the alphabet. Until the 19th century S.E. Asian literature was astonishingly dependent on Buddhist genres. Anything written down was written in a literary form adapted from the Pali. Take the *nat* spirits of Burma, which are commonly assumed to represent the indigenous, pre-Buddhist, strand in Burmese religion. The pre-colonial sources on nat-worship demonstrate that in Burma you must use Buddhist modes of literary expression even to describe heresy! In the *Manugye* dhammathat Manu the cowherd solves a problem on 'squatter's rights' by invoking a precedent of the nat-king. The nat-king had to decide between an oak-dwelling nat and a misletoe-dwelling nat who had slowly choked the oak-tree to death. For years I regarded this as an indigenous nat myth, until I discovered that it was pure canonical Jātaka (the *Palāsa Jātaka* #370) given a legal twist. We face very similar problems in Europe. To what extent does the Grail narrative draw on pre-Christian beliefs? Is the legend that Joseph of Arimathea brought the Grail to Glastonbury part of the Christian apocrypha or is it pre-Christian legend embellished for the sake of respectability with a few Christian symbols?

Some of the murk and ambiguity is the product of a debate about the Indianisation of S.E. Asia. Did Burma and Northern Thailand go through a Hindu period in the first millennium before converting to Buddhism between the 12th and 14th centuries? Forchhammer, who assumed that they did, wrote after the ruins of Angkor had been analysed but before the same attention had been given to Pagan and Sri Kettera. I accept that there were Hindu temples in these cities (though they are vastly outnumbered by Buddhist pagodas). I accept that the early Pagan inscriptions describe Brahmins engaging in the ceremonial laying out of foundations (though I think they only performed such functions as Buddhist monks disdained). Clearly there was a Brahman presence in 1st Millennium Burma, but that is not the same as a Brahman ascendancy. Looking at the gold-plate Pali manuscripts from Sri Kettera, at the descriptions of religious practice left by Chinese visitors and at the geographical distribution of the oldest sites of Buddhist pilgrimage in Burma, I think that the Irrawaddy and Chindwin valleys have never been predominantly Hindu, though I am not so sure about the ports at the mouths of Burma's great rivers and the isolated communities living

in the Hukawng valley. In my view the presumption is against Hindu influence: only if there is evidence for a particular Hindu sect, or god or text in Burma should we acknowledge and explain it. But this is controversial: G. H. Luce, one of the great archaeologists of Burma, was happy to speak of Burma's Hindu period. If there never was a Brahman ascendancy over Burma, then Hindu gods and heroes would have become known to the Burmese villagers via Buddhism. The Pali canon and its associated literature contains vast amounts of pre-Buddhist 'Vedic' mythology. Elsewhere I have talked about this phenomenon in terms borrowed from information theory, distinguishing the Buddha's message from the background noise of pre-Buddhist Indian culture that surrounds it. I now switch to a medical metaphor. Vedic gods, brahmins and institutions like caste and sacrifice are *encysted* within the Pali canon. They are a hostile and potentially threatening presence within Buddhism, but are neutralised, surrounded and isolated by an inner skin of Buddhist signifiers. This can be a source of ambiguity. If Burmese culture is familiar with the god Sakka, is this due to Hindu influence, or to Hindu-encysted-within-Buddhist influence? Did Sakka make his own way across the Bay of Bengal, or did he hitch a lift with the Buddha?

The names of Hindu gods – Indra among the Thais, Sakka among the Burmese – have remained recognisable over the centuries. But the S.E. Asian sources display a marked inability to get Manu's name right. They give it in dislocated form, and treat him not as an individual but as twins or triplets. Dhammathats from the 16th century onwards invoke the twin authority of 'Manu and Mano' (the final syllables pronounced to rhyme with 'glue' and 'war'). A century later Shin Uttamasikkha's *Pitakat Thamaing* (1681) says:

'Out of this list of nine dhammathats, *Manussika*, *Manu* and *Manosara* were composed by Rishis during the time of MS.'

Which 19th century Burmese lawyers took to mean that three hermits, named 'Manu', 'Essence of Manu' [Manusāra] and 'Compendium of Manu' [Manussika] found three different dhammathat texts inscribed on the wall of the universe and independently presented them to MS. In Cambodia Manosāra's name has been spoonerised into 'Namosara'. In S.E. Asia generally Manu is not an instantly recognisable brand name, and so it is hard to agree with Forchhammer that Burmese tradition 'tenaciously maintained the connection of Manu with the secular law'. We need a fresh start. During the last thirty years some inspired work has been published on the ways in which S.E. Asian Buddhists manipulate Indian legends to fit local needs. I have taken these as my models: Jaini

(1966) on the *Sudhana Jataka*, Shorto (1970) on the monk Gavampati, Guillon (1987) on the goddess Vasundhara and Strong (1992) on the monk Upagupta. From them I borrow three methodological tools: [1] a recognition that legends have several variant versions, none of which can claim to be the original [2] a willingness to find multiple levels of meaning directed at different audiences [3] an acknowledgement that Sri Lankan Buddhism and North Indian Hinduism do not exhaust the possible forms of Indian influence and that a third category of texts – those of North Indian Sanskrit Buddhism – may have played a role. I shall use the first tool to divide the fifteen or so surviving versions of the legend into three broad families. I shall then wield the second tool to pick out eight themes that are variously emphasised in different tellings of the tale. I shall conclude with some remarks about the various sources which flow into the earliest S.E. Asian myths of origin.

THE VARIOUS VERSIONS OF THE LEGEND

The *Manugye* dhammathat, written in Upper Burma around 1758, contains the longest and most elaborate version of the legend. For more than half its existence, it has been available in English. Richardson's translation (1847) made it the first (and for several decades the only) dhammathat accessible to non-speakers of Burmese. It is hardly surprising that analysis of the myth has concentrated on this one text. But what do they know of Manu who only *Manugye* know? New versions of the story are still being discovered – I have drawn heavily on Nai Pan Hla's edition (1992) of hitherto unknown Mon law texts – and more may emerge in the near future, now that Pitinai Chaisaengsukkul (1993) has combed the monastic book chests of south and central Thailand. To avoid unnecessary confusion among the fifty or so extant Mon-Burmese dhammathats, I identify them by name followed by an identifying letter and number in square brackets. 'D' prefix numbers refer to the list of Burmese dhammathats in U Gaung (1902: 5–13); 'M' prefix numbers refer to the Mon dhammathats printed in Nai Pan Hla (1992). Where possible I also give an indication of the date when a dhammathat was written. The earliest evidence of the legend is the allusion in *Dhammavilāsa* [D4]. This work can be dated to the period between 1180 and 1220 AD, and can be confidently ascribed to a monk of Mon origins in the Sinhalese ordination tradition whose patron was king of Pagan. Shwe Baw (1955) translates the exordium of the British Museum manuscript as follows:

'The dhammathat was written on the wall at the end of the universe. The rishis went there and placed it before the rishi Manu who promulgated it to the world. It contained difficult words which men did not understand. I, Dhammavilasa, now rewrite in Burmese a compendium of this dhammathat which was originally in the Magadha language.' [p. 48]

By 1220, then, the story about Manu, rishis (hermits) and the wall at the end of the universe was sufficiently well known to be alluded to in passing. This helps us interpret the epigraphic evidence described by Than Tun (1959: 173):

'The name Manurāja occurs four times [in the epigraphy]; twice in the first quarter of the 13th century and twice in the last quarter of the same century. This suggests that experts in law appeared twice in the latter half of the Pagan dynasty.'

Than Tun's suggestion is that 'Manurāja' as a title means something like 'Attorney-General' or 'Chief Justice'. Manu came to personify law at a time when our legend of Manu and MS was widely known. We cannot exclude the possibility that the 'Manu' in 'Manurāja' refers to the author of *Manusmṛiti*, but until there is proof that that text was available in Pagan, it remains the less likely possibility.

Six other early dhammathats survive. None of them can be dated properly, but all of them should contain at least some material written before 1220. In the hope that the legends of origin at the beginning of these texts are less likely to have been altered than the substantive rules they contain, I use the names of three of these early works to designate the three major variations of the Burmese Manu legend. I start with *Manussika* [D2], which may well, as Burmese tradition claims, predate the foundation of Pagan. Shwe Baw (1955: 43), who has examined the manuscript, says that it has no exordium as such. It starts with a sermon from the Buddha describing the punishment meted out to a dishonest judge, and then recounts seven of Manu's decisions. These seven precedents decided by Manu are repeated and elaborated in later dhammathats. Manu (sometimes described as a nobleman, sometimes as a cowherd with a reputation for wisdom) hears seven cases on seven consecutive days. It is his failure to recognise the right verdict in the final case, where neighbours dispute the ownership of a cucumber, which leads to his withdrawal to the forest, his achievement of supernatural powers and his visit to the cakkavala. *Kyetyo* [D35 – an Arakanese work written after 1220] mentions Manu's seven cases but only narrates two of them. *Manuyin* [D17 – 1767], which tells the seven judgement tales in full, identifies Manu as 'the king of the Brahmas descended into the world of men and disguised as the nobleman Manu'. Myat Aung's *Manuwunnana* [D20 – 1772] in Pali verse recounts the same seven tales, and adds an alternate list of seven more. *Manugve* [D12 –

1752] prefaces the standard account of seven cases with a description of the twelve cases which Manu decided at village level in order to achieve his reputation. It is the best known of the Manussika versions of the legend, meaning those which treat Manu and MS as a frame story for judgement tales.

Characteristic of the Manosāra versions is Manu being given a brother whose function is to legitimate texts on astrology and magic. The earliest of this type is *Manosāra* [D1], a work of uncertain date popularised in Upper Burma by the 16th century kings of Toungoo. According to Burmese literary historians it was brought from the Mon cities of Lower Burma where it had been known for many centuries prior. An elaborate version of this myth appears in one of Nai Pan Hla's Mon dhammathats which I call *Long Mon Sangermano* [M10]:

When the universe came into existence, a Boddhisatva named MS became the first king of the world. He followed the ten rules of kingship. He reigned over the people with compassion. He had a wise minister called Brahmadeva, who was the incarnation of Brahma. Brahmadeva was saddened by the numerous disputes and false accusations taking place among the people. He wished to give the king a code of law and was permitted by the king to renounce the world. He went to the forest and became a hermit. As a result of deep meditation he attained a high stage of wisdom and gained supernatural powers. One day there was a great rainstorm and when night fell a young, beautiful angel known as Kinnari lost her way and approached the hermit for refuge. Attracted by her beauty and charm, the hermit immediately fell in love with her and slept with her. By enjoying sexual pleasure with her, the hermit lost all of his supernatural powers. The angel Kinnari bore him two sons. The elder was called Bhadra and the younger Manosāra. The two sons also became hermits. They fostered their father and mother constantly. As a result of serious meditation, they too obtained supernatural powers. When their parents passed away, the two hermit brothers, Bhadra and Manosāra, flew out to the boundary walls of the universe where there was a code of law written in letters the size of a young elephant. Bhadra committed all the Veda to memory and Manosāra learned by heart the dhammathat. Manosāra went to King MS and presented the dhammathat to him for the benefit of all mankind. Since that time, all scholars up to the present day have upheld the dhammathat in solving disputes among the people (p. 619).

Similar stories are told in *Kaingza Shwe Myin* [D7 – 1635], which describes itself as a reordering of *Manosāra*, and Myat Aung's *Manosāra Shwe Myin* [D15 – 1763], which translates D7 into Pali verse. It appears in shorter form in two more of Nai Pan Hla's Mon dhammathats, and in a closely related Burmese text, known, in its Latin summary, as *Sangermano's dhammathat*, where the two brothers are called Meno and Menu. This is the version that has travelled eastward across S.E. Asia. It occurs in the truncated dhammathat which introduces the Siamese *Three Seals Code* and in the Khmer dhammathat translated by Leclère (1898). In the Khmer version the kinnari is called *Konthak* and the brothers are

... to the Cakkavala where he copies the sastras of the predominant law as well as all sorts of spells and rituals. Namosara copies from the cakkavala the *Holy Dhammathat* and the *Book of the World* which is the source of the written laws (pp. 15-6).

The third version of the legend is found in a single text which Nai Pan Hla has only recently brought to light. In this work, which I call *Mon Original* [M4], we read:

'Since the time of the creation of the universe, the supernaturally endowed hermits born from self-existence dwelled in the Himalayan forests. ... Of the nine hermits a certain lord named Manu had sympathy and compassion towards the people. He desired to make the king practice the ten royal duties. He flew to the boundary wall of the universe where the code of the dhammathat was inscribed in various versions using letters the size of a young bull. After learning all the laws by heart, Lord Manu sent the God Lokabyuha to ascend and bring down the god-king Indra to him. Together with the god-King Indra and the god Lokabyuha, Lord Manu the hermit compiled the code of Dhammathat which is the best (p. 594).

The anonymous king in this passage is in fact MS. The identification is made explicit near the end of the text:

The Dhammathat laws are the best because they were compiled by Manu, who had supernatural power, together with King Indra and King MS (p. 603).

The story of MS's election and his cakkavatti-like rule over the four continents has been told at the beginning of the dhammathat to explain why the world is divided into 101 nations.

Because Manu, MS and the dhammathat written in letters as big as a bull are common to all three versions, we can regard them as variations on a single theme rather than three separate legends. Other elements (the judgement tales, the brother, the nine hermits) occur in only one of the variations. I have illustrated the family resemblances between the versions in Table 1, but my division into three versions is not wholly satisfactory: there are a couple of themes which vary as between different texts of the Manussika versions.

In the next section I shall examine these eight themes in turn, looking particularly for parallels in Hindu, Buddhist and indigenous S.E. Asian beliefs.

A THEMATIC ANALYSIS

Theme 1 letters as big as a large mammal

One of the factors common to all three versions of the myth is that the dhammathat written on the wall at the end of the universe was written in letters as big as an elephant (or cow or bull). This theme must date from a period when literacy still retained some novelty value: in the

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TABLE I
Family resemblances

	Theme	Manussika	Manosara	Mon original
1	Letters	yes	yes	yes
2	Cakkavāḷa	yes	yes	yes
3	Frame	yes	no	no
4	Cowherd	yes & no	no	no
5	Kinnari	no	yes	no
6a	Manu = MS	yes & no	no	no
6b	Manu < MS	yes	yes	no
6c	Manu > MS	no	no	yes
7	Subhadra	no	yes	no
8	Cucumber	yes	no	no

age of the billboard we can no longer cling to the naive belief that the bigger the letters, the more important the message.

Theme 2 Manu brings the law text from the cakkavāḷa

The other common factor is that Manu finds the text inscribed on the *cakkavāḷa*. This word can mean (1) the wall at the edge of the universe (2) the universe itself (3) universes as a general class and (4) the boundary wall that surrounds a Buddhist monastery. Shorto (1978: 160) attests this last meaning for the Mon form of the word: I assume, since Mon and Burmese religious usages are so intertwined, that it was known to the Burmese. Here, then, is an interesting ambiguity: some who heard the tale might have understood the dhammathat to have been chiselled into the boundary walls of the monastery – to be, as it were, the face which monastic Buddhism presents to the outside world. In the context of a supernatural flight, the first meaning is more likely. By reaching the edge of the universe, Manu has set a goal that other S.E. Asian heroes will emulate. According to the *Three Worlds* (Lithai 1345: 157) the cakkavatti king made four such trips to the wall at the end of the universe.

Theme 3 Manu frames judgement tales

The defining characteristic of the Manussika version is the use of Manu and MS as a narrative frame for a series of judgement tales. Even where Manu is Brahma reborn into a nobleman's family, as in *Manuyin*, he fails to decide the cucumber case correctly. A cucumber-humbled Manu brings the dhammathat back to MS as a peace offering or act of atone-

ment. In the other two versions Manu has no reason to be humble: like Moses or Mohammed he is an intermediary between man and the innermost secrets of nature. We cannot identify this framing device as distinctively Buddhist, Hindu or S.E. Asian. The practice of slotting judgement tales and riddles into an over-arching master-story is equally common in Hindu and Buddhist literary practices. The Hindu *Twenty Five Stories of Vetala* and the Buddhist *Mahosadha Jātaka* [#546] are well-known examples. We can no longer know whether Burmese story-tellers used this trick before their exposure to Indian culture, but the earliest literary S.E. Asian narratives that survive have mastered it. At least four different collections of *Fifty Jatakas* are known. #14 of the Burmese recension *Dasapañhavisajjana* frames ten riddles into a story of paternity denied and then reluctantly recognised (Jaini 1983: xix). In #13 of the Thai recension *Dukammanitika* four tales are framed by paternal advice to avoid kings who rush to judgement. In #40 *Sabbasiddhi* four tales are told in order to tempt a mute princess into speech. In #54 *Surabbha* a vast number of tales are held together by the flimsiest of frames: a prince has become a hermit and meditates on the benefits of wisdom and the problems of social life. But it contains frames within frames, including the Sheherazade motif of stories told to stave off execution (Fickle 1978: 282–302). The concept of a framing story, then, is not in itself either Buddhist, Hindu or local. But in *Manugye* this particular frame has definitely borrowed some of its details from the *Mahosadha Jātaka*. In *Manugye*, Manu is 'about seven years old' when he starts settling disputes, whereas Mahosadha had 'just completed his seventh year'. The eighth of the nineteen *Manugye* judgement tales presupposes that one is already familiar with the sixth of the nineteen *Mahosadha* judgement tales. Both require the judge to decide (in the face of a wife's mendacious claims) which of two men is her true husband. Manu first uses the technique that was successful for Mahosadha:

So he separates the three and examines them apart but, being all of one village, their statement as to forefathers, names, numbers and hereditary property agreed.

Since Mahosadha's technique does not work, Manu has to adopt a fresh strategy of deciding the issue by following popular opinion. If the villagers all agree that Mr X is the true husband, then Mr Y and the errant wife must both pay him substantial damages and leave the village together in disgrace.

Theme 4 Manu as the cowherd made good

The *Manugye* versions describe Manu as poor

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but honest, the seven year old cowherd on the family farm. That Manu can rise from such humble origins to be royal counsellor implies a degree of social mobility incompatible with caste. The brahmins would insist that the only proper royal counsellor is a brahman. Orthodox notions of *varna* are further challenged when Manu's austerities deliver him super-human powers: a member of the agricultural caste should not have time to worry about this kind of thing. This theme is particularly Buddhist, and would strike a particularly resonant chord with the Burmese. 'Hero makes good decisions, thus king appoints him as chief judge' was a Burmese archetype permeating both fact and fiction. Once again the canonical model (*Jātaka* #546) is Mahasodha, the merchant's son, who at the age of seven answers the nineteen questions to become the great minister of King Vedeha. Later Burmese literature tended to assume that any great man must demonstrate his skill in settling cases: in Mahāmaṅgala's popular biography of Buddhaghosa, the Great Commentator settles a dispute between two women water-carriers shortly after arriving in Ceylon, and thus gains entrée to the Lankan King (Gray 1892: 5). This motif occurs in real life as well as folk tales: Kaingza (1637: 4) tells us that he became Minister of Justice by discrediting a mendacious monk in a case about money-lending, and compares himself to Manu in a way that prettily combines humility and pride:

Kaingza told the king that he was like a glowworm flickering on the edge of the jungle compared with Manu, the legal adviser to MS, who shines like the full moon. And even Manu got one case out of seven wrong! Then he explained to the king about the destruction of Pakhan town. The king, in amazement, presented Kaingza with outer garments made of gold cloth and the title 'Manurāja.'

Taw Sein Ko, giving evidence to the Burma Reforms Committee in 1922, explained that this was a regular feature of pre-colonial life:

Sometimes the village judges who had done well were recognised by the king and some of them were turned into appellate judges (p. 15).

Social mobility does not simply result from the absence of a caste system in Burma: there are positive factors which favour it. We could label pre-Buddhist family structure as 'loosely structured' (assuming that it was not too different from the version that got written down in the 13th century). The popularity of many different forms of adoption meant that the Burmese family was not a biological given but a human construct. Therefore, given a remarkably low and stable population, it made sense for those in power to recognise and sponsor talent wherever they found it.

Theme 5 Manu as a kinnari / human half-breed

The Manosāra versions of the myth describe Manu's parentage. His father was a human being from India, while his mother was a *kinnarī*. In Indian zoology, the *kinnarī* is defined as a bird with a human head, but Singer (1992) tells us that in the Burmese puppet shows she was represented as an angel: a human puppet was modified with wings attached to the hips or wrists. Manu's mixed parentage is generally taken as a metaphor for cultural diffusion: his father sails in from the west to impregnate Mme. Butterfly. If this reading is right – if Burma regards her pre-Buddhist culture as the womb in which her Buddhist culture was conceived – we must examine the emotional tone of the metaphor. Was Burma a siren seductress of the chaste ascetics from India? Was she raped by 'Indian colonists'? Or was her impregnation a stainless miracle? In the vast field of S.E. Asian legitimacy narrative all three possibilities occur. Perhaps the most common is the immaculate conception: King Duttabaung's maternal grandmother, for example, was a young doe whose pregnancy was caused when she quenched her thirst with hermit's urine on the rocks. Least common is the rape motif, which usually appears in disguise: a female *nāga* comes out of the sea to lay eggs on the beach: two hermits steal the eggs, and hatch them out on the slopes of Zingyaik hill. This is not rape – how does a human rape a female *nāga*? – but it is the forcible appropriation of female fertility. The humans who hatch out of the two eggs become king of Thaton and the monk Gavampati's penultimate birth. Manu's parents, in contrast, conceive Manu and his brother in the context of a loving relationship. Such love between human and *kinnarī* was very much in the air at the time the Manu legends were developing. Discussing the *Sudhana Jataka*, Jaini (1966) says that 'no other Buddhist story seems to have enjoyed such wide popularity' (p. 534). The earliest versions of this human-*kinnarī* love story are found in Mahāsaṅghika and Mūla-Sarvāstivāda vinaya texts. A modified version was sculpted in eighteen scenes onto the walls of Borobudur. In 12th century Pagan it was, judging by the title, the subject of a lost work by Dhammasenāpati called *Manohara*. Jaini points out that the samodhana section of the *Sudhana Jātaka* identifies Sakka as a former birth of Anuruddha, the Buddha's disciple. He makes the bold suggestion (1966: 557) that Anuruddha, the founding king of Buddhist Pagan, might have relied on this identification in choosing his name: as Sakka rules over Burma's 37 nats in the nat-world, so on middle earth Anuruddha rules over 37 localities and chiefs. If Anuruddha's name does allude to the *Sudhana Jataka*, then an interesting light is shed on his defeated opponent,

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the king of Thaton, who has entered the chronicles under the name Manohari. Have the chronicles turned a real historic event into a reenactment of a popular love story? Let us leave it like this: the versions of the MS myth which describe Manu as the child of human and *kinnari* parents evoke a world of non-canonical Jātakas with their roots in North Indian Sanskrit Buddhism. And this world overlaps with the legends of city-founders preserved in the chronicles and inscriptions.

Theme 6a Manu identified with MS

In section 2 of his 'Lion's Roar' article Collins has traced a trickle of Sri Lankan texts, perhaps starting as early as the 6th century AD, which equate Manu and MS. In 19th century Burma this identification had become orthodoxy, thanks largely to works written by the 1st Maungdaung Sayadaw. In 1790, as part of a eulogy of King Badon, he wrote:

They say that this famous king of kings, the great hero, who was director of the world's regulation and who existed from the first was Manu. ... Starting from the beginning of all kings, the great king MS, otherwise called Manu, offspring of the light-giving sun, we come to the whole line of his ... descendants (p. 7).

And in 1833, as one of the committee responsible for the Glass Palace Chronicle, he said:

In the books only the natural Sun king is known as Solar, and his son is known as Manu. In the religious books that same Manu is also called MS. Hence the phrase 'Solar family' ... is used literally. ... (Pe Maung Tin & Luce 1923: 38)

Thaung (1959: 176) quotes the *Myanma Min Okchokpan Sadan*, written just after the British conquest of Mandalay, as saying that 'a worthy person named Manu was elected as MS'. Was this identification current in 12th and 16th century Burma, or did the Maungdaung Sayadaw discover it in the Sri Lankan commentaries enumerated by Collins? There are two arguments in favour of the latter proposition. The Maungdaung sayadaw, though criticised by Vinaya purists as overinterested in advancement and wealth, was a formidable Pali scholar. And the contrast he draws between 'books' and 'religious books' recalls the Vimānavatthu commentary's distinction between 'those in the world' and 'those in the teaching'. But some traces of the identification can be found in sources written before the 1st Maungdaung Sayadaw ordained in 1772. Forchhammer (1885: 95) quotes the *Manuvannana dhammathat* [D20], written in 1772, as identifying Manu and MS. Scott (1925: 3) quotes the life of Alaungpaya, written in the 1760s, as asserting that 'There were 252,556 Solar Kshatriya kings who were directly descended

from Manu, the MS'. And *Manugye*, written around 1760, incorporates 23 lines of Pali verse from an unknown source, which include the sentence: 'MS is the solar lawgiver whose other name is Manu' (Richardson 1847: 8). But evidence from before the 18th century is equivocal. The *Lokasara*, an early didactic poem written by the Kandaw Mingyaung sayadaw of Ava [1438–1513 AD] prescribes:

... careful observance of the dhammathat, compiled for making decisions in human affairs by Dr Manu the hermit at the beginning of the foundation of the world (Yeo Wun Sin 1902: 15).

Dr Manu the hermit (Saya Manu the Rishi) is probably intended to be someone other than MS the king. I am left with the impression that the identification of Manu and MS was part of the Buddhist reform movement of the 18th and 19th century. Those who wanted to strip away the folk accretions from Buddhism and return to the undiluted *Tipiṭaka* were embarrassed by Manu's absence from the canon. A diligent search of the commentaries and tikas gave them a text by which the puzzle of Manu could be dissolved away. Their search was rather more diligent than that of Forchhammer (1885: 63) who wrote:

... Buddhaghosa, Dhammapala, Vajirabuddha and Buddhadatta ... could not have avoided speaking of 'Manu' in commenting the Aggañña Sutta ... if the myths and traditions of their time had already individualised a 'Manu' the lawgiver.

The law texts from Chiang Mai appear to have been composed before the rise of fundamentalist Buddhist reformers. They seem to date from the heyday of Lanna scholarship in the late 15th and 16th centuries. Sommai Premchit's microfilm catalogue (1986) of the surviving manuscripts mentions at least four legal texts (#69, #99, #103 and #105) which are ascribed to King MS. There is no mention of Manu: rather these Northern Thai works simply follow the unadorned AS account. Their authors had clearly not read Lingat's dictat (1973: 267) on the subject:

It must have been tempting to attribute the precepts of the *dhammasatthas* to MS, who turned out to be a Bodhisattva. But MS had to remain above all the model of the just king and could only be the interpreter of the law.

Theme 6b Manu obeys MS

In the Manussika and Manosāra versions Manu, the cowherd or nobleman, is clearly subordinate to MS the king. When the king orders, all his subjects, Manu included, must obey. A great deal of writing on Buddhist kingship in recent years has been concerned to dissect this relationship of obedience into Hindu and Buddhist sub-units. Bechert (1979: 26) separates the Theravāda input (the *cakkavatti* and Asokan models) from the Mahayana (the Bodhisattva model) and the Hindu (the

Devaraja model). Tambiah (1976: 83) contrasts 'rājadharmā (in which the brahman sanctifies kingship)' with *dharmarāja* ('in which brahmins serve as subordinate functionaries'). Duncan (1990: 38) 'can identify two major discourses within the larger discursive field pertaining to kingship, the Śākran and the Aśokan'. This kind of approach makes excellent sense for Cambodia, Siam and Sri Lanka, none of which were immune from direct Hindu influence between the 9th and 14th centuries. But is it relevant to the analysis of Burma or Northern Thailand? If Hindu ideas on kingship are present not in their own right but as a foreign body encysted within Buddhism, then we cannot speak of a Hindu contribution to Burmese kingship. Nor do we need to. If Hindu ideas on kingship can be summed up in the god-king equivalence, I doubt that Burmese villagers would need a literary excuse for treating their king with superstitious awe bordering on reverence. The king was, quite literally, the Lord of Life and Land: he personified blind power and random violence. And, insofar as we are able to examine the pre-Buddhist Burmese past, it appears that kings were god-like before they encountered Indian culture: Duttabaung, the legendary king associated with the foundation of Sri Kettera, was the proud possessor of a third eye. But if a literary excuse to conflate kings and gods were needed, Buddhist traditions could provide it. MS, chosen as the most handsome and good looking, the most charismatic and most authoritative of the superhuman original beings, is at least touched by the divine. And Strong (1983) has reminded us that Asoka, as he appears in the legend cycle, is a super-hero capable of battling nāga kings and Roman robots.

Theme 6c MS obeys Manu

In the Mon Original version of the legend, MS is plainly subordinate to Manu, who is one of the nine supernaturally endowed hermits born from self-existence who live in the Himalayan forests. He lectures MS *de haut en bas*, he can fly at will to the boundary wall of the universe and he has the God Lokabyuha at his disposal for errands. Nai Pan Hla (1992) describes it as 'the oldest version' and 'very close to the Indian myths on Manu, who is said to have been born by self-generation of Brahma' (pp. xxvii–xxviii). Unfortunately we have no clue as to when the dhammathat was composed, but my instincts coincide with Nai Pan Hla's. I would emphasise that though it is 'very close to the Indian myths', it is still constructed of Buddhist building blocks. Malalasekera (1937: 2: 787) describes the Lokabyuha as:

A class of devas. One hundred thousand years before the end of the world-cycle they wander about among men with dishevelled hair, weeping, wearing red garments, ugly in form, announcing the approach of doom.

As for the nine hermits among whom Manu is numbered, they lie at the very heart of the mystery to which I keep returning. They function explicitly as the patron saints of the Vedic wisdom encysted within the Buddhist canon. Malalasekera, citing V i 245, D i 104, D i 238 and A iv 61, tells of a tradition of nine ancient rishis led by Aṭṭhaka. The others are Vāmaka, Vāmadeva, Vessāmitta, Yamataggi, Aṅgīrasa, Bhāradvāja, Vaseṭṭha and Bhagu:

It is said that Aṭṭhaka and the other seers had the divine eye and had incorporated the teachings of Kassapa Buddha into their own scriptures. Thus (at that time) the three Vedas were in conformity with the Dhamma. But later the brahmins went back on these teachings (1938 1: 45).

The nine hermits are a device by which whatever is good in the Vedas can be incorporated into Buddhism. They are a Buddhist signifier for those Vedic scholars who study the *philosophia perennis*, the truths shared by rival ideologies. As an honorary member of the nine hermits, Manu is a Vedic figure presented in Buddhist wrapping. Compare Abraham who, as he appears in the *Qu'ran*, is a Jewish figure in Muslim wrapping. Even in this earliest version of the legend, then, it was after his conversion to Buddhism that Manu met MS.

Perhaps the nine hermits can also be linked to local Burmese ideas about astrology and ritual. Mon and Burmese speakers alike use a 3×3 matrix to plot connections between the nine planets, the nine gods, the eight days of the week, the eight directions, the eight disciples surrounding Buddha, and much else besides. Schober (1980) shows how the matrix can be used as a birth chart for horoscopes, or as the stage for a protective ritual. It is so fundamental to the Burmese view of the world that it is the first thing taught to children when they enrol in a monastic school. Vedic gods still play a role in the protective ritual and at some stage there was probably a list of nine Vedic Gods and heroes to correlate with the other lists. If Manu of the nine hermits can be placed in this context, then his Vedic origins are diluted even further: the whole point of this matrix, epistemologically speaking, is to mix scientific, alphabetic, calendrical and religious lists of nine into an undifferentiated body of knowledge.

Theme 7 Manu & his brother Subhadra

Manu proved such a success at explaining the origins of law texts that the Manosāra versions equip him with a brother to explain how non-legal knowledge was discovered. Subhadra's remit is variously described as 'all the Vedas', as 'natural science' and, in the Cambodian dhammathat, as 'the śāstras of the predominant law as well as all sorts of spells and

rituals'. It appears to include the pure sciences of cosmology, astronomy and chemistry, along with their respective applied sciences of geography, astrology, calendrics and alchemy. In our modern world the point of applied science is to develop a marketable process or product in order to make a profit, but in S.E. Asia the point was to increase one's personal stock of power. The term 'magic' is therefore appropriate as shorthand for the applied technologies by which Subhadra's clients attempt to change the world. But insofar as they merely attempt to understand the world, they are engaged in a respectable Buddhist pursuit. What are the kammic consequences for practitioners of Subhadric science? Is there a category of white magic approved by even the most puritanical of the sangha? Schober (1980: 43) recounts two Burmese versions of an origin tale which give incompatible answers to these questions. In one version the *Bedin* (the basic text of astrology whose name is a Burmanisation of the word Veda) remains available to mankind thanks to the Buddha's benevolence. In the other version the Buddha burnt it in order to remove a temptation from humanity's path, but was thwarted by Devadatta who put the text back in circulation.

Clearly Burmese opinion has polarised on this question, just as the sangha is split on whether one can simultaneously be a good Buddhist and a good astrologer. To invoke MS and Subhadra is to sidestep this polarity. If magic goes back to the time of the first king, then it must be one of the things which will be true 'whether or not a Buddha is present in the world' – it falls within a useful category which is neither Buddhist nor anti-Buddhist. Manosāra and Subhadra are truly brothers, given that law and astrology are alternative ways of predicting and influencing the future. In western terms they are the patrons of social science and natural science. An example of how magic can be presented as a discipline within Buddhism is given by an early 20th century manuscript described by Bechert et al (1979: 206). It contains the teachings of the Jetavana-gyi Sayadaw on astrology, magic squares and medical magic, as written down by one of his lay students. Clearly this monk was not one of Burma's late 19th century vinaya purists. The first two words of the lengthy Burmese title are *Mahāsamanta gambhira* which must mean something like 'the profundities of MS' or even 'MS's esoteric knowledge'. The work begins by invoking ten names – the canonical nine hermits (whom we met in Theme 6c) and Kassapa (who in this context is probably the previous Buddha).

In this thematic analysis, I must answer two questions. Firstly, who is Subhadra and how has he come to represent 'Vedic' knowledge? Secondly, how appropriate is it to link cosmology and astronomy with

the MS motif? For the first question I require a candidate who is not an orthodox Buddhist: this eliminates both of the monks called Subhadda who appear in the narrative of the Buddha's last days. And the candidate must be male: this eliminates the sister of Krisna whose image was pulled through the streets of Puri in Orissa with a disregard for road safety that has given rise to the Juggernaut legends. One possibility is Prince Subhadda, the younger son of Samala and Wimala, joint founders of Pegu, according to the Mon chronicle *Nidāna Ārambhakathā* (Shorto 1961: 65). But I prefer the claims of Subhadra Divākara who flourished in 11th and 12th century Cambodia as chief priest to Harṣavarman III. He lived long enough to preside over the enthronement of two subsequent kings of Angkor. And his prowess in Vedic sciences is demonstrated by his reputation as the designer and builder of Angkor Wat (Frédéric 1978 2: 278). Here is a man fit to be Manu's brother! The Mons, the Arakanese and the Buddhists of the Malay peninsula all lived on the trade route between Cambodia and Northern India. They would have heard tales of a startling new building in Angkor to the east soon after they got news of the new Juggernaut temple in Puri to the west. No wonder the name Subhadra meaning 'very auspicious' impressed them.

Why should astrology, calendrics and alchemy be associated with MS? #12 of *Aggañña Sutta* provides the germ of all later elaboration: '... the moon and the sun appeared, the twinkling stars appeared ... the seasons and the years appeared.' By the time Buddhaghosa treats the theme in *Visuddhimagga* he can add astronomical detail, such as the diameters of the sun (50 yojanas) and moon (49 yojanas), and calendrical detail, such as the fact that this 'beginning of time' happened on the full-moon day in the month of March (Nānamoli 1956: 459). Sangermano (1885: 11) reports that the Burmese savants have added to their retelling of AS the diameter of five more planets: 'Mars is twelve yazana [= yojana], Mercury is fifteen, Jupiter seventeen, Venus nineteen and Saturn thirteen'. And by the end of the Konbaung dynasty Taw Sein Ko can quote the Astrologers Royal at Mandalay as engaged in speculative astro-physics:

About a month or two before the 'good old year' passes away, they circulate among the people printed copies of their prognostications and minute astronomical calculations. I have procured a copy of one and find that the sun is a luminary internally made of gold and plastered over with crystal, measuring 50 yazana in diameter (1913: 276).

Whether or not the cosmology in AS was intended seriously by its author, it was accepted as serious science by its audience, at least from the 5th century CE onwards. AS and its related literature became the

proper repository for scientific knowledge and pseudo-scientific 'applied' knowledge. In his Mon chronicle the Monk of Acwo hurries through his account of MS's genealogy in order to get to the all-important information of the Buddha's natal horoscope:

In the year 68 on Friday at midday, the full moon Vaisakha, at noon when Leo was lagna, the moon being in Visakha the sixteenth asterism, the sun in Taurus and Venus in Aries, he became man at that time (Halliday 1923: 36).

The point of this information is not to predict the events of the Buddha's life, which are well-known, or his future incarnations, of which he has none, but to calculate the exact point at which Ariya Metteya will appear 5,000 years on. Such calculations were of interest to alchemists and wizards who needed the elixir of life to live long enough to hear Metteya preach them to an assured nibbana. The Buddha's horoscope is a nodal theme straddling the links between MS and Metteya, between AS and CSS, between the Buddhist book of Genesis and the Buddhist book of Revelations.

Theme 8 Manu and the disputed cucumber

However many of Manu's judgements are recited, from *Manugye's* nineteen to *Kyetyo's* two, the last in the series must be the case of the contested cucumber. Manu's discomforture, his acknowledgement that he had erred, is an integral part of the Manussika version and the cucumber is the necessary plot device that brings it about. Gods, nats and men agree that when the plant roots on my side of the fence but fruits on yours, its cucumbers belong to me. What morals may be drawn from this? The cucumber case illustrates the morality underlying capitalism: if I made the investment by supplying the nutrients, I reap the profits by collecting the fruits. It illustrates Buddhist ethico-causal doctrine, if we take roots as a metaphor for past actions and fruits as their kammic consequences. This interpretation is explicitly put forward in the *Manugye* narrative:

All who have arrived in the Nat country and all who have obtained benefits in the country of men have done so on the strength of their former religious offerings. ... The owner of the root is the true owner (Richardson 1847: 25).

If we take roots in the Alex Haley sense, the case illustrates that, no matter where you roam, your birth-place retains a hold over you (especially if your personal root – your umbilicus – was buried there). Manu should certainly have known all this, and, having flunked the test, he did well to resign in disgrace. Which illustrates a further moral: right answers to legal questions do exist and do not necessarily coincide with the answer given by the king and his highest judge. Dworkin has

made this a topical question in Anglo-American jurisprudence, but my remarks are directed particularly at certain comparative lawyers of the preceding generation. In the 1950s and '60s such strange reifications as 'the East Asian mediational approach to law' were displayed through American campuses as scenes in a pageant marking the Triumph of Western Law. According to Northrop (1959), the rice-growers of Asia were so addicted to compromising their disputes that they lacked the very idea of a right legal answer. In discussing Theme 3, I mentioned 'cucumber-humility', the virtue which Manu had to attain before gaining his psychic powers. There was not enough of this quality in the typical Anglo-American Law School of the 1950s.

These cucumber morals exist at a level of ethical abstraction where distinctions between Buddhist, Hindu and early S.E. Asian can no longer be drawn. But I cannot shake off a suspicion that the cucumber motif is distinctly S.E. Asian. The Glass Palace Chronicle tells us stories which link cucumbers and kings. In one of these King Theinkho, a semi-legendary first millenium king, helped himself to a cucumber while out riding and was killed by a farmer. The farmer was told that 'He who kills the king must become king' and was eventually crowned as King Sawrahan, who is often credited with introducing the new Burmese Era starting in 638 AD (Pe Maung Tin & Luce 1923: 58). Or we are told how, in 12th century Pagan, King Kyansittha, fighting to regain his throne, won the right to use Ngahtihlaing village as a base of operations. When he asked the headman for a cucumber, the headman said 'help yourself'. The only problem was that the headman, who could jump as high as an elephant, had surrounded his market-garden with a gateless thorn-fence as high as an elephant. Undaunted, Kyansittha used his lance to pole-vault over the thorn-fence, plucked and ate a cucumber and strung some more together to eat later. 'This is no common man. It were well surely to trust my life to him!' thought the headman (Pe Maung Tin & Luce 1923: 103). The location of Ngahtihlaing village is unclear, but Stargardt (1970: 302) explains how the story is linked to the old cults of pre-Buddhist Burma, which centred on Mt. Poppa. There is nothing especially Burmese about succeeding the king whom you have killed: this, after all, is the Golden Bough motif. Aye Kyaw (1979: 141) tells a very similar story from Cambodia, and the *Mahāvamsa* gives it as a historical account of the Sri Lankan succession in 60 AD. What is especially Burmese, and especially pre-Buddhist Burmese at that, is the cucumber motif. Has the cucumber some deep significance to the Burmese psyche? Is it a phallic symbol? Does it represent the king's sceptre? Or is it popular merely as a cool refreshing snack in a

dry hot climate? I limit my speculations to suggesting that the theme of Manu misdeciding the cucumber case represents an Indianisation of a pre-Buddhist Burmese legend. Manu's Burmese predecessor, whose name we do not know, came back from a cucumber-fueled journey through time and space bearing the laws for an irrigated rice economy.

CONCLUSIONS

'When Manu met MS' is a story told to explain the origins of the dhammathats. 'This is where the text came from' implies the corollary '... and that is why we must obey the contents of the text.' The special feature of this story, which rendered it unsuitable for inclusion in our 'Postcanonical Adventures' survey, is that MS shares equal billing with Manu. The legitimation of law is such a heavy task that it requires the combined efforts of two culture heroes. Forchhammer and Lingat recognised the strangeness of this shared responsibility and interpreted it in terms of sources. Putting their shared position in colloquial language:

It was Manu's show all along, because everyone knew that the dhammathat's contents came from *Manusmṛti*. MS was just roped in to provide a bit of Buddhist colour.

One of my aims has been to subvert this explanation by pointing out the very un-Hindu ways in which Manu behaves. Other than the two syllables of his name, he has nothing in common with the author of the *Manusmṛti*. But nor is he a normal Buddhist cowherd. The pigeonhole into which he slips most comfortably is the Buddhist-defined common ground between Vedic wisdom and Buddhist dhamma. We should classify him with Aṭṭhaka and the nine hermits who were the best kind of Brahman, undogmatic and not boastful. Though they lacked the Buddha's special talents, they anticipated some of his discoveries. The *Vimānavatthu* commentary tells us '... that the Buddha had realised those things of which these sages thought and for which they wished.' [Malalasekera 1937: 1: 45]. If this is where Manu is most at home, he is four or five centuries older than the author of *Manusmṛti* and may even predate the establishment of a Manu law school. He represents Vedic philosophy rather than Hindu law. But this is to ignore the layers of the legend which emanate from a pre-Buddhist S.E. Asian milieu. How can a legend be simultaneously Buddhicised Vedic and indigenous Burmese?

For guidance I return to the studies of Jaini, Shorto, Guillon and Strong. Their accounts of Buddhicised local cults and localised Buddhist legends yield the generalisation: in the field of legitimatory narrative

nothing can be wholly Indian or wholly S.E. Asian. The whole point of these stories is to blur such categories. If a tale starts out as purely Indian, it will be localised by applying it to explain Burmese phenomena. If a tale starts out as purely local, its literary presentation will borrow from Indian genres. I shall give examples from categories supplied by the Burmese Minister of Puppetry in 1821. Only the following plots are allowed into the official repertoire of the puppet troupes:

the 550 Jātaka tales, chronicles, legends of pagodas and the *Zimme Jātaka* collection (Singer 1992: 22).

This closed canon of legitimacy narrative is especially interesting since puppet shows were the most effective medium for telling such stories. A puppet performance must rise to the occasion, while a manuscript can be read anytime. When the puppet troupe entertains at an annual pagoda festival, it will naturally perform the legend of how that pagoda was founded. I shall examine the categories of acceptable plot in reverse order. 'Zimme' is the Burmanisation of Chiang Mai, and refers to the Burmese recension of the *Fifty Jātaka*. A few of these stories may be traced to stories in Sanskrit Buddhist collections and many are cloned from Pali originals but others must be S.E. Asian legends presented in Buddhist guise. Such local legends usually have a local point: they explain 'How Tagaung was founded', 'How the hair relics reached the Shwesandaw pagoda' or 'How Mahā Kassapa came to live in the Alaungdaw caves'. They can turn up with equal ease in the chronicles and in the legends of pagodas, or *thamaing* literature. The rule of thumb that the Burmese language versions are to be found in the local chronicles and the Pali language versions in the *Fifty Jātaka* is not entirely accurate. Some local chronicles are written in Pali, and some pseudo-Jātaka literature is in the vernacular. A safer claim is that the stories in both genres are composed from the same narrative elements. For instance in the *Suvannasaṅkha* jataka, #53 of the Thai recension, mother and child are set adrift on a raft (Fickle 1978: 298). In the Glass Palace Chronicle account of the foundation of Sri Kettera two blind boys, Maha and Cula Thumbawa, are set adrift on a raft (Pe Maung Tin & Luce 1923: 10). In the *Jātaka* the child is rescued by the nāga king, and goes to the yakkha world to grow up: in the chronicle the boys regain their sight thanks to an ogress, and go to their uncle the hermit where they grow up and marry his daughter. Jaini (1983: xxxiv) demonstrates parallels between the same chronicle passage and the *Sonanandarāja* jātaka, #39 of the Burmese recension. But surely the '550 tales', the canonical Pali Jataka, are entirely Indian? Though they are Indian in origin, different S.E. Asian cultures have adapted them into local tales

of origin. Pranee Wongthet (1989) shows how those Lao who were resettled around Prachinburi in 1835 adapted the *Mahosadha Jātaka* to explain distinctive features of their new geography. Forchhammer (1891) quotes from the *Mahāmuni thamaing* a list of jātakas which describe events that took place in different localities around Arakan. The geographical claim takes on a physical embodiment: relics of the Buddha in these former lives will be found and preserved in local pagodas. The left ear relic from the Buddha's birth as a rhinoceros is enshrined in the Khannadhatu ceti on the banks of the Keladan river. And the hair from his incarnation as a Yak-Ox is in one of the three old pagodas at Sandoway.

All of the popular tales performed in the puppet plays are mixtures, in different proportions, of the Indian and the local. It is with this pool of hybrid Indian – S.E. Asian legitimacy narrative that the Manu legend should be compared. From 600 AD (or perhaps a couple of centuries earlier) to 1200 AD, the Indianisation of S.E. Asian narrative entailed the repackaging of local knowledge to fit into Indian genres and beliefs. The locals knew that their royal family was legitimate because their descendants had climbed down a ladder from heaven, or floated downriver as eggs. The repackaged version said that they were also linear descendants of MS and foreseen by a 'Buddha's smile' prophesy. The locals knew that their town walls were protected by a particular spirit who lived in the pillars of the main gate, and their irrigation system by his sister who lived in the dam. The repackaged version placed relics of the Buddha at the most numinous locations, and portrayed the lesser spirits as the Buddha's servants. The legends justifying the law texts may not have been performed by puppet troupes, but in every other respect they are part of the narrative pool. 'This is why the book of laws commands obedience' is the same kind of story as 'This is why the king's claim to the throne is unassailable' and 'This is why the relics within the pagoda are genuine'. I can prove this by citing a couple of legends of dhammathat authorship which do not involve Manu. The 1st Maungdaung Sayadaw's *Pitakat Thamaing* (1820) gives the authorship details for many dhammathats that have not survived. #4 on his list:

'... the *Unabridged Manussika* commencing with the stanza "Aham avuso gijjhakūṭe pabbate", was written by Lord Hermit Gavanpate and Sakka in the time of Buddha Kassapa's dispensation.'

Compare this with the Shwezigon and Myazedi inscriptions in which, associating himself with traditions about the founding of Sri Kettera 500 years earlier, Kyansittha tells us that he, a reincarnation of Vishnu,

founded the city with the help of Indra, Gavampati and Krtakarman, king of the Nāgas (Stargardt 1970: 290). His helpers represent the three worlds: Indra, alias Sakka, protects Pagan from heaven, Gavampati from middle earth and the Nāga king from the underworld. The dhammathat must share in the same tradition, except that at some point it has passed through the hands of someone who was offended by the claim that a dhammathat had been co-authored by a nāga king. He replaced Krtakarman's name by the meaningless, but Buddhist, reference to Kassapa. Something very similar has happened to #5 on the list:

... *Jali*, commencing with the stanza "*Attano etenatipadam*" was written by Lord Hermits Vasudeva and Sukkadandha and submitted to King Jali.

Compare Swearer's summary of the Northern Thai chronicles (1974: 78):

Deciding that his friend Sukkadanta in Lavo could help, Vasudeva descended from Doi Suthep to seek him out. ... He sought Sukkadanta's advice about a virtuous and just ruler. 'My friend', replied Sukkadanta, 'there is a *cakkavatti* who has succeeded his father as ruler of Lavo. He has a daughter named Cāmadevī who practices the five precepts. Let us go and request that she rule our city.

Queen Cāmadevī's name betrays the fact that this text was composed in Northern Thailand and is therefore of local rather than universal interest: it must be replaced with the name of an impeccably Buddhist [and male] monarch. Jali, the son and successor to Vessantara in *Jātaka* #547, fits the bill on both counts.

What happens if we look at the legend of Manu and MS from this angle? As 'Jali' disguises the name of Cāmadevī, might 'Manu' disguise a Burmese culture hero from the 3rd or 4th century AD who failed to settle the cucumber question, made a shamanic voyage into the unknown, and returned with the rules that govern society? This putative original story is partially Buddhicised in 'When Manu met MS' and wholly Buddhicised in *Gopālakasāla*, #16 of the Burmese recension of the *Fifty Jātaka*. In this story Prince Dhammarāja rules an unspecified city. He builds a special hangar in which to stage stupendous feats of alms-giving. As a result Sakka offers him a trip to heaven:

He consents, but only stays in heaven for one night, and upon returning the next day preaches to his subjects on the theme of offering gifts to the sangha (Jaini 1983: xxi).

Both stories concern a leader who returns from the beyond bearing the new social dispensation. Prince Dhammarāja's account has obvious parallels in the Pali canon [for instance *Jat* #541] and in world literature [Huxley 1989: 238–272]. But it has lost what I regard as the specifically

Burmese element – the cucumber. My final speculation is about the location of the Mt Sinai where proto-Manu received the (oral) tablets of the law: in Upper Burma it would be Mt Poppa and in Lower Burma, if we follow Shorto, it would be Zingyaik Hill south east of Thaton. Shorto (1970) has used stray hints in second millennium Mon texts to show that the pre-Buddhist Mon deity who was Buddhicised as Gavampati was the *genius loci* of Zingyaik. If you are prepared to accept that an anonymous shamanic hero of rice-growing pre-literate times was the original *donée* of *Theme 8*, I can sketch a tentative account of the legend's subsequent development. The advent of literacy (and therefore Buddhism) was marked by the addition of *Theme 1*, the big letters on the *cakkavāḷa*. The name Manu could have entered the picture in two separate ways. *Mon Original* [M4] from Rāmaññadesa demonstrates *Theme 6c*: it shows how a Manu very much like the author of *Manusmṛti* can be introduced in thin Buddhist guise as one of the nine hermits. *Manussika* from Upper Burma demonstrates *Themes 6a and 6b*: the name Manu is Buddhised by linking it to MS – either, in a flight of S.E. Asian fancy, as MS's side-kick or, following the *Vimānavatthu* commentary, by identifying the two protagonists. The framing story of *Theme 3* and the social mobility implicit in *Theme 4* blend well with Upper Burman attitudes. In *Manosāra*, the other Rāmaññadesan version of the legend, attention is concentrated on *Theme 5* and the question of Manu's parentage. This version uses Manu's brother to double the legitimacy work rate. I infer that its authors were familiar with the Pagan Manosara developments but wanted to extend its ambit to cover magic and natural science. Therefore *Manosāra* – a Mon response to developments in Pagan – is the most recent of the three versions. The *Mon Original* and *Manussika* versions may be equally old, but the former mixes Buddhist themes with Hindu-encysted-in-Buddhism themes, while the latter mixes an indigenous legitimacy legend with Buddhist themes and the bare name of Manu.

How does this story compare with MS's other post-canonical adventures? Our original decision to treat it separately was arbitrary: the dhammathats, we felt, came within my research territory. But while working on this and on our joint article, I began to feel that 'Manu meets MS' is indeed a special case: it is more than just a further example of the Mahāsammatan skill in grounding and explaining social institutions. There are three ways in which it differs from his other exploits. Firstly, it has spawned many more versions than his other adventures. Within the genre of MS's post-canonical adventures, these make up a distinct sub-genre: they are, if you like, post-postcanonical. Secondly,

it is special in that MS is forced to share his billing. Usually MS is star of the show, and the only exception which we could find to this rule is the story of Mānikpāla-dēvinānsē, the Sinhalese Jane Eyre, whose final words could be 'Reader, I married him'. Manu, as juvenile lead, upstages MS at every opportunity: the posters nowadays would have to say 'featuring a special guest appearance by MS as himself'. It is this feature that led Forchhammer and Lingat to intuit that MS has been written into an existing story for legitimacy purposes. The third sense in which the story is special is closely related to their intuition. His other adventures, for example as sponsor of coronations or guarantor of social stratification, depend on adding a detail or two to the *Aggañña sutta* story. AS is itself one of the world's great stories, as Plato, Liu Tsung-yüan and Hobbes can attest. We can call it the 'social contract' story for the sake of convenience, but really it is a justification of law (or a repudiation of anarchy) as being the least worst option. Its message is 'Don't obey law because it is inherently glorious; obey it because the alternative is worse.' Because we expect MS to inhabit this story, we are unsettled to find him cast as co-star in another of the world's great stories – the one which tells of heroes who bring back law codes from high and solitary places. Is he happy to be rubbing shoulders with Moses and Mohammed? Is the story consistent with the Buddhist rejection of theism? If God did not inscribe the dhammathat on the boundary walls of the universe, who did? Posner (1990: 161) offers one kind of analysis:

... positing entities of debatable ontology is a frequent device for attempting to solve epistemological problems ... [as] if we thought God had inscribed the principles of justice in the book of nature in a form accessible to human reason.

I had hoped that Buddhism's epistemology was sufficiently well specified to avoid generating the problems that attract this dubious ontological solution. In which case we would have further reason to regard Manu's flight to heaven as fundamentally un-Buddhist, an echo of Burma's earliest stratum of belief. But Posner makes me realise how little work has been done on this area of Buddhist philosophy where *kamma*, ontology, causation and epistemology interact. Does Buddhism, for instance, contain a Natural Law theory? I concede that 'When Manu met MS' is an unintended consequence of AS. But would the authors of AS have repudiated it as bad doctrine? I would enjoy reading answers to that question.

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THE POST-CANONICAL ADVENTURES OF MAHĀSAMMATA

In two articles published in volume 24(4) of this journal, 'The Buddha and the Social Contract' by Huxley, and 'The Lion's Roar on the Wheel-turning King' by Collins, we have debated the original meaning and implications of the *Aggañña Sutta* (= AS) and the *Cakkavatti-Sihanāda Sutta* (= CSS), and the extent to which canonical Pali Buddhism contains a political philosophy. We continue to disagree on certain points of interpretation, but in this paper we shift from the contentious to the cooperative mode.¹ We move to a different period of Buddhist history – from the early Chronicles and commentaries (roughly 4-5th c.A.D.) to the 19th c. – and turn to examine the ways in which the figure of Mahāsammatā was developed in Sri Lanka and S.E. Asia.² The post-canonical adventures of MS cover a vast field and, apart from a pioneering expedition by Tambiah (1989), that field is *terra incognita*. By cooperating we intend, in a preliminary but we hope useful way, to sketch its extent and shape: perhaps at some future date we can allow ourselves the luxury of disagreement as to what it all means. Tambiah's article referred to a variety of secondary sources concerning AS, MS and kingship in Central, South and Southeast Asian texts. Our aim is both narrower, in that we limit ourselves to Theravāda Buddhism in Sri Lanka and mainland Southeast Asia, and wider, in that we also catalog uses of MS for matters outside the palace and the capital city. To those who already know of MS's role as head of royal lineages and sponsor of written law texts, we offer another view of this protean personality: an MS who is invoked in *rites de passage* and exorcism rituals, and who should be thanked for such small comforts of life as betel-chewing. This MS is a long way removed from the 'Great Elect' in AS.

Whether the subject is kingship or betel, one should not presume that those who invoke MS have the precise content of the canonical texts in mind. (We give examples of this in section VI.) Themes from AS and CSS are often used in a way similar to that in which the *Mahāvākya*-s ('Great Sayings') of the *Upaniṣad*-s are cited in the Vedānta tradition in India: as slogans or individual motifs shorn of their original textual setting(s).

We present our findings under six headings (individual texts often exemplify more than one of these, so this classification is only for expository convenience):

- (I) Cosmology
- (II) Lineages, political and/or religious
- (III) Coronation rituals in Burma
- (IV) Caste and social stratification
- (V) Rituals of purification and exorcism in Sri Lanka
- (VI) Etiological myths.

We present the post-canonical MS as more complex than his present reputation, but we cannot claim to have revealed all his complexities. Our findings are not comprehensive, and may be biased by the availability of sources.³ His post-canonical career is most extensively developed in the legal texts of Southeast Asia; but the material there is so extensive, and so much more Huxley's area of expertise than Collins's, that it has seemed best to us to put that in a separate article, under Huxley's sole authorship. It follows this piece, with the title 'When Manu met Mahāsammata'.

(I) COSMOLOGY

Almost every telling of MS's story, even when the main interest is claiming MS as someone's lineage ancestor, includes a certain amount of cosmology, along the lines of that in AS (as, for example, in the Sinhalese *Rājāvaliya* texts discussed in section II). The texts we refer to in this section are ones where the cosmology is expanded and made an object of interest in itself, often accompanied by a version of the traditional South Asian cosmo-geography of the four islands around Mt. Meru, and sometimes by astrological matters. The earliest retellings of the AS origin story are in Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* (414–22 = XIII 28–65), and the commentary to the canonical *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, the *Saddhamma-pakāsinī*, attributed to Mahānāma in the first half of the 6th c. (Patis-a 367ff.). These texts describe the contraction and evolution of the universe, at the end of one cosmic eon and the beginning of another, in a description of the special attainment (*abhiññā*) of remembering past lives. Like the commentary to the AS (Sv 870 *amhākaṃ Bodhisatto*), also attributed to Buddhaghosa, they claim that the being appointed in this eon as MS was the Buddha Gotama in a former life: 'for it is said that whenever anything extraordinary happens in the world, a/the future Buddha is/was the first person (to do it)' (*yaṃ*

hi loke acchariyaṭṭhānam, bodhisatto tattha ādipuriso ti; Vism 419 = HOS XIII 54, Patis-a 372). This sentence can be taken as generalizing, since the account of the contraction and evolution of the universe applies to any two consecutive eons; but earlier in the paragraph the texts specify that they are dealing here with the present eon and with 'this very Blessed One, when he was a Future Buddha (*imasmim tava kappe ayam eva Bhagavā bodhisattabhūto*). An English version of this text is easily accessible in Nānamoli's (1975: 455–63) translation of Vism. A few centuries later (the date is not certain: see Norman 1983: 138–9) the commentary to the *Mahāvamsa*, explaining the text's (II 1) remark that the Great Sage (Gotama Buddha) was born into the lineage of MS, states that MS was a former life of 'our Teacher' (*amhākaṃ pana Saṭṭhā . . . Mahāsammato nāma rājā ahoṣi*, Mhv-ṭ 120, 122). An 18th century Mon Chronicler, the Monk of Acwo, cites the *Mahāvamsa-ṭīkā*, but elaborates the cosmology beyond what that text had said, in a somewhat confusing manner:

After the establishment of the first kalpa [= eon], our Bodhisatva [*sic*] was king MS to begin with. This was after sixty-four antarakappas [explained here as subdivisions of an eon] had elapsed from the establishment of the kalpa. . . . When we speak here of the generation of kings, it is not of the king MS of the beginning of the Kappa we speak, but of our Bodhisatva who was MS of the first antarakappa afterwards. So say the commentators of the *Mahāvamsa*. From this first antarakappa our Bodhisatva was king MS also [Halliday 1913: 34]⁴

In 'The Lion's Roar on the Wheel-turning King', section 2, Collins referred to the concluding chapter in the 13th/14th c. Pali text called *Sāra(ttha)-saṅgaha*, which draws explicitly on earlier canonical, commentarial and other texts, to offer a systematic, 'text-book' cosmo-geography, shorn of any narrative context. HNSM reports various Sinhala texts of this kind, including the *Jananandanaya* Or.6603(47) X, in which a cosmology and an account of the election of MS is followed by *Jātaka*-style stories of how various animal species chose their king.⁵ Nevill wrote that the *Yāga Upata (Kavi)* Or.6615(280) 'commences with Lōkōtpattiya or the origin of the earth and its inhabitants, and the sun and moon in the firmament . . . Mahāsammata yāgaya is the next theme, where a bull is sacrificed by cutting it up and the bull coming back to life'. Nevill's comments on two other Sinhala texts give an idea of how the story of MS was extended and adapted. The *Mahāsammata Uppādaya: Set Sāntiyak* Or.6615(8)

is an account of the origin of the Kalpa, the formation of the heavens, the stars, etc. the arrival of MS's reign. . . . On Sunday rice was created . . . , on Monday, forests; on Tuesday, flesh and fire; on Wednesday, the sixty-four sciences; on Thursday, silver and gold; on Friday, buffaloes and cattle; on Saturday, white ants and all insects.

Under Asvida constellation, horses . . . ; under Berāṇa, thieves; under Kāti, fire etc. In Dvāpara yugaya a king was cured by a brahman by yāga. Bali yāga was instituted. Śāgalapura raja was cured by it, and Vijaya and his dynasty introduced it to Ceylon.

(This last motif is a kind of etiological myth: see section [VI].) In the *Loka Rāja Uppāttiya* Or.6615 (484), (493), Nevill says,

the title has nothing to do with Laṅka, and the folklorist may distinguish the story as the Sinhalese 'flood legend' . . . [there follows a version of AS #11–17] Then Sakra deva [= Indra] looking down, recognised the want of a king among men . . . , and sent a deva with a crown of celestial flowers to crown a king. He selected a boy of five months, who was crowned. Sakra deva then appeared, and named him MS. He also gave the king a Devy of the Sakra world as his wife. They had a son

Obviously, this version of MS's story, although it does contain elements from the AS cosmology, is quite different in its political implications from the AS 'Great Appointee' version of kingship. (Other examples of Sakra choosing MS are given in section VI.)

S.E. Asia also produced cosmo-geographical texts. The best known of these, translated by Coedes and Archaimbault (1973) and Reynolds and Reynolds (1982), is the work known (in Pali) as *Traibhūmikathā* or (in Thai) as *Trai Phum Phra Ruang*. This has normally been taken to be a work by Luthai, a 14th century king of Sukhothai, but Vickery (91) has recently cast doubt on this attribution, preferring to see the text as a compilation – perhaps using much earlier materials – of the late 18th c. Its author acknowledges some canonical and many non-canonical sources. The ninth and tenth chapters of this work contain an extended cosmo-geography and an account of the end and beginning of eons, with a traditional version of the AS story, including MS (Reynolds and Reynolds 1982: 324–5, Coedes and Archaimbault 1973: 231–2). If this text, or parts of it, can be taken back to the Sukhothai period, it may be relevant to mention that a stone on which a double footprint was carved and dedicated in 1426 (Na Nagara & Griswold 1992: 764) had been brought to Sukhothai twenty years earlier by Sumedhaṅkara, a monk from Martaban, who might be the author of *Loka(ppa)dīpasāra* (CPD 2.9.17). Luthai's cosmology does not acknowledge this work, but it does explicitly draw on Saddhammaghosa's *Lokapaññatti* (CPD 2.9.14) which was written in Lower Burma during the 11th or 12th centuries (see Norman 1983: 174–5). *Lokapaññatti*, in turn, incorporates material from a number of places: AS, Sanskrit Buddhist texts and a cycle of legends about Asoka (Denis 1977, esp. I, 2 pp. XVII, LXXVII–LXXV. Such works of Buddhist science continued to be produced. Around 1790 a Siamese monk wrote *Lokasanthān* (sic), in Lyons 1963:

animals in the world. Perhaps this is related to the *Lokasanthāna-jotaralanaganthi*, one of the three cosmologies which Finot (17: 71) found in Laotian monasteries. The other two are Luthai's *Traiphum* and a *Trailokyavinicchaya-kathā*.

We look forward to the day when these S.E. Asian cosmologies are studied in more detail. One issue to be investigated is the way(s) in which AS/MS motifs superseded, were blended with or juxtaposed to alternative, indigenous themes. Examples can be seen in a number of the Sinhalese texts collected by Nevill mentioned in this article; in the Burmese story of MS as the son of a Sun spirit called Pyu-zaw-hti, to be described in section (II).2; in the stories from Cambodia and Burma associating MS with the origins of 101 peoples and languages in section (VI); and in a remarkable Mon text recently re-described by Guillon (92; cp. San Win 12), which he calls the *Mulā Muh*, or 'The Ultimate Origin of the World'. This text, 'manuscripts of [which] could be found even recently in nearly all Mon monasteries' blends certain Buddhist themes (though not, it would seem, any from the MS repertoire) into a specifically Mon 'world view [and] mental universe'. The text was first published by San Win 1912. Finot (1917: 77) describes a Laotian work on meditation topics, *Saddavimala*, which claims to be based in part on a text called Pathama-mulla-mūlī-ṭikā.

(II) LINEAGES, POLITICAL AND/OR RELIGIOUS

We list the data here under three headings:

1. The Buddha's royal Sākya family as in the lineage of MS, and thence also Buddhist monks and nuns, as 'sons' and 'daughters' of the Buddha;
2. Gotama as in the lineage of Buddhas as opposed to that of MS, or any king;
3. Claims by and about historical kings in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia.

1. *The Buddha, Monks and Nuns as Sākyans*

The earliest extant Pali chronicles, the disorganized and clumsy *Dīpavaṃsa* and the elegant *Mahāvāṃsa*, are roughly contemporary with the first Pali commentaries (4th–5th c.), but both genres incorporate earlier material (Norman 1983: 118). In their extant form the two chronicles begin and end in the same way, but differ considerably in what they choose to recount. Chapter 2 of the *Dīpavaṃsa* (1911: 61)

Chapter 2 of the latter, in 32 (on which see Collins, ms. Chapter 3.4.b), list many names and numbers of kings from MS to the Buddha's father king Suddhodana, in 'the Lineage of Great Kings' (*mahārājavamsa*, after Dīp III 50), and 'the Lineage of MS' (*Mahāsammatavamsa*, the title of Mhv II, cp. II 1). Two *Jātaka* tales, the *Mandhātu* (#258) and *Cetiya* (#422), also list names of descendants of MS in their prose sections, which are attributed to Buddhaghosa. Other texts mention particular kings in the lineage in more depth, e.g. Makhādeva and Nimi in *Jātaka* #541. Similar lists are given in Buddhaghosa's commentaries (e.g. Sv 258, Pj II 352), and they become standard thereafter (as, for example, in many of the texts given in section II.3.) Malalasekera's (37) *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names* gives details and some textual references; different versions of the list show discrepancies in kings' names and cities. Geiger (12: Appendix A) sets out 'The Dynasty of Mahāsammata' correlating versions in Pali and Sinhala texts, the Sanskrit *Mahāvastu* and Tibetan *Dulva*.

We hear of S.E. Asian chronicles written before the fall of Pagan. But the earliest surviving chronicles date from 16th century Burma and Chieng Mai (Wyatt 1976; Hla Pe 1985). The *Jinakālamāli* (21–24), written in Chieng Mai some time after 1527 (Norman 1983: 143) gives an extended 'lineage of our Bodhisattva', starting from MS. Thilawuntha's *Mahāsammatavamsa*, otherwise known as *Rājavamsa*, written in 1520, devotes over 70% of its text to reproducing the MS lineage from the *Mahāvamsa*. The fact that it contains so little Burmese material could account for its influence elsewhere in S.E. Asia. The Cambodian law texts state that 'according to the *Phra Rājavamsa* King MS was the promulgator of the *Phra dhammathat*'; or, rather, what our source actually says (in case any reader thinks it is always easy to spot references to MS) is: 'Le Preas reach Pongsa voda dit que le Preas bat samdach moha Sam Nhuti reach est le promulgateur du Preas Thomma satth' (Leclère 1898 vol 1: 19). This is, we think, a reference to a copy of Thilawuntha's text which had travelled to Ayuthaya or Pnomh Penh. It is then quoted to corroborate a dhammathat which has made a separate journey eastwards from Burma: thus does tradition confirm itself! The only definite reference we have found in the Tai-Shan literature is the chronicle of Hsenwi which refers to Hkun Lu and Hkun Lai as 'MS kings' (Scott and Hardiman 1900: 231). In Hsenwi, which was one of the Shan States most influenced by the Burmese, MS appears to have become a generic term for a founding king. (See further section [VI] on MS as a general exemplar for kingship.) These and other SE Asian texts dealing with MS lineages are probably inspired by the Sri Lankan

chronicles, but they are not simply copies of them. Varamandhāta, the eighth descendent of MS according to Jat. #422, is missing from the *Dīpavamsa* and *Mahāvamsa* but present in chronicles from Chiang Mai (Notton 32: 7) and Mon Lower Burma (Halliday 1913: 34).

Any monk or nun, by ordination into the Monastic Order, becomes a 'child of the Buddha' (*Buddha-putta*) and so part of his lineage. A number of commentarial texts (Sv 792, Ps I 295, Spk III 161, Mp II 65, Vbh-a 281) offer as an example of the kind of reflection which leads to the arising of the Energy Enlightenment Factor in any monk or nun the self-admonition 'in terms of social class [*jāti*, literally 'caste'] you are not lower class (*lāmaka-jātiyo*); you have been born in the royal line of Okkāka, come down in unbroken lineage from MS; you are a grandchild of the great king and queen Suddhodana and Mahāmāyā, and the elder brother of Prince Rāhula'. (The phrase 'born into a high family, in the unbroken lineage of MS' is given as one of the grounds for properly honoring the Buddha at Ud-a 256.) The Buddha's cousin and fellow Sākyan Devadatta, as both a member of the Sākyan family and a monk, is said also to be in this line and lineage (Ps II 231), but his many crimes and misdemeanors later disqualify him from the title (Ja II 438).

2. *The Lineage of Buddhas as Opposed to that of MS and Kings*

Many cases given in 1 above and 3 below seem deliberately to coalesce what is usually (if loosely) called the 'charisma' of kings and Buddhas/monks, World Conquerors and World Renouncers, for the (equally loosely described) purposes of 'legitimation'. Some texts, however, contrast the lineage of MS with that of Buddhas. One striking example is an account of the Buddha Gotama's life redacted as an Introduction to the *Jātaka* collection and to the commentary on the canonical *Apadāna*. At first, when Siddhattha has only just left home and begins to eat his first begged meal, he has to overcome his disgust at it, compared to the food he was used to as a prince, such as 'perfumed sāli-rice kept in storage for three years . . . with various delicacies'. So disgusted was he that 'his intestines began to turn and were about to come out of his mouth (Ja I 66, transl. Jayawickrama 1990: 88; Ap-a 71). But he masters himself with a self-admonition. Later (Ja I 88–90, transl. *ibid.*: 120–121; Ap-a 93–4) he returns for the first time after his enlightenment to his family, the Sākyans, who are 'proud by nature and stubborn in their arrogance'. Various miracles occur which humble them, but still no-one invites him and his 20,000 monks for a meal on the next day. That morning, he enters the city to beg for alms: no-one offers him

food. He asks himself whether Buddhas of the past went straight to the houses of the nobility (*issara-rāja-s*) or to every house in turn; the answer is the latter. He says to himself 'I too must accept as mine this tradition, this legacy [*ayaṃ vaṃso, ayaṃ pavēni*] so that in future my disciples pursuing their training under me will fulfill the duties connected with the begging of their daily round'. When his father, king Suddhodana, is told that his son Siddhattha is begging for food he is distressed, on the grounds that other people will think him (Suddhodana) incapable of feeding such a large number of monks. He asks his son why he is begging, and is told that 'this is the customary practice of our lineage' (*cārittaṃ etaṃ . . . amhākaṃ* Ja I 90; *vaṃsa-cārittaṃ* Ap-a 94). Suddhodana asks 'Lord, is not the Khattiya descent from MS our lineage? And in this lineage there was not one Khattiya who went about begging alms'. The Buddha replies to his father: 'Your majesty, this royal lineage is your descent, but mine is this lineage of Buddhas, from Dīpaṅkara, Kondañña and others right down to Kassapa [the Buddha preceding Gotama]. These, and many other Buddhas, thousands in number, have begged their daily food . . . '.

Perhaps this might recall to educated audiences a sentiment expressed in other texts (e.g. Spk 151, Vbh-a 10–11), which respond to an imaginary opponent who objects to the Buddha's employing the categories of 'pleasing' and 'unpleasing' in a *sutta* as if things were intrinsically one or the other. (Nāṇamoli's translation [1987: 9ff.], to be cited below, has 'intrinsically' for *pāṭiyekka* [Skt *pratyeka*], 'individually', or 'separately'.) Such judgments are relative, says the opponent, to the likes and dislikes of different people: some people like to eat worms or peacock's meat, others don't. This is refuted by grounding the capacity to distinguish objects as intrinsically pleasing or not in the judgment of

the average being [*majjhimaka-satta*]. For [they are] not distinguishable according to the likes and dislikes of great emperors [*ati-issara*] such as MS, Mahāsudassana, Dhammāsoka and so on. For to them even a divine object appears unpleasing. Nor is it distinguishable according to [the likes and dislikes of] the extreme unfortunates who find it hard to get food and drink. For to them lumps of broken rice-porridge and the taste of rotten meat seem as exceedingly sweet as ambrosia. But it is distinguishable according to what is found agreeable at one time and disagreeable at another time by average [men such as] accountants, government officials, burgesses, land owners and merchants (pp. 10–11).

Another standard commentarial passage, which one might set alongside the idea that the lineage of Buddhas and of the Monastic order is something quite different from the lineage of MS and kings, names MS, along with Mandhātā and Dhammāsoka, as examples of 'talk about kings' (*rāja-kathā*), which is expressly denigrated as something monks

and nuns should not indulge in (Sv 89, Ps III 221, Mp V 44, Spk III 294). Such talk is one of a number criticized as *tiracchāna-kathā*, literally 'animal' or 'bestial talk' (for references and discussion see Horner 1942: 82 n. 3, Rhys Davids and Rhys Davids 1921: 33 n. 2).

3. *Historical Kings and MS*

In the sources we have used for this article, claims by real, historical kings to be descended from MS are ubiquitous in Sri Lanka, standard in Burma, and somewhat rarer in – but by no means absent from – Thailand, Cambodia and Laos. The claim can be made explicitly by invoking MS's name, or implicitly by alleging descent from the lineage of the Sun (*sūriya-vaṃsa*), from that of Okkāka (Skt Ikṣvāku), or from the Sākyan family. In a Buddhist context each and any of these claims may be taken, perhaps, to imply the others: but one must be careful, since claiming ancestry in the Sun lineage is commonplace among kings everywhere in South Asia (for a non-Buddhist example from South India, see Spencer 1982). Indeed since Rāma is in the Sun lineage, and is well known throughout South and Southeast Asia, to claim ancestry in the Sun lineage could equally well be appealing to his story, at least when there is no evidence one way or the other. Buddhist kings sometimes justified their royal function by asserting that they prevent disorder or restore order, and referring to MS as a precedent. This rhetorical association need not imply a claim to have MS as an ancestor, but the two things are clearly related.

Of extant Sri Lankan inscriptions, the earliest to contain a claim to be from the Sākyan family and the lineage of the Sun are by king Kassapa V, in the early 10th c. (EZ I 52, II 32); the earliest to claim descent from the Okkāka lineage are by a prince called Lāmāni Mihinda in the mid-10th c. (EZ III 224), and the first by a king those by Mahinda IV, in the second half of the 10th c. (EZ I 98 et freq.). The first to mention MS by name would seem to be by Parakkama-bāhu I, in the later 12th c. (EZ II 274, IV 7). These claims then become standard, with MS mentioned by name in inscriptions set up by Nissanka Malla in the 12th c. (EZ IV 88 et freq.), Parakkama-bāhu VI and Bhuvaneka-bāhu VI in the 15th (EZ III 67, 281), and a number of kings in the 16th (EZ III 247, IV 15, 26, V 453). In texts, the earliest such claim is that made by the *Dīpavaṃsa* (X 1ff.) and *Mahāvaṃsa* (VIII 18ff.) that Paṇḍukābhaya, the third king of Sri Lanka and founder of the earliest capital Anurādhapura had a Sākyan princess as his maternal grandmother. This kind of claim is most extensively developed in the family of texts known by the name *Rājāvaliya*, composed from the

14th to 19th c. One of these, describing kings up until Rājasimha II in the late 17th c., has been translated by Gunasekara (1900), and they are described in some detail by Godakumbara (1961: 75–80) (cf. Wickremasinghe 1900: 75–7, HNSM Index to vol. IV). They begin with a cosmology expanding that of AS, and a cosmo-geography of Jambudvīpa and the other islands around Mt. Meru; continue with a description of the election of MS as king and, analogously, the choice by various animal species of one among them to be king; relate stories of the kings between MS and the earliest kings of Sri Lanka; and finally recount events and kings in Sri Lanka down to their own time.

In Burma, inscriptions refer to king Kyanzittha (Kalancacsā) in the 11–12th c. as a 'scion of the exalted solar race' (the translation given in EB I 51 for *udiccādiccavamsajo*; text at *ibid.*: 49, cf. Luce 1969: 74; and EB I 151, 167, cf. Luce *ibid.*: 55 and Aung Thwin 1985: 57, 221 n. 22). Rājākumar, Kyanzittha's son, illustrated a temple with paintings of 'Varakalyāṇa, MS, [and] Mahāsudassana the Cakravartin' (Luce *ibid.*: 377). King Mindon in 1852 set up an inscription in which he both called himself a 'solar king', and traced his descent back to kings Alaungpaya (r. 1752–60) and Narapati-sithu (r. 12th–13th c.; Scott and Hardiman 1901: 124–6; Aung Thwin 1985: 221 n. 22). Both Nyaungyan Min (r. 1597–1606) and Alaungpaya were likened to MS by later chroniclers (Lieberman 1984: 49, 247 n. 70, 255; cf. Aung Thwin 1982: 94, Koenig 1990: 86–7), on the grounds that they, like MS, had saved the world from disorder, and this seems to have been a trope especially favored by kings in the Restored Toungoo dynasty from the late 16th c. (Lieberman 1984: 72–4, citing, as an instance, an edict of Tha-lun, r. 1629–48). On 15 April 1837 the newly crowned King Thayawaday issued an order including the following explanation:

The Elder Brother King was sick and was unable to look after the administration for some time with the result that the people suffered greatly; as it was in the beginning of the world when people requested MS to rule over them; so the Young Brother King has taken over; the former king will be nursed back to health as if he were the father of the king.' (ROB vol. 8 pp. 173–4 s. 2)

The reality behind this charming expression of filial affection was that the incumbent king Sagaing's insanity was becoming too widely known to disguise for much longer. His younger brother deposed him in order to pre-empt a similar move from his chief wife, who with her brother and ministers was then tortured and executed in the normal way.

The place of MS as first in the lineage of the Sun was sometimes taken by the figure of Pyu-zaw-hti, the offspring of a sun spirit (Lieberman 1984: 83). The *Glass Palace Chronicle*, commissioned in 1829 by king Bagyidaw, recounts two versions of this story: in one, Pyu-zaw-hti is

a human being born normally, descended from MS (Maung tTn and Luce 23: 30–3); in the other (derived from Burmese historical ballads) he is the son of a Nāga princess and 'the Sun prince' (*Ibid.*: 33ff.), and as the child of a snake-like Nāga, born from an egg. It prefers the former, citing as authorities the Pali canonical *Sutta Nipāta* v.423, where the Buddha declares he is 'of the Sun race' (*ibid.* 36, rendering *ādiccā nāma gottena*), the 16th c. Burmese chronicler Thilawuntha, and the *Sāratha-saṅgaha* (giving the first two of the verses translated in 'The Lion's Roar ...' section 2).

Connexions between kings and MS are less numerous in Thailand, Cambodia or Laos, although he was certainly known there, from both Pali and vernacular texts. MS or his lineage appear in the Thai chronicles translated by Notton (1926: 91–2, 103, 106 [this a statement that a certain Brahmin was not *de la race Samantarāja*], 141–2); 1932: 7). In 'The Abridged Royal Chronicle of Ayudhya of Prince Paramanānuchitchinōrot' there is reference to a King Phra Ādityavamsa, who ruled for six months in 1629 (Wyatt 1973: 44); and references to the *suriya-vamsa* are found elsewhere (see Griswold and Prasert na Nagara 1972: 35; 1973a: 71 et freq.; 1973b: 121; 1978: 122). Coedes (1960: 20–4) has published an inscription dated at 775 A.D. in which a king is referred to as *Manunā sama*, 'like [or: the same as] Manu. No doubt further research will uncover more: but the trope seems to have been less common in these areas of Southeast Asia than it was in Sri Lanka and Burma.

(III) CORONATION RITUALS IN BURMA

Since MS was elected king, he would naturally have received a coronation. This fact is mentioned in a number of Sinhalese texts (e.g. HNSM 6604[103] IV, 6615[12], 6615[495]), but in Burma it became a favorite theme, elaborated into poetry and ritual. Ba Thein (1910: 153, s.v. Yazabalakyawhtin) mentions a poem on the subject, *Muddhabitheka mawgun*, by the Chaungauk sayadaw (1736–93). The best known literary treatment was written about 1815 by the 1st Maungdaung sayadaw. His *Rājādhirāja Vilāsini* is admired by Pali scholars: to Bode (1909: 79) it is 'a specimen of the elegant scholarship of the time'; to Maung Tin it is 'his masterpiece ... very ornate and diffuse' (1914: 7). As the following extract from Maung Tin's translation shows (he has 'inauguration' for *abhiseka*, our 'coronation') the elegance or obsequiousness of the praise of King Badon coexists with hard-nosed positivist scholarship. The author cites authority for every last detail – from the canon, from

the commentaries and sub-commentaries, or from specialist works on kingship that no longer survive:

The exact traditional ceremony of inauguration, observed by righteous kings, beginning from the creation of the world with MS the descendant of the light-giving sun, otherwise called Manu and coming down in order to Rāja, Vararoja, Kalyāna, Varakalyāna and other kings – the exact process of the inaugural head-bathing and other rites as laid down in Narapatijayacariya and other books – the five symbols of royalty, as the requisites of inauguration as given [in] the Jātaka and other books, – in like manner the auspicious fig pavilion as the fitting place for inauguration, – the throne, the wheel and so on as measures of the time for inauguration, – the person to be inaugurated belonging to the three families worthy of the three conches as given in various books, – the inaugural rites themselves replete with words auspiciously recited with due ceremony according to custom and as laid down in books, – the advantages in inauguration in obtaining the title of True King [*ekamsika-rāja*, a 'certain/definite/absolute king'] – and the disadvantages of non-inauguration in not obtaining the title of True King with all manner of kingly powers – this ninefold meaning of inauguration he understood clearly. He had himself inaugurated, as befitting a worthy prince, by three worthy persons, with due ceremony, according to full traditional rites and with a sufficiency of verbal formalities, the consecrated oil being poured out of three conches going round in the right direction and falling like a continuous healing shower of ambrosial juice thus altogether surpassing the inauguration of all other kings of the earth ... [Further texts are discussed.] This three fold ceremony, consisting of [1] observation of ancient custom [2] consecration of the prince and [3] consecration of the head are mentioned in such books as Sumangala Vilasini and Saratthapakasani [sic]. (Maung Tin 1914: 11 [Pali], 18–9 [transl.])

The author's general stance is that, since a king is not a king without a coronation, the first king in the world must have undergone the first coronation in the world. To follow MS's example is therefore a guarantee of correctness. A text preserved in the *Myanma Min Okchokpan Sadan*⁶ gives a detailed account of the coronation ceremony as envisaged under the Konbaung dynasty [1752–1884] mixing themes from AS and CSS. (Direct quotes in the following summary are from the translation in the appendix to Okudaira 1994.) The head of the sangha and twelve brahmins start proceedings by depositing the Tipitaka in the throne room. As 108 monks chant in the background, princesses, brahmins and rich men in turn 'request the king to rule according to the law'. Firstly the eight princesses admonish the king: 'May you be steadfast in the laws practised by the Maha Thamada, the first King in the world'. They warn him against greed, anger and ignorance before pouring the water over his head. Then it is the turn of the eight brahmins to say 'May the faith increase in glory; may you love and pity all the living beings as your own son ...' They advise him to keep his temper, to follow the laws and to heed the words of the educated before they in turn pour the water over his head. Finally eight rich men, having repeated the previous address, add 'May you receive tax according to the law ... by consuming one-tenth of our products. ... May the kings

of many countries bow their heads before you, may there be no thieves or robbers ...' And, add the rich men, if you break your oath, may the world be ruined by earthquakes, hell-fire, rebels and witches. The king, soaked for the third time, gives a speech in which he asks to be victorious over his dangerous enemies and to attain the white elephant and the treasures (to become, in other words, a *cakkavatti*).

Like AS, to which it alludes, this elaborate Konbaung ceremony has been taken as evidence of a social contract theory (Thaung 1959: 176). Furnivall, more accurately, sees it as an oath backed by a conditional curse and adds:

An oath meant something in those days, probably a good deal more than murder ... to break an oath was like involuntary suicide. A king who broke his public oath was inciting, or at least providing an excuse for, his subjects to rebel. And the coronation oath was taken in the presence of those most likely to rebel.' (Furnivall 25: 142)

This distinction is, we admit, not always easy to make. Wyatt (1994: 1083) summarises a chronicle of the Nan kingdom written in 1821:

This section admonishes kings to heed the tenets of Buddhist morality and it *also* warns that those who do not tread the path of righteousness (using the same Pali word *rājasaccā* [sic] as the Buddhist chronicles used earlier) will be punished by all the various spirits – the spirits of rivers, lakes, streams, caves and so forth – that were the main subject of the animistic texts with which we began.' (Wyatt 1994: 1083)

Sacca, 'truth', can also be used in relation to the virtue of keeping promises. While we would like to distinguish a legalistic contract from a supernatural oath or a constitutional duty, it seems that *rājasacca*, 'the king's truth', does not discriminate between the three concepts. The Nan chronicler certainly relies on supernatural penalties to discipline the errant king, but this may just be a *façon de parler*. To threaten the bad king with rebellion, and thus, in effect, to treat his oath as part of constitutional law, may be counted as *lèse majesté*; to threaten him with the supernatural is acceptable piety. In a lengthy preamble to a short order announcing mercy to those who steal royal property, Badon confirms his own understanding of the coronation as a promise backed by a curse:

Kingship in this life is due to the accumulation of good deeds done in one's former lives. After ascending the throne, there was a coronation. This means that the king promises to rule with benevolence and justice and is placed under a curse if he fails. I have had the coronation five times. I observe all the royal virtues and help all monks live within the Vinaya. (ROB 18-3-1796; Vol. 5 p. 113)

For whatever reasons, there were Konbaung kings who did not undertake this climactic coronation ceremony. Furnivall implies that they could

make do with the 13 lesser grades of coronation ceremony which he enumerates from the *Myanma Min Okchokpan Sadan* (Furnivall 1925: 142–3).

Okudaira (1994: 10) raises the question whether the full Royal Coronation (*Muddha Beiktheik*) ceremony was known before the 18th century. Was it invented by the Konbaung kings and their legitimizers or was it, as they claimed, based on antiquity? San Shwe Bu (1917: 181–4) summarises what ‘the old chroniclers have handed down to us’ about the coronation of King Datha of Arakan (1153–65), to show how ‘Buddhism and Brahmanism shared equal honours’ at that time. They do not mention MS; and there are four groups who administer the oath and pour the chrism, rather than three as in the Konbaung case. These groups are ‘Eight princesses ... eight high-class Brahmans ... eight men belonging to the middle class ... [and finally] representatives of all the different classes of people’. The last group offer good wishes to the king, but warn him of the dire consequences which would follow if he chose to ‘give rein only to your own wicked and selfish desires’. If this account can be trusted,⁷ then it can be plausibly claimed that the Konbaung ceremonies were devised by injecting an increased Buddhist quotient into this Arakan template. If this adaptation took place, it would appear to have happened long before the reign of King Badon. Evidence from the dhammathats shows that the general association of MS with coronation rituals is much earlier than the Konbaung dynasty. Manugye [D12], written within ten years of the first Konbaung king’s accession, mentions that MS ‘was crowned with the three kinds of *bithik* anointment.’ This gives little detail and may record the new ideas of the new dynasty. A more detailed association is made by King Thalun’s Minister for Law Reform around 1630:

They named the man so elected ‘Sammata’. They undertook to pay him a tribute of one tenth of their earnings. They crowned him with the full regalia of a king. They bought water from the River Ganga and sprinkled it over his head. While the sprinkling took place, he was seated on a throne made of Thapan wood. He was decked in pearls and emeralds and a white umbrella was spread over his head.’ (Maharajathat D8: translation slightly adapted from Shwe Baw 1955 2: 100)

Wageru [D5] adds the further detail that the coronation took place beneath a fig tree:

When this universe had reached the period of firmly established continuancy, the original inhabitants of the world conjointly entreated the great king MS to become their ruler; the pouring of water (*abhisekam*) which inaugurated his reign took place beneath the Udumbara tree. King MS governed the world with righteousness.

Inflated claims have been made for the antiquity of Wageru. At best it is evidence for the Mon culture of 13th century Martaban, just after

the fall of Pagan. But the surviving texts are all based on a Burmese translation made in 1707.

To sum up: Burmese kings have been describing their coronation ceremonies as based on MS’s since, at latest, the early 17th century. This has given Burmese ideas on kingship a more canonical slant than those found in 19th century Nan. But the sanction against the bad king was, as in Nan, expressed as a conditional self-curse. It has more affinity with the cosmological and supernatural than with the legal and constitutional.

(IV) CASTE AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

AS deals with the fact of social stratification not by providing a justification – obviously, since it openly mocks Brahmanical concern with ‘caste’ (*jāti*) – but by giving an explanation of how it came about: a genealogy of the four ‘classes’ (*vaṇṇa/varṇa*). But all Buddhist societies have had stratification, in Sri Lanka in the form of a caste system; so in the teeth of the Buddha’s strictures, they could use AS as their social charter. A somewhat mysterious text from 19th c. Sri Lanka, the *Nīti Nighanduva*, provides our first example of this. ‘Free persons’, it says, ‘may be divided into a number of castes – whose origin is as follows’. It then recounts a version of the AS cosmology, and the election of MS (at the instigation of ‘wise men’), which brought in its train ‘prime ministers and treasurers’ also;

merchants gained a living by commerce, and were called the merchant (velanda) caste; others by cultivation, and were known as the cultivating caste (gowiyā [this clearly a form of the more common *goyigāma*]). Hence the distinctions of the four great castes (wise men, kings, merchants and cultivators).

Of their attendants, those who worked in silver, copper and other metals were called the smith (*āchāri*) caste; the makers of coverings for the body, the tailor (*hannali*) caste; the removers of dust and other impurities, the washer (*radawā*) caste. (LeMesurier and Pannabokke 1880: 5)

The text does not locate these developments in Sri Lanka; but next, after kingship was brought to Lanka, it attributes the origin of ten *gowiyā* sub-castes there to caste intermarriage, and gives ‘eighteen castes lower than the Gowiyā’, before going on in the next chapter to discuss four kinds of slaves.

Whether this text is regarded as a primary source for the kingdom of Kandy, or as a secondary source composed (forged?) by an Englishman in the 1820s, based on his conversations with Buddhists (see Huxley, ms.), the connection between MS and Sri Lankan caste is confirmed by earlier sources. MS appears in a story of the origins of the caste

system in a Sinhalese prose work which Nevill dated to the 13th c., called *Janavamsaya* (HNSM vol. 4 p. 71). This text is discussed by Nevill at Or.6606(39), by Godakumbara (1961: 75; he calls it a cosmological work), and by Wickremasinghe (1900: 86, #76c). Nevill (1886) summarises the opening cosmological section, and translates the main part on caste. Two other texts mention MS at the beginning of an account of what Nevill called 'the castes or races of people found in Ceylon' (HNSM vol. 4 p. 21), the *Vitti Patuna*, Or.6605(16) and *Niti-bandhanaya* Or.6606(55); cp. 6605(11). He gives no date for the former, but remarks that the latter is 'at least three or four centuries old'.

MS marks the passage from the golden age of anarchy to that of social organization: once a king is in place he must perform his royal duty of keeping the castes separate. At a very early stage, probably before the arrival of Indian culture, Thais and Burmese had worked out their own patterns of social stratification based on irrigated land use and liability to corvée. To say that S.E. Asia does not know caste is an over-simplification. The rhetoric of *varna* and/or caste was borrowed from India, particularly to describe untouchables – 'elephant slaves' – and the royal family. And in both these cases persistent use of the rhetoric of caste could bring about changes in the laws of marriage. Unofficially, something like a hereditary class of untouchables exists in the lowest strata of Burmese society today. And at the other end of the social scale, when the Burmese kings of the early 19th century flirted with Sanskritization, they invented a complex of *jāti* or sub-castes in which they incorporated MS. This development is preserved in the *Myanma Min Okchokpan Sadan*, which describes three distinct groups of *khattiya* – *anwatta*, *rhulhi* and *noktui*, the first of which divides into two branches, the *asambhina* descending from MS and the *sakiya asambhina* beginning with Okkamukha, who appears in MS's lineage six reigns before Vessantara (Aye Kyaw 1979: 145 n. 71). King Badon raised 18 of his son's retainers to *khattiya* status, so the rhetoric of caste seems merely to be another of Burma's graded honours (ROB 8-6-1803; vol. 5: 186). Ten years later Badon says that a

king's residential city is inevitably inhabited by people distinctly divided into four castes; it is like this from the time that the world was created; the Future Buddha was elected Maha Thamada by the people ... [but] the caste distinction ... would not be so pronounced in Paccanta – [the] outskirts; in a great center where the most powerful king resided the caste distinctions become more pronounced (ROB 8 March 1813; vol. 7: 70).

The Siamese Thai use a highly bureaucratic system of stratification known as *sakdina* in which the king legislates the relative status of

each of his subjects. This found its way into the Cambodian legal literature, probably between 1750 and 1850, where it was known as the *Namoeun Sakha* and retrospectively foisted onto MS's broad shoulders: 'MS reigns in peace, practicing the ten virtues and often reading the *Namoeun Sakha* (the Grade of Dignitaries) and the Holy Dhammathat.' (Leclère 1898 [vol. 1]: 17) In the northern Thai regions where the Shan, Khun, Lu and Lao irrigate rice and form states in the plains and valleys, the central question of social stratification is their relationship with the non-Thai speaking *montagnards*. In Laos and in the Thai regions of Vietnam the mountain people can outnumber the Thais, and yet their subservient legal position was not far removed from slavery. Explaining this disparity is another job for MS, who

was a good looking young man of remarkable intelligence and facility in public affairs – he could solve the most difficult enigmas of the *Athadhammagambhira* and was fit to govern. So, the *Devaputa* [sic: 'junior gods'], *devatā* [deities] and men assembled together to consecrate the young MS as king with sacred water. ... Throughout *Jumbūdīpa* [sic] he was known by the name of *Mahā Samantarāja Khattiya*. ... As for the Brahmins, half of them submitted to MS, but the others declared 'We are descended from the Brahmas of the first kappa. This dynasty has only just begun: we will show it no respect.' Then Phra Indra sent Visukamma [his craftsman] to show them that they were covered in black tattoos; he mocked them for looking so awful. They fled for refuge into the mountain ravines. [*Chronique de Suvanna K'om Kham*; Notton 1930: 91–2]

(V) RITUALS OF PURIFICATION AND EXORCISM IN SRI LANKA

The most unexpected of MS's adventures involve stories about him and his wife, normally named Mānikpāla, in Sinhala texts used in rituals of purification after a girl's first menstruation, and of exorcism. A summary account of these texts is given in Barnett (1916), s.v. Koṭahalu, Mahāsammata, Mānikpāla and Oddisa (cf. Hallisey's Glossary to HNSM, vol. VII); Wirz (1954: 70ff., 243–4) described some of the rituals ethnographically; and for readers of German there is a brief reference in Bechert (1984: 610–11). In the case of purification, the texts – which sometimes incorporate parts or all of the AS story – speak of MS's betrothal and marriage to Mānikpāla,⁸ and tell the story of the queen's ritual purification after her first menstruation, which sometimes involves celestial cloth brought by her brother. In these texts, and others, details are given as to the ancestry of both MS and his wife: some texts make him the son of the Sun; others, such as the *Mahāsammata-mula patuna* (Or.6604[155], 6611[75]) speak of generations of ancestors. In view of the association between MS and the figure of Manu it is

interesting to note that in what is clearly one version of this story (Or.6611[263] III), though without the cosmological part, Nevill tells us (vol. V, p. 278) that 'the king is called Manu-rada-sinha naravara [v. 1], or the lion king Manu-raja, son of Dina-rada [v. 1], the Sun or day-king. He marries Sarasvi [v. 1], which is a form of Sarasvatī' (a name which appears in other texts dealing with MS's wife and sister).

Exorcism rituals involve telling the story of the enchanting of either MS himself or his wife (sometimes both). Texts dealing with these stories are particularly numerous in Nevill's collection (Deriyānagala's collection seems to contain more than does HNSM); Barnett (op. cit) gives a full account. The exorcising of spells put on both MS and his wife is usually effected by a character called Oḍḍisa, who is summoned from the forest (in Or.6615[438] he and MS are said to have been associated in former lives). Texts dealing with MS are on occasion only a small part of a larger cycle of Oḍḍisa stories. There seems to be little narrative elaboration of why MS was enchanted; descriptions of these texts simply refer to 'the illness of MS through sorcery'. The story of Mānikpāla is richer. MS goes on a visit to heaven, leaving his wife in a celestial bower made by Vissakamma, the divine craftsman. Māra, the usual Buddhist god of death and desire, comes disguised as MS to try to seduce her; Mānikpāla (in some versions a servant) recognizes him by his bad breath, and she refuses him. He then enchants her. MS returns, tries to get rid of the spell, and finally Oḍḍisa succeeds in doing so. Wirz (1954: 70ff.), describing contemporary rituals, gives two versions of the MS story, without citing his sources (they may have been oral tales picked up in his fieldwork, or versions taken from texts such as those we are considering). The first gives an AS-style cosmology, with a different (feminist?) account of monarchy:

When the number of people had become very great, they resolved to elect one as their king. They assembled and chose a woman for their queen who should from then on reign over them. She was called Mānikpāla-dēvināṅṣe and afterwards married a man, named Mahasammata-rajjuruvo, who became their king.

(VI) ETIOLOGICAL MYTHS

Of course, from the very beginning of MS's career, in AS, he was a figure used for etiology: how kingship arose, how law began, etc. Almost all of the examples we have cited in this paper have this function to some degree. Specific aspects of kingship are also traced to him, in addition to kingship *per se*. When King Thalun asks Kaingza whether he knows of any precedent for employing spies: 'Do the old books of

law mention the words ... *thet-the* [a person who gives evidence of what he has heard or seen]?', Kaingza replies by citing a Mon account of MS:

To this question I Kaingza Manurāja, reply: "... A Mon dhammathat ... says that in the beginning of the world King MS adopted the practice of sending out messengers to listen to what the people talked about in all the four watches of the night and day ..." (Maharajathat [D8] Shwe Baw 2: 18)

Sometimes reference is made to the canonical texts, but not always accurately, as in the following example from the *Myanma Min Okchokpan Sadan*. Discussing the coronation of various kings, including Anahwraṭa and Badon, it accurately reproduces themes from AS and CSS, mixed with other details, but in a manner inconsistent with their canonical content. If the two canonical texts are read together in a realist mode, the story recounted in AS must precede CSS chronologically, since the latter presupposes the institution of kingship, the origin of which is described by the former. Nevertheless, this text states that:

It was through fear and untruth that the first king was raised to the throne. In the period before there was a king, people put forward conflicting claims to property, and would attempt to fence off lands, distinguish their possessions, hide their valuables, and mount ceaseless guard on them. Therefore evil persons went and stole the property of other persons; when these evil thieves were captured by the good people, they were sternly rebuked and freed on the first and second occasion, but on the third occasion they were beaten and put to death. Because the taking of life had been committed, there arose the evil of lying and untruthfulness; it is thus laid down in the *Cakkavatti Sutta* ... [A] group of wise people searched for a man of penetrating intelligence to distinguish carefully the truth from lies, and a worthy person named Manu was elected as Maha Thamata. (Thaug 59: 176)

In AS and CSS, the first act of (capital) punishment – said by the *Myanma Min Okchokpan Sadan* to be done by 'the good people' – is itself seen as part of the degenerative process, 'one bad thing leading to another' (see 'The Discourse on What is Primary', notes to #19.1, 20.2, 22.1; and 'The Lion's Roar' section 3).

Just as MS supplies the origin both of kingship *per se* and of specific aspects of it, so in the Sinhalese exorcism texts MS's and/or Mānikpāla's enchantment can be used, as in the *Vina Upata*, to recount both an overall 'origin of sorcery' and an origin for one or another aspect of contemporary ritual:⁹ of cutting limes with an areca-cutter (246), of arrows and fowl (326), of sprinkling rose-water (263); and of 'charms to exorcise evil influence from cloths used as canopies' (425, p. 562). MS appears in other etiological contexts. His is the prototypical form of any coronation, so his story is given as the origin of crowns (43), as of drums used in ceremonies of any sort (130, 245); and 'dancing was first invented ... at the ceremony to disenchant [MS]' (309, vol. 6

p. 432). A number of texts involving MS are said by Nevill to give the origin of 'purlieu', a word which in English refers to tracts of land (of various kinds); one such text concerns a space of land, used as a labyrinth (469), but others seem to depict a building (262), or 'a throne purlieu' (468). Whatever space or object appears in the stories, Charles Hallisey suggests (pers. comm.), the contemporary ritual element may be magical diagrams. Finally, betel leaves, ubiquitous throughout South and Southeast Asia, were originally brought to earth from heaven for the marriage of MS, and were subsequently utilized by Oḍḍisa in the exorcising of Mānikpāla (438).

One might also mention here a case where not MS, but another part of AS, may have been used etiologically. Duroiselle (15: 1171) describes 'the old Burmese custom, indulged in by young bachelors of the quarter, of throwing stones and brick-bats at the house where a marriage is taking place', until they are given something or paid to go away. He traces this to AS #16, where people throw dirt, ash and cow-dung at the first human couple to have intercourse.

In section (I) on cosmology, we cited a Sinhalese text called *Lōka Rāja Uppātiya* (Or.6615[484], [493]) which depicted MS not as elected or appointed by the people, but as having been chosen at the age of five by the god Sakka (Indra). The second of Wirz's exorcism stories (54: 72), mentioned in section (V), likewise contains no suggestion of an ancient democracy, and introduces other innovations along with parts of the usual AS context:¹⁰

The first human couple was created by Sakra as the ancestors of mankind. They multiplied the earth and the earth was populated by them. Very soon, however, disagreement arose among them and they quarreled, for they had no sovereign or justice. Everyone wanted to rule and there was nothing but conflicts. Sakra saw how the people grew violent and flew at each other, and decided to appoint a monarch. He let a crown fall from heaven, and the person on whose head it settled should be king. This lot befell MS. ... So he was called to be sovereign and assigned the title of 'Chakravarti'.

A text which Nevill called the 'Blessing of Mahāsammata', the *Mahāsammata Sāhalla (Kavi)* (Or.6615[277]), unlike both the *Lōka Rāja Uppātiya* and AS, recounts the origin of language.¹¹ Where the cosmology of the *Lōka Rāja Uppātiya*, apart from its account of the first king, followed AS reasonably closely, this text by contrast

contains a notice of the great flood at the commencement of the present kalpa, when the waters covered the earth, and mankind was destroyed. All was then dark. Afterwards the sun and moon began to shine, and the days were formed; afterwards the Sapta-kūta or seven peaks appeared, and the seven lakes and the Anottata lake

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Makata-pāli, Abhaya-pāli, Maḍikkaya, Telinga and Grantha began to exist, and both grammar and writing, and Demala (Tamil). There were eighteen languages, eighteen races and eighteen kings. The king MS married Queen Mānikpāla ...

In Southeast Asia it is often said that humanity is divided up into 101 different peoples. Than Tun (1984-90, X: 22) suggests plausibly that this number derives from the references to 101 kings in the *Sona-Nanda, Mahāsutasoma and Mahā-Ummagga Jātaka-s* [#532, 537 546]. But the number is also found in a non-Buddhist context, so here we have another example of the need to look into how themes from the Pali tradition were blended with or juxtaposed to indigenous themes. Archambault (1959: 385) cites a Laotian romance in which Khun Bulom and 6 others climb down the vine from heaven to earth, but drop their 7 gourds, from which spring 101 couples who disperse in all directions to form the 101 races of the world. He compares this (p. 406) to a passage near the start of the Siamese Three Seals Code which describes the 101 races in the world as led by 101 descendants of MS. One of the Mon dhammathats published by Nai Pan Hla (1992: 593-4) gives a lengthy account of this legend. At first, MS reigned over all four continents, flying to each to exercise his rule. When he grew old he assigned each continent to one of his four sons. They too flew around all four continents until they grew old, when they stayed on their own. The king of Jambudīpa divided it into ten regions for his ten sons. Gradually, in the course of the generations, although at first all the princes of Jambudīpa 'knew that they were kin and belonged to one nation', later:

the people forgot they were kinfolk. ... They lived apart and made no contact with each other. Therefore their languages became different from each other. Their costumes became different from each other. Today there are one hundred and one nations in the world.'

Singer (1992: 86) quotes a description from the Burmese *Rājavamsa* of a grand pagoda festival staged by the Arakan king Min Phalaung [1571-93]. It included some kind of pageant in which 'the representations of the 101 races of men, of scenes in the 550 jātaka tales, of aquatic monsters were paraded.' It does appear, then, that attempts were actually made to find 101 nationalities. A Burmese list from 1674 has survived (see the references in Than Tun 1990: 22).

Given the variety of MS's post-canonical adventures, we sense a

difficult to put together a single, consistent person to experience them all: as a culture hero, MS suffers from a split personality. On the one hand he is the Great Elect, as perceived by Buddhist kings and Theravāda monks close to the palace. This MS, whom we meet in royal epigraphy and manuscripts presented to the palace, is an emblem for abstract theories of social order (not all of which, however, conform to expectation: as well as being democratically appointed by the will of the people, this MS can also be theocratically anointed by the King of the Gods). He lives on, albeit in civilian clothes, as the First Statesman or First Democrat in the contemporary discourse of Buddhist politicians and Theravāda newspaper editors. The other side of MS's split personality would be more at home tending his rice-field or driving his ox-cart to market. He is still a great king, but a great king as seen from the village. He presides over the intimacies of puberty and marriage, is a fellow-sufferer in the fear of sorcery and the relief of exorcism, and can be celebrated in the pleasures of dancing, drumming and betel-chewing. He exists, as does the royal MS, in the long ago and far away, at the origin of human society as we know it, in all (or at least in many) of its everyday details. We can hardly call him a 'little tradition' MS, but we might get away with calling him a 'folksy, down-home' Great Elect. This folksy MS embodies nothing so grand as a social theory: as an emblem he merely suggests a diffuse feeling of deference towards a benevolent but distant king. When local conditions belie the ideal image of royalty, the blame must lie with the royal appointees: if only he knew how rapacious they were, our rājadhammic king would get rid of the lot of them.

It is twice as difficult to describe a split personality. Our suggestion that MS can be severed into a Dr Jekyll folksy personality and a Mr Hyde royal one has the unfortunate effect of doubling the difficulties of analysis. From a modern historical point of view, the folksy MS, it seems safe to say, is an unintended consequence of the *Aggañña Sutta*. The issue which we debated in the previous articles can be restated thus: to what extent can the royal MS also be described as an unintended consequence of that text?

NOTES

¹ The division of labour has been as follows: the Pali and Sinhalese material is mostly by Collins, the S.E. Asian material mostly by Huxley. We have commented on each other's contributions and we both accept responsibility for the entire text.

² Apart from when we cite the titles of texts, we refer to Mahāsammata throughout as MS, even in citations from others. There is great variety in spelling the name in

our sources: it is often unclear whether alternative spellings are in the primary texts, or are mistakes by a modern editor or author, or are simply typographical errors. In all cases cited, we believe, we are indeed dealing with king Mahāsammata, the figure from AS. But it should be noted that that Mahāsammata was a common title in South Asian inscriptions, referring to a Chief or Great Vassal – a client king granted special status by his patron – and it is obviously possible that some confusion occurred between the two.

³ Abbreviations for Pali texts follow the Critical Pali Dictionary (= CPD); references to the *Visuddhimagga* give the PTS page no. followed by the Harvard Oriental Series chapter/paragraph numbers (as in Nānamoli's [75] translation); EZ = *Epigraphia Zeylanica*; EB = *Epigraphia Birmanica*; references in the form 'ROB d-m-year' to the orders of Burmese kings collected in Than Tun (1984–90); HNSM = Hugh Nevill collection of Sinhalese Manuscripts, ed. Somadasa, 6 vols. (87–93), from which mss. are cited by their 'Or' catalog number (we have followed the printed version for diacritical marks, or their absence). We are grateful to Charles Hallisey for showing us a ms. of his Glossary of Proper Names in this collection, to be published as vol. 7. There is another description of Nevill's Sinhala texts, edited by Deraniyagala (54) in 3 volumes. Sometimes one can see that texts described here and in HNSM are the same; sometimes not. We have not included references to Deraniyagala's work, but interested readers should consult it. See further note 5 on this collection.

⁴ The number of antarakappas in a kalpa seems confused: although the text first says that the Bodhisattva was MS 64 antarakappas after the beginning of the kalpa, it then gives the number of antarakappas between the beginning of the eon, between the five Buddhas of the present eon, and until the end of the eon – which total 61.

⁵ See: the *Loka-saññhanaya* Or.6603(19) III; the somewhat unconventional *Kap Upata*, *Bamba Upata* *Hā Lōkasaññhānaya* Or.6603(43) I; the *Kalpōpattiya* Or.6603(157), and *Kalpōpattiya Saha Mahāsammata Kavi* Or.6611(93); other versions at Or.6603(62), (107) XII, 6606(174) (a *Rājāvaliya* text), 6607(20), 6615(9), (II), (12), (13). In HNSM vol. 1 p. vii Somadasa describes the mss. in this collection as follows: 'Numbering 2227 items, which Nevill had collected or had had copied during his service [in the British colonial government] in Ceylon from 1865 till near the time of his death in 1897, they include large parts of the Pali Buddhist Canon or scriptures, mostly with *sannaya* or Sinhalese explanatory glosses, as well as Sinhalese Buddhist and popular secular literature, poetry, history and folk tales.'

⁶ U Tin's *Myanma Min Okchokpan Sadan* is one of a number of works written between 1880 and 1915 that are poised between tradition and modernity: they summarise the traditional pre-colonial culture for publication in the new colonial medium of the printed book. U Tin's work salvaged Konbaung dynasty royal documents. The royal orders it contains are now more easily accessible in Than Tun 1984–1990.

⁷ Whereas the Burmese chronicles have been published and analysed, the Arakan chronicles have not. It is not at all clear what works San Shwe Bu was quoting, or what date they were written or whether they still exist.

⁸ There is sometimes confusion over names and identities: e.g. Or.6604(103) IV, 6611(263).

⁹ Or.6615[351], HNSM vol.6 p. 482: all references in this paragraph are to sub-divisions of Or.6615. D. Scott (1994) gives a modern ethnography of one such ritual.

¹⁰ Wirz's language (or that of his informants) seems suspiciously biblical, so caution as to the representativeness of this story is advisable.

¹¹ This seems to be the same text as Derianagala's 371, although that is called *Mahā Sammata sānti*.

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THE BUDDHIST CONDITIONAL IN SET-THEORETIC TERMS

The Buddhist logical school recognizes two means of valid cognition (two *pramāṇa*): sense perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) of something not perceived. In the first case we may cognize a fire by seeing its flames, hearing the crackle of the burning fuel, smelling the smoke, or feeling the heat (presumably we will not care to employ the sense of taste); in the second case, being too far from the fire to sense it in any of these ways, we may infer its existence by (a) perceiving smoke, (b) recalling that smoke means fire, and (c) deducing that there is fire in the locus in question. The first of these is a case of direct sense perception, but it is inadequate in itself; it is the fire that interests us, and our perception of smoke is a perception of what is not fire. So we need to proceed. The second, the conditional statement 'if smoke then fire' (and for our purposes here we make no distinction between term logic, in which we would say 'instances of those that possess smoke are instances of those that possess fire', and propositional logic, in which we would say 'if x is smoky then x is fiery') is validated for Dharmakīrti by its consonance with two of the three criteria (*rūpa*) that the antecedent (in this case smoke) possesses. That is, if we consider 'if smoke then fire' as valid, then it must be because smoke is present only in cases of fire and because (what is contrapositive to this and equivalent to it) where there is no fire there is no smoke (see Stcherbatsky 1930, pp. 55 ff., and Shāstrī 1982, pp. 31 ff.). (How it is that we know these things – do we simply observe cases of smoke and fire in the world, so that cognition of the relationship is induced in us, or is there something intrinsic to the nature of smoke or fire or both, by which we can obtain such cognition by deduction? – involves the dispute between the partisans of *antartvyāpti* and the partisans of *bahirvyāpti*, into which we shall not enter here.)

So thus far we have two perceptions, (a) that of smoke, which is a 'physical' perception in a sense (though Buddhists will point out that one person's perception of the smoke is not another person's perception, even if it is the same body of smoke – the angle from which it is perceived will differ, if nothing else, hence there is still a subjective and mental aspect to this), and (b) that of the validity of the proposition 'if smoke then fire', which may be seen as the mental

perception of a mental object.¹ We then 'multiply' the two, as it were, and obtain by inference the truth of (c) 'there is fire there', which again is mental. Skeptics and Cārvākas may deny the validity of such inference, but historically it appears that most people have accepted it, either intuitionally or by recognition – or belief – in its consistency with the facts of human experience.²

From this point let us renounce consideration of all problems associated with perception and inference in themselves and look only at the conditional statement that in some sense mediates between them (inasmuch as the conditional or 'if-then' statement, applied to a sense-datum such as 'smoke', enables us, provided we are not radical skeptics, to infer 'fire'). For Dharmakīrti there are two types, that by essence (*svabhāva*) and that by causation (*kārya*) (see Shāstrī 1982, p. 35, pp. 38 ff.; Stcherbatsky 1930, p. 60, pp. 65 ff.) (we omit consideration here of the whole topic of negation; note also throughout that Stcherbatsky's English terminology and the present writer's are different). 'If a pine then a tree' (the Sanskrit example is that of *śiṃśapā* or *aśoka* tree) is true because a pine has the 'essence' of 'treeness', but we must add that no implication is made here that the Buddhists regard essences as real entities; indeed, they do not, which is why we now prefer to gloss the whole matter in set-theoretic terms: the set of all pines is a subset of the set of all trees, and it is this fact, this inclusion, this *vyāpti* of treeness (a figure of speech merely, a *nomen*, Buddhists being radical nominalists) over pineness, that provides the basis for our conditional. The term *vyāpti*, often and rightly translated as 'pervasion' (and we can see this pervasion in such as Figure 1a, where the domain of that which possesses animalhood pervades the domain of that which possesses catness), can also be translated as 'inclusion' (and this too we can see). But set-theoretic inclusion also corresponds to conditional propositions concerning the points within the sets (the sets here being seen strictly as sets of points, bounded by circles, in the Euclidean plane).³ The proposition 'if a point *x* is within the "cat" circle then it is also within the "animal" circle' corresponds exactly to the proposition 'the set of all cats is included by the set of all animals'. Thus if $C(x)$ means '*x* is a cat' and $A(x)$ '*x* is an animal', and if C is the set of all cats and A the set of all animals, we can write, for all x ,

$$C(x) \rightarrow A(x) \equiv C \subset A$$

This states the isomorphism between statements of the elementary propositional calculus and statements of elementary set theory.

The other type of conditional, that by causation, may be illustrated by the smoke–fire example. Smoke and fire do not, it seems, share a




Figure 1.

common essence, even if essences are taken to be purely nominal; nor do 'smokes' constitute a subset of the set of fires. But loci on which appears smoke do in fact constitute a subset of the set of all loci of fire; so even here a set-theoretic interpretation is possible, and it will be adopted here.

Let us now see how the conditional works within a syllogistic inference (assuming, as said, for the purposes of this discussion, that we have no theoretical problem with perception as such, on which any inference must at least in part be based, nor with the validity of inference itself, which we here take for granted). We wish to show that Felix is an animal, and by direct perception we ascertain that he is a cat, thus 'placing' him within the set of cats (Figure 1b). We recall then that the set of all cats is a subset of the set of all animals and infer that Felix must be in this set as well (Figure 2a). By way of a (Western) syllogism, we might say 'all cats are animals; Felix is a cat; therefore Felix is an animal'. In the more concise (Indian and Buddhist) *svārthanumāna* form we shall have 'Felix is an animal [the desired conclusion stated first] because of [his] catness'. The thesis that all cats are animals will not be stated explicitly at all, though it is of course implied. In Sanskrit there would be three words only, the thing we are talking about (Felix), called the *pakṣa* or 'locus' (this is not a literal translation); the probandum (animalness), called the *sādhya* or 'thing to be proved' (the quality, as it were, that is to be proved to be in or on the locus); and the probans (catness), called the *hetu* or *liṅga* 'reason' or 'mark' by which we infer what is to be inferred (Figure 2b). Things in the outer circle are those that possess (*mat*) the probandum (*sādhya* [*dharma*]), e.g. animals possess animalhood.

Now an inference that is intended to be valid may nevertheless be invalid, and various lists of fallacies have been drawn up. In a sense

SĀMĀKHYA IN THE ABHIDHARMAKOŚA BHĀŚYA

In a recent article (Bronkhorst, 1994) I drew attention to a number of quotations in various early authors that ascribe to Sāṃkhya a position that we do not find in the classical texts of that school. In Sāṃkhya, if we can believe these authors, a substance used to be looked upon as a collection of qualities. The classical doctrine of the school, on the other hand, distinguishes clearly between a substrate which remains the same, and properties that undergo modification. Modification (*pariṇāma*) itself is described in the following terms in the *Yuktidīpikā*:¹

When the substrate (*dharmin*), without abandoning its essence, drops the earlier property (*dharma*) and accepts the next one, that is called modification (*pariṇāma*);

and again:²

For modification is the destruction of one property of a substance which remains the same, and the appearance (*pravṛtti*) of another property;

and a third time:³

Modification of a substrate (*dharmin*) is the appearance [in it] of another property and the disappearance of the earlier one.

The Yoga Bhāṣya defines the same concept in the following manner:⁴

The production of a new property in a substance which remains the same, while the earlier property is destroyed.

In my earlier article I did not refer to the way in which the Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya defines *pariṇāma* in Sāṃkhya in its discussion of Abhidharmakośa 3.50a. There was no need for this, for its definition is almost identical with the one in the Yoga Bhāṣya, followed by a short discussion. The whole passage reads:⁵

- (a) How do the Sāṃkhyas [define] modification?
- (b) [As follows:] The appearance of a new property in a substance which remains the same, while another property is destroyed.
- (c) What is wrong with that?
- (d) For there is no such substrate (*dharmin*) which remains the same and whose properties could undergo modification.

- (e) Who says that the substrate is different from the property? Modification is merely the becoming otherwise of that very substance.
 (f) This, too, is incorrect.
 (g) What is incorrect about it?
 (h) This is a new way of speaking, to say that this is that, but [at the same time that] it is not like that.

In this discussion two persons speak: a Buddhist and a Sāṃkhya. The Buddhist asks questions and criticizes the answers of the Sāṃkhya. To the Sāṃkhya, it would appear, belong (b), (e), and (g);⁶ the Buddhist questioner may then pronounce (a), (c)–(d), (f) and (h). The Sāṃkhya explains first that modification is “the appearance of a new property in a substance which remains the same, while another property is destroyed”, then specifies that the substrate is not different from the properties, so that “modification is merely the becoming otherwise of that very substance”. The Buddhist disagrees with the initial explanation by pointing out that “there is no such substrate which remains the same and whose properties could undergo modification”, and with the subsequent specification by rejecting the Sāṃkhya’s procedure, according to which “this is that, but at the same time it is not like that”.

This passage gives the impression of presenting Sāṃkhya in its classical form, and not in its pre-classical shape, in which no unchanging substrate of properties had yet been introduced. Yet Louis de la Vallée Poussin’s translation of this passage creates a different impression. It reads:⁷

Qu’entendent les Sāṃkhyas par *parināma*? – Ils admettent que, dans une substance permanente (*dharmin*, *dravya*), les *dharmas* ou essences naissent et disparaissent. – En quoi cette doctrine est-elle absurde? [3a] – On ne peut admettre, d’une part, un *dharmin* permanent, d’autre part des *dharmas* naissant et disparaissant. – Mais les Sāṃkhyas ne supposent pas qu’il y a un *dharmin* à part des *dharmas*; ils disent qu’un *dharma*, quand il se transforme (*parinam*), devient le support de divers caractères: ce *dharma*, ils l’appellent *dharmin*. En d’autres termes, la transformation (*parināma*) c’est seulement la modification (*anyathābhāvamātra*) de la substance (*dravya*). – Cette thèse n’est pas non plus admissible. – Pourquoi? – Parce qu’il y a contradiction dans les termes: vous admettez que cela (la cause) est ceci (l’effet), et que ceci n’est pas comme cela.

This translation deviates in one essential aspect from the Sanskrit passage which we have just studied. The phrase “ils disent qu’un *dharma*, quand il se transforme (*parinam*), devient le support de divers caractères: ce *dharma*, ils l’appellent *dharmin*” has nothing corresponding to it in the Sanskrit.

It should not of course be forgotten that La Vallée Poussin prepared his translation at a time when the original Sanskrit text of the

Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya was not yet accessible, nor indeed known to exist. He worked exclusively on the basis of translations of this text into Chinese and Tibetan, using commentaries where available. The fact that his French translation has still lost none of its usefulness even after the discovery of the Sanskrit original, testifies to its excellence. In spite of this, one might be tempted to think that, in the case of the passage under consideration, La Vallée Poussin’s lack of access to the Sanskrit original is responsible for an inaccuracy in his translation.

However, La Vallée Poussin’s translation expresses something that, though not present in the Sanskrit original, seems to be close to the position of pre-classical Sāṃkhya, so far as we know that earlier position. His translation states that, properly considered, a substance is nothing but a collection of properties (*dharma*), one of which may, in certain circumstances, be called substrate (*dharmin*). Is it possible that La Vallée Poussin used, in preparing his translation, material that contained information about preclassical Sāṃkhya? Where did he find this?

A look at Yaśomitra’s Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā, the only commentary that has been preserved in Sanskrit, may shed light on the question. This text contains some passages that are of the greatest interest in this context. First the following one, which occurs in an altogether different context:⁸

What is modification (*parināma*)? ... It is the becoming otherwise of a chain (*saṃtari*)... What is this chain? Is it the becoming otherwise of a chain which remains the same, just as for the Sāṃkhyas it is the appearance of a new property in a substance which remains the same, while another property is destroyed?

The underlined part ascribes exactly the same position to the Sāṃkhyas as does the passage – esp. sentence (b) – found in the Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya. However, Yaśomitra also comments on Vasubandhu’s passage (and therefore in a way on his own), and there he explains “a substance which remains the same” (*avasthitasya dravyasya*) as meaning “constituted of colour, taste, and so on” (*rūparasādyātmakasya*).⁹ This seems to be what we were looking for. Yaśomitra would seem to interpret Vasubandhu in accordance with early Sāṃkhya doctrine. One is likely to get the impression that, according to Yaśomitra, substance in Sāṃkhya consists in its qualities (*rūparasādyātmaka*), and is not their substrate.

This interpretation looks puzzling. It raises the question whether Vasubandhu had this interpretation in mind while writing this passage. And if Vasubandhu intended this, did the author of the Yoga Bhāṣya, too, hold on to the early position of Sāṃkhya? And what about the

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author of the *Yuktīpikā*? It becomes vital to find out whether we have understood Yaśomitra correctly.

Note first that Yaśomitra does not comment on exactly the passage of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya* cited above from Pradhan's edition. Yaśomitra knew a slightly different reading, which is also the one adopted by Dwarikadas Shastri in his edition. The difference is minimal, but crucial. Yaśomitra and Dwarikadas Shastri have the two words *na hi* at the beginning of sentence (b), and lack *hi* in sentence (d). The whole passage now becomes:¹⁰

- (a) How do the Sāmkhyas [define] modification?
- (b) For there is no appearance of a new property in a substance which remains the same, while another property is destroyed.
- (c) What is wrong with that?
- (d) There is no such substrate (*dharmin*) which remains the same and whose properties could undergo modification.
- (e) Who says that the substrate is different from the properties? Modification is merely the becoming otherwise of that very substance.
- (f) This, too, is incorrect.
- (g) What is incorrect about it?
- (h) This is a new way of speaking, to say that this is that, but [at the same time that] it is not like that.

Here, too, we may attribute the different sentences to two speakers, but they will now have to be attributed differently from before. The new reading of (b) is somewhat clumsy, and one might be tempted to think, with Yamashita (1994: 58 n. 47), that it is erroneous. But if we assume, with Yaśomitra, that it is correct, we cannot but conclude that (a) and (b) go together and are pronounced by the same person, the Buddhist, who knows the position of Sāmkhya, but raises a question about it, knowing that "there is no appearance of a new property in a substance which remains the same, while another property is destroyed". Question (c) is then asked by the Sāmkhya; and answer (d) is to be put in the mouth of the Buddhist. To the Sāmkhya further belong (e) and (g), to the Buddhist (f) and (h).

In this reading sentence (b) cannot but be a remark made by the Buddhist, i.e. by Vasubandhu, about the nature of modification as he sees it, whereas in the reading accepted by Pradhan sentence (b) gives the position of the Sāmkhya. Yaśomitra comments on the sentence with *na hi* and therefore on Vasubandhu's position, not on the Sāmkhya

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"For not in a substance which remains the same" means "constituted of colour, taste, and so on". "While another property is destroyed" means "while the milk is destroyed". "Appearance of a new property" means "production of curds".

On sentence (d) Yaśomitra comments:¹²

"No such substrate (*dharmin*)" means "a property different from the properties of milk etc., which are colour etc., a property which does not arise and does not get destroyed even when [those other properties] arise and get destroyed".

Sentence (d), too, expresses Vasubandhu's opinion, and not that of the Sāmkhyas. This means that Yaśomitra explains Vasubandhu's opinion on the nature of substance. And there substance is conceived of as being "constituted of colour, taste, and so on".

This last point is clear from such passages as the following one from the *Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya*:¹³

[Opponent:] The atom is a substance, and a substance is different from colour etc. It is not established that when those [qualities] disappear that [substance] will disappear, [too].

[Reply:] It is not acceptable that [a substance] is different [from its qualities], since no one distinguishes them, [saying:] "these are earth, water and fire, and these are their colour etc."

Indeed, for Vasubandhu and the Buddhists in general, there is no such thing as a lasting substance that is the substrate of qualities. Strictly speaking there are only qualities, without substrate. This is what Yaśomitra explained correctly.

La Vallée Poussin must have believed that Yaśomitra attributed the position which we now recognize as Buddhist to Sāmkhya. This would explain his misleading translation into French of the passage under consideration. He can hardly be blamed for this, given that he had no access to the Sanskrit text of Vasubandhu's work.

Recently an English translation has been published of La Vallée Poussin's French translation. The translator, Leo M. Pruden, explains in the Translator's Preface (1988–1990: I, xxiii f.) that the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* can best be understood from its Sanskrit original, and he relates how his translation from the French of La Vallée Poussin went hand in hand with a study of the Sanskrit original. Indeed, it was his original intention to publish his work with the English translation on the right facing page, and the romanized Sanskrit on the left facing page; only the high cost of publishing prevented him from doing so. The question that interests us at present is what effect this acquaintance with the Sanskrit text has had on Pruden's English translation of the passage under consideration.

What do the Sāṃkhyas understand by *pariṇāma*?

They admit that *dharmas* arise and disappear within a permanent substance (a *dharmin* or *dravya*).

How is this incorrect?

One cannot admit the simultaneous existence of a permanent *dharmin*, and of *dharmas* arising and disappearing.

But the Sāṃkhyas do not hold that there is a *dharmin* separate from the *dharmas*; they say that a *dharma*, when it is transformed (*pariṇam*), becomes the support of different characteristics: this *dharma* they call *dharmin*. In other words, transformation (*pariṇāma*) is only the modification (*anyathābhāvamātra*) of a substance (*dravya*).

This thesis is not correct.

Why is it not correct?

Because there is a contradiction in terms: you admit that that (the cause) is identical to this (the result), but that this is not like that.

It can easily be seen that this is a satisfactory translation of La Vallée Poussin's French. But quite obviously, the Sanskrit has not been taken into consideration. We still find the claim that "the Sāṃkhyas say that a *dharma*, when it is transformed (*pariṇam*), becomes the support of different characteristics: this *dharma* they call *dharmin*"; we have seen that the Sanskrit says nothing of the kind.

NOTES

¹ YD p. 49 l. 10-11; p. 75 l. 6-7: *jahad dharmāntaram pūrvam upādatte yadā paramtatvād apracyuto dharmī pariṇāmah sa ucyatell*. Compare this with Vkp 3.7.118: *pūrvāvasthām avijahat* (v.l. *pūrvām avasthām ajahat*) *saṃsprśan dharmam uttaram/saṃmūrchita ivārtihātmā jāyamāno 'bhidhīyatell*.

² YD p. 49 l. 6-7: *pariṇāmo hi nāmāvasthitasya dravyasya dharmāntaranivṛttih dharmāntarapravṛttis ca*. Muroya (1996: 49) rightly points out that this definition of *pariṇāma* occurs in a passage defending the point of view of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The next definition of the Yukūḍīpika essentially substitutes *āvīrbhāva* for *pravṛtti*, and *tirobhāva* for *nivṛtti*, in order to answer an objection from the side of these opponents.

³ YD p. 53 l. 25-26: ... *dharmiṇo dharmāntarasyāvīrbhāvah pūrvasya ca tirobhāvah pariṇāmah*. I prefer this interpretation to the alternative one "Modification is the appearance of another property which is the substrate and the disappearance of the earlier one"; cp. Muroya, 1996: 50.

⁴ YBh 3.13: *avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmanivṛttau dharmāntarotpattih*. Cp. the Nyāya Bhāṣya introducing sūtra 4.1.33: *avasthitasyopādānasya dharmamātram nivaratāte dharmamātram upajāyate*. ...

⁵ Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 159 l. 18-19: *katham ca sāmkyānām pariṇāmah/avasthitasya dravyasya dharmāntaranivṛttau dharmāntaraprādurbhāva itilkaś cātra doṣah/sa eva hi dharmī na saṃvidyate yasyāvasthitasya dharmānām pariṇāmah kalpyeta/kaś caivam āha dharmebhyo 'nyo dharmītilasyaiva tu dravyasyānyathābhāvamātram pariṇāmah/evam apy ayuktam/kim atrāyuktam/tad eva cedam na cedam tatheti apūrvaiṣā vācocyuktih*. Instead of *vācocyuktih*, Pradhan's edition has *vāyo yuktih*.

⁶ An independent confirmation that - at least from the Buddhist point of view - modification in Sāṃkhya is "merely the becoming otherwise of that very substance" may be the following observation in the Abhidharmadīpa (Abhidh-d p. 106 l. 10-

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12): *sāmkyasya tv avasthitasya dharmiṇah svātmabhūtasya dharmāntarasyotsargaḥ svātmabhūtasya cotpādah pariṇāma iti*.

⁷ Abhidh-k(VP) II p. 142.

⁸ Abhidh-k-vy p. 148 l. 3-7; Abhidh-k-bh(D) p. 217 l. 18-21: *ko 'yam pariṇāmo nāmetil.../saṃtater anyathātvam itil.../kā ceyam saṃtatir itil/kiṃ yathā sāmkyānām avasthita-dravyasya dharmāntara-nivṛttau dharmāntara-prādurbhāvah tathā 'vasthāyinyāḥ saṃtater anyathātvam itil*

⁹ Abhidh-k-vy p. 324 l. 31-34; Abhidh-k-bh(D) p. 509 l. 17-20; cited below.

¹⁰ Abhidh-k-bh(D) p. 509 l. 3-6: *katham ca sāmkyānām pariṇāmah/na hy avasthitasya dravyasya dharmāntaranivṛttau dharmāntaraprādurbhāva itilkaś cātra doṣah/sa eva dharmī na saṃvidyate yasyāvasthitasya dharmānām pariṇāmah kalpyeta/kaś caivam āha dharmebhyo 'nyo dharmītilasyaiva tu dravyasyānyathābhāvamātram pariṇāmah/evam apy ayuktam/kim atrāyuktam/tad eva cedam na cedam tatheti apūrvaiṣā vācocyuktih*

¹¹ Abhidh-k-vy p. 324 l. 31-33; Abhidh-k-bh(D) p. 509 l. 17-18: *na hy avasthitasya dravyasyetil/rūparasādyātmakasya/dharmāntaranivṛttāv itil/ksīranivṛttau/dharmāntara-prādurbhāva itil/dadhijanmal*

¹² Abhidh-k-vy p. 324 l. 33-35; Abhid-k-bh(D) p. 509 l. 18-20: *sa eva dharmī netil/rūpādyaṃmakakṣīrādīdharmebhyo 'nyo dharma utpādavyaye 'py anutpanno 'vinaṣṭah/pariṇāma itil/ksīranivṛttau dadhibhāvah*

¹³ Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 190 l. 3-5; Abhidh-k-bh(D) p. 562 l. 4-7: *dravyam hi paramānur anyac ca rūpādibhyo dravyam iti na teṣām vināṣe tadvināṣah siddhyatil/ayuktam asyānyatvam yavātā na nirdhāryate (paricchidyate, D) kenacit imāni pṛthivyaptejāmsi ime teṣām (eṣām, D) rūpādāya itil*. Cp. Frauwallner, Phil. d. Buddh, p. 101; Abhidh-k(VP) Vol 2, p. 213-214.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abhidh-d	Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti, ed. P. S. Jaini, Patna 1959 (TSWS 4)
Abhidh-k(VP)	Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośa, traduit et annoté par Louis de La Vallée Poussin, 6 vols., Paris 1923-1931
Abhidh-k-bh(D)	Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra, pts. 1-4, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1970-1973 (BBhS 5, 6, 7, 9)
Abhidh-k-bh(P)	Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, ed. P. Pradhan, rev. 2nd ed. Aruna Haldar, Patna 1975 (TSWS 8)
Abhidh-k-vy	Yaśomitra, Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, ed. Unrai Wogihara, Tōkyō 1932-1936
BBhs	Baudha Bharati Series, Varanasi
Frauwallner, Phil.d.Buddh	Erich Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin 1956
TSWS	Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Patna
Vkp	Bhartṛhari, Vākyapadīya, ed. W. Rau, Wiesbaden 1977
WZKS	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens, Wien
YBh	Yoga Bhāṣya
YD	Yuktīdīpikā

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THE COMING OF NIKALANK AVATAR: A MESSIANIC THEME
 IN SOME SECTARIAN TRADITIONS OF NORTH-WESTERN
 INDIA

In the literary tradition associated with a few "obscure" religious movements of Rajasthan and Gujarat¹ one finds a number of prophetic songs the central motifs of which are of an eschatological and messianic nature. They describe the end of the world or rather, according to Hindu beliefs, the cataclysms and disasters preceding the dissolution (*pralaya*) of the universe at the end of the fourth cosmic Age (*Kali yuga*) before a new Era begins.² The advent of a saviour and restorer of justice in the form of Vishnu's tenth incarnation is also predicted, although, unlike the Epic and Puranic Kalki, he is referred to as Nikalank Avatar.

Some of these devotional compositions known as *Āgam vānīs* (litt. "poems of the time to come")³ are still sung during the sacred vigils (*jamā-jāgrans*) organized by the followers of a sect called Mahāpanth or Nizārpanth, who accept as one of their gurus Ramdev Pir, a fourteenth-fifteenth century saint of Marwar (D.S. Khan, 1993, 1996). The numerous modern devotees who also worship him as a folk-deity but do not belong to the *panth* are not familiar with these songs which are a part of the religious heritage of some other sects as well: the Biśnoi, Jasnāthī and Āī *panths*. The founders of these movements which are mostly spread in Rajasthan but also found in neighbouring areas, such as Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Punjab, are believed to have flourished in the fifteenth century. Most of their teachings have remained secret to this day, although the devotional poems ascribed to them and to their disciples may superficially display similarities with the compositions of better known Medieval saints of North India (D.S. Khan, 1997). The same type of *vānīs* are also found in other traditions such as the Ravi-Ban *sampradāy* and the Praṇāmī sect (Gohil, 1994: 20).⁴

Remarking that this prophetic theme plays a major role in the Nizarpanthi tradition, most followers of which seem to belong to untouchables groups (Gohil, *Ibid.*: 52-3) asserts that the theme is a part of an esoteric revelation connected with the sect. He also attempts to show that the messianic accents of the *Āgam vānīs* reflect the condition

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THE PROLIFERATION OF CITTAVIPRAYUKTASAMSKĀRA-S IN
THE VAIBHĀSIKA SCHOOL

The theory of *cittaviprayuktasamskāra*-s (hereafter CVS) is one of the most characteristic features of the Vaibhāṣika analysis of the constituents of reality. The importance of the category in the whole pastiche of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma was first recognized by the pioneer Soviet buddhologist, T. Stcherbatsky,¹ and the development of the theory and the import of some of the different forces governed by this category have been incisively treated by P.S. Jaini and Collett Cox.² A complete treatment of the theory, however, must wait until the vast store of information preserved in the Chinese translations of the Vaibhāṣika materials is culled and analyzed. From my own preliminary examination of the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā* (AMV), the second century A.D. compendium of Sarvāstivāda doctrine, it seems clear that the mature Vaibhāṣika system resorted to the CVS device to a far greater extent than would be expected according to later Sanskrit sources such as the *Abhidharmakośa* and the *Abhidharmadīpa* in its attempt to provide consistent analyses of complex moral and mental processes. The flexibility of the CVS classification, while observable in all strata of Vaibhāṣika materials, is most clearly discernable in the AMV, and is an important element in the approach of the Vibhāṣāśāstrins. Among the CVSs which are discussed by the Vibhāṣāśāstrins, a number are included which are not even mentioned in the lists of CVS appearing in later texts such as the *Kośa*, Ghoṣaka's *Abhidharmāmṛta*, or Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya*; none of them have as yet received any attention from modern scholars either. I have already written about the Vaibhāṣika treatment of one of these previously unknown CVS, *samucchinakuśalamūla*, in a previous paper; in this article, I propose to make a few preliminary remarks about a few more of these new CVS, and give a general comment about the status of CVS in the AMV as a whole.³

THE TENDENCY TOWARDS PROLIFERATION OF
CITTAVIPRAYUKTASAMSKĀRAS

By the time of the compilation of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts (circa first century B.C.), *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* had become a characteristic feature of the Vaibhāṣika treatment of anomalous doctrinal problems. From that point on, there seems to have been a rapid proliferation of new types of similar forces until the standardization of these lists in later manuals such as the *Kośa*. In particular, it is readily apparent that CVS were postulated to account for events peculiar to specific types of persons, including the damned (*samucchinakuśalamūla*) the saintly (*arhadvaparihāna*), the ordinary (*pudgalatva*), and advanced practitioners (*mūrdhapatita*); there was even a specific type of CVS posited to account for the processes governing a group, not an individual *santāna* (*saṅghabheda*). In such cases, descriptive difficulties made the CVS device attractive in order to explain clearly the processes underlying these events. In the rare instances where the Vibhāṣāśāstrins list CVS, a bare outline of the extent of the category is given, which generally includes: 1) *jīvitendriya*; 2) *nikāya sabhāgatā*; 3) *asaṃjñīsamāpatī*; 4) *prāpti*; 5,6,7,8) the four *samskṛtalakṣaṇas*.⁴ What is clear in the *AMV* listings is that only the most general and comprehensive types of CVS were included; other CVS posited to cover more specific and unusual conditions were postulated as the need arose. Indeed, there is considerable evidence from a variety of Vaibhāṣika texts that a flexibility in the classification was to be encouraged. The *Dharmaskandha* states explicitly: "Furthermore, there are additional [*śeṣita*; *śeṣa*] [and unspecified] dharmas of similar type [*evañjāṇīyaka*; *tadṛśa*] which are not associated with the mind [*cittaviprayukta*]; these are called the *cittaviprayuktasamskāra-skandha*".⁵ The Vibhāṣāśāstrins, following the *Dharmaskandha* treatment of the term, state that, in addition to the various CVS which are mentioned in the *AMV*, "...there are many additional [dharmas] of similar type within the *viprayukta* class. That is because there are many kinds of *viprayuktasamskāras*".⁶ Later, even Vasubandhu, by the addition of a simple, yet suggestive connective *ca* in his verse account of the category, has intimated that the standard list he presents in the *Kośa* was not to be considered as exhaustive:

*viprayuktās tu samskārah prāptya-prāptī sabhāgatā asaṃjñīkaṃ samāpatī jīvitam lakṣaṇāni ca. nāmākāyādaś cēti prāptir lābhīḥ samanvayaḥ.*⁷

Yaśomitra's comments on the last line are particularly trenchant:

"*nāmākāyādayaś ca*:" the word *ca* (and) is used in order to indicate *viprayukta[samskāradharmas]* of similar type which are not mentioned [by the

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Kośakāra); for *saṅghabheda*, etc. are acknowledged [by some teachers] as being *cittaviprayukta[samskāras]* which exist in reality. This is because it is mentioned in the *sūtra* that there are [other *cittaviprayuktasamskāras*] of similar type.⁸

Here, it is clear that the Vaibhāṣikas meant to keep the category open so as to allow for resolution of whatever new doctrinal questions might arise; and this flexibility was justified by such statements as "...there are many additional dharmas of similar type included in the CVS class".

Saṅghabheda (Causing Schism in the Order)

The Vaibhāṣika penchant to resort to CVS in order to analyze complex moral processes is well-illustrated in their treatment of *saṅghabheda*.⁹ This is a unique problem in Abhidharma, because *saṅghabheda* is the only CVS I have found so far which applies not to an individual *santāna*, but to the governing group events. Although it is treated as a CVS even in the *Kośa*,¹⁰ it has not been included in the standard list given by Vasubandhu in his *kārikās*. The *AMV* is equally explicit in calling *saṅghabheda* a CVS and, as usual, gives us detailed information on the Vaibhāṣika interpretation of the question.

Saṅghabheda is called the worst of the five *ānantaryakarman-s* "... because it destroys the *dharmakāya*".¹¹ Among the actions spawned by the three *akuśalamūlas* of *lobha*, *dveṣa*, and *moha* the false speech (*mṛṣāvāda*) which initiates the act of *saṅghabheda* is called the worst, because it brings upon the perpetrator the guarantee of a *kalpa*-long lifetime in *niraka* hell.¹² Indeed, the consequences of this act are so severe that if the malefactor's term in *niraka* has not been completed by the time of the annihilation accompanying the end of the *kalpa* – at which time all life will come to an end – he will reborn into another world-system's hell to finish out his sentence.¹³

Two types of *saṅghabheda* are distinguished: 1) *karma[saṅgha]bheda*, in which within one *sīma* boundary there are two completely separate *saṅghas*, each holding its own *poṣadhakarman* and *prātimokṣa* recitations;¹⁴ 2) *dharmacakra[saṅgha]bheda*, which is the attempt to establish a completely different teacher and dispensation. Of course, here the classic example is that of the Buddha's cousin, Devadatta, who declared that he, and not Gautama, was the Master, and that his five practices were the correct dispensation, not the eightfold path outlined by Gautama.¹⁵

Paralleling much of the material I have outlined previously for *samucchinakuśalamūla*, various features of the act of *saṅghabheda* are discussed by the Vibhāṣāśāstrins, focussing on the latter type of *saṅghabheda* as being the most onerous. The *drṣṭicārins* can perform

dharmacakrasaṅghabheda because their opinions are stronger than those of the *ṛṣṇācārins*.¹⁶ Only men can perform *saṅghabheda*, not women or eunuchs, because the *āśayas* of the latter two are not strong enough to support the claim of being the Master in a Buddha's dispensation.¹⁷ *Saṅghabheda* is the fruition of the *pravrajitacitta*, because obviously the lay status of a householder does not allow him to break up a *saṅgha* of ordained ecclesia.¹⁸ The Vaibhāṣāśāstrins resort to scriptural testimony to support their view that only *prthagjanas* can perform *saṅghabheda*, though they do note the controversy surrounding a minority claim that people who already have *prāpti* of the *nirvedhabhāgīyas* could perform *saṅghabheda*.¹⁹ The commentators use the canonical account of the events surrounding Devadatta's schism as justification for their assertion that *saṅghabheda* can only occur while the Buddha is inside the same *sīma* boundary as the renegade *saṅgha*; he cannot, however, be present among the members of the break-away *saṅgha*.²⁰ Finally, not all dispensations of past buddhas have suffered the experience of schism; rather, this occurs only to buddhas such as Śākyamūni who have tried to interrupt the actions attempted by others during their own past lives.²¹

A variety of interpretations are given by the Vibhāṣāśāstrins concerning the question of the timing of *saṅghabheda* and *samucchinakuśalamūla*. Vasumitra proposed that Devadatta first had to have performed *saṅghabheda* before he could become *samucchinakuśalamūla*. If this were not the case, his evil act would not have caused him to be reborn in hell for an entire kalpa, because he would have already been *samucchinakuśalamūla* and, hence, already subject to such punishment; his subsequent performance of *saṅghabheda* would have been redundant. Furthermore, this process of initial *saṅghabheda*/subsequent *samucchinakuśalamūla* is justified because Devadatta was not totally evil, and still performed wholesome actions, and was learned, handsome, and clever before his act of *saṅghabheda*; hence, he could not have already been *samucchinakuśalamūla*. The interpretation finally accepted by the Vibhāṣāśāstrins, however, is that *samucchinakuśalamūla* takes place simultaneously with the occurrence of *saṅghabheda*.²²

In their analysis of *saṅghabheda*, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins are careful to distinguish between a distinct CVS called '*saṅghabheda*', and the actual act of fomenting schism itself (*saṅghabhedapāpa*). "The essential quality [*svabhāva*] of *saṅghabheda* is disharmony [*asāmagrī*]; it is an *anivṛtāvyaḥkrta* [*dharma*] and is included in the *cittaviprayuktasamskārasandha*. The essential quality [*svabhāva*] of

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saṅghabhedapāpa is false speech [*mṛṣāvāda*]. [This distinction is made because] the '*saṅgha*' is in possession [*samanvāgama*] of '*bheda*' [schism], while a person who performs *saṅghabheda* [thereby producing *saṅghabhedapāpa*], is in possession of '*pāpa*' [sin]."²³ The distinction drawn here by the Vibhāṣāśāstrins is an important one because it demonstrates the rationale used in positing a separate CVS called '*saṅghabheda*' in their doctrinal scheme. Clearly, *saṅghabheda* takes place in the *saṅgha*, not in the person who initiates the act (*bhettr*); hence, the one who foments schism is not *saṅghabheda* himself, but rather, the *saṅgha* which is so affected. *Saṅgha* (assembly) is characterizable as a feeling of unity of purpose and intention common to all members of that group. When the fomentor's false speech creates disunity (*asāmagrī*) in the minds of those various members, *saṅghabheda* is produced which affects the assembly as a whole. Hence, this is a unique problem in analysis which, again, is conveniently resolved by resorting to a distinct CVS.

Moreover, *saṅghabheda* has as its essential quality speech [*vākkarman*], while the four other *ānantariyakarman*-s are, rather, characterized by bodily actions [*kāyakarman*]. Hence, in the Vaibhāṣika scheme, all five of these most heinous of crimes are included in the *rūpaskandha*.²⁴ According to the peculiarly Vaibhāṣika theory of *pratimokṣasamvara avijñaptirūpa*,²⁵ the vows taken by the monks in any given *saṅgha* would protect their ordained status indefinitely, even at times – such as during sleep – when they were not actively pursuing their vocations. Because the continuity of an individual *santāna* is secured by the operation of the *sabhāgahetu* (homogeneous cause), those monks would not be susceptible to *saṅghabheda* while their monks' psycho/physical continuums were protected by *avijñaptirūpa*. Hence, it was only by positing the intercession of a totally dissociated CVS that these *santānas* could be interrupted, allowing *saṅghabheda* to occur.

Mūrdhapatita (Falling from the Summit)

As I noted in a previous paper, the Vaibhāṣikas employed the CVS device in their treatment of *samucchinakuśalamūla*, which can be defined generally as the retrogression from the *puṇyabhāgīya* and *mokṣabhāgīya kuśalamūlas*.²⁶ This same mode of analysis is used in the treatment of two parallel types of retrogression which occur at progressively higher stages of the path: *mūrdhapatita* and *arhattivaparihānadharman*. As far as I have been able to determine, *mūrdhapatita* is not even mentioned in later Vaibhāṣika texts as a discrete dharma, and it has

yet to receive mention in any modern secondary materials. Whereas *samucchinakuśalamūla* applies to falling away from the *puṇyabhāgiya* and *mokṣabhāgiyakuśalamūlas*, *mūrdhapatita* applies to falling away from the *nirvedhabhāgiyas* and *arhattvaparihāṇadharmān* from the fruition of arhatship itself.²⁷ Once again, in both cases, the intercession of a unique CVS is posited to account for the processes which are taking place in the *santānas* of these unusual individuals.

The *nirvedhabhāgiyas* or 'aids to penetration', are the four immediate stages prior to the entrance onto the *darśanamarga*. The four stages of 'heat' (*ūṣman*), 'climax' (*mūrdhan*), 'acceptance' (*kṣānti*), and 'highest worldly dharma' (*laukikāgradharma*)²⁸ are broadly distinguishable into two major divisions, between the former and latter pairs. The criteria for the division are their movability and their susceptibility to retrogression; the former pair suffer from both of these shortcomings, the latter pair does not.²⁹

Mūrdhan, the second of the four *nirvedhabhāgiyas*, is defined in terms of faith in the validity of the four noble truths – a faith which began to develop at the initial stage of *ūṣman* and reaches its 'climax' at the level of *mūrdhan*.³⁰ The term is taken by the Vaibhāṣikas from a *sūtra* passage in which the Lord tells Ānanda:

I will now explain for you all the summit... A noble disciple, in regards to the five grasping-aggregates [*upādānaskandha*] gives rise to contemplation [*vicāra*; *saṃcetanā*] and investigation [*manasikāra*; *upanidhyāna*] in regards to conditionally-arisen dharmas: [to wit, that] these are impermanent, suffering, void, and not-self. He has acceptance [*kṣānti*], vision [*darśana*], incitation [*adhimukti*], and [proper] conduct and understanding [*caranavidyā?*], and the acceptance [deriving from] vision and careful consideration [*darśanōpanidhyānakṣānti?*]. This is called 'summit'.³¹

Retrogression from this stage was accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas and was taken to refer specifically to a person who initially had right faith in the Buddhadharmā, realized that the five *skandhas* were impermanent, and correctly considered the four noble truths; however, he later turns from his mundane faith [*laukikaśraddhā*] and falls from his exalted state. Hence, *mūrdhapatita* usually was defined in terms of loss of faith, though some Vaibhāṣika advocates considered it in terms of loss of *prajñā*.³² Once again, the Vaibhāṣikas justify their use of the term by a *sūtra* passage in which the Buddha tells *Pārāpariyāmanava [波羅衍摩摩納婆]; "If a person turns from [*parihāṇa*] these three [counteracting] dharmas, I say that that type [of person] should be known as *mūrdhapatita*".³³

As we have seen before with these auxiliary CVS which are specific varieties of *aprāpti*, there is considerable discussion among the Vaibhāṣikas in their attempts to determine the true quality of this

dharma. These again run the gamut of *akuśaladharmas* from *āsraddhā* to *kleśasamyojana*, to *sarvadharmāḥ*; some Vaibhāṣikas apparently even considered this CVS to be merely nominal, adumbrating the eventual judgment of the Yogācārin in their treatment of the CVS question. As the AMV relates:

The *svabhāva* of *mūrdhapatita* is *asamanvāgama*; it is an *anivṛtāvyaḥṛta* [dharma] and is included in the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* *skandha*.

There is another explanation. When *śraddhā* is present, it is called *mūrdhaprāpti*; when *āsraddhā* is present, it is called *mūrdhapatita*. Hence, the explanation is given that *āsraddhā* is the *svabhāva* of *mūrdhapatita*.

There is another explanation. All the *kleśasamyojanas* can bring about *mūrdhapatita*; for this reason, the explanation is given that all the *saṅkliṣṭadharmas* are the *svabhāva* of *mūrdhapatita*.

There is another explanation. If a dharma is associated with retrogression [*parihāṇabhāgiyadharmā*], that dharma is called *mūrdhapatita*; for this reason, the explanation is given that all dharmas [*sarvadharmāḥ*] are the *svabhāva* of *mūrdhapatita*. This is because, at the time that one retrogresses from the summit [*mūrdhan*], all dharmas all retrogress from this [same] summit, because of the *adhipatipratyaya*.

[Objection:] Allegorically, it could be said that this [*mūrdhapatita-dharma*] is merely *prajñāpti* and has no real *svabhāva* – i.e., in a *santāna*, where previously there was the *samanvāgama* of *mūrdhan*, there is now its falling away. This can be compared to a person who possesses wealth being called a rich man, but who is called a poor man if [that wealth] is all stolen away. Someone might ask him, "When you are poor, what is the quality [*svabhāva*] of that?" That person might answer, "I am called destitute merely because I previously possessed much wealth and riches which have now been stolen away. What 'quality' would it have [in reality]?"

Alternatively, it is like a person who is first wearing clothes, but, having them stolen away later, is then naked. Someone might ask him, "Your nakedness has what quality [*svabhāva*]?" That person might answer, "I am naked now merely because I previously possessed clothes which have now been stolen away. [What quality would it have?]"

Alternatively, it can be compared to a person whose clothes are all threadbare. Someone might ask him, "Your clothes are threadbare: what is the quality of this?" That person might answer, "These clothes are called 'threadbare' merely because my clothes were originally brand new but are now completely tattered. What real quality [*svabhāva*] should it have?"

In the same way, a practitioner who initially possessed [*samanvāgama*] *mūrdhan*, has now fallen from [that state]. This so-called '*mūrdhapatita*' has no distinct *svabhāva*.

[Reply:] Critique: The prior explanation is preferable. This [*mūrdhapatitadharmā*] is included in [the *cittaviprayuktasamskāras* *skandha*]. There are several additional dharmas of similar type included in this *viprayukta* [class]. This is because the *viprayuktasamskāras* are of many varieties.³⁴

As the Vibhāṣāśāstrins note, there is only falling from this climax, not from the initial heat [*ūṣman*], and justify this claim because scriptural testimony for *mūrdhapatita* can be found, but not for **ūṣmapatita*.³⁵ The Vibhāṣāśāstrins give many examples why *mūrdhapatita* is so much

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more serious than *uṣmapatita* would be that it warrants its own distinct dharma:³⁶

1) The *mūrdhan nirvedhabhāgīyakuśalamūla* is so much more intense than and superior to *uṣman* that there is reason to discuss falling from that stage, but not from *uṣman*.

2) The *sūtras* speak of *mūrdhapatita* but not of **uṣmapatita*.

3) There is great disappointment [*daurmanasya, śoka*] resulting from *mūrdhapatita*, but not from **uṣmapatita*. It is comparable to a person who would find a great store of jewels and realize that his poverty was now ended forever, only to have that store of jewels suddenly disappear; obviously, he would be extremely disappointed. In the same way, a person achieving the stage of *mūrdhan* and realizing that he is soon to enter upon the stage of *kṣānti* where he would forever abandon the three *durgatis*, would be extremely disappointed if he lost that and came to dwell again on the stage of *uṣman*. This analogy shows clearly too that *mūrdhapatita* only meant that one fell back into the *uṣman* stage and no farther, giving the person a good opportunity, despite his disappointment, of regaining that state.

4) A person on the *mūrdhan* level has reached the stage where all the restraints [*adhīṣṭhāna?*] resulting from one's actions and the *kleśas* have been brought to climax so that they may be transcended on the following stage of *kṣānti*. To lose this opportunity, which is not available on the *uṣman* level, would be a great disappointment. [Some of the logic in this section, *AMV* 6, pp. 27a.13–24, is obscure and needs to be carefully examined.]

5) At the *mūrdhan* stage one gains a great benefit, unlike the comparatively meager benefits gained on the *uṣman* stage, so that when one falls one loses this great benefit. This can be compared to Śronaviṃśatikoti who lived for ninety-one kalpas without ever falling into the *durgatis* – but when he did finally fall, he lost a great benefit.

Arhattvaparihāna (Retgression from Arhatship)

The debate on the status of the arhat was a lively one among the early Buddhist ecclesia; as Vasumitra records in his *Samayabhedōparacanacakra*, there were several schools which held the arhat ideal in less than the highest repute.³⁷ Indeed, it can be safely asserted that the notion of retrogression from arhatship [*arhatvāt parihāna*] as found in some of these early schools – and including the eminently respectable Sarvāstivādin sect – eventually led to a redirection in the goal of Buddhist practice away from arhatship and towards the Bodhisattva ideal. As I noted in my previous paper on

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samucchinakuśalamūla there are numerous passages found in the *AMV* which demean the status of the arhat.³⁸ The Vaibhāsikas enumerated six different types of arhats, of whom the lowest type was called *parihānidharman*.³⁹ The Vibhāśāstrins make specific reference to retrogression from the fruition of arhatship [*arhattaphalaparihāna*].⁴⁰ Indeed, they go so far as to say that killing such an “arhat” does not result in the expected *ānantariyakarman*, because that arhat is then back on the *śaikṣa* stage where such *karman* does not obtain.⁴¹ Such statements make it clear that *parihāna* refers to retrogression from the state of arhatship itself, not just a temporary falling from the *dhyānas* as the *Puggalapaññatti* reference noted above implies. The Vibhāśāstrins appeal again to *sūtra* testimony to support their provocative claim of *arhattvaparihāna*.⁴²

Question: For what reason is this doctrine [of the retrogression for arhatship] advocated?

Answer: In order to counter the assertion of other schools that the [view that arhats cannot retrogress] is the correct principle. This is to say that some [schools, including the Mahāsaṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, and Sautrāntika⁴³] cling [to the view that the arhats] are certain never to retrogress or to give rise to any *kleśas*. This can be compared to the Vibhajyavādins who use a worldly simile to justify their view: i.e., [the arhat's destruction of *kleśas*] is like a pot: once broken, there are only shards remaining which can never be made again into a pot. All the arhats are just the same: after the *vajrōpamasamādhī* has destroyed all the *kleśas*, [these arhats] will never again give rise to any *kleśas* and [end up] retrogressing. This can also be compared to wood: after it has been burned, only ashes remain which can never again become wood. All the arhats are just the same: after the fire of the *anāsravajñāna* has burned up all the *kleśas*, [these arhats] can never again give rise to any *kleśas* and [end up] retrogressing. [The Vibhajyavādins] bring up these sorts of worldly similes to prove [their view that] there is no retrogression or production of any *kleśas*.

In order to counter this [wrong] grasping [of theirs], we [Vaibhāsikas] reveal the meaning that [the arhats] are subject both to retrogression and to production of all of the *kleśas*. If there were not this [postulation of] retrogression, then the *sūtra* would be contradicted. As the *sūtra* says, “Arhats are of two types: *parihānidharman* and *aparihānidharman*.” Furthermore, the *sūtra* says, “It is due to five causes and conditions that arhats who are liberated in good time 時解脱 [*sāmayiktivimukti*]⁴⁴ retrogress and are lost. What are the five? 1) much administrative and business work. 多營事業 2) revelling in all [kinds of] *prapañca*. 3) enjoying controversy and argument. 4) enjoying involvement in long journeys. 惠涉長途 5) a body which constantly suffers from sickness”. Furthermore, the *sūtra* says,

There was an arhat named Godhika. At the time [of his eventual *parinirvāna*] he had already retrogressed from *sāmayiktivimukti* six times. Because he was fearful that he would retrogress for a seventh time, he committed suicide with a knife and had *parinirvāna*.⁴⁵

Hence, we know that there is certainly retrogression resulting from the arising of *kleśas*.

The Vibhāṣāśāstrins continue to reject the Vibhajyavādin analyses because they are worldly similes, the meanings of which have no validity in reference to the *āryadharmā*. For example, in the first simile, where the Vibhajyavādins say that shards are remaining, the Vaibhāṣikas say that this would imply that after arhatship, there would still be various defilements left over (like the shards), implying that the person was not really an arhat.⁴⁶

The Vibhāṣāśāstrins follow with an examination of the question of the re-arising of *kleśas* in the arhats.

Furthermore, [when] an arhat excises all the *kleśas*, this does not make all the natures and characteristic of past and future *kleśas* disappear completely; this is because [those *kleśas*] still exist as reals [*dravyasat*]. . . . Cultivating the *āryamarga* is an extraordinary affair [*āścaryavastu*]. Now, although an arhat has excised the *kleśas*, he has not caused them to become non-existent. For this reason, the Bhadanta Ghoṣa[ka] 妙音 said, "[When] *kleśas* do not appear in one's own actions, this is called 'excision'; this, however, does not cause [those *kleśas*] to become totally non-existent." . . . If one meets with the conditions [productive of] *parihāna*, that will cause the arising of future *kleśas*; hence, we perforce must advocate that there is retrogression [for arhats] due to the [re-]arising of *kleśas*.⁴⁷

The Vibhāṣāśāstrins then turn to the question of the precise implication of *parihāna* in the arhat.

Question: How do the Vibhajyavādins explain the *sūtra* [passages] which you have quoted?

Answer: They explain that at the time of *parihāna*, there is retrogression from the *mārga*, but not retrogression from the *phala* [of arhatship]. This is because the *śrāmaṇaphala* is *asaṃskṛta*.

Question: Since [the Vibhajyavādins] acknowledge that there is retrogression, how do they explain the difference between retrogression from the *mārga* and retrogression from the *phala* while, nevertheless, still advocating that there is no retrogression? Moreover, [since] they acknowledge that there is retrogression from the *asaikṣamārga*, at that time is [it to be interpreted as] the *prāpti* of the *saikṣamārga*, or the total *aprāpti* [of the *asaikṣamārga*]?

[Answer:] If [retrogression is interpreted as] the *prāpti* of the *saikṣamārga*, then there would also be retrogression from the *phala*, because it is not the *asaikṣaphala* which is endowed with [*samanvāgata*] the *saikṣamārga*. If [retrogression is interpreted as] the total *aprāpti* [of the *asaikṣamārga*], then they would [have perpetrated] a major logical fallacy, for [after] retrogressing from the *asaikṣamārga* they would not obtain [*aprāpti*] the *saikṣamārga*. If it is the case [that they have retrogressed from the stage of the *ārya*], then they perforce would dwell on the stage of the *prthagjana*; but [if this view is accepted], then they would [in fact] be neither *prthagjana*, *saikṣa*, nor *asaikṣa*. [Since] he would be neither *prthagjana* nor *ārya*, they would have to be acknowledged as another separate type of being [*satva*], and [consequently,] could not have been a disciple of the Bhagavant. Hence, we must accept [the fact that] there is retrogression [from arhatship] due to the [re-]arising of *kleśas*.⁴⁸

Three types of *parihāna* are outlined in the *AMV*, divided according to the stage of development at which retrogression takes place and the

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spiritual lineages which are so subject to retrogression. First is retrogression from what has already been obtained (*pratilabdhaparihāna*). This is retrogression from all the superior meritorious qualities already in one's possession because of meeting with the wrong conditions. Only the *śrāvakas* are subject to this type of retrogression. Second is retrogression from what has not yet been obtained (*aprāpanaparihāna*). This type would apply, for example, to a person who has already obtained the *ūsmakuśalamūa* and is soon to attain *mūrdhan*; unfortunately, before he attains that following stage, craving, attachment, and desire for name and fame arise in his *santāna*, and he retrogresses. *Śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* are subject to this variety of *parihāna*. Third is retrogression from the enjoyment (of one's meritorious qualities; *sambhogaparihāna*). This type applies in cases where the superior meritorious qualities which have already been achieved are not lost, but simply do not manifest themselves and, consequently, are not visible. *Śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, and even *buddhas* are subject to this type of retrogression.⁴⁹

The Vibhāṣāśāstrins also take exception with the Vibhajyavādin appeal to the distinction between the *anuśayas* and the *pariyavasthānas* to support their claim that retrogression from arhatship is impossible.

The Vibhajyavādins also advocate that the *anuśayas* are the *bījas* of the *pariyavasthānas*.⁵⁰ The *svabhāva* of the *anuśayas* are *cittaviprayukta* while the *svabhāva* of all the *pariyavasthānas* are *cittasamprayukta*.⁵¹ The *pariyavasthānas* arise from the *anuśayas*, and because these *pariyavasthānas* manifest, there is retrogression. All the arhats have already cut off the *anuśayas*, and because, [consequently,] the *pariyavasthānas* cannot arise, how can they retrogress? Hence, they advocate that there is no retrogression [from arhatship].⁵²

The Vibhāṣāśāstrins reject this view with little discussion, and continue on to an account of their own intrafraternal debate on the *svabhāva* of *parihāna*. As we have seen before in reference to other CVS, various alternatives are rejected by the Vibhāṣāśāstrins before they give their conclusion that the *svabhāva* of *parihāna* is *cittaviprayukta*. 1) Some Vaibhāṣikas advocated that the *svabhāva* of *parihāna* was the *nivṛtāvyaḥkṛta akuśaladharmas*. This view was justified by the claim that through producing *kleśas* (via the process mentioned previously in which future *kleśas* rearise in the *santāna*), all the *pariyavasthānas* [or *samyojanas*?] manifest and *parihāna* results. 2) All dharmas (*sarvadharmāḥ*) are the *svabhāva* of *parihāna*. Two alternatives justifications were given for this view: first, at the time of *parihāna*, everything which is associated with *parihāna* (*parihānabhāgīya*) follows along and retrogresses; hence the *parihānabhāgīya*-dharmas – i.e., all dharmas – are the *svabhāva*. Second, because all dhar-

mas are in accord with *parihāna* at the time of retrogression, *sarvadharmāḥ* are the *svabhāva* of *parihāna*. 3) *Parihāna* is mere *prajñāpti* and has no real *svabhāva*. All these views are rejected and the orthodox interpretation is given: "The *svabhāva* of *parihāna* is *asamanvāgama* and is an *anivṛtāvyaḥṛta* [dharma]. It is equivalent to *aprāpti* and is included in the *cittaviprayuktasamskāraśāstra*. It is included among the additional dharmas of similar type in the *cittaviprayukta[samskāras]*. It should be understood that *parihāna* and *parihānabhāgiyadharmas* are different. The *svabhāva* of *parihāna* is *asamanvāgama* and *aprāpti*. It is an *anivṛtāvyaḥṛta* [dharma] and is included in the *viprayuktasamskāraśāstra*. The *svabhāva* of the *parihānabhāgiyadharmas* are all the *nivṛtāvyaḥṛta akusāla* [dharmas]. It is like the difference between *saṅghabheda* and *saṅghabhedapāpa*".⁵³

It is clear from the Vibhāṣāśāstrins' treatment of the concept of *parihāna* that they anticipated the problem of having the *kleśas* re-manifest in the *santāna* of an *ārya* who, by very definition, was supposed to have excised the *kleśas* forever. They were fully prepared to accept the consequences of such a view, even while recognizing the logical and descriptive difficulties inherent therein, as the following discussion outline indicates.

Question: Do the *kleśas* manifest causing *parihāna*, or do the *kleśas* manifest only after *parihāna* has already [occurred]? What fault is there in these two alternatives?

Answer: Both have their faults.

The Vibhāṣāśāstrins continue that the first alternative contradicts descriptions given in Vasumitra's *Abhidharmaparakaraṇapādaśāstra* (T 1542) and in such *sūtra* passages as I have noted above. The latter alternative contradicts such statements as are found in the *Prajñāptibhāṣya* and the *Vijñānakāya*. The commentators finally decide that the best interpretation is that *kleśas* manifest first, causing *parihāna*. Their concluding summation is: "Once one has given rise to *kleśas* which manifest before oneself, this accomplishes *parihāna*. This is because one loses all of the superior meritorious qualities. This is the explanation of the stage of *parihāna* . . ." ⁵⁴

CONCLUSION

Even this brief overview of the treatment of CVS in the *AMV* demonstrates that the Vibhāṣāśāstrins resorted to this peculiar category of dharmas to resolve thorny doctrinal questions to a far greater extent than has been previously recognized by scholars. The standardized lists of CVS found in such later Abhidharma treatises as the *Abhidharmakośa*

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or the *Nyāyanusāra* do not do justice to the richness of this category as found in this earlier stratum of Vaibhāṣika literature. The fact that there are several CVS discussed in detail in the *AMV* that are not treated at all in later normative treatises intimates that a substantial simplification of the Vaibhāṣika doctrinal system occurred sometime during, or after, the fourth century A.D., when these treatises were composed. This discrepancy demonstrates once again why a thorough treatment of the development of Sarvāstivāda doctrine demands far more attention to the rich materials found in the *AMV* than has been attempted to date. The later systematization of Sarvāstivāda thought oversimplify what was a much more complex set of speculations among the Vibhāṣāśāstrins and cannot be blithely projected back into earlier periods of the school's doctrinal development.

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NOTES

Editions and works mentioned frequently in the annotation are cited in abbreviated form as follows:

AK and AKB = Dwarikadas Sastri, ed., *Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Āchārya Vasubandhu* (Varanasi, 1970).

AMV = *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā A-p'i-ta-mo ta p'i-p'o-sha lun* 阿毗達磨大毗婆沙論 translated by Hsüan-tsang 玄奘, T 1545.271a-1004a; references cited by fascicle number, and page, column, and line (where relevant).

Jaini = P. S. Jaini, 'The Development of the Theory of the *Viprayukta-Samskāras*', *BSOAS* 22-3 (1959), pp. 531-547.

T = J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe, eds., *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* 大正新修大經藏 (New Edition of the Tripiṭaka compiled during the Taishō reign period), 55 vols. (Tokyo, 1924-1929). Cited by sequential number of the text, volume number, and page, column, and line.

¹ See, especially, Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma"* (1923; rpt. ed., Delhi, 1970), pp. 23-24.

² See Jaini, passim, and Collett Cox, *Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence, An Annotated Translation of the Section on Factors Dissociated from Thought from Saṅghabhadra's Nyāyanusāra*, *Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series XI* (Tokyo, 1995).

³ For some of the variant lists of CVSs, see Jaini, p. 536, and Cox, *Disputed Dharmas*, pp. 70-73. I have discussed the Vibhāṣāśāstrins' treatment of *śamucchinakuśalamūla* in my article 'The Path to Perdition: The Wholesome Roots and Their Eradication', in *Paths to Liberation: The Mārga and Its Transformations in Buddhist Thought*, ed.

by Robert E. Buswell, Jr., and Robert M. Gimello, Kuroda Institute Studies in East Asian Buddhism, no. 7 (Honolulu, 1992), pp. 107-134.

⁴ AMV 20, p. 100c.21-22. The same list appears at AMV 115, p. 599c, but includes also the concept of 'intimiation' (*yu-shuo* 有說, **atideśa*, **adhikṛta*?), perhaps somehow related to the Pali notion of gestures in the derived-form category. The *P'i-po-sha* 轉婆沙 6, T 1547.28.458a16-19 gives the same list as Ghōṣaka with the exception of *prthagjanatva*. AMV 19, pp. 96b and 97a gives the same list as AMV 20 mentioned above, but excludes *asamjñisamāpatti*. See also *Dharmaskandha* 10, T 1537.26.500c.20-22.

⁵ *Dharmaskandha* 10, T 1537.26.510b.21-22.

⁶ AMV 6, p. 27c.29-29a.1; and cf. AMV 27, pp. 137a.29-b.1 et al.

⁷ AK ii.35-6. The implication in Vasubandhu's verse was mentioned first in de la Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu* (Paris, 1923), vol. I, p. 178, n. 2.

⁸ *Sphuṭārtha*, p. 210.

⁹ For *saṅghabheda* in the *Abhidharmakośa*, see AK iv.98 ff.; Pradhan (ed.), p. 160 ff.; Dwarikadas iv, p. 725 ff.; T. 29, p. 93a ff. Much of the material from both the *Kośa* and the AMV on *saṅghabheda* is duplicated systematically in the *Abhidharmaḥṛdaya* 3, T 1552.28.898c-899c.

¹⁰ "saṅghabhedas tv asāmagrī svabhāvo viprayuktakaḥ aklistāvyaḅṛto dharmah ... " "asāmagrī nāna [nānā] cittaviprayuktaḥ saṃskārō 'nīrtāvyaḅṛtaḥ saṅghabhedah". AK iv.18 and bhāṣya. (Shastri (ed.), p. 726 reads *nānā* for *nāna*). The implication of *nānā* in this passage is somewhat problematic, and is not even translated in the Chinese. In Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, *nānā* often has the sense of 'separate', 'different', 'distinct': as in *nānāvāsa* (dwelling separately), *nānāsamvāsika* (one who lives separately), *nānākaraṇa* (difference, distinction), *nānābhāva* (different, various); see Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* (New Haven 1953), p. 292 for the scriptural references. Hence, it seems safe to understand the *Kośa*'s meaning to be that *saṅghabheda* is a distinct (separate, *nānā*) *cittaviprayuktasamskāra*.

¹¹ AMV 119, p. 620c.9-10, and cf. *Jñānaprasthāna* 11, T 1544.26.973b.1. This usage of *dharmakāya* as referring to a harmonious *saṅgha* is first noted in this passage; certainly, a harmonious *saṅgha* could be viewed as embodying the dharma itself. For the five *ānatarīyakarmans* see AMV 119, 620c and AK iv.16. Commonly, *saṅghabheda* is listed as the fourth of the five; AMV 119, p. 619a.8-10.

¹² AMV 116, p. 604b.22-26; in this same passage, *saṅghabheda* is also called the worst of the ten evil ways of action.

¹³ AMV 134, p. 692c.29-693a.2; there is also a long discussion on this point at AMV 119, p. 620b.16-28.

¹⁴ For this type of *saṅghabheda* see also AK, T 29, p. 248a.4.

¹⁵ AMV 116, p. 602b.24 ff.

¹⁶ AMV 116, p. 602c.20-25; and cf. Sukomal Chaudhuri, *Analytical Study of the Abhidharmakośa* (Calcutta, 1976), p. 159.

¹⁷ AMV 116, p. 602c.25-603a.3.

¹⁸ AMV 116, p. 603a.28-b.4.

¹⁹ AMV 116, p. 603b.4-10.

²⁰ AMV 116, p. 603b.22-c.3.

²¹ AMV 116, p. 603c.4-10.

²² AMV 116, p. 603c.11-604a.6.

²³ AMV 61, p. 303b.1-6; cf. also AKB iv.98: "yo hi bhinnas tasya bheda na bhetuḥ. aīha bhettā kena samanvāgataḥ. tadavadya mṛṣāvādas tena bhettā samanvitah: saṅghabhedāvadyena bhettā samanvāgataḥ. tat punar mṛṣāvādah. sa punah saṅghabhedasahaje vāgvijñāpyavijñāpī. sa ca tenāvidyena samanvāgato bhettā".

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²⁴ AMV 119, p. 620a.11-13.

²⁵ For *pratimokṣasamvara* see, AK iv.26 and 27, Shastri (ed.), p. 619; Poussin III, pp. 59, 62, et al.; and cf. *Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 123 ff.

²⁶ See my "The Path to Perdition", p. 115.

²⁷ *Samucchinakuśalamūla* can only occur in the *kāmvacara* (see AMV 35, p. 182c.7ff.) so some means had to be found to account for retrogression from higher stages of existence, and from other *gatis* than the human, and other places than the three continents. There seems to be some discrepancy, however, in determining the locus of production for the *nirvedhabhāgīyas* which would help us to decide exactly how the Vaibhāṣaśāstrins intended to interpret *mūrdhapatiita*. As the AMV relates, *bhāvanāmayiprajñā* is activated on the *rūpa* and *arūpāvacaras*; as the four *nirvedhabhāgīyas* are associated with this type of *prajñā* only, some means of accounting for retrogression from this stage had to be posited, and the means was through *mūrdhapatiita*. However, in direct contradiction to the above AMV statement, the *Kośa* states that the *nirvedhabhāgīyas* are produced in the *kāmvacara*, human *gati*, and on the three great continents, with the exception of Uttarakuru (see AKB vi.21, Sastri (ed.), p. 916; and Chaudhuri, *Kośa*, p. 178, n. 10.). I am uncertain about how to account for this discrepancy.

²⁸ Full bibliographic information on the appearance of the *nirvedhabhāgīyas* in Buddhist literature can be found in E. Lamotte, *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga (Mahāyānasamgraha)* II, p. 314. Cf. also idem, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien* (Louvain, 1958), pp. 678-686, and Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India* (1962; rpt. ed., Ann Arbor, 1973), pp. 175-176.

²⁹ AMV 6, p. 29c.13-23; AKB vi.21, Sastri (ed.), p. 916.

³⁰ See discussion in Guenther, *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma* (1957; rpt. ed., Berkeley, 1976), pp. 219-220.

³¹ AMV 6, p. 26c.1-5.

³² See AMV 6, p. 27a.29-c.4; the debate between advocates of *mūrdhan* being associated with *śraddhā* or *prajñā* appears at AMV 6, p. 26c.5-26. Interestingly, the Vaibhāṣaśāstrins also say, somewhat contradictorily, that *mūrdhan* refers to the four types of *śroṭāpanna*, a classification I have yet to find in the *Kośa*; see AMV 6, p. 26b.15.

³³ AMV 6, p. 27c.6-9. These three [counteracting] dharmas are given variously as: 1) those with dull roots: contemplation on the *triratna*; those with average roots: contemplation on the five *skandhas*; those with sharp roots: contemplation on the four noble truths; 2) those with skeptical doubt: the *triratna*; those with ego-pride [*asmīnāna*]: the five *skandhas*; those with wrong views: the four noble truths, etc. See AMV 6, p. 27b.17-26 for the various alternatives.

³⁴ AMV 6, p. 27c.10-28a.1.

³⁵ AMV 6, p. 27a.3 ff.

³⁶ AMV 6, p. 26c.27-27a.28.

³⁷ The schools and their propositions which demean the status of the arhats were: Mahāsaṅghika, #28; Bahusrūṭya, #5; Caityaśāila et al., #3; Sarvastivāda, ##8, 9, 23, 32, 34; Haimavata, #5; see Jiyo Masuda, 'Origins and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools', *Asia Major* 2 (1925), pp. 1-78. For the controversy see also *Kāthāvanthu* II, 1-5; *Puggalapaññāni*, p. 18 #5; N. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism* II, pp. 85-92; Chaudhuri, *Kośa*, p. 103.

³⁸ AMV 82, p. 422a.22-b.4; AMV 158, p. 801a.21-22.

³⁹ For these six types of arhats see: AMV 62, p. 319c.8 ff.; AMV 154, p. 783a ff.; AK vi.56, 59; Poussin (trans.), IV, pp. 251-253; *Sphuṭārtha* vi, pp. 988-989; Chaudhuri, *Kośa*, p. 183 ff. and n. 22; *Abhidharmadīpa*, pp. 202-203 and p. 353n.

⁴⁰ AMV 119, p. 620a.10.

⁴¹ AMV 119, p. 620b.

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¹¹ cd: meaning not clear.

¹² The number given here is 336, but in *SPP*, XI, 6), this number is 246.

¹³ On Kālayavana, see Norvin Hein, "Kālayavana: A Key to Mathurā's Cultural Self-Perception," pp. 223–35 in *Mathurā: The Cultural Heritage* (ed.) Doris Srinivasan, (New Delhi, 1989).

¹⁴ The poet is here alluding to the three words used for the Supreme Deity in the Vaiṣṇava tradition, namely, creator, protector, and destroyer.

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BUDDHADEVA: MATERIALS TOWARD AN ASSESSMENT OF
HIS PHILOSOPHY

In any attempt to outline and assess the doctrinal development of the Vaibhāṣika school, we are eventually obliged to take into account the intrafraternal controversies between the noted scholiasts of the tradition. A number of doctrinal specialists are mentioned by name in Vaibhāṣika records and their unique views must be considered if we are accurately to understand the reasons for the adoption of specific theories in the orthodox Vaibhāṣika school. Unfortunately, despite the wealth of materials available in Chinese translation dating from virtually all periods of the school, we find preserved no treatises by a number of these recognized masters. One of the most important of these early teachers for whom no major work survives is Buddhadeva.¹ Buddhadeva, for reasons I will outline later, seems to have been one of the earliest of these teachers, and some knowledge of his outline of doctrine would be extremely helpful for ascertaining the views of the Vaibhāṣika school prior to its systematization at the time of the compilation of the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā*.² We are at least somewhat fortunate, however, for passages preserved in the *Vibhāṣā* on a variety of doctrinal questions record the views of many of these early teachers – if, in somewhat truncated, at least recognizable, form. It will be my attempt in this paper to present virtually all of the material available in Chinese sources pertaining to Buddhadeva. The material, while considerable, is admittedly fragmentary. We will skip from one major Abhidharma controversy to another, often with little more than short quotations from several teachers cited on each question. Nevertheless, despite the obvious limitations we must accept in attempting this presentation, I feel that the evidence at hand allows us to reconstruct with some measure of confidence the major outlines of Buddhadeva's system and appraise his primary contributions to the mainstream Vaibhāṣika school. I beg the reader's indulgence for the occasional discontinuity of the narrative, but I feel it essential in this initial treatment of Buddhadeva's thought to present as comprehensively as possible the extant examples of his views. I have adopted this approach in order to ensure that, in our drive

toward synthesis of this material, we do not unwittingly neglect the mention of an element, seemingly insignificant at first, which might upon further investigation prove to be of sizable importance.

REMARKS ON THE METHOD OF COMPILATION OF THE
ABHIDHARMAMAHĀVIBHĀSĀ

Our principal source for determining the views of Vaibhāṣika teachers for whom no complete works survive is in quotations relating to doctrinal controversies recorded in the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā* (hereafter, AMV; *Taishō* no. 1545, vol. 27, cited by *chüan* number, and page, column, and line), the massive second century sourcebook of the Kāśmīri Vaibhāṣikas. In the AMV treatment of such controversies, a certain topic will be introduced into the discussion, often in the catechetical style which is so ubiquitous in Abhidharma texts. In the response, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins commonly begin with the statement that it was the Pūrvābhidharmikas who held this opinion, and generally continue with a variety of anonymous views on the topic, which are usually introduced with little more than the laconic 'moreover' (*fu-ts'e* 復次) or 'there is this explanation' (*yu-shuo* 有說). Although no identification is made for these anonymous opinions, it appears to me that these were oral opinions given by one or another of the five-hundred arhants who are reputed to have participated in the compilation of the AMV. After these anonymous opinions are given – and these can number anywhere from one to several – the views of rival Ābhidharmikas are given. Among these doctrinal specialists, the most commonly cited are Parśva, Vasumitra, Ghoṣaka, Dharmatrāta, Buddhadeva, and an unnamed Bhadanta, who is presumably Kātyāyanīputra, the arhant reputed to have presided over the AMV convocation.³ A number of lesser known figures whose names must often be reconstructed are also mentioned occasionally, including: Pūrṇaśa (*Wang-man* 望滿), Saṃghavasū (?; *Seng-ch'ieh fa-su* 僧伽筏蘇), Śamādhata (?; *She-mo ta-to* 設摩多), Saṃghātaloka (?; *Chung-shih* 衆世), Āryamahika (?; *Wu tsun-che* 霧尊者), and Vāma (?; *Tso-shou* 左受). Apart from the fact that we have reference here to Vaibhāṣika teachers who do not appear in the extant Sanskrit materials of the school, what may prove even more important is that these citations often appear to be direct quotations from specific works by these *ācāryas*, many of which are of course no longer extant. For example, in one section of the AMV (AMV 76, 393a) we are given Vasumitra's view on the meaning of *samskrīta* and *asamskrīta*. The presentations of all the other teachers mentioned in

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this section begin with a stock phrase: for example, "Ghoṣaka gives this explanation: If a dharma is ..." for Vasumitra, however, we read: "Vasumitra gives this explanation: 'What are the *samskrītalakṣaṇas*? ...'". We find here-quoted a clear example of a catechetical exchange apparently found in a section of text by Vasumitra himself which discussed this particular question. Obviously, if this were purely an extemporaneous oral presentation, there would have been no need to repeat in Vasumitra's view the exact same question asked by the Vibhāṣāśāstrins to open the discussion; indeed, this re quotation of the initial question is not found in the citations from other teachers. This would lead us to believe that the compilation of the AMV was carried out while consulting actual treatises by the specific teachers or, at very least, oral recitations of those texts. This would also account for the fact that the same teachers are represented time and again throughout the AMV, for they were the masters by whom individual treatises have been written and/or transmitted. Opinions given by others who were actually present at the convocation – opinions which would not have been cited from a recognized Vaibhāṣika treatise – were simply recorded anonymously at the beginning of the treatment on each topic.

The Vibhāṣāśāstrins do not hesitate to add a definitive statement in response to the topic under discussion, which always begins with the stock "the critique says" (*p'ing-yüeh* 評曰).⁴ This 'critique', or definitive view, will usually appear after a series of anonymous opinions (cf. AMV 10, 46a.26), indicating that there was considerable divergence of opinion among the five-hundred arhants present at the convocation. By some process of debate – on which we are given, unfortunately, no information – the question was resolved and the definitive view recorded. Occasionally, however, this 'critique' will appear following a specific statement by one of the recognized teachers.⁵ This seems to show that the arhants present were attempting to define a coherent, orthodox position for the Vaibhāṣika school by taking into account and assessing the views of rival teachers within the school; they were not simply trying to resolve disputes among themselves, as would be the case if this 'critique' only followed anonymous opinions.

These debates give us some indication of the chronology of a few of these different teachers, as well as dates relative to the compilation of the AMV – still a controversial question in its own right. In one section (AMV 199, 995b.11–c.19), for instance, we are treated to a discussion on a specific textual question, apparently concerning the *Jñānaprasthāna*.⁶ The interlocutor asks why the compiler of the *Jñānaprasthāna* had gone ahead to discuss the nine types of *māna*

in the *varga* dealing with *dr̥ṣṭi*. The Vibhāṣāśāstrins note themselves that a variety of apparently unrelated dharmas have been discussed in specific *skandhas* of the text, so there is no fault in discussing a different dharma in this particular *varga*. Significantly, both Vasumitra and the Bhadanta [Kātyāyanīputra] address specifically this textual question, Vasumitra noting the relationship between views and pride, the Bhadanta focussing on the relationship between *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* and *māna* in their justification for including a treatment of *māna* in this *varga*. The answers of Buddhadeva and Ghoṣaka, however, do not address the textual question of the *varga* itself, but the more general question – not, in fact, raised by the interlocutor, but resulting in passing from the answers of Vasumitra and the Bhadanta – concerning the relationship between views and pride. Buddhadeva tells us:

All types of views and pride make it difficult for sentient beings to enter the Buddhadharmā. Hence, they are discussed [together]. That is to say, if sentient beings are without evil views and all types of pride, then they can take refuge in the *saddharma* of the tathāgata, cultivate the *brahmacarya*, leave behind the suffering of birth and death, and obtain the bliss of *nirvāṇa*. Because of views and pride, they then cannot take refuge in the *saddharma* of the tathāgata and lose this superior benefit.

Ghoṣaka tells us simply that pride is produced based upon *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* and blocks the spiritual progress of sentient beings. This bit of evidence – admittedly scanty at present, but probably verifiable given a more detailed look at the AMV – seems to tell us one of two things: first, that the Bhadanta and Vasumitra were actually present during the compilation of the AMV, as we are in fact told by tradition;⁷ or, second, that Vasumitra and/or Kātyāyanīputra themselves had composed separate commentaries on the *Jñānaprasthāna* which was quoted in answer to this query. Ghoṣaka and Buddhadeva, while appearing frequently in the AMV, do not address directly this specific textual question, and could not have been present at the time of the compilation of the AMV. This would also mean either one of two things: first, that these two teachers lived in a different district than Kaśmīr where the compilation took place, perhaps belonging to the Gandhāra branch of the Vaibhāṣika school;⁸ or, second and most probably, that Ghoṣaka and Buddhadeva were chronologically earlier than Vasumitra, perhaps even earlier than the compilation of the *Jñānaprasthāna*, or at least had written treatises which did not address issues appearing directly in the *Jñānaprasthāna*.⁹ Although Dharmatrāta is not mentioned in this section, because of the evidence of a different citation where he and Buddhadeva were said to belong to the same *nikāya* (*pu* 部; AMV 127, 661c.14), we would

assume that they were near-contemporaries; hence, Dharmatrāta would also be earlier than Vasumitra and the Vibhāṣāśāstrins.

While we are discussing the text of the AMV, I might make a few parenthetical comments on the Chinese translation of the text. We know that most of Hsüan-tsang's translations of Sanskrit materials were made at his translation bureau established in the T'ang capital of Lo-yang.¹⁰ While we are given no account of the actual method of translation undertaken for this text, a list of the nineteen participants in the translation and the jobs they performed is given at the conclusion of the first fascicle of the translation (AMV 1, 4c.21–5a.11).¹¹ Despite the number of 'polishers' (*chui-men* 綴文; four) who assisted in finalizing the form of the Chinese translation, however, there are still differences in the style and translation equivalencies used in the text. A clear example of this is in passages where we have such stock opening lines as "Buddhadeva says." A variety of different equivalencies can be noted for this opening line, such as: "The Venerable Buddhadeva gives this sort of explanation" (*Tsun-che Chüeh-t'ien tso ju-shih shuo* 尊者覺天作如是說; AMV 1, 4b.25/AMV 61, 316b.12); "The Venerable Buddhadeva says:" (*Tsun-che Chüeh-t'ien shuo-yüeh* 尊者覺天說曰; AMV 199, 995b.20); and "The Venerable Buddhadeva says" (name is transliterated not translated) (*Tsun-che Fo-t'o-t'i-po shuo-yüeh* 尊者佛陀提婆說曰; AMV 19, 97a.13). It is probably not to be assumed that those differences are meant to indicate that some statements are direct quotations while others are paraphrases of his views, as the difference in the translation might lead us to expect. In fact, the types of quotations which follow such opening lines seem completely consistent, and are certainly excerpts from specific texts by this teacher. Hence, they are probably simply different equivalencies for the same Sanskrit passage. For this reason, we would seem on safe ground in assuming that several translators participated in the translation of the AMV, and the final translation was never checked thoroughly for consistency by Hsüan-tsang or any of the 'polishers'.

OUTLINE OF BUDDHADEVA'S SYSTEM

As I have already mentioned, there is no systematic presentation of Buddhadeva's doctrinal system appearing in any of the extant Vaibhāṣika materials. It must be reconstructed from the odd references to his views in the discussion on various doctrinal questions appearing in the AMV. Nevertheless, when these references are culled and compared, a basic outline of Buddhadeva's system is adumbrated in the AMV, and should

be summarized here before proceeding to a detailed examination of his views on specific topics.

Buddhadeva is said (AMV 142, 730b.25–c.1) to have advocated a two-tiered system in which the only reals (*dravya*; *shih-r'i* 實體) among the *saṃskṛtadharmas* were 1) the *mahābhūtas* (i.e., *rūpa*); and 2) *citta*. As the Vibhāṣāśāstrins take no small pleasure in criticizing, the major peculiarity of Buddhadeva's thought was his rejection of the reality of any of the derivative *rūpas* or of the *caitasika-dharmas*. As I will explain in a later section, Buddhadeva advocated that all of the eleven derivative *rūpas* accepted by the mature Vaibhāṣika school (AK i.9) were simply differentiations (*ch'a-pieh* 差別; *viśeṣa*) of the *mahābhūtas* and not independent dharmas. Similarly, all forty-six *caitasika-dharmas* were also simply *cittaviśeṣa* and had no independent reality. Both of these views seem to augur later Yogācāra attitudes in which *rūpa* is considered to be merely a projection of *vijñāna* and the *caitasikas* are accepted as being only nominally distinct from the *citta*.¹²

While Buddhadeva does accept the definition of *asaṃskṛta*, no listing is given of exactly which of the three *asaṃskṛtadharmas* mentioned in the AMV (*akāśa*, *pratisaṃkhyā* and *aprasaṃkhyānirodhas*) he accepted. Indeed, we have no direct evidence that he formally admitted any of these, for we are told later that Buddhadeva rejects the independent reality of the three *asaṃskṛta-indriyas* and reduces them all to *manendriya* (AMV 142, 730b.27). Buddhadeva's opinion on the distinctively Vaibhāṣika category of *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* is unfortunately missing, though we have no evidence either way of his acceptance or rejection. The fact, however, that he rejected the reality of even the fairly uncontroversial *caitasika-dharmas* would lead us to believe that he was more probably opposed to than in favor of accepting this category. The only hint we have is Buddhadeva's rejection of the *jīvitendriya* (the seventh of the fourteen orthodox *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*), which was reduced to *manendriya*. Hence, Buddhadeva's system is decidedly peculiar, and certainly distinct from what was to become the orthodox Vaibhāṣika system, as will become clearer in the discussion which follows.

In adopting such a system, Buddhadeva is clearly harkening back to the earliest *suttantamātikā* division of dharmas into *nāma* and *rūpa*, rather than the *pañcaskandha* scheme most common in the *Āgamas* and *Nikāyas*.¹³ We know from Śāriputra's recitation in the *Samgītisuttanta* (D. iii.212) that the primary division of dharmas in the early *mātrkā* system was into *nāma* and *rūpa*, representing respectively all the mental and material dharmas. This was apparently meant to be not an exhaustive,

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but a general division, however, and we know that the reality of separate *caitasika-dharmas* is accepted in the *Samgītisuttanta*. Buddhadeva seems to have accepted the ultimacy of only this bifurcation, and rejected subsequent subdivisions of *nāma* and *rūpa*. Hence, his view would represent an extremely conservative reading of the *mātrkā*, another hint of Buddhadeva's own chronological earliness when compared to other *Ābhidharmikas*. This will also be indicated by the relatively conservative positions of Buddhadeva on many of the doctrinal controversies to be covered later in this paper. This conservatism is perhaps the most striking general aspect of his thought, and indicates a man only slightly removed from the earliest stratum of *Abhidharma* philosophy, and considerably distant from the intricate controversies of his successors in the Vaibhāṣika school.

BUDDHADEVA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD DHARMA AND ABHIDHARMA

In the introduction to the AMV, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins cite the opinions of a number of teachers concerning the precise definition of *Abhidharma*. Though this section is uncontroversial, it is worth citing Buddhadeva's answer, in order to clarify his exact position on the topic at hand. Buddhadeva tells us:

'*Abhi*' is a prefix (*chu-yen* 助言; not in AK Index) which expresses the meaning of addition: e.g., extreme pride (*adhimāna*) is called *abhimāna*; highest enlightenment (*adhibuddha*) is called *abhibuddha*; extreme old age (*adhijarā*) is called *abhijarā*. This [word 'abhidharma'] is just the same, for it adds to this [mundane] dharma [making it into the higher dharma]. (AMV 1, 4b.25–28)

Buddhadeva is held to have accepted the distinction between *saṃskṛta* and *asaṃskṛta* dharmas. The Vibhāṣāśāstrins note that *saṃskṛta* dharmas are those dharmas associated with the eleven *āyatana*s and one portion of the *dharmāyatana*, while *asaṃskṛtadharmas* are those associated with only one portion of the *dharmāyatana*. They then list a variety of anonymous views, such as a dharma is marked as being *saṃskṛta* if it is subject to arising and extinction, cause and effect, and so forth; the opposite of this is *asaṃskṛta*. They then continue to give us the views of Vasumitra, the Bhaḍanta, Buddhadeva, and Ghoṣaka. Vasumitra tells us tersely that *saṃskṛta* dharmas are those dharmas which have *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, and those which don't have such marks are *asaṃskṛta*. The Bhaḍanta tells us, somewhat enigmatically, that if a dharma has aggregation (*rāsi*; *chü* 聚) or dispersion (*asamāhita*, *vikṣipta*; *san* 散) due to *sattvaprayoga* (*yu-ch'ing chia-hsing* 有情加行) it is compounded; if this is not the case, it is un-compounded. Ghoṣaka says that

if a dharma is combined with *samskrta* it becomes *samskrtalakṣaṇa*; if not, it is *asamskrtalakṣaṇa*. Buddhadeva tells us, again quite conservatively, that if a dharma is produced from causes and conditions it is *samskrtalakṣaṇa*; if a dharma is not so produced, it is unconditioned (AMV 76, 392c.17–393a.8). Once again, we receive no clear indication from this terse passage as to which *asamskṛta* dharmas Buddhadeva specifically accepted and, for lack of any other evidence, must assume that he followed the Vaibhāṣika school on this question.

A shorter controversy concerns this problem of *samskrta* dharmas. The interlocutor asks, somewhat absurdly: if all dharmas are produced through the coming together of *hetupratyaya*, and if all dharmas ultimately cease because they are so conditioned, then even at the time that there is no such coming together of cause and conditions, why wouldn't all dharmas continue to arise and cease perpetually? Vasumitra gives a surprisingly lengthy response to this question. He begins by asking: since the coming together of cause and conditions exists only temporarily, how can it be said that all dharmas are permanently arising and ceasing? He notes that once a dharma has arisen through this conditioned process, its *santāna* will then continue for a limitless number of *kṣaṇas* and, consequently, does not need to arise again. It is like saying a man has fallen from a cliff: you do not need to say that he must keep on falling from the cliff time and again in order to remain in the state of "having fallen". It is the same with dharmas: once they have arisen they do not need to continue to arise in order to remain "arisen". Hence, at times when this conditioned process of origination and cessation is not operating, there is no need to say that the coming together of cause and conditions is continuing, and that this arising and ceasing is perpetual. The Bhadanta virtually sets aside the whole question, and says only that since this coming together of cause and conditions is temporary, it is impossible to postulate that a dharma perpetually arises and ceases. Buddhadeva resolves the problem by stating that the arising and cessation of any dharma each take place in one moment. If the function (*karmaka*) continues, then after it has arisen it can arise again; but to say that after it has ceased it again ceases would be absurd. Hence, the arising and ceasing of all dharmas is not perpetual (AMV 21, 105a.6–17). In this treatment of *samskṛtadharmas*, it would be appropriate to bring up also Buddhadeva's unique attitudes towards the past, present, and future state of a dharma, which he uniquely defined in terms of relationship (*āpekṣā*). This has, however, already been treated at some length in my paper, "The Three Times

Controversy in Abhidharma Philosophy," (see note 1 below) and I refer the reader there for discussion.

A treatment similar to that given for the distinction between *samskrta* and *asamskrta* is provided to distinguish *āsrava* from *anāsrava* dharmas. The Vibhāṣāśāstrins note that *āsrava* dharmas are involved with the first ten *āyatana*s and some portion of the *manas* and dharma *āyatana*s, while *anāsrava* dharmas are only associated with a portion of the *manas* and dharma *āyatana*s. A variety of rival opinions are then cited, such as an *āsrava* dharma means a dharma which can support becoming (*bhava*; 有), can add to or increase becoming, etc.; the opposite of this is *anāsrava*. Vasumitra says that *āsrava* is something which can either lead to or bring about *āsravalakṣaṇa*, and the opposite of this is *anāsrava*. The Bhadanta says that only something which is invariable associated with the *āsravas* is *āsravalakṣaṇa*; if such a distinction is possible, however, it is *anāsravalakṣaṇa*. Buddhadeva tells us that if a dharma is the foundation for the arising and development of the *āsravas*, it is *āsravalakṣaṇa*; if this is not the case, it is *anāsravalakṣaṇa* (AMV 76, 392b.17–c.6).¹⁴

We can add somewhat arbitrarily in this section of the paper the discussion on *pratigha* and *apratigha* dharmas. It is said, again as for the *samskrta* and *asamskrta* dharmas, that ten *āyatana*s involve *pratighadharmas*, while *manas* and dharma *āyatana*s are *apratigha*. Several different definitions of *pratigha* and *apratigha* are given anonymously before the Vibhāṣāśāstrins continue on to give the views of Parśva, Vasumitra, the Bhadanta, Ghōṣaka, Vasumitra (apparently for a second time, though this could be a second Vasumitra), and finally Buddhadeva. Buddhadeva says that an obstruction which is characterized by being in contact with the *āyatana* is called *pratighalakṣaṇa*; the opposite of this is *apratighalakṣaṇa* (AMV 76, 391a.6–b.16).

The Vibhāṣāśāstrins also discuss the related question of the difference between *pratīyasamutpāda* and *pratīyasamutpanna* dharmas. The treatment of the question in the *Prakaranapāda*, *Samgītiparyāya*, and *Dharmaskandha* is given before turning to the opinions of the various Vaibhāṣika teachers. Parśva, quoted first, resolves the problem by referring to the twelvefold chain of dependent origination: he says that *avidyā* is the *pratīyasamutpāda* dharma; *jarāmaraṇa* is the *pratīyasamutpanna* dharma; and the middle ten stages are both. Ghōṣaka advocates that the two constituents of the twelvefold chain which are past (*avidyā* and *samskāra*) are *pratīyasamutpāda*; the future two (*jāti* and *jarāmaraṇa*) are *pratīyasamutpanna*; and the eight factors which are present are both. Pūmāśa gives a rather bizarre *catuṣkoṭi* involving

various combinations of the two, while Vasumitra distinguishes them according to whether a dharma is the cause itself (*pratīyasamutpāda* dharma) or is instead cause (*pratīyasamutpanna* dharma), and other similar pairs, such as causing to arise/arisen, and so forth. The Bhadanta says that the *nāmasamcāra* (?; *chüan-ming* 轉名; not in AK index) are *pratīyasamutpāda* dharmas, while the *namānuvartaka* (?; *sui-chüan-ming* 隨轉名; not in AK Index) are *pratīyasamutpanna* dharmas (?). Buddhadeva gives again most conservatively, "When all dharmas arise, they are called *pratīyasamutpāda* dharmas; when all dharmas have already arisen, they are called *pratīyasamutpanna* dharmas" (AMV 23, 118a.24-c.5).

RŪPA

It is in the AMV discussion on *rūpaskandha* that the first hint of the radicalness of Buddhadeva's views appears. The Vibhāṣāśāstrins cite a sūtra passage which states: "At that which is *rūpa* is the four *mahābhūtas* and the derivatives of the four *mahābhūtas*" (AMV 75, 383a.24-25). When asked why this sūtra was propounded, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins state that it was in order to refute the views of people like Buddhadeva who reject the reality of the derivative *rūpas*. Two other sūtra passages are then cited which refute the extreme views of the *tīrthikas* who reject the reality of past and future, and the Dārṣṭāntikas who reject the reality of the (*avijñapti*) *rūpa* which is included in the *dharmāyatana* (*fa-ch'u so-she se* 法處所攝色). The view of Dharmatrāta, who is said to have advocated, somewhat like the Yogācāras, that all *rūpa* was based upon and conditioned by the *pañcavijñānakāya* is also rejected, by citing a sūtra quotation which mentions the first ten *āyatanas* (including, therefore, *manāyatana*) when referring to *rūpa* (AMV 74, 383a.24-b.26). Basing themselves upon the first sūtra passage quoted above, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins go ahead to note that this statement, while correct, is incomplete, because some of this derived *rūpa* is visible (*nidarśana*; *yu-chien* 有見), while some is invisible (*anidarśana*; *wu-chien* 無見). It is here that we finally get some detailed accounting of Buddhadeva's unique view on the *mahābhūtas*.

As is well substantiated,¹⁵ the Sarvāstivādins and Theravādins advocated that the ability of the derivative *rūpa* to perceive, hear, etc., was invisible. The Vibhāṣāśāstrins tell us, however, that there are two *ācāryas* who oppose this view: Buddhadeva and Dharmatrāta. Buddhadeva, in his own defense, is made to state that there is a sūtra quotation which clearly specifies that the *rūpapasāda* (derivative visual *rūpa*) is not

different from the *mahābhūtas*: "In the *rūpapasāda*, that separate internal quality of characteristic of firmness receives the name internal earth-element . . . up to, that separate internal quality of characteristic of movement receives the name internal wind-element". As I will relate later, Buddhadeva also held that the *caitasika*-dharmas are simply distinctions (*viśeṣa*) of the citta, in the same way that the derivative *rūpas* are simply distinctions of the *mahābhūtas*. Of course, if this were the case, Buddhadeva would have difficulty in distinguishing between the *dhāius*, *āyatanas* and *skandhas*. In fact, he is able to differentiate these categories of dharmas only by resorting to a somewhat sophistical heuristic device: by distinguishing between the subject and object of a sensory gestalt. For example, Buddhadeva tells us that the portion of the four *mahābhūtas* which is the subject of vision (the internal sense-field) is the *caḥṣurdhātu*; that portion of the four *mahābhūtas* which is the object of vision (the external sense-field) is the *rūpadhātu*. This same analysis is given also for the *āyatanas*. Buddhadeva then defines *rūpaskandha* as all of the four *mahābhūtas* and does not allow a separate listing of the eleven derivative *rūpas*. All of the remaining *nāmaskandhas* are simply called distinctions of the *citta*: some of those distinctions are called *vedanā*, some *saṃjñā*, some *saṃskāra*, and some *vijñāna*.

It is clear that Buddhadeva's was not a popular opinion, and the critiques of the Sarvābhīdharmikas, Ghōṣaka, and Parsva are preserved in the AMV, another indication that Buddhadeva would have been earlier than either of these two teachers. All of these teachers opine that Buddhadeva has missed the "secret meaning" (*ābhiprāyika*; *mi-i* 密意) of the sūtras which he quotes in support of his view. In the sūtras, it is stated that *pratigha* is produced by two conditions – eye and forms, etc. – and so on up to mind and mental objects. Buddhadeva advocates that this can only mean *rūpa* as a *mahābhūta*, because it is not stated explicitly in these scriptures that this *rūpa* is derivative, nor is there any other type of *pratigha* which would account for such supposed derivative *rūpas* (AMV 127, 661c-662a).

Buddhadeva's rejection of *anidarśanarūpa* would seem to lead to the corresponding rejection of yet another distinctively Vaibhāṣika category, that of *avijñaptirūpa*. Since Buddhadeva defines *rūpa* as only the *mahābhūtas*, he would have rejected the concept of a *rūpa* which is only associated with the *manāyatana* as, indeed, the Dārṣṭāntikas did. This would probably not have been the case with Dharmatrāta, the Ābhidharmika closest to the views of Buddhadeva, who reduced all *rūpa* back to consciousness itself and, consequently, would have

allowed an opening for this peculiarly “mental” type of *rūpa*. Indeed, Buddhadeva’s probable rejection of *avijñaptirūpa* seems indicated in the AMV (AMV 127, 662b) where the discussion on *avijñaptirūpa* is brought up immediately following the treatment of Buddhadeva’s rejection of *anirdarśanarūpa*, indicating the close relationship between the treatment of the two. We do not have any direct evidence one way or the other, however.

Buddhadeva’s view on derivative *rūpa* is unique to Abhidharma Buddhism and, like Dharmatrāta who advocated that all *rūpa* was based upon *viññāna*, augurs the later perspectives of the Yogācārins. Nevertheless, while the number of derived *rūpa* accepted in the different Abhidharma schools varied widely,¹⁶ even the Yogācārins continued to acknowledge the nominal reality of the eleven Sarvāstivādin categories.¹⁷ Hence, this total rejection of the derivative *rūpas* seems to have no precedent among the Ābhidharmikas and does not appear to have exerted much, if indeed any, influence over the subsequent development of the Abhidharma schools.

Buddhadeva is mentioned elsewhere in the AMV concerning a somewhat obscure controversy on the means by which the *śabdadhātu* can constantly remain in the possession (*samanvāgata*) of a being who lives in the *kāma* and *rūpa avacaras*. The interlocutor accepts that while this is possible for the *kāya*, *rūpa*, and *spraṣṭavya dhātus*, it is not for *śabda*. One anonymous answer given is that since the *mahābhūtas* exist perpetually for a sentient being on the *kāma* and *rūpa avacaras*, sound, as a derivative of these *mahābhūtas*, must also be constantly present. The critique of the Vibhāṣāśāstrins is, however, that such a view is incorrect, for if sound were to be constantly produced from the four *mahābhūtas*, it could not be a derivative of them, but would have to be a *mahābhūta* itself. Since the bodies of beings in the *kāma* and *rūpa avacaras* are composed of all four *mahābhūtas*, if there is contact between the *śrotrendriya* and *śabdārtha*, sound is produced, but not so if there is no such contact. Hence, although this *śabdadhātu* might “exist” in the body, those bodies themselves do not themselves constantly emit sound. Buddhadeva is in agreement with this and simply rejects the statement out of hand: “The *kāma* and *rūpa avacaras* are not constantly in possession of sound” (AMV 91, 464c.14–24).

While we are discussing *rūpa*, we can turn to a minor controversy concerning the external environment (*bhājanaloka*). The environment, including Mt. Sumeru, the continents, etc., are said to be the products of the mutual *karman* of all sentient beings in that realm. The controversy concerns the question of whether “the loss” of a sentient being in that

realm who attains to *parinirvāna* would somehow reduce or otherwise affect that environment. Vasumitra tells us that if Mt. Sumeru and other environmental factors are supported by the mutual *karman* of sentient beings, if only one sentient being is alive, those aspects will be protected – let alone if there are limitless numbers of beings still alive after that person’s *parinirvāna*. He compares it with the case of a rich man whose property is not affected by his death. Furthermore, Vasumitra notes that even if an innumerable number of sentient beings were to pass into *parinirvāna*, there would still be a limitless number who would be reborn into that realm and support the existence of the environment through their own mutual *karman*. Finally, “near” *adhipatiphala* which support the environment associated with the individual alone might be affected, but Mt. Sumeru and other major environmental aspects which are “far” – i.e., “universal” *adhipatiphala* – would not be so affected. Buddhadeva expands on this response slightly by noting that the environment is also the product of past actions and is, consequently, supported by those past actions; therefore, it would be unaffected by the demise of a single individual (AMV 21, 106c.26–107a.10).

Having mentioned the *bhājanaloka*, we can discuss briefly also another controversy concerning a sūtra passage in which the Bhagavanta has distinguished between birth (*janma*; *sheng* 生) and appearance (*utpāda*; *ch’u* 出), and death (*maraṇa*; *ssu* 死) and disappearance (*astamgama*; *cyuti*; *pracyuta*; *mo* 没). The Bhadanta tells us that birth and death in any of the *gatis* are called ‘birth’ and ‘death’, while the initial *kṣaṇa* of arising in the *antarābhava* is ‘appearance’ and the final *kṣaṇa* of passing away from the *antarābhava* is ‘disappearance’. Virtually the same response is given by Parśva, who tells us that gaining the *antarābhava skandhas* is ‘appearance’ and their abandonment is ‘disappearance’, while gaining the *skandhas* associated with living in the *gatis* is called ‘birth’, and their abandonment is ‘death’. Vasumitra says that entering a mother’s womb is ‘birth’; coming out from the womb is ‘appearance’; the decay of all the *skandhas* is ‘disappearance’; and their abandonment is ‘death’. Ghoṣaka says instead that the arising of the *skandhas* for womb, egg, or moisture births is ‘birth’ and the gradual decay and destruction of the faculties of such beings is ‘death’; the arising of the *skandhas* for transformational births is ‘appearance’ and the sudden decay of the faculties of those beings is ‘disappearance’. Buddhadeva tells us that when a sentient being is born who possesses *rūpa*, it is called ‘birth’, and his death is ‘death’. The arising of a formless being is ‘appearance’, and his passing away is ‘death’ (AMV 39, 302b.2–18).

CITTA

Parallel to Buddhadeva's radical attitude toward *rūpa* is his equally extreme rejection of the reality (*dravyasat*) of the forty-six *caitasika-dharmas* of the orthodox Vaibhāṣika system and their reduction to *citta*. It has been mentioned earlier that Buddhadeva advocated that the *caitasikas* were precisely differentiations of mind (*cittaviśeṣa*) (AMV 127, 661c.16). Buddhadeva appeals to sūtra evidence in support of this view: "As the sūtra says, 'What is *samādhi* (*teng-chih* 等持)? It is the one-pointedness (*ekāgratā*; *i-ching-hsing* 一境性) of a wholesome [state of] mind (*kuśalacitta*; *shan-hsin* 善心)'" (AMV 127, 661c.20–21). Buddhadeva deduces from this statement that *samādhi* – the tenth of the ten *mahābhūmikacaitasikadharmas* – is reducible to *citta*; by extension, all other *caitasikas* would be similarly reducible. As with *rūpa*, where the derivative *rūpas* were all simply aspects of the *mahābhūtas* and not ultimately real in their own right, so it is with *samādhi*: it is simply an aspect (here '*ekāgratā*') of the *kuśala-citta*, and not independently real.

This view is clarified in the discussion on the *indriyas* (AMV 142, 703b.25–c.1), which seems to provide us with the key for understanding Buddhadeva's complete system. The Vibhāṣāśāstrins accept a listing of twenty-two *indriyas* (cf. AK ii.1–8), of which seventeen have distinct *svabhāvas*, while five do not. This is because, of these five, *puruṣendriya* and *strīndriya* are both said to be included in the *kāyendriya*, while the three *anāsravendriyas* (*anājñātam ājñāsyāmīndriya*, *ājñendriya*, and *ājñātāvīndriya*) are said to be included in nine other *indriyas*: *manendriya*; *saumanasya* and *upekṣā* (of the five *vedanendriyas*); and the five *suddhendriyas* (*śraddhā*, *vīrya*, *smṛti*, *samādhi*, and *prajñā*). Dharmatrāta is said to have rejected the independent *svabhāva* of these five, as well as of *jīvitendriya*, *upekṣendriya*, and *samādhīndriya*. *Jīvitendriya* was rejected because it was included in the *cittaviprayuktasamskāra skandha*, which Dharmatrāta refused to acknowledge as being a *dravya* (*shih-i* 實體). He rejected *upekṣendriya* because it did not accept the reality of *aduhkhamasukhā vedanā* as separate from *sukhā vedanā* and *duhkā vedanā*. Finally, he rejected *samādhīndriya* because there was no *samādhidravya* separate from the *citta*; Dharmatrāta quotes as justification for this view the sūtra given above (AMV 127, 661c.20–21).¹⁸ Hence, Dharmatrāta accepted as *dravyas* only fourteen of these twenty-two *indriyas* (AMV 142, 730b.13–15).

Buddhadeva's view is even more extreme, and I am content to quote the AMV version of his opinion.

The Venerable Buddhadeva gives this explanation. The names [of the *indriyas*] are twenty-two, but only one is a *dravya* 實體 – that is to say, the *manendriya*. He gives this explanation. All *saṃskṛtadharmas* have [one of] two *svabhāvas* (*tzu-hsing* 自性): 1) the *mahābhūtas*; or 2) *citta*. Apart from the *mahābhūtas* there is no derived *rūpa*. Apart from the *citta* there are no *caitasikas*. All *rūpa* is the differentiation 差別 (*viśeṣa*) of the *mahābhūtas*. All that is formless (*arūpya*, i.e., *nāma*) is the differentiation of the *citta*. Because of this definition, the *dravya-indriya* is only one [the *manendriya*]. (AMV 142, 730b.25–c.1)

Although this statement is made only in reference to the *indriyas*, coupled with the recurring statement that Buddhadeva advocated that the *caitasikas* were *cittaviśeṣa*, we are safe in assuming that he rejected the independent reality (*dravyasat*) of all *caitasikas*, and advocated that all were reducible to the *citta*.

A related discussion appears in the following fascicle of the AMV. The interlocutor mentions that portions of the *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃskāra*, and *vijñāna skandhas* were included in the list of twenty-two *indriyas*; only *saṃjñā skandha* was excluded. Why was this? A variety of anonymous reasons are given. For instance, the definition of *saṃjñā* is antithetical to the whole concept of *indriya* and, consequently, it cannot be included in the category. This is because, an *indriya* receives such a designation because it has control over its own particular function (*ata ādhipatyārtha indriyārthaḥ*; cf. Pradhan, ed., *AKBhāṣyam*, p. 38), while *saṃjñā* operates only in conjunction with another mental function. The AMV says:

Indriya means that it evolves (*pravṛtti*) under its own power; *saṃjñā* evolves on account of another's [power]. It is like a worker who works according to another's instruction; if he is not instructed, he doesn't work. *Saṃjñā* develops according to the sense-objects in just the same way. (AMV 143, 736a.22)

The interpretations of Vasumitra, the Bhadanta, Saṃghātaloka, and Buddhadeva are given. Buddhadeva tells us:

The *indriyas* are fixed (*niyāma*) and difficult to affect. The function of *saṃjñā* is to accord with sense-objects (*anyatarāḷambana*; *sui-yuan* 隨緣) and change without becoming fixed. It is like a shadow-image or the glare of the sun. Hence it is not established as an *indriya*. (AMV 143, 736b.13–15)

AKUŚALA FACTORS

From this point on in our presentation, we are faced with the task of organizing a wide variety of divergent discussions which have little coherent structure. For purely heuristic reasons, I have decided to organize the following materials into two major divisions: 1) *akuśala* factors, such as the discussions on the *anuśayas* and *saṃyojanas*; and 2)

kuśala factors, including the treatment of the stages of attainment and various discussions on *kuśaladharmas* which assist in that development. These discussions are scattered throughout the AMV and are in no way inter-connected; by organizing them in this manner, however, we can gain some general sense of Buddhadeva's attitudes towards soteriology and the obstacles to deliverance.

There is a controversy on the *anuśayas* recorded in the AMV (AMV 22, 112a.3–b.5). The interlocutor asks: if the *samprayogato' anuśayah* (*hsiang-ying sui-min* 相應隨眠) are always associated with the mind, why is it that the mind is not perpetually in association with those *anuśayas*? Buddhadeva tells us first:

Samprayogato' anuśayah causes the *samprayuktacitta* to be confused and unclear about the *ālambanārtha* (*so-yüan ching* 所緣境). The *ālambanānuśayas* do not lead to the same situation (lit., do not have the same affair) with regards to the *ālambanacitta*; therefore, for all these various reasons, the *samprayogatānuśayas*, whether they are or are not on the *prahānāvasthā* (*tuan-wei* 斷位), can cause the mind to receive the designation "possessed of the *anuśayas* [*anuśayasamanvāgama*]" [i.e., the mind is said to become associated with the *anuśayas*]. The *ālambanānuśayas* can cause the mind to receive the designation "possessed of the *anuśayas*" only when [the mind] is not yet on the stage of *prahānāvasthā*. If it is already on the stage of *prahānāvasthā*, then it is not to be called "possessing."

Ghośaka's response is similar, with the exception that he advocates that the *samprayogatānuśayas* cause the *asamprayuktacitta* to give rise to (*samutthāna*; *fa-ch'i* 發起) *kliṣṭa*, thereby blocking the *āryaphala*. Vasumitra says that the *samprayogatānuśayas* directly defile (*kliṣṭa*) the mind; are not separate from the mind; obscure (*avacchādita*; *nivṛta*; *fu-pi* 覆蔽) the mind; develop in conjunction with the mind; disturb the mind, and so forth, which is different from the situation with the *ālambanānuśayas*. The Bhadanta, finally, simply accepts Vasumitra's interpretation.

The difference in these three views seems to center on the type of association assumed to pertain between the *samprayogatānuśayas* and the *citta*. Vasumitra seems virtually to equate the two, and says that this type of *anuśaya* is not separate from the mind, which is not the case with the *ālambanānuśaya*. Ghośaka and Buddhadeva seem to accept more of a differentiation between the *samprayogatānuśayas* and the *citta*: while for Ghośaka these *anuśayas* give rise to *kliṣṭa* and block the *āryaphala*, for Buddhadeva they, instead, confuse the *samprayuktacitta* about the sense-fields and cause that mind to come into possession of the *anuśayas*.

Concerning the definition of the *samyojanas*, the interlocutor asks why it is that only five types of *kleśas* (*rāga*; *pratigha*;

māna; *īṛsyā*; and *mātsarya*) are called *samyojanas*, and not the six *kleśamahābhūmikadharmas*, the two *akuśalamahābhūmikadharmas*, the other eight *parittakleśabhūmikadharmas*, or the remaining five *aniyata-dharmas*. The views of Parśva, Vasumitra, Ghośaka, and Buddhadeva are given. Buddhadeva says that since these particular five *kleśas* manifest in a variety of different types of circumstances, irritating both oneself and others, and involve the most severe danger (*ādīnava*), they are called *samyojanas* (AMV 49, 252b.2–16).

Similarly, there is also a discussion on the definition of *āhrikyānapatrāpya*. These are the only two *akuśalamahābhūmikadharmas*, and are therefore involved in all *akuśalacittas*, but are nevertheless not included among the five *nīvarānas*. Why not? Once again the view of Parśva, Vasumitra, Ghośaka, and Buddhadeva are given. Parśva prefaces his response by noting that the Buddha has established a dharma's *svabhāva*, *lakṣaṇa*, and *karmaka*. Buddhadeva adopts this trichotomy in his own answer and replies that, although *āhrikyānapatrāpya* block the functioning of the *śilaskandha* (see AMV 48, 251a.26), they do not involve *lobha* or *dveṣā*. Although they block the functioning of the *samādhiskandha*, they do not involve *auddhatya* or *kaukrtya*. Although they obstruct the *prajñāskandha*, they do not involve *styāna* or *middha*. For these reasons, they are not called *nīvarānas*. A parallel discussion continues for the remainder of the *ṣaṭkleśamala* (*liu fan-nao ko* 六煩惱垢; for which see AK v.49, T 29.109c.6) (AMV 48, 251b.6–c.21).

The *kāmagunas* (*miao-yü* 妙欲; see AK, T 29.51b.8, 115b.17, 60b.2,24) are fivefold, in the sense that they are related with the *rūpa* perceived by the eye, and so forth; the only exception is a *kāmaguṇa* associated with a dharma perceived by the mind. The distinguishing feature of a *kāmaguṇa* is that it be conditioned by *rāga*. However, the interlocutor asks, if such *kāma* is associated with the *āsravas* and subject to such a wide variety of faults, what merit does it have that it can be called a *guṇa*? A variety of anonymous opinions are given, such as they bring pleasure and are consequently meritorious, etc.; and the Vibhāṣāśāstrins follow with the views of Ghośaka, Vasumitra, Buddhadeva, and the Bhadanta. Buddhadeva tells us:

Although all the *kāmas* are not sublime (*miao* 妙; *guṇa*) from a *paramārtha* [standpoint], they are sublime from a *vyavahara* [standpoint]. Although they are not ultimately (*nistha*) sublime, they are temporarily sublime. This is said because they can temporarily bring about the arising of pleasure and the allayment of all suffering. (AMV 173, 870a.4–6; for the whole discussion, see AMV 173, 869b–870b)

This question is seemingly suspicious because of its focus on a specific Chinese word (*miao* 妙) which does not precisely correspond to the word

guṇa in *kāmaguṇa*. Nevertheless, because of the variety of responses given by specific Indian teachers in answer to this question, the passage must be an authentic part of the Sanskrit text, and not simply an interpolated discussion on a Chinese lexical item, as is occasionally found in Hsüan-tsang's translated works.

Finally, in this discussion on *akuśala* factors, we can include a minor discussion on the three types of *vitarka* (*hsün* 尋) – *rāga*, *dveṣa*, and *vihimsa* – which injure oneself, others, and both. This injury is said to take place because, although there is no function of injury (*vihimsakāraka*) which is inevitably associated with any of these three unwholesome types of *vitarka*, this reference to injury taking place is valid from the standpoint of their effect upon the external characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of these functions. That is to say, because these functions create distance or separateness from actions which bring about benefit to oneself and/or others, it is valid to say that they are injurious. The views of Vasumitra, Ghoṣaka, the Bhadanta, and Parśva are given before coming to Buddhadeva. Buddhadeva tells us that when these unwholesome types of *vitarka* arise, they injure oneself because one's body and mind do not function optimally; they injure others, because the heavenly spirits revile you; and because both of these negative occurrences can take place in combination, there is injury to both oneself and others. The other teacher's views are distinguished only by differences in the precise factor which is injured by these types of *vitarka*: for example, the Bhadanta says that because *vitarka* injures the achievement of *sarvajñatā* and *sarvākārājñatā* it injures oneself, and so forth (AMV 44, 227c.22–228a.21).

KUŚALA FACTORS

Having completed our survey of Buddhadeva's attitude toward *akuśala* factors, we can now continue on to examine his perspectives on *kuśala* aspects and the constituents of the path of practice. We can begin with another rather minor controversy concerning the import of a sūtra passage relating an occurrence which took place just after the Buddha's achievement of enlightenment. According to this sūtra, we are told that while the Buddha sat under the *bodhi* tree, he divided all sentient beings into three divisions: those fixed in 1) perverse attitudes; 2) correct attitudes; and 3) those who were not fixed in either. This sūtra continues on to say that after having made this division, the Buddha then continued on to survey the world with the *buddhacakṣus* during the six periods of the day and night. The interlocutor asks about the purpose

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of making this survey anew, since he had already surveyed all sentient beings. A variety of anonymous answers are given. First, although the Buddha had already made that division, he had not yet surveyed the actual status of each being: i.e., when such and such a person moved from the perverse group to the non-fixed group, etc. Another anonymous answer tells us that he wanted to show that at all times he constantly thought of aiding all beings, while another Ābhīdharmika tells us that he wanted to show that the Buddha's compassion was indefatigable. We then come to the replies of the recognized teachers. Vasumitra tells us that sentient beings are always coming from other worlds to be reborn in this world; those who had not yet been born at the time of the Buddha's initial survey were then examined with the buddha-eye and categorized. Buddhadeva says that the Buddha considered the dharma to be his teacher and, wishing to serve the dharma, he surveyed the world during all the six periods of day and night. Finally, Ghōṣaka tells us that the Buddha wished to show what he had already discovered; hence, although he had already made these divisions, he again surveyed the world in order to display to all his profound understanding (AMV 186, 930c.21–931a.18).

While this exchange in itself is not of the greatest intrinsic interest, the fact that specific replies are forthcoming from three major teachers would seem to indicate again that Buddhadeva (and apparently Ghōṣaka as well) had written detailed treatises covering the whole range of material from which the Vaibhāṣikas drew in the formulation of their doctrinal perspectives. Even though this particular sūtra passage might seem uncontroversial, it must have carried some unique significance, perhaps lost to us now, to have elicited the attention of the major Vaibhāṣika teachers. This is not to presume, however, that Buddhadeva and Ghōṣaka were actual participants in the discussion on this question which might have taken place at the time of the compilation of the AMV. This is because, unlike the passage which I noted early on, we have here no direct discussion on the *Jñānaprasthāna* or the AMV, but instead on a well-recognized sūtra text which was accepted by all the Vaibhāṣikas. Hence, this section rather seems to tell us something about the scope and detail of Buddhadeva's own treatise on Abhidharma, which must have been considerable to have included discussion even such minor interpretive questions.

Moving on to actual practices performed by the monks for whom Abhidharma was intended, we are treated to a discussion on the four *āryavamsās*, i.e., contentment with: 1) the food one receives; 2) clothes; 3) bedding and sitting pads; 4) one's cultivation (listed AMV 181,

907a.23–35, and cf. AK vi.7). These are specifically intended to counter four types of *rāga*, or desires for: 1) food and drink; 2) clothes; 3) beds; 4) wrong belief in existence or nonexistence (AMV 181, 907b.15–16). The controversy focuses on the problem of the relevancy of these four *āryavaṃśas* to realms in which certain of these desires might not be present. For instance, since the desire for food and drink is absent in the *rūpāvacara* and since the *arūpyāvacara* is free from the first three types of desires, how can it be said that all three realms of existence are each complete in all four of the *āryavaṃśas*? One of the anonymous Ābhidharmikas states that even if there is no food on the *rūpāvacara*, there has been the previous satisfaction (*santuṣṭa*; *hsi-tsu* 喜足) of that desire on the *kāmāvacara*; hence, that type of desire still has some semblance of currency on that more advanced level as well. Another anonymous respondent tells us that because the *kāmāvacara* includes all four types of desire, and since it is due to one's prior spiritual development in that realm that one has been able to be reborn in higher realms, those realms, by extension, still contain all four types of desire. Buddhadeva tells us: "Thus, although there is no *āsrava* or *anāsrava* clothing, food, etc., there is an *anāsrava āryavaṃśa*. In this wise, although there is no *rūpa* or *arūpya avacara* food, etc., there is still that realm's *āryavaṃśa* . . .". Vasumitra advocates that even though food itself might not be present on such a realm, the counteractive technique (*pratipakṣabhāvanā*) for that desire would still obtain; hence, it is still valid to talk about the *āryavaṃśas* on the *rūpa* and *arūpya* levels. The Bhadanta notes that "abiding in the *āryavaṃśas*" is not dependent upon the state of one's body as either possessing form or being formless; hence, the *āryavaṃśas* still pertain on the *rūpa* and *arūpya avacaras* (AMV 181, 907c.7–25).

Related to the *āryavaṃśas* is another controversy over a sūtra statement that all the buddhas of the past praised the refuse-rag wearing ascetic practice (*pāmsukūladhūtaguna*) but did not permit them to be worn by their monks. Śākyamuni Buddha, however, is said both to have praised refuse-robe robes, and to have allowed them to be worn by his monks. Why then is there this difference between all the past buddhas and Śākyamuni? One anonymous respondent tells us that people in the past had very weak craving, and even if they obtained clothing worth as much as 100,000 coins, their resulting defilement and attachment were less than that which people of today have for the simplest of clothing. Another anonymous Ābhidharmika says that people in those past times were very rich and prosperous; hence, it was easier for monks then to get a robe worth 100,000 coins than for ordinary men of today to get

a refuse-rag robe. Vasumitra says that the mental dispositions (*āśayaḥ*; *i-lo* 意樂) of people in the past were quite magnanimous; hence, even if they saw monks storing up expensive items, they still have faith. People of today, however, are extremely base and have faith only if they see monks storing up inferior items. Buddhadeva tells us that the bodies of people in the past were very delicate; so if they wore coarse clothing they could not protect their bodies. The bodies of people today, however, are very tough, and coarse clothing is adequate to protect them. The Bhadanta simply denies the statement outright, and says that if past Buddhas had not also allowed refuse-rag robes to be worn, they would not have praised them in the first place (AMV 181, 908c.14–28).

Having covered some of the practices which contribute to development on the Buddhist path of practice, we can now turn to a discussion of the different types of the four *nirvedhabhāgīya-kuśalamūlas*, the four divisions of the remote aspect of the *prayogamārga*¹⁹ prior to the inception of *darśanamārga*. The standard view is that there are three degrees of these *kuśalamūlas* – a low, medium, and high – in which *ūṣman* (heat) is the low degree; *mūrdhan* (summit) is the medium; and *kṣānti* (acceptance) and *laukikāgradharma* (highest worldly realization) are both the high degree. A variety of divisions are outlined anonymously before the Vibhāśāśāstrins turn to the accounts of the recognized teachers in the tradition. Buddhadeva advocates an entirely different division for the *nirvedhabhāgīyas*. He gives three different divisions for *ūṣman*: low/low, low/medium, and low/high; three for *mūrdhan*: medium/low, medium/medium, and medium/high; two for *kṣānti*: high/low and high/medium; and only one for *laukikāgradharma*: high/high. If these are, however, combined into only three classes, he says that they would appear as in the standard view outlined above. Ghoṣaka gives instead three divisions for *ūṣman*; six divisions for *mūrdhan*; eight for *kṣānti*; and only one (high/high) for *laukikāgradharma*. Vasumitra has three for *ūṣman*; two for *mūrdhan*; three for *kṣānti*; and again only one for *laukikāgradharma*. Again we see a considerable divergence of opinion among the recognized masters. All three accept unanimously only the uniqueness of *laukikāgradharma* as constituting a single, highest division of the *nirvedhabhāgīyas*. Interestingly, however, we see an example, which is not infrequent in the AMV, where the standard view differs from that held by Vasumitra, apparently belying claims that the AMV was compiled to represent his point of view (AMV 6, 30a.4–6, 14–17).²⁰

One of the longest sections in the AMV appears towards the opening of the text where the Vibhāśāśāstrins discuss the precise meaning and

import of the term *laukikāgradharma*. The Pūrvābhīdharmikas have stated: "What is the *laukikāgradharma*? Answer: If a *cittacaitasika* dharma is the immediate antecedent for entering *samyaktvaniyāma* [the initial moment of *darśanamārga*], it would be called the *laukikāgradharma*. Others give this explanation: if [dharma such as] the *pañcendriyas* [i.e., the *śuddhendriyas*] are the immediate antecedents for entering *samyaktvaniyāma*, it would be called *laukikāgradharma*" (AMV 2, 7b.26–29). The views of a number of rival schools are given, including that of the Vātsīputrīyas who are said to advocate that the *svabhāva* of the *laukikāgradharma* was only these *pañcendriyas*, and not any of the other twenty-two *indriyas* (AMV 2, 8b.10–11; see discussion above), a view which seems remarkably similar to that of the Pūrvābhīdharmikas just given. Indeed, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins had stated earlier that the reason for the latitude allowed toward the definition of the *laukikāgradharma* was to counter the attachment of such groups as the Vibhajyavādins, who advocated that it was these five *indriyas* only which were *anāsrava* and, consequently, the immediate antecedents to *darśanamārga*. Hence, *prthagjanas* were not in possession of (*asamanvāgama*) the *laukikāgradharma* in the view of that school. The Pūrvābhīdharmikas reject this, and state that the *laukikāgradharma* was, in fact, possessed even by *prthagjanas* who were still under the sway of the *āsravas*; for this reason, the five *indriyas* were not merely *anāsrava*, as the Vibhajyavādins had advocated (AMV 2, 2b.3–13). This exchange seems to show that the Pūrvābhīdharmikas wanted to clarify, first, that the precise definition of *laukikāgradharma* was somewhat variable, and could be applied to any dharma which initiated entrance into the *darśanamārga*; and, second, that the *laukikāgradharma* still belonged to the *āsrava* sphere and, thus, was potentially inherent in all *prthagjanas*.

The Vibhāṣāśāstrins proceed to examine the views of Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva, both of which are very similar once again. Dharmatrāta states that all *cittacaitasika* dharmas are simply distinctions of intention (*cetanāviśeṣa*; cf. AK, T 20.68c.20); therefore, the *svabhāva* of *laukikāgradharma* is simply *cetanā*. Buddhadeva, as was noted previously, advocates that the *svabhāva* of all *cittacaitasika* dharmas is just the mind (*cittāiva* AMV 127, 661c. 21 即心). Hence, the *laukikāgradharma* has the mind as its *svabhāva*. Both Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva seem to agree that *śraddhā*, etc., can have a function which is totally distinct from this *cetanā* or *citta*, which is also able to function independently as the *ālambanapratyaya* (object condition) – i.e., the immediate antecedent – for entering into the *darśanamārga*. The Vibhāṣāśāstrins reject this

idea that a single *indriya* would be sufficient to bring about entrance into the *darśanamārga*. For example, if *śraddhā* alone were the immediate antecedent, there would be no need for *vīrya*, *smṛti*, *samādhi*, and *prajñā*; one should, therefore, be able to enter the *darśanamārga* with indolence, forgetfulness, distraction, and *kuprajñā* (AMV 2, 8c.7–25).

One of the fruits of practice is the state of *dhyāna*, concerning the *phala* of which the interlocutor raises a few questions. The interlocutor suggests that if a person who attains to *asaṃjñīsamāpatti* as well as the *asaṃjñīdevas* are able to receive the *sacittaka* (*yu-hsin* 有心) products of the four *dhyānas*, then even at the time that they are merely *sacittaka* and not in the state of *asaṃjñīsamāpatti*, they should still be able to receive this fruition of *asaṃjñīsamāpatti*. If, at the time one is without mind (*acittaka*), one can receive the *phalas* which are *sacittaka* or, if at the time that one is *sacittaka*, one can receive the *acittakaphalam*, then cause and effect would be completely distorted (*viparyāya*).

Buddhadeva replies that a person who achieves *asaṃjñīsamāpatti* receives *asaṃjñīvipākaphala* (the fourth of the five *phalas*), and the *jīvitendriya* and *nikāyasabhāga* of that state is the *sacittaka karmaphala* of the fourth *dhyāna*. The remaining four *vipākas* are, consequently, the associated fruitions (*saphala*). The Vibhāṣāśāstrins challenge this, and claim instead that the *asaṃjñīvipāka* is nothing but the *phala* of *asaṃjñīsamāpatti*. *Jīvitendriya*, *nikāyasabhāga*, and the *vipāka* of the five sense faculties of a person in *asaṃjñīsamāpatti* are only the *sacittaka karmaphala* of the fourth *dhyāna*, while the remaining four *vipākas* are *saphala*. The major difference between the Vibhāṣāśāstrins and Buddhadeva on this point appears to be that the Vibhāṣāśāstrins feel Buddhadeva has neglected to mention the fact that the five sense faculties are also the *karmaphala* of the state of *asaṃjñīsamāpatti*, and that *rūpa* is also one of the *vipākaphalas* accompanying the achievement of that state (AMV 19, 96c.18–19), not simply the *asaṃjñīvipākaphala* as Buddhadeva had advocated (AMV 19, 97a.4–19).

Moving now into the range of attainment, we come upon a discussion concerning *śrotāpannashīp*. In a sūtra passage, the Buddha tells Ānanda of a discourse Śāriputra gave to Anāthapiṇḍada in which Śāriputra describes the ten aspects of the four stages of *śrotāpannashīp*. This passage incites a controversy concerning the precise meaning of those ten aspects and the way they correlate with the four stages. The views of a number of teachers are given, including Parśva; Pūrṇāśa; Ghōṣaka; the Abhidharmaśāstrins; Vasumitra; Bhadanta; Vāmaprāpta; Āryamahika; and finally Buddhadeva. Buddhadeva tells us that the first stage of *śrotāpannashīp* is approaching a *kalyāṇamitra*, which is distinguished

by the arising of *śraddhā*, *śīla*, and *tyāga* (presumably here, abandonment of the home life); the second stage is hearing the *saddharma*, which is distinguished by learning (*śrūta*) and *prajñā*; the third stage is *yoniso-manaskāra*, which is distinguished by *samyaksamkalpa*; the fourth stage is practicing according to that dharma, which is distinguished according to *samyagdarsana*, *samyagadhimukti*, *samyagvimukti*, and *samyagjñāna* (listing at AMV 93, 486b.7–8). Like the previous controversy on the various degrees of the *nirvedhabhāgiyas*, the distinction between the views of the teachers involves nothing more than different correlations between these four stages and their respective factors (AMV 94, 487a.17–b.28).

The interlocutor raises a further problem concerning the actual attainment of one of the two types of liberation: *akopya-cetovimukti*. It has been said that there can be *parihāna* from this type of *vimukti*, because it is not a *vimukti* which is made manifest at all times. If it is, however, *akopya*, then how would this be possible? Both the Vibhāśāstrins and Buddhadeva reject this statement that there is any such retrogression. The Vibhāśāstrins have discussed earlier the *sambhogaparihāna*, the only retrogression to which the buddhas are subject, in which superior meritorious qualities which had previously been achieved are not lost, but temporarily are not made manifest (AMV 61, 315b.11–316b.27). Hence, this type of *parihāna* is not true 'retrogression' in which there is actual loss of the achievement, but mere temporary invisibility. The *akopyacetovimukti-parihāna* is deemed analogous to this sort of retrogression: although it might temporarily be invisible, it is not lost. Buddhadeva, however, accepts the fact of retrogression from meritorious qualities when those qualities do not appear, again apparently in the sense of the temporary invisibility of meritorious qualities. He says, however, that the *akopyacetovimukti* is the 'subject' of such attainment – i.e., is the subjective element in such attainment – and, consequently, is always present implicitly even at times when it might not be immediately apparent. Hence, there can be no real retrogression from *akopyacetovimukti* (AMV 61, 316a.14–b.16).

Finally, we come to the last controversy I will cover here, concerning the two types of *vitarka* which accompany the Buddha's initial attainment of Buddhahood, as they are given in a sūtra passage: *kṣemavitarka* (*an-yen hsün* 安隱尋), and *virativitarka* (*yüan-li hsün* 遠離尋). A variety of anonymous definitions of these two terms are given, such as *alobhakuśalamūla* is *kṣemavitarka*, while *amohakuśalamūla* is *virativitarka*. Buddhadeva tells us that the *vitarka* which is associated with the merit of *nivṛtti* (*huan-mieh* 還滅) is *kṣemavitarka*, while the *vitarka*

associated with seeing the fault in *pravṛtti* (*liu-chüan* 流轉) is *virativitarka*. Ghosaka gives the exact opposite view. The Bhadanta advocates that *kṣema* is the *vitarka* associated with limitless beneficial thoughts, while *virati* is the *vitarka* associated with limitless peaceful thoughts; Paśva is the exact opposite of this. Finally, Vasumitra tells us that *kṣema* is the *vitarka* produced by limitless thoughts of compassion, while *virati* is the *vitarka* produced by limitless thoughts of discipline (AMV 44, 228a.22–b.13).

CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that no treatises authored by Buddhadeva are extant in either Sanskrit or Chinese translation, we no longer need to bewail the utter dearth of materials relating to his Abhidharma philosophy. Thanks to the information provided in the many scattered references to Buddhadeva throughout the massive *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā*, we can reconstruct with a fair degree of accuracy the major outlines of his thought and discuss in considerable detail the intricacies of several of his views. While this reconstruction is often made possible only by contrasting his perspectives with those of the later Vibhāśāstrins, this coverage provides substantial evidence of much of the structure and contours of his philosophy. Buddhadeva's thought as presented in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* is revealed to be a conservative, and decidedly peculiar, system of Abhidharma philosophy, which shares little in common with the later systematizations of the Kāśmīri Vaibhāśikas. In some sense, Buddhadeva emerges as an intriguing potential link between early *mātrkā* treatments of dharmas found in the sūtras and later Mahāyāna Abhidharmika analyses. Indeed, Buddhadeva emerges as a potential vaunt courier of later Mahāyānist strands of Buddhist thought, especially the Yogācāra. By rejecting the substantial reality of all the eleven derivative *rūpas* accepted by the later Vaibhāśikas, and positing that all the forty-six *caitasika-dharmas* were nothing other than differentiations of *citta*, Buddhadeva offers a system of analysis that may have culminated eventually in the mature Yogācāra theories of the purely nominal reality of *rūpa* and the *caitasikas*. Unless and until new discoveries of Sanskrit manuscripts reveal sources now unknown to us, attempts, such as I have made here with Buddhadeva, to cull Chinese translations of Vaibhāśika materials provide one of the few avenues through which to glean something of the thought of important early figures of Indian Abhidharma philosophy of whom no independent treatises are extant.

NOTES

- ¹ Virtually the only attempts to discuss Buddhadeva's philosophy have appeared in two articles by Paul W. Williams: "Buddhadeva and Temporality," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 4 (1977), 279-294; and "On the Abhidharma Ontology," *JIP* 9 (1981), 227-257 passim. I have treated the Chinese sources on Buddhadeva's views on temporality in a previous article and omit that discussion here: see Robert E. Buswell, Jr., 'The Three Times Controversy in Abhidharma Philosophy', in Nogwŏn sŏnim Kohŭi Kinyŏm haksul nonch'ong wiwŏnhoe, eds., *Han'guk Pulgyo ūi chwapyo* (The Direction of Korean Buddhism) (Seoul: Pulgyo Sidaesa, 1997): 1129-1266.
- ² For Hsüan-tsang's account of the traditional legends concerning the compilation of the AMV, see Thomas Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India: 629-645 A.D.* (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1904), vol. 1, 270-278.
- ³ This identification of the Bhadanta with Katyāyanīputra is hypothetical, but seems the most plausible possibility.
- ⁴ First noted by Louis de la Vallée Poussin, 'Documents d'Abhidharma', *Mélanges chinois et bouddhique* 5 (1936-7), 156 n. 3.
- ⁵ Significantly, in the examples I have noticed so far in my readings, there is never a "critique" following the views of Vasumitra or the Bhadanta.
- ⁶ There is some possibility that this could be referring to the AMV itself which, of course, follows the same format as the *Jñānaprasthāna*. This does not seem the most plausible alternative, however.
- ⁷ See Watters, *Yuan Chwang*, vol. 1, 270-271.
- ⁸ There is no indication from Hsüan-tsang's version of the compilation of the AMV that Gandhāra was avoided as the site of Kaniṣka's Council because of potential conflict with rival teachers, but merely because of its poor climate; see Watters, *Yuan Chwang*, p. 271.
- ⁹ This would seem to go against the evidence of Tāranātha, who places Buddhadeva just after Dharmatrāta, Ghoṣaka, and Vasumitra, and just before Nagārjuna (see Williams, 'Temporality', p. 279 and citation at p. 291, n. 2), and apparently substantiates Williams' view that Buddhadeva might be the earliest of these four major teachers (p. 280-1).
- ¹⁰ See Kenneth Ch'en, *Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 238, 368-9; and for his translation bureau and its method of operation, see W. Fuchs, 'Zur technischen Organisation der Übersetzungen buddhistischer Schriften ins Chinesische', *Asia Major* 6 (1930), 84-103.
- ¹¹ Twenty monks are actually mentioned, but one (Chia-shang 嘉尚) is mentioned twice as the "holder of the brush."
- ¹² See the discussion in A.K. Chatterjee, *The Yogācāra Idealism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), 108-110.
- ¹³ See *Suttantamātikā* #131, *Dhammasaṅgīni* #1309-1310; and cf. *Visuddhimagga* xviii. 587 ff. (*Diṭṭhi-visuddhi-niddesa*).
- ¹⁴ This has been translated in de la Vallée Poussin, 'Documents d'Abhidharma: Le corps de l'Arhat est-il pur?', *MCB* 1 (1931-2), 114-115.
- ¹⁵ See AK i.28; *Aiṭhasālīni* iv.29; noted in Herbert V. Guenther, *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1957), p. 151 ff.
- ¹⁶ The Theravādins accepted twenty-three categories; see listing in Guenther, *Abhidharma*, p. 151.
- ¹⁷ *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, p. 3; noted Guenther, *ibid*.
- ¹⁸ We see in this passage from the AMV another distinction in the translation of an identical passage in the text, here using the more conventional *ting* 定 for *samādhi* rather than Hsüan-tsang's preferred *teng-chih* 等持.

- ¹⁹ For a worthwhile summary of the *nirvedhabhāgīyas*, see Guenther, *Abhidharma*, pp. 215-6, 219-221. For further discussion, and other references, see my article 'The "Aids to Penetration" (*Nirvedhabhāgīya*) according to the Vaibhāṣika School', forthcoming in *Journal of Indian Philosophy*.
- ²⁰ See Williams' acceptance of this view at his 'Temporality', pp. 279-280, 291.

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THE "AIDS TO PENETRATION" (*NIRVEDHABHĀGĪYA*)
ACCORDING TO THE VAIBHĀSIKA SCHOOL

INTRODUCTION

In the Vaibhāṣika schema of the path of spiritual cultivation (*mārga*), perhaps the most critical stage is that of the four aids to penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya-kuśalamūla*; hereafter *nirvedhabhāgīya*), which accounts for the transition from the worldly sphere of cultivation (*laukikabhāvanāmārga*) to the supramundane vision of the four noble truths (*darśanamārga*). Both Etienne Lamotte and Edward Conze have already lamented the fact that there is no detailed account in the Vaibhāṣika literature on this vital topic; after giving a bare-bones listing of the four, Conze, for example, remarks, "That is nearly all we know about them, and no detailed Sarvāstivādin account of this vital subject seems to have been preserved".¹ It is true that the extant Sanskrit materials concerning the Vaibhāṣika school, such as the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, devote little space to this point of transition in the nascent stages of the *mārga*, while going into great detail on the distinction between the various types of arhats and anāgāmins. However, the situation is not nearly as dire as Conze would lead us to believe, for we need look no farther than that encyclopedic sourcebook of Sarvāstivādin doctrine, the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā* (hereafter AMV; *Taishō* no. 1545, vol. 27, cited by *chüan* number, and page, column, and line), for an extensive and detailed treatment of the *nirvedhabhāgīya-s*. Indeed, there is a plethora of material preserved in AMV (*chüan-s* two through seven are devoted exclusively to the four *nirvedhabhāgīya-s*, with additional material included elsewhere throughout the two-hundred *chüan-s* of the text) – so much in fact that it defies a brief survey. In this paper, my attempt will be to sort out the major features of the Sarvāstivādin treatment of the *nirvedhabhāgīya-s* presented in the AMV discussion on the topic, and focus on their relation to the two other types of *kuśalamūla-s*, *puṇyabhāgīya* and *mokṣabhāgīya*, which I discussed in an earlier paper.

The basic outline of how the *nirvedhabhāgīya-s* fit into the entire scheme of the path is clear, if hardly illuminative, from the relevant

Vaibhāṣika sources in Sanskrit.² After the preparatory stages of the path, during which the preliminary skills necessary for cultivation are gradually developed (*sambhāramārga*), the adept begins the path of endeavor (*prayogamārga*), the process of spiritual training that will culminate in the supramundane insight into the four noble truths (*darśanamārga*). The preparatory path (*prayogamārga*) is divided into two aspects, the remote and the proximate, which take place in two different lifetimes (see AMV 30, p. 157c22–24). The remote preparatory path consists of the *mokṣabhāgīya-kuśalamūla-s*, which are associated only with *śrutamayī* and *cintamayī prajñā*. This path is presumably concerned with the development of the three *kuśalamūla-s* well known in the sūtras (*alobha*, *adveṣa* and *amoha*) as well as the four foundations of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*). In a provocative passage, however, which as we will see has important implications for the classification of the *nirvedhabhāgīya-s* as *kuśalamūla-s*, the AMV defines this stage in implicitly Mahāyānist terms: “The remote preparatory [stage] refers to the initial [resolve] not to backslide from the *bodhicitta*, and so forth” (AMV 30, p. 157c23–4). Through specific development of the *dharma-smṛtyupasthāna* during that first lifetime, the adept then in his next life enters upon the proximate preparatory stage, which involves the four wholesome roots associated with penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya-kuśalamūla-s*): 1) heat (*ūṣmāgata*); 2) summit (*mūrdhan*); 3) acceptance (*kṣānti*); and 4) highest worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*).³ According to the orthodox opinion of the Kashmiri Vibhāṣāśāstrins, these four are associated exclusively with experiential knowledge (*bhāvanāmāyīprajñā*) and the *dharma-smṛtyupasthāna*. While the first two of these *nirvedhabhāgīya-s* are subject to retrogression and thus are part of the worldly path of practice (*laukikabhāvanāmārga*; AK vilc) the latter pair are nonretrogressive and lead to the supramundane *darśanamārga*. The final stage of the *prayogamārga* is called the unimpeded concentration (*ānataryasamādhi*), and marks the complete perfection of the highest worldly dharmas (AMV 6, p. 29c13–23).⁴ Thus we see that in the Vaibhāṣika system, the preliminary stages of practice are associated with *kuśalamūla-s*: “A *brahmacārin* is one who plants at the inception [of his cultivation] such superior wholesome roots (*kuśalamūla-s*) as those associated with liberation (*mokṣabhāgīya*) and those associated with penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya*)” (AMV 172c23–24).

The adept then enters the *darśanamārga*, the first path of sainthood, via the recognition of the first aspect of the four noble truths, the acceptance of the fact of suffering (*dukkhe dharmajñānakṣānti*).

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His firm conviction that all dharmas in the *kāmadhātu* are suffering constitutes the formal “initiation” into the *darśanamārga*, and the adept enters the stage of certainty that he is destined for enlightenment (*samyakvānīyāmāvakrānti*). At the sixteenth moment of the *darśanamārga*, at which point the adept considers the *mārgasatya* in relation to the formless realm (*mārga anvayajñāna*), the person enters the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*), which corresponds to the first fruit of sainthood. This path of cultivation is sustained throughout the next life (as well as in any subsequent lives, up to a maximum of seven, that might be necessary to complete the training), where the remaining defilements (*kleśa*) are overcome. Once those *kleśa-s* and outflows (*āsrava*) are removed, the resulting adamant absorption (*vajropama-samādhi*; AK vi.44d) suddenly illumines for the student the fact that the *āsrava-s* are now extinct (*kṣayajñāna*) and will never arise again (*anutpādajñāna*). The adept accordingly enters the final stage of the *mārga*: the path of the completion of training, *asaikṣamārga*. The student is then an arhat, and will be totally free from saṃsāra once he abandons the *skandha-s* of the summit of existence (*bhavāgra*) at the moment of his death.

THE NIRVEDHABHĀGĪYA-S AS KUŚALAMŪLA-S

It is relevant at this point to explore the possible reasons that the Vaibhāṣikas would have classified the *nirvedhabhāgīya-s* as a specific type of *kuśalamūla*, alone with the *puṇyabhāgīya* and *mokṣabhāgīya kuśalamūla-s*. We know of course that the *kuśalamūla-s* were generally defined as threefold in the *Āgama-s* – i.e., freedom from greed (*alobha*), hatred (*adveṣa*), and delusion (*amoha*) – which in broad terms correspond to the *mokṣabhāgīya-kuśalamūla-s*. While scriptural evidence is found to support the existence of each of the four *nirvedhabhāgīya-s*, as I shall cite later, nowhere in the Pali *Nikāya-s* or the extant Chinese *Āgama-s* are these called *kuśalamūla-s*.⁵ All stages of the path prior to the *bhāvanāmārga* were defined as one or another type of *kuśalamūla* by the Vaibhāṣikas. One potential reason for the Vaibhāṣika extension of the term *kuśalamūla* to the *nirvedhabhāgīya-s* seems to reflect the division of the *mārga* just outlined, in which the *nirvedhabhāgīya-s* constitute the proximate preparatory stage prior to the inception of insight. Because true cultivation (i.e., *lokottarabhāvanā*) is said to begin only after the *darśanamārga*, the practice that takes place prior to that moment of enlightenment would have to have been redefined. Of course, one way to accomplish this would have been simply to call that practice “mundane” cultivation, as indeed is suggested by the Vaibhāṣika

use of the term *laukikabhāvanāmārga*. The relationship between the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s and the inception of insight was better clarified, however, by describing *darśanamārga* also as a type of *kuśalamūla* – specifically the *anāsrava-kuśalamūla* (AMV 5, p. 25a3–4). Thus, both *darśanamārga* and the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s were related to the first *ārya-mārga*, in a way similar to that in which the *mokṣabhāgīya* and *nirvedhabhāgīya kuśalamūla*-s were related to *darśanamārga*:

The tendency toward stream-entry (*yü-liu-hsiang* 預流向; *śrotāpanna-pratipannaka*) has both a proximate and a remote [aspect]. The proximate [aspect] is the *darśanamārga*; the remote [aspect] is the preceding [levels of practice such as, in descending order,] the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s, the *mokṣabhāgīya* [*kuśalamūla*-s], down to leaving home with right faith (AMV 66, p. 342a.20–21).

As this passage helps to clarify, from the standpoint of the preceding *mokṣabhāgīya-kuśalamūla*-s, the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s were described in terms that indicated their function of catalyzing direct penetration of the four noble truths and thence insight. From the perspective of the *darśanamārga*, however, the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s were instead regarded as the highest stages of the *sāsravakuśalamūla*-s.

A second, and more intriguing reason for redefining the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s as *kuśalamūla*-s suggests possible parallels with proto-Mahāyānist elements of other schools, especially interesting given the “Mahāyānist” definition of the remote preparatory path in terms of the *bodhicitta*, as cited in the quotation from AMV in the previous section. In the Lokottaravādin *Mahāvastu*, as well as in later Mahāyāna texts and inscriptions, the *bodhicittotpāda* is said to be initiated by the maturation of the *kuśalamūla*-s. Hence, the period prior to the *bodhicittotpāda*, called the resolving career (*pranidhānacarya*), is still a preparatory stage and is characterized by “acquiring of the roots of goodness”.⁶ Despite the differences in the interpretations of *bodhicittotpāda* and *darśanamārga* in the various schools, it is significant that both are considered to be momentary visions of reality which are nonetheless of such intensity and import as to alter fundamentally the entire future career of the adept. Hence, the Vaibhāṣāśāstrins’ reference to their own *prayogamārga* as being a type of *kuśalamūla* may have been influenced by the Lokottaravādin and/or the Mahāyāna idea that the preparatory stage was associated with the *kuśalamūla*-s. If so, we find here one more example of the constant problem involved in attempting to elucidate the doctrinal influences between different early schools of Buddhism, as well as the related question of determining the source of apparent “Mahāyāna” elements in Vaibhāṣika texts, as has already been noted in other contexts.⁷

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GENERAL FEATURES OF THE *NIRVEDHABHĀGĪYA*-S

We may now turn to a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of the four *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s as a class, before considering each of the constituents separately.

As I have outlined above, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins considered the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s in terms of a gradual process of development culminating in the *darśanamārga*. The precise practices cultivated on the *prayogamārga* that led up to the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s unfortunately receive little treatment in Vaibhāṣika materials apart from a few passing references made in discussions of other features of the path. Even in those brief mentions, however, we can see that the *prayogamārga* prior to the development of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s involved scriptural learning as well as the cultivation of various types of mindfulness meditation.

Thus, when a person is awake, he may cultivate various types of superior *kuśala-karman*-s – that is he can read, recite, hear, listen, speak, receive, and analyze the text and meaning [of the sūtras], cultivate *aśubha-bhāvanā* or such foundations of mindfulness as *ānāpānasamṛti* either separately or together, [develop] the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s, and enter *samyakṣvānyāma*, and obtain the fruition of the *śrotāpanna*, up to, obtain the fruition of arhatship (AMV 37, 193a15–19).

This placement of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s in relation to insight is suggested in the Vibhāṣāśāstrins’ interpretation of the story of the Buddha’s initial converts.⁸ Among the group of five *bhikṣu*-s who heard the Buddha’s first sermon, all five were said to have seen the dharma, but only Ajñātakaundīya was mentioned by name. The Vibhāṣāśāstrins explain that this is because Kaundīya had entered *darśanamārga* while the other four were still at the stage of the *nirvedhabhāgīya-kuśalamūla*-s (AMV 182, 93b5–12).

This pivotal place of the *nirvedhabhāgīya-kuśalamūla*-s in the path leading up to *darśanamārga* also accounts for their name.

Question: Why are these called ‘Aids to Penetration’ (*nirvedhabhāgīya*-s)? Answer: ‘Penetration’ (*nirvedha*) refers to the *āryamārga*. In this wise, these four things are in harmony with that [function of inducing penetration]. Of those things which are thus in harmony, these four are the most superior. Therefore they are called “aids to penetration”. These four are also referred to as “practicing the [four noble] truths”, “cultivation and training” and “wholesome faculties”. They are called “practicing the truths” because they work through all four [noble] truths by means of the sixteen aspects, such as impermanence, etc. [see AK vi.17c]. They are called “cultivation and training” because, in order to seek the holy path, they cultivate counteragents for the body and remove its filth and evil and guide one to the arising of the holy path. . . . “Wholesome faculties (lit., roots, *kuśalamūla*)”: this is to say, the *āryamārga* and *nirvāna* are the true wholesome [qualities]. These four are the initial foundation for those [higher achievements]. Because they are a firm and settled place, they are called “roots” [i.e., faculties] (AMV 6, p. 29c24–30a4).

According to the standard view of the Vaibhāṣikas, there are three degrees of these *kuśalamūla*-s – a middling, average, and superior – in which heat is the middling degree, summit is the average, and acceptance and highest worldly dharmas are both the superior degree. A variety of alternative divisions are cited anonymously before the Vibhāṣāśāstrins turn to the accounts of the recognized teachers in the tradition. Buddhadeva is said to have advocated an entirely different division for the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s. He gives three different divisions for heat: low/low, low/medium, and low/high; three for summit: medium/low, medium/medium, and medium/high; two for acceptance: high/low and high/medium; and only one for highest worldly dharmas: high/high. If these are combined into only three classes, however, he would admit that they would appear as in the standard view outlined previously. Ghoṣaka gives instead three divisions for heat; six divisions for summit; eight for acceptance; and only one (high/high) for highest worldly dharmas. Vasumitra has three for heat, two for summit, three for acceptance, and again only one for highest worldly dharmas. We see that on this point, as indeed on so many others throughout the AMV, a considerable divergence of opinion existed among the recognized Vaibhāṣika masters. All three accept unanimously only the uniqueness of *laukikāgradharma* as constituting a single, highest division of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s (AMV 6, 30a4–6, 14–17).

Three major divisions of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s are given elsewhere in AMV in summary form.

There are three types of *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s. 1.) those which are subject to retrogression (*hānabhāgīya*; *shun-t'ui-fen* 順退分; *Chu-she lun*, p. 148a.28, 148c.22, 26); 2.) those which abide (*sthītibhāgīya*; *shun-chu-fen* 順住分; see *Chu-she lun*, p. 148c.17, 22); 3.) those which are supreme (*viśeṣabhāgīya*; *shun-sheng-chin-fen* 順勝(進)分; see *Chu-she lun*, p. 148c.18, 22). . . Heat is associated with all three types, as is summit. Others say [however] that [summit] includes only two types, excepting *sthītibhāgīya*, as the stage of summit has transcended the level at which retrogression can occur. Acceptance also has two [types], excepting *hānabhāgīya*. *Laukikāgradharma* is only *viśeṣabhāgīya*; for that reason, that level is absolutely free-from any possibility of retrogression (AMV 5, 22c.22–28).

As in all their discussions on specific dharma classifications, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins take great pains to explore the precise nature (*svabhāva*; *tzu-hsing* 自性) of those dharmas. The *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s are no exception, and we find extensive material on them in the AMV, which illustrates the considerable intrasectarian controversies concerning this and so many other aspects of Vaibhāṣika doctrine.

Thus the four *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s are heat, summit, acceptance, and highest worldly dharmas. Question: What is the own-nature of these four? Answer: They all have the five *skandha*-s as their own-nature.

Venerable Ghoṣaka [however] gives this explanation: The *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s include those which are associated with the desire realm (*kāma-pratisamyukta*; *yü-chieh-hsi* 欲界繫) and those which are associated with the subtle-form realm (*rūpa-pratisamyukta*; *se-chieh-hsi* 色界繫). The middle and lower levels of the bondage to the desire realm are heat, and the highest [level] is summit. The own-natures of these two involve only four *skandha*-s, because there is no accompanying form (*sui-chüan se* 隨轉色; *anuvartaka-rūpa*?; not attested in AK) in the desire-realm. The middle and lower levels of those which are associated with the subtle-form realm are called acceptance and the highest [level] is supreme worldly dharmas. The own-natures of these two include all five *skandha*-s, because there is accompanying form in the subtle-form realm.

Thus, in the [orthodox] explanation, these four wholesome faculties (*kuśalamūla*) all are the meditation-stage (*ting-ti* 定地; *dhyāna-bhūmi*) and cultivation-stage (*hsiu-ti* 修地; **bhāvanā-bhūmi*; not attested in AK) of the subtle-form realm and practice the holy techniques of practice. Hence, the own-natures of the four involve all five *skandha*-s (AMV 6, 29c.6–14).

As is apparent in the above passage, there is some dispute over the precise realms within which the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s can be generated. The *Abhidharmakośa* states that the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s are produced in the *kāma-dhātu*, the human *gati*, and the three great continents, with the exception of Uttarakuru.⁹ Such a position finds support in the AMV as well. We are told, for example, that because the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s culminate in *samyaktvaniyāmāvakrānti*, which the Vaibhāṣikas will not allow to be achieved in either the *rūpa* or *arūpya dhātu*-s, the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s can therefore only be generated in the *kāmadhātu*. Within that *kāmadhātu*, however, they can only be produced in the human or deva realms of existence, not the three evil bourns, because they are a superior type of *kuśalamūla* that would be antithetical to those nether regions. Among humans, they can be developed on all the continents except Uttarakuru; among the devas, however, the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s are actually generated during the preceding human lifetime and only later manifest in the deva-realm. This was because the deva-realm does not have sufficient disgust with sensuality (*yen-li* 厭離; *nirveda*) to induce their development. The *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s also cannot be generated in the three evil bourns either, because the bodies produced in those realms of existence are inferior *āśraya*-s (AMV 7, 33b22–c16). While both men and women have the capacity to develop the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s, a woman's may have been generated initially (i.e., in a previous life) in either a male or female body, while a man's may only have been generated in a male body; this is because the female body is inherently inferior to the male's and therefore is unable to serve as a basis for the superior, male-generated *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s (AMV 7, 33c17–34a10).

A contrary opinion is, however, found in other passages in AMV. As we saw above with Ghosaka, all the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s were considered to be of two types: those associated with the *kāmadhātu* (*yü-chieh-hsi*) or those associated with the *rūpadhātu* (*se-chieh-hsi*). Among the former type, the lowest is called heat, and the highest summit. Among the latter type, the lowest is called acceptance, and the highest is supreme worldly dharmas. The Vibhāṣāśāstrins reject this view, however, because they consider that all four *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s are associated with the *rūpadhātu*. They instead divide the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s into two different groups, depending upon whether they are subject to retrogression: heat and summit are so subject, the latter two *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s are not (AMV 6, 25c.12–21). This question of retrogression will be treated in some detail below. Elsewhere, AMV tells us that because the four *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s are associated with the *bhāvanāmayīprajñā*, which is activated only on the *rūpa* and *arūpya dhātu*-s (AMV 6, p. 40b17–19), they cannot be generated in the *kāmadhātu*; AMV in fact says explicitly, “These four *kuśalamūla*-s are all produced through cultivation in the *rūpadhātu*” (AMV 7, 31b29). The description of the factors that generate these *kuśalamūla*-s is cited in support of this interpretation. We are told that the first level, heat, is engendered immediately (*wu-chien* 無間; *ānantarya*) by ratiocination (*tso-i* 作意; *manaskāra*), because of the qualities that characterize the *dhyāna*-s of the *rūpadhātu*; the point at which the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s can come into play. These qualities are such things as disgust (*yen-li*; *nirveda*), reflection (*ssu-mu* 思慕; *saṃcetanā*?, not attested in AK), and so forth. Each level in turn then also gives rise immediately to its succeeding stage, until *laukikāgradharma* is reached (AMV 7, 31c20–24).¹⁰ However, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins finally admit that *kāmadhātu* has ratiocination which resembles (*ssu* 似; *sādrśya*) that present in the *dhyāna*-s, and thus even without leaving behind sensual-desire (*rāga*), the first of the *anusāya*-s, *uṣman* can be generated (AMV 7, 31c.24–28). Hence, the former explanation seems to be preferable, and we should expect that the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s could be developed in the *kāmadhātu*, and specifically in the human realm of existence.

This statement that one of the prerequisites of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s resembles the qualities of a higher level of achievement is indicative of a common Vaibhāṣika tendency to accept that earlier levels of the path can generate experiences that in some ways mimic (*sādrśya*) the experiences achieved at later stages. Perhaps the best known of these pseudo-experiences is *nirodhasamāpatti*, a peculiar type of meditative trance attainable only by the arhats, which is said to “resemble” *nirvāṇa*.¹¹ In

a parallel manner, the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s too are said to resemble the experiences engendered through the *darśanamārga*. This correlation between the mundane and supramundane is related in a discussion concerning the six types of *āryadharmas* (*sheng-fa* 聖法) outlined by the Vibhāṣāśāstrins – holy dharma, heat, insight (*darśana*), acceptance, zest (*chandas*?; *yü* 欲), and wisdom (*prajñā*).

Because the *dukkhe dharmajñānakṣānti* causes the seeds (*bīja*) of the *skandha*-s to shrivel, it is called *ārya-uṣman* [and therefore *ārya-uṣman* is *dukkhe dharmajñānakṣānti*]. Because it seeks the truth, it is called *ārya-darśana*. Because it can endure the truth, it is called *ārya-kṣānti*. Because it delights in the truth, it is called *ārya-chandas*. Because it analyzes (*pravacaya*?; *chüeh-tse* 抉擇) the truth, it is called *ārya-prajñā*....

Other *ācārya*-s explain: Among these [six], there are these two types of *ārya-dharma*-s: true (*tattva*; *chen-shih* 真實) and semblance (*sādrśya*; *hsiang-ssu* 相似). The semblance *ārya-dharma* is heat and the other four *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s. The *ārya-dharma* is the true *ārya-dharma*, which is the *anāsravamārga*. *Ārya-uṣman* is the *uṣma-dharma*. *Ārya-darśana* is the *mūrdha-dharma*. *Ārya-kṣānti* is the lower-middle [quality] of the *mūrdha-dharma*. *Ārya-chandas* is the highest (*tseng-shang* 增上; *adhipati*?) [quality of the] *kṣānti-dharma*. *Ārya-prajñā* is the *laukikāgradharma*. If one has yet to cultivate and attain the four [*nirvedhabhāgīya*-s of] heat, etc., one should know that that person is still entirely a *prthagjana*; but if one has attained heat, etc. then he also [resembles] an *ārya*. As the World Honored One said, “One who possesses (*samanvāgata*) the *kuśalamūla*-s of heat, etc. (*hsiang-ssu sheng* 相似聖) I say is called a ‘semblance-*ārya*.’” (AMV 45, 232c18–233a9).¹²

This resemblance of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s to the *darśanamārga* is perhaps accounted for by the way in which the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s and the *darśanamārga* relate to stream-entry, the first of the four *ārya-mārga*-s.

The tendency toward stream-entry has two aspects: one is the worldly (*shih-su* 世俗; *saṃvr̥ti*) the other is the absolute (*sheng-i* 勝義; *paramārtha*). Attaining the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s is called the worldly [aspect]; already entering the *darśanamārga* is called the absolute [aspect] (AMV 131, p. 679a24–26).

Hence, both the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s and the *darśanamārga* are two aspects of the same experience of *śrotāpatti-phala*; for this reason, a resemblance between mundane and supramundane aspects should be expected.

It should now be clear that the Vibhāṣāśāstrins intended the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s to serve as the pivotal point in the progression of a *prthagjana* to the stage of the *ārya*. This is reiterated in a fascinating passage concerning the Vaibhāṣika treatment of the demise of the dharma (*kaliyuga*; *mo-fa* 末法), which is clearly defined in terms of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s.

Question: After the demise of the *saddharma*, will there be none who attain *ārya*-hood? Answer: There will be those who attain the fruition of once-returner from the fruition of stream-entry; those who attain the fruition of non-returner from the fruition of once-returner; and those who attain the fruition of arhatship from the fruition of nonreturner. However, there will be none who enter *samyaktvaniyāma* from the *nirvedhabhāgiya*-s. It is solely because of this [deficiency] that it is called "the demise of the *saddharma*" (AMV 183, p. 919a16–20).¹³

Hence, among the Vaibhāṣikas, the demise of the dharma was defined explicitly in terms of the inability of worldly people to enter the path and attain the first fruition of stream-entry; those who previously had entered the path were not, however, hindered from further progress. This position would obviously imply that there could still be a flourishing *śrāvaka-saṅgha* in the final age, which was however composed entirely of *āryas* who has attained their initial entrances into the path in previous ages. We see here that the overriding focus of Buddhist doctrine on soteriological concerns ultimately brought even its eschatology within the purview of soteriology; and it is apparently for this reason that the demise of the dharma was defined in terms of the *nirvedhabhāgiya*-s.

Despite being a non-Mahāyāna school, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins include in AMV a considerable amount of information relating to the ways in which the four *nirvedhabhāgiya*-s come to be developed for the *gotra*-s of *śrāvaka*, bodhisattvas, and pratyekabuddhas. The Vibhāṣāśāstrins first advocate that heat may be generated before entering *dhyāna* and, with that as a foundation, attain the remaining three *nirvedhabhāgiya*-s as well as *samyaktvaniyāmāvakrānti*; but in painstaking detail, they then explore the possibilities that one may instead begin this process at any one of the four *dhyānas*, or work progressively through the four before generating heat. It is finally concluded that there is no fixed method (*pu-ting* 不定; *aniyata*) by which the *nirvedhabhāgiya-kuśalamūla*-s are developed in the *śrāvaka* and *pratyekabuddha gotra*-s (AMV 7, 33b18–20), while the *bodhisattva-gotra* will develop all four in one sitting during a bodhisattva's final lifetime (AMV 7, 33a28–b1).¹⁴

Because of its intrinsic interest in explicating both the Vaibhāṣika attitude toward the bodhisattva ideal as well as possible Mahāyānist influences on the school, I reproduce below the discussion on the development of the *nirvedhabhāgiya*-s in the bodhisattva-*gotra*.

Question: Haven't the bodhisattvas already generated the *nirvedhabhāgiya-kuśalamūla*-s over the past several lives? Answer: If this were the case, what would be the problem? [Question: This would be a problem, because] if they have already been generated [in past lives], then why is it said that "all of the superior *kuśalamūla*-s of a bodhisattva – that is to say, from the contemplation on impurity (*aśubhabhāvanā*) up to the knowledge of nonproduction (*anupādajñāna*) – are all obtained in one sitting"? But if they haven't been so generated, then through what power is it that

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over ninety-one kalpas a bodhisattva does not fall into the evil bourns? [Answer:] There is this explanation: Over the past several lives, a bodhisattva has already generated the *nirvedhabhāgiya*-s; through the force of *ksānti*, over ninety-one kalpas he does not fall into the evil bourns.

Question: If this were so, then why is it said that "the *kuśalamūla*-s of a bodhisattva are obtained in one sitting"? Answer: The [*kuśalamūla*-s] generated in the past were [part of] another [i.e., *prthagjana* or *śrāvaka*] *gotra* (*t'a-chung-hsing* 他種性; **anyagotra*) not in their own [bodhisattva] *gotra* (*tsu-chung-hsing* 自種性; **svagotra*). By [the statement] "those are obtained in one sitting" is meant one's own *gotra*; hence, there is no contradiction. There is [also] the explanation that [the *kuśalamūla*-s] are not generated [in any past life]. Why is this? Because the *kuśalamūla*-s of a bodhisattva are not carried through several generations (*pu-ching-li shih* 不經歷世); they instead are obtained in one sitting.

Question: Were this so, then through what power is it that the bodhisattva does not fall into the evil bourns for ninety-one kalpas? Answer: The capacity to guard against one falling into [lit., obstructing] the evil bourns is not only due to the *nirvedhabhāgiya*-s. Why is this? *Dāna*, *śīla*, learning (*wen* 聞; *śrutamayī*[*prajñā*]), reflection (*ssu* 思; *cintamayī*[*prajñā*]), or heat, or summit are all capable of obstructing [one from falling into] the evil bourns. A person of dull faculties [however] gains this capacity only when he attains *ksānti*. But when all the bodhisattvas cultivate one act of giving, this also involves *śīla* and *prajñā*. When they cultivate one act of moral conduct, it also involves *dāna* and *prajñā*. When they cultivate one moment of *prajñā*, it also involves *dāna* and *śīla*. If, in this wise, they can guard against one falling into *nayuta*-s of evil bourns, then how much more so would they be capable of guarding against one falling into just these three evil bourns! According to this explanation, all the superior *kuśalamūla*-s of a bodhisattva – that is, from the *aśubhabhāvanā* to *anupādajñāna* – arise in this [one] lifetime in one sitting with the four *dhyāna* as their foundation (AMV 7, 33a11–b1).

Finally, in a section that is not entirely clear to me, but seems to imply a role for the *nirvedhabhāgiya*-s similar to that played by the *bodhicittotpāda* in Mahāyāna, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins state that it is the *nirvedhabhāgiya*-s that allow the attainment of *apratīsamkhyānirodha* even in the evil bourns. After rejecting the view that such an eventuality would be possible through the perfection of such *kuśaladharmas* as giving, keeping the precepts, or the three types of wisdom, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins state that "at the time those persons of dullest faculties who have heat, summit, and acceptance obtain a small degree of acceptance, [at that time] they will all attain *apratīsamkhyānirodha*" (AMV 32, 165a20–21).¹⁵

Uṣman

Having now completed our survey of the general features of the *nirvedhabhāgiya*-s, we may turn to a discussion of each of their individual constituents. In AMV, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins open their treatise with an extensive treatment of the final *nirvedhabhāgiya*, *laukikāgradharma*, and continue in descending order down to *uṣman*. For this reason, the

majority of the qualities of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s are treated in terms of *laukikāgradharma*, with the coverage on the other three types correspondingly abbreviated. I reverse the order here in order to clarify better the progression that takes place as the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s are developed. Given the sheer mass of material available in AMV on each of the four members, my coverage will perforce be far from comprehensive; I hope, however, that this summary will at least provide some sense of the type of coverage included in AMV on this topic.

Two complementary definitions of the first of the four *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s, heat (*uṣman*), appear in AMV, one with regard to knowledge, the other with reference to faith.

Question: Why is it called "heat"? Answer: Knowledge (*jñāna*; *chih* 智) develops (*chüan* 轉; *pravartana*; *vivartana*?) with reference to objects; therefore there is superior knowledge (*sheng-chih* 勝智; **kausalā*, Paramārtha, *Kosa*, p. 275b.14). The arising of heat can burn all the fuel of the *kleśa*-s; hence, it is called heat (AMV 6, p. 28a2-4).¹⁶ What is heat? Answer: If one has a little faithful ardency (*hsin-ai* 信愛; *śraddhā-preman*?) in regards to the right *dharmavinaya*, that faith is then called ardency; this is why it is called faithful ardency. If one has faithful ardency in regards to the *saddharma*, that is faith conditioned by the [noble] truth of the path; if one has faithful ardency with regards to the *vinaya*, that is called faith conditioned by the [noble] truth of extinction (AMV 6, p. 28a16-19).¹⁷

Even though *uṣman* was a fairly exalted state for an ordinary person, it was still said to involve only a little faith, because it was the lowest level of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s (AMV 6, p. 28b.11-12).

The following scriptural passage serves as justification for the use of the term.

As the World Honored One explained to the two *bhikṣu*-s Ma-shih and Ching-su: "These two evil men are far from (*li* 離) my true *dharmavinaya*, just as the earth is far from space. These two evil men do not have the slightest amount of 'heat' [read: enthusiasm?] toward my right *dharmavinaya*" (AMV 6, p. 28b.6-9).

The principal preliminary stages in the development of heat are also indicative of the treatment given for the other three *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s.

Initial heat has the three [noble] truths as its object [excepting the truth of cessation]. Its present cultivation is concerned with the *dharma-smṛtyupasthāna* and its future cultivation with [all] four foundations of mindfulness. Its present cultivation is concerned with one aspect [of the four noble truths] and its future cultivation is concerned with four aspects. It cultivates things of similar type, and not dissimilar things conditioned by the truth of cessation. The *dharma-smṛtyupasthāna* is its present cultivation and in the future it will also cultivate only the *dharma-smṛtyupasthāna*. Its present cultivation is on one aspect [of the four noble truths] and its future cultivation is with four aspects. It cultivates things of similar type, and not dissimilar things. Why is this? Because it is not possible that the initial contemplation of the cessation

of the *skandha*-s can cultivate the path of the aggregate of conditions (*hsiu yüan-wen-tao* 修緣蓮道; sense obscure). The heightened sense of heat (*tseng-ch'ang juan* 增長煖; **aupacayika-uṣman*) is conditioned by the three truths, the four foundations of mindfulness and accords with one [of the aspects] for its present cultivation. Its future cultivation is such things of similar type as the four foundations of mindfulness as well as things of dissimilar type. One aspect is its present cultivation and its future cultivation are [all] sixteen aspects. The *dharma-smṛtyupasthāna* conditioned by the truth of cessation is its present cultivation, [while] its future cultivation is the four foundations of mindfulness. Its present cultivation is one aspect, while its future cultivation is [all] sixteen aspects.

Question: Why does the initial heat only cultivate things of similar type but not the dissimilar things, while the heightened sense of heat can cultivate both? Answer: The initial heat has not yet achieved *gotra* (*chung-hsing* 種性), because it is the initial training concerned with contemplating the truths; it only cultivates things of similar type. The heightened sense of heat has already achieved *gotra* because it is adept at contemplating the truths; it cultivates things of both similar and dissimilar type (AMV 7, 31b2-15).¹⁸

Unlike the orthodox Kashmiri Vibhāṣāśāstrins, the western Vaibhāṣikas (the designation used in AMV to refer to the *bhagrdeśakas*, i.e., the Gandharans and Bactrians),¹⁹ are said to have specified seventeen aspects (*men* 門) of the four *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s, which are listed first in a verse, and then treated exhaustively in a subsequent section.²⁰ As we shall see, several of these aspects correspond to some of the alternative treatments of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s noted previously, such as the different division of the four *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s given by Ghoṣaka. Because their treatment of *uṣman* is representative of that given for each of the other three *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s, I will only treat that discussion here.

1) Question: What is the purport (*i-ch'ü* 意趣; *abhiprāya*) of heat? Answer: [The purport is] all the *kuśalamūla*-s previously cultivated and accumulated. That is to say, everything from giving (*dāna*) through the seven sites of wholesomeness (*ch'i-ch'u-shan* 七處善) is directed toward liberation (*hui-hsiang chieh-t'ò* 迴向解脫; *vimukti-parināmita*). This is the purport.

2) Question: What does heat rely on (*āsrīta*) in arising? Answer: It relies on concentration of its own realm (*tzu-ti ting* 自地定; *svabhūmika-dhyāna*?).

3) Question: What is the cause (*yin* 因; *hetu*) of heat? Answer: The *kuśalamūla*-s of similar type and of its own realm that arose previously.

4) Question: What is the object (*so-yüan* 所緣; *ālambana*) of heat? Answer: The four noble truths.

5) Question: What is the fruition (*kuo* 果; *phala*) of heat? Answer: Summit is its immediate fruition (*chin-shih-yung kuo* 近士用果).²¹

6) Question: What are heat's associated factors (*teng-liu* 等流; *niṣyanda*)? Answer: The *kuśalamūla*-s of similar type and of its own realm, which arise later.

7) Question: What is the result (*i-shu* 異熟; *vipāka*) of heat? Answer: The five *skandha*-s of the *rūpadhātu*....

8) Question: What is the principal quality (*sheng-li* 勝利; *guna*) of heat? Answer: It is able to serve as the determinate cause (*chüeh-ting yin* 決定因; **hetuniyāma*?)

for nirvāṇa, for it is said that [once] heat is attained, it is determined that *kuśala* will not be eliminated (*samucchinna*).²²

9) Question: How many aspects (*hsing-hsiang* 行相; *ākāra*) does heat involve? Answer: It involves sixteen aspects.

10) Question: Is heat a name of an object (*yüan-ming* 緣名; *nāmlambana*) or the meaning of an object (*yüan-i* 緣義; *arthālambana*; see *Chu-she lun*, p. 116c.17)? Answer: It is both *nāma* and *artha ālambana*-s.

11) Question: Is heat a product of learning (*śrutamayiprajñā*), reflection (*cintamayiprajñā*), or cultivation (*bhāvanamayiprajñā*)? Answer: It is only a product of cultivation.

12) Question: Is heat bound to the desire-realm, form-realm, or formless-realm? Answer: It is only bound to the form-realm.

13) Question: Is heat present in concentration (*ting* 定; *dhyāna*) or not present in concentration? Answer: It is only present in concentration.

14) Question: Does heat involve both *vitarka* and *vicāra*, only *vicāra* and not *vitarka*, or neither? Answer: All three alternatives are correct.

15) Question: Is heat associated (*samprayukta*) with the *sukhendriya*, with *saumanasyendriya*, or with *upekṣendriya*? Answer: It is associated with all three.

16) Question: Is heat a single thought-moment (*i-hsin* 一心) or several thought-moments (*to-hsin* 多心) [in duration]? Answer: It is several thought-moments [in duration].

17) Question: Is heat subject to retrogression or not? Answer: It is subject to retrogression (AMV 7, 30c22–31a21).²³

Mūrdhan

Mūrdhan, the second of the four *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s, is defined specifically in terms of faith in the validity of the four noble truths – a faith that begins to develop at the initial stage of *ūṣman*, as was noted above in its definition, and reaches its “climax” at the level of *mūrdhan*.²⁴ The term is taken by the Vaibhāṣikas from a sūtra passage in which the Lord tells Ānanda:

I will now explain for you the summit... A noble disciple, in regards to the five aggregates that are the focus of grasping (*upādānaskandha*) gives rise to contemplation (*vicāra*; *saṃcetanā*) and investigation (*manaskāra*; *upanidhyāna*) in regards to conditionally-arisen dharmas: [to wit, that] they are impermanent, suffering, void, and not-self. He has acceptance (*kṣānti*), vision (*darśana*), incitation (*adhimukti*), and [proper] conduct and understanding (*carānavidyā*?), and the acceptance [deriving from] vision and careful consideration (*darśanopanidhyānakṣānti*?). This is called “summit” (AMV 6, 26c.1–5).

Mūrdhan is defined by the Vibhāṣāśāstrins in terms of a faith that is slightly more developed than that found at the stage of *ūṣman*.

What is summit? Answer: It is a small-measure of faith (*hsiao-liang hsin* 小量信; *paritta-śradhā*?) in the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha. Question: Why is it called “summit”? Answer: Because it is like the summit of a mountain. That is to say, it is as if a person cannot stay long on the summit of a mountain. If there are no

difficulties, he will pass over that mountain and then reach another mountain, but if he does meet with problems, he will retreat back down [the mountain]. In the same way, an adept who arrives at the stages of summit will not remain long: if he has no difficulties, he will progress on to *kṣānti*, but if he meets with problems, he will regress back to *ūṣman* (AMV 6, 25c.5–9).

Different explanations are given concerning the meaning of that “small measure” of faith by which summit was defined.

Venerable Ghosaka gave this explanation. The *kāmadhātu* is called “small,” because it is inferior. Since this [faith] existed in the *kāmadhātu*, it was therefore said to be of “small-measure”. Others say that this faith should actually be called “different-measure” (*i-liang* 異量; *anyaparitta*, *viśiṣṭaparitta*?). “Measure” means fixed faith (*chüeh-ting-hsin*; *niyata-śradhā*?) that harmonizes with the transmission (*yin-k'o* 印可); therefore it is called “measure”. Heat is its first [level]; summit is its second [level]. This [type of faith] differs from earlier [types of faith] and, for that reason, is said to be a “different-measure”. Others say that this faith should be called “small-measure” because one does not abide for long on the state of summit. It is like dew suspended from a branch that does not hang on for long. This is the explanation that should be made: Only summit should be called “small-measure-faith” because it is at a stage subject to retrogression which enjoys contemplating the [three] treasures. In this case, giving rise to a small measure of faith concerning the Buddha and Saṃgha is said to be faith with the truth of the path as object; and giving rise to a small measure of faith concerning the dharma is said to be faith with the truth of extinction as object... [The truths of suffering and origination are not included] because, among the four noble truths, it is extinction and path that bring about the transcendence of birth and death (AMV 6, 25c.21–26a.5).²⁵

Retrogression from the stage of summit (*mūrdhapatita*) was recognized by the Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas and classified among the *cittaviprayuktasamskāra-skandha*-s as a variant type of *aprāpti*. It was considered to refer specifically to a person who initially had right faith in the Buddhadharma, realized that the five *skandha*-s were impermanent, and correctly considered the four noble truths; however, he later turns from his mundane faith (*laukikaśradhā*) and falls from his exalted state. Hence, *mūrdhapatita* was usually defined in terms of loss of faith, though some Vaibhāṣika advocates considered it in terms of loss of *prajñā*. I have treated this peculiar *cittaviprayuktasamskāra* in another article, and will not repeat that material here.²⁶

Kṣānti

Acceptance, or perhaps acquiescence (*kṣānti*), is the *nirvedhabhāgīya* for which the least amount of source material is available, apparently because in a number of areas, its treatment parallels that of *laukikāgradharma*. This is consonant with that fact that *kṣānti* is distinguished from *laukikāgradharma* only by the degree to which the validity of the four noble truths is experienced at the two levels – with

kṣānti, this experience is still somewhat cursory, while it becomes complete with *laukikāgradharma*. A variety of issues concerning *kṣānti* are covered by the Vibhāṣāśāstrins in summary fashion, and generally in conjunction with *laukikāgradharma*. *Kṣānti* is said to be associated with any of the four *pratyaya*-s: its *hetu-pratyaya* (object-condition) is other dharmas of similar class with which it is associated; its *samanantara-pratyaya* (immediate antecedent) is the preceding stage of summit; its *ālbhana-pratyaya* (co-operative condition) is the four noble truths; its *adhipati-pratyaya* (predominant condition) is all dharmas that are without own-natures. It is neither associated with *vitarka* and *vicāra*, associated only with *vicāra*, or associated with neither, as is the case with *laukikāgradharma*. It is associated with all three *sukha*, *saumanasya*, and *upekṣa indriya*-s. It is either a single thought-moment (*ekacitta*) in duration when it is predominant acceptance (*tseng-shang-jen* 增上忍; *adhipati-kṣānti*?), or several thought-moments (*to-hsin* 多心). It is also non-retrogressive (see AMV 5, 24c.2–13 for the preceding discussion). Like *laukikāgradharma*, *kṣānti* is also said to be associated only with the subtle-form realm (*rūpa-pratisamyukta*; *se-chieh-hsi* 色界繫) (AMV 5, p. 24c.5–6). Finally, *kṣānti* is also said to involve all four *smṛtyupasthāna*-s. At its inception, it is concerned with only one – the *smṛtyupasthāna* of miscellaneous conditioned dharmas – but later it perfects all four and comes to “resemble the *darśanamārga*” (*darśanamārga-sādrśya*; *ssu-chien-tao* 似見道; *Chü-she lun*, p. 120a.9.139a.24) (AMV 5, 24b.25).

The use of the term *kṣānti* is justified on the basis of the following sūtra passage:

If there is someone who persists in six types of behavior he will never be able to gain any distance from the defilements, leave behind impurity in regards to present dharmas, or produce the pure dharma-eye in regards to all dharmas. What are those six types of behavior? 1.) He does not enjoy hearing the dharma. 2.) Although he hears dharma, he does not listen attentively. 3.) Although he listens attentively, he does not have the mind to cultivate that teaching. 4.) He does not diligently seek to realize those wholesome dharmas that he has not yet realized. 5.) He does not diligently strive to maintain those wholesome dharmas that he has already realized. 6.) He does not perfect acceptance (AMV 5, 24a.3–8).

Laukikāgradharma

As I mentioned previously, AMV opens with an extended discussion of the meaning of highest worldly dharmas (*shih ti-i fa* 世第一法; *laukikāgradharma*). The Vibhāṣāśāstrins state that there are three reasons for beginning at this final stage of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s. From one standpoint, opening with *laukikāgradharma* clarifies the fundamental constituents of the gradual process of development on the

laukikabhāvanāmārga: that is, beginning with either the contemplation on impurity (*pu-ching kuan* 不淨觀; *aśubhabhāvanā*) or contemplation on the breath (*ānāpānasmṛti*; *ch'ih-hsi nien* 持息念), the foundations of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*; *nien-chu* 念住) are then discussed. The student subsequently continues on to the contemplation on the three ideas (*san-i kuan* 義觀: i.e., impermanence, suffering, not-self) and thence to the seven levels of wholesomeness (*ch'i-ch'u-shan* 七處善). Next come the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s, culminating in *laukikāgradharma*. From a second point of view, one can also work down from the fruition of arhatship through *śrotāpanna* and thence to *laukikāgradharma*. Finally, one may also begin with the first of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s and work up to *laukikāgradharma*. However, all explanations of the *mārga* must follow one or another of these three approaches, for otherwise one's exposition would be confused and misleading (AMV 2, 5b.24–c.11).

Laukikāgradharma is defined as that quality which induces the entrance into the certainty of winning liberation (*samyaktvaniyāmāvakrānti*),²⁷ which occurs at the *śrotāpattimārga*. As with the previous three *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s, a sūtra is cited in defense of this definition:

Without being able to contemplate correctly [lit. according to principle; *ju-li* 如理] any of the aspects [of the four noble truths], it is impossible that someone would be able to give rise to *laukikāgradharma*. Without giving rise to *laukikāgradharma*, it is impossible that one can enter *samyaktvaniyāma*. Without *samyaktvaniyāmāvakrānti*, it is impossible that one would be able to attain the fruits of stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner, or arhat (AMV 2, p. 5b8–12).

The Vibhāṣāśāstrins admit, however, that while the sūtras have mentioned the word *laukikāgradharma*, they do not discuss it in detail (AMV 2, p. 5b14–15).

Precisely which dharmas induce *samyaktvaniyāmāvakrānti* is then explored. Two different explanations were given by the Pūrva-Ābhidhārmikas: *laukikāgradharma* is either those *citta* and *caitta* dharmas or else those five faculties (*indriya*, of faith, etc.) that induce entry into *samyaktvaniyāma* (AMV 2, p. 7b26–c2). The latter explanation is said to have been intended to counter the Vibhajyavādin view that the five faculties of faith, etc. were *anāsrava* dharmas, which would have implied that ordinary persons (*prthagjana*), who by definition were still subject to the outflows, would never have been able to perfect them and thence achieve *laukikāgradharma* (AMV 2, p. 7c.2–8b.9). The Vātsīputrīya view that the five faculties are *laukikāgradharma* is also rejected, because of the incorrect definition given to those faculties as being wholesome in their own-natures (*tzu-hsing shan* 自性善), which the Vibhāṣāśāstrins also reject as incorrectly raising *laukikāgradharma*

from a mundane to a supramundane level (AMV 2, p. 3b10–c6). The Vibhāśāśtrins then examine the views of recognized teachers with the Vaibhāśika school. Dharmatrāta advocated that since the *citta* and all the *caitta*-s are distinctions of intention (*cetanā*), the essential-nature of *laukikāgradharma* must therefore be *cetanā*. Buddhadeva proposed that since the *citta* is the essence of all the *caitta*-s, therefore *citta* itself must be the essential-nature of *laukikāgradharma*.²⁸ These two views are rejected because they would imply that one could be able to enter the *darśanamārga* through faith alone, for example, without developing the remaining four of the five faculties (and so on for the rest of the five faculties). If this were the case, then it would imply that one could enter the *darśanamārga* while remaining slothful, forgetful, distracted, and ignorant, which would obviate the need for any development in the soteriological techniques of Buddhism (AMV 2, 8c.7–25). The orthodox view of the Kashmiri Vaibhāśikas is finally that *laukikāgradharma* refers to those *citta* and *caitta* dharmas that induce *samyaktvaniyāmāvrānti*, as Bhadanta Kātyāyanīputra himself had advocated (AMV 2, 8c.26–9a.3).

Laukikāgradharma brings about the inception of *darśanamārga* with one moment of *dukkhe dharmajñānakṣānti* as its immediate antecedent (*samanantarapratyaya*). The Vibhāśāśtrins then explore the issue as to when the actual moment of entry into *darśanamārga* occurs: i.e., whether the moment of *dukkhe dharmajñānakṣānti* itself is entry, or whether it takes place after that moment is completed. Obviously without careful delineation of these various stages, it could lead to a confounding of mundane and supramundane states (and even to a fundamental confusion between ordinary persons and saints), by implying that a single stage could be both defiled and sanctified (AMV 2, p. 9a–c) – obvious problems to the meticulous Ābhīdhārmikas, who were adamant about a single dharma having only one characteristic.²⁹ The conclusion is that the fruits of recluseship (*śrāmanyaphala*) manifest with the *laukikāgradharma* as the *samanantarapratyaya*. Emerging from that *laukikāgradharma*, one has a single moment of *dukkhe dharmajñānakṣānti*, which then leads to the *āryamārga* (AMV 2, p. 9c–AMV 3, p. 11b).³⁰

These dharmas are given the name “highest worldly dharmas” because, “compared to other worldly dharmas, these particular *citta-caitta* dharmas are the most supreme (*sheng* 勝), eminent (*ch’ang* 長), exalted (*tsun* 尊), lofty (*shang* 上), and sublime (*miao* 妙). Hence, they are called *laukikāgradharma*” (AMV 3, p. 11b8–10).³¹ Despite the importance of the prior three *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s in preparing the

adept for insight – each of which has certain qualities that are themselves essential in the spiritual growth of the individual adept – those are all carefully distinguished from *laukikāgradharma*, which is the most supreme of the four. The meaning of supreme with regard to these dharmas is interpreted in a variety of ways: they allow one to attain the “supreme” fruit, they are the final thought-moment (*citta*) of the ordinary man; they are the *citta-caitta* dharmas that immediately catalyze the abandonment of the mundane states of existence through *samyaktvaniyāmāvrānti* (AMV 3, pp. 11c.10–14, 12a.13–16).

Much of the material in the AMV chapter on *laukikāgradharma* has been covered *supra* in considerations of the preceding types of *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s, and I have it omitted here.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, there is no longer any need to bewail the dearth of extant sources concerning the Vaibhāśika position on the four *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s. Even given the wealth of material found in AMV, however, one is occasionally left dissatisfied with the Vibhāśāśtrins for their prolix discussion on relatively minor theoretical concerns, to the neglect of issues of more immediate relevance to their soteriological perspectives. Despite such shortcomings, their treatment elucidates most if not all of the key intrasectarian controversies concerning the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s, and provides a considerable body of material for potential studies comparing the interpretation of *mārga* in different Buddhist schools, which can no longer be ignored.

This treatment of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s finally allows us to make some general comments about the Vaibhāśika interpretation of the *mārga*. Even a cursory examination of the Vaibhāśika treatment of the path, such as was outlined in this treatment of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*-s, reveals some striking indications about the focus and intent of Vaibhāśika spiritual culture. All aspects of the *mārga*, from the impure stage that is subject to the *anuśaya*-s, to the inception of insight on the *darśanamārga*, are analyzed in terms of the four noble truths – the unique understanding achieved by the Buddha through his enlightenment. As the Fifth *Kośasthāna* constantly reiterates, the *anuśaya*-s are fundamentally distinguished as being *darśanaheya*, *bhāvanāheya*, or both, and which portions of which *anuśaya*-s are removed through insight into which truth is outlined in painstaking detail. The *darśanamārga* and the inception of the *bhāvanāmārga* are explicitly defined in terms of the sixteen aspects of the noble truths. Hence, the Vaibhāśikas have used

the four noble truths as a hermeneutical tool to interpret all the varied stages leading up to enlightenment.

One might say that the Vaibhāṣikas have developed a *retrospective* approach to soteriology – a system that begins from the premise of the Buddha's own enlightenment and looks *backwards* as it were from that supramundane point, reinterpreting all other experiences in light of that unique event. Because of this rigorously theoretical orientation in discussion of soteriological questions, their interpretation of the *mārga* inevitably takes a heavily scholastic bent; their effort at *synthèse* has managed to wring out of their description virtually all of the actual struggle undergone by the adept in his quest for enlightenment. Such a tack was perhaps inevitable given the historical exigencies within which Vaibhāṣika doctrine developed, for such a rigorous soteriological system would serve to differentiate their school explicitly from rival schools of Indian or Buddhist philosophy and practice. Unfortunately, however, it allows us to know little of the actual content or practice of Vaibhāṣika methods of *bhāvanā*.³²

A comparison of the path as outlined by the Theravādins in the *Visuddhimagga* reveals some startling contrasts. The *Visuddhimagga* schema of spiritual development focuses on the three trainings (*triśikṣā*) in morality, concentration, and wisdom, a simulacrum of the Buddha's own struggle in gaining enlightenment. The Theravāda system is thus *proleptic* – beginning from the defiled, unenlightened state and looking *forward* in anticipation of purification (*viśuddhi*). While maintaining comparable standards of scholastic rectitude, the *Visuddhimagga* therefore attempts to reconstruct the idealized process via which the unenlightened person works up to enlightenment – *controlling* first his moral conduct, and gradually leading up to attainment. Hence, the Theravādas have left considerable lore on meditation practice itself, including coverage of such concrete issues as choosing an appropriate meditation theme, to the stages leading up to *dhyāna*, and to the seven types of purifications brought about by following its procedures. There, we find no overriding interpretative tool, such as the four noble truths used by the Vaibhāṣikas; in fact, the discussion on the *āryasatya*-s in the *Visuddhimagga* is explicitly subordinated to the *viśuddhi*-s. Instead, the Theravādins have focused on the process of training itself, an approach that serves to hold out more hope for the individual attempting practice, because it does not gloss over with theoretical descriptions the actual tribulations that spiritual development will demand. At the same time, the affinities that Buddhism shares with pan-Indian yogic practices are much more apparent in the Theravāda treatment, suggesting that

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the *Visuddhimagga* account may reflect a more primitive stratum of Buddhist soteriological writing.

NOTES

¹ Conze, E. (1962), *Buddhist Thought in India* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973, Reprint ed.), p. 175; and cf. Lamotte, E., *Histoire du bouddhisme indien*, Vol. I (Louvain: Institute Orientaliste, 1958), p. 680n. who notes that the *Abhisamayāṅkārāloka* (edited by U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932–35, AAA 63) account of Haribhadra is overly Yogācārin in orientation to give any true picture of Sarvāstivādin belief on the four aids. Mahāyāna materials are also woefully deficient in their accounts of this stage of cultivation. The most detailed account of the *nirvedhabhāgiyas* appears in Hurvitz, L., 'The Abhidharma on the "Four Aids to Penetration"', in Kawamura, L., ed., *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization*, Herbert Guenther Festschrift (Emeryville, CA: Dharma Publishing, 1977), 59–104.

² AK vi.17–25ff. For an outline, see Lamotte, E., *Histoire du bouddhisme indien*, pp. 678–686; Guenther, H. (1957), *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma* (Berkeley and London: Shambhala Publications, 1976, Reprint ed.), pp. 215–225, Conze, E., *Buddhist Thought*, pp. 175–177; Sukomal Chaudhuri, *Analytical Study of the Abhidharmakośa*, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, no. 114 (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1976), pp. 178–181. For the relationship between the *nirvedhabhāgiyas* and the two preceding types of *kuśalamūlas*, see my article 'The Path to Perdition: The Wholesome Roots and Their Eradication', in Buswell, R. and Robert M. Gimello, eds., *Paths to Liberation: The Mārga and Its Transformations in Buddhist Thought*, Studies in East Asian Buddhism, no. 7 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), 107–134.

³ "Heat, summit, acceptance, and highest worldly dharmas are the proximate *prayoga* [*mārga*] of the *ārya-mārga*." AMV 68, p. 351c26–27.

⁴ See also AKB vi.21, Dwarkidas Sastri (1981), Editor, *Abhidharmakośam* (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati).

⁵ The only reference of which I am aware in which the *nirvedhabhāgiya*-s are called *kuśalamūla*-s is a quotation cited in AMV itself; see AMV 45, 232c18–233a9.

⁶ See Jones, J.J. (1949), Translator, *Mahāvastu* (London: Pali Text Society), Vol. I, p. 49.

⁷ For example, see Seyfort Ruegg, D. (1967), 'On a Yoga Treatise in Sanskrit from Qizil', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 87: 157–165, and specifically pp. 161–2, where Ruegg notes seeming "Mahāyānist" elements in Vaibhāṣika works.

⁸ Cf. *Vinayapiṭaka, Mahāvagga* Kh. 1, in Nānamoli, Bhikkhu (1972), Translator and compiler, *The Life of the Buddha* (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society), pp. 39–42; and cf. *Majjhimanikāya*, nos. 25 and 85.

⁹ See AKB vi.21, Sastri, ed., *Abhidharmakośa*, p. 916; noted Chaudhuri, *Analytical Study*, p. 178n10.

¹⁰ The way in which this immediacy remains valid even if the latter *nirvedhabhāgiya*-s are achieved in a subsequent lifetime is explained at AMV 7, p. 30c28–31a7.

¹¹ For *nirodhasamāpatti*, see the discussion in Guenther, *Abhidharma*; and see Griffiths, Paul J., *On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem* (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1986).

¹² For the whole section on the relationship between *prthaganatva* and these six dharmas, see AMV 45, 232b–235a.

¹³ For the full discussion on the demise of the dharma, see AMV 183, p. 918a18–919a.20.

- ¹⁴ For the complete discussion see AMV 7, 32b.24–33a.11; for the differences in the *nirvedhabhāgiya-s* as they are developed in the six *gotras*, see AMV 7, p. 33b4–21.
- ¹⁵ I must admit that the true import of this passage is lost on me; for the full discussion on *apratīsamkhyānirodha* and the *nirvedhabhāgiya-s*, see AMV 32, 164c29–165b28.
- ¹⁶ Several similes illustrating this relationship follow at AMV 6, p. 28a.
- ¹⁷ For the reasons why the noble truths of suffering and origination are not considered with regards to faith, see AMV 6, p. 28a–b.
- ¹⁸ The different levels of the following three stages of the *nirvedhabhāgiya-s* are treated at 31b.15–c13.
- ¹⁹ For this distinction between the Kashmiri and Gandharan branches of the Vaibhāṣika school, see Willemen, C. (1975). Translator, *The Essence of Metaphysics: Abhidharmahrdaya*, Publications de l'Institut Belge des hautes études bouddhiques, serie "Etudes et textes", no. 4 (Bruxelles, 1975), pp. xxii–xxiii.
- ²⁰ See AMV 6, 29b21–c5; the verse appears at AMV 7, p. 30c23–24; the Vibhāṣāśāstrins say that the Kashmiris accept only seven aspects (*men 𑖀𑖩*) of the *laukikāgradharma*, while *mūrdhan* only has two, and *kṣānti* and *āśman* are only themselves. The seventeen are treated with reference to heat, etc. in AMV 7, p. 30c22 ff.
- ²¹ I am uncertain as to the precise meaning of the term *chin-shih-yung kuo*, though the sense seems clear enough – i.e., that heat results in the summit. Literally, the term is translated as the "fruition of the function of its near-level."
- ²² This seems to contradict the statement below that the stage of heat is subject to retrogression, and suggests that the Gandharan branch did not accept the claim that the *nirvedhabhāgiya-s* were subject to retrogression. This correlates with the different division of the four *nirvedhabhāgiya-s* given by Ghosaka, as noted above, which does not acknowledge that any of the four are subject to retrogression.
- ²³ The remaining three *nirvedhabhāgiya-s* are treated in summary fashion at AMV 7, p. 31a21–b2.
- ²⁴ See the discussion on this point in Guenther, *Abhidharma*, p. 220.
- ²⁵ For further discussion on why the fruits of suffering and origination are not meant, see AMV 6, p. 26a.7–22.
- ²⁶ See AMV 6, p. 27a.29–c.4. The debate between advocates of *mūrdhan* being associated with *śraddhā* or *prajñā* appears at AMV 6, p. 26c.5–26. Interestingly, the Vibhāṣāśāstrins also say, somewhat contradictorily, that *mūrdhan* refers to the four types of *srotāpannins*, a classification I have yet to find in the *Kośa*; see AMV 6, p. 26b.15. Buswell, R., 'The Proliferation of *cittaviprayuktasamskāra-s* in the Vaibhāṣika School', forthcoming in *Journal of Indian Philosophy*.
- ²⁷ For *samyaktvānīyāmāvakrānti* see the extensive discussion at AMV 3, p. 13a–14a, and *chūan-s* 3–4 passim.
- ²⁸ The positions of Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva have been covered in another of my papers. 'Buddhadeva: Materials Toward an Assessment of his Philosophy', forthcoming in *Journal of Indian Philosophy*.
- ²⁹ Cf. the classic Ābhidharmika phrase, *yo viruddhadharma-adhyāsavān na asau ekaḥ* ("that thing which partakes of opposite qualities is not unitary").
- ³⁰ A variety of explanations as to what the moment following the emergence from *laukikāgradharma* actually is (such as *vajropamasamādhī*, *nirvāna*, etc.) appears at AMV 3, p. 11a–b. For the controversy over whether it is actually the *laukikāgradharma* or the *dukkhe dharmajñānakṣānti* that brings about the abandonment of *prthagatva* and the attainment of sainthood (*sheng-hsing* 聖性; *āryatva*?), see AMV 3, p. 13a16–b1.
- ³¹ For the interpretation of the meaning of each of these epithets, see AMV 3, p. 11c15–12a12.

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- ³² For the Vaibhāṣika approach to *bhāvanā*, see Ruegg, 'Yoga Treatise,' *ibid.* and Collett Cox, 'Attainment Through Abandonment: The Sarvāstivādin Path of Removing Defilements', in Buswell, R. and Robert M. Gimello, eds., *Paths to Liberation*, pp. 63–105.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Aitareya Āraṇyaka
AB	Aitareya Brāhmaṇa
AU	Aitareya Upaniṣad
AV(P)	Atharvaveda Saṃhitā, Paippalāda recension
AV(S)	Atharvaveda Saṃhitā, Śaunaka recension
BhG	Bhagavad Gītā
BU	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, cited according to the Kāṇva recension
CU	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
JB	Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa
KaU	Kātha Upaniṣad
KS	Kāthaka Saṃhitā
KsB	Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa
KsU	Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad
MBh	Mahābhārata
MS	Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā
MtU	Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad
MuU	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
PU	Praśna Upaniṣad
Rām	Rāmāyaṇa
RV	Rgveda Saṃhitā
SB(M)	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Mādhyandina recension
TA	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka
TB	Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa
TS	Taittirīya Saṃhitā
TU	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
VS(M)	Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā, Mādhyandina recension
YV	Yajurveda

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JONATHAN A. SILK

THE COMPOSITION OF THE *GUAN WULIANGSHOUFO-JING*:
SOME BUDDHIST AND JAINA PARALLELS TO ITS
NARRATIVE FRAME

The "Sūtra of Contemplation on the Buddha of Immeasurable Life," the *Guan Wuliangshoufo-jing* 觀無量壽佛經 (hereafter *Guan-jing*), is one of the central canonical texts of so-called Pure Land Buddhism, grouped with the Larger and Smaller *Sukhāvativyūha* sūtras into a triad termed the "Pure Land Triple Sūtra," (*Jōdo sambukyō* 淨土三部經).¹ In this context the *Guan-jing* is especially important in the Japanese Pure Land schools, the Jōdoshū 淨土宗 and the Jōdo Shinshū 淨土真宗. Preaching a means to rebirth in the Pure Land, the *Guan-jing* is highly regarded for its visual depictions of this Pure Land of the Buddha Amitāyus and for its teaching of the benefits of evocation of his name, the latter practice well known as the repetition in Japanese pronunciation of the words "Namu Amida Butsu" 南無阿彌陀仏. As is also well known, however, there have long been questions about the origins of the *Guan-jing*, questions which traditionally have been motivated not by a scholastic search for "historical truth" but rather by the religious (or perhaps more accurately religio-political) necessity of determining the text's orthodoxy, hence its basic "authenticity."²

From the point of view of a modern, disinterested historical study which aims, in so far as this is possible, at objectivity, however, it is meaningless to use terms like "genuine" or "authentic" with regard to the status of a given text, other than to describe traditional attitudes. While it is important to understand that within traditional systems, and for those modern (in the present case mainly sectarian Japanese) scholars whose contexts are defined by such systems, questions about authenticity and orthodoxy are of crucial import, these are notions which are meaningful only within a context which recognizes orthodoxy, which is to say within a normative system, and thus will be avoided in the following discussions.

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Our own questions about the origins of the *Guan-jing* can thus be recast, framed not as ideological suspicions about the text's orthodoxy but rather in terms, for example, of its composition – since the term “composition” can refer both to the structure of the sūtra itself, and to the process through which the sūtra passed to reach its present structure or form. Our examination of the composition of the *Guan-jing*, then, is necessarily a study both of its history and of its structure. As we will see, there is a good reason for setting up the problem in this way: one key to the origins of the *Guan-jing* is the interrelation of the two modes of “composition.”

To set the stage for the present investigation, it will be necessary to briefly sketch some of the reasons why the idea that the *Guan-jing* is a Chinese translation, like so many others, of an Indic original is not generally accepted – the remaining alternatives being that the text was translated from a Central Asian language, or written or compiled from the beginning in Chinese. The Indian origins of the *Guan-jing* have been doubted for a variety of reasons, ranging from generally well-considered arguments to some that can be dismissed out of hand.³ One of the most important points often made is that the vocabulary of the *Guan-jing* seems to owe much to the Wei 魏 (220-265) dynasty translation of the Larger *Sukhāvātīvyūha* (T. 360) and to that of the “Sūtra on the Ocean of Contemplative Trance of Visualizing the Buddha,” *Guanfo sanmei hai-jing* 觀佛三昧海經 (T. 643). Fujita Kōtatsu (1990: 160) has detailed some of the resemblances between the *Guan-jing* and the Wei translation of the Larger *Sukhāvātīvyūha*, showing that the former “drew upon” the latter: “We know this because some of the terms adopted ... are found only in that version.”⁴ Likewise, Shikii Shūjō studied the relation between the *Guan-jing* and *Guanfo sanmei hai-jing* and concluded (1965: 230) that the two sūtras have a very large number of similarities not only in structure, object and vocabulary, but also in goal, method and character, and in the content they seek to express. Rather than supposing that this automatically implies a Chinese origin for the text, Mark Blum (1985: 133) has attempted to explain these facts by saying that “a look at the one other translation attributed to [the putative translator of the *Guan-jing*] Kalayaśas (T. 1161) reveals the same type of borrowing, so this may reflect the attitude and abilities

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of the translator as much as the language or authorship of his original text.” In general, of course, Chinese translators often referred to the works of their predecessors. As Hirakawa Akira (1984: 14) has pointed out, there are for instance many examples in the translations of the Vinayas in Chinese of translators referring to and employing translations from previous translators' works. The impact, for example, of the translation equivalents and styles of such translators as Kumārajīva and Xuanzang on their followers is well known. Thus a similarity between the sentences of different sūtras is no grounds for considering a text to be apocryphal, or in other words, a non-translation.⁵

It is necessary here to clarify a point alluded to by Blum, namely the status of the “translator” of the *Guan-jing*, Kalayaśas. It is widely agreed that the presently available Chinese *Guan-jing* came into existence between 420 and 440 C.E., perhaps toward the earlier part of this period, in the environs of present-day Nanjing.⁶ The Chinese sūtra catalogues, moreover, generally agree in their attribution of the text to the Central Asian monk Kalayaśas.⁷ In order to understand what such attributions mean, however, we have to understand what the catalogues are, and what they are not. It is very clear that rather than being historical documents as we are wont to consider them, the sūtra catalogues which record the existence and attribution of translations are polemical documents, or perhaps better records of political decisions. As Antonino Forte (1984: 333) states, “the purpose of these catalogues is known to be not so much to register all the translations completed but to record the works after they had been judged canonical.”

Now, what is it that allows a text to be considered canonical? In other words, by what criteria did the Chinese Buddhist authorities judge a text to be a genuine Buddhist scripture? Again, we can refer to Forte (1990: 243):

For centuries, the Chinese cultivated the illusion that the existence or absence of a corresponding Sanskrit text was sufficient to establish whether a specific work written in Chinese was authentic or apocryphal. Although convenient heuristically for rejecting many would-be sūtras produced in China ... such a criterion would have been of little help in determining falsifications made outside China. For this reason, the participation of foreign *Tripitaka* masters would have been essential, for only they would know whether a text was current outside of China and therefore

"canonical." Hence it can be said with little exaggeration that these foreign teachers symbolized orthodoxy for the Chinese – to the point that they were considered the guarantors, if not the very source, of translated texts. It is for this reason that translated texts were attributed to such foreign Trepitakas, and certainly not because they had actually translated anything, for, as is well known, their often inadequate knowledge of the Chinese language, especially in the early years of their tenures in China, would not have permitted them to engage in, any but a modicum of translation activities.

Thus, if a given text were accepted as the word of the Buddha in lands considered by the Chinese to be Buddhistically orthodox, namely in India itself and Indian Central Asia, then this constituted proof of the text's authenticity. The mere existence of an Indic language original – it is incautious to use the term "Sanskrit" in this context – was evidently not sufficient to guarantee the authenticity of a text, since such a text could have been considered spurious even in the land of its origin.⁸

Once we understand the logic of the process of authorization of a Buddhist scripture in China, and the reasons why the "translator" may sometimes better be termed a guarantor or certifier of orthodoxy, we can follow more clearly the logic of the attribution process for a translation. Forte (1984: 316) remarks on this as follows:

The assignment of the responsibility for a translation was an extremely important matter as its purpose was to reassure the Buddhist establishment and the government of the full authenticity and orthodoxy of a work. This need to make one person responsible often meant that the actual contribution of other members of the team tended to be unacknowledged. The paradox thus often arose of the accredited translator, usually a foreigner, being unable to speak or write Chinese, while the actual translators received so little attention that, but for the colophons at the end of a number of translations, we would often not have even known their names.

I think the implications of Forte's remarks should be clear. If we are dealing with non-Chinese "translators," then we must imagine that these individuals probably had little to do with the actual mechanics of the translation of a text. Kalayaśas was a foreigner of the type referred to by Forte. With this in mind, Fujita Kōtatsu's remarks (1990: 163) seeking to support the theory that the *Guan-jing* was compiled in China may be seen to convey a misplaced emphasis. Fujita speculates: "When translating the sūtra, Kalayaśas probably

did so orally, since it is reported ... that the Śramaṇa Seng-han served as his scribe. In this process, the sūtra's concepts and expressions assumed a Chinese coloring, since numerous Chinese-translated scriptures were consulted and utilized" Taking into account the observations of Forte quoted above, it is clear that there is nothing in the circumstance of a Chinese serving as Kalayaśas's scribe to set this translation method apart from most others, and nothing here to point to any questionable provenance for the sūtra.⁹

The questions we as modern scholars want to ask about the provenance of the *Guan-jing* are nevertheless different from those asked by the guardians of orthodoxy in Buddhist China. For those Chinese authorities, if Kalayaśas as a Central Asian monk certified the *Guan-jing*'s authenticity, that is to say its currency in the Buddhist realms with which he was familiar, and if he were accepted by the Chinese authorities as a legitimate representative of the type of orthodoxy they wished to promote (Forte 1990: 243), then the *Guan-jing* would have been accepted into the canon and thence recorded in the sūtra catalogues. It is also helpful to recall that we know of cases in which – for their own ideological and political aims – Chinese Buddhist authorities went so far as to arrange for the "forgery" of Buddhist sūtras, or at least parts thereof (Forte 1976: 135), and on the other hand we may add that there were certainly cases in which the Chinese rejected for their own reasons texts – for example Tantras – which *were* considered orthodox in other Buddhist lands.¹⁰ Such an analysis of the ideological background of information provided by orthodox Chinese sources undermines our confidence in them as historical evidence.

Since however our modern standpoint is outside the range of questions of orthodoxy or authority, we must inquire into the provenance of a sacred text without allowing questions of the text's spiritual authority to affect our reasoning. For us whether the *Guan-jing* is a transcript of the words of the historical Buddha Śākyamuni or whether it was compiled in fifth century China – or whether its origins lie anywhere in between – is a problem of history, not a problem of orthodoxy. And thus when we cite evidence from those whose ideological biases differ from our own, we must take this difference into account. The authors of Chinese sūtra catalogues, and

those who wrote hagiographies of monks, had an agenda radically different from our own. If we do not understand this, and weigh their evidence accordingly, we can be misled, or at the least confuse our reasoning. However, that our new understanding of the evidence of the sūtra catalogues erodes some arguments for the Chinese origins of the *Guan-jing* is a destructive rather than a constructive step in the process of tracing its origins; it does not lead positively toward a solution of the problem. To take such positive and constructive steps we turn to the internal evidence provided by the work itself.

The Structure of the *Guan-jing* as a Key to its Composition

According to Kenneth Tanaka (1990: xviii, xix, 58), the earliest commentary on the *Guan-jing* is that of Jingying Huiyuan 淨影慧遠 (523-592) titled the *Guan Wuliangshoujing-yishu* 觀無量壽經義疏, while in retrospect the most influential, at least in the Japanese Pure Land traditions, has been that of Shandao 善導 (613-681), titled the *Guan Wuliangshoufojing-shu* 觀無量壽佛經疏. Both of these commentaries are of the *shu* 疏 type, the earliest example of which was Daosheng's 道生 (355-434) Lotus sūtra commentary.¹¹ Concerning the structure of this type of commentary Tanaka (1990: 59) says that "in its developed form, it divides the sūtras into sections with the following standard nomenclature: 'preface,' 'main body,' and 'conclusion.'" While in the details Huiyuan and Shandao each divide the *Guan-jing* slightly differently, they agree with each other in the basic sub-divisions. These sub-divisions are based, moreover, on a doctrinal analysis of the text, not on a philological or text-critical dissection. It is important to realize this for what follows. Shandao basically divides the text as follows:¹²

Prologue:	序分
Meditative Good:	定善: Contemplations 1-13.
Non-meditative Good:	散善: Contemplations 14-16.
Epilogue:	流通分

In 1976, Yamada Meiji published a paper which revolutionized our understanding of the structure of the *Guan-jing*. Yamada showed

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that the Chinese names used to refer to the Buddha Amitāyus are not mixed randomly in the text, but follow a definite pattern. The name appears in the text thirty-four times. The name *Wuliangshou-fo* 無量壽佛 appears nineteen times, and *Amituo-fo* 阿彌陀佛 appears fifteen times. What is of importance, however, is the distribution of these names. The names appear in the text as follows:

Prologue:	<i>Amituo-fo</i> : 3 times.
Meditative Good:	<i>Wuliangshou-fo</i> : 15 times <i>Amituo-fo</i> : Once, in the 13th (last) section.
Non-meditative Good:	<i>Amituo-fo</i> : 11 times. Both names: Once each in the 16th (last) section.
Epilogue:	<i>Wuliangshou-fo</i> : 3 times.

Yamada (1976: 79) concluded from this (and other types of evidence not directly relevant to us here) the following:

To state my conclusion ..., I stand with those who believe that the *Guan-jing* was created – more precisely compiled – in China. Thus, the variation between the names *Wuliangshou-fo* and *Amituo-fo* in the sūtra is not due to the translator (compiler) willfully or intentionally varying his translations of the name Amitāyus (or a Prakrit variant) found in his original; rather, he collected into one book, with a certain purpose, the legend of Ajātasatru, the thirteen contemplations of the Meditative Good and the three contemplations of the Non-meditative Good, which originally had independent existences, adding a conclusion and polishing the style. This is my hypothesis. The side-by-side appearance of the two names together in the Thirteenth Contemplation and the Section of the Lowest Rank of the Lowest Grade of Birth I understand to be the so-to-speak glue binding together the section on Meditative Good with the section on Non-meditative Good, and both of the latter with the conclusion.

I think Yamada's evidence makes it clear that – with the exception of his statement that the sūtra was actually compiled in China, which is still debatable – his hypothesis must be correct. It is especially convincing that the transitional sections of the sūtra mix both names. The fact that the joints revealed by Yamada's text-critical analysis correspond to joints in the text recognized by the commentators seems to suggest that even to those who lacked any awareness of the

historical background of the formation of the sūtra – and of course for traditional commentators the text was a unified whole, a record of Śākyamuni Buddha's preaching – its episodic character was clear. On the other hand, this may be largely fortuitous, since the *shu* type of commentary was employed in commenting on texts which we have no reason to believe were compiled in the same fashion as the *Guan-jing*. It may be interesting, however, in the future to re-examine traditional dissections of sūtras with an eye toward text-critical problems, looking to see if the commentators' feeling for joints in the sense can lead us to philologically locate historically discrete units of the texts.

Yamada has gone on in his article (1976: 78) to try and identify the origins of the Prologue section itself, the story of Ajātaśatru and Bimbisāra. He points out that within the very brief span of the introductory story the name Devadatta appears twice in two different guises, once as *Diaoda* 調達 and once as *Tipodadu* 提婆達多. Yamada comments that "We can only call this strange. I cannot understand the reason why within an extremely brief story the name of one and the same individual should appear in different guises." Yamada (1976: 86) also agrees with Tsukinowa Kenryū who suggested that materials from the *Mahāyāna-Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* were joined with those from the **Daśabhūmivibhāsa-śāstra*, with some embellishment, yielding the introductory story of the *Guan-jing*. It has of course long been recognized that both of these texts contain stories similar or related to that of the *Guan-jing*.¹³ Yamada sums up his ideas as follows (1976: 86 = Yamada et al. 1984: xxiii):

Additionally, by considering the Ajātaśatru story in this way, the reason for the use of two names for Devadatta becomes clear. That is, we know that the Ajātaśatru story was not a direct translation of an existing story in an Indian text, but rather a story that had been skillfully woven together from strands taken from a number of varying sources. Thus, it is highly conceivable that Devadatta's name was taken from at least two different sources, each rendering the name in a different way, and that these names subsequently were put into Chinese. In other words, it is another case of different Indian or Central Asian texts being translated and compiled in order [to] produce a single Chinese text. For while the story and the main characters suggest an Indian origin, there are story elements, such as the idea of eighteen thousand kings killed by princes coveting the throne, or the treatment of how Ajātaśatru threatens to kill his mother Vaidehī, which seem to fit naturally into the Ajāta-

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śatru story but are elements that cannot be found in any of the story's traditional sources.

At this point let us present a translation of the Prologue section of the *Guan-jing*, containing the story of Ajātaśatru and Bimbisāra.¹⁴

In the great city of Rājagṛha there was a prince named Ajātaśatru who, following the counsel of Devadatta, an evil friend, seized his father King Bimbisāra and confined him within a seven-walled chamber. He ordered his attendants that no one was to be allowed to go to him. The Royal Consort, named Vaidehī, remained loyal to the king. Purifying herself by bathing, she spread flour mixed with ghee and honey over her body and filled her ornaments with grape juice, secretly giving these to the king. Then the king ate the flour and drank the juice, and asking for water he rinsed his mouth.¹⁵

Having finished rinsing his mouth, he joined his palms together in reverence and faced toward the Vulture Peak. From afar he saluted the Blessed One and spoke these words: "Mahā-Maudgalyāyana is my Good Friend. I pray he will show compassion for me and impart to me the eight precepts."

Then Maudgalyāyana, flying like a hawk or falcon, rapidly arrived at the place of the king. Day after day [flying back and forth] like this he imparted to the king the eight precepts. The Blessed One also sent the Reverend Pūrṇa to preach the Teachings to the king. In this way, three weeks passed, and because the king ate the flour and honey and was able to hear the teachings, his countenance was peaceful and calm.

At that time Ajātaśatru questioned the guards at the gate [to the prison]. "Is my father the king still alive?" The gate guards said: "Great King, the Royal Consort, her body spread with flour and honey and her ornaments filled with juice, offers these to the king. And the śramaṇas Maudgalyāyana and Pūrṇa come from the sky to teach the Dharma to the king. It is impossible to prevent them."

Then, having heard these words, Ajātaśatru became angry with his mother and said: "My mother is a rebel and the companion of a rebel. The evil śramaṇas through their illusions and spells caused this evil king not to die through these many days." And then he seized a sharp sword intending to kill his mother.

At that time there was a minister named *Candraprabha, wise and intelligent. Along with Jivaka he saluted the king and said: "Great king, we have heard that the Vedic discourses teach that from the beginning of the aeon there were evil kings numbering eighteen thousands who, because of their lust for the throne, killed their own fathers. Yet we have never heard of anyone illicitly killing his own mother. ..."

After this point Bimbisāra does not reappear in the story, and Vaidehī becomes the central protagonist. Ajātaśatru relents and gives up any idea of harming his mother, but he does cast her into prison. While in prison she, like Bimbisāra before her, entreats the Buddha

from afar, and he sends Maudgalyāyana and Ānanda to her, then follows himself. At this point begins the bulk of the sūtra, comprising the instruction to Vaidehī on the Pure Land of Amitāyus, that is Sukhāvati, and the way to attain birth there. In the epilogue Vaidehī attains awakening, but there is no return to the story of Ajātaśatru.¹⁶

From here on in our investigation, let us accept that we can study the episode of Ajātaśatru and Bimbisāra – the introductory narrative – independent from the rest of the *Guan-jing*. It is but one separable unit of the whole sūtra, and questions of the origins of the sūtra itself as a unit can be set to one side as we deal with this one separable portion. In addition, I believe that Yamada, although he does not prove it, is correct in his suggestion that the introductory story itself is a composite narrative, thus divisible into its constituent parts. While not explicitly stated by Yamada, apparently the joint in the introductory section itself must fall between the episode of Ajātaśatru questioning the guards of the jail, who inform him that Maudgalyāyana and Pūrṇa visit the jail to preach to Bimbisāra, and the immediately following section relating Ajātaśatru's anger at his mother. The latter section begins with the sentence "Then, having heard these words, Ajātaśatru became angry at his mother, and said" 時、阿闍世聞此語已、怒其母、曰... As Yamada has stated, the following passages, in which after grabbing a sword to strike Vaidehī Ajātaśatru is remonstrated with by his ministers, do not occur in other versions of the tale. In fact, as the numerous examples to be quoted below will show, the traditional versions of the tale continue after Ajātaśatru's interview with the jailers in quite a different fashion than does the *Guan-jing*. In this way I think it is possible to prove that the point at which the traditional Indian versions of the tale on the one hand and the *Guan-jing* version on the other diverge is precisely the point of a joint in the text of the latter, indicating a fusion of source materials, and an indication of the boundaries of a stock narrative episode widespread throughout Buddhist and Jaina Indian literature.¹⁷

Before we begin our analysis of the stories in detail, some more or less theoretical observations should be offered. Given the assumption that Yamada's hypothesis is correct, and the *Guan-jing* is in fact composed of a number of elements connected together into a whole,

it should be possible to carry out two types of investigation at the same time. In fact, more generally speaking, we can say that for any text which can be shown to be wholly or even partially constructed out of originally independent elements, a double-sided investigation is possible. First, we can investigate various aspects of the general problem of the origins of a given text itself by looking severally at the elements used to construct that text. Individually tracing the history and evolution of the component elements of a sūtra should help us to better understand the composition and development of the sūtra as a whole. Second, we can investigate the evolution of each given element of the text independent of its context as an element of that text. Thus, at one and the same time we can contribute, first, to a study of the origins of one Buddhist sūtra, and, second, to a more general study of – depending on which elements of a text we choose to trace at any given time – narrative motifs, philosophical doctrines, and so on.

It might be objected that, while Yamada may be correct that the *Guan-jing* is in fact formed out of discreet elements melded together into a whole, his method cannot apply to many, perhaps most, Buddhist sūtras. But it is not necessary that an entire sūtra be constructed out of stock units, or that those units be so obviously of diverse origin, to apply to advantage this research methodology. Probably most Buddhist sūtras, whether Mahāyāna or those of so-called Mainstream Buddhism, no matter the land of their composition, make use of stock phrases, stock episodes (narrative or otherwise), stock doctrinal passages and so forth, mixed to a greater or lesser degree with original material – the innovations of the particular text. These stock materials mixed into a text may become the objects of the double-sided study proposed above.

The idea that texts are formed out of pericopes and stock phrases – although not exclusively so formed, of course – has long been recognized, and especially in the relatively well studied Pāli literature lists could undoubtedly easily be compiled of just such pericopes.¹⁸ The study of narrative elements in Buddhist literature may be one of the easiest areas in which to begin this type of research. Moreover, since narrative materials have often been

ignored in the field of Buddhist Studies, a field which is biased toward doctrinal studies, at least at first progress should be rapid.¹⁹

Within the constraints of an article such as the present one it is impossible to trace in detail any story which appears with some frequency in Buddhist literature, such as the story of Ajātaśatru; there is simply too much material. It is necessary then to preface the following with the disclaimer that what follows is a selective and provisional study. At almost every turn more material could have been added, more parallels adduced, as a glance at the dictionaries of Malalasekera (1938) and Akanuma (1931) will show. Nevertheless, I would like to present several versions of the story of Ajātaśatru's imprisonment of Bimbisāra, and Vaidehī's transport of nourishment into her imprisoned husband, as found in Buddhist and Śvetāmbara Jaina literature. (I believe the story is not found at all in either Digambara Jaina or Brahmanical and Hindu literature.)²⁰ Since one of the foci of the present study is the question of the origins of the *Guan-jing*, the story presented in that sūtra as quoted above will be taken as the point of departure for the analysis that follows.

The Buddhist Parallels

Since long ago scholars have adduced the *Mahāyāna-Mahāpari-nirvāna-sūtra*'s version of the story of Ajātaśatru and Bimbisāra as a parallel to the *Guan-jing*'s version. As we saw above, Yamada (1976: 86) has suggested it as a source for at least part of the *Guan-jing*'s narrative. There are considerable problems with the textual history of the Chinese translations of the *Mahāyāna-Mahāpari-nirvāna-sūtra*,²¹ but we can more or less safely assume that the so-called Northern Recension texts T. 374 and T. 376 date from the beginning of the fifth century. The later so-called Southern Recension T. 375 was apparently heavily revised and augmented in China, but T. 374 and 375 agree exactly in the passages in question here, which do not appear at all in the oldest stratum of the text, T. 376. Two sets of passages contain material parallel to passages in the *Guan-jing*. In the first,²² Ajātaśatru is introduced as a king who killed his own father, and regrets it deeply. His regret causes boils to appear on his body, boils for which there is no cure. His ministers

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variously give him different advice about whom to consult, listing a number of heretical teachers and their doctrines. One minister mentions the names of many kings who killed their own fathers,²³ although with the intention of convincing Ajātaśatru that his action is not wrong, in contrast to the intention of the *Guan-jing* passage. The second often cited passage may be translated as follows:²⁴

When Sudarśana [= Ajātaśatru] heard [the reason why he was named Ajātaśatru, the story of his youth and so forth], he straightaway had his minister arrest his father the king and confine him outside the city, guarded by a four-fold army [consisting of elephant, horse, chariot and foot units]. When the consort Vaidehī heard of these events, she immediately went to the king, but those who were guarding the king intercepted her and would not allow her to enter. At that time the consort was outraged and shouted abuse at them. The guards straightaway notified the prince: "Great King, the consort wishes to see your father the king. We could not judge whether to permit it or not." When Sudarśana heard this he again became enraged, and immediately went to his mother. Approaching her and pulling his mother by the hair, he drew his sword, wanting to cut her down. At that time Jivaka spoke, saying: "Great King, although crimes have been committed as long as there has been a country, even the most awful has never extended as far as women, much less to the mother by whom one was given birth." When Prince Sudarśana heard these words, thanks to Jivaka he quickly released [his mother]. [But] he thoroughly cut off his father the king from clothing, bedding, drink, food and medicaments, and after seven days the king's life ended. When Prince Sudarśana saw that his father was dead, then he became repentant.

These passages obviously refer to the same story as that in the *Guan-jing*, but cannot be the sole source for the whole story. The second episode is, however, unique among the parallel versions known to me in relating the scene of Ajātaśatru's anger, certainly an important detail.

In a series of studies on the *Guan-jing*, Sueki Fumihiko (1982, 1986a, 1986b) investigated among other topics the question of the origins of the sūtra. Especially in his excellent synthetic survey (1986b), Sueki accepted Yamada's 1976 analysis of the structure of the text, and in all three papers just referred to he tried to suggest a possible source for the introductory narrative unit, singling out the episode of Vaidehī's transport of liquid nourishment into her imprisoned husband in her anklets as a characteristic element of the *Guan-jing*'s tale. Sueki apparently selected this story element at least

partially because the closest parallel version of the story known to him, that of the *Samghabhedavastu* of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, contains an account in which not only is the means of transport the same, but it is not grape wine (or juice) which Vaidehī carries in to the king, but water. Sueki thought that this indicated an innovation on the part of the compiler(s) of the *Guan-jing*. I am inclined to disagree with this specific aspect of Sueki's interpretation for reasons I will discuss below, but first let us take a look at the Mūlasarvāstivāda version of the story.

It has been pointed out several times that the story of Ajātaśatru and Bimbisāra is presented in the *Samghabhedavastu* of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya.²⁵ The story there begins with the lifelong opposition of Ajātaśatru, spurred on by the evil Devadatta, to his father, Bimbisāra. Bimbisāra offers Ajātaśatru ever larger shares of his kingdom in order to assuage the latter's greed, first the realm of Campa, then all of Magadha except Rājagṛha, then all but the treasury, then all but the king's own harem. After each conciliation, Devadatta urges Ajātaśatru to "show courage" and demand more from his father Bimbisāra. And each time Ajātaśatru abuses the citizenry, causing them to flee from his oppression. The following is the narrative from that point on, translated, I believe for the first time in a modern language, from the Sanskrit text discovered at Gilgit:²⁶

The king [Bimbisāra] spoke [to Ajātaśatru] in censure, saying: "You were given the provinces along with the treasury and the stores. Why do you now destroy them?" When he had spoken thus, [Ajātaśatru] was angry and said to the ministers: "Gentlemen, what is the punishment for one who rebukes an anointed kṣatriya king?" The ministers said: "Lord, the punishment is to be put to death." He said: "It is my father; how will I put him to [a violent] death? Go, place him in the confinement of jail." [So Bimbisāra] was thrown into jail.

[Now,] that king [Bimbisāra] was beloved by his townsfolk and by the provincials. When the masses of people who dwelt in his realm heard [what had befallen the king], they grew sad, but knowing that Ajātaśatru was angry, violent and harsh, no one spoke any censure of him. King Bimbisāra remained in jail carrying out his [usual] activity,²⁷ and [his queen] Vaidehī [daily] brought him a dish of rice boiled in milk.²⁸

Ajātaśatru asked the jailers: "Gentlemen, how does the old king sustain himself?"

They answered: "Lord, your mother [daily] takes him a dish of rice boiled in milk."

Ajātaśatru gave an order that food and water were to be withheld, so that [Vaidehī] would no more bring them in. And in the harem it was ordered that no one must send food and water into the jail, the punishment for one who sent them in being death. Understanding [Ajātaśatru's] violent nature, none prepared food [for Bimbisāra], so why would they have need of sending it in? Then Vaidehī, her mind troubled by affection for her husband, smearing her limbs with barley-meal paste²⁹ and filling her anklets with water, undertook to take in that [food to Bimbisāra], and he sustained himself by it. This stratagem too was detected by the jailers, but out of affection for the king they did not inform Ajātaśatru.

Once again Ajātaśatru questioned the jailers, asking: "Gentlemen, how does the old king sustain himself?" They reported to him in detail, and he said: "Gentlemen, restrain Vaidehī so that she enters no more." Then [at that time] the Blessed One, in order to plant [in Bimbisāra] the roots of good, began to walk on the Vulture Peak on the side that faced the windows [of the jail]. King Bimbisāra seeing the Blessed One through the window produced a joy which preserved his life.

And Ajātaśatru once again asked the jailers: "Gentlemen, food and water were withheld; now how does the old king sustain himself?"

They answered: "The Blessed One, in order to assist him, walks on the Vulture Peak, and [Bimbisāra] stands [at the window] and gazes at him everyday."

[Ajātaśatru] said: "Close the windows, and lacerate his feet with a razor."

[So] they shut the windows and lacerated his feet with a razor, and he was afflicted by painful suffering. His voice choked with tears and sobbing, with eyes full of tears, he thought: "The Blessed One does not pay any attention to me, beset by troubles, danger and distress."

But there is nothing the Buddhas, Blessed Ones do not know, do not see, do not understand, do not discern. The reality is that, surveying the world thrice nightly and thrice daily with the Buddha-eye, the vision of truth arises for the Buddhas, Blessed Ones³⁰ [Namely, they consider:] "Who is forsaken? Who is joyful? Who is beset by troubles? Who is beset by danger? Who is beset by distress? Who is beset by troubles, danger and distress? Who is sunken in evil states? Who is disposed towards evil states? Who is inclined toward evil states? Extracting him from evil states, whom shall I establish in heaven and in liberation? Whose unplanted roots of merit shall I plant? Whose planted roots of merit shall I mature? Whose fully matured [roots of merit] shall I liberate?"³¹

The Blessed One addressed the Reverend Mahā-Maudgalyāyana: "Go, Maudgalyāyana. Inquire after King Bimbisāra's health on my behalf.³² And say this: 'The Blessed One said: "I have done [for you]³³ what needs to be done by a Good Friend. I have pulled your foot out of the hells, the realm of beasts and the realm of demons, and I established you among the gods and men. I put an end to saṃsāra [for you]. I dried up the oceans of blood and tears [for you]. I leapt over the mountains of bones [for you]. I barred shut the doors of the evil states, and spread open [for you] the doors of heaven and of liberation.³⁴ But actually these deeds are done by you alone, are [now] piled up, their requisites attained, their conditions prepared, they are ready to cascade out like a flood, and they are unstoppable. Who else will experience the

[results of the] deeds done by you alone? Great king, the deeds [you have] done and piled up are not matured [somewhere] outside [yourself] in the earth realm, or in the water realm, or in the fire realm, or in the wind realm, but the auspicious and inauspicious deeds [you have] done are rather only matured in [your own psychic continuum, that is in your own] aggregates, spheres and components of clinging [to existence].

Deeds do not disappear even in one hundred aeons.

[But] reaching completeness and the proper time, they produce results for beings.³⁵

Therefore, Great King, you must act in accord with your deeds.””

“Yes, Reverend,” the Venerable Mahā-Maudgalyāyana promised to the Blessed One. And then he attained such a contemplative trance that when his mind was composed he vanished from the Vulture Peak and set himself in the jail, in front of King Bimbisāra. And he spoke as follows: “Great King, the Blessed One inquires after your health.”³⁶ [King Bimbisāra said:] “I salute [you], Reverend Mahā-Maudgalyāyana, and the Blessed One.”³⁷

[Maudgalyāyana said:] “The Blessed One, Great King, spoke thus: ‘I have done [for you] what needs to be done by a Good Friend. I have pulled your foot out of the hells, the realm of beasts and the realm of demons, and I established you among the gods and men. I put an end to saṃsāra [for you]. I dried up the oceans of blood and tears [for you]. I leapt over the mountains of bones [for you]. I barred shut the doors of the evil states, and spread open [for you] the doors of heaven and of liberation. But actually these deeds are done by you alone, are [now] piled up, their requisites attained, their conditions prepared, they are ready to cascade out like a flood, and they are unstoppable. Who else will experience the [results of the] deeds done by you alone? Great king, the deeds [you have] done and piled up are not matured [somewhere] outside [yourself] in the earth realm, or in the water realm, or in the fire realm, or in the wind realm, but the auspicious and inauspicious deeds [you have] done are rather only matured in [your own psychic continuum, that is in your own] aggregates, spheres and components of clinging [to existence].

Deeds do not disappear even in one hundred aeons.

[But] reaching completeness and the proper time, they produce results for beings.

Therefore, Great King, you must act in accord with your deeds.””

He, imprisoned in the jail, afflicted by the sufferings of having his feet lacerated by razors and by the deprivation of food and water, said: “Reverend Mahā-Maudgalyāyana, where is excellent food to be eaten?”

He said: “Great King, among the gods belonging to the company of the four Guardian Kings,” and so saying the Venerable Mahā-Maudgalyāyana attained such a contemplative trance that when his mind was composed he vanished from the jail and set himself on the Vulture Peak.

[Once] a boil appeared on the finger of Ajātaśatru’s son Udayabhadra. Crying he moved towards Ajātaśatru. Putting [the child] on his lap, [Ajātaśatru] hugged him, kissed him, and embraced him. Still he continued to cry, and would not stay still.

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[So] Ajātaśatru put [his son’s] finger in his own mouth, and the boil burst in his mouth. Ajātaśatru disposed of the purulent blood on the ground, and when Prince Udāyibhadra³⁸ saw the purulent blood, he began to cry once more. Seeing Vaidehī smile, Ajātaśatru said: “Mother, what is it?”

She said: “Son, this ailment comes from your father, and you had it too. But when your father placed [your] finger in his mouth and the boil burst, so that you should not cry he swallowed the purulent blood. He did not dispose of it on the ground.”

[Ajātaśatru] said: “Mother, was I so dear to [my] father?”

She said: “Yes.”

Then Ajātaśatru’s hatred toward his father disappeared, and respect arose. He said to his ministers: “Gentlemen, I will give half the kingdom to the man who tells me that the old king lives.” [Since] that king was beloved by his townsfolk and provincials, a great mass of people began to run towards the jail.

The king [Bimbisāra] heard the noise and considered: “Now what on earth are they going to do?” Trembling with fright, he drew in a long breath and died. He became a son of the Guardian King Vaiśravaṇa, and daily, sitting on his lap, he partook of the nectar of the gods.

Vaiśravaṇa said: “Who are you?”

He said: “I am Jinaṣabha, Great King.” And the appellation Jinaṣabha was applied to him.

Sueki (1982: 463) has characterized his idea about the relationship between the episodes of Vaidehī bringing wine or water to Bimbisāra in, respectively, the *Guan-jing* and the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* as follows: “Probably the author of the *Kuan-ching* [= *Guan-jing*] knew the expression of the *S[amgha]bh[edavastu]* and adopted it transforming the latter half. But the *Sbh* was translated into Chinese more than two hundred years later than the *Kuan-ching*. Therefore the author of the *Kuan-ching* would have known the story before it was translated into Chinese.” Several years later Sueki (1986a: 260) restated his conclusions as follows: “Probably the description of the *S[amghabhedavastu]* or a similar one is the original form and that of the *Guan-jing* is a transformed one.... Whether water or grape juice, the passage that Vaidehī filled her ornaments with drink is found in no other materials than the SV and the *Guan-jing*. Taking this similarity into consideration, we can surmise that [the] author or the author group of the *Guan-jing* would have known either the story of the SV or a similar one.” Fujita Kōtatsu (1985: 43) has accepted Sueki’s argumentation, and speculated as follows: “Probably, as the *Samghabhedavastu* text indicates, the Indian versions of the tale had only

'water,' the compiler of the *Guan-jing* newly adding grape juice (or grape wine), thus transforming the story. If this is so, we can see this as an indication that the tale was established in the wine producing regions of Central Asia."

Sueki apparently intended to emphasize not only *what* Vaidehī was carrying (a problem to which I will turn below), but also the similarity of the expressions in the two texts for the *means* of transport of food – and more specifically drink – into the jailed king. While Sueki is correct that the *Guan-jing* and the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* share certain specific details, and uniquely share the interesting reference to anklets, the overall story which comprises the narrative introduction to the *Guan-jing*, far from being unique to the *Guan-jing* and *Samghabhedavastu*, is in fact a stock tale or vignette in Indian texts. That is, there exist other parallel versions which make it clear that the history of the episode is more complex than Sueki or Fujita perhaps imagined. In order to demonstrate this, I would like to introduce some materials which contain close parallels to the *Guan-jing*'s story of Ajātaśatru and Bimbisāra. I will begin with materials that would have been available in China in the Chinese language at the time of the compilation of the *Guan-jing*. The purpose of this presentation is not to suggest that these versions themselves served as models for the *Guan-jing*, but rather is to demonstrate the circulation of the story not only in India but as far as China even before the time of the *Guan-jing*. I will present these texts in chronological order, and since to the best of my knowledge they have not yet been presented in any European language I translate the extracts in full.

What is probably the earliest available datable version of a story close to that found in the *Guan-jing* appears in a Chinese sūtra, the *Foshou Weishengyuan-jing* 佛說未生冤經 (**Ajātaśatru-sūtra*), translated – if the traditional attribution is correct – by Zhi Qian 支謙 between 220 and 253 C.E.³⁹ Although this version lacks any reference to wine or grape juice, and so cannot be considered to be an exact parallel to the version of the *Guan-jing*, it is of interest in itself, if for no other reason than as an example of one of the oldest surviving Chinese translations of Buddhist literature. The text is translated in full in Appendix II to the present paper, but in summary

the story is as follows:⁴⁰ Spurred on by Devadatta, Ajātaśatru attempts to take over the throne from his father Bimbisāra, throwing the latter into jail. Bimbisāra urges Ajātaśatru to give up his evil ways, but he refuses.

The prince [Ajātaśatru] said [to Bimbisāra]: "Don't blabber! My long-cherished wish is fulfilled. How can I let you go?" He then gave an order to the jailers, saying: "Cut off [the king's] food and starve him to death." And the jailers threw [the king] into jail.

King Bimbisāra entreats the Buddha from his jail cell, and the queen tries to dissuade the prince from his plan.

The prince said: "Ever since I was young I have been determined to kill my father and become king myself. Today I fulfilled my wish. What are you giving me advice for?"

The queen said: "Refusing advice is the cause of the fall of kingdoms. I want to see the king – may I or not?"

The prince said: "You may."

The queen cleansed her body by bathing, and coating her body with honey and flour entered [the jail].

The king complains of his poor physical condition, and the queen tells him that it is for this reason that she has brought food into the jail on her body. The king eats the food, and then turns in the Buddha's direction regretting that he cannot meet the Buddha or his disciples.

The prince interrogated the jailers, saying: "You have cut off the king's food for several days; why is he not yet dead?" And they replied: "The queen entered the jail bringing in honey and flour, and thus sustained the king's life." The prince said: "From now on you must not allow the queen to see the king."

And the king, starving, got up and, facing the place where the Buddha was, made obeisance. And then he was no longer hungry When the prince heard of this, he ordered that the windows [of the jail] be blocked up and the soles of the [king's] feet be lacerated, so that he would not be able to stand up and see the Buddha The jailers immediately lacerated the soles of his feet, and his pain was immeasurable.

The Buddha then preaches to Bimbisāra from afar, and through the Buddha's power Bimbisāra understands his previous karma. He dies and is reborn in heaven. Here there is of course no mention of

any liquid sustenance, wine or otherwise, but there are already a number of details we will find repeatedly in other texts.

The next Chinese text to which we may turn our attention is the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins, the *Shisong-lü* 十誦律 (T. 1435 [XXIII] 261b7-262a10), a translation of the late fourth century.⁴¹ Again, spurred on by Devadatta, Ajātaśatru is urged to overthrow his father.

King Ajātaśatru heard this, became joyous,⁴² and he ordered his ministers and court attendants to apprehend his father the king, commanding them to imprison him. The great ministers received his instructions and straightaway they arrested [Bimbisāra] and secured him in the jail. The great king [Bimbisāra] was good, wise and tender, and so one billion people took various delicacies and went to speak with the king. The king ate and thus sustained himself. After several days had passed, Ajātaśatru asked: "Is the great king alive or not?" [The jailers] answered: "He is alive." "How is he able to survive?" They answered: "People come to speak with the king, and they bring food and drink which sustain him." The king immediately ordered the jailers: "Starting right away you must not allow anyone to enter [the jail]."

Later, a consort⁴³ of the king stole some food and took it in to the king, who by eating it was able to survive. After several days had passed, the king again asked: "Is the great king alive?" And they answered: "He is alive." "How is he able to survive?" They answered: "It is because there is a consort of the king, and she comes and gives him food and drink." Immediately [the king] ordered the jailers not to allow the king's consort to enter [the jail].

Now, there was a chief consort who had a deep respect and regard for the great king. Taking food, she coated the lining of her garments with it. Then putting on yet another layer of clothes on top, she went into the jail. Taking off the clothes she gave them to the king and made him eat, enabling him to survive. After several days had passed, the king again asked: "Is my father the king alive?" They answered: "He is alive." "How is he able to survive?" They answered: "He is able to survive thanks to the visits of the chief consort." The king said: "Do not allow the chief consort to enter [the jail]."

From within his jail cell the king's father looked toward the Vulture Peak in the distance. The great king saw the Buddha and the monks Śāriputra, Maudgalyāyana, Aniruddha, Nandiya and Kimbila, climbing up and descending the mountain. The great king was able to look upon the Buddha and the monks in the distance, and because of the joy [thus caused] he survived. After several days had passed, Ajātaśatru again asked: "Is my father the king alive?" They answered: "He is alive." "How is he able to survive?" A minister with a jealous spirit answered, saying: "He survives since he looks upon the Buddha and the monks in the distance." The king immediately gave an order commanding that an obstructing partition be erected, and [the king] prevented from being able to look out.

.....(list of miracles which occur when Buddhas enter a city omitted).....

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At that time, the Buddha entered Rājagṛha with his right foot treading upon the threshold of the gate, and everywhere he manifested each and every one of the multiple auspicious portents [listed above, but omitted in this translation]. After seeing these signs, King Bimbisāra knew the Buddha would enter Rājagṛha. From his tower the king faced a gap [in the wall] and standing there he gazed upon the Buddha entering the city. The king attained the Noble Path,⁴⁴ and since he saw the Buddha and the monks, the joy [produced by that] sustained him. And after several days had passed, Ajātaśatru again asked: "Is the king still alive?" They answered: "He is alive." "How is he able to survive?" A minister with a jealous spirit answered, saying: "The Buddha entered the city and manifested his supernatural powers. Your father the king survives because he faced through a gap and looked upon the Buddha."

Ajātaśatru said: "With a sharp blade cut the soles of the great king's feet, and quickly bind the skin; do not allow him to move to and fro."⁴⁵ Being so ordered they right away cut the soles of the great king's feet, quickly binding them, and he was unable to move to and fro. For this reason the king lay down, and as the days passed he grew emaciated and ill.

Again, at one time King Ajātaśatru was eating with his mother. The king had a son, whose name was Udayabhadrā, and he was playing in the road with a young dog. The king asked: "Where is Udayabhadrā?" They answered: "In the road playing with the dog." The king said: "Bid him come; I will eat with him." And clutching the dog he came following the messenger.⁴⁶ But the prince did not eat. The king asked why, and the prince said: "If the king allows me to eat with my dog, then I shall eat." The king said: "As you wish." And the prince himself ate, and then took [some food] and gave it to the dog.⁴⁷ The king said to his mother: "I have done a difficult thing. Why? I am an anointed kṣatriya king, yet out of love for my son I allowed him to eat with a dog."

His mother said: "This is not a difficult thing you have done. Why? There are people who eat dog meat, and if you allow them to eat it, what is so strange?⁴⁸ Do you know that your father really did do something difficult?" The king said: "What difficult thing did he do?" His mother said: "When you were young your finger had a carbuncle. It quickly became very painful, and day and night you could not sleep. Your father held you on his knee, and put your abscessed finger into his mouth. The body of the great king was soft, and you were able to be sleep comfortably. Because his mouth was warm, the carbuncle ripened and discharged purulently. The great king thought to himself, 'If I take his finger out [of my mouth] and spit out the pus, this will increase my son's suffering.' So straightaway he swallowed the pus. Your father did this difficult thing; now please release him!"

The king listened to this in silence, but after his mother had spoken he said: "Release him!" A cry went up in the palace: "Release the great king!" Everywhere in the streets people heard that the great king would be released. Because the king was wise and good, a hundred thousand people all proclaimed "Good!" And they all moved toward the jail, each saying: "The great king will be released."

The great king heard this [tumultuous roar], and thought to himself: "My son is

evil, and doesn't feel compassion or pity. I do not know now what sort of punishment he will inflict upon me." And thinking thus, he cast himself off his bed and thereupon ended his life. At that time King Ajātasattu snatched away the life of his father the king and incurred a great sin of immediate retribution.⁴⁹

This text too, while containing a number of vital story elements, does not provide details about the sustenance brought into the king, and in particular there is no mention of drink.

I believe that the texts just presented are the main pre-*Guan-jing* Chinese versions of our story. But this of course does not exhaust the Buddhist versions of the story, and many other versions of the story have come down to us. Looking at this information will help us to understand what forms the story took, and by trying to identify the tolerances of the story itself we can begin to try to identify what may be the innovations of a particular version or tradition.

As has been known for more than one hundred years, our story occurs in the Pāli commentarial literature, and it has been recounted from there several times.⁵⁰ The version of the story closest to that with which we are presently concerned is found in Buddhaghosa's commentary to the *Digha-nikāya*, the *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*. The section introductory to that which contains our tale consists of the background of Ajātasattu's life.⁵¹ Before his birth it was predicted that Ajātasattu would become his father's enemy.⁵² During her pregnancy his mother, due to the influence of the unborn child, felt a pregnancy craving for her husband Bimbisāra's blood. In order to prevent the child Ajātasattu from killing Bimbisāra in the future, she repeatedly tried to abort the foetus, but was found out and stopped by the king. At birth the child was taken from her, and when presented with her son years later she grew to love him. King Bimbisāra subsequently bestowed upon his son the vice-regency. The story then introduces Devadatta who urges Ajātasattu that, life being short, he should kill his father and seize the throne immediately. Ajātasattu is caught in his assassination attempt, and when Bimbisāra questions him, he replies that the attempt was motivated by his desire for the throne. And so Bimbisāra grants the kingdom to him.⁵³ Ajātasattu tells Devadatta that he has attained his desire, and the following is a translation of the story from that point:⁵⁴

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[Devadatta said:] "You, like a man who has put a mouse inside a drum and covered it over, think you have done [all] that needs doing. [But] in a few days your father [Bimbisāra], contemptuous of what you have done, will become king himself [again, just as the mouse will chew his way out of the drum]."

[Ajātasattu asked:] "Well friend, what shall I do?"

"You should kill him off."

"But friend, how can I kill my own father with a weapon?"

"[Then] you should kill him by cutting off his nourishment."

[So Ajātasattu] caused his father to be cast into a torture chamber.⁵⁵ And he said [to the guards], "Except for my mother, you shall not allow others to see him."

The queen [Ajātasattu's mother] placed food in a golden vessel and she entered [the jail] carrying it in a pouch in her garment. And the king [Bimbisāra] ate it and sustained himself. [Ajātasattu] asked: "How does my father sustain himself?" And hearing the situation, he said: "Do not allow my mother to enter [the jail dressed] in a pouched garment."

From that time, the queen placed [the food] in a turban and took it in. Hearing of that too [Ajātasattu] said: "Do not allow her in if she is wearing a turban." And so then, concealing food in a golden slipper, the queen put on the slippers and went in [to the jail]. And the king sustained himself by that [food]. Again [Ajātasattu] asked: "How does he sustain himself?" And hearing the facts he said: "Do not allow her entry wearing slippers."

At that time, bathing in perfumed water the queen smeared her body with a syrup of four ingredients, and clothing herself went in [to the jail]. Licking her body, the king sustained himself. Again [Ajātasattu] asked [how Bimbisāra sustained himself], and hearing the facts he said: "From now on, refuse my mother entrance [to the jail altogether]."

The queen stood at the doorway [to the jail] and said: "Lord Bimbisāra, you did not permit me to kill this [son of ours, Ajātasattu,] when he was young, and you nourished your enemy yourself. This is now our very last visit, for from now on I will not be able to see you. If some fault attaches to me, forgive it Lord." And crying and weeping she left.

From then on the king was without nourishment, and sustained himself through the joy of the fruit of the path [obtained] by walking to and fro, and his countenance was extremely brilliant.

"Tell me, how does my father sustain himself?" [Ajātasattu] asked. Hearing [the answer] "He sustains himself by walking to and fro, Lord, and his countenance is extremely brilliant," he thought: "I shall prevent his pacing." So he ordered the barbers: "Slicing open my father's feet with a razor, smear them with salt and oil and roast them crackle-crackle with acacia wood embers."

King [Bimbisāra] saw those [barbers coming] and thought: "Surely my son has been admonished by someone, and these [barbers] have come to shave me." They came, greeted him, and stood there. And being asked, "Why have you come?" they told him [Ajātasattu's] order. [Bimbisāra] told [them]: "Do what your king commands." Saying "Sit down, Lord," they said to the king: "Lord, we are carrying

out the king's order; do not be angry with us. This is not fit for a Righteous King like you." And with the left hand they grabbed his ankle and with the right hand the razor, and slicing open the soles of his feet they smeared them with salt and oil and roasted them crackle-crackle with acacia wood embers.

The king, it is said, long ago entered the area around a shrine wearing shoes and tread with those [shod] feet on a mat appointed for sitting. This [present situation] is the [karmic] result of that [past act], they say.

The king experienced a strong sensation, and he brought to mind [the expression] "Hail to the Buddha! Hail to the Dhamma!" and in the area around the shrine⁵⁶ he withered like a discarded garland. And he was reborn as a yakkha named Janavasabha,⁵⁷ an attendant to Vessavana,⁵⁸ in the Heaven of the Four Guardian Kings.

On that very same day a son was born to Ajātasattu. The two messages apprising him of the twin facts of his son's birth and his father's death arrived at precisely the same moment. The ministers placed in the king's hands the letter which said: "First I will announce the fact of the birth of [your] son."

At that moment the king felt a great love for his son, his whole body shaking and [the feeling] reaching even down to the marrow of his bones. Then he understood his father's virtuous qualities: "When I too was born my father felt love for me in just the same way," and he said: "Go, release my father, release him!" "Who is there to release, Lord?" they said, and handed him the [second] message.

Learning of the fact [of his father's death], weeping he approached his mother and said: "Mother, did father love me?" She said: "Foolish boy, what are you saying? When you were small there was boil on your finger. Then, being unable to appease [you, the nurses] took you and went into the presence of your father, seated in the law courts. Your father placed your finger in his mouth, and the boil ruptured there in his mouth. Then out of love for you your father did not spit out the pus mixed with blood but instead swallowed it. So much did your father love you." Crying and wailing, [Ajātasattu] performed his father's funeral.

In this tale again, although there are a number of characteristic story elements, many of them common to the other versions we have examined above, there is still no mention of liquid nourishment, and specifically no mention of wine.

It may be that there are or were other important Buddhist versions of our tale, in Indic languages, Tibetan, Chinese or other Buddhist languages, for certainly, as we have already seen, the story is widespread. But I believe that those versions presented so far give at least a fair sample of the main extant versions.⁵⁹ Now, if these versions constituted the complete extent of the tale in Indian literature, the story would still have to be counted as a fairly widely known one. We have quoted it in Indic languages from fifth century Ceylon and perhaps sixth or seventh century Gilgit,⁶⁰ and in Chinese from as

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early as the third century on. This must be counted as a fundamental Buddhist legend. But there is at least one vital element missing in those versions which parallel the episode presented in the *Guan-jing*, as noted by Sueki, namely the introduction of wine into the story. And if we were to limit our study to Buddhist sources, we might be at an impasse. But this story is not the sole property of the Buddhists.⁶¹

The Jaina Parallels

The question of the dating of early Jaina texts is a vexing one, but already in the *Nirayāvaliyā*, the eighth of the Śvetāmbara Upāṅgas, a text which dates (in the form in which we have it) to not before the fourth century,⁶² we find a story identical in outline to the versions recounted above, although the element of the queen's efforts to carry nourishment to the imprisoned king is missing. The *Nirayāvaliyā* is a very interesting work, and should certainly be translated in its entirety by a competent Jaina scholar. Since, however, the work does not contain an exact parallel to the episode we are studying here, and is thus not directly relevant to the issue at hand, I will not translate the story, which is rather long, in full. On the other hand, this represents probably the earliest non-Buddhist version of the story, so it is worth summarizing briefly: Queen Cellaṇā, the mother of Kūṇika (that is, Ajātaśatru), craves in her pregnancy for the fried muscle of the heart of King Śreṇika (that is, Bimbisāra). Prince Abhaya, Śreṇika's son, tricks her into believing that she has been given it to eat. When Kūṇika is born Cellaṇā expels him, and a cock tears open the child's finger. Śreṇika discovering this succors the child, and puts the injured and infected finger into his own mouth to clean it and ease the child's pain. Later, Kūṇika along with his ten brothers imprisons his father and himself takes the throne. Then, on a certain occasion Kūṇika comes to pay his respects to his mother, who however looks unhappy and does not respond. Asked why, she relates to Kūṇika the story of her pregnancy and wish to be rid of him, and of Śreṇika's care of his son's injured finger, accusing Kūṇika of ingratitude. The story goes on.⁶³

Then King Kūṇika, having listened and attended to this statement in the presence of Queen Cellaṇā, spoke thus to Queen Cellaṇā: "I have done a wicked thing, mother; I binding with chains the dear, divine King Śreṇika, venerable, beloved with tender attachment. I will go to him and sever the chains of King Śreṇika myself!"

So saying, with an axe in hand he went, determined, to the prison fortress. Then King Śreṇika, seeing the prince approaching with axe in hand, spoke thus [to himself]: "This Prince Kūṇika desires what no one desires [namely, death], is marked out for a miserable end, was inauspiciously born on the fourteenth day of the month, has abandoned propriety, fortune, happiness and renown, and comes here quickly with an axe in hand. Who knows, but I shall die through some horrible means of death."⁶⁴ And so saying [to himself] in fear, dread, alarm, anxiety and terror, he put *tala-puḍaga* poison⁶⁵ into his mouth. Then King Śreṇika, having put *tala-puḍaga* poison into his mouth, in the passing of an instant fell down lifeless, motionless, deprived of vitality.

Then, when that Prince Kūṇika arrived at that prison fortress and saw King Śreṇika fallen down lifeless, motionless, and deprived of vitality, overcome by grief for his father he fell with his whole body upon the ground like the best Campaka tree cut down by an axe.

Kūṇika then regains consciousness, and repents the evil he has done. While the parallel is not exact, it is plain that this is, in general terms, identical to the story we found in several Buddhist texts. This in itself is quite interesting, but there is more.

The oldest Jaina text of which I am aware in which our story, including the episode of the queen of Śreṇika / Bimbisāra bringing him nourishment in prison, appears is the *Āvaśyakacūrṇi* of Jina-dāsagaṇi, dated by Leumann (1934: IVb) to between 600 and 650 C.E.⁶⁶ The whole *Āvaśyaka* literature – what Bruhn (1981: 17) calls the "Āvaśyaka cluster" – is a vast storehouse of Jaina and more generally Indian tales, and has yet to be explored in much detail. Despite the apparently rather late date of the *Cūrṇi*, for instance, it almost certainly preserves earlier narrative material. Watanabe Kenji (1990: 900) has observed that:

Compared with Buddhist works, the dates of these works [= *Āvaśyaka* texts] are new, but ... the stories of the Jaina tradition use Prakrit even within *śikā* which are written in the Sanskrit language. This indicates that those stories are quoted from an old tradition. Actually, the Jaina stories are often indicative of a form close to the original of the tales. There are many cases in which the age of the text and that of the tale it transmits are not the same.

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Although Adelheid Mette (1983: 137-38) has discussed some parallels between the *Āvaśyakacūrṇi* and the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya*, and opined that in some cases motifs or stories found in the former "are probably borrowed from Buddhist sources in later times," this can by no means be the case in a great many instances, and undoubtedly is not so in the present circumstance. The text of our story is given in the *Cūrṇi* in Prakrit prose:⁶⁷

At one time, Kūṇika conferred together with the princes, Kāla and the rest: "Arresting Śreṇika, we will split the kingdom into eleven parts." They agreed, and Śreṇika was arrested.

Forenoon and afternoon, [Kūṇika] caused [Śreṇika] to be given one hundred lashes with a whip, and he permitted no one except Cellaṇā to approach [Śreṇika]. "Food and water are prohibited," [he said].

Thence Cellaṇā, fixing *kummāsa*⁶⁸ in her hair, and repeatedly [washing] her hair with a hundred layers of wine, entered [the prison]. She pretended to wash, and one hundred times washing her hair with water it became [reconstituted as] wine. Thanks to the power of this [wine], he did not perceive any pain.

Once, at another time, [Kūṇika] had a son, Prince Udāyin, by [his consort] Padmāvati. When [Udāyin] was eating he urinated on his hand and on the plate. But [Kūṇika] did not move him, saying "He must not be disturbed!" Removing as much of the food as was urinated upon, he ate the remainder. He [then] said to his mother: "Mother! Did anyone else ever hold a son so dear?"

She said: "Vile one! Your finger spilled forth worms and your father put it in his mouth. Nevertheless you wailed."

His mind became tender toward her, and he said: "Then why did he give me [only] molasses sweetmeats to eat [rather than sugar ones]?"

The queen said: "It was I who did that to you, since you were always your father's enemy, beginning in the womb," and thus she told him everything. "Still your father did not become indifferent. Still your father showed such devotion to you."

[Kūṇika] became unhappy, and hearing that, excitedly grabbing an iron staff the size of his arm he ran thinking "I will shatter his fetters."

The guards, out of concern for the king, informed him: "This evil one comes holding an iron staff."

Śreṇika thought: "Who knows, but I shall die through some horrible manner of death." And thinking thus he took *tālapuḍa* poison. By the time [Kūṇika] got there, [Śreṇika] was dead.

Seeing this, [Kūṇika] became even more unhappy. Then cremating [Śreṇika], he went home. Content to abandon the burden of sovereignty, he sat thinking about that. The crown prince and the ministers thought: "The king will die." And so inscribing an edict on a copper plate, and giving it an old appearance, they publicized it: "Thus it is to be done for the father: He will be saved through the giving of the

pinḍa." From that time on, [the general custom of the rite of] offering of *pinḍa* to one's father became established. And thus in time [Kūṇika] became free of grief.

What we immediately notice here is the mention not only of the transport of food into the imprisoned king, but also of drink, and specifically of wine, an element found in none of our extant Buddhist parallels. On the other hand, the means of transport of the wine is different from that in the *Guan-jing*, a perhaps significant detail.

It seems more than likely that the great Jaina scholar Hemacandra (1088-1173) was inspired by, or even directly based himself on, this account in the *Āvaśyakacūrṇi* when several centuries later he recorded the same tale in his veritable encyclopedia of Jaina narrative lore, the *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacarita* or "Lives of the Sixty-three Divine Persons [of Jainism]."⁶⁹ Our tale occurs in the tenth book of Hemacandra's vast work, the *Mahāvīracarita*, this version in Sanskrit as distinct from the earlier Prakrit versions.⁷⁰ Hemacandra lived in Gujarat under the Caulukya dynasty, and is credited with converting the monarch Kumārāpāla to the Jaina faith, this conversion leading to the domination of Jainism in Gujarat. As the life and works of Hemacandra, however, are well known and well studied, there is no need to describe them here in detail,⁷¹ and we can move directly to a translation of the story.

In the meantime, Prince Kūṇika held counsel together with Kāla and the others, ten brothers like himself: "Although our father is old, he still has not had enough of kingship. For when the son of a king reaches the age at which he may wear armor, [the king] is entitled to take a vow. [For the kingship] excellent Abhaya, who gave up his wealth though young, is preferable to our father, blind to worldly concerns, who does not perceive his own old age. So now, arresting our father we will assume the sovereignty suited to us at this time; there will be no objection to this, for he is devoid of discernment. That done, we brothers will enjoy the kingdom in eleven parts. But after that let our imprisoned father live for even a hundred years!"

Accordingly they all, evil-minded, imprisoned their own unsuspecting father. For evil offspring are like a poison tree born within one's own house. Therefore, Kūṇika threw Śreṇika, like a parrot, into a cage. But there was a difference, for he did not give him even food or drink. Prompted by his former hatred, morning and afternoon day after day evil Kūṇika lashed his father a hundred times with a whip. Śreṇika endured this misfortune wrought by fate; even if he is strong, what can an elephant do, tied by a rope?

Kūṇika did not permit anyone to go near Śreṇika, except that out of courtesy to his mother he did not bar Cetaṇā. Daily Cetaṇā, hair wet from a hundred washings in

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wine, like one who had bathed a short while before, went to Śreṇika. And placing a ball of *kulmāṣa* into her hair like a wreath of flowers, Cetaṇā, devoted to her husband, took it to him. Cetaṇā gave the hidden ball of *kulmāṣa* to her husband, and obtaining what was for him hard to find he thought it to be like divine food. Śreṇika maintained his life with that ball of *kulmāṣa*. In the absence of food, the disease that is hunger leads to death. Together with drops of tears from her eyes Cetaṇā, devoted to her husband, made fall from the tangles of her hair drops of wine [placed there] through a hundred washings. And Śreṇika drank those falling drops of wine, as a thirsty *cātaka*⁷² drinks drops of water released by the clouds. By virtue of that wine drunk up in mere drops Śreṇika did not feel the whippings, nor did he suffer from thirst.

And having imprisoned Śreṇika in this way, to the haughtily reigning Kūṇika a son was borne by his wife Padmāvati....

One day, fond of his son, the king, the son of Śreṇika, sat down to eat, having set Udāyin atop his left thigh. When Kūṇika had half-eaten, [his son] the child urinated and like a stream of liquid ghee the stream of urine fell into the food. "Let there be no interruption of my son's voiding" said the king, whose father is Śreṇika, and he did not move his knee; such was his affection for his son. And removing with his own hand the urine-soaked food, he ate the remainder just like that; and even this made him happy, because of his love for his son.

Then Kūṇika asked Cetaṇā who was sitting there: "Mother, has there ever been a son so dear to anyone else as this one is to me?" Cetaṇā said: "Aah! Villain! Wretch! Disgrace to your family! Don't you know how exceedingly beloved you were to your father? Because I had an evil pregnancy craving, I knew then that you were your father's enemy. For pregnant women have pregnancy cravings which correspond to the [nature of the] embryo. Knowing that even while you were in the womb, vile one, you were your father's enemy, out of concern for my husband's welfare I undertook an abortion. Nevertheless, you were not destroyed by the various abortion medicines, but on the contrary you flourished; everything is beneficial for the very strong. And expressing the fervent wish 'When shall I see my son's face?' your father satisfied whatever sort of hankering I felt. Certain that you were the enemy of your father, even when you were born, I abandoned you; but your father fetched you back zealously as if his own life [were being abandoned]."

"Then one of your fingers was pricked by the tail feather of a wild hen, and became filled with worms and pus, exceedingly painful. Your father placed your finger, wounded though it was, into his mouth, and only as long as your finger was within his mouth were you succored. That father by whom you, ill-mannered wretch, were thus cosseted was thrown into prison as his reward." ...

Kūṇika said: "Shame! Shame on me, acting without reflecting! I shall deliver the kingdom back to my father, as if it had been placed on deposit." With these words, though the meal was but half-eaten, rinsing his mouth and handing his son to a nurse, Kūṇika stood up, anxious to go into the presence of his father. Intending "I will shatter the fetters on my father's feet" and grabbing an iron staff, he ran toward Śreṇika. The guards assigned to Śreṇika, previous intimates of his, saw Kūṇika

coming and full of confusion said: "Like the staff-bearer Yama embodied, your son is quickly coming toward us, bearing an iron staff. We do not know what he will do." Śreṇika thought: "Certainly he intends to kill me. Other times he came carrying a whip, but now he comes carrying a staff. I do not know – probably I will be killed through some horrible manner of death. Therefore even before he has come, death will be my refuge." And thinking thus Śreṇika put *tāluputa* poison on the tip of his tongue, and his life left quickly, as if it had been right at the foremost point standing ready to depart.

Kūṇika repents, and after performing the cremation begins to waste away himself. His ministers convince him to perform the requisite offerings by forging a copper-plate inscription, and eventually Kūṇika gets over his grief. There is no question that this version is highly elaborated and embellished, but at the same time its connection with the *Āvaśyakacūrṇi* version should be obvious. While perhaps the most detailed and elaborate version I have met with, the *Triṣaṣṭisalākāpuruṣacarita* version is not the latest.

A close parallel to our story appears again in the *Ākhyānakamaṇi-kośa*, a text by Nemicandra (1073-83) furnished with a Prakrit verse commentary (*vr̥tti*) by Āmradeva (1134). The narrative material is contained in Āmradeva's commentary.⁷³ Here too Prince Aśoka-candra, the Kūṇika character, arrests his father, imprisons and whips him, and attempts to starve him to death. And again, Cellaṇā conceals *kulmāsa* in her hair, which is also washed with wine. She gives the food to the king, and reconstitutes the wine. By drinking the wine, the king is able to endure the whippings, and so on.

The latest of the versions I will quote here is that found in the *Kathākośa*, a Jaina story collection of unknown authorship and date.⁷⁴ Discussing the text in his *A History of Indian Literature*, Winternitz (1927: 542, n. 2) says "It is certainly not old, though it probably made use of old sources." The editor of the Sanskrit text, Ingeborg Hoffmann, quotes Ludwig Alsdorf's opinion that "No dating appears to be attempted anywhere. The work, however, may belong at the earliest to the fifteenth century, rather than the sixteenth."⁷⁵ This text was translated into English already in 1895 by C.H. Tawney, the well known translator of the *Kathāsaritsāgara* or "Ocean of Story," but the text and this English translation seem to have remained little known, even among Indologists.⁷⁶ It was in fact

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in reading this translation that I first noticed the parallel to the *Guan-jing*, a parallel pointed out already by Tawney in his introduction.

The story that interests us is found in chapter 25 of the *Kathākośa*, in the episode of Kūlavālaka. Tawney himself, in the brief introduction to his translation, pointed out that "The statement in the 'Kathākośa' with regard to the behavior of the head-queen agrees closely with that found in the 'Amitāyur Dhyāna Sūtra,' translated from the Chinese by Mr. J. Takakusu."⁷⁷ ("Amitāyur Dhyāna Sūtra" is, of course, the hypothetical, and almost certainly false, Sanskrit "reconstruction" of the Chinese title *Guan Wuliangshou-jing*.) Hoffmann has taken no note of this identification, but has noted other parallels including that with the *Triṣaṣṭisalākāpuruṣacarita*.⁷⁸ Tawney himself (1895: xx-xxi, and 175-78, in the notes), as Hermann Jacobi before him, correctly identified Śreṇika with Bimbisāra, Koṇika (Kūṇika) with Ajātaśatru and Cillaṇā (Cel[ī]jaṇā) with Vaidehī.

The story of Kūlavālaka begins with Śreṇika ruling in Rājagṛha. After Prince Abhaya abdicates the succession to become a Jaina monk, King Śreṇika hands the kingdom over to Koṇika.

One day Koṇika, having consulted with the ten princes, Prince Kāla and the others, threw King Śreṇika into prison. He whipped him a hundred times every forenoon and a hundred times every afternoon, and forbid him food and water. Then Queen Cillaṇā, having fixed *kulmāsa* in her hair, with great difficulty took them in for him to eat. Through a stratagem she took [him] Candrahāsā wine⁷⁹ in her hair, and when her hair was washed a hundred times, all the water became wine. Owing to the strength given him by the wine, the king was able to endure the whippings.

One day there was born to that same Koṇika, by his wife Padmāvati, a son named Udaya. Once Koṇika was eating, having placed [his son] on his lap, and his urine fell right into the food vessel. Koṇika did not put him off his lap for fear of disturbing his rest, but ate his food mixed with urine. He said to his mother, who was nearby: "Mother, is there anyone whose son is so dear to him?" His mother said: "Damn! Listen, you wicked man! When you were in my womb, I had a pregnancy craving to eat your father's flesh. The king satisfied my pregnancy craving. When I gave birth to you, saying that you were evil I abandoned you in a grove of Aśoka trees. When the king heard this, he himself went to the grove and brought you back. Thus you were named Aśokacandra. Then a cock⁸⁰ tore open your finger, and it became inflamed.⁸¹ Therefore you received the name Koṇika.⁸² Your infected finger caused you intense pain, and your father held that finger, oozing fetidly, in his mouth, and then you did not cry. To this extent did he love you."

When Koṇika heard this, he was full of remorse, and he said: "Shame on me, to show such gratitude to my own father!" Then immediately taking up an iron club,

with the aim of breaking the [jailed king's] chains, he personally set out [for the jail]. Then the guards informed the king in advance: "Koṅika is coming in a very impatient mood, with an iron club in his hand. We have no idea what he is up to." The king thought to himself: "He will put me to death by some degrading mode of execution." And so thinking he took *tālapuṣa* poison. When Koṅika arrived there, King Śreṇika was dead. [Śreṇika] subsequently became an inhabitant of hell, destined to live in the first hell for eighty-four thousand years. Liberated from hell, he shall be the first *tīrthāṅkara*, named Mahāpadma,⁸³ in this very land of Bhārata.

The resemblance of all these versions, with the exception of the first, to each other is clear. I do not know if the relationship between these texts has been investigated from a more general standpoint, but it seems very likely if not nearly certain that at least the versions of our story in the *Āvaśyakacūrṇi*, the *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacarita* and the *Kathākośa* go back to a common origin, so close are they in wording and sequence. It is probable that there are other Jaina versions of our tale, but I am not a specialist in Jaina literature, and I must leave it to those who are to point out additional examples.

Now that we have presented in translation the main versions of the story as found in what we may term primary texts – old Indian texts or direct translations from such, excluding secondary compilations which may quote or paraphrase the story on the basis of such primary texts – it is time to turn to an analysis and comparison of the various versions.

Appraisal

There are a number of impressive parallels between the various Buddhist and Jaina versions of the story of Ajātaśatru and his father Bimbisāra. Among these, the reference to Bimbisāra's queen bringing liquid nourishment to her jailed husband appears to be a significant element for the study of the history of this story. It would, naturally, be unreasonable to suggest that the authors of the *Guan-jing* knew of the Jaina parallels to their story, and I in no way mean to suggest that the presence of wine in both traditions indicates a direct relation between them. On the other hand, the absence of references to wine in known Chinese and Indian Buddhist sources and the presence of such references in non-Buddhist Indian sources makes it more than likely that the materials which inspired the

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Discussing the overall composition of the *Guan-jing*, Sueki (1986b: 178) says:

I surmise that while on the one hand the Prologue, the first Thirteen Contemplations and the later Three Contemplations contain elements going back some to Central Asia and some in their turn to India, on the other hand some of those elements date to the time when the sūtra was put together in its present form. That is, the sūtra along with organizing contemplations on Amitāyus which were being practiced in Central Asia transformed the tragedy of Bimbisāra and Ajātaśatru – which I imagine was popular in Central Asia – turning it into a story centered on Vaidehī. Moreover,

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It will require considerable further work to critically examine the evidence for this hypothesis, at least parts of which are nevertheless certainly correct. Since the Nine Grades of beings into which the *Guan-jing* classifies religious practitioners seems virtually certain to be of Chinese origin,⁸⁷ and the Indic origins of the introductory story are equally clear, it may be best to use the term suggested by Fujita (1985: 60-61) and speak of a “mixed origin” for the sūtra, this referring to its composition out of units of mixed Indian, Central Asian and Chinese origin.⁸⁸ Following the arguments of Yamada (1976), it is hard to imagine that the text was written originally in a language other than Chinese.

Several other aspects of the versions we have examined should not be overlooked. While I cannot offer a detailed discussion of the literary qualities of the texts presented above, it is clear that some are bare presentations of a story, while others are rich, poetic treatments of the same theme. Here even the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya rises above the generally pedestrian literary level of most Buddhist texts when it employs such poetic conceits as the terms *bhārīśnehoparuddhyamānahṛdaya* (“her mind troubled by affection for her husband”) and *bāṣpoparuddhyamānagadgadanṭha* (“his voice choked with tears and sobbing”), and the imagery of Hemacandra's version in which Celanā rehydrates the wine she smuggles to Śreṇika with her tears is vivid and striking. The ways in which these stories have each been transformed would make an interesting object of study.⁸⁹ We might provisionally note some ironic twists, such as the concern of the king, dying of hunger, to discover which realm, upon his rebirth, will offer him the best kinds of food. It is only speculation to suggest that the motif of the rebirth of Bimbisāra on the lap of Vaiśravaṇa is primary, and the connection with the food in the latter's realm secondary. Likewise the laceration of the king's feet to prevent his seeing the Buddha and thereby sustaining his life is integrated into the stories with varying degrees of success. In the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya and **Ajātaśatru-sūtra*, the sight of the Buddha sustains the king, but in the version of the scholastic Buddhaghosa it is the joy produced by his attainment of the *magga-*

with the aim of breaking the [jailed king's] chains, he personally set out [for the jail]. Then the guards informed the king in advance: "Koṇika is coming in a very impatient mood, with an iron club in his hand. We have no idea what he is up to." The king thought to himself: "He will put me to death by some degrading mode of execution." And so thinking he took *tālapuṭa* poison. When Koṇika arrived there, King Śreṇika was dead. [Śreṇika] subsequently became an inhabitant of hell, destined to live in the first hell for eighty-four thousand years. Liberated from hell, he shall be the first *tīrthānkara*, named Mahāpadma,⁸³ in this very land of Bhārata.

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it expanded the various practices of Good and practices of the Recitation of the Name into the Nine Grades, molding the whole into a single sūtra.

It will require considerable further work to critically examine the evidence for this hypothesis, at least parts of which are nevertheless certainly correct. Since the Nine Grades of beings into which the *Guan-jing* classifies religious practitioners seems virtually certain to be of Chinese origin,⁸⁷ and the Indic origins of the introductory story are equally clear, it may be best to use the term suggested by Fujita (1985: 60-61) and speak of a “mixed origin” for the sūtra, this referring to its composition out of units of mixed Indian, Central Asian and Chinese origin.⁸⁸ Following the arguments of Yamada (1976), it is hard to imagine that the text was written originally in a language other than Chinese.

Several other aspects of the versions we have examined should not be overlooked. While I cannot offer a detailed discussion of the literary qualities of the texts presented above, it is clear that some are bare presentations of a story, while others are rich, poetic treatments of the same theme. Here even the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* rises above the generally pedestrian literary level of most Buddhist texts when it employs such poetic conceits as the terms *bharṭṛsnehoparuddhyamānahrdaya* (“her mind troubled by affection for her husband”) and *bāṣpoparuddhyamānagadgakanṭha* (“his voice choked with tears and sobbing”), and the imagery of Hemacandra's version in which Cetaṇā rehydrates the wine she smuggles to Śreṇika with her tears is vivid and striking. The ways in which these stories have each been transformed would make an interesting object of study.⁸⁹ We might provisionally note some ironic twists, such as the concern of the king, dying of hunger, to discover which realm, upon his rebirth, will offer him the best kinds of food. It is only speculation to suggest that the motif of the rebirth of Bimbisāra on the lap of Vaiśravaṇa is primary, and the connection with the food in the latter's realm secondary. Likewise the laceration of the king's feet to prevent his seeing the Buddha and thereby sustaining his life is integrated into the stories with varying degrees of success. In the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* and **Ajātaśatru-sūtra*, the sight of the Buddha sustains the king, but in the version of the scholastic Buddhaghosa it is the joy produced by his attainment of the *magga-*

phala (for Buddhaghosa probably technically equivalent to *sotāpatti-phala*) which sustains the king, and preventing the king's pacing does nothing to affect this. It has been suggested that in the concern with feet we should see some connection with a world-wide archetype including the piercing of Oedipus's heel, but I confess I am not convinced by this suggestion.⁹⁰

A theme which provides part of the background for the story, but is not expressed explicitly in every version (or is mentioned previous to the place in the text where our extracts began), is the pregnancy craving (*dohada*) of Ajātaśatru's mother during the time he is in her womb. This motif, as Maurice Bloomfield (1920) has so interestingly shown, is a common element in Indian tales. Bloomfield discusses several versions of our story, and in addition mentions a similar, though not entirely parallel, account in the Jaina *Samarāicca Kahā* of Haribhadra (mid-eighth century) and its Sanskrit paraphrase the *Samarādityasamkṣepa* of Pradyumna (1214). The Prakrit story collection *Samarāicca Kahā* contains (Jacobi 1908-26: xlvi; 125. 6ff.) the story of a prince who imprisons his father the king. The king's queens visit him in jail, but in this version the king wishes to starve himself to death. His son threatens to cut off the king's head unless he takes food, and upon his refusal the son indeed does take his own father's life. I have not studied this story in detail, but its connection, at least conceptually, with our tale is obvious. The actual violent murder of a father by a son is rather rare in Indian literature, and the reluctance of the son to undertake such a vicious action against his father is referred to in several versions of our story.⁹¹ There are, however, in fact examples in Buddhist and Jaina literature of violent patricide, and I refer the interested reader to my paper (Silk Forthcoming) which deals with this topic in detail.

One aspect of the tale of Ajātaśatru and Bimbisāra which has drawn considerable attention is the similarity to the European story of Oedipus. A Japanese psychoanalyst and sometime disciple of Freud, Kozawa Heisaku 古沢平作 (1897-1969), apparently decided that the Japanese did not have an Oedipus Complex, but rather an "Ajase Complex," Ajase 阿闍世 being the Japanese reading of the Chinese transliteration of the name Ajātaśatru. Here we may merely note that the tale interpreted psychoanalytically in this theory is a

modified version of the one we have recounted above. According to Sueki (1985), Kozawa presented the Ajātaśatru story based on the version in the *Kyōgyōshinshō* 教行信證 of Shinran 親鸞, which is in turn based on the *Guan-jing* and the *Mahāyāna-Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*.⁹² Kozawa's follower Okonogi Keigo 小此木啓吾 (1930 -) added additional elements of his own creation removing the story, as Sueki says, even further from the sources. Sueki questions whether an ancient Indian story can reveal anything about the contemporary Japanese psyche, although of course a similar question could be asked about an ancient Greek story and modern Europeans. Be that as it may, it is very revealing for the Buddhist scholar and the psychoanalyst alike to note, as Sueki suggests, that apparently Shinran added our story to his monumental work the *Kyōgyōshinshō* late in his life, after his break with his own son Zenran 善鸞.⁹³ Although perhaps for somewhat different reasons than those adduced by the Japanese psychoanalysts, I also believe that it is not entirely accurate to treat the Ajātaśatru story as a true Oedipal tale since, crucially, Ajātaśatru does not in fact desire his mother.⁹⁴ I have discussed the issue of Indian Oedipal tales in detail in my paper mentioned above.⁹⁵

Finally, in order to more fully understand the *Guan-jing* and its Prologue, it is important to ask what a story like that of Ajātaśatru and Bimbisāra does when used as a narrative frame for a text. I think one of the most important roles fulfilled by any such frame story is the provision of legitimation for the text. The audience of a new literary production, the authors of which adopt a well-known story such as that of Ajātaśatru and Bimbisāra, is already familiar with the "facticity" of the story. It is a tribute to the hold that this particular story has on the imagination, perhaps, that even such a modern, critical scholar as Fujita Kōtatsu (1985: 89) repeatedly refers to the "historical reality" (*shijitsu* 史実) of the "Tragedy at Rājagṛha." While suggesting (1985: 91) that "Probably the compiler(s) of the *Guan-jing*, collecting various available versions of the tale of Ajātaśatru, reconstructed them into a shape fitting to the introduction to this sūtra," a suggestion with which I agree, he goes on to say (1985: 92): "However, this Tragedy of Rājagṛha has as its background the historical reality of Ajātaśatru's murder of his father, but the overall

structure skillfully integrates some psychological coloring.... It is not merely a report of historical fact...." In his very valuable comparative study of the earliest Buddhist and Jaina canonical texts, Nagarājji (1986: 456ff.) even goes so far as to debate about the religious affiliation – Buddhist or Jaina – of the main actors. As far as I can see, neither of these scholars, or the many others who similarly refer to the historical facticity of the story, offers reasons for accepting the historicity of the tales to which they refer, perhaps assuming that the weight of tradition guarantees their authority. As a matter of general principle, however, the burden of proof must fall on one who wishes to accept legendary material as representing historical fact, and we as historians must begin with an assumption that the legends are *not* historical, believing so until convinced otherwise.⁹⁶ On the other hand, an examination of legends *as legends* may often help us understand how Indian Buddhists understood their own tradition.

As one illustration of this approach, let me suggest that from the point of view of the insiders of a tradition, if an account is filled with information they know (or think they know, a modern might say) to be correct, those pieces of information new to them share in the factual authority of the already known and (therefore) true. In the case of frame stories in religious works, the facticity of the frame – the historical reality, from the point of view of the tradition – lends authority to the message of the preaching contained in the work. Since we know it to be true, the argument will run, that Prince Ajātaśatru imprisoned his father Bimbisāra, and so forth, it should also be true that the religious lessons conveyed to the imprisoned king as recorded in the text at hand (for us the *Guan-jing*) are authentic, an accurate report of the teaching of the Buddha Śākya-muni (and therefore, of course, they are also "true" in a more profound sense). Familiarity with a story brings with it an emotional or emotive attraction, in which new elements then share in the "charisma" of the old and familiar. The legendary material may, therefore, serve as a tool for the text's self-authentication. It almost goes without saying that such self-authentication might be especially necessary for a text whose authority or authenticity is potentially doubtful. The authors of the text might well go out of their way to try

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to convince their audience of the text's *historicity*, since this is an aspect of its broader overall *authenticity*. One approach is to examine the dynamics of the legends themselves, to explore the ideology which drove their authors to compose these stories. I believe that such investigations will be one fruitful area for future research in Buddhist literature.

As an example of a direction future investigations might take, we might inquire how a traditional reader is affected when a narrative frame familiar to him from a certain context is used to encase a completely different doctrinal content. The sermon framed in the *Guan-jing*, which is to say the entire teaching of contemplations on Amitāyus's Pure Land, is totally unconnected with that framed within the very same frame story in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, the latter sermon being a rudimentary exposition of karma. The more general question, then, might be how narrative frames interact with what they frame. I cannot explore these issues here, but I think the problem is one worth keeping in mind.

Conclusion

The present paper has provided evidence for the Indian origins of the first part of the Prologue section of the *Guan-jing*, the narrative frame of the story of Ajātaśatru and his father, Bimbisāra, further showing that the story recounted there is the common property of the Buddhist and Śvetāmbara Jaina traditions. It is therefore certain that this portion of the text is directly based on Indian materials. However, it is likewise clear that the *Guan-jing* as a whole cannot be an Indian product, and is most likely a work initially composed in the Chinese language, perhaps in Central Asia. The importance of comparative studies which take into account not only Buddhist materials but also those of other Indian traditions, such as Jainism, has therefore been emphasized. Moreover, mention has been made of the problem of the historical facticity of legendary materials, and it has been suggested that much can be learned from the study of legendary materials *as legend*, when care is taken not to confuse legend with history.

There remain many interesting questions about the *Guan-jing*, and

the full story of its origins is far from written. The present paper has, however, offered some clues which, it is hoped, might aid in the writing of that history. It is also hoped that some of the methods utilized here might also be used, *mutatis mutandis*, in the investigation of other Buddhist texts.

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Appendix I: On the Problem of Wine

In his very detailed study of the *Guan-jing* published in 1985, which totally supersedes his 1970 (and 1990!) accounts, Fujita Kōtatsu has accepted the arguments of Sueki Fumihiko (1982, 1986a, 1986b) offered on the basis of the *Guan-jing*'s mention of grape juice or wine. In the passage recounting Vaidehī's transport of nourishment in to the imprisoned King Bimbisāra, the *Guan-jing* has her carrying in "grape wine (or possibly: juice)" (*putaojiang* 蒲桃漿) concealed in her ankle ornaments, while the parallel version in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* (in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese) has her bringing in water, again in her anklets. Recalling that Central Asia, and particularly the Turfan basin, is a central area in the production of grapes, Fujita (1985: 43) speculated as follows: "Probably as the *Samghabhedavastu* text indicates, the Indian versions of the tale had only 'water,' the compiler(s) [*hensansha* 編纂者] of the *Guan-jing* newly adding grape juice (or grape wine), thus transforming [the story]. If this is so we can see this as an indication that the tale was established in the wine producing regions of Central Asia." Now, Fujita and Sueki did not go beyond the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* to see if they could locate other Indian versions of the tale (as indeed the present paper shows is possible), but even without access to such direct evidence a portion of the reasoning offered by these two scholars can be shown to be in need of correction.

Certainly the coincidence of the means of transport, ankle ornaments, is important. However, although I believe that it is nowhere made explicit, there seems to be an underlying assumption behind the argument sketched above that the term for grape wine found in the *Guan-jing* could not have come from either a Chinese source other than the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* – which itself is rightly rejected as a possible source of the idea by Sueki, since the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* was translated only after the *Guan-jing* is known to have come into existence – or from an Indian source. I would like to show briefly that either of these alternatives can be shown to be possible, even based on an assumption that one knows nothing of the other versions of the *Guan-jing*'s story discussed above.

Konikas tatra yāti tāvan mṛto rājā Śreṇikah. Prathama-narake caturaśīti-varṣa-sahasrāyur nārako babhūva. Narakād udvṛtto 'traiva Bhārate'¹¹⁹ Mahāpadma-nāmā prathama-tīrthānkaro bhaviṣyati.

NOTES

* I would like to thank those who have so generously helped me with different aspects of this study over the years. I received good advice and various help from (in alphabetical order) Griff Foulk, Phyllis Granoff, Satoshi Hiraoka, Robert Sharf, Fumihiko Sueki, Michihiko Yajima, and Nobuyoshi Yamabe, and the paper is much better for their assistance.

¹ The term *Jōdo sambukyō* is given in Japanese since it seems, according to Fujita 1970: 9, note 8, to have been invented by the Japanese cleric Hōnen 法然 (1133-1212), and used for the first time in his *Senchaku Hongan Nenbutsushū* 選擇本願念佛集 (T. 2608 [LXXXIII] 2a7).

In giving a conventional translation of the text's title, I intentionally avoid the vexed question of the precise meaning of *guan*.

² At least since the time of Dōgen 道元 the authenticity of the *Guan-jing* has been questioned within the Buddhist tradition. In his *Hōkyōki* 寶慶記 Dōgen records the following polemic from his time in China (1223-27): "These days the Doctrine [Tiantai] temples of the realm are constructed with a hall of sixteen contemplations. Those sixteen contemplations appear in the [*Guan*] *Wuliangshou-jing*. [But] it is not clear whether that sūtra is genuine or spurious, and scholars of the past and the present have wondered about the point." 今天下教院或構十六觀之室。彼十六觀者出於[觀]無量壽經。彼經真偽未詳、古今學者之所疑也。Quoted by Tsukinowa 1971: 159-60, followed by Fujita 1985: 61, note 2. For a critical edition of the text, and a translation of the complete passage, see Kodera 1980: 245 and 131.

Note that Tsukinowa 1971: 160 has argued that Dōgen's doubts about the authenticity of the *Guan-jing* expressed here have nothing to do with scholarly questions but were rather entirely sectarian prejudices, reflecting Chan conflicts with the Tiantai school. On the other hand, it is unlikely that Dōgen could have meaningfully raised the question at all unless some suspicions about the text had already been current.

³ A list of some seventeen of these reasons can be found in Fukuhara 1984. On the other hand, there are some who still hold that it is an Indian text. Chief among these seems to be Hirakawa Akira. In 1984 he reintroduced the idea of Hayashima Kyōshō (1964) that the mention in the *Guan-jing* of the term *qingjing yechu* 清淨業處 refers to a "pure *karmasthāna*," an Indian Abhidharmic scholastic category otherwise unknown in the northern Buddhist tradition. The terms and ideas of *karmasthāna* (Pāli *kammaṭṭhāna*) meditation are well known, but apparently restricted to the

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Theravāda tradition. Hirakawa (1984: 2; 12) thus argues that the restriction of the idea to southern Buddhism implies the Indian origin of the *Guan-jing*. (For a general discussion of *kammaṭṭhāna*, see Mori 1982.) Hirakawa's reasoning has been rejected by Sueki (1986b: 166-67) and Fujita (1985: 31-32). According to these scholars there is no good reason to identify the term *qingjing yesuo* in the *Guan-jing* with the Abhidharmic *kammaṭṭhāna*. Among the forty *kammaṭṭhāna* listed in the *Visuddhimagga*, for instance, such a term does not appear. Sueki (1986b: 167) argues that *qingjing yechu* is rather to be connected with the term *jingye* 淨業 in the sense of "undefiled actions"; this term appears in the *Guan-jing* in a place preceding *qingjing yesuo*. I agree with this analysis.

Takahashi 1993: 284-85 misunderstands the issue of origins as an entirely geographic one (and raises the problem of the definition of "India"), when it is primarily a linguistic problem. In the case of the thesis of Indian origin, the problem is not in precisely what spot the text was created, but whether it was originally written in an Indic language.

⁴ See also Tsukinowa 1971: 145.

⁵ It has been suggested (e.g., by Gómez 1995: 244, n. 61) that the term "apocryphal" is not a good one to describe the materials we are discussing. However, in my opinion, "apocrypha" is at least preferable to one of the proffered alternatives, "pseudepigrapha," since the latter is defined in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (compact reprint edition of 1971) as "A collective term for books or writings bearing a false title, or ascribed to another than the true author," the example being given that certain Jewish writings dating to early in the first millennium were ascribed to Old Testament prophets. Apocrypha, on the other hand, is defined as "A writing or statement of doubtful authorship ... spec[ifically] those books included in the Septuagint and Vulgate versions of the Old Testament, which were not originally written in Hebrew" The latter case seems much closer to the example we are discussing. (D. S. Russell, writing in *The Oxford Companion to the Bible* [Metzger and Coogan, 1993: 629b, s.v. Pseudepigrapha], has even suggested that, given the ambiguities of the term, rather than pseudepigrapha "it is much less confusing to use the word apocryphal.")

⁶ For some discussions see Fujita 1990: 151ff; Sueki 1986b: 165; Nogami 1981: 167ff. The hagiography of Kalayaśas is translated by Shih 1968: 147-48.

⁷ There are, however, some problems with this, as is often the case when considering the evidence of sūtra catalogues. Pas 1977: 195 (and again 1995: 36) is wrong in referring to a "unanimous tradition." More accurate is Mark Blum's (1985: 131) characterization: "Despite its initial listing in Seng-yu's catalogue among the 'miscellaneous sutras by anonymous translators' and references in Ming-ts'uan's *Ta chou mu lu* and Chih-sheng's *K'ai-yuan lu* of a separate translation from the same period by Dharmamitra (356-442), scholars have generally accepted the tradition of a single translation by the monk Kalayaśas from the 'western regions.'" For more on sūtra catalogues, see below.

⁸ It is of some interest to note that the reverse argument is sometimes found even

today, namely that without evidence of an Indian original a text cannot be judged Indian (and "authentic"?). A recent work by Kenneth Tanaka (1990: 38) comments about the *Guan-jing* as follows: "Since the sūtra has neither been found in a Sanskrit version nor cited by extant Sanskrit texts, the original was probably not compiled in India. The absence of a Tibetan translation further undermines the theory of an earlier Sanskrit text." It is frustrating to see such reasoning repeated in spite of frequent and clear statements of the obvious fact that many definitely Indian texts are extant only in Chinese. See for example the statements of Hirakawa 1984: 13-14 and Fujita 1985: 29, to name only two scholars whom Tanaka has obviously read. The same point is again made with explicit reference to the *Guan-jing* by Takahashi 1993: 280-81.

⁹ The implication of this point is that, whether or not there existed an original of the *Guan-jing* in a non-Chinese language, it is almost certain that those who made the text in (or into) Chinese were native Chinese who no doubt had before them ample examples of previous Chinese Buddhist works. This means that similarity in diction and so on between the *Guan-jing* and other works proves nothing about its putative apocryphal status.

¹⁰ Contrary to what is sometimes thought, it seems that the Tibetans too did similar things. See Karmay 1988: 5-6.

¹¹ The *Miaofahua-jing-yishu* 妙法華經義疏, published in the *Dainippon Zokuzōkyō* 大日本續藏經 (revised edition), volume 27, # 577. Kim 1990: 82 and 106 n. 3 seems, with some confused phrasing, to support and yet contradict this claim. His book is a translation of this commentary.

¹² For a more detailed breakdown of the text according to Shandao, see the chart in Fujita 1985: 80, and his discussion 79ff. See now also Pas 1995.

¹³ For the story in the *Mahāyāna-Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*, see Hirakawa 1971: 2-5; Kawamura 1976; Mochizuki 1988: 137-54. The particulars are discussed in detail below. The **Daśabhūmivibhāsa-śāstra* refers to the story, T. 1521 (XXVI) 49a21, but without any significant details. While the text obviously knows the episode, it could not have served as a source for a more detailed recounting.

¹⁴ The Chinese text of the *Guan-jing* (T. 365) is printed in Yamada et al. 1984, but see also Fujita 1985 and Sueki 1986b for lists of textual variants. In making my translation from the Chinese I am indebted to that contained in Yamada et al. 1984, despite my occasional disagreements with its renderings.

¹⁵ Rinsing with water signifies the end of the meal. There is considerable discussion in the scholarly literature concerning the exact signification of the terms translated here and below provisionally as honey, ghee and flour. Since exact identifications are not necessary for the arguments of the present paper, I happily leave aside these questions.

¹⁶ An interesting discontinuity occurs in the coda to the sūtra, the return to the frame story. There it is stated that Vaidehī and her five hundred attendant women rejoiced and so on. The mention of five hundred attendants is a stock expression, found throughout Buddhist literature, but this is the first mention of such a retinue in

the text; one would not expect an imprisoned queen, who is clearly out of royal favor, to be attended by a small army of servants.

¹⁷ For references to this story in Pāli Buddhist literature see Malalasekera 1938, s.v. Ajātasattu I.31-35, and s.v. Bimbisāra II.285-89. For Chinese materials see Akana 1931 s.v. Ajātasattu 10-12, and s.v. Bimbisāra 99-102. For references in Jaina literature see Mehta and Chandra 1970-72, s.v. Kūṇia I.196-97, and s.v. Senia II.856-57. For the story of Ajātasattu in Buddhist literature generally see the excellent study of Chinese sources in Ono 1916, and more briefly the remarks of Hirakawa 1971. Recent rather popular works are Sadakata 1984 and 1989 (a translation of the *Ajātasattu-kauṛṭya-vinodana*). Even more popularized is Igarashi 1989. Some speculative comparative remarks on motifs may be found in Imoto 1982: 25-53, followed by Takenaka 1982. (I thank Elizabeth ten Grotenhuis for informing me of Takenaka's article, and sending me a copy.) See also Ishigami 1984.

¹⁸ In fact, to a certain extent the Pāli Text Society's editions and translations, and the practices of some native scribes, of marking exact repetitions in a text by reference to the preceding instance of a passage, rather than repeating it *in extenso*, reflect one albeit obvious aspect of this fact. This is even more pronounced in canonical Jaina literature, in which expressions indicating the instruction "(insert here the stock) description" (*van[n]ao* and *jāva*) occur with regularity.

¹⁹ It is to be sure not only Buddhist Studies which labors under this prejudice. One of the leading scholars of Jaina literature (Bruhn 1981: 19), in a preliminary study of the Āvaśyaka literature, a rich storehouse of Jaina narrative materials, has avowed that the study of the texts of this literature "is after all largely a study of their dogmatic and scholastic contents." This approach is, I feel, most unfortunate.

²⁰ Dr. Luitgard Soni (University of Marburg) has kindly informed me that although there are several tales about Śreṇika and his family in the *Bṛhatkathākośa* and other allied Digambara narrative compilations, the Ajātasattu episode is absent.

²¹ For a detailed study see Shimoda 1991.

²² Found at T. 374 (XII) 474a = T. 375 (XII) 717a and following.

²³ T. 374 (XII) 475c8-13 = T. 375 (XII) 718b29-c6.

²⁴ T. 374 (XII) 565c19-29 = T. 375 (XII) 812b6-17.

²⁵ The story and its connection with the *Guan-jing* was discussed in Nishimoto 1934: 322, n. 20. See also Yamada et al. 1984: 6, n. 2; Sueki 1982: 463; and Fujita 1985: 42-43.

²⁶ Gnoli 1978: 155.23-159.10. A few corrections can be suggested to this text: Page 156.24, and 156.25: *vātāyanāni*. 157.16: *ārogyaya*. 158.5: *-tebhyah pādah*. 158.9: delete *upacitāni*. (I am well aware that this edition may not report the manuscript precisely, but since photos of the manuscript have never been published and are unavailable, I am unable to re-edit the text.) I was able to consult the corresponding Tibetan text only in the Derge Kanjur, *dul-ba, nga*, 215a6-218a2. The Chinese translation due to Yijing 義淨 is found in T. 1450 (XXIV) 189c1-190b23, given in

kundoku Japanese "translation" by Nishimoto 1934: 322-25. For a modern Japanese rendering from this Chinese version see Bukkyō Setsuwa Bungaku Zenshū Kankō-kai 1973: 10.215-21. The episode is summarized from the Tibetan by Rockhill 1907: 90-91, and Panglung 1981: 112.

²⁷ The passage is not quite clear. The normal Brahmanical sense of *karmaparāyana* is devotion to ritual activity, but the sense here might be different. The Tibetan *phyag sbal na las kho na la rten cing 'dug pa* seems to mean that the king remained in jail due only to his karma, but it could be taken to mean "engaged only in action."

²⁸ *Shālipāka*. The exact sense of this term is not certain here; it may not have the connotation it has in Brahmanical ritual texts.

²⁹ *Saktukalka* = Tibetan *phye'i 'de gu*.

³⁰ A list of epithets of Buddhas is omitted from the translation at this point.

³¹ This entire passage is a set phrase, which has been translated by Lamotte 1958: 715-16, including the section abbreviated here.

³² Or: "Send a greeting to King Bimbisāra in my words."

³³ Following the Tibetan, *kyod la*.

³⁴ See the stock passage given in Lamotte 1958: 717.

³⁵ The verse is common in the Avadāna literature, e.g., *Divyāvadāna* (Cowell and Neil 1886) 54.9-10, *Avadānaśataka* (Speyer 1906-09) I.74.7-8. A slightly variant form, preferable as Speyer (note 13) points out in avoiding the awkward repetition of *api*, is:

*na pranaśyanti karmāni kalpakotiśatair api /
samāgrīm prāpya kālaṃ ca phalanti khalu dehinām //*

³⁶ Or: "Greets you."

³⁷ It is perhaps better to follow the Tibetan and omit *ca*. Then translate: "Reverend Mahā-Maudgalyāyana, I salute the Blessed One."

³⁸ Gnoli's text spells the name here thus differently from above, but the manuscripts must be checked before the form is finally accepted into the text.

³⁹ Even if the translation is not by Zhi Qian, the archaic language makes it quite clear that the text dates from a very early period.

⁴⁰ The entire sūtra has been translated into modern Japanese by Sadakata 1984: 103-12. Hirakawa 1971: 7 is partially mistaken when he writes: "There seem to be no scholars who have noticed this sūtra in relation to the establishment of the *Guan-jing*, but I believe it certainly is a text which must be taken into consideration." I of course agree with the latter half of this statement, but compare the study of Ono 1916: 395 and 411-12, who did in fact discuss this sūtra long before Hirakawa.

⁴¹ The text is paraphrased in modern Japanese by Sadakata 1984: 116-18. It is discussed in some detail by Ono 1916 *passim*, but especially 413 and 418. In my translation 261b25-c10, the listing of miracles, is omitted.

⁴² I am not certain if *xinxirenshou* 心喜忍受 is to be understood in its technical

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sense as one of the "three patiences," which may not be an Indian category at all. The normal sense in which I would read the Chinese – "he was happy and bore [it] patiently" – is clearly impossible; there is nothing to endure. We must take *xiren* 喜忍 as the core of the phrase, rather than reading two sets of two characters. See Oda 1974: 1363a3, 245b.

⁴³ It is possible that we should understand a plural here, consorts, in contrast to the chief consort below. But no number is marked in the Chinese.

⁴⁴ I am not certain of the technical sense here of *shengdao* 聖道, often but not necessarily a rendering of *ārya-mārga*. See Oda 1974: 417a.

⁴⁵ This seems to be the sense of the phrase 不得東西, but the dictionaries apparently do not record this usage. In T. 653 (XV) 792c13 東西 seems to mean "in every direction." The Tibetan equivalent is there (Peking Kanjur #886 *mdo*, *tshu* 41a2) *phyogs dang phyogs mtshams su*. [The Tibetan translation of the Chinese version (Peking #791 *mdo*, tu 188a4), however, has *shar nub du phyogs shing*. This might indicate that the translators did not understand the Chinese term to mean anything other than "east and west."] Another confirmation of this sense is found in T. 99 (II) 345c12-13 (*Samyuktāgama* 1260 = SN ii.270-271 [xx.10]). A cat eats a mouse, but once inside the bowels of the cat the mouse eats at the cat's bowels. Then: "The cat raced about *hither and yon* in confusion and panic, through abandoned houses and graveyards, not knowing where it was, until ultimately it died." 貓狸迷悶東西狂走, 空宅塚間不知何止遂至於死。

⁴⁶ The sentence could perhaps be understood slightly differently. 即抱狗子、隨信俱至 may mean "clutching the dog he came in accord with the message."

⁴⁷ This sentence may also be interpreted somewhat differently. 自食隨持與狗 may mean "he took from his own food and gave it to the dog."

⁴⁸ I do not understand the reference.

⁴⁹ Note that the term 大逆罪, while undoubtedly here a reference to the worst of the *anantārya* sins, is found in Chinese as early as the *Shiji* 史記 in much the same sense. See Morohashi 1955-60: vol. 3: 386 (581.446).

⁵⁰ See Hardy 1880: 328-30 (I have not seen the first edition of Hardy's work, dated 1853); Kern 1882a: 191-99; 1882b: 243-53; 1901: 199-206; Law 1931: 192ff; 1933: 428-30. Hardy's account is apparently directly based on the *Pūjāvāliya*, which dates to 1266 C.E. Kern seems to have based himself on Hardy. Kern also seems to refer to a Northern version of the story, perhaps from Schiefner 1851, but the latter is not available to me.

⁵¹ *Ajātasattu* is of course the Pāli form of Sanskrit *Ajātaśatru*.

⁵² This presupposes the etymological interpretation of *Ajātasattu* as an adjectival compound meaning "unborn enemy," but the more natural (although it is difficult to say "correct") understanding is to take the term as a possessive compound, meaning "he whose enemy is unborn," implying that one is so great that none can face him as a worthy opponent.

⁵³ Up until this point the story, verbally very close to the *Sumāṅgala-vilāsini*

version, is found also in the Pāli Vinaya, *Cullavagga* VII.3-5 (Oldenberg 1880: 190-191, Horner 1952: 266-68), with some additional details.

⁵⁴ The text is found in Rhys Davids and Carpenter 1886: I.135,29-138,17.

⁵⁵ A gloss in the text here says: "Torture chamber is used in the sense of smoke-house."

⁵⁶ Presumably in the prison yard – or is there some contamination from the preceding sentence?

⁵⁷ The manuscript reading recorded in the edition, page 137 note 14 (from the Royal Library of Mandalay manuscript), Janavasabha, is probably correct, rather than the edition's Javanavasabha (otherwise unattested?). On the other hand, the form is a lectio facilior and may be a hyper-correction. The parallel versions, however, also suggest the correction. See Edgerton 1953 s.v. Jinaṣabha, and the version from the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, above.

⁵⁸ The Pāli form of Sanskrit Vaiśravaṇa.

⁵⁹ I mean primary versions. Derivative versions, quoting from other versions with or without attribution, are of course common. See for example the *Fayuan zhulin* 法苑珠林 (T. 2122), a seventh century Chinese work which quotes ([LIII] 660b24ff.) the *Weishengyuan-jing* among other versions of the story as an illustration of lack of filial piety, and the eleventh century Japanese tale collection *Konjaku Monogatari-shū* 今昔物語集 III.27 (Yamada et al. 1959: 248-51), one source of which is clearly the *Guan-jing* itself. A bad English translation of the *Konjaku* episode is to be found in Dykstra 1986: 56-60. As for other Indian Buddhist, and perhaps not derivative, versions, I have not been able to check the *Kalpadrūmāvadāna*, which is referred to by Feer 1891: 212 as containing in the *Śrīmaty-avadāna* twelve manuscript pages (167-179 in the Paris manuscript) which "relate in great detail the murder of Bimbisāra by Ajātaśatru." Compare also the *Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā* T. 1546 (XXVIII) 266c13-267a9; T. 1545 (XXVII) 360b4-c16; T. 1547 (XXVIII) 521b3-c1. Here Vaidehī is absent, but Bimbisāra's rebirth is discussed in detail.

Kazuo Enoki's appendix to La Vallée Poussin 1962: 256 lists a Chinese manuscript fragment (item C 83) which tells part of a "story of King Ajātaśatru who, having killed his father and mother, was converted to a very faithful believer in Buddhism." According to Enoki "No identical text is found in the existing sūtras relating to Ajātaśatru." Intrigued by this, I obtained a copy of the manuscript in question; when I asked his help in matter, however, Prof. Fujieda Akira identified the manuscript fragment as belonging to the *Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* T. 374 (XII) 564b21-566b8. This previously unidentified Dunhuang manuscript fragment does not, therefore, contain another version of our story, but is rather a copy of a well-known version.

⁶⁰ I give a very conservative date for the Gilgit Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya; the text might be considerably older.

⁶¹ Fujita 1985: 94, n. 2, never followed up his one lead to non-Buddhist versions of the tale.

⁶² There is a good likelihood, however, that the contents are much older. The

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Prakrit text can be found in Deleu 1969, the *editio princeps* of Warren 1879 (which I have not seen), and other editions mentioned by Deleu. Probably the first to point out the parallelism between this Jaina tale and the Buddhist versions was Jacobi 1879: 5, and 1880: 178 (the latter Jacobi's review of Warren 1879). Jacobi's identification was noted by Weber 1883: 421, by Deleu 1969: 87-88 and note 30, and by many in between. Jacobi repeated his reference in his translation of Kern 1882b; 244 note **. However, this reference is not found in Kern's Dutch original 1882a, nor oddly in the later French translation 1901. As far as I know, this text has never been translated into a Western language. I imagine there may be Gujarati translations, but I have never seen or even heard of one.

⁶³ I translate the following from the Ardha-māgadhi text in Deleu 1969: 105.26-106.2. I have filled in the abbreviated stock expressions with reference to the preceding portions of the story, and to Hoernle 1885-90.

⁶⁴ For this stock expression, see Hoernle 1885-90: text page 153 (§256): *na najjai ṇaṃ, ahaṃ keṇa vi kumāreṇaṃ mārijissāmi*. The commentary page 71 clarifies: *kumāreṇaṃ ti duḥkhamṛtyunā*. Hoernle translates on page 162 "who knows but I shall die by some evil death," with the note that literally one should translate "it is not known, (but) I shall be killed by some evil death." Very close is *Vivāyasuyam* VI.125 (Upadhye 1935: 39): *tae ṇaṃ mama na najjai keṇai asubheṇaṃ kumāreṇaṃ māriṣṣai*.

⁶⁵ The term here (Deleu 1969: 105.36) is *tāla-puḍaga-ṇaṃ*. See Ratnachandrajī 1923: 3.42. Below we get in Prakrit *tālapuḍa* and, in a text which is otherwise in Sanskrit, *tālapuḍa*. Now, *kālakūṭa* is the well-known poison produced at the primal churning of the oceans and the drinking of which turned Śiva's throat blue. K. R. Norman 1992: 154 (ad *Suttanipāta* 62) has suggested that if Sanskrit *kālakūṭa* is the original form of the term in question here, the Middle Indic forms may be derived thus: *kālakūṭa* (with dissimilation of *k > ṛ*) > **tālakūṭa* > Prakrit *tāla(v)uḍa* > [tālapuḍa] > Pāli *tālapuḍa*. I thank Dominik Wujastyk (email communication) for his efforts to identify for me *kālakūṭa* poison in Ayurvedic sources, but unfortunately (as is so often the case) the authorities disagree.

⁶⁶ The text is in Jinadāsagaṇi 1928-29: II.171-172. It has been referred to for example by Jain 1984: 169, n. 4, whose interpretation of the wine mentioned in the story however is not quite right.

⁶⁷ As the text edition is rather difficult to come by, I give a transcript of the portion translated here in Appendix III.

⁶⁸ The exact sense of *kulmāsa* (*kulmāsa* or *kulmāsa* in Sanskrit) is not quite clear, but Johnson 1962: 104, n. 126, says that it is half-cooked pulse. Dictionaries define the word as gruel or half-cooked rice and pulse (peas, beans, etc.). Chinese Buddhist texts seem to render it in ways that suggest rice or beans was understood. See Wogihara 1964-74, s.v. *kulmāsa*. But since the *Kāśyapaparivarta* §152, for example, has the compound *odanakulmāsa*, it seems less likely that *kulmāsa* means rice. The *Mahāvīyutpatti* 5747 renders the term by *wenmian* 温麵, "warm noodles (?)," but Tibetan *zan dron* seems to mean simply "warm food," or a food made of hot, ground

up tsampa. See also Wojtilla 1978: 41 (item 4) who quotes (without, however, mentioning the source) Śaṅkara's commentary to *Chandogyopanīṣad* 1.10.2, offering for *kulmāṣa* what is clearly a sort of folk etymology, *kutsitā māśāḥ*. "despised or contemptible beans." We may further note that D. D. Kosambi (1963: 184) has pointed out that, whatever the technical identification of *kulmāṣa* may be, all indications point to it as the lowest, most humble, type of food. Thus, the suggestion that the high-status king was sustained by means of such course food is significant.

⁶⁹ Actually, Johnson, the translator of the work, consistently writes *-caritra*, but the edition I have referred to (Sah 1977) writes *-carita*, which I have followed; I think the meaning does not change.

⁷⁰ A translation of this section is found in Johnson 1962: 313-16, and the Sanskrit text in Sah 1977: 357-61. Previous volumes of Johnson's translation appeared in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series volumes 51, 77, 108, 125 and 139. My translation is deeply indebted to that of Johnson, but often differs. I translate Book 10, chapter 12, verses 114-31, 144-57, 160-67. The text is given in Appendix IV.

⁷¹ See Bühler 1889 = Patel 1936, and Winternitz 1927: 482ff.

⁷² A mythical bird which lives on raindrops.

⁷³ The text is to be found in Punyavijayji 1962: 36 (116): 61ff.

⁷⁴ See Hoffmann 1974: 429.8-431.18, and Tawney 1895: 176-78. My translation is indebted to those of Tawney and Hoffmann.

⁷⁵ Hoffmann 1974: XVII, quoting Alsdorf 1928: 4. I have unfortunately not been able to see Alsdorf's book myself.

⁷⁶ The text in Sanskrit with Apabhraṁśa verses, accompanied by a German translation, was presented as a thesis over twenty years ago, although regrettably it seems never to have been published. However, a bound photocopy of Hoffmann's work is kept in America in the University of Pennsylvania Library, call number BL/1316/K37/1974a. I thought this was the *editio princeps*, but Hoffmann (page XIX) refers to an edition published in Lahore in 1942 by Jagadishlal Shastri. Even Hoffmann, however, did not see this edition. Because of its inaccessibility, I print the text of our tale in Appendix V.

⁷⁷ Tawney 1895: xx, referring to Takakusu 1894: 161. It is interesting to remark that in his additional notes to Tawney's translation (Tawney 1895: 239), Ernst Leumann pointed out that this account in the *Kathākośa* parallels the story in the *Nirayāvaliyā*, referring to Warren 1879.

⁷⁸ I have not been able to check some of the other parallels referred to on page XXXIII, but most seem not to be directly relevant. Hoffmann refers to, but I have not seen, the *Āvaśyakaniryukti* IX, 65, 6, and Somatilaka's *Śīlataṅginī* and *Puṣpamālākathā* 49 (referring to Alsdorf 1928: 7). The parallel between the *Kathākośa* and the *Triṣaṣṭīśālākāpuruṣacarita* was noted long ago by Johnson 1925: 308. The story is there summarized and Johnson notes that "The account of Śreṇika's death agrees fairly closely with that in the *Kathākośa*," referring to Tawney's translation. It is odd that Johnson seems not to refer at all to her own 1925 article in her 1962

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translation of the *Mahāvīracarita*.

⁷⁹ Tawney took *Candrahāsā* as a proper name, but this does not seem to be correct. Hoffmann notes that *Candrahāsā* is not known as a type of alcoholic beverage, but here it certainly seems to be. *Candrahāsā* means that which mocks the moon (in clarity), and it may signify a clear drink. The *Śabdakalpadruma* defines the term as *gudūci*, a plant technically called *Cocculus cordifolius* (probably the same or nearly the same as *cocculus indicus*). The applicability of this here seems dubious, however, since this plant is poisonous.

⁸⁰ As Hoffmann notes, Tawney's "dog" is incorrect (but it is not certain how he read his manuscript); is the coincidence with the *Shisong-lū*'s dog nothing more than dumb chance?

⁸¹ I am not certain of this rendering. Tawney translated "whitlow," and Hoffmann "Der finger begann zu faulen." The *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch* of Böhtlingk and Roth 1855-75: 2.381 translates *kūnita* as "zusammengezogen, eingeschnürt." In Prakrit (Sheth 1928 s.v.) the term is defined as *samkocita*, that is, "contracted, shriveled up." If the word is correctly to be taken as etymologically Sanskrit (from the root *√kūn*), the sense would seem to be derivationally something like "atrophy," but the context leads to the conclusion that the meaning should be "inflammation."

⁸² Hoffmann's note reads: "This is only understandable in Prakrit. The Kumārapālāpratibodha has: sā kūniyā jāyā. tao dāragehir Kūṇio tti te nāmaṁ kayarṁ." See the preceding note.

⁸³ That is, the first of 24 Tirthaṅkaras of the coming age, equal to Padmanābha. See Mehta and Chandra 1970-72: II.568.

⁸⁴ A very interesting example of the independent existence and historical persistence of one of these episodes is found in modern Hindu story-telling, wherein the vignette of urinating into food is repeated. See Narayan 1989: 164.

⁸⁵ It is of course still possible that the version known to the compilers of the *Guan-jing* resembled the Mūlasarvāstivāda version in having a liquid transmitted by anklets, that liquid being water. Since the Central Asian compilers were no doubt quite familiar with grape wine, they *could* have adapted such a version, changing, as it were, water into wine. Such an explanation seems to me, however, unnecessarily complicated, although certainly the scenario cannot be ruled out.

⁸⁶ In this context other similar texts must be taken into account. Although not translated (?) until after the *Guan-jing*, there exist five other "guan" 觀 or visualization (or contemplation) sūtras in Chinese. One of these is the previously mentioned *Guanfo sanmei hai-jing* (T. 643). The others are the "Sūtra on the Technique of the Practice of Visualizing the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra" *Guan Puxian pusa xingfa-jing* 觀普賢菩薩行法經 (T. 277), the "Sūtra on Visualizing the Bodhisattva Ākāśagarbha" *Guan Xukongzang pusa-jing* 觀虛空藏菩薩經 (T. 409), the "Sūtra on Visualizing the Bodhisattva Maitreya Gaining Birth in the Tuṣita Heaven" *Guan Mile pusa shangsheng doushuaitian-jing* 觀彌勒菩薩上生兜率天經 (T. 452), and the "Sūtra on Visualizing the Two Bodhisattvas Bhaiṣajyarāja and Bhaiṣajyasamudgata" *Guan Yaowang Yaoshang erpusa-jing* 觀藥王藥上二菩薩經 (T. 1161). The

last mentioned is attributed, like the *Guan-jing*, to Kalayāsa. The other translators, as Kasugai (1953: 98) has pointed out, are predominantly Central Asians. This fact speaks – although with how loud a voice is not clear – for the Central Asian connection of these texts. So far the most detailed study of these texts is that of Tsukinowa (1971), and see now Ōminami 1995, but much more work is still required. It is my impression, and perhaps nothing more than that, that these texts in a general way reflect fourth and fifth century meditational teachings popular in Nanjing and southern China, having their origins in Central Asia, and perhaps ultimately in Kashmir. The extremely important role of Kashmir in the development of Indian Buddhism on the one hand, and Central Asian Buddhism and through that Chinese Buddhism on the other, has yet to be given the attention it deserves. Be that as it may, further studies of the *Guan-jing* will need to take into account these other extant “*guan*” texts. We are now eagerly awaiting the completion of Nobuyoshi Yamabe’s Yale doctoral dissertation which will study these and related questions, centering on a close investigation of the *Guanfo sanmei hai-jing*.

⁸⁷ The question of the so-called nine grades of beings, the *jiupin* 九品, has been raised several times in discussions over the origins of the *Guan-jing*. As various scholars have pointed out (Pas 1977: 210; Nogami 1973: 179-81; Sueki 1982: 462), the system of ranking beings from those of the Highest Rank of the Highest Grade of Birth in the Pure Land 上品 down through the Lowest Rank of the Lowest Grade 下品 found in the *Guan-jing* seems to reflect the Chinese bureaucratic system of the “Nine Categories and the Impartial and Just,” *jiupin zhongzheng* 九品中正. This system itself is rather old in China. In a detailed study of the system, Donald Holzman (1957: 388) has characterized its history succinctly: “Although it was formally established at the beginning of the Wei dynasty, in 220 A.D., the system of the Nine Categories is in reality an extension of methods applied since the Later Han for the choosing and the promotion of Bureaucrats,” despite which he confesses (1957: 395) that the origin of the term itself is obscure. The application of this nine-fold scheme to people may well go back to this bureaucratic system, but the nine-fold division of things ranging from 上上 to 下下 is even older, dating as Holzman (1957: 395) points out to the *Book of Documents* (*Shangshu* 尚書), in which (Karlgrén 1950: 12ff.) fields, products and so forth are so ranked. Another possible source of the idea, however, and one which I believe has not yet been investigated, lies in a text perhaps more likely to have been associated with Buddhist interests, the Taoist *Taipingjing* 太平經. As discussed briefly by Kaltenmark (1979: 31), this text contains (at 42: 88ff.) a nine-fold division of human beings, ranking them from “divine men who are without shape and are endowed with *qi* [氣]” down to slaves, but I believe the terms 上上 and so forth do not appear. I must leave it to specialists in Taoism to discuss whether there may be any connection between this categorization and that of the *Guan-jing*.

Note however also the fifth century translation of the **Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā* T. 1546 (XXVIII) 213b ff. = T. 1545 (XXVII) 274b ff., where we find 上上 through 下下. See too the *Dasheng Bensheng Xindi Guanjing* 大乘本生心地觀經 T. 159 (III) 303b5 and following which uses the terms 上品, 下上品 and so forth.

There seems little doubt, however, that this very interesting text was compiled in China, although its date remains uncertain.

⁸⁸ Fujita 1993 is merely a summary of his 1985 book which, he complains, has been almost entirely ignored. In any case, in this recent work Fujita repeats his earlier suggestion of the “mixed origin” of the sūtra.

⁸⁹ I do not want to imply my belief in the existence of any unique original version which served as a basis for some transformation, but rather use the term “transformation” more loosely to indicate the apparently original and innovative features unique to a given version.

⁹⁰ See Imoto 1982: 48-51, and *passim*.

⁹¹ Reluctance to draw the blood of royalty was also known for example among the Mongols, who, it is reported, employed suffocation instead. The Tibetans are known to have “avoided violence” by sewing a victim into a skin and tossing him into a river. Sending off the victim still alive apparently avoided or mitigated the sin associated with violence. This is probably the same idea being referred to in those versions of our tale which speak of the son’s reluctance to kill his father “with a weapon.”

⁹² The *Kyōgyōshinshō* passage is found in Hoshino et al. 1990: 109ff. = 328ff.

⁹³ This interpretation is apparently not entirely without controversy, however, as the chronological details of Shinran’s life, and the history of the composition of the *Kyōgyōshinshō*, are fraught with problems. Therefore Sueki’s suggestion, while certainly attractive from the psychological point of view, may in the end not stand up to historical criticism. See Dobbins 1989: 37-38.

⁹⁴ Imoto 1982, however, apparently seems to suggest that Ajātaśatru in fact actually *does* desire his mother. But as far as I can tell there is absolutely no textual basis for such a claim.

⁹⁵ Suggestions of other even less obvious connections with European legends have been hazarded. I do not know quite what to make of the article by Uno 1988 which discusses the similarities between the episode studied in the present paper and the “*Caritas Romana*,” the story of the imprisoned Cimon being nourished by the breast of his daughter. On the story see Steensberg 1976. I am inclined to think that any similarities are simply adventitious. Certainly, at any rate, Uno’s suggestion (1988: 113) of a connection (even conceptually) with the “earth-breast” which nourishes the prince in the “*Foundation Legend of Khotan*” is to be rejected. (On the latter story, see Yamazaki 1990.)

⁹⁶ Moreover, the weight of legendary tradition is not itself evidence in the study of history. Of course, on the other hand, when the object of the historical study is the legend itself, the various manifestations of that legend *are* our evidence, but then the history we are writing is the history of a *story*, and not the history of a true happening. (For an excellent study of just such a legendary tradition, see Watanabe 1909.) Unfortunately, in much of what is written about Indian Buddhism, at least, this distinction has been blurred or even lost entirely. The result has been disastrous especially for the study of the formative stages of the Buddhist tradition, and the

damage will no doubt take a very long time to repair.

⁹⁷ Takahashi 1993: 283 has also referred to Laufer's study, but he did not, I think, take his investigations far enough.

⁹⁸ It is gratifying to note that, having been made aware of my critique by an early draft version of the present paper, Sueki has adopted my understanding in 1992: 65. Although I sent the same draft to Prof. Fujita, in 1993: 244-45 he again offered his old argument without any reference to my critique.

⁹⁹ The punctuation of the Taishō edition in the present sūtra is particularly bad, but since the translation itself indicates where we differ this is not marked further.

¹⁰⁰ "Soul" renders *hunling* 魂靈.

¹⁰¹ "Non-self" renders *feishen* 非身.

¹⁰² A reference to the Avici hell.

¹⁰³ Compare the *Classic of Filial Piety, Xiaojing* 孝經 9.1: Confucius said: "Of all the natures between Heaven and Earth, human nature is [the most] lofty. Of all human behavior, there is nothing greater than filial piety. Of all filial piety, there is nothing greater than respecting one's father. Of all behavior of respecting one's father, there is nothing greater than treating one's father as equal with Heaven." 天地之性人為貴。人之行莫大於孝。孝莫大於嚴父。嚴父莫於配天。 Despite this kind of parallel, however, this may be an authentic reference to old Buddhist literature, or at least to ideas current in Buddhist India. Compare for example AN II.iv §2 (Samaccittavagga, Duppaṭikāra) = *Ekottarikāgama* T. 125 (II) 161a10-20, and see T. 687 (XVI) 780bc. See also *Avadānaśataka* (Speyer 1906-09): 204.13-205.7. I owe these references to Demiéville 1925: 107, note 2. In addition, see Schopen 1984.

¹⁰⁴ The text following "...become a śramaṇa" is not easy to understand clearly. But certainly Bimbisāra is giving his reasons for quitting the world, becoming a monk, and leaving the sovereignty to Ajātaśatru. There is, he is arguing, no need to imprison him, because he will gladly give up his position in exchange for the life of a renunciant. But the translation remains tentative.

¹⁰⁵ Perhaps something is wrong with the text, since the king is already in jail. But more likely the author(s) just lost track of the story a bit.

¹⁰⁶ Compare *Xiaojing* 11.1: Confucius said: "The ordinances of the five punishments amount to three thousand, and there is no crime more enormous than being unfilial." 子曰。五刑之屬三千。而莫大於不孝。 See note 103, above.

¹⁰⁷ Sadakata thinks the "quotation" ends here, rather than with the previous sentence as we have taken it; this is certainly also possible.

¹⁰⁸ *Sida* 四達 seems to be a non-standard translation of *ṛddhi-pāda*.

¹⁰⁹ The Pāli tradition attributes the death of Mahā-Maudgalyāyana to a beating received from Jainas (Nigaṇṭhas); see Malalasekera 1938: II.546-47. But in the Chinese *Ekottarikāgama* 增壹阿含經 26.9, T. 125 (II) 639a12 and following, which is without Pāli equivalent, the beating to death of Maudgalyāyana is attributed to the

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Brahmin *Daṇḍapāni 執杖梵志. The same is found in the *Binaiye* 鼻奈耶 T. 1464 (XXIV) 857c26 and following. I owe these references to Akanuma 1931: 379.

¹¹⁰ Accepting the variant 佛法 for 神化 in note 9.

¹¹¹ Accepting the variant 儀誠 for 儀式 in note 10.

¹¹² Accepting the variant 俗 for 濡 in note 11.

¹¹³ Or: the light of / produced by the Buddha.

¹¹⁴ That is, the Buddha.

¹¹⁵ Accepting the variant 太 for 大 in note 14.

¹¹⁶ This may refer to freedom from future rebirth in the three evil destinies, the realms of hell, hungry ghosts and beasts, or to the fact that his defilements, the karma which comes from those defilements and the fruits of that karma are all cut off.

¹¹⁷ For the edition's *satāoyāe*, which seems to be a misprint.

¹¹⁸ Both these words are written *-āhne* by Hoffmann, without variants, but strictly speaking *-āhne* is correct.

¹¹⁹ Hoffmann writes Bharate without variants, which should probably be emended as I have done.

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	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X
Devadatta	1	1	1	1	1	1				
Ministers		2	2	2	2					
Reluctance to violence			3			2				
Restriction on food		5	8	4		3	2	2	1	2
Whipping								1	2	1
Affection of people for king			4	3	3					
Queen requests to enter prison		3		6						
Bathing of queen	2			7		6				
Taking in food	3		5	8	4	4		3	4	3
— repeated —			X		X	X				X
Taking in drink	4		6					4	3	
Facing Buddha / pacing	5		9	5	6	7				
— repeated —				X						
Monks visit prison	6		12							
Questioning of jailers	7		7	9	5	5				
— repeated —			X		X	X				
Shutting window			10	10	7					
Lacerating feet			11	11	8	8				
Anger at mother	8	4								
Urination episode								5	5	4
Son and dog					9					
Injured finger							1		6	5
Boil on son's finger			13							
Boil on own childhood finger		*	14		10	10		6		
Fright at noise / sight of advancing son			15		11		3	7	7	6
Suicide					12		4	8	8	7
Rebirth			16	12		9				8

* Another story about boils is included in this text, but it is not directly parallel.

I	<i>Guan-jing</i>	II	<i>Mahāvāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra</i>
III	<i>Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya</i>	IV	<i>*Ajātasatru-sūtra</i>
V	<i>Shisong-lū</i>	VI	<i>Sumāṅgala-vilāsini</i>
VII	<i>Nirayāvaliyā</i>	VIII	<i>Āvaśyakacūṛṇi</i>
IX	<i>Trīṣaṣṭīśalākāpuruṣacarita</i>	X	<i>Kathakośa</i>

REVIEW

Raffaele Torella, *The Īsvaraṣṭyabhijñāṅkārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author's Vṛtti*. Critical edition and annotated translation (Serie Orientale Roma, LXXI). Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1994. LIV + 273 pp.

In ninth-century Kashmir there prevailed various currents of Tantric Śaivism, maintaining nondualist doctrines as opposed to the dualist traditions of the Śaiva Siddhānta. The Pratyabhijñā school of Śaivism emerged from this background. Somānanda (875/900–925/950) was the first to systematize the doctrine of this school in his *Śivadrṣṭi* by reformulating and organizing the contents of the scriptures maintained by nondualist Śaivas in Kashmir. His disciple Utpaladeva (900/925–950/975) composed the *Īsvaraṣṭyabhijñāṅkārikā* (IPK), in which he set forth the doctrine of *pratyabhijñā* (recognition), viz., the doctrine that the knowledge of the identity of the self with the Lord Śiva is regained by removing the misconceptions veiling the true nature of the self. It is a purely theoretical work elaborated with philosophical concepts formed under the influence of the systems of thought prevalent in his time. Utpaladeva himself wrote two commentaries on the IPK, a *vṛtti* on the *kārikās* and a *vivṛti* (or *īkā*) on the *kārikās* and the *vṛtti*. The former is a brief explanation in prose of the contents of the *kārikās*, while the latter, of which only some fragments are extant (cf. Torella, *East and West*, Vol. 38, 1988), is known to be an extensive commentary containing lengthy excursuses. The philosophy of the Pratyabhijñā school was brought to its highest perfection by the profound scholarship of Abhinavagupta (flourished c. 980–1020), who wrote the *Īsvaraṣṭyabhijñāvimarsinī* (IPV) and the *Īsvaraṣṭyabhijñāvivṛtivismarsinī* (IPVV), which are the commentaries on Utpaladeva's IPK and IPK-*vivṛti* respectively. Until recent years not much light had been thrown on the literature of Kashmir Śaivism. In the book under review, the author Raffaele Torella has presented an edition and a copiously annotated English translation of the IPK together with the *vṛtti*. This work should certainly receive a welcome from scholars in concerned fields.

Journal of Indian Philosophy encourages creative activities among orientalist and philosophers along with all the various combinations that two classes can form. Contributions to the journal are bound by the limits of rational inquiry and avoid questions that lie in the fields of speculative sociology and parapsychology. In a very general sense, the method is analytical and comparative, aiming at a rigorous precision in the translation of terms and statements. Space is devoted to the works of philosophers of the past as well as to the creative researches of contemporary scholars on such philosophic problems as were addressed by past philosophers.

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THUPTEN JINPA

DELINEATING REASON'S SCOPE FOR NEGATION
TSONGKHAPA'S CONTRIBUTION TO MADHYAMAKA'S
DIALECTICAL METHOD

The history of the development of Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet is highly complex and much remains to be fully worked out. One of the greatest difficulties lies perhaps in the fact that to understand this history it is not adequate simply to trace the lineage of the Indian Madhyamaka texts in Tibet; what is required is also a 're-construction' of the process of the 'evolution' of Madhyamaka thought in Tibet. By this latter, I am referring to the question of how the Tibetan interpreters of the Madhyamaka tradition have 'appropriated' the tenets of the Indian Madhyamaka schools.¹ There is also the critical issue of whether or not the Tibetan Mādhyamikas have taken what could be called the 'Madhyamaka discourse' further than their Indian predecessors. My own view is that they have. One such Tibetan figure in this development is Tsongkhapa (1357-1419), the 14th century Tibetan religious reformer and one of Tibet's greatest philosophers. Tsongkhapa wrote extensively on Madhyamaka philosophy including a number of highly influential commentaries on some of the principal Indian Madhyamaka texts. In these works Tsongkhapa takes great pains to explore the wider philosophical implications of the Madhyamaka's key insight that things and events are devoid of intrinsic existence and intrinsic identity. I have examined some of these explorations elsewhere.²

In this paper, I shall concentrate on Tsongkhapa's understanding and, more importantly, his contribution to the development of Madhyamaka's dialectical method. I shall argue that the central concern underlying Tsongkhapa's extensive discourse on the Madhyamaka method is to delineate 'reason's scope for negation', so that the Madhyamaka dialectics is not seen as negating objects of everyday experience and, more importantly, ethics and religious activity. Perhaps the challenge for Tsongkhapa is to demonstrate coherently that the Madhyamaka's arguments in general and the so-called *catuṣkoṭi* (or tetralemma) argument in particular do not destroy the validity of our everyday world of experience. As I see it, the following appear to be the key elements of Tsongkhapa's strategy:

- (i) distinguishing between the domains of 'conventional' and 'ultimate' discourses;
- (ii) distinguishing between two senses of 'ultimate' in the context of Madhyamaka dialectics;
- (iii) identifying 'correctly' the objection of negation prior to the application of Madhyamaka dialectics;
- (iv) distinguishing between that which is 'negated by reason' and 'not found by reason';
- (v) understanding correctly the logical form of the negation involved in the dialectics.

I shall argue that the above points are integral to Tsongkhapa's attempt to delineate reason's scope for negation in the context of Madhyamaka dialectics. Given this, the viability and coherence of Tsongkhapa's interpretation of the Madhyamaka dialectics depends, to a large extent, on how far he can be seen to have been successful in making a case for these approaches. If Tsongkhapa's enterprise can be shown to be successful – or, at least rationally tenable –, this may provide the Mādhyamikas with a better defence against the perpetual charge that they are nihilistic.

TSONGKHAPA'S READING OF THE MADHYAMAKA'S *CATUṢKOṬI* ARGUMENT

Perhaps the best place to begin is to examine Tsongkhapa's reading of the Mādhyamika's argument known as *catuṣkoṭi*, i.e. tetralemma.³ A typical formulation of the Madhyamaka tetralemma could be presented as follows. A supposed entity, or a thing possessing 'intrinsic being' (*svabhāva*) cannot be said to exist under either of the following four possibilities:

- (1) that it is existent, or
- (2) that it is non-existent, or
- (3) that it is both existent and non-existent, or
- (4) that it is neither existent nor non-existent.

In other words, all the above four possibilities are rejected. Like any thorough-going Mādhyamika philosopher, Tsongkhapa gives serious consideration to this argument. To call this pattern of argument 'dialectic', as some noted modern Mādhyamika scholars have done, is not too misleading.⁴ Certainly, Tsongkhapa does not agree with those who claim that the Madhyamaka's use of the tetralemma entails a denial of fundamental logical principles like the law of the excluded middle

and the principle of contradiction. He does not believe that the tetralemma argument suggests an ontological standpoint which is somehow supposed to transcend these fundamental principles of logic. This is to say that Tsongkhapa does not share the views of those who assert that the Madhyamaka dialectic aims to lead us to an 'awakening' where we perceive the 'absolute' (which is supposedly indeterminate, indivisible, and ineffable) through a higher faculty. This higher faculty (or intuition), in this view, is supposed to be awakened within us by the 'paralysis of reason' brought about by the Madhyamaka dialectic.⁵ Tsongkhapa reads the Madhyamaka dialectic as arguing against what may be called 'essentialist ontology', i.e. an ontology that entails a belief in 'intrinsic being' (*svabhāva*).

According to Tsongkhapa there is nothing to indicate that the tetralemma argument is open to the charge of logical inconsistency, nor is there anything paradoxical about the Mādhyamika's use of it. If there is any paradox at all, it remains at the surface, only a seeming one which naturally dissolves when one takes a closer look at the structure of the argument. According to Tsongkhapa, the fact that the dialectic is structured in the form of tetralemma is an indication that the logical principles such as the law of the excluded middle and the law of contradiction are at work here. For him, the force of the argument derives from the fact that if any self-enclosed entity exists (note the subjunctive), as the essentialists⁶ would like to assert, it must do so within the framework of the tetralemma. In other words, if an entity possessing a self-enclosed nature or intrinsic being exists, there are only four conceivable possibilities. And the *catuṣkoṭi* is the best pattern of argument whereby the central thesis – i.e. *svabhāva* – is negated by means of negating the four possibilities. However, this raises a crucial question, why four lemmas when the negation of the first lemma seems to serve the purpose of negating the central thesis, i.e. the total negation of *svabhāva*? In other words, what is the difference of scope between the negation of the first lemma and the total negation of *svabhāva* itself?

For Tsongkhapa this point is critical. The four lemmas have to be not only logically exhaustive but also *conceptually* inclusive in order to prove effective in the argument.⁷ For this, he must show a distinction between the scope of the negation of the first lemma and the conclusion of the entire argument. He does this by making several important distinctions. Crucial to this is the appreciation of the various meanings of the terms *dn̄gos po/bhāva* (entity, actuality, or existence) and *dn̄gos med/abhāva* (non-entity, non-actuality, or non-existence). On

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this critical point Tsongkhapa makes the following general observation in *LTC*:

One might wonder thus: "Given that in the Madhyamaka literature all four lemmas (*koṭis*) – i.e., an entity or intrinsic being is existent, [it is] non-existent, [it is] both, or [it is] neither – are negated, and since there is nothing which exists outside them, isn't it the case that everything is negated by reason?"

[Response:] As explained earlier, here too there are two distinct senses to the term *dngos po* (entity). In that it refers to an intrinsically established being (*rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i dngos po*) *dngos po* must be negated at whichever of the two [the conventional and the ultimate] levels of reality it is being posited. However, in the sense of an actuality, i.e. a functional thing or an event (*don byed nus pa'i dngos po*), *dngos po* cannot be denied at the level of conventional truth. Similarly, in the case of *dngos med* (non-entity) too, if non-composite phenomena such as space are being asserted as intrinsically established as non-entity (*rang gi ngos bos grub pa'i dngos med*) then *dngos med* too must be negated. Also, both the existence and non-existence of such *dngos po* (entity) must be negated, and so too must the intrinsic reality of their opposites. It is in this way that all types of negation involving the tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*) should be understood.⁸

Tsongkhapa also treats the Madhyamaka argument known as 'diamond splinters' (*rdo rje gzeḡs ma*) that de-constructs the concept of causality, in a similar manner. In its classical formulation in Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, the argument is stated in the following manner:

Never, nowhere, does anything arise;
not from itself, nor from an other,
not from both, nor without any cause.⁹

If anything arises from anything in an essential way, it must do so in either of the above four possible ways. An intrinsically real production (*bden pa'i skye ba*) must imply an essential production, which means that a thing must come into being either from itself, or from an intrinsically true other, or in some sense from both self and the other, or from no cause at all, for these four modes exhaust all the conceptual possibilities of a thing coming into being in an essential way. However, the negation of all the four leaves intact the actual production itself, which is operational within the framework of mere conditionality. For according to Tsongkhapa, within the framework of our everyday world of conventional reality, we simply accept that effects come into being due to their corresponding causes and conditions. The statement that "sprouts arise from their seeds" should imply no metaphysical claim on causality over and above what it asserts on the linguistic surface. The conventions of the world do not posit the notion of causality on the basis of an analysis determining whether something arises from a cause that is identical, or different, or from a cause that is a synthesis of both, or that is neither identical nor different from the effect. According

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to Tsongkhapa such metaphysical considerations arise only as a result of philosophical reflections. Tsongkhapa makes the following point in *LTC*:

If origination [of things] is accepted on the ultimate level (*don dam par*) one must also maintain that it can withstand an analysis pertaining to its true mode of being (*de nyid la dpyod pa'i rigs pa*). In such a case, the concept of origination arises through an analysis determining whether the effect comes into being from itself or from an other, or from one of the four possibilities; one must then accept the relevance of the tetralemma reasoning. However, by simply accepting [the empirical fact] that this and that effect come into being due to this cause and that condition (*rgyu dang rkyen 'di la brten nas 'di byung gi skye ba tsam 'hig*), one does not necessarily accept causation in an ultimate sense (*de kho na'i skye ba*). Since this is not accepted, how can one analyse from the ultimate standpoint whether it comes into being from itself, or an other, etc. Hence there is no need to admit that it [origination] can withstand [critical] analysis (*rigs pa'i dpyad bzod*).¹⁰

In Tsongkhapa's treatment of the Madhyamaka dialectic we can see the overwhelming influence of a critical distinction which he makes between two types of analysis and their differing domains of application. To appropriate a well-known Anglo-American philosophical term, Tsongkhapa brings an 'analytic' dimension to his reading of the Madhyamaka's *catuṣkoṭi* argument. With great consistency he brings to his reading a methodological principle that delineates the domains of two distinctive perspectives: 'analysis from the ultimate standpoint' (*don dam dpyod byed*) and 'conventional analysis' (*kun rdzob dpyod byed*).¹¹ This distinction has far-reaching ramifications.

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE DOMAINS OF 'CONVENTIONAL' AND 'ULTIMATE' ANALYSES

Let us first examine how and on what grounds Tsongkhapa draws the above distinction. This will then enable us to deal with the question of the various logical and philosophical implications of the distinction. In *GR* Tsongkhapa alludes to a story from Buddhapālita's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.¹² The story involves a dispute between two persons regarding the correct identity of a figure depicted in a mural. One claims that the deity holding a sceptre in his right hand is Indra while the other argues that it is Viṣṇu. As they cannot resolve the dispute themselves they approach a third person to arbitrate. However, the arbitrator settles the dispute in the most unlikely manner. He concludes that, since the object in question is a mere drawing, it is neither Indra nor Viṣṇu and so none of the parties is right! Buddhapālita states that in actual fact it is the arbitrator himself who is in the wrong. The moral of the story is this: By simply stating that the identity of

the subject in dispute is a mere drawing (hence neither Indra nor Viṣṇu in person) the arbitrator has totally missed the point. The fact that it is a drawing is not in question, it is an assumption common to both the disputing parties. What is in question is the identity of the figure represented in the picture. So in some sense, the arbitrator has committed a major offence – he has stepped outside the domain of their relevant discussion by conflating two distinct perspectives. Hence his statement that neither of the parties is right has simply no place within the domain of the current discourse. Therefore, the question of whether the verdict he has given is true or not simply does not arise. This is reminiscent of the Wittgensteinian notion of language games.

Just as in the story, Tsongkhapa distinguishes between two distinct domains of discourse, namely that which pertains to the reality of our everyday world of convention and that which pertains to the ultimate ontological status of things and events. Corresponding to these two, Tsongkhapa conceives of two distinct categories of discourse and analysis.¹³ This immediately raises a crucial question: “By what criterion does Tsongkhapa delineate the demarcations of the two perspectives?” In other words, how does he define his ‘analysis from the ultimate perspective’ and ‘conventional analysis’? On the surface it seems that this distinction is nothing but a different way of describing the Madhyamaka doctrine of two truths (*satyadvaya*). On closer examination, however, we find that the issue is far more complex demanding a treatment independent of the two truths.

We find that the above distinction between the scope of the two analyses is already fully developed in *LTC*. Tsongkhapa writes:

Although the objects of conventional reality such as form, sound, and so on exist, they can never be established through a reasoning process that examines whether or not they possess intrinsic being (*rang bzhin*). Our master [Candrakīrti] has repeatedly stated that they [form, sound, and so on] are not susceptible to [‘critical’] analysis (*rigs pa'i brtag pa ni 'jug*). ... If the reasoning that determines whether or not intrinsic beings exist can negate them [the objects of the conventional world], one can say that they are susceptible to analysis. But this [point] is categorically rejected in the writings of this master [Candrakīrti].¹⁴

So, as Tsongkhapa claims, if the objects of our everyday world are not open to ‘critical’ analysis in the sense that they can be neither affirmed nor negated by an analysis which seeks the ultimate ontological status of things, what forms of analysis and discourse are appropriate to dealing with the everyday world? Tsongkhapa devotes a large section in *LN* to distinguishing between ‘ultimate’ and ‘conventional’ forms of discourse. He writes:

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If this is so [referring to the point that objects of the everyday world cannot be subjected to ultimate analysis], as there are [still] many questions involving analysis [operative within the everyday world] such as whether one is coming or not, whether something has grown or not, can one not respond to these questions in the positive?

[Answer:] This way of probing is very different from the mode of analysis defined earlier [i.e. ultimate analysis]. Questions of this kind [e.g. going and coming, etc.] do not operate from a premise whereby, being not contented by the [mere] conventions of ‘goer’ and ‘comer’, and the acts of ‘going’ and ‘coming’, one seeks intrinsically real referents to propositions. For these questions operate only at the level of everyday discourse. Therefore, why should there be any [logical] contradictions (*gal ba*) for accepting such a mode of analysis.¹⁵

Similarly in *RG*, while delineating the differing scopes of the two analyses according to the Prāsāngika-Madhyamaka school, Tsongkhapa first makes the following observation:

There is not the slightest difference between the following two statements “Devadatta sees a form” and “A substantially existent Devadatta sees a form” insofar as nothing substantial can be found as the referent of the subjective terms. However, if we deny the validity of the first [sentence] we go against conventional knowledge. In contrast, the second assertion is something which can even be negated by a valid knowledge (*paramāṇa*). Therefore, at the relative level the two propositions are totally different. The reason for this is that *substantiality* (*rdzas yod*) is something that if it exists must be found when sought through analysis. Therefore when it cannot be found we can conclude that it is negated by reason. Whereas in the case of “mere existence” (*yod tsam*) or actuality there is no need for it to be findable when sought analytically. Furthermore, its unfindability through analysis cannot be taken as [a proof of its] non-existence.¹⁶

The point being made here is this. Although the above two statements – i.e. “Devadatta sees a form” and “A substantially existent Devadatta sees a form” – share many common features they differ in a philosophically significant way. The first is making a statement only within the framework of the ordinary usage of language while the other is clearly making a metaphysical assertion. Because of this difference in the respective scopes of the two claims the second statement remains open to philosophical objections while the first is not. For example, in *LTC*, Tsongkhapa states that because he does not accept events such as ‘origination’ (*skye ba*), ‘cessation’ (*dgag pa*), and so on as being capable of withstanding ‘ultimate analysis’, he cannot be criticised for being committed to any notion of ‘true beings’ or ‘entities’.¹⁷ In other words, Tsongkhapa is clearly distinguishing between essentialistic metaphysical concepts of causality and causal processes such as ‘production’ as understood in everyday usage. Tsongkhapa argues that much of the philosophical incoherence and also the problems of nihilism which were endemic in Tibet at his time result from conflating the scopes of these two perspectives.¹⁸ In contemporary terminology, we can say

that what Tsongkhapa is engaged in here is an attempt philosophically to define the scope of reason in relation to our understanding of the nature of existence. Following the general lineage of the Madhyamaka philosophico-soteriological approach, Tsongkhapa wishes to destroy every single metaphysical basis that might otherwise lead to hypostatisation. Nevertheless Tsongkhapa is also keen to maintain a 'meaningful' level of reality for the everyday world of cause and effects. He sees the clear demarcation of the scope of the Madhyamaka's dialectics as essential to this purpose. And a coherent analytic distinction between the scope of the ultimate and conventional perspectives is a crucial element of this strategy.

So what exactly is an 'ultimate analysis'? Tsongkhapa gives a general definition of the 'analysis pertaining to the ultimate' in a succinct way in *LTC*. He states that any form of reasoning which examines in the following manner – i.e. whether all things and events such as form, etc. exist in a true mode of being or not (*bden par yod dam med*), or whether they come into being in an essential way or not (*rang gi ngo bo'i sgo nas grub bam ma grub*) – is an analysis pertaining to the ultimate status of objects in question. Such types of reasoning can also be called the 'analysis of the final status' (*mthar thug dpyod byed*).¹⁹

Tsongkhapa does not claim originality in this distinction. He sees Candrakīrti as having made clear this point. Tsongkhapa quotes particularly the following passage from Candrakīrti's *Yogācāryacatuḥśatakaṭkā*:

Our analysis focuses only on those that search for the intrinsically real referent. What we are refuting here is that things [and events] are established by means of their own-being. We do not [however] negate [the existence of] eyes, etc. that are [causally] conditioned (*byas pa*) and are dependently originated in that they are the fruits of *karma*.²⁰

For Tsongkhapa, the crucial expression in this quote is what Candrakīrti calls the "search for the intrinsically real referent" (*don rang bzhin 'tshol ba*). Tsongkhapa identifies several other similar important expressions in Candrakīrti's works, which according to him carry the same sense. He argues that Candrakīrti uses interchangeably expressions such as 'thorough analysis' (*rnam par dpyad pa*) (as in the statement "It does not exist when sought by means of a thorough analysis"), 'search for the intrinsically real referent' (*don rang bzhin 'tshol ba*) (as in "It is not found when searched for the intrinsically real referent"), and 'in the ultimate sense' (as in the context of "There is nothing to attain in the ultimate sense").²¹ In Tsongkhapa's view the considerations concerning the different scopes of the two types of analysis are, in general terms, common to both the Svātantrika school of Madhyamaka and that of Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika as well.²² In other words, Tsongkhapa is

asserting that anyone who claims to follow the lineage of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka must accept some form of analytic distinction between two domains of discourse roughly corresponding to the two levels of reality, i.e. the ultimate (*paramārtha*) and the conventional (*samvṛti*). Regardless of whether Candrakīrti was conscious of the logical distinction between the domains of the two perspectives, it is clear that the way in which this distinction is understood and used as a fundamental methodological principle is unique to Tsongkhapa.

TWO SENSES OF PARAMĀRTHA IN THE MADHYAMAKA DIALECTIC

The above distinction is closely related to what Tsongkhapa reads as two key senses of the term *paramārtha* (the ultimate) in the context of the Madhyamaka's argument for *sūnyatā*, i.e. emptiness. By this I am referring to the Mādhyamikas' usage of the term when they speak of things and events as being non-existent on the ultimate level. First and foremost, it is used in the context of Madhyamaka ontology (or the negation of it) where all things and events are denied as having existence and identity in any absolute sense.²³ In this usage, *paramārtha* becomes synonymous with 'true mode of being' as in the expression 'established in its true mode of being' (*bden par grub pa*), and 'thorough' as in 'thoroughly established' (*yang dag par grub pa*). Second, *paramārtha* is 'ultimate' when contrasted with the 'relative' (*samvṛti*) in the pan-Mahāyāna doctrine of the two truths (*satyadvaya*). In this latter context, it functions as the ultimate nature (*don dam pa'i ngo bo*) of all things and events as opposed to their relative, empirical and conventional level of reality. Though the two senses of *paramārtha* overlap, each has a distinct meaning. Nothing can be said to be real in the first sense of *paramārtha* – i.e. the absolute – because all things and events, and even *sūnyatā*, the emptiness of intrinsic being, are ultimately devoid of identity and existence. However, *sūnyatā* or emptiness can be said to be 'real' in the second sense, i.e. *paramārtha* as the ultimate. It is the truth (*bden pa*), and the ultimate nature of phenomena (*chos rnam kyi mthar thug gi rang bzhin*). This is because only emptiness (*sūnyatā*) is found to remain at the end of an analysis pertaining to the ultimate status of things and events. This does not mean that Tsongkhapa accepts that emptiness can withstand ultimate analysis for nothing can withstand such probing. When subjected to such de-constructive analysis, emptiness too is found to be empty. Hence the emptiness of emptiness.²⁴

This distinction between two senses of the term *paramārtha* allows Tsongkhapa to make seemingly paradoxical statements like "emptiness

is the ultimate reality but it is not ultimately real", "it is the truth but not truly established", "it is the intrinsic nature but not intrinsically established" and so on. For example, in *GR*, Tsongkhapa writes:

If this [distinction between the two senses of the term *paramārtha*] is ascertained well, one will understand the significances which indicate that there is no contradiction between [maintaining] that nothing exists as its own essence and that nothing exists in the ultimate sense, while holding that ultimate nature (*chos nyid*) exists and that it is the mode of being (*gshis lugs*) and the ultimate object (*don dam*).²⁵

Although it is quite customary for modern scholars on Mahāyāna Buddhism to translate *paramārtha* as the 'absolute' within the context of the Madhyamaka doctrine of two truths, my view is that its usage should not be accepted as unproblematic. Following Tsongkhapa, there seem to be adequate grounds to make a case for distinguishing between *paramārtha* as the absolute and *paramārtha* as the ultimate. The first sense of *paramārtha* is totally rejected in the Madhyamaka dialectic even in relation to *sūnyatā*, emptiness. However, *paramārtha* as the ultimate is accepted, as it is the perspective contrary to the relative, veiled truth, *samvṛti*. Tsongkhapa writes:

Therefore, it cannot be the case that the ultimate referent (*don dam pa*), the nature (*chos nyid*), the suchness (*de kho na nyid*) and the mode of being (*gshis lugs*) [of all phenomena] do not exist. However, to suggest that if they exist in what sense other than the absolute or as the true mode of being can they exist is to demonstrate a total lack of understanding of the modes of analysis from the perspectives of the ultimate standpoint.²⁶

Tsongkhapa concludes the above discussion by stating that it is due to the lack of appreciating this subtle distinction, i.e. between the ultimate and the absolute, that some [e.g. Ngog Loden Sherap] maintained that *paramārtha* is unknowable, while others [such as Jonangpas] asserted that it is the absolute.²⁷ In brief, Tsongkhapa is saying that nothing, not even emptiness, can be said to exist from the absolute standpoint, yet something, e.g. emptiness, can be said to be the ultimate nature. In other words, nothing exists 'ultimately' (*don dam par*) although something can be said to be the ultimate (*don dam pa*). It is interesting to note here that so much philosophical significance hangs on what seems to be a peculiar linguistic, or grammatical form. Tsongkhapa seems to imply that any form of a particular usage of the term *paramārtha* in this peculiar grammatical case entails ontological claims. The grammatical case in point is what is known in Tibetan as *de nyid*, which is a unique case of prepositional usage, almost exclusively pertaining to the notion of identity. This usage could be perhaps best compared to the adverbial case in English. Instances such as *don dam par grub* (established as the ultimate), *yang dag par grub* (thoroughly established), *bden par*

yod (truly existing), *gshis lugs su grub* (established as its nature), *rang dbang du grub* (independently established), *rdzas su yod* (substantially existing), *tshugs thub tu yod* (existing with autonomous reality), are cases of this usage.²⁸

Again, the manner in which Tsongkhapa has defined the meaning of 'ultimacy' in the context of Madhyamaka dialectics, based on disguising between the two different senses of *paramārtha*, does seem to contribute greatly towards a greater clarity to the Madhyamaka analysis. It enables us to have clearer appreciation of what exactly is being negated when the Mādhyamikas assert that things and events do not exist at the 'ultimate' level. This, then, takes us to the next element.

'CORRECT' IDENTIFICATION OF THE OBJECT OF NEGATION

Another integral part of Tsongkhapa's philosophical strategy for delineating the 'correct' domain of reason is what he calls the '[proper] identification of the object of negation' (*dgags bya ngos 'dzin*).²⁹ Tsongkhapa is aware that everyone who professes to be a Mādhyamika is familiar with the claim that all things and events lack an ultimate ontological status. He thinks, however, that not everyone is clear as to what exactly is meant by the absence of ultimate modes of being. And according to him, confusion about this can have grave consequences. If you go too far in your negation, it can result in a position that denigrates the everyday world of valid experience thus leading to a position of nihilism. On the other hand, if you cast your net to too confined an area, you may let certain residues of the reified categories slip. This is to say that you may leave the elusive *svabhāva* undetected, thus pushing you more towards the abyss of 'absolutism'. So what is required, according to Tsongkhapa, is a skilful treading of a fine line between the two extremes of 'over-negation' and 'under-negation'.³⁰ Tsongkhapa argues that it is crucial to have a clear conception of what is to be negated.³¹ Without this, he suggests that statements like "Nothing can exist in an absolute sense", and "If things and events are still claimed to exist in such a manner, such and such objections can be raised", and so on, remain only grand words with no real effect.³²

This raises some interesting questions. What exactly is constituted by this so-called correct identification of the object of negation? In other words, is it an analytic distinction based on a 'correct' understanding of a definition, or is it a practical distinction that the Mādhyamika has to make drawing from his or her personal experience? Does Tsongkhapa perceive this 'correct' identification of the object of negation to be a

prerequisite of the Madhyamaka dialectic? If so, for whom and for what purpose? Is it a prerequisite for the Mādhyamika who is arguing against the metaphysical postulates of the essentialist schools? Or, is it a requirement for the Mādhyamika practitioner whose main concern is to gain insight into the emptiness of intrinsic being?

It appears that, for Tsongkhapa, this 'correct identification' means nothing more than developing a clear understanding of the meaning of the term 'ultimate referent' (*paramārtha*) in the context of the Madhyamaka's rejection of the ultimate ontological status of things and events. This is evident from the serious treatment he gives to an important passage from Bhāvaviveka's *Tarkajvālā* where Bhāvaviveka enumerates three different senses of the term *paramārtha*. According to Bhāvaviveka, emptiness is the 'ultimate referent' (*paramārtha*) because it is both "supreme" and "referent". It is also the ultimate object (*paramārtha*) because it is the object (*don*) of the supreme gnosis (*ye shes dam pa*), namely the nonconceptual awareness of an ārya. It can also be said to be the ultimate in that it is the object of an awareness that is in accord with the cognition of the supreme object.³³ Of these three, Tsongkhapa asserts that it is the third sense of *paramārtha* that is directly relevant in the context of Madhyamaka's rejection of essentialist ontology.³⁴ He substantiates this point further by quoting from Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka* where Kamalaśīla states that when it is said that nothing comes into being in the ultimate sense, we should understand this to mean that their (i.e. things and events) coming into being is not affirmed by the supreme cognition.³⁵ Tsongkhapa concludes by observing that when the Mādhyamikas argue with the others (i.e. the essentialists), contending that things and events do not exist in the absolute sense, what they wish to reject is that things and events *can* be found to exist when sought through an analysis pertaining to their ultimate nature. Once again this takes us back to the critical distinction we drew earlier between the ultimate and conventional perspectives and their corresponding domains of discourse.

Is this all there is to Tsongkhapa's insistence on the 'correct' identification of the object of negation? The answer appears to be, "no". The problem with the above reading is that, for Tsongkhapa, its understanding of the Madhyamaka's usage of the all-important ontological term *paramārtha* is not comprehensive enough. In other words, Tsongkhapa must argue that the Mādhyamika needs to have a conceptual understanding of how we perceive things and events within our naive, normal, pre-philosophical ways of seeing things. For without this, the Madhya-

maka's emptiness becomes merely a de-constructive device to criticise other philosophical theories.

It is interesting that although Tsongkhapa seems clear from an early stage on the point that the principal objects of negation in the context of the Madhyamaka dialectic are our innate apprehensions³⁶ of self-existence and their content, it is not, however, until the writing of *GR* that this point is explicitly related to the hermeneutic of understanding the all-important qualification "ultimately" in the Mādhyamika's rejection of essentialist ontology. In *LTC* Tsongkhapa states that it is important to understand the significance of the qualifying term "ultimately" in the context of Madhyamaka discourse on emptiness. He rejects the suggestion that it is only the Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas who use this qualification, and not the Prāsaṅgikas. However, when it comes to defining the meaning of the term, Tsongkhapa relates it to the discussion of Bhāvaviveka's distinction between the three senses of ultimacy (*paramārtha*).³⁷ We find a similar approach in *LN* as well.

In contrast, in *GR* Tsongkhapa develops a convincing case to distinguish between two senses of ultimacy (*don dam*) as it is used as a qualifying term in the Mādhyamika's rejection of intrinsic being (*svabhāva*). Tsongkhapa writes:

It is necessary to understand that there are two senses to the qualifying term "ultimate" (*don dam*) in the context of identifying the object of negation in the ultimate sense. One is the case where the critical consciousnesses such as those derived through hearing, reflection, and meditation are known as the ultimate [perspectives]. In this sense, to say that "things do not exist ultimately" means that they are not found by such consciousnesses. Secondly, there is the "ultimate" (*don dam*) in the sense of something that is said to possess a mode of being that is not posited in dependence upon the mind (*blo'i dbang gis bzhag pa mm pa'i sdod lugs*). Of these two senses of ultimacy (*don dam*), not only does the first *don dam* exist, but also something can be said to exist from its perspective (*de'i ngor grub pa*). [In contrast] both the second *don dam* and its object *cannot* exist (*yod mi srid*). Therefore, if anything exists from the perspective of the second *don dam*, it must also exist from the perspective of the first *don dam*. However, apprehension of the first *don dam* is not innate (*lhan skyes*) for [innate apprehensions] this requires the second kind of *don dam*.³⁸

Tsongkhapa makes this critical observation in *GR* in the section on the identification of the objection of negation according to Svātantrika-Madhyamaka. This, however, is not a cause of concern for Tsongkhapa makes the following point:

Insofar as it is necessary to understand that there are two senses to the qualifying term "ultimately" (*don dam par*) this is true also in the case here [Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka]. Although the Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas maintain that the three such as "true being" (*bden par grub pa*) ["absolute being" (*don dam par grub pa*), and "thoroughly established being" (*yang dag par grub pa*)], cannot exist, they accept at the conventional level the existence of the three such as "established by means of its own being" (*rang gi ngo bos grub pa*) ["established by its own characteristics"

(*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*), and "established by means of intrinsic being" (*rang bzhin gyis grub pa*).³⁹

There is not much in the Indian Madhyamaka literature to substantiate the point about the importance of prior identification of the object of negation by means of direct citations. Tsongkhapa quotes *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* 9:139⁴⁰ to make a general point about the critical importance of cultivating a clear conceptual understanding of one's object of negation. But, to the best of my knowledge, no commentator in India seems to have associated this verse with identifying one's object of negation. Nor did any Tibetan commentators on Madhyamaka before Tsongkhapa either. However, Tsongkhapa literally beats the texts, as it were, to say what he wishes them to state. In *GR* Tsongkhapa shows how a close reading between the lines of a passage from Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka* can reveal a clear identification of the object of negation that is being rejected by the Madhyamaka. He argues that the passage that defines 'conventional existence', when reversed, gives us the criterion of its direct opposite, namely 'ultimate existence'.⁴¹ If the Madhyamaka's negation of essentialist ontology is to lead to liberation as Mādhyamikas of all shades appear to agree, it does seem essential that the object that is negated is that which is conceived by the innate *avidyā*, an ignorance that is inherent in all beings and not just those with philosophical views. After all, liberation (*nirvāna*) according to Buddhism, entails cutting off the root of *samsāra*, which according to the Madhyamaka is the innate *avidyā*. So Tsongkhapa seems to assert that not only is the prior correct identification of the object of negation crucial for the Mādhyamika philosopher, it is equally essential for the Mādhyamika spiritual aspirant as well.

What does it mean to say that someone must have a prior understanding of what is to be negated? Tsongkhapa gives the analogy of someone who is trying to ascertain the absence or presence of a certain person. For this, he argues, it is necessary to have some idea of who that person is in the first place.⁴² Judging by this analogy, Tsongkhapa seems to assert that the Mādhyamika must develop a clear sense of what is to be negated by the Madhyamaka dialectic before even the actual process of de-construction has begun. If this is true, in my view, this raises some epistemological problems for Tsongkhapa. First of all, this implies that the Mādhyamika aspirant is able coherently to distinguish between 'existence only' (*yod tsam*) on the one hand, and 'intrinsic existence' (*rang bzhin gyis yod pa*) on the other. Not only that, he or she must be able to distinguish this within his or her own personal experience, i.e. how things and events appear to the naive worldview.

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The problem with this, however, is that such distinctions can be made, if at all, only in the aftermath of one's true cognition of the absence of intrinsic being (*niḥsvabhāva*). Until then, 'existence' and 'intrinsic existence' are completely indistinguishable so far as the perception of the individual is concerned. They are, to use Tsongkhapa's own imagery, like a face and the reflection of the face that appears in the mirror. As far as the visual perception is concerned, the face that you see in the mirror and the reflection of the face are one and the same image. There is no separate image of the face apart from the reflection that appears in the mirror.⁴³ Tsongkhapa himself seems to be fully aware of this problem of circularity. In *LN* Tsongkhapa states that until the individual himself has [experientially] de-constructed *svabhāva*, no amount of verbal explanation given by a third person can help him clearly distinguish between 'existence only' and 'intrinsic existence'.⁴⁴

Judging by Tsongkhapa's overall approach, we might expect that he would reconcile this seeming paradox by invoking a popular Tibetan epistemological distinction between 'true cognition' (*tshad mas rtogs pa*) and an 'intellectual understanding' (*gid dpyod kyi go ba chags pa*). On this view, prior to his cognition of *sūnyatā*, the Mādhyamika aspirant should develop an intellectual or conceptual understanding of the distinction between 'existence only' and 'intrinsic existence'. However, a 'true cognition' of such a distinction arises only subsequent to the actual de-construction of intrinsic reality (*svabhāva*). This response does seem to go a long way in resolving the epistemological problem, i.e. only if one is prepared to accept the epistemological distinction between an 'intellectual understanding' and 'true cognition'.⁴⁵ It is interesting to note that Tsongkhapa himself does not invoke this concept of 'intellectual understanding' as opposed to 'true cognition' to deal with the problem of circularity. Perhaps he did not think it a real problem.

THAT WHICH IS 'NEGATED BY REASON' AND 'NOT FOUND BY REASON'

Tsongkhapa accepts that the tetralemma argument definitely has only a negative function, in that by rejecting all four possibilities (*koṭis*) it illustrates the limits of any essentialist metaphysical description of reality. Its primary function is that of criticism, constantly moving from the critique of a thesis to its antithesis so that no room is left even for the slightest tendency towards reification. However, so far as the actuality of our everyday world is concerned, the tetralemma argument leaves it completely unscathed. The reality of this world need not be exhausted within any of the four ontological possibilities being negated

in the Madhyamaka dialectic. It is only when one steps outside the bounds of conventional sense and seeks a metaphysical grounding for the world that one becomes susceptible to the de-constructive power of the dialectic. Hence, from Tsongkhapa's point of view, there is nothing surprising in finding that even the reality of everyday objects like tables, chairs, etc., is found to be untenable when searched for through such critical analysis. This does not entail that these things are in some profound sense negated by reason (*rigs pas bkag pa*). Something can be said to be negated by reason only if it falls within the scope of that particular analysis and yet cannot withstand that analysis. The following is a useful analogy. If there is a flower-pot in front of the speaker it should be observable, and when it cannot be seen we can safely conclude that there is no such object in front of the speaker. In this context, there is a coincidence between 'non-finding' of an object and 'finding its absence'. This is, however, not the case with, say for instance, the presence of a ghost (supposing such things exist!) in front of the speaker. In the latter case, the non-observance of it simply cannot be taken as an adequate ground for its non-existence. This distinction reflects a strong influence of Dharmakīrti's logic of inference. In his *Pramāṇavārttika*, Dharmakīrti draws a distinction between two types of negative inference. One instance is where the negatum (*dgag bya'i chos*) is negated by means of asserting its non-observance or the non-observance of objects that are naturally related to it. This type of negation is applicable only in instances where the thing to be negated is generally perceptible. However, this does not apply to cases where the object of negation is even in general terms non-observable (*mi snangs ba ma dmigs pa*). In the latter case, we can only infer the absence of its perception rather than the object of negation itself.⁴⁶ For Tsongkhapa, just as between 'non-observance' of something and the 'observance of its absence', there is a world of difference between that which is 'not found by reason' (*rigs pas ma brnyed pa*) and that which is 'negated by reason' (*rigs pas bkag pa*).⁴⁷ This distinction is critical if Tsongkhapa is to succeed in his task of delineating the scope of reason. Again, we can see that this relates to the critical distinction made earlier between the scopes of 'ultimate analysis' and 'conventional analysis'.

Tsongkhapa wants to develop a methodology which will allow him to make a coherent distinction between the non-intrinsic existence of everyday objects of experience on the one hand and what he perceives as unnecessary (at worst harmful) metaphysical postulates like *ātman*, primal substance (*prakṛti*), etc., on the other. Without the subtle distinc-

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tions which he has drawn between different perspectives, he argues, one will be forced to admit that there is no significant difference between these two categories. For insofar as the inability or ability to withstand analysis is concerned both categories are equal. Also there is no difference between the two insofar as they are both objects of discursive thought. Thus, Tsongkhapa writes:

Without a comprehensive and detailed critical analysis, if one negates ultimate existence (*don dam du grub pa*) by means of some partial reasoning, and upholds the reality of things that exist on the conventional level on the grounds that they are perceived so by distorted consciousnesses (*'khrul shes*) – i.e. maintaining that being an object of such consciousness is the criterion of conventional reality – no distinctions can be maintained between the propositions that "pain and pleasure are created by *Īvara* (transcendent, supernatural being) or primal substance" and that "pain and pleasure are caused by karma". [According to the proponent of the above view], if one proposition is true, the other must be true too; similarly, if the former is false, so must the latter be. This is because when subjected to critical analysis as characterised earlier, even the latter [proposition] becomes untenable (*sngar bzhin dpyad na ni dpyod byed kyis phyi ma yang mi rnyed la*); and, insofar as being the object of a distorted consciousness is concerned, even the former [proposition] can be said to be true (*'khrul ngor ni snga ma yang yod*).⁴⁸

Tsongkhapa argues that those who maintain that the Prāsaṅgikas do not accept the existence of everyday objects even on the conventional level, do so because of their failure to appreciate the subtle distinction between that which is 'not found by reason' and that which is 'negated by reason'. Furthermore, according to Tsongkhapa, they are ignorant of the critical distinction between the different domains of ultimate and conventional discourses. Such ignorance, according to Tsongkhapa, leads to certain impoverishment in one's philosophical thinking often compelling one to make absurd statements like "the world exists only from the perspective of the other", and "I have no views of my own", etc. For Tsongkhapa, this is certainly not the silence of the noble sage the Madhyamaka dialectic is supposed to lead to; rather it is the silence of an impoverished sceptical philosophy.

Earlier I suggested that Tsongkhapa does not see the tetralemma itself as a form of paradox. Even if there may appear to be some element of paradox in the classical formulation of the argument, Tsongkhapa has successfully resolved it with his penetrating distinctions between the various perspectives involved in the argument. The crucial question is whether or not, at the end of the negation of the four lemmas, we are still left dangling with a paradox, a paradox born of a paralysis of *reason* brought about by the Madhyamaka dialectic. Given Tsongkhapa's overall approach – i.e. his clarity of vision, his thorough-going rationality, and most importantly his refusal to seek any easy option of viewing reality in some indeterminate, absolute mode – the temptation is indeed great to

answer in the negative. However, let us not hasten. A closer reading of Tsongkhapa reveals an interesting situation. One thing which is certain is that Tsongkhapa does not believe that the tetralemma leaves you in a state of indecision, or 'non-commitment', as some modern scholars have called it.⁴⁹ So far as the conclusion that all things and events lack *svabhāva* ('intrinsic being', or 'essence') is concerned, there is nothing undecided or noncommittal about it. The Mādhyamika conviction is as certain as any belief could possibly be. The negation of such reified ontology is absolute and final. Paradox, if it can be called this at all, arises only when you redirect your perception to the everyday world of experience in the aftermath of the Madhyamaka dialectical process. At the core of one's perception of reality, or world view, lies what could best be described as a paradox – a sense of perplexity at the world constituted by interrelations with no 'real' entities. This is paradoxical in that you are at a total loss (conceptually) to reconcile the world of appearance and its underlying reality (or unreality), i.e. its thoroughly empty nature. Coming to terms with this, according to Tsongkhapa, is the greatest challenge for the Madhyamaka philosopher. Tsongkhapa himself describes the experience as follows:

O friends, [you who are] learned in the profound Middle Way treatises,
difficult though it is to posit
causality and dependence without 'intrinsic being',
Still it is wiser to rely on this [Prāsaṅgika] line of thought,
hailing it as the way of the Middle.⁵⁰

LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF FORMS OF NEGATION

We now come to the final element in our examination of Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka dialectic. It is clear that Tsongkhapa accepts that the Madhyamaka dialectic functions only in the form of negation, and also that as far as the negation of *svabhāva* is concerned it is absolute or total. We must now look at Tsongkhapa's analysis of the various forms of negation so that we can assess how it relates to his soteriological concerns. In most of his substantial works on the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness Tsongkhapa gives a separate treatment of the analysis of the principal forms of negation employed in Buddhist philosophy.⁵¹ If the negation of *svabhāva* ('essence' or 'intrinsic being') is not categorical and therefore absolute, there will always be a tendency, no matter how slight and residual, towards reification.⁵² And reification, according to Tsongkhapa, always obstructs true liberation – it constricts our ability to relate to the world in an appropriate manner. In other words, it obscures

our vision of reality and chains us to a vicious cycle of illusion and projections. Therefore, in order for negation to be thorough, it must be what is known as *prasajya* – nonimplicative negation, i.e. a negation which leaves no room for any affirmation or implication in its aftermath. This is in contrast to a type of negation which is known as *paryudāsa* – implicative negation – which in place of the negated subject makes an implication or a supposition of something positive. Although these negations have a lot to do with what (in the wake of Searle's work⁵³) may be called speech acts, the difference between them is essentially logical and semantic.⁵⁴

To have a clearer understanding of Tsongkhapa's emphasis on the use of *prasajya* negation in the Madhyamaka dialectic, let us look at some of the propositional forms in which negation is used in language. A typical illustration of the *prasajya* form we find in Tsongkhapa's writing is this: "Brahmins don't drink alcohol." What is unique about this is that it makes a simple negative statement to the effect that Brahmins do not drink alcohol. Of course, Brahmins may drink water, or tea, or juice, etc. but none of these is implied in that statement, nor are any other features like the fact that they don't eat meat, etc. also supposed in any way. It is a clear, precise, unambiguous statement whose purpose is simply to deny that Brahmins drink alcohol. Compare this with the following statement: "This fat man doesn't eat during the day." This form of negation is called *paryudāsa* for it involves more than a simple negation. In the present context, the speaker, in addition to denying that the man eats during daytime, implies that he eats during the night. Tsongkhapa, by citing a verse quoted in Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*,⁵⁵ lists four types of 'implicative negation' (*paryudāsapratīśedha*): 1) affirmation by implication (*don gyis bstan pa*), e.g. "This fat Devadatta doesn't eat during the day"; 2) negation and affirmation both effected explicitly by the same proposition (*tshig gcig gis bsgrub pa*), e.g. "the absence of self exists"; 3) affirmation effected both explicitly and implicitly as well (*dnagos shugs gnyis ka la 'phen pa*), "This fat Devadatta doesn't eat during the day yet does not lose any weight"; and finally, 4) affirmation implied by context (*skabs stobs kyis 'phen pa*), "This man is not a Brahmin" in the context where the person is known to be either a Brahmin or a royal.⁵⁶

Interestingly, Tsongkhapa and many Tibetan Mādhyamikas do not seem to distinguish clearly, when examining the nature of various forms of negations, between statements and their propositional contents. Often the discussion on forms of negation is conducted in terms of 'negative phenomena' (*dgag pa*) versus 'positive phenomena' (*sgrub pa*) as if they

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are objective features of reality. There could be several reasons for this. There is a basic ambiguity in the Tibetan language about the grammatical status of many verbs. Words like *dgag pa* (to negate) and *sgrub pa* (to posit) can be read, depending upon the context, both as nouns and also as verbs. When read as nouns, *dgag pa* can be translated as 'negative phenomena' and *sgrub pa* as 'positive phenomena'. Unfortunately, most of the contemporary Western scholars of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy appear to have read these only as nouns, thus failing to appreciate the logical and philosophical significance of the distinction between negation and affirmation. One reason is perhaps because Tibetan thinkers on the whole, including Tsongkhapa, are always more interested in the actual philosophical content of a theory than in the linguistic aspects of it. This might also explain why, unlike their Indian counterparts, Tibetan philosophers very rarely take grammatical analysis as being crucial for philosophical examination. Nevertheless, I do not feel that this has led to any serious shortfalls in Tibetan understanding of the nature of negation in propositional language.

Tsongkhapa argues that just as the appreciation of the thoroughly negative character of emptiness, i.e. its *prasajya* nature, is critical in that it removes all possibilities for reification, it is equally important not to confuse this negation with nihilism. He warns us against being carried away by frequent usage of terms like 'mere' (*tsam*), and its analogues such as 'only' (*gcig pu*), 'just' (*kho na*), 'alone' (*'ba' zhig*).⁵⁷ What is being denied by all these terms of exclusion is the notion that something positive, perhaps a deeper reality, is being affirmed in the aftermath of the negation. This is in direct contrast to those who perceive the ultimate nature of reality in the Madhyamaka in terms of an absolute, something along the lines of Leibnizian plenitude or the Brahman of the Vedānta, which somehow serves as the fundamental substratum of reality.⁵⁸ According to Tsongkhapa, anyone who characterises the ultimate nature of reality in positive terms ultimately falls victim to the deeply ingrained human trait for reification. No matter what terms you may use to describe it, be it Brahman, plenitude, Buddha nature, the absolute, etc., it still remains a metaphysical concept. Only a thorough-going negation can lead to full liberation from our tendency for grasping.

Tsongkhapa would agree with Ruegg when the latter characterises the negation involved in the Madhyamaka dialectic as ontological rather than linguistic.⁵⁹ According to Tsongkhapa, there are two principal types of *prasajya* negation. One is a type of *prasajya* whose object of negation is actual in that at the level of everyday reality it possesses

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a certain status of existence and identity (*dgag bya shes bya la srid pa'i med dgag*).⁶⁰ In this case, although the denial or negation of the object in question may be final and total, its scope is limited. It may be limited by spatial location, for example, in the statement: "There are no yaks." This is limited in that the non-existence of yaks can be taken only within the context of a limited location. Or, the limit may be temporal, e.g. "It is not snowing." In both cases, the negation is said to be absolute in that there is no element of "may be" involved. So far as the speaker is concerned, his or her commitment to the denial is final. There is a second category of *prasajya*, where the object of negation does not exist at all (*dgag bya shes bya la mi srid pa'i med dgag*).⁶¹ Examples of the second type include such negative expressions like "the non-existence of rabbit's horn, sky flower, son of a barren woman, etc." Here, not only is the negation total but it is also universal in that it is free of any spatio-temporal constraints. The negation of *svabhāva* ('essence' or 'intrinsic-being') by the Madhyamaka dialectic belongs to this category.⁶²

For Tsongkhapa, the understanding of the nature of *prasajya* negation is crucial for fully appreciating the scope of the negation involved in the Mādhyamika's critique of intrinsic being. This takes us back to the central point, i.e. delineating the scope of reason, especially in its role of negating essentialist ontology. Tsongkhapa argues that even the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school of Bhāvaviveka cannot deny the view that the negation involved in establishing the theory of *śūnyatā* must be that of *prasajya*.⁶³ Tsongkhapa's point is this. Unless the negation involved in the application of the Madhyamaka dialectic aimed at arriving at the true cognition of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) is final and universal, the negation cannot fulfil its soteriological function. Interestingly, those who criticise Tsongkhapa's understanding of emptiness as a mere negation, i.e. a *prasajya*, raise exactly the same soteriological objection.⁶⁴

In that Tsongkhapa saw the Madhyamaka's *śūnyatā* (emptiness) to be a non-implicative, absolute negation is beyond question. It is, however, not a mere negation *per se*; it is an absolute negation of *svabhāva* (intrinsic being). By maintaining this, Tsongkhapa is suggesting that the absence of intrinsic being is the ultimate nature of reality! And, since, according to the Mādhyamika, *śūnyatā* (emptiness) is the *tathatā* (essence), the absence of intrinsic being also becomes the essence. This has, of course, been an object of vehement criticism by subsequent Tibetan thinkers. For example, Gowo Rabjampa calls this *chad stong* (nihilistic emptiness),⁶⁵ while Shākya Chogden labels it an inferior version of extrinsic emptiness (*gzhan stong tha shal ba*).⁶⁶ Mikyō

Dorje too makes a similar criticism. In their view, Tsongkhapa's notion of *sūnyatā* is inadequate and therefore cannot serve as the content of the liberating gnosis. They argue that such gnosis must have a more positive content.⁶⁷ Tsongkhapa would respond to this by arguing that his *sūnyatā* can serve as the content of an Ārya's liberating gnosis. For, according to Tsongkhapa, insofar as the actual object of cognition is concerned there is no difference between an Ārya's nonconceptual awareness and inferential cognition of *sūnyatā*.⁶⁸ And, as for inferential cognition, negation of *svabhāva* is the cognition of *niḥsvabhāva*.

For Tsongkhapa the soteriological dimension of the dialectic is crucial. He does not agree with those who assert that for the Mādhyamika argument functions only as a critique of the opponent's viewpoint. On this view, within the Madhyamaka project, argument has only a reactive role. You wait for the opponent to come up with a theory and then by using his own logic, as it were, turn the table back on him. A true Mādhyamika dialectician, the proponents of this view argue, acts only as a parasite upon other philosophies, never committing himself to any conclusive thesis. This is in sharp contrast to Tsongkhapa's position. As far as he is concerned these interpreters are only caught up in the rhetoric of *Prāsaṅgika*, and have totally missed the point. For Tsongkhapa, all types of reasoning found in the Madhyamaka literature primarily function as self-criticism (if it can be called such at all). They are aimed at liberating the mind of the Mādhyamika from his deep-seated tendency for reification, which in Tsongkhapa's view is the fundamental obscuration lying at the root of all our suffering and which makes our existence samsaric, unenlightened and an imprisonment. And the dialectical nature of many of the arguments is designed to prevent the Mādhyamika virtuoso from succumbing to any of the possible metaphysical havens which he may otherwise seek. The fact that many of these standpoints do represent tenets of actual historical schools is, as far as Tsongkhapa is concerned, an interesting coincidence. In fact, it strengthens his point that these are possible routes one might quite naturally take to seek refuge if one is not vigilant through a critical approach. In *LN* Tsongkhapa writes:

All Madhyamaka reasonings are parts of the [overall] task of uprooting the apprehension of our fundamental ignorance which is the root cause of cyclic existence, *samsāra*. Therefore, by identifying the manner in which your innate ignorant mind grasps [at entities], you should endeavour to bring about its elimination. You should not indulge in mere sophistic disputation with opposing philosophical schools.⁶⁹

and earlier in the same book he writes,

... there is no contradiction between the fact that the innate conception of self-existence (*bdag 'dzin lhan skyes*) is the principal object of negation [of the Madhyamaka dialectic]

and yet in the [Madhyamaka] literature [often] the refutation is done through analysis. So, one should not think that it is only the intellectually acquired apprehension and its content which are to be negated.⁷⁰

To sum up, by giving special attention to the various forms of negation in philosophical discourse, Tsongkhapa wishes to achieve two things. First and foremost, he wants to make it clear that the Mādhyamika's rejection of *svabhāva* ontology must be unqualified and absolute. Only by ensuring this, he contends, will the Mādhyamikas succeed in their project to de-construct all tendencies for reification. Second, Tsongkhapa wishes to establish that the Mādhyamika's emptiness is very different from mere nothingness. It is the absolute negation of intrinsic existence and not of existence *per se*. Thus, it becomes critical for Tsongkhapa correctly to delineate reason's scope of negation. The negation of *svabhāva*, i.e. intrinsic being, must be absolute and universal, yet it should not destroy the reality of the everyday world of experience. Although Tsongkhapa believes that there is an element of what could be called 'pre-critical innocence' in our everyday perspectives on the world, he thinks that they are nevertheless 'tainted' by an underlying belief in intrinsic being of things. Thus, the role of the dialectic is to 'cleanse' our perceptions of this pollution so that we can arrive at a 'post-critical innocence'. Once this principal objective is identified, we can then appreciate with greater coherence all the various elements of Tsongkhapa's de-constructive methodology.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we must raise the question about the validity and coherence of Tsongkhapa's reading of the Madhyamaka dialectic. At the core of Tsongkhapa's approach seems to be the assumption of a systematic coherence in the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness. This means that, according to Tsongkhapa, there must be a systematic way by which the Mādhyamika should be able conceptually to articulate his so-called 'middle point' (*madhyama*). Of course, this requires the Mādhyamika to maintain a 'meaningful' level of reality of the everyday world while rejecting all tendencies for reification. According to Tsongkhapa, crucial to this project is to delineate the 'correct' scope of reason so that the Madhyamaka dialectic is not seen as destroying the validity of our everyday world of experience. In arguing thus, Tsongkhapa can be seen as continuing in the long lineage of Mādhyamika philosophers who are sensitive to the charge that the Madhyamaka theory of emptiness is nihilistic. A further assumption Tsongkhapa appears to

make, from what we have discussed so far, is that the application of the Madhyamaka dialectic is a crucial aspect of the process of eliminating the innate *avidyā*. Needless to say this presupposes the centrality of reason in Madhyamaka soteriology. Those who wish to take issue with Tsongkhapa's reading of the Madhyamaka philosophy may question these presuppositions.

My personal view is that if the Madhyamaka is to be seen as an important lineage within the Buddhist religious and philosophical milieu – i.e. sharing the basic soteriological concerns of a Buddhist path – something like Tsongkhapa's interpretation of the school's key tenets is unavoidable. Tsongkhapa's distinction between the domains of the conventional and ultimate perspectives, his insistence on a prior, correct conceptual identification of the object of negation, his identifying of different senses of the all-important term *paramārtha*, and finally the distinction he draws between what is *negated* by reason and what is *not found* by reason, all contribute greatly towards a more coherent understanding of the Madhyamaka's rejection of essentialist ontology.

If what I have sketched in this paper represents an accurate reading of Tsongkhapa's understanding of the Madhyamaka dialectics, his approach to defend Madhyamaka against the charge of nihilism appears to be somewhat different from his Indian predecessors. The Indian Mādhyamika's response, on the whole, primarily involves invoking the idea of illusion-like nature of reality. For example, in *BCA*, 9:11–17, Śāntideva defends ethical responsibility on the grounds that killing an illusion-like person accrues illusion-like karma. This approach is very much in line with the approach of the Mahāyāna *sūtras* which present the doctrine of emptiness through a multitude of metaphors all of which intimate the illusion-like character of things and events. In contrast, Tsongkhapa's approach involves, in addition to invoking the illusion-like nature of reality, a logical dimension as well in that he wishes to conceptually stipulate the parameters of the Madhyamaka dialectical analysis. Perhaps, the Indian Mādhyamikas felt that it is not necessary analytically to determine the scope of negation prior to one's cognition of emptiness for what *exists* is what is left behind in the aftermath of the application of the Madhyamaka dialectic. As a philosopher, however, Tsongkhapa is not satisfied by this assumption. He wants to demonstrate that the Madhyamaka dialectic does not destroy everything and that indeed the world of everyday reality is left intact. More importantly, Tsongkhapa must have felt this need to stipulate the parameters of reason's domain to counter the pervasive influence of the

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so-called 'thesisless' interpretation of the Madhyamaka's philosophy of emptiness in Tibet.⁷¹

Regardless of the enormous influence of Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka writings not all Tibetan Mādhyamika thinkers agree with his interpretation. The Sakya scholars Gorampa Sonam Senge (1429–1489), Shakya Chogden (1428–1507), and the Kagyü hierarch Karmapa Mikyö Dorje (1507–1554), have criticised Tsongkhapa's claim that the Madhyamaka's emptiness is the absolute negation of intrinsic being – i.e. it is a mere absence of intrinsic being with no positive content. Others such as Taktshang Lotsawa (b. 1405) have taken issue with Tsongkhapa's premise that everyday reality must be accorded a status that is logically defensible and is grounded in valid cognition. At the core of all of these disputes is the role of rationality within Buddhist soteriology, an issue that is relevant to many areas of dispute between Tsongkhapa and his critics. Tsongkhapa wishes to argue that the ultimate truth according to Madhyamaka – i.e. emptiness – *can* be and *must* be initially accessed through reason and discursive thought. For, according to him, negation of intrinsic being through reason *is* the cognition of emptiness, albeit at the intellectual level. In contrast, for the critics of Tsongkhapa the gulf between rationality and insight into the ultimate truth is so great that only by discarding thought can one access it. Needless to say, Tsongkhapa's followers have defended his reading of Madhyamaka and these defences have been attacked further by other subsequent thinkers. Thus the debate goes on.

NOTES

¹ For example, there is now a general consensus within modern Madhyamaka scholarship that the labels Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika and the sharp division within the Indian Madhyamaka thinkers along the two distinct lines as suggested by such labels are most probably retrospective Tibetan creations. See, for example, Williams (1989, Spring), p. 3.

² See Jinpa (1997).

³ Madhyamaka's *caṭuṣkoṭi* argument has received extensive treatment in modern Buddhist scholarship. For an in-depth review of the modern scholarship on *caṭuṣkoṭi*, see Wood (1994).

⁴ One of the first modern scholars on Madhyamaka philosophy to characterise the Madhyamaka tetralemma as a 'dialectic' was T.R.V. Murti. His example has been followed by modern Madhyamaka interpreters like Richard Robinson and David S. Ruegg.

⁵ See, for example, Murti (1955), p. 59. Interestingly, this seems to be Gorampa's view too. See *ITa ba'i shan 'byed*, folio 40a.

⁶ By 'essentialist' I am referring to what Tsongkhapa calls *dnogs smra ba* which literally means 'one who propounds the notion of entity'. This should not be confused with an 'objective realist' (*don smra*) as in the case of 'the two proponents of objective

realism' (*don smra sde gnyis*): Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika. I use 'objective realism' in that these two schools assert an objective reality of the external world rather than the real existence of universals. According to Tsongkhapa the essentialists include, in addition to almost all non-Buddhist ancient Indian philosophical schools, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika and Cittamātra schools of Buddhism. All of these schools accept in one form or another the existence of a 'truly real' entity (*bden pa'i dngos po*). In the case of Vaibhāṣika it is the irreducible *dharma*s while for the Sautrāntika, it is the *svakṣaṇas* – the unique, indivisible particulars, e.g. atoms, indivisible points of consciousness and time. As for Cittamātra they accept the ultimate reality of consciousness, be it in the form of *ālayavijñāna* (foundational consciousness) or *svasamvedana*, the aperceptive faculty of all mental events.

⁷ Inasmuch as this need for logical exhaustiveness is seen to be necessary for satisfying oneself one could say that there is also a psychological element in the formulation of the *catuṣkoṭi* argument.

⁸ *LTC*, p. 83: dbu ma'i gzhung mams nas dngos po'am rang bzhin yod pa dang med pa dang gnyis ka dang gnyis ka min pa'i mu bzhi thams cad bkag la/ der ma 'dus pa'i chos kyang med pas rigs pas thams cad 'gog go snyam na/ 'di ni ngar bstan pa ltar dngos po la gnyis las rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i dngos po ni bden pa gnyis gang du yod par 'dod kyang 'gog la/ don byed nus pa'i dngos po ni tha snyad du 'gog pa ma yin no// dngos po med pa'ang 'dus ma byas mams la rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i dngos med du 'dod na ni de 'dra ba'i dngos med kyang 'gog go// de bzhin du de 'dra ba'i dngos po yod med gnyis char yang 'gog la/ gnyis ka ma yin par rang gi ngo bos grub pa'ang 'gog pas mu bzhi 'gog tshul thams cad ni de ltar du shes par bya'o// The pages references of Tibetan texts are to modern typeset editions if it is listed in the bibliography. All translations of citations are mine unless otherwise stated.

bdag las ma yin gzhan las min//
gnyis las ma yin rgyu med min//
dngos po gang dag gang na yang//
skye ba nam yang yod ma yin//

*Na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyam nāpy ahetutah,
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana. (MMK, 1:1)*

¹⁰ *LTC*, p. 79: don dam gyi skye ba khas len na de nyid dpyod pa'i rigs pas dpyad bzod du 'dod dgos la/ de'i tshu rigs pas bdag dang gzhan la sogs mu bzhi gang las skye dpyad dgos pas don dam gyi skye ba 'dod pas mu bzhi gang rung gi dpyad pa nges par khas blang dgos so// rgyu dang rkyen 'di la brten nas 'di 'byung gi skye ba tsam zhig 'dod pas ni de kho na'i skye ba khas ma blangs la/ de ma blangs pas de kho ne nyid la dpyod pa'i rigs pas bdag dang gzhan la sogs pa gang las skyes zhes ji ltar dpyod de rigs pas dpyad bzod du 'dod mi dgos pa'i phyir ro//

¹¹ Gadjin Nagao translates these two expressions respectively as 'truly reasoned understanding' and 'knowledge based on criteria'. See Nagao (1989), p. 125. Hopkins (1983), Napper (1989) and Cabezón (1994) discuss this critical distinction. However, to my mind, they do not fully appreciate the philosophical significance of it. Although Cabezón's treatment is philosophically more sophisticated than the other two, his suggestion that the distinction should be read primarily as pertaining to a linguistic formulation of the doctrine of emptiness hinders him from understanding what I have called the 'analytic' dimension of the distinction. As a consequence, Cabezón fails to relate this to Tsongkhapa's overall project of delineating reason's scope for negation. See Cabezón (1994), pp. 161–66.

¹² Buddhapaṭita, *Buddhapāṭitamūlamadhyamakavṛtti*. P. No. 5242, Vol. 95; Toh. 3842.

¹³ It is crucial to understand that *dpyod pa* (literally, analysis) here covers both

analysis and also forms of discourse. Both Thurman and Napper have failed to appreciate this, thus weakening their reading of Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka dialectic.

¹⁴ *LTC*, pp. 52–53: gzugs sgra la sogs pa kun rdzob pa 'di mams yod du chug kyang de kho na la dpyod pa'am rang bzhin yod med dpyod pa'i rigs pas gtan mi grub pas de dag la rigs pa'i brtag pa mi 'jug go zhes ... gal te rang bzhin yod med dpyod pa'i rigs pas 'di dag dgag par nus na gzugs dang 'tshor ba la sogs pa'i kun rdzob pa 'di dag la rigs pa'i brtag pa shin tu gzhug dgos pa yin na de 'dra ba ni slob dpon 'di yi gzhung las mam pa thams cad du bkag pas ...

¹⁵ *LN*, pp. 141–2: 'di'i 'tshol tshul dang dpyod lugs snga ma ches mi 'dra ste/ 'dis ni 'gro 'ong byed mkhan dang 'gro 'ong gi tha snyad btags pa tsam gyis ma tshim par tha snyad de ltar btags pa'i don de gang yin dpyad nas 'gro 'ong dris pa min gyis/ 'gro 'ong gi tha snyad rang dga' bar 'jug pa la rang dga' ba'i brtag pa byas pa yin pas de'i brtag pa khas blangs pa la 'gal ba ci zhig yod//

¹⁶ *RG*, p. 32: de yang mchod sbyin gyis gzugs mthong zhes pa dang mchod sbyin rdzas yod kyi gzugs mthong zhes pa'i tha snyad btags pa'i btags sa'i don de ji ltar yod btsal bas cung zad kyang mi rnyed pa la khyad par ci yang med kyang/ snga mas mthong ba tha snyad du med pa la tshad mad gnod pa'i phyir tha snyad du yod med gtan mi mtshungs so// de'i rgyu mtshan yang rdzas yod rigs pas btsal na rnyed dgos pas des ma rnyed na dgag nus la yod tsam rigs pas btsal na rnyed dgos pa min pas des ma rnyed pas 'gog mi nus pa'i phyir ro//

¹⁷ rigs pa des gzugs sogs kyi skye ba dpyad bzod par ni kho bo cag mi 'dod pas bden dngos thal ba'i skyon med do// *LTC*, p. 50.

¹⁸ See *LN*, pp. 214–218; *LTC*, pp. 50–58.

¹⁹ *LTC*, p. 50.

²⁰ *CST*, P5266 p. 261:3. Kho bo cag gi mam par dpyod pa don rang bzhin tshol ba lhur byed pa nyid kyi phyir ro/ Kho bo cag ni 'dir dngos po mams rang gi ngo bos grub pa 'gog gi mig la sogs pa byas shing rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba las kyi mam par smin pa ni mi 'gog pa'o//

²¹ *LTC*, p. 112.

²² In his *LN* (p. 140), Tsongkhapa maintains that both schools of Madhyamaka share the basic premise that the conventional world cannot be subjected to an ultimate analysis. Where they differ is what exactly constitutes this ultimate analysis.

²³ In *LTC*, Tsongkhapa devotes a whole section to explaining what exactly is meant by the all-important qualification "on the ultimate level" (*don dam par*) when Madhyamikas reject any notion of intrinsic existence within their ontology. *LTC*, pp. 113–120.

²⁴ *RG*, p. 21, 48.

²⁵ *GR*, p. 132: 'di legs par shes na gshis lugs la dang/ don dam du med zer ba dang/ yang chos nyid yod par 'dod cing de nyis gshis lugs dang don dam yin par smra ba mi 'gal ba'i gdnad mams shes par 'gyur ro//

²⁶ *RG*, p. 22: de'i phyir don dam dang chos nyid dang de kho na nyid dang gshis lugs mams med par mi 'thad la/ yod na'ang de dag du ma grub na gzhan gang du grub ces smra ba ni don dam par grub ma grub dpyod pa'i dpyod lugs kyi mam pa ma chags pa'i gtam mo//

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ In all of these examples what is common is the grammatical case in which the prepositions (*la don*) such as *su*, *ra*, *ru*, *du*, and *tu* are used. Admittedly, Tsongkhapa himself does not draw attention to this linguistic form although he is fully versed in the intricacies of Tibetan grammar. But the above quote, i.e. note 25, provides good evidence for my case. It is interesting to note that Tsongkhapa seems to pay less attention to linguistic points in his writings that follow the so-called period of maturity.

²⁹ *LTC*, p. 23; *GR*, p. 130.

³⁰ Tsongkhapa gives a lengthy treatment of the problems of 'over-negation' and 'under-negation' in *LTC*, pp. 23–97. See also Napper (1989), chapters 4 and 5.

³¹ *LTC*, p. 23.

³² *LN*, p. 125: de mams su grub pa mi sris ces pa'i brda 'jigs pa tsam la brten nas/ de ltar grub na gnod pa 'di yod dang ma grub pa'i sgrub byed 'di'o zhes mang du smras kyang don legs por mi go bas dgag bya ngos bzung ba ni shin tu gal che'o// In some editions of *LN*, the word 'jigs pa' which literally means 'terrifying' (I have translated it as 'grand' here) is misspelt as 'jags pa', i.e. without the vowel *i*. Thurman does not detect this error in his translation thus weakening the point Tsongkhapa is making with regard to the importance of having a prior, clear identification of the object of negation. See Thurman (1984), p. 282.

³³ Don zhes bya ba ni shes par bya ba yin pa'i phyir don te brtag par bya ba dang go bar bya ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go// Dam pa zhes bya ba ni ... don dam pa de yod pas don dam pa dang mthun pa'o// Cited in *LN*, p. 125.

³⁴ *LN*, p. 125–26.

³⁵ Des na 'di skad du don dam par skye ba med do zhes bya ba ni 'di dag yang dag par shes pas skye bar ma grub pa'o zhes bya ba yin no zhes bshad par 'gyur ro// Quoted in *LN*, p. 126–7. It is interesting to note that although Tsongkhapa sees himself as a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika following in the footsteps of Buddhapaṇita and Candrakīrti, on number of critical points of Mādhyamaka discourse Tsongkhapa relies heavily on *Kamalaśīla's Madhyamakāloka*. Further research may help us ascertain the extent of *Madhyamakāloka's* influence on Tsongkhapa's Mādhyamaka.

³⁶ Gendūn Chöphel (1903–1951) questions the validity of the distinction between 'innate apprehensions of self-existence' (*bdag 'dzin lhan skyes*) and 'intellectually acquired apprehensions of self-existence' (*bdag 'dzin kun btags*). He argues that because there is nothing within human thought that is not conditioned by some form of reasoning process, to speak of "innate conceptions" – i.e. thoughts and perceptions not conditioned by intellectual thinking – is nonsensical. According to him, such types of conception, if there are any, can be found only in animals like birds. See *dBu ma klu srgub dgongs rgyan*, p. 336. In my view, Tsongkhapa's position is much more subtle than what this criticism allows. Tsongkhapa explicitly states that by speaking of non-analytic, naive worldly understanding, he is not precluding analysis *per se*. What he is precluding are those analyses that seek to establish intrinsic reality of things and events. There are serious doubts concerning the authenticity of some sections of *Klu rgub dgongs rgyan* which is a post-humous work purported to be a compilation of notes taken from Gendūn Chöphel's lectures on Mādhyamaka philosophy.

³⁷ 'o na don dam par med pa'i don gang yin snyam na/ ... *LTC*, pp. 116–120. See above, pp. 45–6.

³⁸ *GR*, pp. 131–2: dgag bya la don dam gyi khyad par sbyar ba'i don dam de la gnyis su shes dgos te/ thos bsam sgom gsum gyi rigs shes la don dam du byes nas/ des sngar bshad pa ltar ma grub pa cig dang/ blo'i dbang gis bzhag pa min par don gyi sdod lugs su yod pa la/ don dam du yod par bzhag pa gnyis kyi dang po'i don dam dang/ de'i ngor grub pa yang yod la/ phyi ma'i don dam dang der yod pa gnyis ka mi srid do// des na don dam di yod pa la dnga ma'i don dam du yod pas khyab kyang/ snga ma'i yod 'dzin ni lhan skyes kyi bden 'dzi min la/ de'i bden 'dzin la ni phyi ma'i yod 'dzin dgos so// The above quotation is considered to be one of the most obscure passages in *GR* and generates, to this day, much discussion within the Geluk monastic colleges. My interpretation is informed by what I see as Tsongkhapa's overall project of delineating the reason's scope for negation.

³⁹ *GR*, pp. 140–41: dgag bya la don dam gyi khyad par sbyar ba'i don dam la tshul gnyis shes dgos pa ni 'dir yang 'dra la/ dbu ma rang rgyud pa mams bden pa sogs

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gsum du grub pa shes bya la mi sris par bzhed kyang/ rang gi ngo bos grub pa sogs gsum ni tha snyad du yod par bzhed de/ ...

brtag pa'i dngos la ma reg par/
de yi dngos med 'dzin ma yin/

Without touching the imagined entity,
its nonactuality cannot be [cognised].

Perhaps, the earliest textual evidence from Tsongkhapa underlining the philosophical point about the critical importance of having a clear identification of the object of negation is his *Queries*, p. 15. Interestingly, in this text Tsongkhapa does not cite Śāntideva's verse. Tsongkhapa begins to cite this verse only from *LTC*. For a detailed survey of the divergent readings of *BCA*, 9:139ab by Tibetan commentators, see Williams (1998), chapter 4.

⁴¹ Following is the passage Tsongkhapa quotes from *Madhyamakāloka*: dngos po yang dag par ngo bo nyid med pa dag la yang de las ldog pa'i mnam par sgro 'dags pa'i 'khrul pa'i blo gang yin pa de ni kun rdzob ces bya ste/ 'di'am 'dis de kho na nyid mthong ba la sgrub pa lta bur byed/ 'gebs pa lta bur byed pa'i phyir ro// ... de'i phyir de dag gi bsam pa'i dbang gis dngos po rdzun pa'i ngo bo thams cad ni kun rdzob tu yod pa kho na'o zhes bya'o// Quoted in full in *GR*, p. 130; referred to in *LN*, p. 128.

⁴² *LTC*, p. 23. In *Queries*, p. 15, Tsongkhapa uses the process of identifying a thief as an analogy.

⁴³ *GR*, p. 222.

⁴⁴ *LN*, p. 186: phyi rgol la bsgrub bya grub ma zin gyi gong du rang gi ngo bos yod med gang gis kyang khyad par du ma byas pa'i tshad mas gzhai bya grub lugs 'di 'dra zhi yin no/ zhes nges par bya mi nus pas ...

⁴⁵ That Tsongkhapa is aware of this concept of *yid dpyod* (intellectual understanding) is evident from *lDe bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel*, *TKSB*, vol. *tsha*. The notion must have evolved from Chapa's Sangphu school. Interestingly, Sakya Paṇḍita subjects this notion to detailed criticism and suggests that it is an unnecessary epistemological category. See *Rigs gter rang 'grel*, pp. 172–3. On key differences between Chapa and Sapen's epistemological views, see Dreyfus (1997).

⁴⁶ See *Pramāṇavārttika*, "Svāntarānumāna", verse 5&6.

⁴⁷ *RG*, p. 32; *LN*, p. 215; *LTC*, p. 51. Gendūn Chöphel takes issue with this distinction too. He argues that if the sense of 'non-finding' here is nothing more than that of a visual perception's inability to hear sounds, then surely one could say that inanimate objects like earth and pebbles never 'find' absolute being. In that case, he contends, we must accept that these objects have long since attained true liberation (*dBu ma klu sgrub dgongs rgyan*, p. 338). Again we can see here that this criticism trades on a certain caricature of Tsongkhapa's views. I think that Tsongkhapa is making a philosophically valid point when he draws our attention to the distinction between 'that which is not found' (*ma rnyed pa*) and 'that which is negated' (*bkag pa*).

⁴⁸ *LN*, p. 215: de dag zhib tu 'byed pa'i dpyad pa ma rdzogs par rigs pa ltar snang res don dam du grub pa bkag cing/ kun rdzob tu yod pa mams 'khrul shes res yod par bzung na de'i ngor yod pa tsam gyis 'jog nus te/ de'i don ni 'khrul ngor yod pa tsam yin pa'i phyir ro snyam du bsams na ni/ dbang phyug dang gts'o bo la sogs pa las bde sdug skye ba dang dkar nag gi las gnyis las skye ba gnyis 'thad na 'thad mnyam dang ma 'thad na ma 'thad mnyam du 'gro ste/ sngar bzhin dpyad na ni dpyod byed kyi phyi ma yang mi rnyed la 'khrul ngor ni snga ma yang yod pa'i phyir ro//

⁴⁹ See, for example, Matilal (1971), p. 164; and Huntington (1989), p. 98.

⁵⁰ *LTC*, p. 222.

⁵¹ *LN*, pp. 220–27; *RG*, pp. 39–41; *GR*, pp. 148–50. *LTC* is an interesting exception

to this. It seems that although Tsongkhapa is clear that the Madhyamaka's emptiness is best understood in terms of a non-implicative negation, it was only when he began to write *LN* that the full significance of this point dawned upon him.

⁵² B.K. Matilal has suggested that we read Nāgārjuna's rejection of all four lemmas of the *cauṣkoṭi* as 'illocutionary' and not 'propositional' negation. See Matilal (1985) p. 18. The difference between these two forms of negation comes from the scope of the negative particle 'not'. Take the following case: "I do not say that there is an after-life", and "There is no after-life". (Matilal's example, p. 18.) Clearly, there is a difference between the two propositions. In the first sentence the negation applies only to the proposition in that the speaker is stating that he does not claim that there is an after-life. In contrast, in the second sentence even the propositional content, i.e. the existence of after-life, is also denied. As we can see, Tsongkhapa's reading of the *cauṣkoṭi* differs from this. For Tsongkhapa, Nāgārjuna's rejection of all four lemmas is absolute, which means that in Searlian language the negation involved in their rejection is 'propositional' as opposed to 'illocutionary'. The problem with Matilal's reading is that it inevitably leads to the interpretation of the Madhyamaka dialectics as purely de-constructive with no commitments of one's own. See Matilal (1971), p. 164.

⁵³ Searle (1969), pp. 32–33.

⁵⁴ The much-quoted following verse from Nāgārjuna illustrates a typical case of *prasajya* negation:

Here, the existence is negated only,
but its non-existence is not upheld.
For when I say that it is not black,
I don't assert that it is white!

Tsongkhapa attributes this verse to Nāgārjuna and states that according to Avalokitavratā the verse is in Nāgārjuna's *Lokāṅgastava*. See *RG*, p. 225. However, the verse cannot be found in the Tibetan translation that exists in the *bstan 'gyur* collection. Bhāvaviveka quotes this verse in his *Prajñāpradīpa* (thus reinforcing the impression that it is from Nāgārjuna) but does not give its source.

⁵⁵ Negations that show [the other] implicitly,
or by an explicit term,
or through both, or not by its own name,
are implicative; the others are different.

Quoted by Tsongkhapa in both his *LN*, p. 222; and *GR*, p. 149.

⁵⁶ The above examples and enumeration of the four negations are from Tsongkhapa. See *LN*, p. 221; *RG*, pp. 39–41. On contemporary work on the Gelug theories about negations, see Klein (1990).

⁵⁷ *LN*, p. 141.

⁵⁸ Murti (1955) and Stcherbatsky (1968) seem to subscribe to this view.

⁵⁹ Ruegg, (1977), p. 36.

⁶⁰ In *GR*, p. 113, Tsongkhapa identifies the absence of pot (*bum med*) as an example of this negation.

⁶¹ See *GR*, p. 113. In accepting these two kinds of nonimplicative negation, I think Tsongkhapa is following a distinction made earlier by the Tibetan epistemologist Chapa Chökyi Senge.

⁶² chos gzhan mi phen no zhes med dgag tu bstan ... *RG*, p. 42.

⁶³ rang bzhin 'gog pa'i rtags kyi bsgrub bya med dgag yin pa dang ... dbu ma thal rang la khyad par yod pa ma yin nol/ *Ibid.* p. 43.

⁶⁴ See, for example for Mikyö Dorje's critique, Williams (1983), p. 134.

⁶⁵ In *lTa ba'i shan 'byed* Gowō Rabjampa lists Tsongkhapa's view of emptiness as nihilism.

⁶⁶ *dBu ma'i byung tshul*, p. 247. Much of Shākya Chogden's critique of Tsongkhapa's view of emptiness seems to be based on the premise that Zhentong Madhyamaka represents the apex of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness. He sees Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu as principal proponents of this highest Madhyamaka teaching. As Tillemans & Tomabechi (1995) have underlined, it is crucial to recognise that Shākya Chogden's Zhentong is significantly different from that of Dolpopa Sherap Gyaltzen's. For one, unlike Dolpopa's Jonang school, Shākya Chogden accords greater significance to the Rangtong interpretation of emptiness. A detailed discussion of Shākya Chogden's critique of Tsongkhapa lies beyond the scope of our study.

⁶⁷ Williams (1992), p. 204.

⁶⁸ *LTCh*, p. 731. It is interesting that in *LTC* Tsongkhapa appears to think that the mere absence of intrinsic being which is the content of an inferential cognition (*rigs shes rjes dpag*) is a 'similitude' of the ultimate referent (*don dam rjes mthun*) thus not the genuine ultimate object (*don dam mtshan nyid pa*). He writes "rigs shes kyi gzhal bya ni don dam bden pa dang mthun pas don dam zhes btags par ... don dam bden par mi bzhed pas legs pa min nol/" *LTC*, p. 15–16. On variants between *LTC* and *LTCh* on the question of whether or not the object of the inferential cognition of emptiness is a genuine ultimate truth, see my "The Question of 'Development' in Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka Philosophy", unpublished paper. For a standard Geluk hermeneutics on this issue, see Zhamar Gendün Tenzin's *Lhad mthong dka' 'grel*, folio 12–15a.

⁶⁹ *LN*, p. 158: des na dbu ma'i rigs pa thams cad ni 'khor ba'i rtsa ba ma rig pa'i 'dzin stangs sun dbyung ba'i yan lag yin pas/ rang rgyud kyi lhan skyes kyi ma rig pas ji ltar bzung ngos zin par byas la de nyid 'gog pa la brtson par bya yi/ grub mtha' smra ba dang gshags 'gyed pa tsam gyi mkhas pa dga' bar mi bya'o//

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 142: des na ma dpyad pa'i 'dzin pa lhan skyes kyi bdag 'diz yul dang bcas pa rigs pa'i dgag bya'i gtso bo yin pa dang/ gzhung mams nas dpyad nas 'gog pa sha stag 'byung ba'ang mi 'gal bas kun btags kyi 'dzin pa yul bcas kho na 'gog go snyam du mi gzung ngo//

⁷¹ On the debate of whether or not the Madhyamika has a thesis, see Ruegg (1989). For an analysis of Tsongkhapa's critique of the 'no thesis' view, see Jinpa (1997), chapter 5.

TIBETAN NAMES IN PHONETICS AND THEIR CORRESPONDENCE IN WYLIE transliteration

Chapa Chökyi Senge	Phya pa chos kyi seng ge
Dolpopa Sherap Gyaltzen	Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan
Geluk	dGe lugs
Gendün Chöphel	dGe 'dun chos 'phel
Gowo Rabjampa, Sonam Senge	Go bo rab 'byams pa, bSod nams seng ge
Jonangpa	Jo nang pa
Kagyü	dKa' brgyud
Karmapa Mikyö Dorje	Karmapa Mi bskyod rdo rje
Ngog Loden Sherap	rNgog blo ldan shes rab
Nyagpa Dawa Zangpo	Nyag pa zla ba bzang po
Nyingma	rNying ma
Pañchen Lobsang Chögyen	Pañ chan blo bzang chos rgyan

Rangtong	Rang stong
Sakya	Sa skya
Shākya Chogden, Serdok Pañchen	Shā kya mchog Idan, gSer mdog Pañ chen
Taktshang Lotsāwa, Sherap Rinchen	sTag tshang Lo tsā ba, Shes rab rin chen
Tashi Lhünpo	'bKra shis lhun po
Tsongkhapa, Lobsang Drakpa	Tsong kha pa, blo bzang grags pa
Zhamar Gendün Tenzin	Zha dmar dge 'dun bstan 'dzin
Zhentong	gZhan stong

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- LTC *Lhag mthong chung ba* ("Abridged Special Insight") in *Byang chub lam rim chung ba* (An Abridged version of the Path to Enlightenment), TKSb, vol. pha. Reprinted in typeset in *rJe'i gsung lta ba'i skor*. Dharamsala: Office of H.H. the Dalai Lama, 1975, vol. 2, pp. 668–757.
- RG *dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*, ("Ocean of Reasoning" being a Commentary of Mūlamadhyamakārikā), TKSb, vol. ba. Reprinted in typeset, Sarnath: Gelukpa Students Union, 1973.
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THE PROSPECTS OF MEMORY

You say, 'After I know what lies ahead,
I'll forget what went before.'
Can you know what lies ahead?
How can you forget
what went before?'

I. RECOGNITION

It is springtime, a sad and lonely spring; Duṣyanta, amnesiac hero of Kālidāsa's masterpiece, the *Abhijñānaśakuntalā*, is going home. He has completed his most recent mission in heaven, destroying Indra's demon foes; this latest feat has temporarily extricated the king from the forlorn and self-pitying state to which his own forgetfulness had reduced him. This act of forgetting was the central, defining episode of Duṣyanta's career; and his story, now cyclically moving toward closure in the final act of Kālidāsa's play, is undoubtedly the most famous meditation on memory and forgetting in the whole classical literature of India. It is this aspect of the work that I wish to explore, together with a glance at related themes in the linguistic domain as formulated by Bhartr̥hari in the *Vākya-paṭīya*, perhaps some decades after Kālidāsa.

Let me remind you of the main lines of the story. Some six or seven years before, Duṣyanta, hunting in the wilderness, had stumbled on the innocent and ravishing Śakuntalā, whom he eventually left, pregnant with child and with hope, to return to his kingdom. Unfortunately, Śakuntalā, heedless with longing, was then cursed by the irascible sage Durvāsa to be forgotten by her lover – until the moment when that lover would see again a concrete token of their love. In due course Śakuntalā arrived in Duṣyanta's court, only to be publicly rejected by the king, who, of course, had no recollection of ever meeting or loving her. Only later, when the ring he had given her, engraved with the syllables of his name, miraculously turned up in the belly of a fish, did Duṣyanta recover the memory of a love now cruelly lost. Despairing, heavy with remorse, he has submerged his sorrows in the military campaign just mentioned.

Now, descending through the skies toward the earth, Duṣyanta pauses to pay his respects to the divine Kaśyapa on Hemakūṭa Mountain. But

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MAITREYA'S JEWELLED WORLD: SOME REMARKS
ON GEMS AND VISIONS IN BUDDHIST TEXTS

I. INTRODUCTION

There is a common adage heard across Indian religions that the true sage is one who looks upon gold and a lump of earth as essentially the same and displays towards both the same attitude of total indifference. Nonetheless, gold, jewels and precious substances have an important role to play in a variety of Indian religious texts in all the renunciatory traditions. In particular, diamonds and rubies, sapphires and crystal, gold and silver, virtually glitter from the pages of many a Buddhist text.

Typically students first encounter Buddhism in a discussion of the *triratna*, the three jewels of Buddha, samgha and dharma. Jewels as metaphors for all that is most excellent enliven many accounts of Buddhist practice. Buddhist ritual and ethical practice are called "the jewel of practice"; the teacher or *ācārya* is said to be the highest jewel; the desire for enlightenment is called a wishing jewel; even the discipline may be called an excellent jewel. Individual Buddhist virtues are also called jewels; thus compassion, *kṛpā*, is a wishing jewel.¹ One text, the *Ratnaguṇasamcayagāthā*, a verse summary of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikaprajñāpāramitā*, describes the wisdom of the Buddha, *prajñā*, as a precious jewel. There in a series of verses that are offered to explain the worship of the Buddha's relics, the body of the Buddha is likened to the jewel box, still viewed with awe even after the jewel has been removed.² In the *Mahāyānasūtrāṅkāra*, chapter 9, omniscience is compared to an open jewel box and Buddhahood to an ocean, the source of all jewels, for it gives rise to various gems such as the Buddhist teaching. The Buddha is also compared to a jewel and his activity to the rays of light that effortlessly stream out from the jewel.³ The examples could be multiplied and could be drawn from other religious traditions in India as well, where similarly anything worthy of praise may be called a jewel or a wishing jewel.⁴

If we move out of the realm of metaphor, into the more concrete, Buddhist texts are replete with stories that show how real wealth and

jewels are the result of merit making activities. The *Avadānaśataka* tells many tales of men and women who in previous births performed acts of piety that now have made them rich, handsome, pleasant smelling and of melodious voice.⁵ This we hear of Suvarṇābha, who in a past life had seen a mirror that had fallen from a stūpa of the Buddha Vipāśyin. He replaced it and as a result was born with such a radiant complexion that he illumined the entire city of Kapilavastu (pp. 154–157). Having a radiant complexion, as bright as gold, is an attribute in the text of the gods in general and the Buddha in particular, who is said to surpass even the gods in his golden hue. Thus in the *Rāstrapālapariṣcchā* we are told that the body of the Buddha is luminous like a jewel (10) and that the Buddha's glowing form surpasses even that of the gods Brahmā and Indra (27). The body of the Buddha is said to be like a golden image (40).⁶

The belief that the gods are luminous and have golden bodies is not peculiar to Buddhism. A Jain cosmological text, the *Srī Prajñāpanā Upāṅga* describes the world of the gods, in which all the buildings are made of jewels, and the gods themselves are bright in hue, adorned with every conceivable jewel. Like Suvarṇābha in the *Avadāna Śataka*, they illuminate the ten directions with their radiance.⁷ Hindu Purāṇic texts similarly describe the gods as of striking radiance, dwelling in jewelled palaces in jewelled heavens.⁸ Perhaps the most famous description of a god in an early Hindu text is that of Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavadgītā*; *Bhagavadgītā* 11.12 describes the god as similar in radiance to the radiance of a thousand suns. Kṛṣṇa is said to be a mass of light, glowing in all directions (11.17).

An early description of the palaces of the gods may be found in the *Mahābhārata*, *Sabhā parvan*, 2.6 ff. Yudhiṣṭhira has had a *sabhā* or court built by the Asura, Maya. The wandering sage Nārada happens by and Yudhiṣṭhira asks if he has ever seen a *sabhā* like his, made of jewels and all aglitter (2.6.10). Nārada replies that such jewelled palaces exist only among the gods. We are also told that the building materials for Yudhiṣṭhira's palace were procured from a marvellous mountain that has gold peaks and is itself made of jewels (2.3.8). Jewels and their radiance are the unique possessions of the gods in later medieval Hindu texts on jewels and their marvellous powers. These texts often begin with a statement that jewels properly once belonged exclusively to the gods; some texts add accounts of how they came to earth. A common account involves the dismemberment of a divine or semi-divine being, whose body parts and fluids become gemstones.⁹

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A jewel-like body is not the only reward for pious acts in the *Avadāna Śataka*. In another story a child is born with an actual jewel on his head. His parents name him Sūrya, "The Sun", because the jewel illuminates the entire house. In his past life he had been gambling with a king and had won a jewel that he then put on the stūpa of the Buddha Vipāśyin (p. 170). In yet another story we hear of a child born with a gold coin in each hand, because in a past life he had placed some coins on the stūpa (p. 206). But, these are small prodigies compared to the great wealth that piety may bring. Worshipping a Buddha may even lead to rebirth as a world emperor or Cakravartin, who inhabits a city made entirely of jewels and surrounded by jewelled ramparts.¹⁰ It may also lead to a life of fabulous pleasures among the gods in a jewelled palace, as we learn from the *Vimāna Vatthu* and its commentary.¹¹

These jewelled cities of the cakravartins and the mansions of the gods are given further religious meaning in the texts devoted to the jewelled paradises of the various Buddhas. Nonetheless, all of these accounts of acquiring jewels and wealth, including the accounts of coming to live in fabulous jewelled cities, in this world as a world emperor, or in the next world as either a god or a citizen of paradise, share a common belief in jewels as somehow associated with karmic reward. At least one Buddhist text suggests that the association between jewels and karmic reward extends beyond the simple equation of good deeds lead to good results and the truism that everyone desires wealth and jewels. In the story of Sadāprarudita that forms part of the *Aṣṭasāhasrika Prajñāpāramitā*, Sadāprarudita has a vision of numerous Buddhas; but the vision eventually evaporates. The account of Sadāprarudita is in fact fundamentally a visionary quest; it culminates in his finding the city Gandhavatī, which is a typical paradisiacal jewelled city, made of the seven great jewels and surrounded by seven jewelled walls (p. 240), and in a vision of countless Buddhas.¹²

In the city of Gandhavatī there are jewelled trees that bear jewels as fruits. The entire city is surrounded by bells that act like wind chimes and produce a soft sound that delights all the inhabitants. In the moats around the city are jewelled boats that have come into being through the ripening of the good karma of the people there (*pūrvakarmavipākenābhinirvṛtāh*).¹³ The gardens of the city boast jewelled flowers and birds of every kind. The gardens, too, are said to have come into being through the good karma of those who now enjoy them. Indeed perhaps it is not unreasonable to generalize from this and assume that the jewelled city in its entirety is a result of good deeds.

That the experience of this marvellous city is part of a larger, visionary experience is clear from what happens there to Sadāprarudita. Sadāprarudita during his quest for the city gains certain *samādhis*, a term often translated by the word "meditation" or "concentration", but which I would prefer to translate here as "visions".¹⁴ One of these *samādhis* is called "*sarvatathāgatadarśī*", "Displaying all of the Tathāgatas" (pp. 242–243). Through the power of this *samādhi*, Sadāprarudita sees countless Buddhas, who instruct him and then vanish. His ultimate religious achievement will also be a final vision of the Buddhas, after he has reached the city and met his mentor Dharmodgata.

At one point in his encounter with Dharmodgata Sadāprarudita asks about the nature of his visions of the Buddhas that he has had along the way to Gandhāvātī. He asks Dharmodgata specifically where all the Buddhas he had seen have gone on the dissolution of the vision (p. 251). Dharmodgata answers with a number of analogies to show that truth or reality cannot come or go. One of the images he uses is of jewels in the ocean:

It is this way, o son of a good family. It is just like the jewels of the ocean; they do not come from the Eastern direction, nor from the South, nor from the West, nor from the North; they do not come from the intermediate directions, nor from below nor above; indeed they do not come from any place, from any direction, and yet jewels do come into being in that great ocean in response to all the good deeds of living beings. They could not do so without the proper collocation of causes. They come into being through a chain of major causes and ancillary causes. And when those jewels vanish, they do not go anywhere, not to any one of the ten directions. Rather, in the absence of those very causes that brought them into being, those jewels do not appear. It is exactly the same, o son of a good family, with the production of the bodies of the Buddhas. They do not come from any one of the ten directions, nor do they go to any one of the ten directions. And yet the body of the Buddha is not without causes; it is produced through earlier deeds, dependent on major causes and ancillary causes, it is produced through causes, it comes into being because of the ripening of previous karmas (p. 254).

In this passage, jewels are seen to be a particularly apt point of comparison for the visionary Buddha bodies Sadāprarudita has seen because the very existence of jewels in their main source, the ocean, is said to be a response to karma. There is something wonderful about jewels that makes them appropriate as a vehicle to understand the nature of ultimate reality, in this case its seemingly unpredictable and visionary presentation to the spiritual seeker.¹⁵

This ability of jewels to appear in response to good karma may in part lie behind their importance in certain visionary texts. We shall see below that Maitreya's marvellous palace or *kūṭāgāra* in the *Gandavyūha* is said to be the result of the ripening of his good karma (p. 360). In addition, we might note here that the many Pure Lands of Mahāyāna Buddhism,

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also constructed of fabulous jewels, are primarily described as coming about in response to the vows of the Bodhisattva. In a discussion of how this is possible, one text, the *Akṣobhyatathāgatavyūha Sūtra*, gives an answer that recalls the statement about jewels in the ocean in the *Aṣṭasāhasrika*: it is simply the case that the Pure Land exists as a response to the Bodhisattva vow.¹⁶ I would argue that this statement, far from seeming unusual, might have seemed natural to an audience who believed that the appearance of any and every jewel in its ocean source was itself a response to karma.¹⁷

That this belief in the appearance of jewels as a response to karma was in fact wide-spread is suggested by a humorous episode in a medieval Jain story. A pious young man has been given a magical jewel by a *vidyādhara*, a creature of supernatural abilities. The *vidyādhara* himself had received the jewel from a god who was pleased with his deeds. Our young man entrusts the jewel to his friend, who decides to steal it. He places an ordinary stone in the hole in which he had hidden the jewel, thinking that if his friend should by chance decide to dig up the jewel and find the stone instead, he would merely assume that the jewel had turned to stone because of his own lack of merit and have no suspicion of any wrong-doing.¹⁸ Thus the wicked young man's trick in the story depends on a shared belief that jewels appear as a response to good karma and can just as simply disappear when there is no merit. Another Jain story explains the mechanism of the change from jewel to ordinary stone, or in this case to lumps of coal. The monk Hemacandra comes to the house of a merchant who has fallen on bad times. His gold has turned to coal. Hemacandra touches the coal and makes it into gold again. The text explains that he does this by driving away the evil demi-god that had been concealing the gold.¹⁹ Other Jain stories make fun of the belief that precious substances come and go according to a person's merit; when a man is cheated of a jewel by his friend and shown a stone in its place, he takes his revenge by inviting the cheater's two sons to dinner and then returning to him two monkeys in their place. When the cheater asks how children can turn into monkeys, the clever friend replies that it was due to their father's lack of merit; for if a jewel can turn into a stone surely a child can turn into a monkey.²⁰

To return to our story of Sadāprarudita, Sadāprarudita is further instructed by his mentor and the story concludes in chapter 32 with a final vision of the Buddhas in all the ten directions. I have singled out the story of Sadāprarudita for two reasons. The first is the prevalence of jewels and jewelled objects in this primarily visionary account. There is the city itself, the wonderful jewelled city of the cakravartin

with its jewelled buildings, walls, tree and gardens. There is also a jewelled *kūṭāgāra* that Dharmodgata had caused to be made to enshrine the *Prajñāpāramitā*. The structure is adorned with red sandalwood and surrounded by garlands of pearls. It is made of the seven jewels. In the corners are jewels which serve the function of lamps. In the middle of the *kūṭāgāra* is a jewelled throne made of the seven jewels and a container made of jewels. The *Prajñāpāramitā*, written on gold sheets with *vaiḍūrya* gems, is in this container (p. 249).²¹ And most importantly, there is the suggestive statement of Dharmodgata, likening the appearance of the Buddhas in visions to the appearance of jewels in the ocean. Jewels seem to be present here not only because they are valued precious substances, nor merely because of their association with the gods and heavenly cities. The text attests to a particular belief in the ability of jewels to appear as a response to collective and individual merits, making them a parallel to the appearance of the Buddha body in visions.

There were in fact many unusual beliefs about jewels in ancient and medieval India that I would like to suggest made them not only the stuff out of which heavenly palaces were thought to have been made, but also helped determine their importance in visionary texts. I refer specifically to diverse beliefs that associate jewels with a marvellous ability to create or make manifest diverse worlds and diverse objects, either within themselves, or by projecting these objects outside of themselves. There are also some unusual beliefs in jewelled palaces that belong to denizens of the underworld; these jewelled palaces are further associated with magic powers and magic objects. I would like to suggest that such beliefs made jewels a particularly fitting material for religious visions, which themselves seem to come from a different world and to be somehow of a different nature from ordinary experience. In what follows I focus on the religious visions of one specific text, the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, and a complex of ideas about jewels that can be found in this and other texts. I hope ultimately that by focussing on the material aspect of the religions visions and by exploring what texts have to say about the peculiar properties of one ubiquitous material element of visions, namely jewels, we might gain further insight into the power and significance of some of the visions texts like the *Gaṇḍavyūha* describe.²²

II. MAITREYA'S JEWELLED WORLD: THE VISIONS IN THE *GAṆḌAVYŪHA*

Like the quest of Sadāprarudita, Sudhana's quest may also be understood as a vision quest. His search includes an elaborate vision granted him by Maitreya. The vision takes place in a *kūṭāgāra*, a term we have met in Sadāprarudita's quest.²³ The *kūṭāgāra* of Maitreya is an elaborate structure; it is first described in chapter 53, where it is said to be the result of Maitreya's good deeds as a bodhisattva (*bodhisattvakuśālamūlavipākābhinirvṛtto*, p. 361, line 25) and to have been produced from his vow (*bodhisattvapraṇidhānasamudgata*, p. 360, line 26) and from the power of his special knowledge (*bodhisattvābhijñānabalābhinirvṛtta*, p. 360, line 27).²⁴ Later, when Sudhana finally sees the structure we are told that it is as vast as the sky (p. 407; *gaganatalāpramāṇam*) and adorned with all kinds of flags and banners (*asaṃkheyacchattradhvajapatākālamkāram*) and with innumerable jewels (*asaṃkhyeyaratnālamkāram*). It has countless hanging ornaments of jewels and pearls (*asaṃkhyeyamuktāhārapralambitālamkāram*; *asaṃkhyeyaratnahārapralambitālamkāram*). It has jewelled bells and chains and fine gold dust (*asaṃkheyaghāṇṭhāmādhuranirghoṣālamkāram*; *asaṃkhyeyasuvārnacūrṇasampravaraṣānālamkāram*); it has countless mirrors and heaps of bricks made of jewels (*asaṃkhyeyādarśamaṇḍalālamkāram*; *asaṃkhyeyaratneṣṭikānicitālamkāram*). Its walls are of jewels (*asaṃkhyeyaratnabhūtyalamkāram*) and it has jewelled trees and paths (*ratnavṛkṣa*; *ratnapatha*). There are ponds and lotuses, jewelled steps and all kinds of marvellous jewelled arrangements (*asaṃkhyeyasarvaratnavyūhālamkāra*, p. 408). Once inside Sudhana sees hundreds of thousands of other similar structures. They do not touch each other, but in the manner of reflections they all appear on each and every surface.²⁵

Sudhana then sees himself in the *kūṭāgāra*; among other things he sees Maitreya and all the events in Maitreya's religious life. From the hosts of mirrors he sees countless Buddhas, bodhisattvas and Buddha fields. From the rays emitted by the pillars he sees figures emerge; he sees lakes, he sees men and women and children; he sees gods, Śakra and Brahmā and the protectors of the quarters; he sees nāgas and yakṣas, pratyekabuddhas, śrāvakas and bodhisattvas (p. 412). In short, coming from the jewelled rays and the jewelled pillars, from the reflecting surfaces of mirrors and gold he sees every manner of creatures that people the universe. The vision is brought about by the power of Maitreya and the expansion of Sudhana's own consciousness.²⁶

The vision disperses at Maitreya's bidding and Sudhana, like Sadāprarudita, is left to wonder where has it gone. Maitreya's answer

is somewhat different from Dharmodgata's reply to Sadāprarudita. He tells him that it is in the very nature of things that they appear in a marvellous way, controlled by the power of the bodhisattva's knowledge. "*eśā dharmānām dharmatā, aviṣṭhapanapratyupasthānalakṣaṇāḥ kulaputra sarvadharmā bodhisattvajñānādhiṣṭitāḥ*" (p. 415, line 28).²⁷

The text gives a series of analogies to explain Sudhana's visionary experience. I would like to focus for a moment on one of these, because I believe that it can help us to understand how jewels play a role in visions in the text and some of the cultural beliefs that may have contributed to shaping the visions and the way in which they are described. We have already seen above that jewels share one very important characteristic with these visionary structures; jewels and these marvellous buildings are both said to be produced by the ripening of good deeds. But there is another important feature that they seem to have shared in the imaginative world of this and related texts. Jewels are capable of projecting the universe out of themselves or manifesting it within themselves. I begin from a consideration of jewels as magic objects and what this might tell us about one of the many meanings of the visions in the *Gaṇḍavyūha*.

II.A. Vidhurapaṇḍita's Jewel and Māyā's Body: The Reality of Visions

At one point (p. 415, lines 13–16) Maitreya tells Sudhana that the appearance of the entire universe in the *kūṭāgāra* may be likened to the appearance of the universes in the *vimāna* or palace of Brahmā. Just as the *kūṭāgāra* of Maitreya was called the *Vairocanavyūhālamkāragarbha*, "the *kūṭāgāra* that contained within it all of the manifestations of Vairocana" (p. 407, line 10), so the palace of Brahmā is called *sarvajagadvaravyūhagarbha*, "the palace that has in it all of the most excellent manifestations of the universe" (p. 415, lines 14–15). In this palace of Brahmā, we are told, "*sarvatrisāhasramahāsahasro lokadhātur ābhāsam āgacchati pratibhāsayogena sarvārambaṇāmiśrībhūtaḥ*", "the entire great universe, the entire three-thousand-fold world system appears like a reflection, intimately connected to each and every surface".²⁸

In the *Mahābhārata*, *sabhā parvan*, in which the various palaces or courts (*sabhā*), of the gods are described, the court of Brahmā is distinctive. While it shares with the palaces of the other gods its luminous nature, it is constantly changing in form and so no definite description can be given of it (2.11.9). Maitreya's palace shares with the court of Brahmā its elusive appearance; it seems all things at once so that no single description of it is possible. Thus we are told that from the pillars came rays of light that belong to every type of jewel. At some points

they were dark blue in color; elsewhere they were yellow, or red or white or crystal clear, and in places they were the color of the rainbow; the rays that came from the pillars were at once of every possible color (p. 412). Jain stories know of magical jewels of divine origin which similarly cannot be described by any single characterization. Thus in the story from the *Upamitibhavaprapanakathā* and the untrustworthy friend mentioned earlier, the magic jewel is described as follows:

*kiṃ nīlaṃ kimidam raktaṃ kiṃ pītaṃ yadi vā sitam /
kiṃ kṛṣṇam iti suvyaktaṃ lokadṛṣṭyā na lakṣyate //
dyotitāśeṣadikkakram sarvavarnavirājītam/
lasadacchaprabhājālair dikṣu baddhendrakārmukam //*

"The common eye could not tell exactly if the jewel was blue or red, yellow, white or black. It illuminated space in every direction around it, and shone with every possible color, casting a rainbow in every direction with its dancing rays" (pp. 749–750).

This magical jewel seems an exact counterpart to the pillars in Maitreya's *kūṭāgāra*. Protean shape, complexity of vision and defiance of the normal laws of nature would appear to be some of the unusual features of the jewelled palaces of the gods and magic jewels themselves. But the closest parallel that I could find to Maitreya's description of Brahmā's palace in which the entire universe appears is in another Buddhist text and concerns not a palace but a single jewel.

The *Vidhurapaṇḍita Jātaka* (545) tells of the efforts of a yakṣa to bring the famous Vidhura to a Nāga king. Vidhura is serving as the minister of a king named Dhanañjayakorabba. The yakṣa knows that the king is fond of gambling. He decides that he must have something with which to tempt the king into playing against him; he intends to win Vidhura in the dice game. He thinks to himself that the king already has a palace full of jewels and won't be tempted by any ordinary gem. He then remembers that there is a special jewel fit for a world emperor that is to be found in a mountain named Vepulla, on the outskirts of the city Rājagaha.²⁹ He seeks for the jewel and finds it in the middle of one of the mountain peaks (*pabbatakūṭamajjhe*, vs. 1177, p. 272). He takes it with him and goes at once to king Dhanañjayakorabba. At first the king is uninterested in a gambling match for the sake of some jewel, but the yakṣa gives him to understand that the jewel he has brought is no ordinary gemstone. In the shining jewel the king can see the forms of women and men, deer and birds, the king of the Nāgas and the king of the Garuḍas (vs 1186–1187). Even the language of what the king sees in the jewel in these verses recalls the language of Sudhana's vision; both see *vigrahas*, forms or likenesses or images. The king further sees whole armies arrayed for battle (1188–1189). He sees a city surrounded by moats and ramparts. There is the city gate on which different birds

roost. And then the king sees the various dwellings in the city, the market, the wine shops, the district of the courtesans and the artisans. He sees all kinds of musical instruments and various spectacles like wrestling matches in progress; he then moves out of the city to see its surrounding mountains and wild beasts. Then there are rivers with golden sand and finally he sees the very boundaries of the earth ringed by the oceans. Beyond that he sees distant world systems. In short, he can see in this jewel all of the universe and everything that is in it. The magic jewel that came from a *kūṭa* or mountain peak displays to the king the entire world, just as Maitreya's *kūṭāgāra* allows Sudhana to see within it every conceivable creature and the lives and worlds of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.

Maitreya's *kūṭāgāra* is by no means the only visionary architecture in the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, and in what follows I shall examine some of these other visionary structures. We will see that like Maitreya's *kūṭāgāra*, they are made of shining jewels. Like Maitreya's *kūṭāgāra* and the yakṣa's jewel one looks into them and sees something surprising and marvellous. One of the most unusual chapters in the text is chapter 44, devoted to Māyā, the mother of the Buddha. In this chapter, Sudhana has a vision of a jewelled *kūṭāgāra* (p. 342). First a large jewelled lotus emerges from the earth, its stalk entirely made of diamond. Its leaves are of jewels and it is surrounded by jewelled filaments. In the center of the lotus is a jewelled *kūṭāgāra*. It has thousands of jewelled pillars and is adorned with hanging garlands of pearls. On all sides of it are jewelled stairs. In the middle of the structure is a fabulous seat of rubies and wishing jewels. Sudhana sees Māyā on this throne. She has the ability to display herself in accordance with the mental tendencies of the different observers; thus some see her looking like one of the daughters of Māra, while others see her as a heavenly damsel, an *apsarās*, and some see her as a beautiful mortal woman (p. 344). Māyā explains to Sudhana that she is the mother of all the Buddhas. She further explains to him how her own body basically becomes a jewelled *kūṭāgāra* upon the descent of the future Buddha into her womb. When the Buddha is about to descend from the Tuṣita heaven he emits rays of light from his body. These rays of light fall on Māyā and enter into her from her head and from all the pores in her skin. At that moment all of her retinue can see on her body the miraculous manifestations of the bodhisattvas. She herself can see the future Buddha seated at the seat of enlightenment; surrounded by a host of bodhisattvas, worshipped by the protectors of the quarters. She can even see the various Buddhas that this future Buddha has worshipped before. This vision almost prefigures

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what Sudhana will see in Maitreya's *kūṭāgāra*, where he sees the entire career of Maitreya. Māyā goes on to tell Sudhana that when the Buddha descends into her womb all kinds of beings also go into her womb so that they can see the Buddha; there are the four world protectors and countless bodhisattvas. And despite their presence in her womb she retains her original size.

The textual lineage of this vision is not difficult to uncover. In the *Lalitavistara* the descent of the Buddha from the Tuṣita heaven into the womb of his mother is described in great detail.³⁰ The text is uncomfortable with the idea that the future Buddha should dwell in the foul-smelling womb of a woman. The compromise is reached that the future Buddha descends in a marvellous pavilion or *kūṭāgāra*; it has three rooms, one inside the other.³¹ It is smeared with sandal paste, exactly as is the marvellous *kūṭāgāra* that Dharmodgata is said to have made for the *Prajñāpāramitā* in the story of Sadāprarudita discussed above. We are then told of what the gods do when the future Buddha descends into his mother's body in this structure (p. 52):

tasmin khalu punaḥ kūṭāgāre śakrasya devānāṃ indrasya trāyastriṃśānāṃ devānāṃ ca pratibhāsāḥ samdrśyante sma

"And in that *kūṭāgāra* were seen the reflections of the thirty-three gods and Śakra, the king of the gods".

This statement develops in the *Gaṇḍavyūha* into the elaborate account of Māyā, in which the future Buddha enters her womb along with a vast retinue, including of course Śakra and the gods. We are also told in the *Lalitavistara*, p. 53, that as Māyā looked at her own body, "she could see the bodhisattva in her womb, just as one sees one's own face clearly reflected in a mirror", *yadā ca māyādevī svam dakṣiṇam pārśvam pratyavekṣate sma, tadā paśyati sma bodhisattvam kuṣiḡatam, tadyathā nāma supariśuddhādarśamaṇḍale mukhamaṇḍalam drśyate*. We might add that Māyā's entire body seems to have become transparent like a jewel.

We would appear to have come some distance from the jewel that the yakṣa procured in order to win the minister Vidhura, but I hope I can make some of the intervening steps clearer. The story of Vidhura introduces us to a jewel in which all of the universe exists or can be seen. The actual verb used in the verses is more intriguing; the verses tell us that these things are *nimita* or produced there. The vision of Maitreya in the *Gaṇḍavyūha* tells us of jewelled structures in which all manner of things are seen as if by reflection. And in answer to the question where these visions go, Maitreya tells Sudhana that it is the nature of things that they are magically produced by the power

of the bodhisattva's knowledge. The *Lalitavistara*, I think, helps us with some of the language of these visions; here there are really two "jewelled" structures, the structure in which the future Buddha descends into Māyā's womb and her body itself. In the first structure the gods would seem to be reflected, but the language of Māyā's seeing of the Buddha cautions us against taking the word *pratibhāsa* too literally and too simply as "reflection", meaning "false appearance" for she sees the Buddha in her womb as she might see her own face reflected in a mirror, and yet we know that the Buddha is in her womb and not somewhere outside, casting his reflection.³² The word *pratibhāsa*, then, and the language of reflection seem to indicate here a remarkable presence and clear, limpid seeing. It is the seeing of religious visions. In the developed version of the descent of the Buddha in the *Gaṇḍavyūha* there is, I think, even less room for ambiguity in the understanding of what happens to the gods at the moment of descent of the Buddha, for there we are told how the Buddha descended into Māyā's womb with all the gods and bodhisattvas and how Māyā saw on her own body, which was turned into a jewel-like structure by the rays that came from the descending future Buddha, all of the events in the life of the Buddha, beginning with his birth. We are back, I think, to the *Vidhurapaṇḍita Jātaka* and to the paradigm of a jewel that reveals and contains within itself the wonders of the universe.

The *Gaṇḍavyūha* itself actually has much to say about jewels that can help us in this quest to understand their role in certain religious visions. At one point Maitreya compares *bodhicitta* with various jewels (pp. 399–400). There are some jewels that surpass all others in their brilliance; there are jewels that prevent the ocean from being burnt up by the submarine fire; there are jewels that when thrown into water clear the water of all impurities and jewels that prevent a fisherman from drowning. There are jewels that allow their wearer to enter into the palaces of the nāgas, under the sea. Moonstones release streams of water when touched by moonbeams, while sun stones belch fire on contact with the sun. Another jewel fulfills all the wishes of living beings, while the jewel of the world emperor dispels darkness. Finally we come to something called the *vaśirājamāni*, which is capable of displaying the various manifestations of all the heavenly palaces and abodes of the spheres of the sun and moon (p. 400, lines 20–22). Similarly the jewel called *sāgaravyūhagarbha* can display all the many oceans. These two jewels, capable of these different displays, are the highest jewels known and the final points of comparison for the Buddha's omniscience and *bodhicitta*.

From these references, I believe that we can conclude that the author(s) or compiler(s) of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* undoubtedly knew about jewels that like the jewel in the *Vidhurapaṇḍita Jātaka* were capable of giving rise to marvellous appearances. The jewelled *kūṭāgāra* of Maitreya, I would suggest, builds naturally on a complex of beliefs about jewels, namely that jewels appear in response to meritorious deeds and that they have the power to create a visionary world. I would add that such beliefs in the magic power of jewels are pan-Indian and not by any means uniquely Buddhist.

There is a long tradition in story literature of jewelled palaces, in appearance similar to the jewelled palaces of the gods, but belonging to demi-gods, to Asuras or Yakṣas. These are magical palaces, very much like Yudhiṣṭhira's court or *sabhā* in the *Mahābhārata* that I mentioned above and that was said to have been built by an Asura. A wonderful source of medieval stories is Somadeva's *Kathāsaritsāgara*.³³ In the *Kathāsaritsāgara* we are told of the quest of a King Bhūnandana (12.79ff). Bhūnandana falls asleep and has sex with a beautiful woman only to awaken and find her gone. He knows from the marks on his body that the experience was not in fact a dream at all, but a real occurrence. He decides that Śiva has given him the experience and that only by propitiating Śiva can he find the girl again. He gives up his kingdom and goes to a tīrtha known as Kramasaras, made by the foot of Viṣṇu in his dwarf incarnation (96–97). There he performs austerities for twelve years, when an ascetic comes to him and tells him that the woman lives in Pātāla, the underworld, and that he can take the king to her. He explains that there are many holes in the earth that lead to the underworld, but that one of the largest is in Kasmir. The king agrees to follow the ascetic and his disciples. They perform a number of rituals, propitiating the goddess Śarikā, and throwing consecrated mustard seeds on the ground. They cross a river to a land of silver sands and divine forests with gold lotuses and trees of coral, sandal and aloe woods (120). In the middle of the forest is a divine temple to Śiva that has a jewelled staircase, gold walls, jewelled pillars and is made of moonstones (120–121). They worship Śiva there and proceed to find a great wall of gold with a jewel-studded gate. Having driven off the guardians of the gate the king and the ascetic enter the jewelled city beyond the wall. The houses are of jewels and gold (133). The king is led into one of the houses by an attendant who is a *daitya kanyā*, a demon girl (142). On the walls of the house are reflected the likenesses of the servant girls, so that the house seems to have living paintings on its walls (143). There the king finally encounters his elusive lover,

only to fail her test and lose her and find himself back at the tīrtha once again. He does more austerities and eventually wins the girl. This jewelled world is a world of magic, peopled with women of exotic and superhuman beauty. In the story that immediately follows this one, another hero, Sudarśana, comes upon a jewelled palace in a forest that belongs to a demi-goddess, a yakṣiṇī, whose feet point backwards. There he receives divine food and drink (243). In yet another tale, an ascetic tells a queen how he had been wandering from tīrtha to tīrtha when he came to lake Mānasa in the Himālayas (6.207). There he sees in the lake as if in a mirror a jewelled house: *ādarsaivāpaśyam antar maṇimayam grham* (207). Out of the house comes a man holding a sword in his hand and accompanied by some women. He scampers onto the bank of the lake and proceeds to enjoy himself with the women, until he falls into a drunken stupor. Another man happens on the scene; he explains to the ascetic that he is King Tribhuvana. Once he was duped by a Śaiva monk, a Pāśupata, who had persuaded him to go down a hole and into a jewelled house there to get a magic sword. Tribhuvana also found for himself a beautiful Asura girl there. But the ascetic had tricked him and stolen both. Now he has the chance to take his revenge, for the drunken fellow on the bank is none other than the duplicitous Pāśupata ascetic!

There are several elements in this story that I think are relevant to this discussion. In this story the jewelled house is the abode of women who have magic powers and magic objects; the sword has the power to accomplish all the *siddhis* and is said to grant the power to fly. The jewelled palace also appears in the lake *as if in a mirror*, and yet from it come real beings with special powers. I would like to suggest that at least in some cases the jewelled palaces and appearances in them in the *Gaddavyūha* that are said to be "like reflections" are like reflections in the same way as the jewelled house in this story: that is to say, they are somehow otherworldly structures.³⁴ Further, I would suggest that these jewelled palaces and Maitreya's jewelled structure have in common a connection with unusual powers.

There are also many references to jewels in medieval philosophy texts which I think can be read as indications of the belief in a strong association between jewels and magical creative properties. The *Spandapradīpikā* of Utpalācārya has a brief discussion on why the soul is called a "wishing gem" or *cintāmaṇi*.³⁵ Citing the *Śrīpauskarā* the text says that although one cannot see anything in a wishing jewel, it produces anything and everything a person wishes; Brahma is the same, capable of doing all things. A verse from the *Paramārthasāra*

says that Brahma appears to a worshipper in whatever the form the worshipper chooses to worship; similarly the wishing jewel comes to a person as he or she desires. The *Jñānasambodha* is quoted as saying that although the power of consciousness is essentially one it becomes many under the influence of desires, just as the beautiful form of a wishing jewel changes in response to wants. In all of these examples it is the creative power of the jewel that is the reason for it serving as the standard of comparison for the soul, which in this text is the active creative source of the world. I would like to suggest that similar beliefs may have motivated these jewelled visions of the *Gaddavyūha*.³⁶

Before making further tentative conclusions I would like to examine a few other sections of the *Gaddavyūha* and their visions. By reviewing these examples we see clearly that the culminating vision of Maitreya's *kūṭāgāra* has a familiar context to the reader of the text. It is only one of a host of other visions which involve jewel-like structures or a body of jewel-like purity. Individually they provide us with pieces of information about how the text interprets its visions. In my discussion of the vision of Māyā's body I have stressed the creative/magical properties of jewels and drawn some tentative conclusions about how we might interpret the ontological status of at least some of the visions in our text. In the next section we learn something about the agent of a vision.

II.B. *Muktaka's Jewelled Body and the Mind as a Jewel*

The merchant Muktaka in chapter 6 is an example of a vision that takes place not in some jewelled architectural structure but on a body that has become jewel-like. Muktaka steeps himself in *samādhi*, assisted by the power of the Buddha and Mañjuśrī (p. 64). His body becomes so pure that all the Buddhas in the ten directions along with their Buddha fields and their retinues of Bodhisattvas, along with their former deeds, including their turning of the wheel and instructing all creatures, are seen everywhere on his body (p. 64). We might recall that such a vision of the career of a bodhisattva or Buddha is a component of the vision that Sudhana will later have in Maitreya's *kūṭāgāra*. Sudhana not only sees the Buddhas living out their careers on Muktaka's body; he even hears their preaching (p. 65). Muktaka goes on to explain to Sudhana that he has the power to see the Buddhas in the ten directions whenever he wishes, without going anywhere and without those Buddhas going anywhere. He says that he knows that his mind is like a vessel of clear water and that the Buddhas are like reflections, their words like echoes.³⁷ The mind, he realizes, has the magical power to make things known the way magic can (*māyopamavijñaptim svacittasya prajānan,*

p. 66, line 32). He adds that it is the power of the mind or perhaps the total control of the mind that is the purification of the Buddha fields.

One of the most pervasive comparisons in Buddhist and indeed non-Buddhist texts is in fact of the mind to a jewel.³⁸ That the mind plays a major role in the generation of the visions is clear in the chapter on Sudhana's encounter with Maitreya. There by way of explaining how Sudhana can have these visions we find this phrase: *parittasamjñāgataniruddhacetā vipulamāhadgatānāvaranabodhi-sattvasamjñāgatavihārī* (p. 414, line 20). I would translate this roughly as follows: "His mind stopped conceiving of things as limited and roamed freely in the knowledge of the bodhisattva, which is vast, expansive and without impediment". The ability to have visions is here related specifically to an expansion of consciousness accomplished by a freeing of the mind from any association with limited objects.³⁹

In Muktaka's vision the role of the mind is made even more explicit. The mind has become clear, a reflecting surface, on which the Buddha is reflected. But beyond that, Muktaka tells us that his mind is also associated with a magical ability to create. I would like to suggest that the comparison between the mind and jewel that occurs in this text and numerous other texts captures both of these aspects. A jewel has the ability both to reflect and to project. It is both passive reflecting surface and active creative agent.⁴⁰ In Muktaka's vision, I might add, the body and the mind have become indistinguishable in nature and function, both extremely pure, both reflective and creative.

II.C. *Maitrāyaṇī's Palace: The Jewel Palace/Body/Mind as Reflecting Surface*

The final vision I will examine is the vision of Maitrāyaṇī. In chapter 13 Sudhana approaches Maitrāyaṇī, the daughter of King Simhaketu. She is in a palace, the Vairocanagarbha palace, that prefigures the name of Maitreya's *kūṭāgāra*, *Vairocanavyūhālamkāragarbha*. The palace sits on ground made of crystal and has pillars of vaidūrya and walls of diamond. It is adorned with every kind of jewel, and with bells and mirrors (p. 96). When Sudhana asks Maitrāyaṇī how one is to practice the bodhisattva path she tells him to look at the wonderful manifestations coming out of her palace. He looks and sees from every wall, pillar, mirror, every form and shape, every jewel, every golden bell, every jewelled tree, every jewelled garland, all of the tathāgatas enacting the major events of their lives, turning the wheel, passing into nirvāṇa, and so on. The way in which he sees these things is described by a term that is now familiar to us, *pratibhāsayogena*, "in

the manner of reflections" (p. 96, line 31). The text expands on this comparison, "*yathāca ekasmād ārambaṇāt tathā sarvārambanebhyah// tad yathāpi nāma udakasarasī svacche 'nāvile viprasanne gaganam candrādityam jyotirganapratimaṇḍitam samdrśyate pratibhāsayogena, evam eva vairocanagarbhaprāsādasya ekaiskasmād ārambaṇād dharmadhātugatās tathāgatāḥ samdrśyante pratibhāsayogena, yaduta Maitrāyaṇyāḥ kanyāyāḥ pūrvakuśalamūlaniṣyandena*" (p. 96, line 31 – page 97, line 4), "And just as those things could be seen from one surface so were they seen from every surface. It is like this. Just as in a lake with pure and calm water, undisturbed, the sky and the sun and moon, surrounded by the stars may be seen by way of reflection, just so in this palace known as Vairocanagarbha from each surface all the Buddhas in the entire universe are seen by way of reflection, and all of this is on account of the ripening of the good deeds of the princess Maitrāyaṇī".

Here it is the reflective properties of the jewels that are highlighted. Jewels are the *ārambaṇa*, the support of visions of the Buddhas because they are reflective. The body of the Buddha is like a reflection and needs this reflecting surface, whether it be the mind, a purified body, or some jewelled building. It would take us too far afield to discuss the significance of the body of the Buddha itself as a reflection; I have argued extensively elsewhere that the language of reflection in Indian religions may indicate not the falsehood of the divine body but its greater reality.⁴¹ Here I would only like to point out that in this particular account of a vision it is primarily the passive ability of jewels to serve as reflecting surfaces that is emphasized. In closing I would like to try to summarize what we may learn from putting the information we have gained from these individual visions together.

III. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper I attempted to look at the language of religious visions in one text, the *Gaṇḍavyūha*.⁴² I focussed on the role that jewels are accorded in the descriptions of the visions and tried to suggest how the prevalence of jewels in visions is related to general beliefs about jewels that we find attested in a wide range of literary sources. Focussing on the question, why jewels, I hoped might help us to understand the meanings of the visions. In section II.A. I argued that jewels are regarded as active creative agents in a wide variety of texts and appear in a number of stories that deal with magic and magic powers. I proposed at various junctures in the paper that we consider this when we come to interpret

the ontological status of religious visions and the language of reflections in descriptions of visions. The language of jewels, I wanted to suggest, argues against the interpretation of these visions as examples of absolute fictions and in favor of an interpretation of visions as expanded realities.

I also tried to suggest a unity behind the many accounts of visions in the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, achieved through the medium of jewels. We have seen that jewels are ubiquitous in the religious visions of the *Gaṇḍavyūha*. Religious visions are attributed to the agency of the mind, which is likened to a jewel in its creative potential. The perfected body of the aspirant becomes a jewel in which the deeds of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are either visible or actually manifested (Muktaka; Māyā); alternatively a jewelled palace is the vehicle of the vision (Maitrāyaṇī; Maitreya). Both these cases, the achievement of the jewelled body and the creation of the jewelled building, are said to be the result of karma. In both of these two cases I argued that it was a combination of the belief in the ability of jewels to respond to karma and the belief in the creative power of jewels that lay behind the language of these visions in which the body becomes jewel-like or the aspirant has a jewelled palace in which various objects and actions are made visible. Additionally, with the visions of Muktaka and Maitrāyaṇī, we add to this complex the notion that the body of the Buddha, a perfected body and thus a jewelled body, is itself a reflection. As a reflection it needs a reflecting surface. Thus the mind of the aspirant as a jewel becomes both the active agent of a vision and its passive recipient; similarly perfected bodies or the jewelled palaces that may be considered to be their further externalizations actively create and passively receive the visionary universe as a reflection. In addition these reflecting surfaces themselves become reflections, for in the language of the text every surface was reflected on every other surface.

Finally I would like to consider the culminating vision of Samantabhadra in which all of these are brought together. Indeed the crowning vision given Sudhana in the *Gaṇḍavyūha* is not the vision of Maitreya's *kūṭāgāra*, which was the starting point of the discussion in this paper, but a vision of the universe on Samantabhadra's body, a vision which was said to appear *pratibhāsayogena*, in the manner of a reflection (p. 424, line 26). Samantabhadra explains that one of the fruits of long term religious practice is the attainment of an extremely pure body which is capable of displaying such manifestations (*anuttaraśca rūpakāyaḥ pariśodhitah. . . Sarvataḥ sarvavikurvitasamdarśanaḥ*, pp. 426-427, lines 31, 1-2, "And I purified my incomparable physical body which is capable of displaying everywhere every marvellous type of display").

That such a body in which may be seen the bodies of the Buddhas, in the manner of a reflection, is a jewelled body is confirmed by one of the wondrous signs that precedes Sudhana's meeting with Samantabhadra. From every mote of dust in the universe emerge clouds of jewelled images that have reflections of the bodies of the Buddhas on them, (*sarvatathāgatakāyapratibhāsamanīratnavigrahameghā*, p. 421, line 22).⁴³ The Buddha body and the body of Samantabhadra are jewelled bodies. As jewels we know now that they can both manifest within themselves and project beyond themselves the objects of the universe; at the same time they are also reflecting surfaces that can receive the reflections of other objects and they are themselves reflections. The perfected world of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* is a world fittingly of jewels, the only substance in Indian religious and secular literature that is at once reflection, reflecting surface and creative matrix.

NOTES

- ¹ These references are all from the *Guhyādi Aṣṭasiddhisamgraha*, ed. Samdhong Rinpoche and Prof. Vrajvallabha Dwivedi, Rare Buddhist Texts Project, Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1987.
- ² *Rainagunasamcayagāthā*, in *Mahāyānasūtra Samgraha*, ed. P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts Series no. 17, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1961, p. 359.
- ³ Ed. S. Bagchi, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts Series, vol. 13, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1970, p. 37; p. 40.
- ⁴ Numerous examples could be brought in from non-Buddhist religious writing. I give here only a few from Jainism. In an allegorical "autobiography", the *Upamitibhavaprapañcakathā*, the island of jewels is the state of birth as a human being, while the jewels gathered there are the right religious doctrines in a Jain text; beneficial qualities such as knowledge and strength in pursuing the religious path are also called jewels. See the *Upamitibhavaprapañcakathā* of Siddharṣi, chapter VII; Chapter V; Bibliotheca Indica 946, ed. Peter Peterson, Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1899.
- ⁵ The text is edited by P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, 19, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1958. Again, these are beliefs that are pan-Indian. Poverty is universally associated with lack of merit and wealth is seen as a just reward for pious acts.
- ⁶ *Rāṣṭrapālapariṣcchā*, in the *Mahāyānasūtra Samgraha*, cited above.
- ⁷ The text is edited by Śrī Vijaya Bhuvanabhanuśrī, Bangalore: Śrī Ādinātha Jaina Mandir Trust, 1988. See p. 57.
- ⁸ For references see my paper, 'Heaven on Earth: Temples and Temple Cities of Medieval India', forthcoming in a festschrift for Frits Staal.
- ⁹ See the texts collected by Louis Finot, *Les Lapidaires Indiens*, Paris: Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, no. 111, 1896.
- ¹⁰ See for example the *Rāṣṭrapālapariṣcchā*, p. 154. The jewelled city of the Cakravartin has been discussed many times. For a recent review see the forthcoming book by Steven Collins, *Nirvāna and Other Buddhist Felicities*. Luis Gomez has drawn attention to the close relationship the jewelled city of the Cakravartin bears to

Buddhist paradises. See *The Land of Bliss: The Paradise of the Buddha of Measureless Light*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996, pp. 52–54.

¹¹ For a discussion of some of these stories see Collins, cited above.

¹² The actual list of the seven jewels can vary from text to text. See Finot in the introduction to the texts he has edited on jewels, cited above. My references to the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* are to the edition by P. L. Vaidya, *Buddhist Sanskrit Texts*, no. 19, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1958.

¹³ This clearly connects the city with traditional notions of paradise. The *Vimāna Vattu* includes episodes which portray the person in paradise seated in a gold boat on a lotus lake. *Vimānavattu and Peṭavattu*, new ed., N. A. Jayawickrama, London: Pali Text Society 1977, the section entitled *Nāvāvimānavattu*, 'Accounts of the heavenly abode as a boat', pp. 6 ff.

¹⁴ See the comments of David Eckel, who argues that there is no word for visionary experience in the text; Eckel, *To See the Buddha: A Philosopher's Quest for the Meaning of Emptiness*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 146. I would disagree with Eckel that there is a problem in these texts with the very notion of visions; it is not the case that the *Gaṇḍavyūha* does not allow Sudhana to be the active perceiving subject of the vision as Eckel states; the verb "to see" is not used solely in the causative as he asserts. I also have a different understanding of the vision itself, as this paper will make clear. In my reading Maitreya does not make manifest the peaked dwelling nor does he cause it to disappear; the peaked dwelling exists before the vision and remains after the vision disperses. In chapter 53, for example, Śrīśambhava tells Sudhana about a garden and the peaked dwelling there in which Maitreya resides (p. 360). Eckel's book is a sustained effort to understand the role of visions in the context of Madhyamaka philosophy. While my own aim in this paper is much more limited, I will be arguing that somehow we must understand these visions as integral religious experiences in themselves and not simply as metaphors or didactic tools. On the relationship between *samādhi* and visionary or miraculous manifestations, see the interesting passage in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (ed. Cecil Bendall, 's Gravenhage: Mouton & Co., 1957), quoting the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra*, chapter 18, beginning p. 342, where the phrase *samādhivikurvita* appears a number of times. See also Luis Gomez's comments in his thesis, *Selected Verses from the Gaṇḍavyūha: Text, Critical Apparatus and Translation*, Yale University, 1967, pp. 67–68, where he translates *samādhi* as "ecstasy".

¹⁵ With this should be compared statements like those in the *Mahāyānasūtrāṅgikā*, chapter 9 verse 16 in which it is said that wicked beings cannot see the Buddha, just as the orb of the moon cannot be seen in a pot of water that has been smashed. Thus here too the vision of the Buddha is the result of the good karma of the one who sees it.

¹⁶ Cited by Tai-wo Kwan in his thesis, *A Study of the Teaching Regarding the Pure Land of Aksobhya Buddha in Early Mahayana*, University Microfilms, 1985, p. 49.

¹⁷ It is not only jewels that act in this way. Poison and the drink of immortality have the same ability to turn into each other in response to a person's merit. Thus we read in a medieval Jain version of the *Mahābhārata* how Duryodhana tried to poison Bhīma, but the poison turned into ambrosia because of Bhīma's great merits (*Śatruñjaya Kalpa*, ed. Munirāja Lābhasāgaragani, Āgamodhāra Granthamālā 41, 1969, p. 25). Similar stories are told in Buddhist literature. For an example from the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* see my paper, 'Divine Delicacies: Monks, Images and Miracles in the Contest Between Jainism and Buddhism', in *Images, Miracles, and Authority in Asian Religious Traditions* by Richard Davis, Boulder: Westview Press, 1998, pp. 55–97.

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¹⁸ *Upamitibhavaprapaṅcakathā*, chapter 5, pp. 765–766.

¹⁹ Jinamaṇḍana, *Kumārāpālaprabandha*, ed. Muni Caturavijaya, Bhavnagar: Jaina Ātmānanda Sabha (vol. 34), 1915, p. 11.

²⁰ Commentary, *Avacūri* to the *Nandisutta* Devachand Lalbhai Pustakodhāra Series, Bombay, vol. 107, 1969, p. 112.

²¹ With this might be compared later Jain descriptions of the marvellous Jina temples in the various realms of the gods. Uddyotani Sūri in his *Kuvalayamālā*, ed. A. N. Upadhyey, Singhi Jain Series, vol. 45, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidyā Bhavan, 1959, p. 95, describes a temple of jewels that contains jewelled images of the Jinas. There the god Padmaprabha worships the Jinas. He then sees a jewelled book on a jewelled throne. The pages of the book are made of crystal and the lettering is made of sapphires. Its binding is of rubies. The book is a summary of the basic tenets of Jainism. Uddyotana Sūri's Prakrit text is dated 779 A.D.

²² The text is edited by P. L. Vaidya, *Buddhist Sanskrit Texts Series*, no. 5, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1960.

²³ David Eckel has discussed some of this material in his book, *To see the Buddha*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, pp. 15 ff. Eckel sees the palaces as symbols in a lesson on the illusory nature of reality. I am trying in this paper to move away from such an interpretation and consider these visions as somehow primary religious experiences that are themselves the goal of religious practice. On *kūṭāgāra* see Willem Bollée, 'Le kūṭāgāra ou de la maison des hommes au manoir dans l'Inde orientale et l'Asie du Sud-Est', *Bulletin d'Etudes Indiennes*, 4, 1986, 189–214; K. De Vreese, 'Skt. Kūṭāgāra', *India Antiqua*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1947, pp. 323–325.

²⁴ The statement that Maitreya's *kūṭāgāra* has been produced by his vow makes the structure analogous to the many Pure Lands that are also said to have been produced through the power of the vows of different Bodhisattvas.

²⁵ The text reads *te cāsya kūṭāgaravyūhā anyonyāsambhinnā anyonāmaitrībhūtā anyonyāsamkīrñāh praiibhāsayogena ābhāsam agaman ekasminnārambane/ yathā ca ekasminn ārambaṇe, tathā seṣārambaṇeṣu*, p. 406, lines 6–8. I take this to mean that they appear on the surface of the main *kūṭāgāra* into which Sudhana has just entered and then on the surfaces of each and every one of these multiples. I am also interpreting the term *praiibhāsayogena* to mean "in the manner of a reflection"; these are not quite ordinary reflections but are like reflections. Hopefully this reading will be made clearer by what follows.

²⁶ As the text explains, *bodhisattvādhiṣṭhānena sarvatraidhātukasvapnasamavasarañānena parīttasamjñāganiruddhacetā vipulamahadgatānāvaranabodhisattvasamjñāgatavihārī*, p. 414, line 25, "Sudhana, sojourning in the consciousness of the Bodhisattva which is great and vast and free of impeding, his mind no longer stuck in limited knowledge, through the power of the bodhisattva which allowed him to have simultaneous knowledge of the entire universe as in a dream" (tentative translation).

²⁷ This reads *viṣṭhāpana* for *aviṣṭhāpana*, following Edgerton.

²⁸ My reading of the last compound is conditioned to some extent by the definition of a reflection given in other texts. I explain this in note 36 below. Another reading would be to take the term to mean that the reflections on every surface remain distinct from each other. While this is a statement often made in the description of the visions in this section of the text, it is grammatically a less likely interpretation of the compound, requiring the reader to supply some term like *anyonya*. In fact this is the reading taken in the new Japanese translation of Kajiyama, *Satori e no Henreki*, Tokyo: Cūō Kōronsha, 1994, vol. 2, p. 402. I thank Jonathan Silk for telling me about the existence of this new translation. For the term *ārambaṇa* I am using

the general meaning of support or surface; for another interpretation see Gomez, *Selected Verses*, pp. 105–106.

²⁹ Edition of V. Fausboll, Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1990, vol. VI, p. 271.

³⁰ Edited by P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts Series, vol. 1. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1958, pp. 48 ff.

³¹ On the significance of the three-chambered structure and its association with the pursuit of alchemical secrets in the medical texts see Arion Rosu, 'Considerations sur une technique du *Rasāyana* Āyurvédique', *Indo-Iranian Journal*, 17, 1975, pp. 1–29.

³² I do not mean to imply that the term *pratibhāsa* is never used in Buddhist texts to mean a reflection in the sense of a false appearance; in fact there is probably substantial evidence to prove that false appearance is its more frequent significance, in usages for example such as those in the *Sikṣāsamuccaya*, ed. Cecil Bendall, 'S-Granvénhage: Mouton, 1957, p. 272, line 10 or 204, lines 15, 16. My point in this paper will be that there is a special language of religious visions, of an alternate reality, and that the language of reflections and jewels has a special significance in the context of such visions.

³³ Ed. Paṇḍita Jagadīśālaśāstrī, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1970, with variant from Tawney for 6.207.

³⁴ Stories of the caves of the Asuras and the wonderful palaces and beautiful women in them were apparently popular in Buddhism. One of the best known of these stories was told by Hsüan-tsang of Bhavaviveka. For other references see R. A. Stein, *Grottes-Matrices et Lieux Saints de la Déesse en Asie Orientale*, Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient, vol. CLI, Paris, 1977, pp. 24–28. Malcolm David Eckel in his book, *To See the Buddha: A Philosopher's Quest for the Meaning of Emptiness*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, pp. 11–15, interprets the palace of the Asuras as an illusory palace and compares Hsüan-tsang's stories of Asura's palaces with stories in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* as retold by Wendy O'Flaherty. I would argue that this is not the only possible reading of these stories. As I read them in the context of medieval Indian religious beliefs such as those attested by the *Kathāsaritsāgara*, these palaces are magical and wonderful, but not by any means illusory. The stories discussed by Stein give the same impression of a belief in paradise-like caves of the Asuras, where one may achieve magical powers.

³⁵ Edited Paṇḍit Vaman Sastri Islampurkar, Benaras: E.J. Lazarus, 1898, p. 3.

³⁶ There are other analogies used in the text to explain the visionary appearances the bodhisattva both witnesses and creates for others to see that suggest a magical kind of supramundane reality rather than any abstract denial of reality. One persistent comparison is to the way in which the nāgas are said to create rain through a mere act of will or mental effort (vs 154 p. 390 and p. 416. On p. 416 in particular Maitreya is answering Sudhana's question about where the vyūhas have gone. He tells him, *tad yathā kulaputra nāgānām meghajālam na kāyena cittena abhyantaribhūtaṃ na saṃcayasthitam na [ca na] samdrśyate/ nāgacetaṇāvasena apramāṇā vāridhārāḥ pramuñcati nāgaviṣayācintayatayā/ evam eva kulaputra te vyūhā nādhayatmagatā na bahirgatā naca na samdrśyante, bodhisattvādhiṣṭhānavaśena tava ca subhājanatayā/* "It is this way, oh son of a good family; just as the hosts of clouds are neither inside the minds nor the bodies of the snakes and yet are not not seen, and purely through an act of mental exertion on the part of the snakes they release countless streams of rain because of the mysterious ability of the snakes; so these manifestations are neither inside nor outside and yet they are also not not perceived, because of the mysterious power of the bodhisattva and because of your own merits". My emendation makes the line parallel with what follows; it is also possible to read the last *na* before the verb *samdrśyate* as *ca*. The line requires some assistance. The Japanese translation of Kajiyama, p. 404 translates the lines as printed, but I prefer the emendation. The

verse 154 says that the appearance of rain corresponds to the thoughts of the nāgas; similarly the practice of the bodhisattva corresponds to knowledge and vows.

³⁷ Compare this verse from the *Rāstrapālapariṣcchā: rūpaṃ drśyate manoramam jagadarthe/pratibhāsodakacandrasam nibhaṃ yathā māyā/ sarvāsveva ca dikṣu drśyate jinakāyo/no ca rūpaprāmāṇu drśyate sugatānām/* vs 333, p. 156. "The handsome body of the Buddha is 'seen, for the sake of the welfare of the world; it is like a reflection, like the moon in water; it is like a display of magic. The body of the Jina is seen in all the directions; there is no limit to the bodies of the Buddhas". I tried to argue in my paper, 'Portraits, Likeness and Looking Glasses' prepared for the Jacob Taubes Center conference in Heidelberg, February 1997, that the reflected body in the terminology of many religious texts is the true body; ascetics who practice asceticism come to have a crystal body in Hindu *purānas* and in Jain religious texts the Jina body is said to be a reflection and like a reflection unstained by any physical impurities. This idea is supported by some late Buddhist texts in which the successful aspirant is said to get a *chāyā* body, a body that is a reflection or shadow, the term meaning both. See the *Guhyasiddhi, Advayavivaraṇaprajñopāyavinīcayasiddhi*, verse 20, where the body of Vajradhara is said to be pure and shining like a mirror, bearing the major and minor marks of the Buddha. In the *Guhyasiddhi* itself the goal is said to be the attainment of a pure body that is like a reflection and like diamond (5.44). It is with this background in mind that I hesitate to conclude that a reflection is always by definition something false. Compare the comments of Gomez, *Selected Verses*, in his introduction, which attempts to reconcile the magic, creative aspect of the visions with the similes stressing the unreality of the world. Gomez stresses, I think, the illusory nature of the visions and the world. Here I am trying to suggest another interpretation.

³⁸ Compare the many references in the *Guhyasiddhi* and related texts cited above and the references to bodhicitta as a jewel from the *Gaṇḍavyūha*. The *Yogasūtra* of Pātāñjali 1.41 also compares the mind to a precious jewel that takes on the complexion of objects with which it is in contact.

³⁹ There is a remarkable parallel to this visionary freedom of the mind in a text that clearly shows Buddhist influence, if not the specific influence of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* itself. In the *Yogavāsiṣṭha, Utpati Prakaraṇa*, chapter 15–68 there is a long account of a queen, Līlā, who prays to the goddess Sarasvatī that her husband may be immortal. When Sarasvatī cannot grant that wish, Līlā asks for a different one. She asks that when her husband dies his soul will never leave her room. This unusual request is granted. Līlā's husband does die and she keeps his corpse carefully in her room. She summons the goddess again and asks to know where her husband has gone. The goddess takes her on a flight over all the universe, where she sees her husband's next birth, his past birth and all her own past births. It is how she makes that flight that enables her to see worlds past and future that concerns us. She makes the flight by giving up limited notions such as "I" and "mine"; by recognizing that objects of perception cannot possibly exist or come into being and by rejecting the notion of her gross physical body (chapters 21–22). Līlā does as she is instructed and gains the vision of her own past lives and her husband's past and future births. In another section of the text, the *Nirvāṇa Prakaraṇa*, a story is told of a queen Cūḍālā, who enlightens her husband. At one point Cūḍālā decides that she wants to amuse herself by flying. The text explains that she accomplishes this and other magic powers not through yoga but through knowledge, by giving up her false perceptions of limited objects (chapter 82).

I would like to read the descriptions of visions and their causes in the *Gaṇḍavyūha* with this larger context in mind. Here visions are not primarily proof texts for the unreality of the world, but are examples of a transformed reality. They are brought about by a change in consciousness, an expansion of consciousness made possible

by a realization that conceptualizations of limited ordinary objects of experience are false. They are to this extent experiences of a higher, expanded reality.

⁴⁰ The creative functions of the mind and its description as an active reflecting surface are frequent topics in Kashmiri Śaiva texts, and I hope in the future to continue studying images of the mind in Kashmiri Śaiva writings. These texts also place considerable emphasis on the generative power of the mind. Creation in fact encompasses a stage that is very much like the visions in the *Gaṇḍavyūha* in that at an early stage of the manifestation of the world of objects from the mind the objects appear as inseparable from their base, the mind; they appear as reflections, the defining characteristic of which is that a reflection is perceived as intimately connected to the reflecting surface. As I note here my reading of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* to some extent has been conditioned by my reading of these later texts from an entirely different tradition. I am looking for a larger context for the visionary language of the *Gaṇḍavyūha*; hopefully I will enrich my reading of the text more than I will distort it in the process. See the *Tantrasāra* of Abhinavagupta (ed. Mukunda Ram Sastri, Delhi: Bani Prakashan 1982, pp. 10–11), chapter 3, for the description of consciousness as a pure reflecting surface on which all things in the universe are reflected. The definition of a reflection is given there as follows: *yat bhedenā bhāsitam* (read *bhāsitum*) *aśaktam anyavyāmiśratvenaiva bhāti tat pratibimbam*, "That which is incapable of being perceived as something on its own and only appears as intimately related to another thing is called a reflection". In answer to the question what is the *bimba* or prototype, the answer is that there is none. But there is a cause of the reflections, which is the power of consciousness as the ultimately real. This seems to me tantalizingly close to the language of the *Gaṇḍavyūha*. Compare the statement made to describe Brahmā's *vimāna*: *tatra sarvatrisāhasramahāsāhasro lokadhātūr ābhāsam āgacchati pratibhāsayogena sarvārambaṇāmiśrībhūtaḥ* (p. 415, line 14) I am struck by this last phrase, which I read as *sarvārambaṇa-āmiśrībhūtaḥ*, and which I would translate loosely as, "intimately related to all the various reflecting surfaces". This would bring us very close indeed to the language of Abhinavagupta in this text. To complicate the discussion, in his *Paramārthasāra* (Kashmir Sanskrit Texts Series, no. 7, Srinagar, 1916), Abhinavagupta seems to be saying something slightly different. He says there that the reflections in a mirror appear to be both one with the surface of the mirror and distinct from each other and from the mirror itself; similarly the objects of the world are both distinct from each other and from consciousness and one with consciousness. The idea as the commentary explains it is that although the reflections appear to be part of the mirror one is still aware of the mirror as the bearer of the reflections. Similarly when we have knowledge of some object that knowledge bears the form of the objects, but one is also aware of the presence of knowledge as the conscious agent. The commentator further draws this distinction between knowledge and the mirror: the experience of an object in a mirror is an error, while the experience of something in knowledge is not an error because knowledge has the power to create the objects it knows from within itself. This, I have argued in this paper, is a power not attributed in our texts to mirrors, but it is a power that can be attributed to jewels, which makes the jewelled visions of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* particularly intriguing to interpret. One might compare with this notion of images that somehow co-mingle and at the same time remain distinctive the description of the eternal jewelled images of the Jinas in heaven in Uddyotana Sūri's *Kuvalayamālā*, p. 95. The images are described as *annonna-vanṇa-ghādie nīya-vanṇa-pamāna-māna-nimmāe*, "having blended onto them the colors of all the other images and yet each having its own distinctive color, measure and size".

⁴¹ As I noted above I have written about the jewelled body or the jewel-like body of the Jina with some references to Buddhist and Hindu beliefs in a recent paper that I delivered in Heidelberg at a meeting of the Taubes Center. The paper, 'Portraits, Likenesses and Looking Glasses: Some Literary and Philosophical Reflections in

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Representation in Medieval Indian Religious Art' will be published in the conference volume. The language of reflection when applied to the Buddha body is no doubt more complex than the discussion in that paper indicates. The Buddha body is often referred to as a reflection on the viewer's mind, for example in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, 4.25, cited John Makransky, *Buddhahood Embodied*, Buffalo: SUNY, 1997, pp. 95–96. I hope to study this further. The language of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* has much in common with texts like the *Ratnagotravibhāga*.

⁴² In fact such visions occur in many texts. We have seen above that in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* jewelled structures figure prominently in the quest of the Bodhisattva Sadāpranūta. Jewels and the creation of a jewel-like body are also important in the *Daśabhūmikāsūtra*, a text frequently cited for its contribution to the development of doctrine (Edited P. L. Vaidya, *Buddhist Sanskrit Texts*, 7, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1967). The text is replete with the language of religious visions (cf. p. 55). Thus at certain stages of his career the bodhisattva gains the ability to enter certain *samādhis* in one of which, for example, he sees a jewelled lotus appear. He sees himself to have a jewelled body and seated on the lotus. He sees other lotuses on which are seated bodhisattvas. In another case, the Bodhisattva Vajragarbha enters into the *samādhi*, *sarvabuddhakṣetrakāyasavahāvasamdarśana*, "Displaying the true nature of his body as all the Buddha fields". And no sooner does he enter into this *samādhi*, than the entire assembly of bodhisattvas sees themselves in his body and they see a vast Buddha field there. They see a vast bodhi tree and a marvellous seat and on the seat is the tathāgata Sarvābhijñāmitarāja. Vajragarbha displays this great wonder and then returns the assembly to its former state. The assembly is then told that a bodhisattva in the tenth bhūmi is capable of creating this vision and countless others like it (pp. 62–63). The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, chapter 7, also discusses the perfected Bodhisattva's ability to manifest worlds, including Buddha fields made of crystal and vaidūrya gemstone.

⁴³ Kajiyama's translation p. 416 translates this differently, "from each mote of dust emerged jewelled images that looked like the bodies of all the Buddhas". I prefer my translation because of the consistent use in the text of the term *pratibhāsa* to mean reflection rather than "like". There is of course a third way to read the compound in which the jewelled images are the reflections of the Buddha. This would be perfectly consistent with the text which speaks of the Buddha bodies as reflections and as jewelled bodies. Other religious texts in India speak of special bodies of gods or perfected individuals in the same dual language, as reflections and as jewels. In part I suspect the combination is made possible by the common assumption that a reflection is the reflecting surface. There is also the simple observation that jewels as objects can be reflected in other objects, while their surface properties allow them to serve as reflecting surfaces. Finally there is evidence in some descriptions of wonderful jewelled objects that jewels have the unique ability to reflect off each other in such a way that an observer cannot differentiate the reflection from the reflecting surface.

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WOMEN IN THE PURE LAND: SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE
TEXTUAL SOURCES*.¹

INTRODUCTION

In the course of a recent class visit to a local Dharma centre, one of my students asked the resident Chinese Buddhist nun whether it was true that women could not be reborn in Sukhāvātī, the Pure Land of Amitābha, as women, but must instead first change into men. She replied that there was no distinction between male and female in the Pure Land, and that those who were reborn there were thus neither men nor women. The students must have been puzzled by this apparent clash between what I had taught them in my lectures, based on my reading of the classical texts, and what a modern-day person working within the Chinese Pure Land tradition actually believes.² For me, however, as a practitioner of the academic activity known as Religious Studies, it came as no surprise that what I present to my classes as Buddhism does not always match what real Buddhists believe and do. After all, how could it? As I frequently warn my students, to talk about "the Buddhist religion" is to be drawn inevitably into abstractions, generalizations and oversimplifications which could never do justice to the rich diversity of all past and present forms of the Buddhist tradition. But this caveat need not lead to paralysis, to the suspension of the attempt to understand Buddhism. While taking cognisance of the positions held by modern believers, scholars interested in Buddhist history may still work to clarify the texts on which, in one way or another, those positions are based. Nor should they be deterred if they sometimes find more differences than points of agreement between belief and text. Indeed, to construct an ever more finely nuanced picture of Buddhism should be part of their project as researchers, even if they must continue to simplify that picture as teachers.

That the particular issue of female rebirth in Sukhāvātī is one on which a diversity of opinions is possible is also suggested by an

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article by James Dobbins entitled "Women's Birth in the Pure Land as Women: Intimations from the Letters of Eshinni", published in *The Eastern Buddhist* in 1995. The title is promising. Dobbins' thesis is that the surviving letters of Eshinni (1182–1268?), the wife of the famous Japanese Pure Land master Shinran (1173–1263), show that she probably expected to be born in Sukhāvātī as a woman.³ Whether or not we regard the thesis as proved, we have here a second answer to the question "Can women expect to be reborn in the Pure Land as women?"⁴ But whether we take the nun's belief that they can't (but that men cannot be reborn as men either) or the scholar's assertion that at one point they probably did (which is allegedly based on medieval Japanese sources), in both cases there appears to be a disjunction with the classical sources, at least as I have read them up till now. The challenge is to determine whether that disjunction is apparent or real. To that end, this paper sets itself the comparatively modest task of clarifying what the classical sources actually say. In other words, I want to know whether what I teach my students about the scriptural tradition is correct, and whether the positions held by my ordained friend and imputed to Eshinni by Dobbins are really innovative departures from that tradition.

THE THIRTY-FIFTH VOW

When we speak of the classical scriptural sources for Pure Land Buddhism, we generally mean the *Larger Sukhāvātī-vyūha*, the *Smaller Sukhāvātī-vyūha* and the so-called *Amitāyur-dhyāna-sūtra* in their various versions. Although many other texts are important to the Pure Land tradition, these three works provide the most detailed and authoritative description of the Buddha Amitābha, the realm of Sukhāvātī, and the various practices connected with them. Do these texts then state explicitly and unequivocally that there are no women in that magnificent realm? Since the *Smaller Sukhāvātī-vyūha-sūtra* and the *Amitāyur-dhyāna-sūtra* have absolutely nothing to say on this question,⁵ we will confine ourselves in this paper to a consideration of the *Larger Sukhāvātī-vyūha-sūtra* (henceforth simply *Sukhāvātī-vyūha*).⁶ The obvious place to start is the famous vow No. 35. In Sanskrit (Ashikaga, 1965: 18; cf. Fujita, 1980: 35) the text reads:⁷

sacē me bhagavan bodhiprāptasya samantād aprameyāsamkhyeyācī-
nryātulypārīmāṇeṣu buddhakṣetreṣu yāḥ striyo mama nāmadheyam śrutvā prasādam
samjanayeyur [Fujita: samjanayeyur] bodhicittam cotpādāyeyuh śrībhāvam ca vijugup-
syeran [Fujita: vijugupseran] jātivyatīrṇāḥ samānāḥ saced dvitīyam śrībhāvam
pratilabheran mā tāvad aham anuttarām samyaksambodhim abhisambudhyeyam.

Lord, let me not awaken fully to supreme and perfect awakening if, after I have attained awakening, any women in the countless, incalculable, inconceivable, imponderable and measureless Buddha-fields in every direction who, on hearing my name, have faith, conceive the aspiration to awakening, and spurn their womanhood should, when they depart this birth, become women again.³

In a footnote to his translation of this passage, Gómez (1996: 74, n. 26) characterizes this as "a classical example of early Indian misogyny". "The female sex and gender", he goes on to say, "are excluded from the Land of Bliss and women must not only shed their feminine nature and be reborn as males – it appears that, additionally, women must actually come to despise their feminine status in order to transcend it. Needless to say, the passage presents a challenge to modern commentators, especially since the paradise of Buddha Akṣobhya does not exclude women". However, while not necessarily disagreeing with Gómez's overall characterization,⁹ I think one might legitimately ask whether the passage means everything he says it does. First of all, it says nothing explicit about rebirth in Sukhāvātī, but merely offers women anywhere in the cosmos who fulfil certain conditions the alleged blessing of never being reborn as women again. The necessary conditions are that, when they hear the name of Amitābha, they should (1) have faith (presumably faith in Amitābha and his salvific power) and (2) they should conceive the aspiration to awakening (*bodhicitta*). In other words, they should become bodhisattvas. The final condition is (3) that they should spurn, shrink from, despise or loathe their womanhood.¹⁰ The *bhikṣu* Dharmākara is only putting his enlightenment at stake if those women who reject womanhood and wish to be reborn as men are again reborn as women, even though they have fulfilled the other conditions after hearing his name.¹¹ That there may indeed be other women who fulfil the first two conditions and do not wish to cease being women is conceivable, but the essential point is this: that the blessing offered by this vow is of the sort that we might call "generalized". Women whose consciousness is affected by Amitābha can, if they so desire, become men in their next rebirth: the fulfilment of a wish professed by many women in the Buddhist tradition, indeed, an aspiration so commonly attested that it scarcely needs comment. Thus it falls into the same category as the generalized blessings offered in Vows No. 33, 34, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 44. That is to say, in this part of the text the vows relate (generally explicitly) to blessings enjoyed by beings in *other* Buddha-fields, not by those who have been or will be reborn in Sukhāvātī: such advantages as a feeling of happiness, the power of *dhāraṇīs*, the homage of all and sundry, splendid clothing, unimpaired faculties, meditative powers and noble birth. In all these

other vows, as in Vow No. 35, there is no hint of rebirth in Sukhāvātī being involved.¹² Thus their substance is not taken up again later in the text when the features of Sukhāvātī are described in detail.¹³ In most of the other vows, by contrast, the blessings are promised to those beings who will be reborn or who will aspire to be reborn in Sukhāvātī. We are left with the distinct impression, then, that this vow does not after all say that women cannot be reborn in Sukhāvātī as women, as it is commonly thought to do.

Thus the Sanskrit text, at least as we have it today. Do the Tibetan or Chinese versions tell a different story? The Tibetan version as edited by Kawaguchi (Wogihara et al., 1972: 248–250) does not: it agrees with the Sanskrit.¹⁴ When we turn to the five existing Chinese versions, however, we find that their testimony is not entirely uniform. It is probably best to take these translations in chronological order, although here I must admit to entering an area in which I am no specialist, only a casual visitor. Nor have I had time to acquaint myself with the extensive scholarship produced by Chinese and Japanese writers on the textual tradition of Pure Land Buddhism. However, taking my lead from the magisterial study by Fujita (1970), I will regard the chronological sequence of the Chinese versions as being, according to their Taishō numbers with traditional attributions, (1) T.362, currently ascribed to Zhi Qian; (2) T.361, currently ascribed to Lokakṣema; (3) T.360, currently ascribed to Saṅghavarman; (4) T.310.5 by Bodhiruci; and (5) T.363 by Faxian.¹⁵ This is the order I shall follow in this paper, adding some thoughts of my own on the authorship of the two oldest versions (T.361 and T.362).

While T.361, the *Fo shuo wuliang qingjing pingdengjue jing* 佛說無量清淨平等覺經, is attributed to the Han Dynasty translator Zhi Loujiachen 支婁迦讖 or Lokakṣema (fl. c. 170–190 C.E.), that it is probably not his work seems to have been admitted by many scholars.¹⁶ When it is compared with T.362, the *Fo shuo amituo-sanyesanfo-saloufotan guodu rendao jing* 佛說阿彌陀三耶三佛薩樓佛檀過度入道經, attributed to the Wu Dynasty translator Zhi Qian 支謙 (fl. c. 220–257), it becomes clear that something very odd has happened. The two translations are for the most part so closely related that they can be regarded as different versions of the same text. Only at specific points do they diverge, and they often diverge in an illuminating way. Where T.361 has *gāthās* translated as verse, T.362 has nothing; where T.361 has translations of proper names or technical terms, T.362 has phonetic transcriptions (this is even true of the title!). My preliminary conclusion on the basis of an initial perusal of the texts is that somehow the translators' names

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have been switched: T.362 might very well be the original translation by Lokakṣema, while T.361 is a later reworking of it, with new material added, by Zhi Qian or some other translator, on the basis of another Indic exemplar. Zhi Qian is in fact well known to have made this kind of revision of a number of older translations, most notably Lokakṣema's renditions of the *Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra* and the *Śūramgama-samādhi-sūtra*. Thus some of the objections which could be made to Lokakṣema's authorship of T.361 – e.g. that it has verse *gāthās*, or not enough phonetic transcriptions – do not apply to T.362. At the same time several serious objections remain.¹⁷ Although I would not at this point hazard a definitive conclusion, the historical implications of the discussion are obvious, since ascription to Lokakṣema would allow us to date the composition of the *Sukhāvātī-vyūha* to the mid-2nd century C.E. or earlier.¹⁸

In any case, the Indic exemplar (or exemplars) underlying these two Chinese versions must reflect a very archaic form of the text, since among other things they both list only 24 vows.¹⁹ However, despite this agreement in number, the vow section is one of those parts of the text where the two versions differ markedly. When we search for a counterpart to vow 35 in the Sanskrit, we find that T.362 has as its second vow the following (301a27–b3):²⁰

第二願。使某作佛時，令我國中無有婦人。女人欲來生我國中者，即作男子。諸無央數天人，飛騰動之類，來生我國者，皆於七寶水池蓮華中化生，長大皆作菩薩阿羅漢，都無央數。得是願乃作佛，不得是願終不作佛。

The second vow: When I become a Buddha, may there be no women in my country. Women wishing to come and be reborn in my country will forthwith become men. All the countless gods, human beings and species that flit and wriggle²¹ who come to be reborn in my country will be born through spontaneous generation in lotus flowers in pools made of the seven precious substances, and they will grow up and all become bodhisattvas or arhats, quite beyond counting. If this vow is fulfilled, then I will become a Buddha. If this vow is not fulfilled, I will never become a Buddha.

In T.361, by contrast, there is no vow relating to female rebirth. However, such a vow does appear in the next Chinese translation, T.360, the *Fo shuo wuliangshou jing* 佛說無量壽經, attributed to the Wei Dynasty (220–265) translator Kang Sengkai 康僧鎧 or Saṅghavarman, but probably the product of a collaboration between Buddhahadra (359–429) and Baoyun 寶雲 and dating from 421.²² The relevant vow, No. 35 in the list, runs (268c21–24):

設我得佛，十方無量不可思議諸佛世界其有女人，聞我名字，歡喜信樂，發菩提心，厭惡女身，壽終之後復為女像者，不取正覺。

If, when I have become a Buddha, all the women in the countless, inconceivable Buddha-worlds of the ten quarters, on hearing my name, rejoice with faith and delight, conceive the aspiration to *bodhi* and become disgusted with the female body, if they take female form again after their lives come to an end, I shall not attain perfect awakening.

We find a similar wording in the early 8th-century version of Bodhiruci (fl. 693–713), which formed part of the Chinese *Mahā-ratna-kūta-sūtra*. This version, the *Wuliangshou rulai hui* 無量壽如來會 (T.310.5) was produced during the period 706–713. Here the vow is also No. 35, and reads as follows (94b14–17):

若我成佛，周遍無數不可思議無有等量諸佛國中所有女人，聞我名已，得清淨信，發菩提心，厭患女身，若於來世不捨女人身者，不取菩提。

If, when I have become a Buddha, all the women in countless, inconceivable, matchless and measureless Buddha-lands everywhere, on hearing my name, come to have pure faith, conceive the aspiration for *bodhi* and become disgusted with the female body, if they do not discard their female body in their future lives, I shall not attain *bodhi*.²³

These two later Chinese translations, therefore, seem quite close to the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts. The last Chinese translation, however, turns out on this point to be somewhat different. In T.363, the *Fo shuo dasheng wuliangshou zhuangyen jing* 佛說大乘無量壽莊嚴經, dated 991 and attributed to the Song Dynasty translator Faxian 法賢 or Dharmabhadra, otherwise known as Tianxizai 天息災 (fl. 980–1000), the relevant vow is No. 27 in a list of 36, and runs (320b8–12):

世尊，我得菩提成正覺已，所有十方無量無邊無數世界一切女人，若有厭離女身者，聞我名號，發清淨心歸依頂禮，彼人命終即生我刹，成男子身，悉皆令得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。

Lord, after I have attained *bodhi* and achieved perfect awakening, as for all the women in all the countless, boundless numberless worlds in the ten quarters, if any of them are disgusted with a female body, and hear my name, have pure thoughts and take refuge in me with prostrations, those persons shall at the end of their lives be born in my *kṣetra* assuming male bodies, and they shall all be made to achieve *anuttara-samyak-sambodhi*.

Reviewing this evidence we see a kind of progressive development which is not entirely consistent with the relative chronology of the Chinese translations. In what appears to be the oldest version of the text (late 2nd or early 3rd century C.E.) and in the youngest (991 C.E.), the vow relates specifically to rebirth in *Sukhāvātī*. In all other versions where it appears, it takes the form we saw in the Sanskrit version. How is this anomaly to be explained, unless we assume that, despite its late date, Faxian's translation reflects either a middle stage in the development of the text, or a deliberate recombination of the earlier and

later recensions? The second possibility is in fact the more likely one.²⁴ Thus it is interesting to note that in T.364, the *Fo shuo da amituo jing* 佛說大阿彌陀經, a synoptic version of the text compiled by Wang Rixiu 王日休 (fl. 1162–1173) on the basis of four existing Chinese translations (i.e., TT.360–363), the relevant passage is given in the following terms (329c12–15):

第三十二願。我作佛時，十方無央數世界有女人，聞我名號喜悅信樂，發菩提心厭惡女身，壽終之後其身不復為女。不得是願終不作佛。

The 32nd vow: When I have become a Buddha, all the women in the countless worlds of the ten quarters, on hearing my name, will rejoice with faith and delight, conceive the aspiration for *bodhi* and become disgusted with the female body, and their bodies will not become female again after their lives come to an end. Should this vow not be fulfilled, I will never become a Buddha.

It can be seen that the compiler has rejected Faxian's reading at this point, even though he collated his translation into his own work. Furthermore, that reading is unsupported by any other later version of the *Sukhāvātī-vyūha*, including the Tibetan and the Sanskrit. Where these versions speak of female rebirth, they promise male rebirth as a *general* boon to women, rather than offering women the *specific* guarantee of male birth in *Sukhāvātī*.

NYMPS IN SUKHĀVĀTĪ?

Are there any other indications in the *Sukhāvātī-vyūha* about the question of female rebirth? As it happens, there is one other passage which might be thought to have a bearing on it, at least at first sight. This is the passage in which those reborn in *Sukhāvātī* are promised the company of nymphs. The relevant passage in Sanskrit, which is actually about the mansions or palaces in the Pure Land, runs (Ashikaga, 1965: 38):

te yādṛśaṃ vimānaṃ ākāṃkṣanti yad varnalīngasaṃsthānaṃ yāvad ārohaparīṇāho nāmāratnamayaniryūhaśatasahasrasaṃmalakṛtaṃ nānādivya-dūśyasamstīraṃ vicitropadhānavinyastarataparyāṅkaṃ tādṛśaṃ eva vimānaṃ teṣāṃ purataḥ prādurbhavati. te teṣu manobhinirvṛteṣu vimāneṣu saptaśaraḥsahasraparivṛtāḥ puraskṛtā viharanti kṛdanti ramanti paricārayanti.

Whatever kind of (aerial) palace they [the inhabitants] desire, whatever its colour and appearance and shape, however great its dimensions, be it embellished with hundreds and thousands of turrets made of all kinds of precious substances, strewn with all kinds of celestial rugs, and furnished with jewelled couches piled with all sorts of cushions – that is exactly the kind of palace which materialises before them. And they stay in those mentally created²⁵ palaces, with a retinue and a following of seven thousand nymphs, dallying, disporting and diverting themselves.²⁶

In the context of this paper this image of palatial luxury and self-indulgence is of primary interest to us on account of the sudden appearance of “nymphs” – seven thousand to each inhabitant! The *apsaras* or *apsarā* is a female divinity inhabiting the sky, but called *ap-saras* (going through the water) because she moves among the clouds or the waters of the clouds, according to Monier-Williams, q.v. In Chinese they are generally called *tiannü* 天女 “celestial women” or – with more ambiguity as to gender – *feitian* 飛天, “flying celestials”, their flight suggested typically by their gracefully trailing garments (they do not have wings). While the term *feitian* might be sexually ambiguous, *apsaras* is not.²⁷ The *apsaras* (to use the English plural form) occur frequently in Buddhist descriptions of the heavenly realms of this world, where they obviously form part of the sensual (or frankly sexual) attractions of these higher *samsāric* planes; their function is to serve – or service – those fortunate enough to be reborn as gods. If these creatures are female, what are they doing in *Sukhāvātī*? Is their appearance in the Sanskrit version anomalous, or do they also appear in other versions? The same passage is, as we might expect, found in the Tibetan text (see Wogihara et al., 1972: 282), where there are only minor differences; the translator has also made it clear that these are indeed female gods (*lha 'i bu mo*).²⁸ Here again the close relationship between the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions is manifest. However, when we turn to the Chinese translations, we find a different story.

In broad terms the particular section of the Sanskrit text in which this passage occurs consists of a comparison between the lifestyle of the inhabitants of *Sukhāvātī* and the *Paranirmitavaśavartin* gods (Ashikaga, 1965: 37–39; Gómez, 1996: 88–90; Cowell et al., 1894: 40–42), in which various aspects of their existence – food, perfumes, jewellery, palaces – are described in detail, followed by an additional set of comparisons between a beggar and a universal emperor and Śakra and the aforementioned gods of the sixth and highest heaven of the *Kāmadhātu* or Realm of Desire: as glorious as the latter are, the beings in *Sukhāvātī* are equally blessed. In the two oldest Chinese translations the second set of comparisons is considerably amplified (and terminates in a different conclusion), but the short paragraph on the miraculous birth and bodies of the inhabitants which immediately precedes it makes no mention of the *Paranirmitavaśavartins* (see T.362, 304b15–305a2; T.361, 284a8–c3). The so-called *Saṅghavarman* version has something very similar to this (T.360, 271c6–272a5; §§93–98 in Gómez’s translation), but sandwiches it between two paragraphs which develop the *Paranirmitavaśavartin* comparison in much the same way

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as the Sanskrit does (T.360, 271b25–c5, 272a6–13; Gómez §§91–92, 99). The passage concerning the palaces corresponds to the Sanskrit only approximately:

無量壽國其諸天人。所居舍宅宮殿樓閣。稱其形色高下大小。或一寶二寶乃至無量眾寶。隨意所欲。應念即至。又以眾寶妙衣遍布其地。一切人天踐之而行。

As for the gods and humans in the land of Amitāyus ... the houses, palaces and pavilions they live in, with respect to their shape and colour, height and size, and [whether made of] one precious substance, or two, and so on up to innumerable precious substances, are in accordance with their heart’s desires, and as soon as they think of them they are there. Also, their floors are spread with marvellous stuffs of many precious substances, which all the humans and gods tread upon as they walk.²⁹

On the other hand, in the two later Chinese versions this particular section of the text is as a whole structured more like the Sanskrit. Bodhiruci’s text is closest (T.310.5: 97b9–12):

若諸有情所須宮殿樓閣等。隨所樂欲高下長短廣狹方圓。及諸床座妙衣敷上。以種種寶而嚴飾之。於眾生前自然出現。人皆自謂各處其宮。

As for the palaces, pavilions and so on which the sentient beings require, high or low, long or short, wide or narrow, square or circular according to their desires, together with couches and seats spread with marvellous stuffs, decorated with all sorts of jewels, they materialise spontaneously in front of the sentient beings, and all the people believe that each of them resides in his own palace (cf. Chang, 1985: 351).

Faxian’s version of the text deals with this in a somewhat abbreviated fashion (T.363, 323a2–4):

又復思念摩尼寶等莊嚴宮殿樓閣堂宇房間。或大或小。或高或下。如是念時。隨意現前。無不具足。

In addition, if [the inhabitants of *Sukhāvātī*] think of palaces, pavilions, mansions and halls, adorned with *maṇi*-jewels and the like, be they large or small, high or low, as soon as they think like this, they materialise in accordance with their thoughts, and they are provided with everything.

Thus none of the Chinese versions of the *Sukhāvātī-vyūha* – even the latest and closest to the Sanskrit – makes any mention of nymphs, and we must regard their appearance as an aberration of the Sanskrit/Tibetan recension. What is interesting is that the redactor responsible for their introduction into this recension appears not to have been conscious of any potential contradiction between the presence of nymphs in *Sukhāvātī* and the 35th Vow. As for explaining this development in general terms, we can see it as reflecting a longstanding tendency to cannibalise traditional Buddhist (and Indian) accounts of the heavens of this world-system for parts with which to build up a picture of

Sukhāvātī. The attractions of the Kāmadhātu heavens, in particular, must have been well-known to Buddhists of every persuasion, and one can see from such collections as the Pāli *Vimāna-vatthu* how the enjoyment of the sexual favours of the nymphs in magnificent aerial palaces (*vimānas*) was held out to men and women alike as a reward for good deeds in this life.³⁰ We can argue, then, that we have here a comparatively trivial problem: when the images were transposed the appropriate (or inappropriate) detail was not edited out. Of course, we could also say that even in their new environment the nymphs remain part of the (mentally created) furniture, as it were, and that as “virtual nymphs” they do not possess the status of persons, but this would be to fudge the issue. What is crucial about this section of the text is the ascription of the mental powers of the Paranirmitavaśavartin gods to the inhabitants of Sukhāvātī, so that they too become those who wield control (*vaśa-vartin*) over the mental creations of others (*para-nirmita*). In this age of cyberspace and virtual reality technology, it is perhaps much easier for us to imagine such an environment. The inhabitants in Sukhāvātī dwell in a world created – we might say programmed – entirely by another (viz., Amitābha) in which they too have the power to call into being and experience interactively whatever they require: food, clothing, shelter, and so on. However, as wonderful as this power is, it is surprising to find it also deployed for the purposes of conjuring up women as objects of enjoyment. One would expect all the pleasures of Sukhāvātī to be fully in accordance with the Dharma.

OTHER RELEVANT PASSAGES

Up to this point we have taken our cue from the Sanskrit text, and attempted to track down the famous 35th Vow and the question of the nymphs in the corresponding sections of other renditions. What we found was that the vow is by no means uniformly attested, while the nymphs do not seem to have existed outside the recension of the text represented by the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions. However, as Gómez has pointed out (1995: 125), the Sanskrit text is only one strand of a textual tradition in which each version stands in its own right as an “interpretation, and the basis for the continuation and expansion of traditions of belief, practice, and exegesis”. Furthermore it is quite clear that the Chinese translations differ substantially among themselves, at some times reflecting different Indic exemplars, at others the apparent interpolation of Chinese commentary. Thus, in order to reach a definitive conclusion on this or any other matter, it is necessary to check all the

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Chinese versions thoroughly. When we do this, we find that on the specific matter of female rebirth, while the second oldest version (T.361) lacks the relevant vow, it does after all agree with T.362 when this issue arises elsewhere in the text. As they embark on their detailed description of Sukhāvātī, and – significantly – at the point where they expand upon the absence in it of the irregularities and inequalities, both topographical and social, to be found in this world, both texts declare:

其國中悉諸菩薩阿羅漢，無有婦女，壽命無央數劫，女人往生即化作男子，但有諸菩薩阿羅漢無央數。

In that land all are bodhisattvas and arhats, and there are no women. Their lifespans are innumerable kalpas long. Women who take rebirth there are forthwith transformed into men. There are only bodhisattvas and arhats beyond numbering.

Thus T.362 (303c8–10), but so also, with minor differences in wording, T.361 (283a20–23).³¹ The implication is possibly that bodhisattvas cannot be women, and neither can arhats, but both of these positions are problematical, to say the least.³² In any case it is clear that at this point T.362 is taking up the matter of its Vow No. 2 (see above). It is thus curious to find the same passage in T.361, which lacks that vow.³³ A little further on the inhabitants of Sukhāvātī are also described as being free of the three poisons, not prone to evil-mindedness and thinking about women (*wu you xie xin nian funü yi* 無有邪心念婦女意: T.362, 303c22–23; T.361, 283b7–8). Again, this is clearly the fulfilment of Vow No. 11 in T.362 (see 301c17–20):

第十一願。使某作佛時，令我國中諸菩薩阿羅漢，皆無有淫泆之心，終無念婦女意，終無有瞋怒愚癡者。得是願乃作佛，不得是願終不作佛。

The eleventh vow: When I become a Buddha, may all the bodhisattvas and arhats in my country not have lustful minds, never have thoughts of women,³⁴ and never be angry or stupid. Should this vow be fulfilled then I will become a Buddha. Should this vow not be fulfilled, I will never become a Buddha.³⁵

Neither of these passages in T.361 and T.362 appear in any other version of the text, but their message is clear enough. They reinforce the point that women take rebirth in Sukhāvātī as men, and having done so, have no more thoughts of women. This would presumably rule out thinking about apsarases too!

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Like the general run of Mahāyāna sūtras, the *Sukhāvātī-vyūha* turns out to have been a rather protean entity. Scholars like Fujita have distinguished an early form of the text from a later one, but this twofold division is

rather broad, and does not convey the full complexity of the differences between the various versions, Chinese, Tibetan and Sanskrit. As far as our present topic is concerned, we can see that these versions differ to a significant degree. In the two oldest Chinese translations, which reflect the early recension, it is made quite clear that women are reborn in Sukhāvātī as men, and that consequently there are no women to be found there. The most ancient version (T.362) affirms this at several points, not just one. However, in most of the later Chinese translations, as well as the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, all we find is a single vow concerning female rebirth of which the intent is anything but clear.³⁶ Indeed, this vow can be interpreted in a way which is not consistent with the early recension, viz., as a generalized blessing promised only to those women who wish to become men, without any necessary implications for rebirth in Sukhāvātī itself. Furthermore, the vow has been shifted, from the prominent place it occupies in the early text to a point near the end of the list in the later versions. How are we to explain all this? Could it be that as Pure Land Buddhism became more popular, the *Sukhāvātī-vyūha* was rewritten in such a way as to soften the hard-line stance of the early tradition? Can it be that whereas the early text reflects the uncompromising anti-female sentiments of the male ascetics who composed it, the later text breathes a softer, more ambiguous and inclusive spirit to a wider and more diverse audience?³⁷ If this is so – and we have *prima facie* evidence that it is – then not only does this cohere generally with current attempts to re-evaluate early Mahāyāna Buddhism as a movement or set of movements with a pronounced ascetic or renunciant bent,³⁸ but we can see that contemporary moves to rethink this aspect of Sukhāvātī faith have a very long history, and that even in the supposedly foundational texts of the movement we can find evidence of the contestation and negotiation of meaning.

Be that as it may, and however we might choose to read the text today, one might still ask what effect the early recension of the *Sukhāvātī-vyūha* had upon stock interpretations of the later one, or upon more widespread notions of what Sukhāvātī was like. Was Sukhāvātī then a kind of paradigm case in this respect, an archetypal female-free zone? If so, it would have contrasted strongly with Abhirati, for the texts relating to this equally magnificent Buddha-field belonging to the Tathāgata Akṣobhya are quite specific about the fact that women can be reborn there as women.³⁹ Nevertheless, such a contrasting conception appears to have become entrenched in the Buddhist tradition, not only in what we commonly call Pure Land Buddhism,⁴⁰ but also outside it. A full review of the Chinese and Japanese Pure Land commentarial tradition is

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beyond the scope of the present paper, but as a prime example one could cite the so-called *Sukhāvātī-vyūha-upadeśa* ascribed to Vasubandhu and translated c. 529 by Bodhiruci (T.1524).⁴¹ The author of this text leaves us in no doubt as to his belief that there are no women in Sukhāvātī, and that even the word “woman” is unknown there.⁴² However, even outside sūtras and commentaries devoted specifically to the cult of Amitābha, one finds the same situation. As Gregory Schopen showed in his 1977 paper “Sukhāvātī as a Generalized Religious Goal in Sanskrit Mahāyāna Sūtra Literature”, the idea of Sukhāvātī and rebirth in it is by no means confined to Pure Land literary sources. Although the main thrust of Schopen’s paper is to demonstrate that rebirth in Sukhāvātī is promised as a reward for or benefit of a whole host of religious practices which have nothing to do with the cult of Amitābha (i.e. it is a “generalized” blessing), of special importance for our present purposes is the way in which two sūtras which he cites describe other Buddha-fields (*buddha-kṣetras*) as being *like* Sukhāvātī. One of the features of these Buddha-fields – Vaidūryanirbhāsa in the *Bhaiṣajyaguru-sūtra*, *Aśokottamaśrī in the *Sapta-tathāgata-pūrva-pranidhāna-viśeṣa-vistara-sūtra* – is that they are devoid of women. This is stated clearly and unambiguously (see Schopen, 1977: 194–195). The inference that can be drawn from this is that Sukhāvātī was commonly thought to possess this feature, i.e. that it was paradigmatically single-sex.⁴³ This suggests that although we may be able to detect evidence of attempts within the very heart of the Pure Land tradition to soften the position on women, the early hard-line stance was extremely persistent and influential.

My conclusion then is totally unsurprising: not all the classical sources speak with one voice; they do not always agree with one another. Nor, we might add, do they always agree with what contemporary Buddhists say. It has not been my intention simply to prove my ordained friend wrong, but to provide some historical context or background for her opinion. Indeed, even if one were inclined to set her view alongside some unvarying and unequivocal standard of scriptural orthodoxy, and judge it heterodox, one would find, as we have, that there is no such standard. That being said, the widespread belief that the inhabitants of Sukhāvātī are neither male nor female finds no clear support in the texts, and the usual appeal to the vow which states that all those reborn in Amitābha’s land will have the same form or appearance becomes rather unconvincing when set alongside all the other passages that this paper has discussed.⁴⁴ Is this then the end of the matter? Are we left with nothing but unresolved disagreement? Naturally I have approached this issue as a scholar raised in the Western academic traditions of

philology, Buddhism and – more broadly – Religious Studies. From this standpoint the various versions of the *Sukhāvati-vyūha* and other texts are historically conditioned artefacts, products of particular social circumstances. When one attempts to work out what they say, one expects to find traces of historical development, of change and contradiction, and one nowadays also expects the disappearance of the text as a single, unitary entity. For others, however, these documents are *buddha-vacana*, revelations of a timeless and immutable truth, and the *Sukhāvati-vyūha* remains *the Sukhāvati-vyūha*. A scholar's most basic presuppositions about the texts may thus be diametrically opposed to those of a believer, but does that mean their agendas are irreconcilable? I believe they are not irreconcilable, even though they are certainly not the same. If there is a middle ground on which both parties can meet, it may lie in seeing beyond the letter of the text to the spirit which has informed it, and indeed the whole tradition, right from the start. That spirit, in my view, is a kind of radical egalitarianism, not as some kind of democratic ideal, but as a more profound non-dualistic insight that divisions and distinctions that impede spiritual progress and stifle human creativity and happiness ought to be overcome, and that in the more perfect state that *Sukhāvati* represents they are indeed transcended. Thus the differences between men and women, which cause humans in this world so much anguish as well as joy (and arguably much more anguish than joy), ought to be transcended as well. But does this mean that they must also be removed, or, to put the question more bluntly, that the salvation of men is dependent upon the elimination of women? Some of the Buddhists who produced and transmitted the *Sukhāvati* tradition in the beginning appear to have been strongly of that opinion, perhaps because, as male renunciants, their ideal of paradise was a projection of their earthly circumstances, and they could imagine nothing else. Others, arriving on the scene later, seem to have had a different answer to that question, as far as we can tell, and they also seem to have felt quite at liberty to reshape the tradition accordingly. Scholars and believers alike may argue today over how closely these later guardians of the tradition approached the contemporary position on the asexuality of the Pure Land's population, but for the time being one thing should be clear: the texts we have reviewed represent a dialogue in progress, in which generations of past Buddhists have tried to elaborate their changing and at times conflicting visions of perfection and realisation. If these texts are indeed foundational, it is small wonder that in the edifice which is built upon them, the dialogue should continue.

NOTES

¹ This is a revised version of a paper presented at The Third Chung-Hwa International Conference on Buddhism (Taipei, 19–21 July 1997), and differs in certain respects from the version to be published in the Proceedings volume. My thanks go to the Ven. Master Sheng-Yen and the Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies for their kind invitation to the conference, and to Jan Nattier and Jonathan Silk for their critical comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

² Although the nun in question is a representative of the Buddha Light International movement, led by the Venerable Master Hsing Yun (Xingyun) and based on Fo Kuang Shan (Fo Guang Shan) in Taiwan, it is my understanding that her position on this matter is not only typical of this movement, but is widely held amongst contemporary Pure Land Buddhists.

³ I have tried to represent the thesis (see esp. pp. 117–120) as fairly as possible – not easy to do, when it is stated with so many qualifications – but it seems to me that Dobbins' only argument for it is that he himself finds it "hard to imagine that Eshinni expected to see her daughter in Pure Land in masculine form" (p. 119). The evidence he cites is in my view entirely inconclusive as to whether Eshinni believed that she and her daughter would be reborn and reunited *as women*. They testify only to her strong faith in rebirth and reunion. In fact, this strikes me as the more interesting aspect of Dobbins' article. The notion of "heavenly reunion", of looking forward to being reunited in the afterlife with one's friends and loved ones, is not found at all in the classical scriptural sources, but is here fully attested. This is a significant development in Pure Land thinking and, once again, a disjunction between the scriptures and the beliefs of real people, or between what Dobbins calls "idealized religion" and "practiced religion". There is an analogous development in the history of Christian notions of the afterlife.

⁴ It is important to bear it always in mind that the problem is not whether women can or cannot be reborn in *Sukhāvati* (there is never any doubt of that), but whether they can be reborn *there as women*.

⁵ The Sanskrit text of the former may be found in Wogihara et al. (1972: 193–212), which also reprints (pp. 446–460) the English translation by F. Max Müller published in Cowell et al. (1894: II, 89–103). A better translation appears in Gómez (1996: 15–22). Gómez (1996: 145–151) has also translated Kumārajīva's Chinese version of this text, T.366, *Fo shuo amituo jing* 佛說阿彌陀經. Takakusu Junjirō's English translation of the *Amitāyur-dhyāna-sūtra* from the single Chinese version by Kālayāśa (T.365, *Fo shuo wuliangshou-fo jing* 佛說無量壽佛經) may also be found in Cowell et al. (1894: II, 161–201). This too was reprinted in Wogihara et al. (1972: 462–502).

⁶ The Sanskrit edition cited in this paper will be that of Ashikaga (1965), supplemented in the Vows Section by Fujita (1980). English translations of this *sūtra* have been made by F. Max Müller, in Cowell et al. (1894: II, 1–72), reprinted in Wogihara et al. (1972: 372–443), and by Gómez (1996: 61–111). The Tibetan version is that edited by Kawaguchi Ekai in Wogihara et al. (1972: 213–339). The Chinese translations of the same text – five are extant – are those as published in the *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō*, i.e. T.310.5 and TT.360–363.

⁷ I have removed the Western punctuation and changed the diacritical mark denoting *anusvāra* (replacing *m̐* with *m*).

⁸ Cf. Max Müller's translation in Cowell et al. (1894: II, 19) – where the vow is No. 34 – and now the much finer translation in Gómez (1996: 74).

⁹ Deciding whether it is valid is far from straightforward. One might object that to characterise this vow as misogynist (indicating hatred or fear of women) is to impose inappropriate 20th-century Western categories and miss the point that what is

at stake has to do with classical Indian ideas of purity and impurity (I owe this point to Richard Gombrich). However, the two positions need not be mutually exclusive, i.e. notions of the inferiority of women, feelings of antipathy towards them and the resulting ideological and social strategies may easily be couched in the language of purity. One might add that getting women themselves to loathe the fact that they are women and thus become, as it were, self-hating is a classic misogynist move. At the risk of lapsing further into jargon, one might also say that the vow is an explicit illustration of the principle that hegemonic discourses work in part by inducing the oppressed to appropriate the instruments of their own subordination.

¹⁰ See Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, s.v. *vi-gup-* and Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, s.v. *vijugupsaka*, *vijugupsana-tā*.

¹¹ It is possible, of course, to regard the hearing of the name as the first condition of four. This does not alter the situation appreciably.

¹² Indeed, this would be downright impossible in the case of Vow 42, since birth in a noble family could not occur in Sukhāvati, where there are no class distinctions of the usual kind, and no families either.

¹³ Cf. Gómez (1996: 249, n. 27).

¹⁴ The Tibetan text reads: *bcorn ldan 'das gal te bdag byang chub thob pa'i tshé kun du* [variant: *tu*] *sangs rgyas kyi zhing grangs ma mchis bsam gyis mi khyab mtshungs pa ma mchis tshad ma mchis pa dag na bud med gang dag gis bdag gi ming thos dang* [variant: *nas*] *rab tu dang ba skyes te / byang chub tu sems bskyed par gyur la bud med kyi lus la smad* [variant: *smod*] *par gyur te / de dag tshé brjes* [variant: *rjes*] *nas gal te bud med kyi lus lan gnyis thob par gyur pa de srid du bdag bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'shang rgya bar mi bgyi'o //* (only variants that are not obvious mistakes have been supplied here). This vow is No. 36 in this Tibetan version. It is substantially the same as the Sanskrit, but note that it translates *strī-bhāva* as *bud med kyi lus*, "female body".

¹⁵ See also Fujita (1975: 20–22), and cf. Gómez (1996: 130). As often happens with Buddhist texts, there is no fixed relation between the date of translation and the earliness or lateness of the recension of the text. For example, a Chinese translation of the 4th century may represent a later or more developed form of the text than the Tibetan version of the early 9th or indeed the Sanskrit manuscript of the 13th.

¹⁶ For example, it contains verse *gāthās*, whereas prose translation of *gāthās* is a feature of Lokakṣema's style, and it is prosodically rather too regular in places. Furthermore, while some of the terminology used is reminiscent of other, better attested translations by Lokakṣema, other terminology is inconsistent with them. It also tends to avoid the phonetic transcriptions which are the hallmark of Lokakṣema's translations.

¹⁷ One of them is the unanimous testimony of the catalogues ascribing T.362 to Zhi Qian. Another – more serious, in my view – is the passage on the five evils. With its well-known Chinese religious and philosophical touches and its more classical prose style, it cannot have been written by Lokakṣema, and must be the work of a later author.

¹⁸ Fujita 1970 provides a careful and extensive discussion of the evidence and the various authorship theories which have been advanced, and comes to the tentative conclusion that T.361 is a translation by Bo Yan 帛延 or Bai Yan 白延 of the Wei Dynasty, and thus dates to 258 (Fujita, 1970: 35–51), while T.362 is by Zhi Qian, and was thus produced between the years 222–228 or 222–253 (Fujita, 1970: 51–62). My different conclusions about the authorship of these two translations are similarly tentative. Needless to say, confirmation of Lokakṣema's authorship of T.362 would

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require – at the very least – a comprehensive study of his entire translation corpus (and that of Zhi Qian!). At some later date I hope to return to this problem.

¹⁹ The table in Gómez (1996: 263) gives 18 for the so-called Zhi Qian text, but the vows in it clearly number 24.

²⁰ The punctuation of the Chinese quotations has been altered wherever appropriate.

²¹ On this interesting equivalent for Sanskrit *sarva-sattva*, which is typical of Lokakṣema, see Harrison (1990: 246).

²² If it had indeed been made by Saṅghavarman it would date from c. 252 and be about as old as Zhi Qian's text, but this is most unlikely. However, this version has undoubtedly incorporated material from earlier translations. For a review of the evidence see Fujita (1970: 62–96). Cf. also Gómez (1996: 125–131), but note that Buddhahadra was *not* a Tang Dynasty translator. Gómez (1996) contains an excellent English translation of this text.

²³ Cf. the English translation of this passage in Chang (1983: 344).

²⁴ On the problematic nature of Faxian's work in general see, e.g. Shibata (1966). With regard to the *Sukhāvati-vyūha*, however, the doubts raised by Shibata as to the status of this translation can be resolved only on the basis of a study of the whole text. One notes incidentally that it contains only 36 vows.

²⁵ *Manobhinirvṛta* is not entirely clear: Max Müller and Gómez both translate it as "delightful", but here I follow Fujita (1975: 102) and the Tibetan translation (see below) in understanding it as *manobhinirvṛta*, "mentally created".

²⁶ Cf. Cowell et al. (1894: II, 41–42) and Gómez (1996: 89). It is fairly clear that the three verbs at the end of this passage denote the enjoyment of carnal pleasures. For the fact that they refer often – but not exclusively – to sexual intercourse, see *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, s.v. *paricārayati*.

²⁷ Here I must thank my student Elizabeth Guthrie for raising the issue of the iconographical representations of these beings and of Sukhāvati in the Chinese context, e.g. in the Dunhuang murals. Although the equation *feitian* = *apsaras* seems to be common currency (see, e.g. Whitfield, 1995: 267, 342), it is by no means clear that *feitian* are always female, and indeed there is at least one painting at Dunhuang in which a particular *feitian*, being totally nude, is most definitely male (ibid., p. 285). In general the Dunhuang depictions of the Pure Lands abound in airborne figures whose gender is not clear, although they are usually naked from the waist up. These could well represent the gods supposed to inhabit Sukhāvati and other such realms, rather than the *apsaras*, as is commonly thought, and thus they could all be male (cf. Ning, 1992: 35). However, the belief that *feitian* are typically female is amply illustrated on the ceiling paintings of the Buddha Hall of the recently constructed Nantian Temple in Wollongong, Australia. There one sees all the iconographical features of the figures in the Dunhuang paintings, to which are added unmistakably full breasts. This is a complex art-historical question which can hardly be gone into here, but clearly the way in which the text of the *Sukhāvati-vyūha* was translated onto the walls of the Dunhuang caves has a bearing on the issues discussed in this paper. For now, all that can be said is that the equation *feitian* = *apsaras* is suspect.

²⁸ The Tibetan text reads: *de dag gang kha dog dang / rtags dang / dbyibs dang / chu zheng gi bar dang / rin po che sna tshogs kyi ba gam brgya stong gis brgyan pa rin po che'i khri lha'i ras bcos bu sna tshogs bting ba / sngas khra bo bzhang pa dang ldan pa'i gzhal med khang ji lta bu 'dod pa de lta bu'i gzhal med khang de dag de dag gi mdun du 'byung ste / de dag rin po che'i gzhal med khang grub pa de dag gi nang na lha'i bu mo mdun [read bdun] stong bdun stong gis yongs su bskor zhing mdun gyis btas nas 'khod de rtse zhing dga' la dga' mgur spyod do /*. Interestingly for the interpretation of the Sanskrit, the Tibetan translators have obviously read *nānādivyādūśyasamsīrnavicitropadhānavinyastarāparyāikam* as

one compound (i.e. as "having jewelled couches strewn with all kinds of celestial rugs and piled with multicoloured cushions") and have understood *manobhinirvṛt(t)a* as "created" (*grub pa*).

²⁹ Cf. Gómez (1996: 185). My interpretation differs in several respects.

³⁰ When women too are promised the services of large companies of nymphs one assumes that they are expected to take rebirth in the heavens as men.

³¹ The passage is directly preceded by a mention of the mentally produced enjoyments of the inhabitants (like those of the gods of the sixth heaven), before which comes a description of the absence of mountains, seas, topographical irregularities, the three unfortunate destinies, seasons and so on. A somewhat similar passage stands near the beginning of the so-called Saṅghavarman version's description (T.360, 270a7-15; Gómez, 1996: 176), but it is not followed by anything to do with the absence of women.

³² On the former contention see Harrison (1987: 76-79). The latter position is certainly at odds with the Mainstream tradition, as expressed for example in the *Therī-gāthā*.

³³ One explanation is that at this point T.361 is a straight copy of T.362. This is a further reminder that any study of the authorship of these two translations must take full account of the close relationship between them.

³⁴ The expression "having thoughts of women" is of course ambiguous, but it is reasonably clear that here the Chinese means thinking thoughts about women (thus amplifying the concept of lust) rather than thinking women's thoughts. For a clear Indic instance of the latter sense, cf. *Dīgha-nikāya* ii.271-272. In this passage a certain Gopikā, by abandoning a woman's thoughts (*iithi-cittam*) and cultivating a man's way of thinking (*purisa-cittam*), is reborn in heaven as a male, Gopaka. I am indebted to Kate Blackstone for drawing this interesting reference to my attention.

³⁵ The counterpart vow in T.361 is No. 10 (281b6-7): 十。我作佛時，我國人民有愛欲者，我不作佛。 (10: When I become a Buddha, if the people in my country have desires, I will not become a Buddha.)

³⁶ The only exception is Faxian's very late Chinese translation, which, as we have seen, may well reflect an attempt to recombine both earlier and later recensions of the text.

³⁷ A spirit so ambiguous and inclusive, in fact, that it could encompass references to the presence of nymphs without seeing the logical problem so apparent to us.

³⁸ See, e.g., Harrison (1995).

³⁹ The *Aksobhya-tathāgatasya-vyūha* in its two Chinese translations and one Tibetan version states that women reborn in Abhirati enjoy painless childbirth and are free of other alleged deficiencies of the woman's lot in this world. On this see, e.g. Lokakṣema's version (T.313, 755c28-756a2, 756b3-15) or Bodhiruci's version (T.310.6, 105b24-27, c18-23, only partially translated in Chang, 1983: 323). Cf. also Williams (1989: 245). With regard to the theme of this paper, the hypothesis put forward by Kwan (1985) merits serious consideration. He conjectures that the *Aksobhya-tathāgatasya-vyūha* reflects a more ascetic (forest-dwelling) authorship, while the *Sukhāvati-vyūha* is pervaded by a more urban, less renunciator spirit, and that this difference accounts for the greater popularity of the latter text and of the cult which it propounds. As interesting as this thesis is, it has its problems. One of them is the presence of women in Abhirati, the other - more germane to our discussion here - is its failure to take full account of the fact that the *Sukhāvati-vyūha* was far more ascetic in orientation at the outset but became progressively less so over time. For a further discussion of the historical questions raised by the comparison of these two scriptures we await the forthcoming work of Jan Nattier.

⁴⁰ See, e.g. Gross (1993: 65-66).

⁴¹ This is a different Bodhiruci from the later translator of the *Sukhāvati-vyūha*.

⁴² See T.1524, 231a14-15, 232a2-9. An English translation of the relevant passages can be found in Kiyota (1978: 276, 282).

⁴³ Note, however, Schopen's own observation on p. 196 that the comparison is not between specific details but between general magnificence. I am doubtful about this.

⁴⁴ This is the fourth vow in the so-called Saṅghavarman translation (T.360, 267c23-24; see also Gómez, 1996: 166), as well as in Bodhiruci's version (T.310.5, 93b20-21). Taken with various other indications in the text (not all of which have been dealt with in this paper), it is hard to construe it as meaning anything other than that all the inhabitants of Sukhāvati will have the same *male* form.

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VASUBANDHU'S PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF THE
VĀTSĪPUTRĪYAS' THEORY OF PERSONS (II)

INTRODUCTION

This is the second of three articles in which Vasubandhu's philosophical critique of the Vātsīputrīyas' inexplicabilist theory of persons is reconstructed and assessed.¹ The critique appears in the "Refutation of the Theory of a Self" (*Ātmavādapratishedha*), which is his prose addendum to his *Treasury of Knowledge (Abhidharmakośa)*. The set of objections to their theory with which I am concerned is a philosophical critique in the sense that Vasubandhu attempts in it to use logic (*tarka*) to demonstrate that the theory is not reasonable (*na yukta*) rather than simply to show that it contradicts scripture (*āgama*). My reconstruction of this critique is a logically perspicuous formulation of the arguments it contains which reveal the theses (*siddhānta*-s) upon which they are based. The purposes of my reconstruction are the recovery of the theses of the theories of persons of Vasubandhu and the Vātsīputrīyas and an assessment of the extent to which Vasubandhu's critique is successful. In this second article I shall begin the process of recovering the major theses of the Vātsīputrīyas' theory of persons. In the third I shall complete this process and then list the major theses of Vasubandhu's theory. A thorough philosophical discussion of the substantive issues recovered by my investigation will be undertaken elsewhere.

In the first article I reconstructed and assessed Vasubandhu's objection from the two realities to the inexplicabilist theory, the Vātsīputrīyas' reply from aggregate reliance to this objection, Vasubandhu's causal objection to this reply, the Vātsīputrīyas' fire and fuel reply to the causal objection, and the Vātsīputrīyas' middle way argument for their theory.² To facilitate a summary of the results of my investigation in the first article I shall list the theses of the *Vātsīputrīyas' theory of persons (VTP)* which come into play in the part of the critique with which the first article was concerned. For each of these theses I have created a descriptive name so that references to it may be made which will help the reader recall its content. The first four are as follows:

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TOM J.F. TILLEMANS and DONALD S. LOPEZ, JR.

WHAT CAN ONE REASONABLY SAY ABOUT NONEXISTENCE?
A TIBETAN WORK ON THE PROBLEM OF ĀŚRAYĀSIDDHA*

Journal of Indian Philosophy encourages creative activities among orientalist and philosophers along with all the various combinations that two classes can form. Contributions to the journal are bound by the limits of rational inquiry and avoid questions that lie in the fields of speculative sociology and parapsychology. In a very general sense, the method is analytical and comparative, aiming at a rigorous precision in the translation of terms and statements. Space is devoted to the works of philosophers of the past as well as to the creative researches of contemporary scholars on such philosophic problems as were addressed by past philosophers.

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The fallacy of *āśrayāsiddhahetu*, or a “logical reason whose basis is unestablished” arises when the subject of an argument is nonexistent; in usual cases, this subject failure implies that the proposition to be proved (*sādhya*) cannot be established – Buddhists such as Dharmakīrti repeatedly stress that when the subject fails, a debate about its properties ceases. To take an invented example, if one says that “Pegasus flies around the Aegean”, it suffices to show that there is no Pegasus and one will have, *ipso facto*, short-circuited the question of “his” flight, or even proved the contrary, i.e. that he does not fly. Similarly, if someone shows that the Primordial Matter (*pradhāna*) accepted in Sāṃkhya philosophy does not actually exist, then the Sāṃkhya’s own thesis that *pradhāna* has such and such properties will thereby be refuted.¹ The problem however becomes thorny when one is proving simple nonexistence of some pseudo-entity, for then the case should be different from that of Pegasus’s supposed flight. The height of absurdity would be if all proofs of nonexistence became self-refuting because the subject failed to exist.

The problem of *āśrayāsiddha* is taken up in various Buddhist contexts – typically in connection with proofs of momentariness (*kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhi*)² and in connection with later Madhyamaka proofs of the absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). Although it is certainly not our intention to inventory all the considerable Indian and Tibetan Buddhist literature on this problem of *āśrayāsiddha*, or even the majority of texts in which the problem figures, certain seminal works do stand out and are repeatedly cited. Besides passages from Dignāga, we should mention the substantial and influential sections in Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 136–148 and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III, as well as those in the works of Kamalaśīla, in particular his *Madhyamakāloka*. The Tibetan treatment is largely centered around Tsong kha pa’s *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, his commentary on the *Madhyamakālamkāra* in which he integrates and elaborates upon the key passages in Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Kamalaśīla. Although there are some relatively brief

passages in the Sa skya pa *Rigs gter* and *Pramānavārttika* commentaries (e.g. gSer mdog Pañ chen Śākya mchog ldan sketches out some significant differences from the treatment in *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*³), it does seem that the problem of *āśrayāsiddha* was not treated nearly as thoroughly in the other schools as in the dGe lugs, where it became a recurring topos figuring markedly in numerous works. The present article consists primarily in a translation of the section on *āśrayāsiddha* in a text by A lag sha Ngag dbang bstan dar (1759–1840), a dGe lugs pa scholar who was from the A la shan region of Inner Mongolia but wrote in Tibetan and who was, in our opinion, remarkable for his clear and often quite innovative thinking. His *gCig du bral gyi rnam bzhag* is a Madhyamaka work, one that treats of various problems centered around the Svātantrika Madhyamaka's use of the *ekānekaviyogahetu* (= *gcig du bral gyi gian tshigs* "neither one nor many reason [for *sūnyatā*]"). For Ngag dbang bstan dar the problem of *āśrayāsiddha* arises when the Madhyamaka uses logical reasons like the *ekānekaviyogahetu* to prove ultimate voidness of things; it also occurs when he uses logical reasoning to prove that pseudo-entities do not exist at all. Ngag dbang bstan dar, thus, like his Indian and Tibetan Svātantrika predecessors, zig-zags between the Madhyamaka and logicians' positions, using the latter to buttress the former.

A striking aspect of the later Indian and Tibetan explanations of *āśrayāsiddha* is that certain earlier texts are almost invariably cited in later ones, giving a kind of "unfolding telescope" effect where each subsequent text includes its predecessors but seems to enlarge upon them and carry the ideas a few steps further, all the while seeking to remain faithful to the original intentions of Dignāga. This impression is, however, potentially misleading. In fact, be it the position of Kamalaśīla, that of Tsong kha pa or Ngag dbang bstan dar, what is at stake is a complex synthesis of disparate doctrine that has been elaborated over time; it would thus be a mistake if the seeming elegance of the unfolding telescope presentations lulled us into thinking that the later presentation was also ahistorically present *ab initio*. Lopez, in his *Study of Svātantrika*, has described the Tibetan theory on *āśrayāsiddha* as it is found in Tsong kha pa, rGyal tshab and lCang skya rol pa'i rdo rje and others: this constitutes the received position for Ngag dbang bstan dar. The section in *dBu ma rgyan gyis zin bris* treating of *āśrayāsiddha* has been translated in Tillemans (1984). As we shall try to show in the rather extensive explanatory notes to our translation, the positions that we find in Tsong kha pa, Ngag dbang bstan dar and others had an

intricate history that certainly did not just consist in what Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and Kamalaśīla had already understood.

Various works of bsTan dar have been studied by now, and it is becoming clear that this later dGe lugs pa thinker did make significant contributions, especially in the domain of ideas and arguments where he often shows originality in building upon and reinterpreting earlier writers.⁴ The *gCig du bral gyi rnam bzhag*, and in particular the section on *āśrayāsiddha*, is a good case in point. On certain topics, such as avoidance of *āśrayāsiddha* in cases of simple, non-implicative, negation (*prasajyapratishedha*), bsTan dar makes a radical break with his Indian and Tibetan predecessors, and arguably he is right to do so. The rapprochement with the Madhyamaka debate on "concordantly appearing subjects" (*chos can mthun snang ba*) is also noteworthy for its philosophical interest, turning as it does on the general problem of the incommensurability of rival theories.

Readers will probably recognize that the problem of talking about non-being has a long history, not only in the East, but in the West, including its twentieth century technical treatment in formal logic's theory of descriptions and in the theory of presuppositions. We add this later Tibetan position on what is one of the most recurrent and interesting problems of philosophy.

TRANSLATION

§1. Secondly, the doubt that the subject (*chos can; dharmin*) might be unestablished, when one presents the formal argument (*sbyor ngag; prayogavākya*). [Objection:] If we follow what is literally stated in the *Madhyamakālamkāra*, it is evident that one also presents partless consciousness, Primordial Matter (*spyi gts'o bo; pradhāna*) and so forth⁵ as subjects of enquiry (*shes 'dod chos can*) for a valid logical reason.⁶ Thus this [reason] would have an unestablished basis (*gzhi ma grub pa; āśrayāsiddha*). Would it not then result that the reason would be one which is unestablished (*ma grub pa; asiddha*) because the entity of the subject does not exist?⁷

§2. By way of a reply to this [objection], many scholars have said that there is no [such] fault so long as one presents simple negations (*med dgag; prasajyapratishedha*), as both the reason and the property to be proved (*bsgrub bya'i chos; sādhyadharmā*), but that should one present a positive phenomenon (*sgrub pa; vidhi*) or an implicative negation (*ma yin dgag; paryudāsapratishedha*), it will then be an unestablished reason.⁸ This does indeed seem to be based on certain statements [in

the works] of Tsong kha pa and his disciples, such as [the passage] in [Tsong kha pa's] *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* that reads:

The fact that there is no fault, even though the subject stated for that reason might be negated, is due to the essential feature that both the reason and the property [to be proved] are mere exclusions (*rnam bcad tsam; vyavacchedamātra*).

However this alone can not eliminate all doubt. Thus it is necessary to explain things as follows. There are cases where [the reason] would not be a reason that is unestablished, in spite of the fact that one might present either an implicative negation or a positive phenomenon for both the reason and the property to be proved. For example, an argument such as “Take as the subject, a rabbit’s horn; it is fitting to be designated by the word ‘moon’, because it exists as an object of conceptual thought.” – this [argument] is the idea of ‘Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje.’⁹ Alternatively [there could be the argument], “Take as the subject, being gored by a rabbit’s horn; this is a fallacious reason for proving that a person is in pain, because it is a reason that does not have the triple character [needed] for proving that a person is in pain” – this [argument] is the idea in [dGe ‘dun grub pa’s] *Tshad ma rigs rgyan*.¹⁰

§3. The reason why these [arguments] are not reasons that are unestablished because the entity of the subject does not exist devolves from the essential feature that when something is [qualified by] either the reasons or properties to be proved in the proof of these [propositions], it need not be existent. So, even when simple negations are presented as both the reason and property [to be proved], there can also be the fault of the subject being unestablished provided that either the reason or property to be proved in the proof in question is pervaded by being existent, as for example when one proves that [something nonexistent like a rabbit’s horn] is the subtle selflessness of the elements (*chos kyi bdag med; dharmanairātmya*) by means of the reason, “being the consummate [nature]” (*yongs grub; pariniṣpanna*).¹¹ Consequently, when one presents an unestablished basis as the subject, then all cases where a thing’s being held to be [qualified by] the reason necessitates its being existent will [incur the fault of] being fallacious reasons unestablished because of the nonexistence of the entity of the subject, but when being held to be [qualified by] the reason does not necessitate being existent, then the [reason] will not be fallacious. The details of this way [of distinguishing between faulty reasons and valid ones] should be correctly brought out.

§4. In general, the subject of an argument is of two sorts, the subject that is the [proponent’s] own [intended] locus (*rang rten chos can*)¹² and

a nominal subject (*chos can ‘ba’ zhig pa; kevaladharmin*).¹³ Between these two, the subject that is the [proponent’s] own [intended] locus is, e.g., when one proves to a Sāṃkhya that sound is impermanent by means of the reason that it is produced, for at that time one proves impermanence based upon the simple [commonly recognized entity] sound. A nominal subject is, e.g., when one proves to a Vaiśeṣika that the space, which is [taken by the Vaiśeṣika to be] a real entity (*dnogs por gyur pa’i nam mkha’; vastubhūtākāśa*), is not [in fact] a permanent substance [as they maintain it is] by means of the reason that it does not serve as the locus for other qualities. [This is called a “nominal subject”] because, at that time, one is not proving that being a permanent substance is located in a real entity, space, and thus this type of space is just merely presented as the subject, but is not the locus or subject.¹⁴ Now, something’s being a “nominal subject” means that although it might be stated as the subject, it is not the locus of the property to be proved (*sādhyadharmā*), and is thus an unrelated subject. Consequently, although the nominal subject, i.e. the stated subject [as Tsong kha pa refers to it in §2 above], in the argument in question [against the Vaiśeṣika] is an unestablished basis, the subject that is the [proponent’s] own [intended] locus does exist, because at that time it is what appears to the conceptual thought grasping the real entity space (*vastubhūtākāśa*) as excluded from the contrary of real space that is the [actual] subject or locus for the proof in question. It follows that this is so, because [this appearance] is like that [i.e. is the actual locus], due to the fact that the desire to know (*shes ‘dod; jijñāsā*) occurs once the opponent has mistakenly taken this type of space and the [conceptual] appearance as such [a space] to be identical.¹⁵ Therefore, in order that we understand this difference between the fact that in the argument in question the subject that is the [proponent’s] own locus is an established basis, while the nominal subject that is presented in the actual words is not an established basis, [Dignāga] stated in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*:

With regard to the [proponent’s] own locus (*rang rten la*), [a thesis is not opposed] by perceptible states of affairs, by inference, by authorities or by what is commonly recognized.¹⁶

The purpose behind [Dignāga’s] not saying “the [proponent’s] own subject” (*rang gi chos can; svadharmin*) here but rather “the [proponent’s] own locus” (*rang gi rten*), was explained *in extenso* in thirteen verses from the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* in *Pramāṇavārttika*, verses that begin “*sarvatra vādino ... sva° ...*”.¹⁷

§5. [Objection:] Then, it would follow [absurdly] that the appearance as something excluded from not-sound (*sgra ma yin pa las log par*

snang ba) would also be the subject that is the [proponent's] own locus when proving that sound is impermanent by means of the reason that it is produced, because that is what you asserted [about space].

§6. [Reply:] This is not the same, because of the following: if something is a valid reason it must be established on the basis of the subject of enquiry in accordance with its mode of presentation ('*god tshul*'),¹⁸ and so, because the appearance to conceptual thought as something excluded from not-sound is an imagined entity (*kun brtags; parikalpita*), it does not concord at all with being a product.¹⁹ This follows, for it was stated in [Tsong kha pa's] *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*:

If one is proving that sound is impermanent because it is produced, then as the exclusion *qua* appearance (*snang ldog*), which appears to conceptual thought as excluded from not sound, is not a real entity (*dngos po*), the reason, i.e. being produced, does not qualify it. Rather, [being produced] must qualify the basis of the appearance (*snang gshi*), i.e. sound. This is due to the essential feature that real entities (*dngos po*) are taken as the reason and property to be proved.

The [latter] necessary implication (*khyab pa; vyāpti*) holds, because (a) it is obvious that a conceptual appearance will not be established as the subject of enquiry of an argument where real entities are presented as the reason and property to be proved, and (b) it was stated in the *rNam nges dar tik* [of rGyal tshab rje]:

The [two cases] are not the same, because the conceptual appearance of space is the subject that is the basis ascertained as [qualified by] the previous reason [in the argument against the Vaiśeṣika], but what appears to conceptual thought as sound cannot be the basis that is ascertained as produced.

§7. To summarize, although we present space as the subject to the Vaiśeṣika, it is not the subject, but the appearance of this [space] is the subject. And when we prove that sound is impermanent by means of the reason, being produced, what appears as sound to conceptual thought does not serve as the subject, rather it is mere sound itself that serves as the subject that is the [proponent's] own [intended] locus. The reason for this, if one carries it as far as possible, comes down to whether there is or is not a subject that appears concordantly (*chos can mthun snang ba*) to both the Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣika, for the Buddhist accepts space as being a simple negation (*med dgag*) consisting in the mere denial of obstruction and contact, whereas the Vaiśeṣika accepts that it is a real entity (*dngos po*) that is independent (*rang dbang ba*) and is a positive phenomenon (*sgrub pa*).²⁰

§8. [Objection:] Then it would follow that even sound would not appear concordantly to both [parties], because the Buddhist asserts that sound is derived from the elements ('*byung 'gyur; bhautika*), whereas

the Vaiśeṣika asserts that sound is a quality of space (*nam mkha'i yon tan; ākāśagūṇa*).

§9. [Reply:] This is completely different on account of the essential feature that, to both these [parties], a mere object grasped by the auditive consciousness is established as appearing concordantly as an object found by non-erroneous means of valid cognition (*tshad ma; pramāna*),²¹ whereas in the case of space, if [the parties] were to search for the designated object (*biags don*), they would find no object established as appearing concordantly apart from the mere verbal designation.

§10. Moreover, the omniscient lCang skya [Rol pa'i rdo rje] has said that rGyal tshab rje maintained that the conceptual appearance (*rtog pa'i snang ba*) was the subject, but that mKhas grub rje did not accept that verbal objects (*sgra don; śabdārtha*) [i.e. conceptual entities] were the subject.²² And the omniscient 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa has said that taking Primordial Matter as the subject was Dignāga's idea, and that Dharmakīrti's idea was to take the conceptual appearance as the subject. However, suppose we examine their ideas carefully. Then whomsoever's position we might take, be it that of Dignāga and his disciple [Dharmakīrti] or that of Tsong kha pa and his disciples [rGyal tshab rje and mKhas grub rje], if we presented an argument like "Take as the subject, Primordial Matter, it is not the substratum (*nyer len; upādāna*) for its various manifestations (*rnam 'gyur; vikṛti*), because it is not perceived to be the substratum of its various manifestations",²³ none would deny that it is correct to take what appears as excluded from not-Primordial Matter to the conceptual thought grasping Primordial Matter (*gtso bo 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la gtso bo ma yin pa las log par snang ba*) as being the subject of this argument. For it was stated in the *Madhyamakāloka* [of Kamalaśīla]:

It is just what exists as an aspect of mind, but is metaphorically designated by the infantile as external and real, that is the subject. Therefore, one negates Primordial Matter and the like in dependence upon that.²⁴

§11. There is a necessary implication (*khyab pa; vyāpti*) here [between what the passage from the *Madhyamakāloka* says and the fact that the subject is a conceptual appearance], because [Kamalaśīla's] words "It is just what exists as an aspect of mind that is the subject" make it clear that he holds the conceptual appearance to be the subject.²⁵ This is also the case because of the following quotations. It is said in the *Svārthānumānapariccheda* [of Dharmakīrti's *Pramānavārttika*]:

A verbal object [can] be a *dharma* of three types [a basis for existence, for non-existence or for both].

[To which] [Dharmakīrti's] *Svavṛtti* states:

Thus, those who depend upon this subject [deliberate about existence and non-existence, asking whether] this object that is represented by the word "Primordial Matter" [does or does not have a real substratum].²⁶

In the commentary on this [passage] Śākyabuddhi says:

What is expressed by the word "Primordial Matter", that alone is the subject.

And in [mKhas grub rje's] *rNam 'grel 'tik chen rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* it is said:

This means that because it is generally taught that all conceptual appearances are verbal objects (*sgra don; śabdārtha*),²⁷ what appears as Primordial Matter to the conceptual thought grasping Primordial Matter is also established as being a verbal object. And in this way it is the exclusion *qua* basis (*gzhi ldog*) of the verbal object for Primordial Matter, or [in other words] it is just what appears as Primordial Matter to conceptual thought, that is the subject of this argument.²⁸

§12. Here an opponent might say: Take as the subject the verbal object for Primordial Matter (*gtso bo'i sgra don*); it would follow that this would be the subject of that argument [mentioned earlier], because the appearance as Primordial Matter to the conceptual thought grasping Primordial Matter (*gtso bo 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba*) is the subject of that argument.

§13. [We would reply:] There is no necessary implication (*ma khyab*).

§14. [The opponent:] It would follow that there is a necessary implication, because the appearance as Primordial Matter to conceptual thought is the verbal object for Primordial Matter.

§15. [We would reply:] Again there is no necessary implication, because there is a difference between an exclusion *qua* thing itself (*rang ldog*) and an exclusion *qua* basis [of the thing] (*gzhi ldog*).²⁹ For it was stated in the same [*rNam 'grel 'tik chen* [of mKhas grub rje]:

Therefore, the subject when one says, "Primordial Matter is not existent, because it is not perceived" is neither a real (*dnagos po ba*) Primordial Matter, nor is it the exclusion *qua* thing itself of the verbal object for Primordial Matter (*gtso bo'i sgra don gyi rang ldog*). Why? This very appearance as Primordial Matter to conceptual thought is asserted by the Sāmkhyas to be the [actual] Primordial Matter endowed with the five qualities, but in our own system we assert that it is a verbal object. Thus, the conceptual appearance as Primordial Matter is considered to be the subject, because it is the basis of the debate about whether [something] is or is not the Primordial Matter endowed with the five qualities.

A differentiation between the exclusion *qua* thing itself (*rang ldog*) and the exclusion *qua* basis [for the thing] (*gzhi ldog*) is extremely valuable in this context.³⁰

§16. This [point] is related to the essential feature that although the Sāmkhya believes in this type of conceptual appearance, he does not

believe that this appearance is a verbal object, for in [mKhas grub rje's] *Tshad ma yid kyi mum sel* it is said:

Also for the foolish opponent to say that the verbal object for this type of [autonomous and substantially existent (*rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod*)] self is the subject would be a proclamation of his own faults since he accepts that the verbal object of this type of self (*de lta bu bdag gi sgra don*) does not [really] exist.

§17. Thus, it is indeed correct that the conceptual appearance is the subject, but when one is refuting an opponent's position, one does not have to present literally the conceptual appearance as being the subject. Why? It is because the very Primordial Matter, permanent Īśvara, autonomous persons and so forth in which the opponent believes must be explicitly presented as the subjects in just the same way [as the opponent believes in them]. Otherwise there would be the fault that Primordial Matter and so forth would not be negated in themselves (*rang ldog nas*).³¹ For in [rGyal tshab rje's] *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* it was said:

Their thought according to the Lord of scholars, Kamalaśīla, was that Primordial Matter had to be refuted by [explicitly] taking it as the subject. Otherwise, although [the property of] being the substratum of various manifestations might be negated, Primordial Matter would not be negated in itself (*rang ldog nas*). The basis for ascertaining the reason with a *pramāna* is maintained to be just the appearance as Primordial Matter (*gtso bor snang ba nyid*).³²

§18. [Objection:] In that case, it follows that the conceptual appearance cannot correctly be held to be the subject, because it is void of ability to perform a function (*don byed nus pa; arthakriyāsāmarthyā*). There is a necessary implication, because whatever is void of ability to perform a function cannot properly be a basis of deliberation for the perspicacious (*rtog ldan; prekṣāvāt*). In this vein, the *Pramānavārttika* stated:

What point is there, for those who have such an aim, in deliberations about a thing that has no ability to perform a function? Why should a woman filled with desire wonder whether a eunuch was handsome or not?

§19. [We reply:] There is no necessary implication (*ma khyab*). This is for the following reasons. The meaning of this quotation is that when someone hopes his desired effect will ensue from some basis, then the basis about which he deliberates must have the ability to perform the function. Thus, [Dharmakīrti] illustrates [his point about the uselessness of deliberation about inefficient things] saying that it is inappropriate, because it would be like, for example, a woman, intent upon sexual pleasure, who took as the subject [of her thought] a eunuch, and after [mistakenly] hearing that he could perform the acts that would give [her pleasure], wondered whether he was handsome or not. Nonetheless,

in general, things that are void of ability to perform a function can properly be bases for [positive] proofs and negations. Indeed, the direct basis (*dn̄gos rten*) for proofs and negations must inevitably be a verbal object. This follows, because:

- (a) the reason why the direct basis must be a verbal object when one is denying that sound is permanent or proving that it is impermanent by the reason of its being produced is also grounded in the fact³³ that the conceptual thought that proves or negates relies upon verbal objects;
- (b) it was said in the *Parāṛthānumānapariccheda* [of *Pramānavārttika*],
... We accept that all [positive] proof and negation (*vidhiṣedhana*) here [in practical activity (*vyavahāra*)] is in reliance upon a verbal object ..., which has no external basis;³⁴
- (c) when it is said that permanence is negated and impermanence is proved with regard to sound, what is meant [here] is the performance of the function of conceptual thought (*rtog pa'i don byed*), and thus, on such an occasion, particular (*rang mtshan pa; svalakṣana*) sounds, impermanent things or products and so forth do not directly (*dn̄gos su*) appear to the conceptual thought that proves or negates.

In this vein, it was stated in [Tsong kha pa's] *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*:

The [*Pramāna*]vārttika, the sense of Dignāga's statements, states:

However, this condition of practical designations in terms of what infers (*anumāna*) [i.e. the logical reason] and the proposition to be inferred (*anumeyārtha*) is constructed in dependence upon a difference established by means of [conceptual] thought.³⁵

Following this explanation, in cases where the basis must be a real entity (*dn̄gos po*). [such as when one is] proving that sound is impermanent because it is produced or that there is fire on the smoky hill, the direct basis (*dn̄gos rten*) for these proofs and negations is just the object that is the appearance of sound or hill to conceptual thought as things excluded from what they are not. Sound and hill are not, however, themselves direct bases, because they do not directly appear to the conceptual thought that proves or negates.

As for the meaning of conceptual thought performing the function of negation and proof, it is as follows. When, for example, the quality of the subject (*phyogs chos; pakṣadharmā*) is established for proving sound to be impermanent by the reason that it is a product, then from the perspective of the opponent, it is as if sound is initially established and after that producthood newly depends upon sound. There is such an appearance (*snang tshul*), but in reality (*gnas tshod la*) there is no such progression.

TIBETAN TEXT OF THE EXCERPT FROM THE *GCIG DU BRAL GYI RNAM BZHAG*

§1. [453.2; f. 16b] gnyis pa sbyor ngag tu bkod na chos can ma grub pa'i dogs pa ni / *dBu ma rgyan gyi tshig zin ltar na / shes pa cha med dang spyi gtso bo sogs kyang rtags sbyor yang dag gi shes 'dod chos can du bkod par mngon pas / de gzhi ma grub pa yin pas rtags de chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs su mi 'gyur ram zhe na /*

§2. de'i lan la mkhas pa mang pos / rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos gnyis char med dgag yin pa bkod na skyon med kyang sgrub pa dang ma yin dgag bkod na ma grub pa'i rtags su 'gyur zhes smras so // de ni *rNam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal las /*

rtags des^a smras pa'i chos can bkag kyang skyon med pa ni rtags dang chos gnyis ka mam bcad tsam^b yin pa'i gnad kyis so //^c

zhes pa lta bu rJe yab sras kyi gsung 'ga' zhig la brten par snang mod / de tsam gyis dogs pa'i mtha' sel mi nus pas 'di ltar bshad dgos te / rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos gnyis char ma yin dgag dang sgrub pa gang rung bkod kyang ma grub pa'i rtags su mi 'gyur ba yang yod de / ri bong rwa chos [454; f. 17a] can zla ba zhes pa'i sgras brjod rung yin te / rtog yul na yod pa'i phyir zhes pa'i sbyor ba lta bu'o // 'di 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje'i dgongs pa'o // yang ri bong rwas phug pa chos can / skyes bu sdug bsngal bar sgrub pa'i rtags ltar snang yin te / skyes bu sdug bsngal bar sgrub pa'i tshul gsum ma yin pa'i gtan tshigs yin pa'i phyir zhes pa'i sbyor ba lta bu ste / 'di *Tshad ma rigs rgyan gyi dgongs pa'o //*

§3. de dag chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs su mi 'gyur ba'i rgyu mtshan de sgrub kyi rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos gang rung yin na yod pa yin mi dgos pa'i gnad kyis yin pas / des na rtags chos gnyis kar med dgag bkod na yang de sgrub kyi rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos gang rung yin na yod pas khyab pa can yin na chos can ma grub pa'i skyon du 'gyur ba yang yod de / dper na yongs grub kyi rtags kyis chos kyi bdag med phra mo sgrub pa lta bu'o // de'i phyir gzhi ma grub pa chos can du bkod pa'i tshe rtags su bzung ba de yin na yod pa yin dgos phyin chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs ltar snang du 'gyur la / rtags su bzung ba de yin na yod pa yin mi dgos na gtan tshigs ltar snang du mi 'gyur ba'i tshul la zhib cha legs par thon dgos so //

^a *dGongs pa rab gsal*: des. bsTan dar. de'i.

^b bsTan dar omits *tsam*.

^c *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* f. 200a.

§4. spyir sbyor ba'i chos can la rang rten gyi chos can dang chos can 'ba' zhig pa gnyis las / rang rten gyi chos can ni / **Grangs can pa'i** ngor^d byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa lta bu yin te / de'i tshe sgra nyid la mi rtag pa brten [455; f. 17b] par sgrub pa yin pa'i phyir ro // chos can 'ba' zhig pa ni / **Bye brag pa'i** ngor yon tan gzhan gyi rten mi byed pa'i rtags kyis dngos por gyur pa'i nam mkha' rtag rdzas ma yin par sgrub pa lta bu yin te / de'i tshe dngos por gyur ba'i nam mkha' la rtag rdzas brten par sgrub pa ma yin pas / de 'dra'i nam mkha' de rten gzhi chos can du ma song bar chos can du bkod pa 'ba' zhig pa yin pa'i phyir / chos can 'ba' zhig pa zhes pa'i don yang chos can du smras kyang bsgrub bya'i chos kyi rten du ma song bar chos can yan gar bar song ba'i don yin pas / de'i phyir sbyor ba de sgrub kyi chos can 'ba' zhig pa ste smras pa'i chos can gzhi ma grub kyang rang rten gyi chos can yod pa yin te / de'i tshe dngos gyur gyi nam mkha' 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la dngos gyur gyi nam mkha' ma yin pa las log par snang ba de sgrub kyi rten gzhi'i chos can du song ba yin pa'i phyir / der thal / phyi rgol gyis de 'dra ba'i nam mkha' dang der snang ba gnyis gcig tu 'khrul nas shes 'dod zhugs pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis de ltar yin pa'i phyir / des na sbyor ba de sgrub kyi rang rten gyi chos can gzhi grub cing tshig yin la bkod pa'i chos can 'ba' zhig pa gzhi ma grub pa'i khyad par 'di 'dra shes pa'i ched du / *Tshad ma kun btus* las /

mngon sum don dang rjes dpag dang yid ches grags pas rang rten la'o //^e

zhes rang gi chos can ma smos par rang gi rten smos pa'i dgos pa / *rNam 'grel mngon sum le'u* las /

kun tu^f rgol ba bdag nyid kyi //^g

zhies sogs kyi tshigs bcad bcu gsum gyis rgyas par [456; f. 18a] 'chad pa yin no //

§5. 'o na sgra ma yin pa las log par snang ba'ang byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i rang rten gyi chos can yin par thal / 'dod pa'i phyir zer na

§6. mi mtshungs te / rtags yang dag yin na shes 'dod chos can gyi steng du 'god tshul dang mthun par grub dgos pas / rtog pa la sgra ma yin pa las log par snang ba kun btags yin pas byas pa dang mthun lugs med pa'i phyir / der thal / *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* las /

^d bsTan dar: *bor*.

^e *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*(a) ad III.2cd. See n. 12.

^f PV Tib.: *tu*. bsTan dar: *du*.

^g *Pramānavārttika* IV.136. See n. 17.

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byas pas sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa na / rtog pa la sgra ma yin pa las log par snang ba'i snang ldog^h dngos por med pas byas pa'i rtags de la 'grub pa' mir' gyi / snang gzhi sgra la grub^k dgos te / dngos po' rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos su byed pa'i gnad kyis so //^m

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir / khyab ste / dngos po rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos su bkod pa'i rtags sbyor gyi shes 'dod chos can la rtog pa'i snang ba mi 'jog par shin tu gsal zhing / *rNam nges dar tik* las kyang /

rtog pa la nam mkha' snang ba sngar gyi rtags de nges pa'i gzhi chos can yin la / rtog pa la sgrar snang ba byas par nges pa'i gzhi mi rung ba'i phyir mi mtshungs so //ⁿ

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

§7. mdor na **Bye brag pa'i** ngor nam mkha' chos can du bkod kyang de chos can du ma song bar de'i snang ba chos can du song zhing / byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i tshe rtog pa la sgrar snang ba chos can du mi 'gro bar sgra nyid rang rten gyi chos can du 'gro ba'i rgyu mtshan mthar gtugs na / **Sangs rgyas pa dang Bye brag pa** gnyis ka'i ngor chos [457; f. 18b] can mthun snang ba yod med la gtugs pa yin te / **Sangs rgyas pas** nam mkha' thogs reg bkag tsam gyi med dgag tu 'dod pa gang zhid / **Bye brag pas** sgrub pa rang dbang ba'i dngos por 'dod pa'i phyir /

§8. 'o na sgra yang de gnyis ka'i ngor mthun snang du grub pa med par thal. **Sangs rgyas pas** sgra 'byung 'gyur du 'dod pa gang zhid / **Bye brag pas** sgra nam mkha'i yon tan du 'dod pa'i phyir zhe na /

§9. shin tu mi mtshungs te / de gnyis ka'i ngor nyan shes kyi gzung byar gyur pa'i don tsam zhid ma 'khrul ba'i tshad mas myed don du mthun snang du grub pa yod la / nam mkha' la ming tsam ma gtogs mthun snang du grub pa'i don btags don btsal na mi myed pa'i gnad kyis so //

§10. gzhan yang lCang skya thams cad mkhyen pas / rGyal tshab rjes rtog pa'i snang ba chos can du bzhed kyang / **mKhas grub rjes** sgra don chos can du mi bzhed par gsungs la / kun mkhyen 'Jam **dbyangs bzhad pas** / gtso bo chos can du bzung ba **Phyogs glang** gi dgongs pa dang / rtog pa'i snang ba chos can du bzung ba **Chos grags** kyi dgongs pa yin gsungs kyang / dgongs pa zhib tu brtag na **Phyogs**

^h *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* f. 10a and other editions in Tillemans (1984) p. 385: *snang ldog*. bsTan dar: *snang ldog dang*.

ⁱ *Zin bris*: 'grub. bsTan dar: *sgrub*.

^j *Zin bris*: *min*. bsTan dar: *ma yin*.

^k *Zin bris*: *grub*. bsTan dar: *sgrub*.

^l *Zin bris* f. 10a and other editions: *dngos po*. bsTan dar: *dngos pos*.

^m *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, f. 9b-10a. See Tillemans (1984) p. 385.

ⁿ *rNam nges dar tik*, f. unidentified.

glang yab sras dang rJe yab sras su'i lungs byas kyang / gtso bo chos can / mam 'gyur sna tshogs kyi nyer len du med de / rman 'gyur sna tshogs kyi nyer len du ma dmigs pa'i phyir / zhes pa'i sbyor ba 'di la mtshon na / gtso bo 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la gtso bo ma yin pa las log par snang ba rtags sbyor de'i chos can du 'dzin rigs pa la sus kyang bsnyon du med de / dBu ma snang ba las /

byis pa mams kyis phyi rol dang dngos po nyid du nye bar btags pa blo la mam pa^o yod [458; f. 19a] pa nyid chos can yin te / de'i phyir de la brten nas gtso bo la sogs pa 'gog par byed do //^p

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

§11. khyab ste / blo la mam pa yod pa nyid chos can yin zhes pas rtog pa'i snang ba chos can du 'dzin par gsal zhing / Rang don le'ur /

sgra don chos ni mam pa gsum //^q

zhes dang / Rang 'grel las /

de bas na chos can de la brten nas ci^r gto bo'i sgra las snang ba'i don 'di ni / [dngos po nye bar len pa can nam ma yin zhes yod pa dang med pa nyid dpyod par byed do]^s

zhes dang / de'i 'grel bshad du / Śā kya blos kyang /

gtso bo la sogs pa'i sgras brjod par bya ba de nyid ni chos can yin la /^t

zhes dang / rNam 'grel tik chen rigs pa'i rgya mtsho las /

de ltar rtog pa'i snang ba thams cad sgra don yin no zhes spyir bstan pas gtso bo 'dzin pa'i rtog pa^u la gtso bor snang ba'ang sgra don du grub la / de ltar gtso bo'i sgra don gyi gzhi ldog rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba de nyid rtags sbyor de'i chos can yin zhes bya ba'i don no //^v

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

§12. de la kho na re / gtso bo'i sgra don chos can / rtags sbyor de'i chos can yin par thal / gtso bo 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba rtags sbyor de'i chos can yin pa'i phyir na /

^o rnam pa not in Peking and sDe dge editions of *Madhyamakāloka*. See n. 24

^p P. 190a, D. 174a. See n. 24.

^q *Pramānavārittika* I.205cd: *śabdārthas trividho dharmo bhāvābhāvobhayāśrayaḥ* //.

^r *Svavṛtti* Tib.: *ci*. bsTan dar: *spyi*. See n. 26.

^s *Pramānavārttikasvavṛtti* ad PV I.206 (P. 477a3–4; D. 321a2): *de bas na chos can 'di la brten nas ci gtso bo'i sgra las snang ba'i don 'di ni [dngos po nye bar len pa can nam* ma yin zhes yod pa dang med pa nyid dpyod** par byed do] /*. (*P. omits *nam*. **P.D. *spyod*) Skt. ed Gnoli p. 106: *tad atra dharmīni vyavasthitāḥ [śadasattvaṃ cintayanti] (1) kim ayam pradhānasabdapratibhāsy artho [bhāvopādāno na veti]*/. See n. 26.

^t *Pramānavārttikatikā* P. 279b7, D. 238a3.

^u *rNam 'grel tik chen*: gtso 'dzin rtog pa.

^v Vol. *tha* f. 149a.

§13. ma khyab /

§14. khyab par thal / rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba gtso bo'i sgra don yin pa'i phyir na /

§15. yang ma khyab / rang ldog dang gzhi ldog gi khyad par yod pa'i phyir te / Tik chen de nyid las /

des na gtso bo ni yod pa ma yin te ma dmigs pa'i phyir zhes pa'i rtags kyi shes 'dod chos can ni / gtso bo dngos po ba yang ma yin la / gtso bo'i sgra don gyi rang ldog kyang ma yin gyi / 'o na ci zhe na / rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba de nyid Grangs can [459; f. 19b] pa^w dag gtso bo khyad par lnga ldan du 'dod la / rang lugs la sgra don du 'dod pas / khyad par lnga ldan gyi gtso bo yin min rtsod pa'i gzhi yin pa'i phyir rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba chos can du gzung bar byas pa yin no //^x

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir / rang ldog dang gzhi ldog gi khyad par phye ba skabs 'dir shin tu gces so //

§16. de yang Grang can pas de lta bu'i rtog pa'i snang ba khas len kyang snang ba de sgra don du khas mi len pa'i gnad la thug pa yang yin te / Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel /

yang blun po kha cig gis de lta bu bdag gi sgra don chos can yin no zhes zer ba ni / de lta bu bdag gi sgra don med par khas blangs pa yin pas rang gi mtshang bsgrags pa yin no //^y

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

§17. de ltar rtog pa'i snang ba chos can du rigs mod / 'on kyang pha rol po'i 'dod pa 'gog pa na rtog pa'i snang ba tshig zin la chos can du 'god dgos pa yang ma yin no // 'o na ci zhe na / spyi gtso bo dang rtag pa'i dbang phyug dang zag rang rkya ba sogs pha rol pos gang khas blangs pa de nyid ji lta ba bzhin chos can du dngos su 'god dgos te / de lta ma yin na gtso bo la sogs pa rang ldog nas mi khegs pa'i skyon yod pa'i phyir te / rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed las /

de dag gi dgongs pa mkhas pa'i dbang po Ka ma la st las / gtso bo nyid chos can du bzung nas dgag dgos kyi / de min na rnam 'gyur sna tshogs kyi nyer len yin pa khegs kyang / gtso bo rang ldog nas mi khegs par 'gyur la / rtags tshad mas nges pa'i gzhi ni gtso bor snang ba nyid la bzhed do //^z

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

§18. de la gal te rtog pa'i snang ba [460; f. 20a] chos can du 'dzin mi rigs par thal / de don byed nus stong yin pa'i phyir / khyab te / don byed nus pa ma yin na rgol ba rtog ldan gyi dpyad gzhir mi rung bas khyab pa'i phyir / de skad du rNam 'grel las /

^w *rNam 'grel tik chen* reads *gangs can pa*, which is surely wrong.

^x *rNam 'grel tik chen* vol. *tha* f. 149a–b.

^y F. 151b.

^z F. 95b–96a.

don byed nus pa ma yin la //
 don gnyer brtag pas ci zhig bya //
 ma ning gzugs bzang mi bzang zhes //
 'dod ldan^{aa} mams kyis brtag ci phan //^{bb}

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir na /

§19. ma khyab ste / lung de'i don ni rang 'dod pa'i 'bras bu gzhi de las 'grub tu re nas dpyod pa'i gzhi la don byed nus pa dgos zhes pa yin pas / de ni dper na 'khrig pa'i bde ba don du gnyer ba'i bud med kyis / ma ning khyad gzhi bzang nas des skyes pa'i bya ba byed par go nas de'i gzugs mdzes mi mdzes la dpyod pa dang 'dra bas mi 'thad ces ston pa yin gyi / spyir dgag sgrub kyi gzhi la don byed nus stong rung bar ma zad / dgag sgrub byed pa'i dngos kyi rten la sgra don nges can du dgos pa'i phyir / der thal / byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra la rtag^{cc} dgag pa dang mi rtag pa sgrub pa'i dngos kyi rten sgra don yin dgos pa'i rgyu mtshan yang / dgag sgrub byed pa'i rtog pa mams sgra don la brten pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis yin pa'i phyir / *gZhan don le'u* las /

phyi rol rten min sgra don la //
 brten nas 'dir ni sgrub pa dang //
 dgag pa thams cad 'dod pa yin //^{dd}

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir dang / sgra'i steng du rtag pa dgag pa dang mi rtag pa sgrub ces pa'i don yang rtog pa'i don byed pa yin pas / de'i tshe dgag sgrub byed pa'i rtog pa de dag la sgra dang byas mi rtag sogs rang mtshan pa dngos su mi [461; f. 20b] snang ba'i phyir / de skad du *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris las* /

Phyogs glang gis gsungs pa'i don *rNam 'grel las* /

dpag bya dpog par byed pa y^{ee} //
 don gyi tha snyad gnas pa 'di //
 shes pa la grub tha dad la //
 brten nas mnam par brtags pa^{ff} yin //^{gg}

^{aa} PV Tib.: 'dod ldan (= kāmīyāh). bsTan dar: rtog ldan.

^{bb} *Pramāṇavārttika* I.211: arthakriyāśamarthasya vicāraiḥ kiṃ tadarthinām / śaṅ-dhāsyā rūpavairūpye kāmīyāḥ kiṃ parikṣayā //.

^{cc} bsTan dar: rtags.

^{dd} *Pramāṇavārttika* IV.228bcd: [tasmād] āśritya śabdārthaṃ [bhāvābhāvasamās-
 rayam] / abāhyāśrayam atreṣṭam sarvaṃ vidhiniṣedhanam /. See n. 34.

^{ee} PV Tib, *Zin bris*: yi. bsTan dar: dag.

^{ff} PV Tib, *Zin bris*: brtags pa. bsTan dar: dag pa.

^{gg} *Pramāṇavārttika* IV.183: anumānānumeyārthavyavahāraṣṭhitis tv iyam / bh daṃ
 pratyayasamsiddham avalambya prakalpyate //. The text of PV Tib. cited in *dEu ma*
rgyan gyi zin bris shows none of bsTan dar's "variants".

zhes gsungs pa ltar / gzhi dngos po dgos pa byas pas sgra mi rtag pa dang du ba la la^{hh} me yod du sgrub pa la yang / rtog pa la sgra dang la gnyis de gnyis ma yin pa las log par snang ba'i don nyid dgag sgrub kyi dngos rten yin gyi / sgra dang la nyid dngos kyi rten ma yin te / dgag sgrub byed pa'i rtog pa la dngos su mi snang ba'i phyir dangⁱⁱ

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir / dgag sgrub rtog pa'i don byed ces pa'i don yang dper na byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i phyogs chos grub pa na / phyi rgol de'i rtog ngo na / sgra dang por grub nas de'i rjes su sgra la byas pa gсар du brten pa lta bu'i snang tshul yod cing / gnas tshod la rim pa de 'dra med pa'i don no //

NOTES

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¹ See n. 17 and 7.

² See Mimaki (1976) pp. 60–61.

³ See e.g. his *Tshad ma rigs gter dgongs rgyan smad cha* f. 76a1–7 (p. 151). Śākya mchog ldan's position turns on the Rigs gter ba *apoha* theory's contrast between theoretical explanation ('*chad pa*) and practical application ('*jug pa*) and especially the contrast between an object of conceptual thought as it really is (*song tshod*) (i.e. a mental representation) and what we mistakenly assume it to be (*rlom tshod*). See Tillemans (1995) p. 869 and n. 19, Dreyfus (1997) pp. 161, 163, 167 *et passim*. Note that this latter schema, i.e. *song tshod kyi chos can* and *rlom tshod kyi chos can* is applied to the problem of *āśrayāsiddha* in a way that does not seem to coincide fully with the *svadharmin* and *kevaladharmin* contrast. See n. 13 on *svadharmin* vs. *kevaladharmin*.

⁴ Selections from his work on particulars and universals, i.e. his *Rang mtshan spyi mtshan gyi rnam bzag rtsom 'phro*, have been translated in Klein (1991). A translation of his commentary on the *Heart Sūtra* appears in Lopez (1988), pp. 137–159. His work on the proof of the Buddha's authority in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, i.e. the *sTon pa tshad ma'i skyes bur sgrub pa'i gnam*, has been translated and studied in Tillemans (1993). Lopez (1987) refers to many parts of bsTan dar's *gCig du bral gyi rnam bzag*. Finally, elements of bsTan dar's grammatical work, the *Sum cu pa dang rtags 'jug gi don go sla bar bsdus pa'i bshad pa skal ldan yid kyi pad ma 'byed pa'i snang ba'i mdzod*, have been studied in T. Tillemans and D. Herforth, *Agents and Actions in Classical Tibetan*, Vienna, 1989.

⁵ Cf. *Madhyamakālamkāra*, k. 1: niḥsvabhāvā amī bhāvās tatvataḥ svaparoditāḥ / ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat // – Śāntarakṣita proposes to show that entities accepted by Buddhists as well as those advocated by non-Buddhist adversaries are without any intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) because of being neither one nor many different things. Skt. in *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* 173.17–18; translation Ichigō (1985) p. cxxxv. Note that following rGyal tshab's *dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang* (Samath

^{hh} See Tillemans (1984) p. 385, n. 12 on *du ba la la*. bsTan dar: *du bas la*. *Zin bris* f. 9b: *du ba la*.

ⁱⁱ F. 9a–b. Tillemans (1984) p. 384.

edition, 1976) p. 80, the refutation of partless consciousness is in the context of the refutation of the Sautrāntika view that the "manifold is non-dual" (*sna tshogs gnyis med pa*). The Madhyamaka argues that the aspects/images (*rnam pa;ākāra*) cannot be substantially distinct (*rdzas tha dad*) from each other, because they are not substantially distinct from a partless unitary consciousness (*shes pa cha med gcig*).
mDo sde pa'i lugs dgag pa la / sna tshogs gnyis med pa / sgo nga phyad tshal ba / rnam shes grangs mnyam pa'i lugs dgag pa'o // dang po ni / shes sogs bzhi la / shes pa gcig la sngo ser dkar dmar sogs rnam pa du ma shar ba'i tshes rnam pa de rnam rdzas tha dad min par thal / de rnam shes pa cha med gcig dang tha dad min pa'i phyir i. Cf. *Madhyamakālamkāra* 34 et sq.; cf. also Tsong kha pa's *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* f. 8a (Samath ed. p. 41; transl. Tillemans [1984] p. 365): *gal te sbyor ba 'di rang rgyud du byed na / gchan gyis smras pa'i bdag dang dbang phyug la sogs pa dang / rang sides smras pa'i sdug bsngal dang / shes pa cha med kyi chos can ma grub pas / phyogs chos ma grub par / gyur bus mi 'thad do 'che na /* – the entities accepted by others include the āman and Īsvara, while those accepted by the Buddhists include suffering, partless consciousnesses and so forth.

⁹ The term is an adaptation of the Indian Buddhist requirement that debate be about what the opponent desires to know (*jijñāsā, jijñāsita*), i.e. whether a certain property qualifies a certain subject. Cf. e.g. *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* ad III. 92: *prativādinō hi yaj jījñāsitam tai prakaraṇāpannam* I. On the term *shes 'dod chos can* (**jijñāsitadharmin*), see the definition in *Yongs 'dzin rtags rigs* (ed. Onoda) p. 17.

⁷ For the varieties of *asiddhahetu*, see *Nyāyabindu* (NB) III.57 et sq. (transl. Stcherbatsky p. 172ff.) and in particular NB III.65 on *dharmyasiddha*; for the *dGe lugs pa* classification see *Yongs 'dzin rtags rigs*, p. 57, which speaks of a triple classification of *asiddhahetu*, those which are due to objective facts (*don la ltos pa*), due to attitudes (*blo la ltos pa*) such as doubt, and those which are due to the debaters (*rgol ba la ltos pa*) having incompatible views on the nature of the subject. The "reason that is unestablished (*asiddha*) because of the nonexistence of the entity of the subject" (*chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa'i gian tshig*) is a subdivision of the first category.

⁸ On these two types of negation, see Kajiyama (1973) p. 167f. and the references in his n. 1. Indian Buddhist logicians had the important insight that proving a mere negation of existence is, in its logical structure, quite different from proving positive qualities, and that in the former case (i.e. simple denial along the lines of "it is not so that S is existent") subject failure is not a problem at all whereas in the latter case it is. Cf. Matilal (1970). Tibetan explanations of *āśrayāsiddha*, such as those found in *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* and 'Can sgya grub niha', generally cite a passage from Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka* as being the source for this idea. The quotation in question is found in *Madhyamakāloka* D. 172a6–b1, P. 188a3–6: *gang la dngos po'i chos yod pa'i ngo bor sgrub par mi 'dod kyi don kyang sgro biags pa'i chos rnam par gcad pa sgrub pa tsam 'chig brjod par 'dod pa de la ni ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa brjod pa tha snyad du yang dngos por gyur pa'i chos can mi dgos te / de ni de'i chos ma yin pa'i phyir ro // de la ltos nas kyang de'i chos can nyid du mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro // de ma grub tu zin kyang bsgrub par bya ba med na de mi 'byung ba'i gian tshigs mngon par 'dod pa'i don grub pa la gegs byed pa med pa'i phyir ro //*; translated in Lopez (1987) p. 358. On Kamalaśīla's different treatment of *āśrayāsiddha* in his earlier *Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā* and in the later *Madhyamakāloka*, see Kobayashi (1989). The Tibetan *dGe lugs pa* treatment of the problem has been developed in detail in Lopez (1987) pp. 168–180. Klein (1991) pp. 118–119, 173–181 et passim.

In fact the central idea in the *Madhyamakāloka* that one avoided *āśrayāsiddha* when the property being proved was a simple negation was already clearly formulated well before Kamalaśīla. What we find in the Indian Buddhist literature is that Dharmakīrtian commentators, like Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, in their explanations of

Pramānavārttika IV k. 136–148, emphasize the idea that subjects, like space, taken as real (*dngos por gyur pa = vastubhūta*) by the opponents, are *kevala* in nonexistence proofs where the property to be proved and the reason are "mere exclusions" (*rnam par gcod pa isam = vyavacchedamātra*); in these special cases, the subjects can be negated with impunity. Although Devendrabuddhi himself does not gloss these "mere exclusions" by the notion of non-implicative negations (*prasajyapratishedha*) so often invoked in Buddhist philosophy, the transition is very natural and is, indeed, explicitly made by Śākyabuddhi: mere exclusion means that no entity or positive property is stated, implied or presupposed. See *Pramānavārttikapañjikā* D. 296b4 et seq. and *Pramānavārttikapañjikā* D. 269a4–5: *gian tshigs rnam par gcod pa'i ngo bo ma grub pa nyid ma yin no zhes bya ba ni / cig car sgra sogs rgyu min phyir / zhes bya ba'i gtsan tshigs rnam par gcod pa tsam gyi ngo bo med par dgag pa tsam gyi mshan nyid ma grub pa nyid ma yin te / dngos por gyur pa'i chos can med na yang tha snyad pa'i chos can rnam par gcod pa tsam la gnod pa med pa'i phyir ro //* "When [Devendrabuddhi] says 'a logical reason that is of the nature of an exclusion is not unestablished', he means that a logical reason like 'because it is not the cause for [producing its various effects like] sound etc. all at once', which is of the nature of a mere exclusion, i.e. which has the character of a simple *prasajyapratishedha*, is not unestablished. This is because in spite of there being no subject that would be a real entity, there is no invalidation of the mere exclusion of the conventionally designated subject". Our thanks to Mr. Ryusei Keira for making us aware of this passage from Śākyabuddhi.

This position concerning "mere exclusion" was adopted by later Indian writers such as Prajñākaragupta, Kamalaśīla and by Tibetans such as Tsong kha pa et al., with the further development that it was argued that when a Buddhist logician was proving a mere exclusion, or non-implicative negation (e.g. that such and such a pseudo-entity did not exist), the Buddhist proponent's intended subject, the *svadharmin*, was just the conceptual image. (In the case of Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi it is not at all clear that this last additional development is also attributable to them. See n. 13.) Ngag dbang bstan shows the rough edges and pitfalls of this Indo-Tibetan attempt to use the distinction between the two types of negation as a watertight way to delineate between harmless subject failures and genuine *āśrayāsiddha*.

⁹ Unidentified in 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa. The example purports to show that the property being predicated of a nonexistent subject (like a rabbit's horn) can be a positive entity (*vidhi*) or an implicative negation: it need not necessarily be a *prasajyapratishedha* if we are to avoid *āśrayāsiddha*. The property being proved here, viz. "being fitting (*rung ba = yogya*) to be designated by the word 'moon'", is itself a positive entity. Ngag dbang bstan dar, supposedly following 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, has hearkened back to the argumentation found in the *prātibādhā* section in *Pramānavārttika* (PV) IV.109–130, *Nyāyabindu* III, *Pramānaviniścaya* III etc., where Dharmakīrti develops the idea that any word is fitting (*yogya*) to designate any object, the use and correctness of words depending only upon the speaker's linguistic intention (*vivakṣā*). Cf. PV IV. 109: *artheṣu apratisiddharvāt puruṣecchānurodhinah / iṣṭāśabdābhidheyarvasyāpto 'trākṣatavāg janah //* "An intended word's designatum (*abhidheya*), which is in keeping with people's wishes, is unrestricted with regard to objects. Therefore, the person [i.e. the user of language], whose speech is unopposed, is an authority here [i.e. with regard to the designatum of the word]". This doctrine of unrestricted *yogyatā* is being alluded to in the present argument. Thus, a rabbit's horn is indeed fitting to be the designatum (*abhidheya*) of the word "moon", in that there is no objective or intrinsic nature found in words or objects that would preclude such a use.

Ngag dbang bstan dar is obviously playing with a frequently found reasoning (*prayoga*) called *grags pa'i rtags* ("reason for a conventional concept" [*grags*

pa = *prasiddha*, *pratīti*). This reasoning is given in Indian and Tibetan texts to establish the fact that *śāsin* (*ri bong can*, “that which has a rabbit”, “that which is hare-marked”) is fitting to be the designatum of the word *candra* (“moon”). The trick is to change *ri bong can* to *ri bong rwa* (“the rabbit’s horn”). On the Indian reasoning, see *Dharmottarapradīpa* 184.16–17: *evaṃ tu prayogo draṣṭavyaḥ yo ’rtho vikalpaviññānaviṣayaḥ sa sāmketikena śabdena vaktum śakyah / yathā śākhādīmān artho vrkṣaśabdena / vikalpaviññānaviṣayaḥ ca śāṣṭi* / “The formal argument (*prayoga*) should be regarded as follows: ‘Whatever entity is the object of a conceptual cognition, can be designated by an agreed upon word, just like the entity having branches and so forth. [can be designated] by the word ‘tree’. Now, *śāsin* is the object of a conceptual cognition’”. (The conclusion is that *śāsin* can be designated by the agreed upon word *candra*.) The usual Tibetan formulation of the *prayoga* is: *ri bong can la zla ba zhes pa’i sgras brjed rung ba yin te / rtog yul na yod pa’i phyir /* “That which is hare-marked is fitting to be designated by the word ‘moon’ because it exists as an object of conceptualization”; see *Yongs ’dzin rtags rigs* p. 46.

¹⁰ See *Tshad ma rigs rgyan* f. 117a.

¹¹ See Lopez (1987) pp. 173–174. Just as it was shown that avoidance of *āśrayāsiddha* is possible even where the property is a positive entity, so now Ngag dbang bstan dar shows that the reason and property being non-implicative negations will not guarantee that *āśrayāsiddha* is avoided. To say that the rabbit’s horn is the subtle selflessness of the elements because it is their consummate nature is a case of *āśrayāsiddha*, even though both the reason and the property are simple negations. In short, it is not so that *āśrayāsiddha* is avoided if and only if the reason and property are *vyavacchedamātra*. Ngag dbang bstan dar, to his credit, proposes a stricter criterion than had his Indo-Tibetan predecessors: *āśrayāsiddha* will be avoided if and only if the reason and property do not imply existence. The innovation here is discrete, but it represents a radically different, and even in some ways better, approach: it turns on the sound logical insight that certain properties (like being blue, etc.) imply existence, while others (like “being thought of”) do not, and that subject failure will lead to refutation in all and only the former types of cases.

¹² The term *rang rten chos can* is most likely a Tibetan invention, based on Tibetan writers’ choice of a rather misleading Tibetan translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (PSV), a translation which was also reflected in the sDe dge and Co ne editions of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) III.2. See Tillemans (1984) n. 42 for the details. In brief, PSV(a) *ad Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) III.2cd reads *de yang ma bsal ba’o // mngon sum don dang rjes dpag dang // yid ches grags pas rang rten la’o*, whereas the Peking version of PS III.2cd and of PSV(b) have: *rang gi chos can la mngon sum don dang rjes dpag dang // yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba’o //*. See Kitagawa (1973) pp. 471–472. What happened is that major dGe lugs and Sa skya writers cited PSV(a)’s text *mngon sum ... rang rten la’o* without the initial *de yang ma bsal ba’o*, which they probably considered to be an independent sentence due to its final particle. Now, we do have Sanskrit fragments of PS III.2: *svārūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo ’nirākṛtaḥ / pratyakṣārthānumāntaprasiddhena svadharmīni //* “[A valid thesis] is one which is intended (*iṣṭa*) by the [the proponent] himself (*svayam*) as something to be stated (*nirdeśya*) according to its essence alone (*svārūpeṇaiva*) [i.e. as a *sādhya*]; [and] with regard to [the proponent’s] own subject (*svadharmīni*), it is not opposed (*anirākṛta*) by perceptible objects (*pratyakṣārtha*), by inference (*anumāna*), by authorities (*āpta*) or by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*)”. It can be seen that *anirākṛta* = *ma bsal ba*, and that placing this before *mngon sum ... rten la’o* is an attempt to follow the Skt. word order, but is virtually incomprehensible in Tibetan: hence PSV(a) and the Peking version of PS III.2 is preferable, also because it reads *rang gi chos can* (= *svadharmīni*). Nonetheless, most Tibetan writers seem to have chosen PSV(a)’s reading; such is the case for Tsong kha pa, Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge, Śākya mchog ldan, but also for the earlier writer bTsun pa

ston gzhon (13th C), who in his *rNam ’grel gyi rnam bshad gungs can gyi rgyan*, p. 438 clearly gives credence to PSV(a): *rang rten la’o zhes rang gi chos can smos pa la dgos pa ci yod ...* Finally not just Tsong kha pa, but rGyal tshab in his *rNam ’grel thar lam gsal byed* to PV IV k. 136–148 repeatedly phrased his explanations in terms of *rang rten chos can*. In what is an ironic, but understandable blunder, Ngag dbang bstan dar will subsequently on p. 455 argue that Dignāga himself did not speak of *rang gi chos can* (*svadharmīni*), but rather *rang gyi rten*.

¹³ Ngag dbang bstan dar has introduced one of the key themes in the Indo-Tibetan explanations of *āśrayāsiddha*, viz. the contrast between *svadharmīni* and *kevaladharmīni*. Amongst Indian authors, the starting point in their discussion of *āśrayāsiddha* consists in Dignāga’s definition of the thesis (*pakṣalākṣaṇa*) in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III.2, in particular, the specification that the thesis should not be opposed (*anirākṛta*) by perception and other means of valid cognition with regard to the proponent’s own intended subject (*svadharmīni* “with regard to his own subject”). See n. 12. While Dignāga only spoke of *svadharmīni*, Dharmakīrti in *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) IV, k. 136–148 introduced the idea of a contrast between *svadharmīni* and *kevaladharmīni*, the latter being a nominal or unrelated subject, one which may be merely stated but which is not actually what is qualified by the property to be proved. This contrast comes up again and again in Ngag dbang bstan dar, and indeed he mentions the twelve *Kārikās* in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV (not III!) as being the Indian source.

Important in the philosophical background to this discussion of *svadharmīni* and *kevaladharmīni* (although not so often explicitly cited in Tibetan texts) is Dignāga’s treatment in the *Nyāyamukha* of the Sāṃkhya’s arguments concerning Primordial Matter (*pradhāna*) and other such postulates in the Sāṃkhya system. Dignāga had argued “*pradhāna* and so forth do not exist because they are not perceived” (*na santi pradhānādāyo ’nupalabdeḥ*) and spoke of “non-perception being a property of an imagined object (*kalpitasyānupalabdhir dharmah*)”. See Katsura (1992), pp. 230–231; G. Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*, Heidelberg, 1930 pp. 16–17; Skt. fragments in *Svavṛtti* (ed. Gnoli) pp. 105 and 107. This idea of an imagined subject was then generalized by Dharmakīrti to form a key part of his *apoha* theory. In particular, he took the anti-Sāṃkhya argument in Dignāga’s *Nyāyamukha* proving the nonexistence of *pradhāna* as well as the *Nyāyamukha*’s phrase *kalpitasyānupalabdhir dharmah* to lead to the general principle in PV I, k. 205–212, the *Svavṛtti* and *Pramāṇavinīścaya* III that the directly designated objects of words were always conceptual representations (*kalpanā*); he then maintained that although *pradhāna* did not exist as something real and external, its conceptual representation, or in other words, the verbal object (*śabdārtha*) existed, so that the charge of *āśrayāsiddha* did not apply.

In later developments, including what we find in the dGe lugs pa positions and clearly in Ngag dbang bstan dar, the Dharmakīrtian general principle of designata being only concepts will be combined with the *svadharmīni* vs. *kevaladharmīni* contrast to explain when *āśrayāsiddha* is avoidable and when it is not. *Grosso modo*, in nonexistence proofs the *svadharmīni* is the concept and no more; the *kevaladharmīni* is the pseudo-entity. Ngag dbang bstan dar here (following Tsong kha pa and others) applies this point of view to PV IV.141–142’s discussion where the Buddhist refutes the Vaiśeṣika’s version of space. Thus the Vaiśeṣika’s space becomes the *kevaladharmīni*, whereas the conceptual representation of space is the *svadharmīni*, i.e. the subject accepted by the Buddhist himself. Although the *kevaladharmīni* is obviously refuted, the *svadharmīni* is not and hence *āśrayāsiddha* is avoided. However, this synthesis is arguably a later invention. Tillemans is of the opinion that while for a writer like Kamalaśīla (who figures so prominently in the Tibetan theories) this move to combine the notions of *svadharmīni* and conceptual subjects is present in his *Madhyamakāloka*, in the case of Dharmakīrti this combination is not very likely. The *kārikās* in PV IV (viz. k. 141–142) that are often interpreted as supporting this combination are probably better interpreted differently. First of all, Prajñākaragupta’s

Pramānavārttikabhāṣya (PVBh) ad PV IV. 141–2 clearly specified two interpretations of the *kārikās* at stake. One advocates proving nonexistence with regard to a subject that is “completely derived from conceptual thought” (*vikalpapariniṣṭhite dharmīni*) and thus that the conceptual subject is the *svadharmin*. The other paraphrases the controversial reasoning about space in such a way that the *svadharmin* becomes a real entity acceptable to the Buddhist, namely the impermanent space that Buddhists themselves accept. See PVBh 550.18: *tathāpy anityam ākāśam dharmī bhaviṣyati*. Secondly, this latter interpretation in PVBh fits noticeably better into the rest of the argumentation in PV IV, k. 136–148, where a completely parallel reasoning against the Sāṃkhya *sukhādi* (“pleasure, etc.” = the three *guṇas*) is introduced by *tathaiva* (“in precisely this way”) in k. 144–145. This time the *svadharmin* is clearly taken by Dharmakīrti as *not* being the conceptual representation of *sukhādi*, but as being the ordinary, impermanent sensations of pleasure that the Buddhist himself acknowledges. The impression is that reading an advocacy of the combination of *svadharmin* with conceptual subjects into Dharmakīrti is a later position that may well change Dharmakīrti’s own stance. The *svadharmin* may well have been no more than an entity acceptable as real (and not conceptual) to the Buddhist himself. And determining what this actual subject was seems to have involved paraphrasing of the explicitly stated arguments, but had little to do with postulating conceptual subjects.

¹⁴ Ngag dbang bstan dar is (correctly) simplifying the argument. As it stands in Dharmakīrti, the reasoning at stake seeks to prove that space does not have “a novel nature unproduced by other conditions”, in other words, a permanent but real intrinsic nature. Cf. *Pramānavārttika* IV.141-2: *yathā parair anupādyaḥpūrvarūpam[1] na khādikam / sakṛc chabdāyāheturvād ity ukte prāha dūṣakāḥ // tadvad vastusvabhāvo ‘san dharmī vyomādir ity api / naivam iṣṭasya sādhyasya bādha kācana[2] vidyate //* “When [the Buddhist] states that space, etc. do not have a novel nature unproduced by other [conditions] because they are not causes for [producing their qualities such as] sound, etc. all at once, then the [Vaiśeṣika] adversary might say that like that the subject, space, etc., would also not have the nature of a real entity. [Dharmakīrti’s position:] In this fashion [even though the subject is invalidated(3)], there is in fact no invalidation of the intended [proposition] to be proved (*sādhyā*) at all.” [1] *Miy. anupādyaḥ pūrvarūpan* is wrong; [2] *Miy. kvacana* – cf. Tib. ‘ga’ yang; [3] *PVV evaṃ dharmibādthane ‘pi*.

¹⁵ The argument presupposes some fundamental positions in the dGe lugs pa understanding of *apoha*. In brief, the dGe lugs pa explain the conceptual representation of real space (*dnegos gyur gyi nam mkha’ = vastubhūtākāśa*) as being “what appears as excluded from the contrary of real space” (*dnegos gyur gyi nam mkha’ ma yin pa las log par snang ba*). They then add the additional step that not only does the conceptual appearance/representation (*snang ba*) itself appear in this way but real space itself (albeit nonexistent) also appears (*snang*) as excluded from the contrary of real space. The result is that the dGe lugs can argue that the *svadharmin*, the actual *dharmīni* that is being argued about, i.e. the conceptual representation, appears concordantly (*mithun snang*) to both parties in the debate. However, the Vaiśeṣika, who believes in *vastubhūtākāśa*, does not know that it is only a mentally invented concept being argued about rather than *vastubhūtākāśa* itself. The opponent thus has the impression that he is arguing about actual space, while the Buddhist proponent knows that they are both only arguing about the concept. This is said to be possible because both real space itself and the representation/appearance (*snang ba*) appear erroneously mixed together (*‘dres nas*) to conceptual thought. An analysis of this type of argumentation is to be found in Tillemans (1995); see Lopez (1987) pp. 178–179 for rGyal tshab’s use of the same type of argument; see Klein (1991) pp. 35–36 for ICang skya’s and bsTan dar’s position that “the actual object appears, mixed with its image, to thought”; see also Yoshimizu (1997) pp. 1107–1108; Dreyfus

(1992) p. 36 *et sq.* Tillemans stresses that the position that X itself appears (*snang ba*) to the conceptual thought about X is by and large a dGe lugs pa-gSang phu ba development, with problematic or no antecedents at all in India. It seems to be equally rejected by Sa skya pas like Śākya mchog ldan; see *op. cit.* p. 872 *et sq.* In part, the position was facilitated by the syntactical ambiguities in the Tibetan term *snang ba*, which can mean “appears”, “what appears” and “appearance”.

¹⁶ See n. 12 for *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III.2cd.

¹⁷ These verses are not from the *Pratyakṣa* (PV III) chapter; they are from the *Parārhānumāna* chapter, i.e. PV IV.136–148. Nor did Dignāga use *rang rten* instead of *rang gi chos can* (= *svadharmin*); see n. 12. Here are some of the principal verses amongst the twelve. Additions generally follow Manoranandīn’s *Pramānavārttikavṛtti*.

136 *sarvatra vādino dharmo yaḥ svasādhyatayepsitāḥ / taddharmavati[1] bādha syān nānyadharmaṇa dharmīni //*

“Always, invalidation (*bādha*) [of the thesis] would occur in a case of [invalidation of] the possessor of that property (*dharmā*) that the proponent himself intends to prove (*sādhyā*), but not in the case of a subject (*dharmīni*) [that is qualified] by some other property.”

143 *dwayasyāpi hi sādhyatve sādhyadharmoparodhi yat / bādhanam dharmīṇas tatra bādhetv etena varṇitam //*

“Indeed, given that both are to be proved (*sādhyatva*), then when invalidating the subject negates the property to be proved, in that case there will be an invalidation [of the thesis]. Such is what is expressed by the [words ‘his own subject’ (*svadharmin*)].”

147 *svayam iṣṭo yato dharmāḥ sādhyas tasmāt tadāśrayaḥ / bādhyo na kevalo nānyasamśrayo veti sūcitam //*

“It was asserted [by Dignāga] that as the property that [the proponent] intends himself is what is to be proved (*sādhyā*), therefore, the basis of this [property] is what is to be invalidated, and not something nominal or the basis for a [property] other [than the one being proved].”

[1] Read *taddharmavati* instead of Miyasaka’s *tad dharmavati*.

¹⁸ Ngag dbang bstan dar refers here to one of the three characteristics (*rūpa*) of valid reasons: the *pakṣadharmatva* (“[the reason’s] being a quality of the subject”). Cf. the definition of the *pakṣadharmatva* in *Yongs ‘dzin rigs rigs* p. 23: *de sgrub kyi shes ‘dod chos can skyon med kyi steng du ‘god tshul dang mithun par yod pa nyid du tshud mas nges pa* “It [i.e. the reason] is ascertained by a *pramāna* to exist relative to the faultless subject of enquiry in accordance with the mode of presentation”. The ‘god tshul “mode of presentation” in Ngag dbang bstan dar (as in *Yongs ‘dzin rigs rigs*) refers to the type of verb stated in the reason, i.e. the copula *yin* as in e.g. *byas pa yin pa’i phyir* or *byas pa’i phyir* “because ... is a product” or the existential *yod* as in *du ba’ yod pa’i phyir* “because there is smoke” – we thus have the possibility of *yin ‘god* or *yod ‘god*. The point of including ‘god tshul dang mithun par in the definition of the *pakṣadharmatva* is a rather cumbersome way to guarantee that the subject possesses the property of the reason in the very same way as the proponent has stated, i.e. *yin* or *yod*.

¹⁹ Ngag dbang bstan dar’s reply here and in what follows turns on the principle that the reason must be a property of the subject, i.e. of the *svadharmin*: in other words, the reason must be a *pakṣadharmā* (see n. 18). Now, when we prove that space is not a permanent substance, the conceptual representation of space is indeed not a substance, and will also be qualified by the reason. Thus the *pakṣadharmatva*

will hold. On the other hand, if we are validly proving that sound is impermanent because it is produced, then sound itself (and not the concept of sound) must be the *svadharmin*. This is because sound is both impermanent and something causally produced – hence the *paṅśadharmatva* holds with regard to that subject, i.e. sound *qua* particular, rather than the concept of sound. See Lopez (1987) pp. 175–176.

²⁰ On the Tibetan development of the problem of *chos can mthun snang ba* (“concordantly appearing subjects”) see D. Lopez (1987), p. 78 *et passim*; Hopkins (1989); Yotsuya (1995); Tillemans (1990), p. 42f.; Tillemans and Tomabechi (1995) n. 25. The term *chos can mthun snang ba* is a Tibetan invention with no Sanskrit equivalent. The notion is developed by Tsong kha pa in *Lam rim chen mo*, *Drang nges legs bshad snying po* and other works as a philosophical elaboration upon a section in the Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti debate in *Prasannapadā* I, p. 26 *et sq.* (ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica, reprint Osnabrück, 1970), where Realist and Śūnyavādin conceptions are argued to be radically incommensurable so that there are no commonly acknowledged (*ubhayaprasiddha*) subjects when the two parties are debating about ultimate truth – see Tillemans (1992) n. 5 for a translation of the passage from *Prasannapadā*. The issue is also taken up by non-dGe lugs pa writers (such as Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge in his *lTa ba'i ngan sel* f. 41af.), but plays a particularly important, and undeniably complex, role in the dGe lugs pa Svatantrika Madhyamaka system.

Ngag dbang bstan dar is presupposing an understanding of Tsong kha pa's position on Svatantrika. The point in the argument is delicate. Judging by the previous discussion, bsTan dar seems to accept that the *svadharmin* in the Buddhist-Vaiśeṣika arguments, viz. the concept of space, is what both parties are actually arguing about – nonetheless this conceptual *svadharmin*, as he had said earlier, could not be explicitly acknowledged by the Vaiśeṣika opponent, who thinks he is arguing about real space (*vastubhūtākāśa*). bsTan dar then argues that space itself is incommensurable for both parties, i.e. given the parties' differing respective views on what space is, a concordantly appearing and commonly acknowledged (*ubhayaprasiddha*) space cannot be what they are arguing about: space is thus the *kevaladharmin* and cannot be the *svadharmin*. (Here one could reasonably ask if the *svadharmin*, i.e. the concept, appears concordantly to both, given their respective positions.) In what follows, Ngag dbang bstan dar alludes to an objection in *Prasannapadā* that if the Realist and Śūnyavādin have no commonly recognized subject, then nor do Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas when they argue about sound being impermanent or not, given that both have different conceptions of what sound is; see *Prasannapadā* p. 29. The dGe lugs pa reply, based on Candrakīrti, is that sound, irrespective of one's philosophical theories, is heard commonly by both parties, whereas space is just a purely theoretical notion without any perceptual content in common for both parties.

²¹ Ngag bstan dar is arguing from a Svatantrika position where concordantly appearing subjects and especially non-erroneous valid cognitions must be possible for both parties, as this is a condition for the logical reasons being “autonomous” (*rang rgyud = svatantra*). The phrase *ma 'khrul ba'i tshad ma'i rnyed don du mthun snang du grub pa* (“established as appearing concordantly as an object found by non-erroneous means of valid cognition”) alludes to the dGe lugs pa view that for a Svatantrika, who holds a type of limited realism, a *pramāna* is non-erroneous in apprehending its objects as being established by their own intrinsic natures (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyi grub pa*). Note that for a Pāśāṅgika, by contrast, a *pramāna* can supposedly never be correct in this way, because these intrinsic natures do not exist at all, and thus for him all *pramānas* without exception would be erroneous. The incommensurability between Realist and Śūnyavādin then lies in the fact that the way the subject is established by a *pramāna* (*tshad mas grub tshul*) will differ for the two parties, the realist taking the *pramāna* as non-erroneous and the Śūnyavādin

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holding it to be erroneous. Cf. *sTong thun chen mo* p. 496 (f.157b3–6): *des na mdor bsdus te go bde bar brjod na l rang gi mtshan nyid kyi grub pa'i gzhul bya la ma 'khrul pa'i tshad mas rnyed don yin par snga rgol phyi* rgol gnyi ga'i lugs la mthun snang du grub pa'i chos can gyi steng du l snga rgol zang la dpag 'dod zhugs pa'i bsgrub bya'i chos sgrub byed kyi gtan tshigs su bkod pa ' zhes pa rang rgyud kyi rtags kyi don yin la l chos can de nyid tshad mas 'grub tshul snga rgol phyi rgol gnyi ga'i mthun snang du grub pa med kyang spyir chos can de nyid snga rgol gyi lugs la'ang tshad mas grub phyi rgol gyi lugs la'ang tshad mas grub cing chos can dang phyogs chos sogs phyi rgol lugs la tshad mas grub pa'i khas blangs la 'khrid nas bkod pa'i gtan tshigs ni gzhun la grags kyi rjes dpag ces bya'o ll. *Text has gyi. “So let us summarize and explain [things] in an easily comprehensible manner (sic!). The meaning of ‘autonomous logical reason’ (*rang rgyud kyi rtags = svatantrahetu*) is: what is presented as a logical reason establishing the *sādhyadharmā* that the proponent wishes to infer on the basis of a *dharmin* established as appearing concordantly (*mthun snang du grub pa*) for both the proponent's and the opponent's traditions, namely, [appearing concordantly] as being an entity found by a *pramāna* that is unmitigated with regard to *prameyas* established by their own characters (*rang gi mtshan nyid = svalakṣaṇa*). [As for ‘opponent-acknowledged’ inferences:] Although the way in which this *dharmin* is established by *pramānas* does not appear concordantly for both the proponent and opponent, nonetheless in general (*spyir*) this *dharmin* is established by a *pramāna* in the opponent's tradition and is also established by a *pramāna* in the opponent's tradition; when the logical reason is presented after we have ‘guided’ (*'khrid nas*) the *dharmin*, *paṅśadharmā* and so forth in terms of positions established by a *pramāna* in the opponent's tradition, this is said to be an ‘opponent-acknowledged inference’ (*gzhun la grags kyi rjes dpag*).”*

²² See Lopez (1987); pp. 178–179.

²³ Cf. n. 13 for Dignāga's arguments against the Sāṃkhya.

²⁴ bsTan dar cites *Madhyamakāloka* somewhat out of context, as if the quote was unproblematically Kamalaśīla's own position. In fact, it is to be found in a very long *pūrvapākṣa* where a logician's position is presented, one which Kamalaśīla replied to by drawing partial parallels with his own philosophical project of proving ultimate lack of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). The logician's position, which looks to be a type of *Alīkākarāvāda* (“false images”), held that: (a) the *dharmin* is said to be a mental entity, but in reality is not mind and has no real existence at all, being only an imagined and unreal mental image (*ākāra*); (b) the ordinary person erroneously conflates the image with the objects themselves; (c) mind really exists although the images are unreal. (Note that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are usually represented in texts on philosophical tenets (*grub mtha' = siddhānta*) as leaning towards *Sarvākārāvāda* (*rnam bden dang mthun pa*); see Mimaki (1982) pp. 29–31, 35.) See *Madhyamakāloka* D. 174a–175al (P. 190a–191a): *ji ste thog ma med pa'i rang gi sa bon yongs su smin pa las yang dag par byung ba'i rnam par rtog pas yongs su bsgrubs pa l byis pa rnam kyis phyi rol dang dngos po nyid du nye bar brtags pa blo la yod pa nyid chos can yin te l de'i phyir de la brten nas gts'o bo la sogs pa 'gog par byed do ll de ni don dam par ngo bo nyid med kyang rnam par 'khrul pa'i dbang gis phyi rol lta bu dang l gts'o bo la sogs pa dang l tha mi dad pa lta bu dang l nus pas pas stong pa la sogs pa'i chos mtha' dag dang ldan pa lta bur rtog go ll de la gts'o bo la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid dgag pa sgrub pa la gts'o bo la sogs pa dgag pa bsgrub par bya ba dang l sgrub pa dag gzi gcig pa nyid kyang grub pa kho na yin te l 'di ltar de nyid byis pa rnam kyis phyi rol dang l gts'o bo la sogs pa nyid du nye bar gzung ba rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba dag kyang rab rib can gyis zla ba gnyis su mthong ba bzhin du de dang tha mi dad par sems pa kho nas tha snyad 'dogs pa'i phyir ll de ni blos kun brtags pa yin yang de'i*

rnam pa nyid kyi blo zhes nye bar 'dngs te / 'di dngos su ni blo'i ngo bo yang ma yin te / de ni de dang mshan nyid mi mihun pa'i ngo bo nyid du snang ba'i phyir ro // de'i phyir de ngo bo med pa nyid du rab tu bsgrubs kyang blo ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du thal ba ni ma yin te / de la phyi rol dang gts'o bo la sogs pa'i ngo nyid dgag pa tshad mas sgrub par byed kyi / de nyid dgag pa'i phyir gtan tshigs sbyor ba ma yin no / ... de'i phyir rjes su dpag par bya ba dang / rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa'i tha snyad 'di thams cad ni blo la yod pa'i chos can kho na brten nas 'jug pa nyid de / rnam pa gzhān mi srid pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar 'dod na /

gal te de lta yin na / 'o na don dam par ngo bo nyid med kyang kun brtags pa'i chos can la brten nas dgag pa la sogs pa rab tu sgrub par byed pa la yang gzhi ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa mi 'jug na ci ste nan gyis kho bo cag la klan ka tshol byar byed / ji ltar khyed don dam pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir gts'o bo la sogs pa dgag par kun brtags pa'i chos can kho na la bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa'i sems pa rgyas par byed pa de bzhin du kho cag kyang gzugs dang sgra la sogs pa grags pa dag la / yod pa dang med pa la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid du sgro biags pa dgag par byis pa rnam la de dag sgyu ma dang / smig rgyu dang / rmi lam dang / gzugs brnyan dang mshungs pa nyid du ston par byed do // de la ji ltar brtags pa'i chos can la dngos po'i ngo bo nyid du sgro biags pa la sogs pa bkag tu zin kyang rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba dag la snang ba'i phyir ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa mi 'jug pa de bzhin du gzugs la sogs pa yang gnag rdzi'i chung ma yan chad kyi skye bo la snang ba'i phyir ji ltar ma grub pa nyid du 'gyur //.

["Objection:] – It is just something existing in the mind that is the subject, [something] established by conceptualisations stemming from the ripening of their own beginningless [karmic] tendencies [and] which is metaphorically designated by the infantile as being external and real. Thus it is with reference to that [fictional mental existent] that one negates *pradhāna* and so forth. Although that [mental existent] does not ultimately have any nature, still, due to error, it is conceived of as if it were external, as if it were not different from *pradhāna* and the like, and as if it had all the various properties like being void of efficacy and so forth. In that case, when we negate the natures of *pradhāna* and so forth, the *sādhya* consisting of negations of *pradhāna*, etc. and the *sādhana* [for these negations] not only have the same locus but are in fact established. This is because the infantile grasp this [mental existent] alone as being external and as being *pradhāna*, etc. and the proponent and opponent both apply conventional designations simply because they think that this [mental existent] is not different from [the pseudo-entities themselves], just as when a person suffering from [the eye-disease] *timira* sees the moon as two. Although this [mental existent] is something [merely] imagined by the mind, it is metaphorically designated as the mind due to its being an image. In reality, however, it is not of the nature of the mind, in that it appears as something different in character from the [mind]. Hence even though it is acknowledged that this [mental existent] is without any nature, it does not follow that the mind is without nature. In that case, the negations of natures such as the external and *pradhāna*, etc. are proven by means of a *pramāna*. But one does not apply the logical reasons in order to negate the [mind] itself. ... Consequently, all these conventions, like inferable objects (*anumeya*), inferring [reasons] (*anumāna*) and so forth, operate only in reliance upon subjects existing in the mind. Any other way is impossible.

[Reply:] Suppose this were so. Now, even when one proved negations and so forth in reliance upon imagined subjects, though they be ultimately without any nature, no fault like *āśrayāsiddha*, etc. would be committed. So then why direct your criticisms so vociferously against us! Just as you develop ideas of *sādhya* and *sādhana* in reliance upon imagined subjects in order to negate *pradhāna* etc. so that you may have access to the ultimate, in the same fashion we too, in order to negate superimpositions of natures like existence and nonexistence, etc. upon commonly recognized things

like form and sound, demonstrate to the infantile that these [commonly recognized things like form, etc.] are like illusions, mirages, dreams and reflections. In that case, just as [for you], even though [you] do negate the superimposed nature of being a real entity with reference to imagined subjects [like *pradhāna*, etc.], there are no faults like (*āśraya-śāyāsiddha*) because these [subjects] appear to both the proponent and the opponent, so too, since form and so forth also appear to everyone from cowherds' wives on up, how is it that they would be unestablished (*asiddha*)?"

²⁵ See n. 24.

²⁶ bsTan dar has truncated the passage from the *Svavṛtti*. The additions to our translation follow the missing portions of the Skt. and Tib. of the *Svavṛtti*. Note that it is clear from the Skt. that Ngag dbang bstan dar is wrong in reading *spyi gts'o bo'i sgra*, and that the reading *ci (= kim) gts'o bo'i sgra* in the *bsTan 'gyur* is the correct one. Ngag dbang bstan dar seems to have been seduced by the homonymy of *spyi* and *ci*, plus the fact that *pradhāna* is usually rendered as *spyi gts'o bo*, by indigenous Tibetan authors of the dGe lugs school. Our translation of the quotation follows the *Svavṛtti*'s Sanskrit and the Tibetan in the *bsTan 'gyur*, which must yield a different understanding from that of Ngag dbang bstan dar himself. Unfortunately, it is difficult to guess how the latter would have understood the passage. But a natural reading of bsTan dar's version of the *Svavṛtti* passage would be something like: "Thus, in dependence upon this subject, this object that appears due to the word *pradhāna* ...".

²⁷ "Verbal object" (*sgra don; śabdārtha*) is, for a logician, always a conceptually created entity, one having no real existence. Cf. *Pramānavārttika* III.287ab: *śabdārthagrāhi yad yatra taj jñānam iatra kalpanā //* "Wherever a consciousness apprehends a verbal object, it is conceptual".

²⁸ On *gzhi ldog* and the argument at issue, see n. 30.

²⁹ See n. 30.

³⁰ The term *ldog pa (= vyāvṛtti)* is a pivotal term in the Indian and Tibetan *apoha* theories of meaning; see Tillemans (1993) pp. 69–70, n. 6 for explanations and references to *Pramānavārttika* I. The fundamental idea is that the object directly designated by a word for X is a conceptual construction proceeding by exclusion of all which is non-X. As for *rang ldog* and *gzhi ldog*, these are terms whose Indian origins, if indeed they have any, seem quite obscure. The terms figure preeminently in the *bsDus grwa* literature (and hence in dGe lugs pa *pramāna* commentaries) as part of a scholastic category of different sub-types of the Indian logician's notion of *vyāvṛtti*, including also *don ldog* ("exclusion *qua* object") and *spyi ldog* ("exclusion *qua* universal"). Given their place in a literature heavily influenced by the *Tshad ma bsDus pa* texts of gSang phu traditions, it is not unlikely that the interpretation of these four sub-varieties of *vyāvṛtti*, and possibly even their origin, is due to the gSang phu traditions stemming from Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge. See e.g. the third chapter of *Yongs 'dzin bsDus grwa chung*, the chapter concerning *ldog pa ngos 'dzin* "recognizing exclusions" (in *Textbooks of Se-ra Monastery for the Primary Course of Studies* ed. T. Kelzang and S. Onoda, Kyoto, 1985). The argumentation in Ngag dbang bstan dar turns essentially on the distinction between knowing an object X as being simply an X itself (*rang*), and knowing an instance, or basis (*gzhi*), of X but under some other name or description – the first case is that of *rang ldog* and the second *gzhi ldog*. Thus, for example, the *rang ldog* pertaining to a vase (*bum pa'i rang ldog*), is just the vase and not, e.g., some particular bulbous golden object that is able to carry water – the latter would be a *gzhi ldog* of vase. In the context at hand, a Buddhist and a Sāṃkhya, when arguing about Primordial Matter, are both arguing about a mere concept of Primordial Matter, i.e. a verbal object (*sgra don*). Nonetheless they cannot be arguing about the *rang ldog* of the verbal object (*sgra don gyi rang ldog*) of Primordial Matter because this would mean that both know

the verbal object to be just a verbal object, i.e. a conceptually and verbally created fiction; clearly, the Sāmkhya does not know this, but thinks that Primordial Matter is more than just a verbal object, because it is for him fully real. Thus they are both thinking and arguing about a type of verbal object, but one that both parties don't consciously recognize as such – hence the insistence on the subject of their deliberations being the *gzhi ldog* of a verbal object. See also n. 15 on the dGe lugs pa idea of an object (like Primordial Matter, etc.) and its conceptual representation appearing “mixed” (*dres nas snang ba*) and hence indistinguishable to the opponent.

³¹ Literally, “from their exclusions *qua* the things themselves”. On *rang ldog*, see n. 30 On the argument at stake, see n. 32.

³² The point is that if we *explicitly* presented the subject as being something along the lines of the concept of Primordial Matter, and not Primordial Matter itself, we would not actually succeed in refuting Primordial Matter. The argument would not tell against the Sāmkhya opponent, who is convinced that there really is such an entity and that it is *a fortiori* not a mere concept. On the other hand, when we establish by means of a *pramāna* that the reason is a property of the subject (*pakṣadharmā*), then the subject can only be the conceptual construct, i.e. only the appearance as Primordial Matter (*gtso bor snang ba nyid*). The argument at stake is, in fact, that both the *kevaladharmin* and *svadharmin* have their purpose: the former assures that the refutation presents the subject as ‘the opponent conceives it, while the latter is the proponent’s actual subject that will serve as the basis upon which will be assessed the three characteristics of the logical reason. Finally, note that we cannot say with any certainty which exact passages from the *Madhyamakāloka* rGyal tshab rje had in mind.

³³ Literally: “the reason ... (*... rgyu mtshan yang*) ... is also due to the reason (*rgyu mtshan gyis yin*)”.

³⁴ *Pramānavārttika* IV.228bcd. The whole *kārikā* reads: *tasmād āśrīya śabdārthaṃ bhāvābhāvasamāśrayam | abhīyāśrayam atreṣṭam sarvaṃ vidhiniśedhanam || (de phyir dngos dngos med rten can || phyi rol rten min sgra don la || brten nas 'dir ni sgrub pa dang || dgag pa thams cad 'dod pa yin ||)* “Therefore, we accept that all [positive] proof and negation here [in practical activity (*vyavahāre*)] is in reliance upon a verbal object, which is the basis for being and non-being [and] which has no external basis.” For the interpretation of the compounds ^o*samāśrayam* and *abhīyāśrayam*, see *Pramānavārttikavṛtti*: *tasmāc chaddasyārtham aropitabahirūpam anyavyavacchedam abhīyāśrayam bāhyaviśayarahitam ya eva bhāvābhāvayor vidhipratīśedhavalpapratipādyayor samāśrayas tam āśrīya vyavahāre sarvaṃ vidhiniśedhanam iṣṭam!*

³⁵ The *kārikā* is closely related to the well-known fragment attributed to Dignāga’s *Hetumukha* and cited in *Pramānavārttikavṛtti* (ed. Gnoli pp. 2–3): *sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūdhena dharmadharmibhedena*. Note that the Tibetan of k. 183c reads *shes pa la grub* “established in/for thought”, whereas the *Pramānavārttikavṛtti* (PVV) reads *pratayena vikalpakenaikavyāvṛttimātraviśayena samsiddham* ... “established by means of conceptual thought, which has as object only an exclusion of unity.” Finally, note that Manorathanandin in PVV takes *artha* as going only with *anumeya*, i.e. *anumeyārtha* which is also in keeping with PV Tib. Cf. PVV ad k. 183: *ato 'numānahetutvād anumānasya līngasyānumeyārthasānyayor upalakṣaṇatvāt (1) dharmīṇas ca vyavahārasṭhītis tv iyam* ...

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ABBREVIATIONS

A lag sha Ngag dbang bstan dar. *gCig du bral gyi rnam bzhag* = *gCig du bral gyi rnam bzhag legs bshad rgya msho las btus pa'i 'khrul spong bdud rtsi'i gzegs ma*. In Vol. I of the *Collected gSung 'bum of bsTan-dar lha-ram of A-lag-sha*. Published by Lama Guru Deva, New Delhi, 1971.

bTsun pa ston gzhon. *rNam 'grel gyi rnam bshad gangs can gyi rgyan*. Qinghai: Zhonguo zangxue chubanshe, 1993.

D. = sDe dge edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka.

Devendrabbuddhi. *Pramānavārttikapañjikā*. P. 5717, D. 4217.

dGe 'dun grub pa. *Tshad ma rigs rgyan* = *Tshad ma'i bstan bcos chen po rigs pa'i rgyan*. *Collected Works of the First Dalai Lama dGe 'dun grub pa*, Gangtok, 1978–1981, Vol. 4 (nga).

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Dharmakīrti. *Pramānavārttika*. Ed. by Y. Miyasaka. *Pramānavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)*. Naritasan Shinshoji: Acta Indologica 2 1972, pp. 1–206. (PV I = *Svārthānumāna*; PV II = *Pramānasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna*.)

Dharmakīrti. *Pramānavārttikavṛtti*. Ed. R. Gnoli. *The Pramānavārttikam of Dharmakīrti*. Serie Orientale Roma 23, Rome, 1960.

Dharmottara. *Nyāyabinduṭkā*. See Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*.

Dignāga. *Pramānasamuccayavṛtti*. P. 5701, D. 4204 (i.e. PSVa) transl. Vasudhararakṣita and Seng rgyal; P. 5702 (i.e. PSVb) transl. Kanakavarman and Dad pa shes rab.

Dignāga. *Pramānasamuccaya*. P. 5700, D. 4203

Durveka Mīśra. *Dharmottarapradīpa*. See Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*.

Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge. *lTa ba ngan sel* = *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i dkyus kyi sa bcad pa dang gzhung so so'i dka' ba'i gnas la dpyad pa lta ba ngan sel*. In *Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum*, vol. 13, Tokyo, 1969.

gSer mdog Pañ chen Śākya mchog ldan. *Tshad ma rigs gter dgongs rgyan smad cha* = *Tshad ma rigs gter gyi dgongs rgyan rigs pa'i 'khor los lugs ngan pham byed*. Volume 10 of *Collected Writings of gSer-mdog Pañ-chen Śākya-mchog-ltan*. Reprinted by Nagwang Topgyal, Delhi, 1988.

k. = kārikā.

Kamalaśīla. *Madhyamakāloka*. P. 5287, D. 3887.

Manorathanandin. *Pramānavārttikavṛtti*. Ed. by R. Sāṅkrtyāyana with the notes of Vibhūticandra in the appendices to the *Journal of the Bihar and*

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Miy. = Y. Miyasaka's edition of *Pramānavārttika*. See Dharmakīrti, *Pramānavārttika*.

mKhas grub rje = mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po. *rNam 'grel 'tik chen* = *rGyas pa'i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rgya cher bshad pa rigs pa'i rgya msho*. *Collected Works*, dGa' ldan phun tshogs gling edition, Vol. *tha, da*.

mKhas grub rje. *sTong thun chen mo* = *Zab mo stong pa nyid kyi de kho na nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bzang mig 'byed*. *Collected Works*, Vol. *ka*.

mKhas grub rje. *Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel* = *Tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan yid kyi mun sel*. *Collected Works*, Vol. *tha*.

P. = Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka.

Prajñākaragupta. *Pramānavārttikabhāṣya*. Ed. R. Sāṅkrtyāyana, Patna: Tibetan Sanskrit Works 1, 1953.

rGyal tshab rje = rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen. *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* = *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i rnam bshad phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa*. *Collected Works*, Lhasa edition, Vol. *cha*.

rGyal tshab rje. *rNam nges dar 'tik* = *bsTan bcos tshad ma rnam nges kyi 'tik chen dgongs pa rab gsal*. *Collected Works*, Vol. *ja and nya*.

rGyal tshab rje; *dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*. Popular edition, Sarnath, 1976.

Śākyabuddhi. *Pramānavārttikāṭikā*. P. 5718, D. 4220.

Śāntarakṣita. *Madhyamakālamkāra*. See Ichigō (1985).

Tsong kha pa = Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa. *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* = *bsTan bcos chen po dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal*. In Vol. *ma of Collected Works*, reproduced from prints from the 1897 Lhasa old Zhol (dGa' ldan phun tshogs gling) blocks, New Delhi 1979.

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Yongs 'dzin Phur bu lcoog Byams pa tshul khriims rgya mtsho. *Yongs 'dzin rtags rigs* = *Tshad ma'i gzhung don 'byed pa'i bsdus grwa'i rnam par bshad pa rigs lam 'phrul gyi lde'u mig las rigs lam che ba rtags rigs kyi skor*. References are to the edition by S. Onoda, *The Yoñs 'dzin rtags rigs – A manual for Tibetan logic*. Nagoya: Studia Asiatica 5, 1981.

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THE BONES OF A BUDDHA AND THE BUSINESS OF A MONK:
CONSERVATIVE MONASTIC VALUES IN AN EARLY
MAHĀYĀNA POLEMICAL TRACT

There is nothing very distinguished about the *Maitreyamahāsimhanāda-sūtra*. It appears to be just another of a long list of little known mahāyāna *sūtras* that have no particular context and had no demonstrable importance in the history of Indian Buddhism. It appears not to have been quoted or even referred to in learned Indian mahāyāna sources and there is no evidence that it was ever significant there.¹ It is therefore not surprising, perhaps, that it is almost equally unknown in modern secondary sources, although it has at least been occasionally cited. Demiéville has, for example, summarized, paraphrased, and occasionally translated significant parts of the second half of the *Maitreyamahāsimhanāda-sūtra* in his entry on "images" in the *Hōbōgirin*.² He has also at least alluded to this same text in an interesting paper entitled "L'iconoclasme anti-bouddhique en Chine";³ but in neither place does he even suggest that the text was well known or significant. More recently Zürcher, in a paper covering much the same ground as Demiéville had, has translated two short passages from, again, the second half of the text, and, again, without being able to show that either was of any particular importance.⁴ Apart from these published sources, at least one recent unpublished dissertation makes several references to our text and translates several more passages from it.⁵ But other than this very little seems to have been said about the text, and very little seems to be known about it.

Although it appears to have had two different titles, there was apparently only one translation of the *Maitreyamahāsimhanāda-sūtra* into Chinese. It now forms part of the *Ratnakūṭa* that was compiled by Bodhiruci in the early eighth century (Taishō 310, no. 23), but was apparently translated already in the mid-sixth century by a gentleman – said to have been the son of a King of Ujjayinī in Central India – whose name cannot be reconstructed with certainty: the *Hōbōgirin* catalog gives it as "Upasūnya (?) ou plutôt Ūrdhvasūnya (?)"⁶

There is also a Tibetan translation of the text which in the *Kanjur* is entitled *byams pa'i seng ge'i sgra chen po mdo = Maitreyamahāsimhanāda-sūtra*.⁷ In most 'editions', it seems, the translators are given as Jinamitra, Surendrabodhi, Prajñāvarman and Ye šes sde, and this would place it, of course, at the beginning of the 9th century. The translation seems to be already listed in the Ldan Kar catalog as no. 47 under the slightly shorter title *byams pa seng ge'i sgra = Maitreyasimhanāda*, and Bu-ston still uses this shorter title (*byams pa seng ge'i sgra'i mdo*) when he quotes two sets of verses from our text at the beginning of his *Chos 'byung*.⁸ Like the Chinese version, the Tibetan version of the *Maitreyasimhanāda* also now forms a part of a *Ratnakūta*.

* * *

Given how little is known about the *Maitreyasimhanāda*, and given the fact – already noted – that it appears to have been even less known in India and to have had no particular impact on the history of Buddhism there, it is not altogether clear that rescuing it from what might be a well deserved obscurity could be counted as a positive contribution to scholarship: surely we do not need another convoluted argument that tries to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. But even apart from the details that will be discussed below, it is virtually certain that if the history of Buddhism in India is ever to be even imperfectly understood it will be necessary to study not only its successes, but also its apparent failures. And, as we will see, the *Maitreyasimhanāda* seems to be one such failure that is particularly worthy of study. A number of things would seem to recommend it.

First of all the contents of at least a part of the *Maitreyasimhanāda* recommend it as an object worth some study. Zürcher, perhaps somewhat inelegantly, has described the *Maitreyasimhanāda* as "a typical *sūnyavāda* scripture",⁹ and it is certainly true that there are scores of similar texts, and that the authors of at least this sort of mahāyāna *sūtra* literature were apparently slow to realize that you cannot talk about emptiness very long before you start repeating yourself. But it is also true that Zürcher's characterization applies much more accurately to the first half of the text than to the second. In fact Zürcher himself – like Demiéville before him – appears to have been drawn to the text not by what it said about emptiness, but rather by what it had to say about 'images'. And what it said about images was unusual.

The author of the second half of the *Maitreyasimhanāda* – who may or may not have been the author of the first half as well¹⁰ – was not,

it seems, so concerned with images themselves as he was with how he thought they were being used by "some" monks. He says, for example, or rather has the Buddha say:

Kāśyapa, there will be some monks (*dge slong ... kha cig*) in the last time, the last period, in the final five hundred years, who have not developed (*ma bsgoms pa*) the body, have not developed the mind, have not developed good conduct, have not developed wisdom. They will paint (*'dri bar 'gyur zhing*) images of the Tathāgata (*de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku zgugs dag*) on cotton cloth (*ras bcos bu = duṣya*), on walls and in enclosures (*ra ba dag gi ngos la*) and they will simply intend to make a living through them (*de dag gis 'tsho bar sems par yang 'gyur te*); they will be proud of themselves and boast on account of that business (*las*), and they will despise and disparage others.¹¹

Demiéville, in summarizing such passages, says that the Buddha of our *sūtra* "condamne les candidats à l'Éveil [i.e. bodhisattvas – we will return to this] qui fabriquent des images pour en faire commerce"; Zürcher calls the practice referred to here "simony".¹² Whatever you call it, what the Buddha is here made to 'predict' about the use of images by monks is certainly not common in canonical Buddhist literature, and certainly worth further study.¹³ This is especially so since what appear to be contemporary *Vinaya* sources contain elaborate rules prescribing monastic image processions and the proper procedures for dealing with the wealth of donations they produce,¹⁴ and since what appear to be contemporary inscriptions like those of the Bhikṣu Bala seem to record the activities of a prominent and learned monk engaged in what can legitimately be called the 'promotion' of the cult of images.¹⁵ In fact when viewed in light of this other material it becomes possible to seriously suggest that these sections of the *Maitreyasimhanāda-sūtra* might well represent an actual mahāyāna polemic aimed at mainstream monastic practice – and the "bodhisattvas" who engaged in it – in the Kuṣān period. The further fact that the polemical position taken by the *Maitreyasimhanāda* appears to have failed, that monastic involvement with images did not decrease but actually increased after the Kuṣān period,¹⁶ does not necessarily render that position less interesting. It simply defines it as marginal, and that in itself is a gain: we might know where it finally hits.

However interesting the polemic in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* against monks making a living with images might be, it cannot be pursued here. It requires and deserves separate treatment.¹⁷ Here we need first to note what neither Demiéville nor Zürcher did: in addition to – in fact preceding – the polemic on the use of images by monks the *Maitreyasimhanāda* also has a very similar polemic against monks who make a living from the relic cult. This polemic we will look at in

some detail. We also need to note that this polemic on relics – like the polemic on images – has some linkages with material that is external to the *Maitreyasimhanāda* itself, material that may in fact allow us to date and geographically locate if not the text, at least some key conceptions and elements of the vocabulary found in it.

Although, for example, the date of the Chinese translation of the *Maitreyasimhanāda* would not seem to suggest it, there are some good reasons for thinking that at least the polemics it contains might legitimately be described as ‘early’; and might represent an ‘old’ stratum of mahāyāna *sūtra* literature. Some of these reasons are – as already noted – external to the text; some internal. If we begin with the latter, the first thing that is immediately obvious is that the term *mahāyāna* appears nowhere in the text of these polemics, and recent scholarship is beginning to assert that the presence or absence of this term has chronological significance. Durt, for example, has said in a recent overview of the state of our ignorance in regard to ‘the Mahāyāna’ that “une analyse des plus anciennes traductions chinoises de *sūtra* de G[rand] V[éhicule] et des textes sanskrits des *Mahāyāna-sūtra* censés appartenir aux strates doctrinaux les plus anciens aboutit au même résultat: il semble que les termes Mahāyāna et Daijō ne se soient imposés que lentement”, and that “Le G[rand] V[éhicule] lui-même est longtemps désigné par des périphrases ...”¹⁸

One such “paraphrase” does occur in our polemics – though rarely – and that may be significant. But surely as significant is the way that it is used. We have already seen that in summarizing the polemical passages in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* that are directed at those monks who make a living from images Demiéville says the Buddha “condamne les candidats à l’Éveil [i.e. bodhisattvas] qui fabriquent des images pour en faire commerce”. The particular passage that Demiéville is referring to comes at the end of the polemic on images, and the wording of the corresponding passage in the Tibetan version is a bit more precise. The Tibetan text says:

'od srungs yang phyi ma'i tshé phyi ma'i dus lnga brgya pa tha ma la / byang chub sems dpa'i theg pa pa'i rigs kyi bu dang rigs kyi bu mo thabs la mi mkhas pa / brkam pa / 'dod pas zil gyis non pa kha cig 'byung bar 'gyur te / de dag ni ras bcos bu dang risig ngos la bris pa'am / de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku gzugs gzan dag la mchod pa byas pas / dngos grub dang rdzu 'phrul 'thob par sems shing / de dag 'di snyam du bdag cag ni de bzhin gshegs pa la mchod pa byed pa yin gyi / gchan dag ni mchod pa byed pa ma yin no snyam du rlom sems su 'ang 'gyur te / de dag dge ba cung 'ad tsam po des bdag la bstod par byed / gchan la smod par byed cing / gchi des 'tsho bar sems par yang 'gyur ro /¹⁹

Kāśyapa, there will be some sons and daughters of good family who are adherents of the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas (*bodhisattva-yānika*, *-yāniya*) in the last time, in the

last period, in the final five hundred years, who are not skilled in means, greedy, and overcome by desire. They will intend to obtain success and magical power through performing worship to images of the Tathāgata painted on cotton cloth and walls, or other images of the Tathāgata. They will think, ‘we indeed are performing worship to the Tathāgatas but no one else is’, and so thinking will be arrogant. On account of this meager good they will boast of themselves and disparage others, intending only to make a living by their activities.

Here, then, when we actually get a group designation like ‘mahāyāna’ – in fact *bodhisattvayāna* or *-yānika* is supposed to be one of the early “paraphrases” of the latter – it turns out that at least “some” members of this group are – far from being paragons of ‘right’ practice – the actual targets of the intended criticism. Moreover, if this ‘prediction’ at the end of the polemic on the use of images looks familiar, that is because it should: it forms a pair with and is a companion-piece to the parallel ‘prediction’ that occurs at the beginning of the same polemic, and the latter – as we have seen – directs its criticism towards “some monks ... who have not developed the body, have not developed the mind etc. ...” In other words, if this is a mahāyāna polemic it is directed either at two groups – “some monks” and “some sons and daughters of good family who are adherents of the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas” – or it is directed at a single group that can be described as either “some monks” or as “some adherents of the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas”. If the first alternative holds, then the two groups, though designated differently, were thought to be doing the same thing and engaging in the same practice. If the second holds, then the ‘two’ were actually one and the same. Something very similar appears when we look at the polemic on the use of relics.

The two polemics found now in the second half of the *Maitreyasimhanāda-sūtra* are both built on the same basic armature and have the same basic structure. Both begin and end with a ‘prediction’ about conditions in “the last time”. In both these two predictions frame a story of the past which carries the bulk of the polemic.²⁰ The opening ‘prediction’ in the polemic on relics²¹ concerns the appearance in “the last time” of “sham bodhisattvas” (*byang chub sems dpa' tshul 'chos*) who are further described as bodhisattvas “who have been taken hold of by bad friends, are destitute of determination, and interest themselves only in food and clothing” (*sdig pa'i grogs pos yongs su zin cing lhag pa'i bsam pa nyam chun ste / zas dang gos lhur len pa'i byang chub sems dpa'*). These are the bad guys, those who are further said to reject *yoga*, religious exertion (*prahāna*), exposition (*uddeśa*) and recitation (*svādhyāya*) – all the works of a monk – and instead to engage in the worship of relics for the sake of making a living.²² But

the concluding 'prediction', which presumably would be referring to the same group, describes them differently, although in a way that will be at least partly familiar. In the concluding 'prediction' those who engage in the worship of relics simply to ensure a livelihood are not described as "sham bodhisattvas" who have rejected a standard list of a monk's activities, but rather as "some monks who are adherents of the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas and (some who are) adherents of the Vehicle of Disciples who have not developed the body, have not developed the mind, have not developed good conduct, have not developed wisdom" (... *byang chub sems dpa'i theg pa pa dang / nyan thos kyi theg pa pa'i dge slong lus ma bsgoms pa / sems ma bsgoms pa / tshul khirms ma bsgoms pa / shes rab ma bsgoms pa kha cig* ...) ²³ This characterization in the concluding 'prediction' in regard to the use of relics is, of course, very near to that found in the opening 'prediction' in regard to images cited above, but it is still at least a little unexpected. In fact the whole situation here is.

One might legitimately expect that polemics in a mahāyāna text – which the *Maitreyasimhanāda* at least now is – would be directed, as they frequently are, at a well defined non-mahāyāna opponent, but that is not what we seem to see here. There are group designations of a sort here, but they do not appear to be 'sectarian' in any significant sense, and they do not even seem to be strongly drawn. What we seem to be seeing – perhaps most clearly in the polemic on the use of relics – is a criticism by one group of monks, represented by the author of our polemics, directed at two other groups of monks – 'some' of those who are adherents of the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas, and 'some' of those who are adherents of the Vehicle of the Disciples – who are engaging in the same practices for the same motive. The adherence to one or another 'vehicle' is not an issue for our author anywhere in these polemics. ²⁴ He is taking issue with the behavior of "some" monks regardless of their affiliation. He is not trying to define a mahāyāna over against something else. He is trying, above all else, to draw a clear distinction between what he thinks – and presumably what he wants his reader to think – is a good monk, and what he thinks is a bad monk. He is arguing, in other words, for a particular definition of what a monk is and what a monk should do. Although – as will be evident in what follows – he occasionally does use a conceptual vocabulary that we would call 'mahāyāna', he is most certainly not arguing for the rejection of what he understands as the monastic ideal, but for its full implementation; he is not arguing for the rejection of monasticism, but for its reform.

The mahāyāna is, of course, not normally considered to have been preoccupied with the problem of prescribing rules of behavior for monks – this is supposed to be the concern of *Vinaya* texts, and the mahāyāna did not have any of these. The fact remains, however, that it is difficult to read our polemics as anything else than an attempt to do just that. And the fact too remains that in his attempt to define what he seems to have thought was proper monastic behavior the author of our polemics actually uses elements of a vocabulary that is found in what appears to be a contemporary *Vinaya* source.

In, for example, what is certainly one of the least subtle passages in his polemic on monks who involve themselves in the relic cult to attract donations our author says of, again, "some monks who are adherents of the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas and (some who are) adherents of the Vehicle of Disciples":

... still these dullards (*mi blun po*), when they have entered into the religious life in this Order (*bstan pa 'di la rab tu byung nas*), abandon and reject the (true) occupation of a religious (*dge sbyong gi las*) which I have declared, and, for the sake of sustaining themselves, for the sake of cultivating the houses of friends and houses that give alms, for the sake of acquiring bowls and robes, for the sake of getting acquisitions (*myed pa*) and honors, for the sake of obtaining renown, reputation and fame, they provide (*nye bar sgrub par byed do*) honor to the relics and *stūpas* of the Tathāgata with acts of worship and honor directed toward both.

But what then, Kāśyapa, is the occupation of a religious (*dge sbyong gi las*)? They are, Kāśyapa, the two occupations of meditation and recitation which I have taught ('*od srungs ngas las gnyis po bsam gtan dang kha ton bya ba bstan pa gang dag yin pa dag ste* ²⁵

Fortunately, we have some idea of how the final sentence here would have looked in Sanskrit because the author of our polemic almost certainly did not invent either the idea expressed or the basic vocabulary used to do so.

In, for example, the *Cūdāpakṣāvādāna*, now found in the *Divyāvādāna*, when Mahāpanthaka enters the Order, the monk who admitted him immediately says to him: *dve bhikṣukarmaṇī dhyānam adhyayanam ca kiṃ kariṣyasi*: "There are two occupations for a monk, meditation and recitation. Which will you do?" ²⁶ And the *Cūdāpakṣāvādāna* is, of course, an adaptation – even more crude and clumsy than the cases Shackleton Bailey studied ²⁷ of a text that forms a part of the *Vinayavibhaṅga* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*. There the corresponding passage reads: *dge slong gi las ni gnyis te / bsam gtan dang / klog pa yin na khyod bsam gtan dang / klog pa gang 'dod /* ²⁸ This assertion that there are two occupations for a monk is in fact something of a common-place in the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*. It occurs repeatedly throughout its *Vibhaṅga* in contexts similar to that

found in the *Cūdāpakṣāvādāna* and in almost exactly the same form.²⁹ It also occurs in the *Kṣudrakavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* where it is used in an interesting way, and there is a reasonably good chance that the author of our polemic might have known something like this usage since he seems to be simply repeating it.

Our polemist may not have been doing anything very novel when – through the mouth of the Buddha – he charged the monks he did not approve of with abandoning and rejecting the two occupations of a religious which had been taught by the Buddha himself. The redactors of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* had also – and perhaps already – deployed much the same rhetorical strategy against forms of monastic behavior that they too, presumably, did not wish to see continued. When, for example, in the *Kṣudrakavastu*, the monk Kāśyapa – the same Kāśyapa who is the chief interlocutor of our polemics – catches the monk Nanda painting a picture of his lovely wife's body on a rock he says:

"What are you doing, Venerable Nanda?"
Nanda said: "Reverend Mahākāśyapa, I am painting Subhadrā."

Kāśyapa then responds with what can be imagined as some disgust:

"Venerable, when the Blessed One has said: 'there are two occupations for a monk, meditation and recitation', how can you sit here painting pictures of your wife?!"
(*tshe dang ldan pa bcom ldan 'das kyis dge slong gi bya ba ni gnyis te / bsam gtan dang gdon pa'o zhes gsungs na / khyod rang gi chung ma 'dri zhing 'dug gam*)³⁰

Simply put, Kāśyapa in this instance is made to invoke the words of the Buddha in regard to the two (acceptable) occupations of a monk to criticize behavior which, presumably, the redactors of this *Vinaya* did not approve of and which, significantly, the Buddha himself is then made to forbid: "Monks", the Buddha is made to say, "it is with thoughts of passion towards Subhadrā that Nanda, a deluded man, paints pictures. Therefore, a monk must not paint pictures. If a monk were to paint pictures he would come to be guilty of an offence." Although later in the same text the rule is emended so that it only applies to the forms of living things (*sems can gyi gzugs ni bri bar mi bya'o*), still the point is clear: those things that do not fall under the heading of the two occupations are condemned by the Buddha.

But the redactors of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* also used the same assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk in attempts, presumably, to curb other forms of monastic behavior which they seem to have judged unacceptable. In yet another text in the *Kṣudrakavastu*, for example, when the Buddha declares the five benefits or blessings (*anūsamsa*) that come from sweeping, all the Elder Monks (*sthaviras*) abandon meditation and recitation (*bsam gtan dang 'don pa bor te*) and start

sweeping the Jetavana. But, the text says, the Buddha himself then had to immediately curb this particular enthusiasm and correct the situation. He did so by saying, according to the redactors of this *Vinaya*:

"What I said referred to the monk in charge of physical properties (*upadhivārika*), not to every single Elder Monk. On the contrary, the occupation of the monk who has entered the Order of this well-spoken Dharma and Discipline is twofold, to wit: meditation and recitation" (*ngas dge skos las dgongs te gsungs kyi / dge slong gnas brtan gnas brtan dag ni ma yin no / 'on kyang legs par gsungs pa'i chos 'dul ba la rab tu byung ba'i dge slong gi las ni gnyis te / 'di lta ste / bsam gtan dang 'don pa'o*)³¹

It is probably difficult for some to fully realize what the problem is here. Suffice it to say that in brahmanical India where such activities as sweeping were undertaken only by the lowest castes and servants it simply would not do to have senior monks engaging in them. In any case, the *vinayadharas* who compiled the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* are once again seen here invoking the assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk to deal with what must have been considered an inappropriate form of monastic behavior.

These *vinaya* passages would seem to present clear parallels, then, for both what the author of our polemics is in part saying and for what in part he is doing. Both 'mahāyāna' polemic and mainstream monastic code seem to be using basically the same *specific* language. In both this language seems to be deployed against forms of monastic behavior which the author of the polemic and the redactors of the code did not approve of. Since the intention of the redactors of the code was almost by definition to govern, structure, or reform the behavior of monks, this too – however much it might seem to be out of character – must also have been the intention of at least the polemical parts of what is now a mahāyāna *sūtra*. There remains, however, the problem of how to further describe the situation. If, for example, the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* predates the polemics in the *Maitreyasimhanāda-sūtra* then it could be argued – perhaps even be concluded – that the author of these mahāyāna polemics simply took over a standard *vinaya* argument and applied it, or adapted it, to yet another form, real or potential, of what he considered errant monastic practice. In other words, the specificity of the parallels between polemic and code – especially the close verbal parallels – almost inevitably raises the question of the exact relationship between the two.³² And this question becomes even more pressing, perhaps, in light of the fact that the close verbal parallels already pointed out between the *Maitreyasimhanāda-sūtra* and the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* are not the only ones that seem to occur.

It has already been briefly noted that the opening 'prediction' in the polemic in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* on the use of relics refers to those who worship relics for the sake of making a living as "sham bodhisattvas". These "sham bodhisattvas" are also described as under the influence of bad friends, devoid of determination, and interested only in food and clothing. But even this may not be the worst the author of our polemic had to say about such individuals – he may have saved that for last, when he had the Buddha say:

"I, Kāśyapa, in the presence of the world with its gods, have said: 'You, monks, must continue with efforts that are applied to disciplining yourselves and calming. Since there are brahmins and householders who are devout, they will perform the worship of relics for my relics!' But in spite of this, look, Kāśyapa, how these dullards, when they have even given up *yoga*, even given up religious exertion, even given up exposition, even given up recitation, will make efforts in acts of worship of relics and, supporting themselves on those, intend only to make a living!" (*od srungs ngas lha dang bcas pa'i 'jig rten gyi mdun du dge slong dag khyed cag ni bdag nyid dul ba dang zhi bar sbyor ba'i rjes su brston pas gnas par gyis shig / bram ze dang khyim bdag dad pa dang ldan pa dag yod na de dag ni nga'i sku gdung rnam la sku gdung gi mchod pa byed par 'gyur ro zhes de skad gsungs na / 'od srungs mi blun po de dag mal 'byor kyang spangs / spong ba 'ang spangs / lung nod pa 'ang spangs / kha ton bya ba 'ang spangs nas / de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku gdung gi mchod pa'i las la brston par 'gyur zhing / de dag la brten nas 'tsho bar sems par byed pa de dag la ltos /*)³³

There are, of course, a number of interesting things about this passage, not the least of which is the fact that its author seems to have the Buddha quote a version of the instructions he himself gave to Ānanda in regard to his own body in his final days.³⁴ But for our more immediate purposes what we need to note is that another part of what the Buddha is here made to say looks very much like a variant version of yet another formula which is frequently found in the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, a formula which is once again consistently associated with monks turning away from their 'proper' activities.

In the *Cīvaravastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, for example, in a case of some significance for *Mūlasarvāstivādin* monastic inheritance law, when the monks of Śrāvastī are confronted with a long and ongoing series of claims on a very considerable estate left by the monk Upananda they end up doing nothing else than dealing with the estate; i.e. they no longer perform the normal and expected activities of a monk. This is expressed by the formula: *bhikṣavaḥ . . . riñcanti uddeśam pātham svādhyāyam yogam manasikāram (dge slong rnam . . . lung nod pa dang / klog pa dang / 'don pa dang / yid la byed pa bor ba)*, "The monks give up exposition, reading, recitation, *yoga* and mental concentration".³⁵ Likewise in the *Śayanāsanavastu* when the Buddha praises dwelling in the forest (*āraṇyakarva*), and some monks (*kecid bhikṣava*) take up

residence there, thieves steal all their possessions and those monks are reduced to spending all their time trying to get robes from the laity. This state of affairs is also expressed by exactly the same formula in Sanskrit, though in this instance the Tibetan renders it by *lung mnod pa dang / klag pa dang / gnod pa dang / rnal 'byor dang / yid la bya ba nyams par gyur pa*.³⁶ The same formula is also used again, for example, in the *Kṣudrakavastu* to describe what happens when the monks of Śrāvastī are – because of activities of the group of six – completely preoccupied by fears of being (falsely) accused of faults. As a result of their anxiety (*bag tsha*) the text says, "they came to be haggard, worn out, exhausted and physically incapable of work" (*lus las su ma rung bar gyur te*). But more importantly for us, they are also described as *lung ston pa dang / klog pa dang / kha ton dang / rnal 'byor dang / nang gi tshul bzhin yid la byed pa dag shor nas . . .*, "having abandoned exposition, reading, recitation, *yoga*, and inner mental concentration . . .", of having, in effect, ceased to function as monks.³⁷ In all such cases,³⁸ of course, the condition or situation described by the formula requires the intervention of the Buddha himself who then promulgates an appropriate rule designed to reverse what was clearly understood to be a very serious dereliction of monastic duties and highly undesirable state of affairs.

At the very least, then, these *Vinaya* passages would seem to make possible a much more precise reading of the corresponding remarks of the author of our polemic. They would seem to indicate that when he describes the "sham bodhisattvas" who engage in the relic cult to gain a livelihood as "dullards" who have given up *yoga*, religious exertion, exposition and recitation, he is in fact accusing them of having abandoned or fallen away from the practices of a monk, and he is using an established *vinaya* idiom to do so. Obviously, for the accusation to have force the individuals so charged must have been members of the monastic community. Conversely, it stands to reason that if the "sham bodhisattva" was, for the author of our polemic, one who abandoned the practices of a monk, the 'good' bodhisattva, the 'authentic' bodhisattva, was one who had not.

But, while these passages confirm the strong monastic orientation of our author – and there is a great deal of other evidence that does so – and while they provide yet another link between this 'mahāyāna' polemic and the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, they still do not explain those links, and the problem of the relationship between mahāyāna polemic and mainstream monastic code becomes even less easy to avoid: now there are two instances of shared vocabulary.³⁹ Given the specificity of

that shared vocabulary the most conventional approach would be, of course, to assume a kind of linearity and to assert both that one source must be earlier than the other, and that the latter must have borrowed from the former. And there is some internal evidence – especially in regard to the shared assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk – that would seem to point in this direction.

The assertion of the twofold occupation of a religious is delivered in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* as something that had already been said by the Buddha – ‘*od srungs ngas las gnyis po bsam gtan dang kha ton bya ba bstan pa gang dag yin pa*. That is to say, these words are not presented here as if they were being taught for the first time. The same, of course, holds for the passage in the *Kṣudrakavastu* where Kāśyapa quotes the assertion as already having been made: *bcom ldan ‘das kyis dge slong gi bya ba ni gnyis te / bsam gtan dang gdong pa’o zhes gsungs na* . . . The situation is different, however, in the second passage cited above from the *Kṣudraka*. There the assertion is delivered as original, as if it were being stated for the first time, and it is not impossible that this was indeed its original context.⁴⁰ Other elements of this *Kṣudraka* text are also frequently and widely quoted elsewhere in this *Vinaya*. The enumeration of the five blessings that come from sweeping that is certainly original to this text is also cited, for example, in the *Śayanāsanavastu* and the *Cīvaravastu*.⁴¹

But if considerations of this kind could be taken to argue for the priority of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* over the *Maitreyasimhanāda*, so too might the fact that both the assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk and the formula describing the abandonment of monastic activities are well established and of wide occurrence in the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, but such things appear to be rarely if ever found elsewhere in mahāyāna *sūtra* literature.⁴² And there is one other bit of internal evidence which would seem to suggest that at least the assertion of the twofold occupation is not original to the *Maitreyasimhanāda*: not only is the assertion not presented in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* as having been delivered there for the first time, it is also not presented there as the definitive or final word in regard to the matter. The assertion is not simply cited in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* and left to stand. The full passage reads:

But what then, Kāśyapa, is the occupation of a religious? They are, Kāśyapa, the two occupations of meditation and recitation which I have taught. But even these two occupations were only taught for the sake of setting out on the path. Even they are not the final and full conclusion. The occupation which sets out for the sake of exhausting all occupation – this is the occupation of a religious.

‘*od srungs de la dge slong gi las gang zhe na / ‘od srungs ngas las gnyis po bsam gtan dang kha ton bya ba bstan pa gang dag yin pa dag ste / las de gnyis kyang lam la ‘jug par bya ba’i phyir bstan par zad kyi / de dag kyang shin tu mtha’ thug pa dang / shin tu mthar phyin pa ma yin no / ‘od srungs las gang las zad par bya ba’i phyir ‘jug pa de ni dge sbyong gi las yin te*’⁴³

Seen in its full form, this presentation of the assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk in the *Maitreyasimhanādasūtra* looks like nothing so much as a characteristic mahāyāna rehandling of received material. Given that the author of our polemic first has the Buddha cite what he had already said, then – in effect – immediately deny it, it would seem unduly difficult to argue that his passage represents the original context of the assertion and that the redactors of the *Vinaya* adapted their version from it. To argue the reverse would at least require less painful contortions, but to argue in one or another direction may also not be the only option.

Although the basic assertion of the twofold occupation and the description of the abandonment of monastic activities in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* and the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* are strikingly similar, they are not literally the same. One is not a direct quotation of the other. There are some noticeable differences. The *Maitreyasimhanāda* refers to the occupation of a religious (*dge sbyong gi las*), the *Vinaya* to that of a monk (*dge slong gi las*);⁴⁴ neither the individual monastic activities that are abandoned, nor the order of their enumeration are precisely the same in both: whereas the *Maitreyasimhanāda* has *prahāna*, the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* has *pāṭha*; while the former begins with *yoga*, in the latter this does not occur until the end.⁴⁵ Differences of this sort may, of course, be judged minor, but they may also represent just the sort of differences that one might expect to find in contemporary documents belonging to the same basic group, or to closely related competing groups. And this hypothesis might indeed account far better for the shared elements than does the always problematic and rarely provable invocation of direct borrowing. The assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk and the formulaic description of the abandonment of monastic activities may very well occur in both the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* and the *Maitreyasimhanādasūtra* not because one source was borrowing from the other, but because these formulations – and the problem that lays behind them both – were topics of discussion and debate at the time that both the polemic in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* and the texts in the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* were being composed or redacted. The two sources may very well share material because they are roughly contemporaneous expressions of a common debate about the definition of a monk. They use a common language because in at least some

sense they were arguing with each other about a shared concern in regard to which there were a range of opinions – if each used only its own language they would only be talking to themselves. Moreover, if contemporaneity accounts more easily than direct borrowing for these shared elements, contemporaneity alone, it seems, can account for another instance where our polemic shares a specific vocabulary with yet another group of sources. But before moving on to that particular instance, it is necessary to note one further thing here.

Whether the polemic in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* borrowed important bits of its language from the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, or whether the two share elements of a common language because they are contemporary statements in a common debate – either way this would seem to have implications for the date of our polemic. If the author of our polemic is borrowing from the *Vinaya* then the polemic must be later than the monastic code but, for the borrowing to have had effect, probably not very much later. In this case if we can date the monastic code we can at least arrive at a date before which the polemic could not be dated. If code and polemic are roughly contemporaneous then dating the former would date the latter as well. Unfortunately, there is a good deal of confusion about the date of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* and the most commonly cited date is almost certainly wrong.

In his *Histoire du bouddhisme indien* published in 1958 Étienne Lamotte said in regard to the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*: "... one cannot attribute to this work a date earlier than the 4th–5th centuries of the Christian Era",⁴⁶ and in spite of the fact that Lamotte's own subsequent work rendered this assertion more and more untenable, and in spite of the fact that this assertion was – and remains – at odds with other scholarly views, still it is this date that is commonly cited.⁴⁷ Lamotte himself seems first to have encountered difficulties with his own date in an important paper entitled "Vajrapāṇi en Inde" published in 1966.⁴⁸ There he stumbled up against the fact – to summarize very briefly – that Vajrapāṇi was found frequently in Gandharan art starting from its earliest phases, phases that are securely, if only broadly, dated to the Kuṣān period. But he was also forced to note that, apart from the *Buddhānusmṛtisamādhī-sūtra* which may well be a Central Asian or Chinese 'apocryphal' text of the early 5th century, the single most important, if not the only possible, textual source for Vajrapāṇi was the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*. This was awkward and Lamotte – without ever explicitly jettisoning his earlier view – ends by saying that "la compilation" of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* "ne fut pas terminée avant le II^e siècle de notre ère" – this is a marked retreat from "one cannot

attribute to this work a date earlier than the 4th–5th centuries of the Christian Era". Moreover Lamotte here goes on to say "grâce au *Vinaya* des *Mūlasarvāstivādin*, trois points seront acquis au I^{er} ou au II^e siècle de notre ère ..." which he then lists – the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* is now cited as evidencing developments in "the 1st or 2nd century of our era".⁴⁹ But the complications did not end here.

Lamotte himself went on to make easily available even more evidence that undermined his own dating of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*. As he worked through his monumental translation of *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse* it became increasingly obvious that – as Demiéville noted already in his review of the second volume – "in matters of *Vinaya*, it [*Le traité*] follows the recension of the *Mūlasarvāstivādins*"; and in his 'new' introduction to the third volume Lamotte himself noted that in regard to both *Vinaya* and *Avadānas* the author of *Le traité* was "inspired" above all else by the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*.⁵⁰ "It would be impossible", Lamotte said, "to draw up here the list of more or less direct borrowings from the *Vinaya* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādins*" – they were far, far, too numerous.⁵¹

In itself, of course, the massive dependence of the author of *Le traité* on the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* was not a problem. The problem arose from the fact that in addition to ascertaining this dependence, Lamotte also went a long way towards showing that – in his words – "the author of the *Traité* certainly lived at the time of the Great Kuṣānas".⁵² How an author who lived at the time of the Great Kuṣānas could depend so heavily on a work that cannot be dated earlier than the 4th/5th centuries was, of course, never explained. Gnoli has noted simply and succinctly: "the datation that Lamotte attributes to the *Vinaya* of the MSV in the *Traité* is apparently different from the one he proposes in HBI."⁵³

Although, then, Lamotte himself never explicitly withdrew the date he purposed in 1958 for the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, his own material clearly forced him on more than one occasion back to the Kuṣān period for a date for the text. The Kuṣān period was, moreover, where almost everyone else had already put it, and the Kuṣān period is where it almost certainly belongs. R. Gnoli – who has already pointed out many of the problems with Lamotte's dating of our monastic code – says: "however, one point seems certain to me: the date of the compilation of the *Vinaya* of the MSV is to be taken back to the times of Kaniska ...";⁵⁴ and there is a great deal of diverse evidence that suggests that such a date cannot be very far off.⁵⁵

Obviously, if the date of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* "is to be taken back to the times of Kaniska" or to the Kuṣān period, then – in light

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of what has already been said above – so too must the polemics in the *Maitreyasimhanāda-sūtra*. They cannot be taken to represent a late mahāyāna position, nor even a middle mahāyāna position, although some elements of their position are certainly found in what might be called middle mahāyāna *sūtras* like the *Saddharmapundarika*, the *Buddhabalādhānaprātihārya*, and even the *Suvarṇabhāsottama*.⁵⁶ That these polemics in fact date to a time when mahāyāna groups were first forming, or rather when mahāyāna literature was first being written, has already been suggested, perhaps, by internal evidence regarding their lack of a clear sense of group identity, for example. That they might date to a period near the beginning of the Common Era, or at least to a time before the Great Kuṣānas has already been suggested on the basis of lexical material that they share with the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*. That such a date is fundamentally sound, however, is further confirmed, it seems, by an even more remarkable series of specific lexical links between our polemic and such diverse sources as a group of early Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions from the Northwest, the poet Aśvaghoṣa, and the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*.

The author of the polemic on relics in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* uses more than one expression that will appear to be familiar, for example, to anyone who has read even a little of the recent work done on early Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions. When, for example, the two monks Dharma and Sudharma are criticized by the gods and “those monks who were beginners” (*dge slong las dang po pa*) for not venerating the relics of the Tathāgata Puṣpavicitra,⁵⁷ the author of our polemic has them respond with the following rhetorical question: “What do you think friends? How does a Tathāgata come to be worshipped, and why do the relics of a Tathāgata, which are without life, receive worship? (*grog po dag 'di ji snyam du sems / ji ltar na de bzhin gshegs pa mchod par 'gyur zhing / rgyu gang gis na de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku gdung sems pa mi mnga' ba rnam kyis mchod pa brnyes par 'gyur snyam /*).⁵⁸ The key expression here – and certainly the one most difficult to translate – is *sems pa mi mnga' ba*, which I have glossed as “without life”. The final element here is perhaps the least difficult. *mnga' ba* is the respectful form for *yod pa*, “to be”, and as an adjective generally means “being owned by”, “belonging to”, “having, owning”, and is frequently the equivalent of *dang ldan pa*, “to be possessed of”; here in the negative “not having”, “without”. *sems pa*, of course, normally means “to think”, but *sems* can mean “living or animated being”, and *sems pa can* – according to Roerich⁵⁹ – means “pregnant” – our *sems pa mi mnga' ba* could be the exact respectful equivalent of the latter.

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Although I have not found an attested Sanskrit equivalent for *sems pa mi mnga' ba*, *sems can* itself is an attested equivalent of *prāṇin*, literally “having or possessed of breath”, or “life”,⁶⁰ and *sems pa mi mnga' ba* could very easily be translated into Sanskrit as a negative form of *prāṇasameta*.

The significance of all this is, of course, that the relics of the Buddha are described in the so-called Shinkot or Bajaur Casket Inscription of the Time of Menander – perhaps the earliest actually dateable reference to such relics – as *prāṇa-samedā = prāṇasameta*, as “endowed with or possessed of breath or life”.⁶¹ Seen in this light the author of our polemic seems to be using either the same expression that was used by the individual who composed the Shinkot or Bajaur inscription, or an expression that was very similar to it, an expression that was already current in the 1st or 2nd century B.C.E. outside of texts. But in using that expression the author of our polemic was also reacting against – in fact denying – its validity. Since he negates the expression he is quietly denying what must have been in his day an old but still current conception of the relics of the Buddha. Or so at least it seems, and there is much less uncertainty about another of his expressions.

The author of our polemic on relics also uses – on two separate occasions – another expression that can be traced even more clearly in Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions. In response to the rhetorical question of the monks Dharma and Sudharma just quoted the author of our polemic has “the monks and gods” – who represent, of course, the point-of-view in need of correction – say: “Because these relics are imbued with good conduct, concentration, wisdom, release, and the knowledge and vision of release, they are therefore worthy of worship” (*sku gdung 'di dag ni tshul khirms dang / ting nge 'dzin dang / shes rab dang / rnam par grol ba dang / rnam par grol ba'i ye shes mthong bas rab tu phye ba yin pas na / de'i phyir 'di dag ni mchod par 'os pa yin no /*).⁶² That this is indeed the point-of-view in need of correction is then confirmed by Dharma's and Sudharma's counter-response: “But, friends, these relics are then surely worthy of worship because good conduct, concentration, wisdom, release, and the knowledge and vision of release are themselves worthy of worship?” (*grog po dag 'o na tshul khirms dang / ting nge 'dzin dang / shes rab dang / rnam par grol ba dang / rnam par grol ba'i ye shes mthong ba dag nyid mchod pa'i 'os yin gyi / sku gdung dag ni mchod par 'os par mi 'gyur ba ma yin nam*). The author of our polemic here seems to treat the assertion that relics are “imbued” with good conduct, etc., very much like he had treated the assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk – he denies

neither but wants to go beyond both. And if in the first instance he was aiming at a current or contemporary conception, it is very likely that he was doing the same thing in the second.

Our polemist also does not deny that relics are imbued with good conduct, etc., when he repeats the assertion a second time – he simply turns it against those he does not approve of:

Although they themselves are defective in good conduct, unfocused, defective in wisdom, not released, and without the knowledge and vision of release still, solely for the sake of making a living, they intend to honor and venerate and worship the relics of the Tathāgata which are pervaded with good conduct, concentration, wisdom, release, and the knowledge and vision of release. (*de dag ni bdag nyid tshul khriṃs 'chal pa dang / brjed ngas pa dang / shes rab 'chal pa dang / nam par ma grol ba dang / nam par grol ba'i ye shes mthong ba ma yin bzhin du 'tsho ba tsam gyi phyir / de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku gdung tshul khriṃs dang / ting nge 'dzin dang / shes rab dang / nam par grol ba dang / nam par grol ba'i ye shes mthong bas yongs su bsgos pa dag la bkur sti bya ba dang / ri mor bya ba dang / mchod par bya bar sems so*).⁶³

Aside from some interesting rhetorical moves, what needs to be noted here is that – as with the assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk and the formula describing the abandonment of monastic activities – it is very unlikely that the author of the polemic on relics in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* invented the language that he is using. In fact, virtually the same exact characterization of the relics of the Buddha occurs in “the Inscription of Senavarma, King of Oḍi” where we find: *ima dhadu śīla(pari)bhavita samasiprañavimutiñānādra(śa)paribhavita*, which Salomon translates as “these relics . . . saturated with virtue, saturated with concentration, wisdom, release, knowledge and sight”.⁶⁴ And something very like it also occurs in another early Kharoṣṭhī inscription: *te dhaduve śīla-paribhāvīda sama(s)i-paribhavemtu prañā-paribhāvīda*, which Fussman renders as “ces reliques . . . parfumentées de moralité, parfumentées de concentration, parfumentées de discernement”.⁶⁵ The parallels – if that is what we should call them – could scarcely be more exact. But the idea that the relics of the Buddha were “imbued” or “saturated” or “parfumentées” with the very qualities that defined the living Buddha, and the use of the term *paribhāvita* to express it, were at one time widespread in the Indian Buddhist world. They also occur, as I have noticed elsewhere, in Aśvaghoṣa’s *Buddhacarita*: relics, Aśvaghoṣa says, are “full of virtue” (*dge legs gang ba*) and “informed (*paribhāvita*) with universal benevolence (*mairī*)” – *byams pas yongs su nam par bsgoms pa*. They also occur in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* where relics are said, for example, to be “saturated with the Perfection of Wisdom” (*prajñāpāramitāparibhāvita*).⁶⁶

We have, then, a group of very different kinds of sources – inscriptions, learned *kāvya*, mahāyāna *sūtra* – in which the same basic idea is expressed using the same key and characteristic verbal expression. Here of course the idea of ‘borrowing’ seems even less appropriate than it did in the cases of the assertion of the twofold occupation and the formula for the abandonment of monastic activities, and there is good evidence in support of quite another explanation: these inscriptions, the learned *kāvya*, and the mahāyāna *sūtra* all express the same basic idea with the same basic vocabulary not because one borrowed from another, but because they all date to the same period, and because both idea and expression were current at the time. Both inscriptions can be dated with some precision to the first half of the 1st century A.D.;⁶⁷ Johnston dates Aśvaghoṣa to “between 50 B.C. and 100 A.D. with a preference for the first half of the 1st century A.D.”;⁶⁸ the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* too is commonly assigned to the same century.⁶⁹ That the author of the polemics in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* shares with all three both basic idea and specific verbal expression would also strongly suggest that he must share the same dates as well, that all four sources are in fact contemporary. The further fact that the inscriptions and Aśvaghoṣa simply assert that relics are “imbued” with good conduct, etc., but both the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* and the polemic in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* want in addition to blunt in some sense the received significance of such an assertion and redirect the focus away from relics may suggest – if anything – that these two mahāyāna sources might be somewhat later. But that they are much later seems very unlikely, and in any case we once again end up at the Kuṣān period.

In addition to the chronological anchor that these parallels may provide, however, they may help as well to place our polemic geographically. The expression *ima dhadu śīla(pari)bhavita samasiprañā(vimuti)vimutiñānādra(śa)paribhavita* which occurs in the inscription of Senavarma and for which there is an almost exact parallel in our polemic is, epigraphically speaking, uniquely and characteristically a North-West Indiān idiom. Neither it, nor the use of *paribhāvita* in regard to relics, occurs anywhere else in Indian inscriptions.⁷⁰ In spite of the fact that several colophons describe Aśvaghoṣa as a *sāketaka*, “a native of Sāketa”,⁷¹ there is a strong and persistent tradition – ferreted out largely by Sylvain Lévi – which associates Aśvaghoṣa with Kanishka and the Kuṣāna empire.⁷² Indeed, in spite of Johnston’s remarks against such an association, Renou, for example, was able to say without comment that Aśvaghoṣa “fut un contemporain et un protégé de roi Kanishka (donc, prob. du II^es) . . .”,⁷³ and at least one of Johnston’s arguments

against the association would now have to be further evaluated. He said, for example: "moreover the internal evidence of the extant works makes it somewhat doubtful whether they could have been written in the Kushan kingdom. For while Brahmanical literature represents that dynasty as hostile to the Brahmans, Aśvaghōṣa writes for a circle in which Brahmanical learning and ideas are supreme . . ."74 But – allowing for the amorphous character of the term 'brahmanical' – virtually the same thing could be said about the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*. It is saturated with references to "brahmanical learning and ideas" and practices, and full of indications of an accommodation to them,⁷⁵ and yet probably no one doubts that it too was compiled in the North-West, and most would place that compilation in the Kuṣāna period. It is, moreover, becoming increasingly clear from art historical, inscriptional, and numismatic sources that the Kuṣāna kingdom was religiously diverse and had a significant 'Hindu' or 'Brahmanical' component.⁷⁶ All of this is to say that even if we still cannot place the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* geographically,⁷⁷ still the preponderance of the 'evidence', the linkages and parallels all point, it seems, towards placing the composition of our polemic in Northwest India at the time of the great Kuṣānas, or a little before. It is as well worth noting that however unsatisfactory our evidence here is it is far, far better than what we usually have for other pieces of mahāyāna *sūtra* literature.

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If the polemic on relics in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* can in fact be better located and more closely dated than is usually the case with other pieces of mahāyāna *sūtra* literature, and if in fact it represents a demonstrably early mahāyāna position in regard to relics, then it is of more than causal interest, in part at least because of the importance still assigned by some to the worship of *stūpas* in "the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism". Something of the position of the author of this polemic has already emerged, no doubt, in the attempt to date it. Still more needs to be made explicit. But some aspects of that position are so strongly drawn and so often repeated that they lend themselves to summarization.

If anything like a lay movement was ever a part of early mahāyāna groups our author gives no evidence of it, and it is probably safe to say that had there been he at least would almost certainly not have approved of it. His text is in every possible sense a monastic text: it is directed at monks; it is concerned with monastic behavior; it repeatedly praises becoming a monk, repeatedly points out that monks gain superior merit; and it was almost certainly written by a monk, a monk who gets so

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carried away with his own enthusiasm that he creates an imagined past period in which everyone – literally everyone – enters the religious life: *od srungs de nas gling chen po bzhi pa'i jig rten gyi khams de na sems can gcig kyang khyim na gnas par ma gyur te*, "at that time, Kāśyapa, in that world of four continents there was not a single person who lived in a house".⁷⁸

But the monastic ideal of our author is also a very narrow and severe one. Although he knows of monasteries, his monasticism is firmly and self-righteously located in the forest. This orientation is particularly pronounced in the 'story of the past' which prefaces and prefigures the more discursive portion of the polemic on relics. Upon entering the religious life the two monks who are the heroes of that 'story of the past' deliver a long series of verses whose point is difficult to miss.

Even those past most excellent Lords of the World on that account did not obtain the most excellent awakening when they had made their residence in a household.

Those past Buddhas, Lords of the World, who experienced *nirvāna* – all of them obtained the most excellent awakening in the forest, in the wilderness.

*'jig rten mgon po bla na med
snga ma 'ga' yang gang gi phyir
khyim gyi gnas na gnas mādā nas
bla med byang chub brnyes pa med ||
sngon gyi sangs rgyas 'jig rten mgon
gang su mya ngan 'das gyur pa
kun gyis dgon par rab dgon du
bla med byang chub brnyes par gyur ||*⁷⁹

To verses like these – distinct echoes of which are found in other examples of what might be called forest oriented mahāyāna *sūtras* like the *Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā*⁸⁰ – can be added others like:

Those who have quickly rejected the house and taken up residence in the forest, they – wise and seeing correctly – train in conformity with the Buddhas.

Those who make efforts for the sake of awakening, they keep themselves in solitude, they rejoice in the forest, they find no joy in the house.⁸¹

Even those – perhaps especially those – who are committed to helping others remain, or should remain, aloof and isolated in the forest:

Those who want to free those persons who are tormented by passions, etc., are terrified by

living in a house and keep themselves entirely to the forest.⁸²

This ideal – which is still being repeated as late as Śāntideva's *Aranyasamvarṇana*⁸³ – is decidedly not a lay ideal. But neither is it the ideal found in mainstream *vinayas* where monks who frequent the forest are almost always objects of ambivalence or amusement, and presented as particularly prone to sexual problems. In fact there are clear instances where monks are explicitly forbidden to go to the forest.⁸⁴ The 'good' monk in the various *vinayas* is, rather, a fully integrated member of a well organized community with a plethora of social and institutional obligations and duties. He is clean, well attired, and respectable. Some sense of the ambivalence directed towards forest dwellers in these monastic codes, and at least a subliminal hint that those who redacted them did not always even want to recognize that such individuals might belong to *their* community, seems to lurk in a story in the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* that was also excerpted in the *Divyāvadāna*. Here Kāśyapa – the same Kāśyapa who is the main interlocutor in our polemic – shows up at the door of Anāthapiṇḍada's house to partake of a meal offered to the community. But because Anāthapiṇḍada's doorman had been told not to admit any non-buddhist religious, and because Kāśyapa's hair and beard were long and his robe in a bad state from living in the forest (*mahākāśyapo 'nyatasmād āraṇyakāc chayanāsanād dīrghakeśaśmaśrulūhacīvaro*), he was summarily turned away – he was not recognized as a Buddhist monk.⁸⁵

In its promotion of this forest-ideal our polemic in the *Maitreyasimhanāda-sūtra* is, however, not unique. It is rather only a specific instance of what appears to have been a concerted effort in a significant number of mahāyāna *sūtras* to revive, revitalize, or reinvent the 'old' forest ideal. What may be unique about our polemic is that it is one of the very few such efforts that might actually be dateable, and if in fact it dates to the Kuṣān period that would place the beginnings of these attempted revitalizations at the beginning of mahāyāna literatures. That such efforts to revive the forest ideal would start at this particular time would, moreover, probably not be fortuitous: this was also almost certainly the period during which Buddhist monasticism – especially in the North – was being fully housed in permanent, well organized, elaborately constructed monasteries, monasteries that would have required permanent staffs, well organized divisions of labor, and elaborate financial infrastructures.⁸⁶ Some monks – like the author of our polemic – may not have liked the changes and may have reacted to

it with a call – real or rhetorical or both – to return to the 'old' ways. Some mahāyāna forest texts in fact even resurrect what are almost certainly the old verbal formulae or slogans of the forest ideal: both the *Rāṣṭrapāla* and the *Samādhirāja*, for example, repeat the exhortation to live alone like the rhinoceros or its horn.⁸⁷

Such calls to return to the forest – a dominant theme in both polemics in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* – must suggest that this call was an important component of at least a part of that convoluted tangle of movements that we still try to contain by the designation 'the early mahāyāna'. But this component must also mark these movements not as progressive, but as remarkably conservative, if not actually reactionary. And although this conservative character of significant strands of 'the early mahāyāna' has often been overlooked, it is everywhere apparent in our polemic.

The dominance of the call to return to the forest in our polemic must not, however, be taken to imply that our author had nothing to say about the place of laymen in his scheme of things. He does speak of both it and them, but what he has to say in this regard is, again, remarkably conservative. He clearly seems to have thought that what laymen do in giving, for example, was infinitely inferior to what bodhisattvas who remain apart and live in forests and the wilderness do, even if that is to only obtain for the length of a finger snap "patience in regard to the fact that all things are not produced".⁸⁸ This is at least the substance of a large part of the story of the past presented in our polemic where the merit of such a forest-dweller is said to be far, far greater than all the merit a king generates through elaborate gifts to the community of food, clothing, and monasteries, etc., even though that king puts aside all other lay duties and does nothing else but make such gifts for eighty four thousand years (*rgyal po mu khyud des ... lo brgyad khri bzhi stong rdzogs kyi bar du las gzhan mi byed par khyim gyi yid la byed pa thams cad spangs te ...*).⁸⁹ This is not of course a ringing recommendation of either lay activity or the religious potential of lay life, nor is the narrative fact, already noted, that all laymen – literally all – end by entering the religious life in this same story. When, in other words, our author imagines an ideal world of long ago it is ultimately a world in which there are only monks.⁹⁰ The story of the past is, however, not the only place in our polemic where reference is made to laymen.

Outside of the story of the past there are at least two other important passages that make reference to laymen, one at the beginning and one at the end of the main body of the tract – the topic in fact quite literally frames the entire debate. These two passages make it particularly clear

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that although the 'dialectical' language of our author sometimes may appear to be both advanced and progressive, his position in regard to laymen and in regard to relics and their worship, most certainly is not. And here we come very near to the heart of the matter.

We might begin at the end, with the second of these two passages, a part of which we have already seen. The passage starts by saying: "at a future time some monks who are adherents of the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas and adherents of the Vehicle of the Disciples will appear who do not develop the body, do not develop thought, etc." – the text, then, starts with 'bad' monks, so bad – as we will see – that they are not even as good as laymen. Then:

Kāśyapa, although I have empowered (*byin gyis rlob par mdzad de, adhiṣṭhita*) relics for the purpose of rendering devout the minds of sons and daughters of good family who are neophytes (*rigs kyi bu dang rigs kyi bu mo las dang po pa dag gi sems mngon par dang par bya ba'i phyir*), and although those who would worship them will experience the good fortune of gods and men, and although that might be an intermediate cause for their *nirvāna*,⁹¹ still there are dullards who, when they have entered into the religious life in this Order, abandon and reject the (true) occupation of a religious which I have declared, and, for the sake of sustaining themselves, for the sake of cultivating the houses of friends and houses that give alms, for the sake of acquiring robes and bowls ... provide honor to the relics and *stūpas* of the Tathāgata.

... These dullards reject such occupations of a religious and search out other occupations. They do not even train in the training which I have taught for white-robed householders, even though white-robed householders obtain the fruit of never returning by training for only a short time in the trainings as they were delivered by the Tathāgata (*de dag ni ngas khyim na gnas pa gos dkar po can rnam s kyi bslab par gsungs pa gang yin pa de tsam la 'ang slob par mi byed do l khyim na gnas pa gos dkar po can rnam s kyang re zhig de bzhin gshegs pas bslab pa ji ltar bcas pa rnam la slob par byed pa na l phyir mi 'ong ba'i 'bras bu 'thob par gyur na*). When, after they have already entered the religious life in this Order, these dullards do not develop even so much as this which conforms to release how could they obtain it? – that cannot be (*mi blun po de dag ni bstan pa 'di la rab tu byung nas mam par grol ba dang l rjes su mthun pa tsam yang sgom par mi byed na l 'thob par lta ga la 'gyur te l de ni gnas med do l*).⁹²

The view of lay practice and lay religious potential that is implied here is, of course, not unique to our polemic. In fact something very like it is not infrequently found in a wide range of sources that have no discernable connection with anything specifically mahāyāna, and therein, perhaps, lies its interest: the author of our polemic here again seems to be taking a position which is probably more often taken to represent that of the conservative mainstream monk. He seems to think, for example, that relics are for neophytes. He, like a number of conservative monks after him, seems to have considered laymen largely incapable of anything other than devotion and external pious acts. Although he seems to allow that what they do might have some

connection with an ultimate religious achievement, he also seems to think that the most that might be expected from such activities is the achievement of worldly – divine or human – success. But his views of laymen are even more apparent in what he says about religious who do what laymen do: they are stupid; they have given up real religious practice; and they are only interested in material gain. These appear to be strong views and so out of keeping with what might have been expected from an early mahāyāna text that there might well be a suspicion that such an interpretation can only be the result of misreading the text. Any such suspicion, however, will be hard to maintain in the face of the second passage in our polemic which makes explicit reference to laymen, a passage which – not incidentally – may well also reveal one of the primary sources of our author's view.

It is fairly certain – as we will see – that later authors who developed or maintained views similar to those we seem to see in our polemic drew directly or support, or inspiration, on a particular reading of certain passages from various versions of the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*. Our author may, indeed, have done the same, and may have been one of the earliest to have done so. At least so it seems from our second passage where the Buddha is made to say:

Kāśyapa, in the last time, in the last period, in the final five hundred years, those bodhisattvas who have been taken hold of by bad friends and are destitute of determination will make efforts in acts of worship by presenting flowers, incense, aromatic powders, perfume, garlands, unguents, umbrellas, banners, flags, chimes and lamps to the relics of the Tathāgata. Although, Kāśyapa, worship was taught by me (only) so that those deprived of wisdom could accumulate roots of good, still these dullards make efforts in it ('*od srungs ngas ni shes pa dang mi ldan pa rnam s kyi [rd: kyis]⁹³ dge ba'i rtsa ba yang dag par bsgrub pa'i phyir mchod pa bshad pa yin na l mi blun po de dag ni de la brtson par 'gyur te l*)⁹⁴

Then follows immediately a passage already quoted, but worth repeating for what it tells us about our author's sources:

I, Kāśyapa, in the presence of the world with its gods, have said: "You, monks, must continue with efforts that are applied to disciplining yourselves and calming. Since there are brahmins and householders who are devout, they will perform the worship of relics for my relics!" But in spite of this, look, Kāśyapa, how these dullards, when they have even given up *yoga*, even given up religious exertion ... will make efforts in acts of worship of relics and, supporting themselves on those, intend only to make a living!⁹⁵

Although in part the terminology differs here, this passage is little more than a rephrasing of the passage cited just before it. Here again the objects of our author's criticism are monks who do what laymen do. Although he does not explicitly say so here, the "bodhisattvas" our author has in mind, "those bodhisattvas who have been taken hold

of by bad friends and are destitute of determination”, were obviously monks: they are both criticized for doing what laymen are supposed to do and described as being derelict in the duties of a monk, neither of which would be grounds for criticism if they were laymen. Such monks or religious are also once again described as “stupid”, and this happens twice here, and once again the activities of laymen are presented as inferior: they are for those who lack wisdom and are intended only for the accumulation of the roots of merit. Once again too laymen appear as largely incapable of anything other than pious external acts – at least that is all that is assigned to them here. But here the author of our polemic also actually cites what must have been a primary and important source for his views.

Although the quotation that our author has the Buddha cite does not correspond exactly to any extant version of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, it almost certainly comes from one, it almost certainly constitutes a version or paraphrase of what the Buddha was supposed to have said to Ānanda when Ānanda had asked him how one should proceed in regard to the Buddha’s *body* after his death. There are in fact several versions of this ‘saying’ extant in Indian languages. The Sanskrit text reconstructed by Waldschmidt⁹⁶ has:

alpotsukas tvam ānanda bhava sartrapūjāyāḥ / prasannā brāhmanagṛhapataya etad āpādayiṣyanti – “You, Ānanda, must have few concerns in regard to the honors for the body! Devout brahmins and householders will take care of that.”

The version quoted in the *Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa*⁹⁷ says:

alpotsukair yusmābhir bhavitavyam. upāsakāḥ sartram yathā jñāsyanti tathā kariṣyanti – “vous devez avoir peu de désirs; quant aux laïcs, ils traiteront mon corps comme ils (sauront)”; or perhaps a bit more accurately: “you all must have few concerns. As lay brothers understand so will they do in regard to the body.”

And the Pāli version in the *Dīgha-nikāya*:⁹⁸

avyāvaṭā tumhe ānanda hoṭha tathāgatassa sarīra-pūjāya, iṅgha tumhe ānanda sadatthe ghatatha. sadattham anuyunṇatha, sadatthe appamattā ātāpino pahitattā viharatha. sant’ ānanda khattiya-paṇḍitā pi brāhmaṇa-paṇḍitā pi gahapati-paṇḍitā pi tathāgate abhippasannā, te tathāgatassa sarīra-pūjāṃ karissanti-

You all, Ānanda, must not worry in regard to the honors for the body of the Tathāgata! Look here, Ānanda, you all must be engaged in the highest goal, you must attend to the highest goal, you must continue heedful, ardent, and intent on the highest goal! There are, Ānanda, wise kṣatriyas, wise brahmins and wise householders who are devout in regard to the Tathāgata; they will perform the honors for the body of the Tathāgata.

When seen in the light of these various versions it is hard to see how the text cited in our polemic could be anything other than yet another version of this ‘same’ exhortation:

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dge slong dag khyed cag ni bdag nyid dul ba dang zhi bar sbyor ba’i rjes su brston pas gnas par gyis shig / bram ze dang khyim bdag dad pa dang idan pa dag yod na de dag ni nga’i sku gdung mams la sku gdung gi mchod pa byed par ‘gyur ro /

The text in our polemic does not – as already noted – correspond exactly to any of the other versions, but none of the other versions corresponds to one another either. This clearly was a contested saying, the most elaborate and ideologically saturated version being found in Pāli. But the version cited by the author of our polemic does differ in at least one important regard: in the two Sanskrit versions and in the Pāli version the activity under discussion quite clearly has to do with the *body* of the Buddha, not his relics, and this almost certainly was the original topic of discussion.⁹⁹ Something has clearly happened between these versions and the version of the exhortation in our polemic, and in this instance we may actually be able to say what that was because the same thing may very well have happened independently – and later – elsewhere.

It is virtually certain that the Sanskrit underlying the Tibetan phrase *sku gdung mams la sku gdung gi mchod pa* that occurs in our polemic was *sarīre sarīra-pūjā*, a phrase which occurs dozens of times in the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, and related texts like the *Avadānaśataka*, in purely funereal contexts where it can only mean: “honors for the body on the body” – the same phrase, in the same meaning, occurs twice in Waldschmidt’s *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. But in spite of this the Tibetan translators of the *Maitreyasimhanāda* rendered the phrase into Tibetan here as *sku gdung mams la sku gdung gi mchod pa*,¹⁰⁰ which just as certainly can only mean “worship for the relics on the relics”, and, although this is almost certainly not a literal translation, it is very likely that it correctly reflects our author’s intention and that the translators knew this.

Elsewhere, of course, and here too, the shift of meaning from “body” to “relics” is effected or signaled by a shift in grammatical number. In Sanskrit *sarīra* in the singular means “body”, but in the plural “relics”.¹⁰¹ It is, however, not necessary to assume that the author of our polemic actually wrote *sarīresu* in his original – such a major change in a set phrase is very unlikely. It is far more likely either that he himself was trying to force a change, or was reflecting a change that was already occurring, in the interpretation of the phrase and the significance attributed to the exhortation; in short, that he was making much the same exegetical move that the compilers of the late books of the *Milindapañha* would come to make. There too *sarīra-pūjā* at least is being presented as now referring to the relics of the Buddha, not his

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body, and the exhortation is there being interpreted in such a way that it appears to support the assertion that worshipping relics, indeed worship in general, "is not the occupation of the sons of the Jina" (*akammam h'etam mahārāja jinaputtānam yad idam pūjā*). Worship, the compilers of the *Milindapañha* will also determine, is for the schleps, both human and divine (*avasesānam devamanussānam pūjā karaṇiyā*).¹⁰²

It is of course just conceivable that all these suggestions might not win universal assent and that some might require modification. But however the details might eventually be determined, some things here seem to be secure and settled. It seems fairly certain, for example, that once again the author of this early mahāyāna polemic was drawing heavily on important mainstream sources – and we may in fact be able to detect even further influences of his specific source. It seems fairly certain too that our author's views on laymen – on their practices and religious potential – were hardly radical. They seem to have come straight out of a very narrow and conservative reading of a primary mainstream source. This is not what one might expect to find at the beginning of what was supposed to be a major revolution which was supposed to have radically redefined religious roles. It is, however, what is actually found in what appears to be a demonstrably early 'mahāyāna' tract.

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What remains here – and that seems only fitting – are the relics. And since we have in passing already seen much of what our author had to say about both relics and the worship of relics we can, perhaps, be uncharacteristically brief and simply summarize.

On one level our author seems to have been ambivalent in regard to relics. He denies that they had life or were alive – if that is what *sems pa mi mnga' ba* means – and yet has the Buddha himself say that he "empowered" them. *Adhiṣṭhātī* is, of course, in all its forms notoriously difficult to translate, but in contexts like ours it must come very close to "enliven, invigorate, or make endure"; or "to sustain", "make continue"; or something very like that.¹⁰³

At first glance our author seems to accept the assertion that the relics of the Buddha are "imbued with good conduct, concentration, wisdom, etc.", which seems to have been widely accepted in his day. But, first of all, he has the gods and neophyte monks introduce the idea and thereby immediately distances himself from it – these two groups never speak for him. Then he subjects the assertion to two tight exegetical twists. His gods and neophyte monks make the assertion to justify the worship of

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those relics: those relics are worshipped *because* they are imbued with good conduct and concentration. But our author's heroes, the Monks Dharma and Sudharma, then draw an all but unavoidable conclusion: if that is so, if those relics are worshipped because they are imbued with these qualities, then it is really the qualities themselves that are worthy of worship.¹⁰⁴ This is the first exegetical twist. The second comes a little later and is equally obvious: "... and those qualities through the possession of which the relics of the Tathāgata have received worship – those qualities themselves must be perfected. Just so would the Tathāgata be worshipped" (... *de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku gdung yon tan gang dag dang ldan pas mchod pa brnyes par gyur ba'i yon tan de dag bdag nyid kyis bsgrub par bya ste l de ltar na de bzhin gshegs pa mchod par 'gyur ro*).¹⁰⁵ The handling here is nothing if not skilled.

Our author, however, does not completely reject conventional worship. It was taught by the Buddha. It can produce or result in the experience of both divine and human good fortune, the accumulation of roots of merit, even the state of 'never returning'. But it is also only for those who lack wisdom, for devout brahmins and householders, certainly not – according to our author – for monks or religious, at least 'good' monks or religious, monks or religious who have not given up their 'proper' occupation. Our author, however, perhaps inadvertently, himself indicates that there were other views on the matter, views which he felt compelled to respond to. Our author apparently knew – or at least anticipated – that monks who did not engage in the *stūpa* cult would be subject to criticism and accused of impiety. The whole purpose of his polemic is in some ways to deflect such criticism and deflate such charges. He says as much by how he introduces the discussion. The Monks Dharma and Sudharma who deliver the bulk of the argument do not do so as a gratuitous service to their fellows, but in direct response to a specific criticism of their own behavior that is made in part by other monks. Dharma and Sudharma – names certainly not casually chosen – say what they say in direct response to what was said about them:

Kāśyapa, the two Monks Dharma and Sudharma had few occupations then and, persisting in efforts connected with their own good, they did not even worship the relics of that Blessed One, did not venerate them, and did not even go to that Tathāgata's *stūpa*. Because of that, Kāśyapa, those many hundreds of thousands of gods and those monks who were neophytes were critical of the Monks Dharma and Sudharma saying "these two do not even worship the relics of the Tathāgata! They do not even circumambulate the *stūpa* of the Tathāgata! They consequently are impious and undevout." (*'od srungs de na dge slong chos dang chos bzang gnyis bya ba nyung ba dang l bdag gi don la sbyor ba'i rjes su brston par gnas shing l bcom ldan 'das de'i sku gdung rams la 'ang mchod pa mi byed l ri mor mi byed la l*

body, and the exhortation is there being interpreted in such a way that it appears to support the assertion that worshipping relics, indeed worship in general, "is not the occupation of the sons of the Jina" (*akammaṃ h'etam mahārāja-jinaputtānaṃ yad idam pūjā*). Worship, the compilers of the *Milindapañha* will also determine, is for the schleps, both human and divine (*avasesānaṃ devamanussānaṃ pūjā karanīyā*).¹⁰²

It is of course just conceivable that all these suggestions might not win universal assent and that some might require modification. But however the details might eventually be determined, some things here seem to be secure and settled. It seems fairly certain, for example, that once again the author of this early mahāyāna polemic was drawing heavily on important mainstream sources – and we may in fact be able to detect even further influences of his specific source. It seems fairly certain too that our author's views on laymen – on their practices and religious potential – were hardly radical. They seem to have come straight out of a very narrow and conservative reading of a primary mainstream source. This is not what one might expect to find at the beginning of what was supposed to be a major revolution which was supposed to have radically redefined religious roles. It is, however, what is actually found in what appears to be a demonstrably early 'mahāyāna' tract.

* * *

What remains here – and that seems only fitting – are the relics. And since we have in passing already seen much of what our author had to say about both relics and the worship of relics we can, perhaps, be uncharacteristically brief and simply summarize.

On one level our author seems to have been ambivalent in regard to relics. He denies that they had life or were alive – if that is what *sems pa mi mnga' ba* means – and yet has the Buddha himself say that he "empowered" them. *Adhiṣṭhāti* is, of course, in all its forms notoriously difficult to translate, but in contexts like ours it must come very close to "enliven, invigorate, or make endure"; or "to sustain", "make continue"; or something very like that.¹⁰³

At first glance our author seems to accept the assertion that the relics of the Buddha are "imbued with good conduct, concentration, wisdom, etc.", which seems to have been widely accepted in his day. But, first of all, he has the gods and neophyte monks introduce the idea and thereby immediately distances himself from it – these two groups never speak for him. Then he subjects the assertion to two tight exegetical twists. His gods and neophyte monks make the assertion to justify the worship of

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those relics: those relics are worshipped *because* they are imbued with good conduct and concentration. But our author's heroes, the Monks Dharma and Sudharma, then draw an all but unavoidable conclusion: if that is so, if those relics are worshipped because they are imbued with these qualities, then it is really the qualities themselves that are worthy of worship.¹⁰⁴ This is the first exegetical twist. The second comes a little later and is equally obvious: "... and those qualities through the possession of which the relics of the Tathāgata have received worship – those qualities themselves must be perfected. Just so would the Tathāgata be worshipped" (... *de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku gdung yon tan gang dag dang ldan pas mchod pa brnyes par gyur ba'i yon tan de dag bdag nyid kyis bsgrub par bya ste / de ltar na de bzhin gshegs pa mchod par 'gyur ro*).¹⁰⁵ The handling here is nothing if not skilled.

Our author, however, does not completely reject conventional worship. It was taught by the Buddha. It can produce or result in the experience of both divine and human good fortune, the accumulation of roots of merit, even the state of 'never returning'. But it is also only for those who lack wisdom, for devout brahmins and householders, certainly not – according to our author – for monks or religious, at least 'good' monks or religious, monks or religious who have not given up their 'proper' occupation. Our author, however, perhaps inadvertently, himself indicates that there were other views on the matter, views which he felt compelled to respond to. Our author apparently knew – or at least anticipated – that monks who did not engage in the *stūpa* cult would be subject to criticism and accused of impiety. The whole purpose of his polemic is in some ways to deflect such criticism and deflate such charges. He says as much by how he introduces the discussion. The Monks Dharma and Sudharma who deliver the bulk of the argument do not do so as a gratuitous service to their fellows, but in direct response to a specific criticism of their own behavior that is made in part by other monks. Dharma and Sudharma – names certainly not casually chosen – say what they say in direct response to what was said about them:

Kāśyapa, the two Monks Dharma and Sudharma had few occupations then and, persisting in efforts connected with their own good, they did not even worship the relics of that Blessed One, did not venerate them, and did not even go to that Tathāgata's *stūpa*. Because of that, Kāśyapa, those many hundreds of thousands of gods and those monks who were neophytes were critical of the Monks Dharma and Sudharma saying "these two do not even worship the relics of the Tathāgata! They do not even circumambulate the *stūpa* of the Tathāgata! They consequently are impious and undevout." (*'od srungs de na dge slong chos dang chos bzang gnyis bya ba nyung ba dang / bdag gi don la sbyor ba'i rjes su brston par gnas shing / bcom ldan 'das de'i sku gdung mams la 'ang mchod pa mi byed / ri mor mi byed la /*

de bzhin gshegs pa de'i mchod rten gyi drung du 'ang mi 'gro 'o l 'od srungs de nas lha 'bum phrag rab tu mang po dang dge slong las dang po pa gang dag yin pa de dag dge slong chos dang chos bzang gnyis la l 'di gnyis ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku gdung rnam la mchod pa 'ang mi byed l de bzhin gshegs pa'i mchod rten bskor ba 'ang mi byed pa las na l ma dad pa dang ma gus pa yin no zhes kha zer bar gyur to l)¹⁰⁶

As might have been expected, and as this passage makes clear, our author is not just developing a polemic against what some monks do. He is also – and perhaps more importantly – defending other monks who are open to criticism for what they do not do. The expectation in his day seems to have been that monks do and should venerate relics and *stūpas*, that if they don't they will be subject to social, even divine, criticism. The latter at least seems to have been our author's expectation, and the former was certainly the expectation of all continental mainstream *Vinayas* – even the Pāli *Vinaya*, it now seems sure, has rules governing monastic behavior connected with *stūpas*.¹⁰⁷ When our author presents arguments to justify monks *not* engaging in the relic cult he is then – or so it seems – defending an innovation that he approves of and wants to further: this is the position in need of justification. So if there is something 'new' in this early mahāyāna polemic it is, in other words, that monks – our author also calls them *bodhisattvas* – should not engage in such cult activity. Here, it seems, is the opposite of what might have been expected.

In the course of his argument our author also gives at least three different reasons why monks should not engage in the relic cult. The first can be expressed in two slightly different ways; he suspects the motives of monks who engage in the relic cult; or *he* thinks monks who engage in the relic cult do so only to make a living or for material gain. He says, for example as we have seen, that some monks – he calls them "stupid" – engage in the relic cult "for the sake of sustaining themselves, for the sake of cultivating the houses of friends and houses that give alms, for the sake of acquiring bowls and robes . . . acquisitions and honors . . . renown, reputation and fame." But such monks must have been really stupid if this in fact were not possible, if in fact a monk could not gain material support and reputation from engaging in the relic cult. If it was not already an established practice for "houses that give alms" to give their alms to monks who worship *stūpas*, then why would a monk who wanted alms engage in such practices? In other words, for our author's claim or 'prediction' to be credible, his audience must already have been familiar with – or at least able to imagine – a situation in which material support, honors, renown, and reputation went to monks who did indeed participate in the worship

of relics and *stūpas*, a situation in which monastic status was at least in part determined by such activity. If this was not the situation our author faced and was trying to reform then he was flaying at the wind.

The author of our polemic also insists that monks who engage in the relic cult are not engaging in the proper occupations of a monk. He insists, at least initially, that the proper occupations of a monk are meditation and recitation. But in doing so he is – as we have seen – doing nothing more than insisting that what is repeatedly stated in a mainstream monastic code, should be adhered to. This would be a curious kind of innovation, and is rather characteristic of deeply conservative movements. In fact the author of our polemic seems to be insisting on a far stricter and far more narrow interpretation of the assertion of the twofold occupation of a monk than the redactors of the code that repeats it held. Those redactors, in addition to repeating the assertion, framed rules requiring, for example, that monks attend rituals connected with the establishment of *stūpas* and presentations to them, and that attendance was compulsory; rules that required monks to venerate *stūpas* at the conclusion of monastic funerals, to anoint and sprinkle *stūpas* with scents, use perfumes to daub palm prints on *stūpas*, sweep, clean, and help build them, put pavements down around the *stūpas* so that when they venerate them they will not get their feet muddy; rules that require monks to use property belonging to the Buddha to maintain *stūpas* and forbidding monks to transfer donations made to a *stūpa* to some other purpose; rules requiring that permanent endowments be accepted and lent out on interest to, again, maintain *stūpas* and pay for the costs involved in their worship; rules allowing monks to step on the shadow cast by the pole of a *stūpa* if they first recite a verse of scripture, and not allowing monks who have eaten garlic or are wearing robes made from cemetery-cloth to approach the *stūpa*.¹⁰⁸

Although already long, this list however only represents a sample of such rules, rules that make it clear that for the redactors of this *Vinaya* the *stūpa* was an integral and pervasive part of what they thought the life of a monk should be. They, in other words and unlike our author, could not have understood their own assertion literally; they could not have seen in that same assertion any suggestion that *stūpa* worship was not a part of what a monk should do. Such an interpretation was, if anything was, an innovation of our author, so that once again where we might expect to find in an early 'mahāyāna' source a broadening and inclusive approach, what we actually find is a narrow literalist one. We find an odd situation in which a 'mahāyāna' author insists on a

far more conservative reading of a monastic trope than a mainstream *Vinaya* did.

The third and final reason that our author gives for insisting that monks should not participate in the relic cult can perhaps be easily, if crudely, paraphrased: the real worship of the Buddha is not accomplished through external pious acts but by internal religious achievement. He says as much – as we have seen – when he says: “. . . and those qualities through the possession of which the relics of the Tathāgata have received worship – those qualities themselves must be perfected. Just so would the Tathāgata be [truly] worshipped”.¹⁰⁹ But once again neither the language nor the notion that appear here are unique to our author or particularly mahāyāna. Since what I have translated as “perfected” here is in Tibetan *bsgrub par bya ba*, and since forms of *sgrub pa* are widely attested equivalents of *pratipatti*, *pratipad*, etc., our author, it seems, is simply insisting on the superiority of *pratipatti*, “practice”, over *pūjā*, “worship”, a position he would then share with a wide variety of mainstream sources.

This same position, for example, is already (?) articulated in the Pāli *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* in a very odd passage where it seems the world of nature itself is criticized for showing its devotion to the dying Buddha. When the Buddha is lying between the twin *sāla* trees they burst into flower out of season and these flowers drop “out of reverence” for the Tathāgata (*tathāgatassa pūjāya*) on the body (*sarīra*) of the Buddha; then heavenly flowers and sandalwood powder fall from the sky, and heavenly music and song resound from the sky, all, again, *tathāgatassa pūjāya*. But the Buddha’s reaction to this remarkable display is equally remarkable. He says:

*na kho ānanda ettāvātā tathāgato sakkato vā hoti garukato vā mānito vā pūjito vā apacito vā. yo kho ānanda bhikkhu vā bhikkhunī vā upāsako vā upāsikā vā dhammānudhamma-ṭṭipanno viharati samīci-ṭṭipanno anudhamma-cārī, so tathāgatam sakkaroti garukaroti mānenti pūjeti paramāya pūjāya.*¹¹⁰

Not indeed, Ānanda, by even this much is the Tathāgata honored or revered or respected or worshipped or venerated. But, Ānanda, the monk or nun or lay brother or lay sister who continues practicing in accordance with the Dharma, practicing rightly, proceeding in the proper way, he honors, reveres, respects, worships, the Tathāgata with the most excellent worship.

The Sanskrit text of the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* reconstructed by Waldschmidt seems not to have anything corresponding to this curious account, but other Sanskrit versions must have had something like it.¹¹¹ Speyer already long ago pointed out that an otherwise lost “Northern” version of “the words spoken by the Lord at the time of his Complete Extinction” was quoted in one of the fascinating “epilogues” added to

the chapters of Āryaśūra’s *Jātakamālā*, epilogues added, he thinks, by monks to help other monks prepare for preaching.¹¹² The ‘quotation’ found at the end of Āryaśūra’s chapter XXX comes in the following form:

*Yaccoktam bhagavatā parinirvānasamaye samupasthiteṣu divyakusumavādirādiṣu na khalu punar ānandaitāvātā tathāgataḥ satkṛto bhavātīti / tac caivam nidarśayitavyam / evam abhiprāyasampādanāt pūjā kṛtā bhavati na gandhamālyādyabhihāreṇeti //*¹¹³

And what was said by the Blessed One at the time of his final nirvāna when heavenly flowers and music, etc., had appeared: ‘not, indeed, Ānanda, by even this much is the Tathāgata honored’ – just that should be expounded (with the words of this story:) ‘from fulfilling ones intentions thus worship and honor are done, not by bringing flowers, garlands, etc.

The appropriateness of these instructions are clear from a glance at the *Jātaka* they are attached to. Āryaśūra’s *Hastijātaka* is in fact little more than a zoomorphic allegorization of the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* passage. In it a magnificent elephant meets a band of starving exiles. He realizes they will perish if he does not sacrifice his body for them. He tells them to go to a certain place where they will find the body of an elephant, and he tells them to “use its flesh as provisions and its entrails as water bags to collect water”. Then the elephant rushes ahead of them to the place, and throws himself from a mountain there. When the exiles find the body and recognize it some of them are so moved that they say “we ought rather to pay our debt to him by cremating his body with full honors” – the absurdity of this reaction is left devastatingly unstated. Śūra simply has others of the group say, in Khoroché’s translation, “by doing this we would certainly not be greatly honoring this excellent elephant, nor would we be treating him fitly. In our view we should honor him by carrying out his wishes” (*na khalv evam asmābhir iyam dviradavaraḥ sampūjitah satkṛto vā syāt / abhiprāyasampādanena tv ayam asmābhir yuktaḥ pūjayitum iti paśyāmah*).¹¹⁴ The elephant, of course, was the Buddha himself in a former existence, so his remarks in the *Mahāparinirvāna* passage had a long pedigree. They also continued to be cited in mainstream sources.

Yet another Sanskrit version of the same remarks is cited, for example, in the *Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa* in the following form:

mahāparinirvānāsūtre uktam. āgātā ānanda devā divyāni ca candanacūrnāni gṛhya divyāni ca māndāravāṇi puṣpāni divyāni . . . [na] . . . nanda evam tathāgataḥ satkṛto bhavati gurukṛto mānito vā pūjito vā. yaḥ punaḥ kaścid ānanda mama śāsane ‘pramatto viharati . . . ā . . . kurute dharmam dhārayati. tenāham satkṛto gurukṛto mānitaḥ pūjito bhavāmi.

Which in spite of the lacunae Lévi was able to translate as:

Il est dit dans le MahāParinirvāṣasūtra: Les dieux sont arrivés, ô Ānanda, prenant des poudres de santal célestes et des fleurs célestes de māṇḍarava ... [a negative must be inserted here] ... O Ānanda, c'est ainsi que le Tathāgata est honoré, respecté, vénéré, adoré. Celui que se comporte sans négligence, ô Ānanda, dans ma doctrine, qui fait ..., qui maintient la Loi, c'est celui-là qui, m'honore, me respecte, me vénère, m'adore.¹¹⁵

Once again it seems then that the position taken by the author of our early 'mahāyāna' polemic is the same position that is firmly embedded in a primary mainstream source that had a long life and broad circulation. This is not to say that something like what we see in the *Mahāparinirvāṣa-sūtra* and in the polemic now found in the *Maitreyasimhanāda* does not occur in other mahāyāna sources. It does, but it occurs only in a narrow band of the enormous spectrum of extant mahāyāna *sūtras*. It occurs, for example, in texts like the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* and the *Samādhirāja-sūtra* – neither of which appears to be particularly early – but already in an advanced or at least elaborated form. Both texts, for example, insist on the primacy of *pratipatti* over *pūjā*, but both also do so in part by developing the concept of *dharmapūjā* "the worship of Dharma". The *Vimalakīrti* declares "le culte de la loi (*dharmapūjā*) est le meilleur parmi tous les cultes", *chos kyi mchod pa ni mchod pa thams cad kyi nang na mchog go*,¹¹⁶ the *Samādhirāja* says *pratipatti dharmesv iha dharmapūjā*, "practice in the Dharmas – here is the worship of the Dharma".¹¹⁷ There is, however, no trace in our polemic of this sort of development, and only the slightest trace of the ideas that would quickly converge elsewhere to create the cult of the book. Our polemic is not yet pushing for an alternative cult form, and this, again, is probably just another indication of its early age and a certain indication that it is still very firmly in a mainstream group.

* * *

This essay could perhaps have been entitled – in conscious contradistinction to Professor Hirakawa's old paper – "The Rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Its Relationship to the Rejection of the Worship of *Stūpas*". But, apart perhaps from being moderately clever, where would that get us. Surely we are now beyond talking about 'the mahāyāna' as if it were a single monolithic thing, beyond using that very designation as anything other than a heuristic device – that at least is how I have tried to use the term here. But that must also mean, and that is starting to come clear, that we are also well beyond – or should be – looking for single causes for the emergence or 'rise' of what is clearly not a single thing. The best reason for not using such a title

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may, however, be that if there is any 'relationship' of the polemic found in the *Maitreyasimhanāda-sūtra* to the "rise of mahāyāna Buddhism" that relationship remains a mystery. This early 'mahāyāna' polemic does not seem to be connected to the 'rise' of anything, but rather to the continuity and persistence of a narrow set of conservative Buddhist ideas on cult and monastic practice. That is all.¹¹⁸

NOTES

¹ An exception to this might be Ats'a's *Mahāsūtrasamuccaya* (Derge, No. 3961) which quotes extensively from the *Maitreyamahāsimhanāda-sūtra* as is clear from the unpublished paper by Mochizuki Kaie, "Ats'ha no 'Daikyōshū' ni in'yo sareru kyōron" presented at the 46th Annual Meeting of the Nihon Indogaku Bukkyō Gakkai, 11 June 1995, at Hanazono University, Kyoto (I owe my knowledge of this paper to the kindness of J. Silk). The problem, of course, is knowing what, if any, influence this late anthology had in India.

² P. Demiéville, "Butsuzō", *Hōbōgin*, Troisième fascicule (Paris: 1974) 210–215, esp. 213.

³ P. Demiéville, "L'iconoclasme anti-bouddhique en chine", *Mélanges d'histoire des religions offerts à Henri-Charles Puech* (Paris: 1974) 17–25; esp. 21.

⁴ E. Zürcher, "Buddhist Art in Medieval China: The Ecclesiastical View", in *Function and Meaning in Buddhist Art. Proceedings of a Seminar held at Leiden University 21–24 October 1991*, ed. K. R. van Kooij and H. van der Veere (Groningen: 1995) 1–20; esp. 8–9 and n. 57; 11.

⁵ J. A. Silk, *The Origins and Early History of the Mahāratnakūṭa Tradition of Mahāyāna Buddhism with a Study of the Ratnarāsisūtra and Related Materials*, PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1994; 78–79; 94–95; 154–55; 198–99; 213–14; etc.

⁶ P. Demiéville, H. Durt, and A. Seidel, *Répertoire du canon bouddhique sino-japonais. Fascicule annexe du Hōbōgin* (Paris/Tōkyō: 1978) no. 310.23 and 249, s.v. Gatsubashuna; see also P. C. Bagchi, *Le canon bouddhique en chine. Les traducteurs et les traductions*. T. I. (Paris: 1927) 265–67; 431; Zürcher, "Buddhist Art in Medieval China", 16 n. 57 gives the title as "The Assembly of Mahākāśyapa". The fact that one title refers to Maitreya and the other to Mahākāśyapa may be connected to the structure and therefore, perhaps, to the history of the text as we have it: in the first half of the text as we have it, at least in the Tibetan translation, the main character is the Bodhisattva Maitreya, while in the second half it is Mahākāśyapa, and the exact relationship between the two halves is not yet clear.

⁷ For the Tibetan text I was able to use that found at Tog, *dkon rtsegs* Ca 148b.7–218b.5; Derge, *dkon rtsegs* Ca 68a.1–114b.7; and – thanks to P. Harrison – fragments of at least two copies of the text from Tabo. Unfortunately, the catalog for the Tabo material is not yet in final form nor the identification of all the fragments firm. Suffice it to say here that Running Number (= RN) 260 contains at least 13 folios of the *Maitreyamahāsimhanāda*; RN 261 contains 5; and RN 263, contrary to expectations, none – the folio in 263 marked as the *Maitreyamahāsimhanāda* (Ga-Ma 47) actually contains the *Adhyāśayasamcodana*. Since the amount of text on a Tabo folio is almost twice the amount on a Tog folio this means that almost half the text has been identified in the Tabo fragments. Since too in at least three places the same text is found on two fragments it is certain that there were at least two copies of the text at Tabo = (On the Tabo fragments see at least: E. Steinkellner, "A Report on the 'Kanjur' of Ta pho", *East and West* 44.1 (1994) 115–36; E. De Rossi-Filibeck, "A

Study of a Fragmentary Manuscript of the *Pañcaviṃśatikā* in the Ta pho Library", *ibid.*, 137–55 and figs 10–17; J. L. Panglung, "New Fragments of the *sGra-sbyor bam-po gn̄is pa*", *ibid.*, 161–72; H. Tauscher, "Tanjur Fragments from the Manuscript Collection at Ta pho Monastery. *Sambandhaparikṣa* with its Commentaries *Vṛtti* and *Tikā*", *ibid.*, 173–84; also D. E. Klimburg-Salter, *Tabo. A Lamp for the Kingdom. Early Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Art in the Western Himalaya* (New York: 1998), the bibliography of which lists a number of forthcoming works). The textual tradition preserved in the Tabo fragments does not appear to be uniform. In some cases it may represent an early and important 'variant' tradition; in others not. Unfortunately, the latter is true for the *Maitreyasimhanāda*. Apart from orthographic differences, the Tabo fragments contain few, if any, significant variants, and a significant number of 'scribal errors'. – Although the Tibetan title of the text is the same in Tog, Derge, and Tabo, each gives a slightly different Sanskrit title: Tog has *Ārya-maitreya-mahā-simha-nādana*, Derge *Ārya-maitreya-mahā-simha-nāda*, and Tabo RN 260, Ga-Na 58 *Ārya-maitreya-mahā-simha-nādan*.

⁸ M. Lalou, "Les textes bouddhiques au temps du roi khri-sroñ-lde-bcan", *JA* (1953) 320; *Bde bar gshegs pa'i bstan pa'i gsal byed chos kyi 'byung gnas gsung rab rin po che'i mdzod* (L. Chandra, *The Collected Works of Bu-ston* (Śatapitaka 64) (New Delhi: 1971) Vol. 24 (Ya)) 4b.4 (cf. D. Martin, *Tibetan Histories. A Bibliography of Tibetan-Language Historical Works* (London: 1997) 50–51) – I shall use this short title throughout.

⁹ Zürcher, "Buddhist Art in Medieval China", 11.

¹⁰ The relationship of the various parts of the text as we have it in its Tibetan translation remains to be determined, see above n. 6 and below.

¹¹ Tog Ca 208b.2–.4 = Derge Ca 107b.5–.7 = Tabo, RN 260, Ga-Na 90a.6–.8.

¹² Demiéville, "Butsuzō", 213; Zürcher, "Buddhist Art in Medieval China", 8.

¹³ The position taken in regard to the use of images and paintings in this section of the *Maitreyasimhanāda* might, for example, fruitfully be discussed in connection with the remarks in Pāṇini and Patañjali on religious images as "a source of livelihood" (see H. Von Stietencron, "Orthodox Attitudes towards Temple Service and Image Worship in Ancient India", *Central Asiatic Journal* 21 (1977) 126–38; P.-S. Filliozat, "La conception de l'image divine dans la *Mahābhāṣya* de Patañjali", in *Langue, style et structure dans le monde indien. Centenaire de Louis Renou*, éd. N. Balbir and G.-J. Pinault (Paris: 1996) 199–212), and – further afield – the monastic debate about art in 12th century Europe (see M. Casey and J. Leclercq, *Cistercians and Cluniacs. St. Bernard's Apologia to Abbot William* (Kalamazoo: 1970); C. Rudolph, "The 'Principal Founders' and the Early Artistic Legislation of 'Cîteaux'", in *Studies in Cistercian Art and Architecture*, Vol. III, ed. M. P. Lillich (Kalamazoo: 1987) 1–45; C. Rudolph, *The "Things of Greater Importance". Bernard of Clairvaux's Apologia and the Medieval Attitude Toward Art* (Philadelphia: 1990).

¹⁴ For the canonical *Vinaya* see *Vinayottaragrantha*, Derge, *dul ba pa* 137b.4, and Pa 175b.1–177a.7; both passages have been digested by Guṇaprabha (R. Sankrityayana, *Vinayasūtra of Bhadanta Guṇaprabha* (Singhi Jain Śāstra Śikṣapīṭha Series – 74) (Bombay: 1981) 120.23–121.12) providing the basic Sanskrit vocabulary underlying the Tibetan translation of the *Uttaragrantha*. And both passages have again been presented in abbreviated form by Bu-ston in his *'Dul ba pha'i gleng 'bum chen mo* (L. Chandra, *The Collected Works of Bu-ston* (Śatapitaka Series 63) (New Delhi: 1971) Vol. 23 (Ha), 417b.5ff); for some brief remarks on this work see G. Schopen, "Marking Time in Buddhist Monasteries. On Calendars, Clocks, and Some Liturgical Practices", in *Sāryacandrāya. Essays in Honour of Akira Yuyama on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday* (Indica et Tibetica 35), ed. P. Harrison and G. Schopen (Swisttal-Odendorf: 1998) 178 n. 67. See also n. 17 below.

¹⁵ A. L. Basham, "The Evolution of the Concept of the Bodhisattva", in *The*

Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhism, ed. L. S. Kawamura (Waterloo: 1981) 19–59, esp. 29–30; G. Schopen, "On Monks, Nuns and 'Vulgar' Practices: The Introduction of the Image Cult into Indian Buddhism", *Artibus Asiae* 49 (1988/89) 153–68 (= *BSBM* 238–257).

¹⁶ See, for example, Schopen, "On Monks, Nuns, and 'Vulgar' Practices", 155ff [= *BSBM* 240ff]; Schopen, "Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism. The Laymen/Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of the Transference of Merit", *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 10 (1985) 26ff (= *BSBM* 32ff).

¹⁷ This section of the *Maitreyasimhanāda* will be treated in some detail as one chapter in a work in progress tentatively entitled *Beauty and the Business of a Buddhist Monk. Various Voices in a Monastic Debate about Art, Property, and Acquisition in Kuṣān North India*. The passages on monastic image processions in the *Uttaragrantha* referred to in n. 14 will be treated in another chapter.

¹⁸ H. Durt, "Daijō", *Hōbōgirin*, Septième Volume (Paris/Kyoto: 1994) 778; see also P. Harrison, "Who Gets to Ride in the Great Vehicle? Self Image and Identity among the Followers of the Early Mahāyāna", *JIAS* 10 (1987) 67–84, esp. 72–73. – J. Nattier has pointed out to me that it is far more historically accurate to say that 'mahāyāna' is a paraphrase of 'bodhisattvayāna', not vice versa.

¹⁹ Tog Ca 217a.3–.7 = Derge Ca 113b.6–114a.1 = Tabo, RN 260, Ga-Na 94b.8.

²⁰ There is a similar though much shorter polemic in the first half of the text dealing with what its author clearly considered to be unsavory aspects of the monastic practice of begging – Tog Ca 164b.5ff = Derge Ca 78a.6ff = Tabo, RN 260, Ga-Na 69a.1, though only the end of the polemic is preserved in the Tabo fragments.

²¹ Tog Ca 183a.5 = Derge Ca 90b.1 = Tabo, not available.

²² For more on the "works" of a monk and a fuller citation of the Tibetan for this passage see p. 288ff of this paper.

²³ Tog Ca 205b.1 = Derge Ca 105b.4 = Tabo, RN 260, Ga-Na 88b.3, RN 261, 28a.3.

²⁴ The issue does however arise at least once in a fairly mild form in the first half of the text. There one of the twenty things a bodhisattva should do (*nyi shu po 'di dag ni byang chub sems dpa' rnam kyī las yin te*) is *nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas kyī theg pa la dga' ba'i sems yid la mi bya ba*, "He should not fix in mind a thought which delights in the Vehicle of the Disciples and Non-teaching Buddhas" (Tog Ca 175b.3ff = Derge Ca 85b.7 = Tabo, RN 260 Ga-Na 72b.3). Still more subtle is the very interesting passage which – without any reference to 'vehicles' – has Kāśyapa decline, because of his self-avowed limitations, to take responsibility for the maintenance of the Dharma in the future and to insist that the assignment be given to a bodhisattva (*bcom ldan 'das bdag ni nyi tshē bar spyod pa nyi tshē ba'i shes pa dang ldan pa lags pas de lta bu'i khur 'deg pa'i rngo mi thog lags kyī / bcom ldan 'das byang chub sems dpa's ni de lta bu'i khur 'deg par rngo thog lags so /* – Tog Ca 160a.6 = Derge Ca 75b.2 = Tabo, not available. Here the text is cited from Derge; Tog appears to be faulty). But this passage too is from the first half of the text.

²⁵ Tog Ca 206a.5–b.2 = Derge Ca 106a.5–.7 = Tabo, RN 261, 28b.1 – Note that Tog has *dge slong gi las* instead of *dge sbyong gi las* here. but two lines later in concluding the same section it – like Derge and Tabo – also uses *dge sbyong*

²⁶ *Divyāvādāna* 488.2.

²⁷ D. R. Shackleton Bailey, "Notes on the *Divyāvādāna*", *JRAS* (1950) 166–84; (1951) 82–102. In his introductory remarks Bailey says: "In making use of the *Hdul ba* for a systematic revision of the *Divyāvādāna* text ... account would have to be taken of two further conclusions which emerge from a careful reading. The first is that some of the *Divyāvādāna* tales are deliberate abridgements of the *Vinaya* narratives, often very clumsily carried out ... Ralston's translation of the *Mādhātṛ*

story as it stands in the Hdul ba provides a smoothly flowing narrative which has been abbreviated to the point of incomprehensibility in the Sanskrit of Cowell and Neil's edition . . ." Though of the same nature, the situation is perhaps even worse in regard to the *Cūḍāpākṣa* where numerous key narrative elements have been entirely omitted in the "very clumsily carried out" abridgement found in the *Divyāvādāna*.

²⁸ Derge, 'dul ba Ja 64b.4 – Almost all of the versions of this formula I have collected are in Tibetan so this particular case is especially important since it establishes the Sanskrit that is behind these other versions. Especially important for getting at an Indian understanding of the assertion presented in the formula is the equivalence *karma* = *las*. Given the frequent overlap in both vocabulary and rule between Buddhist *Vinaya* and Indian *Dharmaśāstra* and *Dharmasūtra*, it seems very likely that the statement *dve bhikṣukarmaṇī* would have been taken as parallel in kind to the repeated assertion that there are six lawful "occupations" for a brahmin (*Āpastamba* II.5.10, 4; *Gautama* VIII.10; X.1–2; *Manu* I.88, X.75; *Yājñavalkya* I.118 etc.). This suggestion might find some support from the fact that the compilers of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* seem to have been familiar with the brahmanical assertion – see, for example, *Kṣudrakavastu*, Derge 'dul ba Tha 56b.3ff where a brahmanical family is twice described as *bram ze las drug la brston pa*, "diligent in the six occupations of a brahmin"; *Vibhaṅga*, Derge Ca 170a.5 where exactly the same thing is said; or C. Vogel and K. Wille, "Some More Fragments of the Pravrajyāvastu Portion of the Vinayavastu Manuscript Found Near Gilgit", in *Sanskrit-Texte aus dem buddhistischen Kanon: Neuentdeckungen und Neueditionen, Zweite Folge* (Göttingen: 1992) 76.9 (96), 80.33 (106).

²⁹ *Vibhaṅga*, Derge 'dul ba Ca 123a.5; 129b.7, 265b.1; etc.

³⁰ *Kṣudraka*, Tog, 'dul ba Ta 185b.4 = Derge, 'dul ba Tha 121b.7 = 'Dul ba pha'i gleng 'bum chen mo, 'A 411b.3 – Here both the canonical text and Bu-ston have *dge slong gi bya ba* . . ., using *bya ba* instead of *las*.

³¹ *Kṣudraka*, Tog, 'dul ba Ta 265a.4 = Derge, 'dul ba Tha 175b.2 = 'Dul ba pha'i gleng 'bum chen mo, 'A 397a.2.

³² It should be noted that for the moment the formula *dve bhikṣukarmaṇī dhyānam adhyayanam ca* appears to be characteristically *Mūlasarvāstivādin* – it has been noted so far only in literature connected with this group or with this *Vinaya*. To what degree this will continue to hold true as other sources – especially *Vinaya* sources – are investigated remains, of course, to be seen. But one thing, at least, seems already to be relatively sure: the assertion in the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* that "there are two occupations for a monk" has no apparent connection to the already divisive distinction noted long ago in the Pāli *Nikāyas* by de La Vallée Poussin between "deux catégories de moines" and "les moines qui pratiquent le recueillement ou extase (les *jhāyins*)" and "les moines qui s'attachent à la doctrine (les *dharmayogas*)" (L. de La Vallée Poussin, "Extase et Spéculation (*Dhyāna* et *Prajñā*)", in *Indian Studies in Honor of Charles Rockwell Lanman* (Cambridge, MA: 1929) 135–36; de La Vallée Poussin, "Musīla et Nārada. Le Chemin du Nirvāna", *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 5 (1936–37) 189ff); nor to the distinction – also divisive – between *ganthadhuras* ("scholars") and *vipassanādhuras* ("meditators") found in the Pāli commentaries (W. Rahula, *History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (Colombo: 1956) 158ff), and even in Sri Lankan inscriptions (R. A. L. H. Gunawardana, *Robe and Plough. Monasticism and Economic Interest in Early Medieval Sri Lanka* (Tucson: 1979) 139ff). In the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* meditation and recitation are indeed presented as two alternatives or two possible options, and individuals are generally presented as choosing one or the other. But it is equally clear that they are not (yet) mutually exclusive options, and there are a number of cases in which individuals choose to pursue both. In the case of Mahāpanthaka cited above, when asked which of the two he will do (. . . *kiṃ karisyasi*), he responds "I will do both" (*ubhayaṃ karisyāmi*),

and does so; exactly the same thing happens in yet another *Vibhaṅga* text at Derge 'dul ba Ca 265b.1; and there are even cases where the disciple of a monk who pursues one option elects to pursue the other (Derge, 'dul ba Ca 229b.7). Moreover, there is no indication that in this *Vinaya* one option was considered better or worse than the other, and no indication that there was any serious ideological antagonism between groups of monks who pursued one or the other. The closest thing to any antagonism might well be the mildly amusing account at *Bhaisajyavastu*, GMS iii 1, 56.20–57.18 (= Derge 'dul ba Kha 151a.2–151b.2) of a *prāhānika* monk who was repeatedly reborn as a frog because he once said that a group of recitative-monks (*svādhyāyākāraka*) who disturbed his concentration sounded like a bunch of croaking frogs. – These considerations too point, it seems, towards understanding the assertion that there are two occupations of a monk as parallel in kind to the assertion that there are six occupations for a brahmin; see above n. 28.

³³ Tog Ca 184a.1–.4 = Derge Ca 91a.1–.3 = Tabo, not available.

³⁴ This passage will be discussed further pp. 303ff of this paper.

³⁵ *Cīvaravastu*, GMS iii 2, 120.3 = Tog 'dul ba Kha 134a.3 = Derge Ga 102a.3 = 'Dul ba pha'i gleng 'bum chen mo A 290b.2. The account in which the passage occurs is translated in G. Schopen, "Deaths, Funerals, and the Division of Property in a Monastic Code", in *Buddhism in Practice*, ed. D. S. Lopez, Jr. (Princeton: 1995) 496–97; see also 483.

³⁶ *Śayanāsana* (Gnoli) 36.6 = Tog, 'dul ba Ga 285b.1 = Derge, 'dul ba Ga 210a.7 = 'Dul ba pha'i gleng 'bum chen mo 'A 263b.1 (the latter, incidentally, paraphrases the formula as *klog pa dang bsam gtan las nyams de* . . . almost as if it were conflating our two formulae.

³⁷ *Kṣudraka*, Tog, 'dul ba Ta 368b.2 = Derge, 'dul ba Tha 247a.6.

³⁸ Further examples of this formula occur at *Pāṇḍulohitakavastu*, GMS iii 3, 11.17; 12.17; 13.4; 14.12; *Vibhaṅga*, Derge 'dul ba Ca 39b.4; *Bhikṣuṇī-vibhaṅga*, Derge 'dul ba Ta 264b.5 (see also Ta 286b.3); etc.

³⁹ What looks like a version of the *riñcanti uddeśam pātham*, etc. formula also occurs in the Pāli *Vinaya*, but very rarely. Horner has noted two instances, Pāli *Vinaya* i 190.5 (*riñcanti uddeśam paripuccham adhiṣṭam adhiṣṭam adhipaññam* – repeated several times) and iii 235 (exactly the same form repeated twice.) Given the degree of variation these Pāli *Vinaya* passages almost certainly could not have been the source for the passage in our polemic. Moreover there is absolutely no evidence that might suggest that the Pāli *Vinaya* was ever known in Northwest India, the area in which – as we will see – other evidence might place our polemic.

⁴⁰ See references in n. 31 above – the initial announcement of the five blessings actually occurs a few leaves prior: Tog, 'dul ba Ta 261a.4 = Derge, 'dul ba Tha 172b.6.

⁴¹ *Śayanāsana* (Gnoli) 37.27 = Tog, 'dul ba Ga 287a.2 = Derge, 'dul ba Ga 212a.1; *Cīvaravastu*, GMS iii 2, 101.7 = Tog, 'dul ba Ga 121a.2 = Derge, 'dul ba Ga 94a.2.

⁴² There are, however, other instances in mahāyāna *sūtra* literature where elements of these two formulae appear to have been used in polemical contexts, e.g. *Rāṣṭrapāla* 31.1: *dhyānam tathādhyayanam ṭyākvā nitya vihārakarmaṇī niyuktāh* / . . . (on the well-known passage in which this occurs and which has been called "un tableau satirique des moeurs relâchées du clergé bouddhique", among other things, see L. Finot, *Rāṣṭrapālapariprcchā. Sūtra du Mahāyāna* (St. Petersburg: 1901) ix–xi; L. de la Vallée Poussin, "Bouddhisme. Notes et Bibliographie", *Le Muséon*, n.s.4 (1903) 307; Ét. Lamotte, "Sur la formation du mahāyāna", in *Asiatica. Festschrift Friedrich Weller* (Leipzig: 1954) 379; etc.).

⁴³ Tog Ca 206b.1–.3 = Derge Ca 106a.7–b.1 = Tabo, RN 261, 28b.3–4.

⁴⁴ But note the variant in Tog cited above in n. 25.

⁴⁵ Even within the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* there is – as there almost always is

with formulae there – a certain amount of variation: where, for example, the *Cīvara* has *riñcanti uddeśam pātham svādhyāyam yogam manasikāram*, the *Pāṇḍulohitaka* repeatedly has *riñcanti uddeśam pātham svādhyāyam yogam manasikāram adhyātman cetaśsamatham*.

⁴⁶ Ét. Lamotte, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien. Des origines à l'ère Śāka* (Louvain: 1958) 727.

⁴⁷ See for two very different kinds of examples A. M. Quagliotti, "Mahākāraṇika", *Annali* 49 (1989) 349, 360 (her reference to Lamotte (1967) 165 is, of course, wrong – the only work of Lamotte that she lists under "references" is *Histoire*); J. W. de Jong, review of Falk, *Schrift im alten Indien*, in *IJ* 39 (1996) 69.

⁴⁸ Ét. Lamotte, "Vajrapāni en Inde", in *Mélanges de sinologie offerts à M. Paul Demiéville* (Paris: 1966) 113–59.

⁴⁹ Lamotte, "Vajrapāni en Inde", 121; 135.

⁵⁰ P. Demiéville, *JA* (1950) 375–95; esp. 378 and n. 2; 382 [= P. Demiéville, *Choix d'études bouddhiques (1929–1970)* (Leiden: 1973) 473 and n. 2; 477]. Demiéville attributes this view to Lamotte but the situation is a bit more complicated. See Lamotte, *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse*. t.I (Louvain: 1944) 104 n. 2 ("Nous avons déjà remarqué à plusieurs reprises [e.g. 88 n. 1] que le Mppp, quand il cite d'une manière vague 'le Vinaya', se réfère presque toujours au Vinaya des Sarvāstivādin . . ."); Lamotte, *Le traité . . . t. II* (Louvain: 1949) xv ("On a constaté, au cours du tome précédent . . . que *Le traité* utilise, de préférence à tous les autres, les Vinaya des Sarvāstivādin et des Mūlasarvāstivādin. Le présent tome également a fréquemment recours au second . . ."). And see next note.

⁵¹ Ét. Lamotte, *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse*, t. III (Louvain: 1970) xviii – Lamotte then goes on to cite, "à titre d'exemple", fifteen examples. He also says in effect here that *Le traité* depends on the *Sarvāstivādavinaya* for the technical matters of *vinaya* but on the *Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya* for its extensive narrative accounts.

⁵² Lamotte, *Le traité*, t. III, xi; see also ix: "D'après les indications fournies par l'auteur, il semble avoir exercé son activité au début du IV^e siècle de notre ère, dans le Nord-Ouest de l'Inde".

⁵³ R. Gnoli, *The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu*, Part I (Serie Orientale Roma, XLIX.1) (Rome: 1971) xx n. 1.

⁵⁴ Gnoli, *The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu*, xix.

⁵⁵ This evidence will be treated in some detail in the work in progress mentioned in n. 17 above.

⁵⁶ For the positions taken in regard to relics in these sources see, for the *Saddharma*, the now very old G. Schopen, "The Phrase 'sa prthivīpradeśaś caitryabhūto bhavet' in the *Vajracchedikā*: Notes on the Cult of the Book in Mahāyāna", *IJ* 17 (1975) 147–81; esp. 163ff (for some recent remarks on this piece see T. Vetter, "On the Origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism and the Subsequent Introduction of *Prajñāpāramitā*", *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* 48.4 (1994) 1241–81; esp. 1266ff, although I, at least, am not always able to follow his arguments); G. Schopen, "The Five Leaves of the *Buddhabalādhānaprātihāryavikurvānanirdeśa-sūtra* found at Gilgit", *JIP* 5 (1978) 319–36 – which contains a particularly ugly translation; J. Nobel, *Suvarabhāsottamasūtra. Das Goldglanz-Sūtra. Ein Sanskrittext des Mahāyāna-Buddhismus* (Leipzig: 1937) Ch. 2.

⁵⁷ This past Buddha is called *me tog sna tshogs* in Tibetan. Puṣpavicitra is only my guess as to what the Sanskrit might have been.

⁵⁸ Tog Ca 201b.1 = Derge Ca 102b.7 = Tabo, not available.

⁵⁹ Y. N. Roerich, *Tibetan–Russian–English Dictionary* 10 (Moscow: 1987) 65.

⁶⁰ D. T. Suzuki, *An Index to the Lankavatara Sutra* (Nanjio Edition) (Kyoto: 1934)

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121; Y. Ejima, *Index to the Saddharmapūṇḍarikasūtra – Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese* (Tokyo: 1990) fasc. 7, 693.

⁶¹ See most recently G. Fussman, "L'indo-grec Ménandre ou Paul Demiéville revisité", *JA* (1993) 61–138; esp. 95ff., and the literature cited.

⁶² Tog Ca 201b.2 = Derge Ca 103a.1 = Tabo, not available.

⁶³ Tog Ca 205b.3 = Derge Ca 105b.6 = Tabo, RN 260, Ga-Na 88b.5; RN 261, 28a.4.

⁶⁴ R. Salomon, "The Inscription of Senavarma, King of Odi", *IJ* 29 (1986) 261–93; esp. 265,7a–b; 270; 278; also G. Fussman, "Documents épigraphiques kouchans (III). L'inscription kharoṣṭhī de Senavarma, roi d'oḍi: une nouvelle lecture", *BEFEO* 71 (1982) 1–46; esp. 4,7a–b; 8; 25 – it is very likely that a *-vimuti-* has been scribally omitted and that the intended reading was *samasiprañāvimuti[vimuti]ñāṇadra(sa)paribhavita*.

⁶⁵ G. Fussman, "Nouvelles inscriptions śāka (II)", *BEFEO* 73 (1984) 31–46; esp. 39.

⁶⁶ G. Schopen, "Burial 'ad sanctos' and the Physical Presence of the Buddha in Early Indian Buddhism. A Study in the Archaeology of Religions", *Religion* 17 (1987) 193–225; esp. 205 (= *BSBM* 126–27) – Note that the chapter in the *Buddhacarita* in which these passages occur is not preserved in Sanskrit. The Sanskrit equivalents are Johnston's. On the Tibetan translation see now D. P. Jackson, "On the Date of the Tibetan Translation of Aśvaghōṣa's *Buddhacarita*", *Studia Indologicae* 4 (1997) 41–62.

⁶⁷ On the inscription of Senavarma Salomon says: "the inscription can be securely dated to the early Kuṣāṇa era, i.e. about the first half of the 1st century A.D." (p. 261 of work cited in n. 64 above); Fussman: "La date de l'inscription (entre 20 et 40 de n.è) étant assurée par son contenu . . ." (p. 9 of work cited in n. 64). The second inscription is dated "en l'an quatre-vingt-trois du roi Azès dont le temps est passé" = 25/26 A.D., so Fussman, *BEFEO* 73 (1984) 39.

⁶⁸ E.H. Johnston, *The Buddhacarita or Acts of the Buddha* Part II (Calcutta: 1936) xvii.

⁶⁹ Not securely, of course, and largely, it seems, on the basis of the date of the earliest Chinese translation.

⁷⁰ The closest thing to the expression in the Inscription of Senavarma that I know occurs in a 5th Century inscription from Sānchī where *śīla-samādhi-prajñā-guṇa-bhāvitendriyāya* is applied to the local saṅgha (J. Marshall et al. *The Monuments of Sānchī* (Delhi: 1940) Vol. 1, 388. – It is worth noting too that the *Maitreyasimhanāda* – like other texts in the *Ratnakūṭa* – also refers to monastic robes as "pervaded with good conduct, concentration, wisdom, release, and the knowledge and vision of release" using exactly the same formula (*bcom ldan 'das kyois bka' stsal pa / 'od srungs de bzhin du nga'i gos ngur smrig tshul khirms dang / ting nge 'dzin dang / shes rab dang / rnam par grol ba dang / rnam par grol ba'i ye shes mthong bas bsgos pa gang dag yin pa . . .* Tog Ca 207b.2 – On this and similar passages elsewhere, see Silk, *The Origins and Early History of the Mahāratnakūṭa . . .* (n. 5 above) 77ff). The fact that relic and robe are described in the same way is not so surprising in light of what especially mahāyāna sources say about the sacrality of the monastic robe. Although its Indian background has yet to be studied see, for example, B. Faure, "Quand l'habit fait le moine: The Symbolism of the *Kāśāya* in Sōtō Zen", *Cahiers d'extrême-asie* 8 (1995) 335–69, one section of which is entitled "The Robe as Relic". Also not surprising – but yet another indicator of the essential 'identity' of the relics of the Buddha and the Buddha himself – is the fact that our polemic also describes the body (*sku*) of the Buddha in exactly the same way: *grogs po dag de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku ni tshul khirms dang / ting nge 'dzin dang / shes rab dang / rnam par grol ba dang / rnam par grol ba'i ye shes mthong bas*

yongs su bsgos pa yin pas ... Tog Ca 204a.7 = Derge Ca 104b.7 = Tabo, RN 260, Ga-Na 88a.2. And the same passage goes on to say that his body is – like his relics according to Aśvaghōṣa – also “prevaded with universal benevolence” (*byams pa*); etc.

⁷¹ Johnston, *Buddhacarita*, Pt. 2, xiii.

⁷² See at least S. Lévi, “Notes sur les indo-scythes”, *JA* (1986) 444–84; Lévi, “Açvaghōṣa. Le *Sūtrāṅkāra* et ses sources”, *JA* (1908) 57–184; Lévi, “Encore Açvaghōṣa”, *JA* (1928) 193–216; Lévi, “Autour d’Açvaghōṣa”, *JA* (1929) 255–85; Lévi, “Kaniṣka et Śātavāhana. Deux figures symboliques de l’Inde au premier siècle”, *JA* 63–121; see also L. Renou “Sylvain Lévi et son oeuvre scientifique”, in *Mémorial Sylvain Lévi* (Paris: 1937) xi–li esp. xx–xxi; xxx–xxxii; xxxix–xi.

⁷³ L. Renou, *Les Littératures de l’Inde* (Paris: 1966) 58, although he then immediately adds “... mais sur la vie duquel on ne sait rien de précis (on le croit né à Ayodhya, mod. Oudh)”.

⁷⁴ Johnston, *Buddhacarita*, Pt. 2, xv.

⁷⁵ On specific points of contact or commonality between this *Vinaya* and ‘brahmanical’ ideas see G. Schopen, “On Avoiding Ghosts and Social Censure. Monastic Funerals in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*”, *JIP* 20 (1992) 1–39 (= *BSBM* 204–37); Schopen, “Doing Business for the Lord: Lending on Interest and Written Loan Contracts in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 114.4 (1994) 527–54; Schopen, ‘Monastic Law meets the Real World: A Monk’s Continuing Right to Inherit Family Property in Classical India’, *History of Religions* 35.2 (1995) 101–23 – But there are in addition scores of passages in this *Vinaya* that indicate its compilers’ knowledge of and adjustment to a ‘brahmanical milieu’; see as a sample: the passages in the *Kṣudraka* and *Vibhaṅga* cited in n. 28 above where brahmanical families are described as ‘diligent in the six occupations of a brahmin’; the rules in the *Kṣudraka* (Tog ‘dul ba Ta 8b.4) against monks wearing “sacred threads” (*tshangs pa’i skud*) or (Ta 4b.3) *trīśūla* marks (*so ris gsum*); the rules in the *Kṣudraka* (Ta 164a.3) concerning the establishment of drinking facilities in the monastery and (Ta 337b.2) monks washing their bowls in such a way as to accommodate brahmanical concerns with purity; passages in the *Vibhaṅga* (Derge ‘dul ba Ca 246b.6ff; Ja 61a.4ff) which refer in some detail to brahmanical educational practices; the delightful story of the clever thief in the *Saṅghabhedavastu* (Gnoli) ii 32.4ff which refers to the components of a brahmanical funeral – even to the deposition of the bones in the Ganges (*asthīni gaṅgāyām prakṣeptavyāni*) – and to Kāpālikas; etc.

⁷⁶ See the overview in G. Fussman, “*Upāya-kauśalya*: L’implantation du bouddhisme au gandhāra”, in *Bouddhisme et cultures locales. Quelques cas de réciproques adaptations. Actes du colloque franco-japonais de septembre 1991*, éd. F. Fukui et G. Fussman (Paris: 1994) 17–51; esp. 39ff.

⁷⁷ The question of the place of origin of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* has, of course, been conflated with the question of the place of origin of “the *Prajñāpāramitā*”, and this has not been particularly helpful. Although Lamotte wanted to place both (?) in the North-West during the Kūṣāna period his suggestion has not gone unchallenged – for what it is worth see the discussion in E. Conze, *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature*, 2nd rev. ed. (Tokyo: 1978) 1–4; the discussion does not seem to have progressed much beyond this.

⁷⁸ Tog Ca 199a.6 = Derge Ca 101b.1 = Tabo, RN 261, 25a.1.

⁷⁹ Tog Ca 197a.2 = Derge Ca 99b.7 = Tabo, not available.

⁸⁰ *Rāstrapāla* 39.3: ... sarva eva purimā narottamā aranyagocararātāḥ; 45.16: ... prāptā hy aranyaniratena jinena bodhiḥ. See also the verse from the *Samādhirāja* cited in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* 193.9: na kaści buddhaḥ purimeṇa āstī anāgato bheṣyati yo vatiṣṭhate / yehi sthitair eva agāramadhye prāptā iyam uttama agrabodhiḥ; etc.

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– I refrain here and below from multiplying random references in the belief that what is needed now are systematic studies of this and other themes in the whole range of mahāyāna *sūtra* literature. The interesting discussion of the ‘forest ideal’ in R. Ray, *Buddhist Saints in India. A Study in Buddhist Values and Orientations* (New York/Oxford: 1994) 251–92, is a good start, but almost entirely limited to those mahāyāna *sūtras* that have been translated.

⁸¹ Tog Ca 197b.2 = Derge Ca 100a.5 = Tabo, not available.

⁸² Tog Ca 197b.5 = Derge Ca 100a.7 = Tabo, not available.

⁸³ This is the title of the eleventh chapter of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*. Bendall and Rouse render it as “Praise of the Forest Seculsion” (C. Bendall and W. H. D. Rouse, *Çikṣā-Samuccaya. A Compendium of Buddhist Doctrine* (London: 1992) 188).

⁸⁴ As a small sample see *Kṣudraka*, Tog ‘dul ba Ta 57b.4–58b.1 = Derge, ‘dul ba Tha 39a.6–39b.5; Tog, ‘dul ba 154b.3–158a.3 = Derge, ‘dul ba Tha 102a.5–104b.2; Tog ‘dul ba Tha 50b.5–51b.2 = Derge ‘dul ba Da 35b.2–36a.2 etc.

⁸⁵ *Bhaiṣajyavastu*, GMs iii 1, 79.3ff = *Divyāvadāna* 80.11f.

⁸⁶ See Schopen, “Doing Business for the Lord”, esp. 547–52.

⁸⁷ *Rāstrapāla* 16.7: eka viharati yathaiva khaḍgo; *Samādhirāja* Ch. XIX.14: khaḍgasamā vicarantimu loke; Ch. XXIX.53: advitīya khaḍgasama bhotha sadā (on the simile see most recently K. R. Norman, “Solitary as Rhinoceros Horn”, *Buddhist Studies Review* 13.2 (1996) 133–42). For the *Maitreyasimhanāda* cf. Tog Ca 180a.5 = Derge Ca 88a.7 = Tabo, not available: ... bdag ni gnas dang yul gcig yongs su ‘dzhin par mi bgyid kyi / bdag ni ri dags ltar kun tu rgyu bar bgyid pa ...

⁸⁸ Tog Ca 189b.1 = Derge Ca 94b.5 = Tabo, not available: rigs.kyi bu rgyal po mu khyud ‘dis bsod nams kyi sbyin pa yongs su gtong ba gang yin pa de bas ni byang chub sems dpa’ dben par gnas pa zhiḡ dgon pa dang / rab tu dgon pa dag na gnas shing se gol gtogs pa tsam zhiḡ chos thams cad ni ma skyes pa’o zhes bzod pa thob pa gang yin pa de bsod nams kyi phung po ches che bar rig par bya’o / – Underneath chos thams cad ni ma skyes pa’o zhes bzod pa must be some form of the expression *anupatitika-dharma-kṣānti*.

⁸⁹ Tog Ca 185a.5 = Derge Ca 91b.7 = Tabo, not available.

⁹⁰ See references in n. 78.

⁹¹ I am not sure how to best understand *de ‘ang de dag gi yongs su mya ngan las ‘da’ ba’i bar gyi rgyur ‘gyur ba yin na ... esp. bar gyi rgyu*, and the translation here is more than usually tentative.

⁹² Tog Ca 206a.3–207a.2 = Derge Ca 106a.3–106b.5 = Tabo, RN 261, 28b.1–8.

⁹³ Both Tog and Derge read *kyi* and that may be correct. If that is so, the sense and translation would differ only very slightly: “... for the accumulation of roots of good of those deprived of wisdom”.

⁹⁴ Tog Ca 183b.5–184a.1 = Derge Ca 90b.5–91a.1 = Tabo, not available.

⁹⁵ See p. 288 of this paper and references in n. 33.

⁹⁶ E. Waldschmidt, *Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (Berlin: 1951) §36.3.

⁹⁷ S. Lévi, *Mahākarmavibhaṅga (La grande classification des actes) et Karmavibhaṅgapadeśa (Discussion sur le Mahā Karmavibhaṅga)* (Paris: 1932) 159.14 (text), 173–74 (translation) – see also C. B. Tripāṭhī, “*Karmavibhaṅgapadeśa* und Berliner Texte”, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 10 (1966) 208–19; esp. 211–12.

⁹⁸ T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, *The Dīgha-Nikāya* (London: 1903) Vol. II, 141.20.

⁹⁹ See G. Schopen, “Monks and the Relic Cult in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*: An Old Misunderstanding in Regard to Monastic Buddhism”, in *From Benares to Beijing: Essays on Buddhism and Chinese Religion in Honor of Jan Yün-Hua*, ed., K. Shinohara and G. Schopen (Oakville: 1991) 187–201 (= *BSBM* 99–113; this paper

has also now been translated into Japanese: “*Daihatsu Nehangyō ni okeru Biku to Ikotsu ni Girei: Shukke Bukkyō ni kansuru furuku Kara no gokai*”, *Otani Gakuhō* 76.1 (1996) 1–20.

¹⁰⁰ On the Tibetan translations of the compound or phrase see G. Schopen, “On Avoiding Ghosts and Social Censure”, 28 n. 38 (= *BSBM* 227 n. 38)

¹⁰¹ For some examples of the continuing use of *śarīra* in the singular to mean ‘body’ see *Saṅghabhedavastu* (Gnoli) i 198.2 (*yena rājā śuddhodana anāvṛtam buddhaśarīram paśyati* ...); ii 93.21 (*jivakah kathayati: vajramayaśarīro bhagavān brhatakāyaś ca*); and the numerous instances in the *Karmavibhaṅgopadeśa* (Lévi) 157.20ff; 158.1, .8ff; 160.8ff (a quotation from a *Bodhimūlasūtra* which – as Lévi already noted – has a very close parallel in the *Kṣudrakavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* (see *Tog*, ‘*dul ba* Ta 73a.5–76a.1); etc.

¹⁰² V. Trenckner, *The Milindapañho* (London: 1880) 177.4ff; see Schopen, “Monks and the Relic Cult in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*”, 195ff (= *BSBM* 108ff).

¹⁰³ See M. D. Eckel, *To See the Buddha. A Philosopher’s Quest for the Meaning of Emptiness* (San Francisco: 1992) 90–94. Note too, for example, that the expression is twice used in the account of the last days of Mahākāśyapa in the *Kṣudrakavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, once in regard to the robe of the Buddha which Kāśyapa puts on just before he ‘dies’ and which is supposed to last/remain/endure until the arrival of Maitreya (... *od srungs chen po ... bsams pa l ma la bdag la bcom ldan ‘das kyis phyag dar khrod pa byin pa ‘di lus la bgos la l byams pa’i gsung rab rgyas kyī bar du byin gyis brlabs te* ... *Tog*, ‘*dul ba* Tha 464b.5), and once in regard to Kāśyapa’s own body, which was also to endure (... *rang gi lus byin gyis brlabs nas* ...) (This passage is quoted in Bu-ston’s *Bde bar gsheg pa’i bstan pa’i gsal byed chos kyī ‘byung gnas gsung rab rin po che’i mdzod*, Ya 85a.2; cf. E. Obermüller, *History of Buddhism (Chos-hbyung)* by Bu-ston (Heidelberg: 1932) ii 86 where *byin gyis brlabs te* is translated “uttered a blessing” or “pronounced a blessing”. The expression seems to have disappeared in the Chinese translation – see J. Przyluski, “Le Nord-ouest de l’inde dans le vinaya des mūla-sarvāstivādin”, *JA* (1914) 524–25.

¹⁰⁴ See p. 295 of this paper and references in n. 62.

¹⁰⁵ *Tog* Ca 202b.4 = *Derge* Ca 103b.5 = *Tabo*, not available.

¹⁰⁶ *Tog* Ca 201a.4–7 = *Derge* Ca 102b.4–7 = *Tabo*, RN 261, 25b.9 (but only a very small part of the very beginning of the passage).

¹⁰⁷ Although it can now be supplemented in a number of ways see A. Bareau, “La construction et le culte des stūpa d’après les *vinayaṭīkā*”, *BEFEO* 50 (1960) 229–74 – For the Pāli *Vinaya* see G. Schopen, “The Stūpa Cult and the Extant Pāli *Vinaya*”, *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 13 (1989) 83–100, esp. 89–93 (= *BSBM* 86–98, esp. 89–91) and Schopen, “The Ritual Obligations and Donor Roles of Monks in the Pāli *Vinaya*”, *ibid* 16 (1992) 98 n. 2 and the literature cited there (= *BSBM* 83 n. 14); Schopen, “The Suppression of Nuns and the Ritual Murder of their Special Dead in Two Buddhist Monastic Texts”, *JIP* 24 (1996) 563–92 – for the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* see next note.

¹⁰⁸ *Varṣavastu*, GMs iii 4, 136.12–143.7 = *Tog* ‘*dul ba* Ka 343b.7–349b.6 = *Derge* ‘*dul ba* Ka 240b.6–244b.6; *Kṣudraka*, *Tog* ‘*dul ba* Ta 352b.7–354a.5 = *Derge* ‘*dul ba* Tha 236a.2–237b.1; *Kṣudraka*, *Tog* ‘*dul ba* Ta 185b.1–186a.4 = *Derge* ‘*dul ba* Tha 121b.6–122a.5; *Kṣudraka*, *Tog* ‘*dul ba* Ta 6a.6–8a.1 = *Derge* ‘*dul ba* Tha 4a.7–5b.3; *Kṣudraka*, *Tog* ‘*dul ba* Ta 154b.3–158a.3 = *Derge* ‘*dul ba* Tha 102a.5–104b.2; *Kṣudraka*, *Tog* ‘*dul ba* Ta 180b.7–181a.4 = *Derge* ‘*dul ba* Tha 118b.7–119a.3; *Kṣudraka*, *Tog* ‘*dul ba* Ta 279b.4–280a.2 = *Derge* ‘*dul ba* Tha 285b.2–285b.6; *Cīvaravastu*, GMs iii 2, 143.12 = *Tog* ‘*dul ba* Ga 149b.1 = *Derge* ‘*dul ba* Ga 113a.5; *Vibhaṅga*, *Derge* ‘*dul ba* Cha 210b.1ff and *Cīvaravastu*, GMs iii 2 145.13–146.6 = *Tog* ‘*dul ba* Ga 151a.2–7 = *Derge*, ‘*dul ba* Ga 114a.6–114b.2; *Uttaragrantha*,

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Derge, ‘*dul ba* Pa 265a.6–266a.2; *Kṣudraka*, *Tog* ‘*dul ba* Ta 265a.1–266a.2 = *Derge* ‘*dul ba* Tha 175a.7–176a.3; *Kṣudraka*, *Tog* ‘*dul ba* 96a.7–97b.1 = *Derge* ‘*dul ba* Tha 64b.6–65b.2; *Kṣudraka*, *Tog* ‘*dul ba* Ta 332a.4–335a.1 = *Derge* ‘*dul ba* Tha 222b.2–224b.1 – In addition to these scattered references see also the sets of rules at *Kṣudraka*, *Tog* ‘*dul ba* Ta 366b.6–368a.5 = *Derge* ‘*dul ba* Tha 246a.4–247a.4 and *Uttaragrantha*, *Derge* ‘*dul ba* Pa 114a.3ff and 119a.7 which are digested in *Vinayasūtra* 119.30–120.21 and presented again in ‘*Dul ba pha’i gleng ‘bum chen mo*, ‘A 416a.2ff

¹⁰⁹ See p. 307 of this paper and references in n. 105.

¹¹⁰ *Dīgha* ii 138.16.

¹¹¹ See Bareau’s translation of what he identifies as the Dharmaguptaka version of the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*: “A ce moment, la divinité qui était entre les deux arbres jumeaux et qui avait une foi sincère en le Bouddha répandit sur le sol des fleurs écloses hors de saison. Le bienheureux dit alors à Ānanda: ‘cette divinité des deux arbres jumeaux me fait offrande de fleurs écloses hors de saison, mais ce ne sont pas là des offrandes pour le Tathāgata’. Ānanda dit: ‘Que nomme-t-on offrandes pour le Tathāgata?’ Le Bouddha dit à Ānanda: ‘Que des hommes reçoivent ma Doctrine et pratiquent ma Doctrine, c’est là ce que l’on nomme offrandes pour le Tathāgata’”; A. Bareau, *En Suivant le bouddha* (Paris: 1985) 242–43.

¹¹² J. S. Speyer, *The Jātakamālā. Garland of Birth-Stories of Āryasūra* (London: 1895) xxvii. The status of these “epilogues” is still not clear. Khoroché omits them from his recent translation saying – like many before him – that “they are probably by a later hand” (P. Khoroché, *Once the Buddha was a Monkey. Ārya Sūra’s Jātakamālā* (Chicago: 1989) 255 n. 1), but to judge by the variants he cites they are already in his earliest manuscripts which appear to date to the 11th and 12th centuries (P. Khoroché, *Towards a New Edition of Ārya-Sūra’s Jātakamālā (Indica et Tibetica)* 12) (Bonn: 1987) 8–9; 15 (6.7, 6.9); 17 (18.22); 18 (22.9); 21 (33.12); 23 (40.20, 40.21, 40.23); etc.

¹¹³ H. Kern, *The Jātaka-Mālā or Bodhisattvāvadāna-Mālā by Ārya-Çūra* (Harvard Oriental Series 1) Boston: 1891) 207.12.

¹¹⁴ Khoroché, *Once the Buddha was a Monkey*, 219; Kern, *Jātaka-Mālā*, 206.16.

¹¹⁵ Lévi, *Mahākarmavibhaṅga* 159.3 (text), 173 (translation).

¹¹⁶ Ét. Lamotte, *L’enseignement de Vimalakīrti* (Bibliothèque du Muséon 51) (Louvain: 1962) 377; J. Oshika, “Tibetan Text of *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*”, *Acta Indologica* 1 (1970) 235.18.

¹¹⁷ *Samādhirāja* V.20 – *pūjā*, its redefinition and reorientation are major preoccupations of the *Samādhirāja*. Three entire chapters – V, VI, and XXXIII – are almost totally concerned with these topics. See also at least II.8, 15; III.12; XI.43–47; XIII.26; XIV.40, 49, 54; XV.5, .7–9; XVII.9, 21, 50, 52, 53; XXIV.29–30, 55–59; XXV.3; XXIX.49–55, 114; XXXI.19–20; XXXII.135, 142, 165, 233, 236, 277–79; XXXV.3–5, 68; XXXVI.14–15; XXXVII.2, 78–81.

¹¹⁸ I would like to thank Paul Harrison and Jan Nattier who, without necessarily agreeing with what I wrote, allowed me to benefit from their observations on it.

ABBREVIATIONS AND TEXTS CITED

- BEFEO = *Bulletin de l'école française d'extrême-orient*
 BSBM = G. Schopen, *Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks. Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India* (Honolulu: 1997)
 Derge = *The Tibetan Tripitaka. Taipei Edition* (Taipei: 1991)
 GMs iii = N. Dutt, *Gilgit Manuscripts* (Srinagar and Calcutta: 1942-50) Volume III, Parts 1-4
 IJ = *Indo-Iranian Journal*
 JA = *Journal Asiatique*
 IABS = *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*
 JIP = *Journal of Indian Philosophy*
 Rāṣṭrapāla = L. Finot, *Rāṣṭrapālapariṣcchā. Sūtra du mahāyāna* (Bibliotheca Buddhica II) (St. Petersburg: 1901)
 Samādhirāja = N. Dutt, *Gilgit Manuscripts* (Srinagar and Calcutta: 1942-50) Volume III, Parts 1-3
 Saṅghabhedavastu = R. Gnoli, *The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu. Being the 17th and Last Section of the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādīn* (Serie Orientale Roma 49.1-2) (Rome: 1977-78) Parts I and II
 Śayanāsana = R. Gnoli, *The Gilgit Manuscript of the Śayanāsnavastu and the Adhikarānavastu. Being the 15th and 16th Sections of the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādīn* (Serie Orientale Roma 50) (Rome: 1973)
 Śikṣāsamuccaya = C. Bendall, *Śikṣāsamuccaya. A Compendium of Buddhist Teaching* (Bibliotheca Buddhica I) (St. Petersburg: 1897-1902)
 Tabo = Photographs of Two Fragmentary Manuscripts of the *Maitreyasimhanāda* found among the Tabo Manuscripts – see n. 7 above
 Tog = *The Tog Palace Manuscript of the Tibetan Kanjur* (Leh: 1979)

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ŚĀBDABODHA, COGNITIVE PRIORITY AND THE ODD STORIES
 ON PRAKĀRATĀVĀDA & SAMŚARGATĀVĀDA

OUTLINE

["We do what we do because we *know* that we can do it and that it is the only means to attaining some good. Therefore knowledge always precedes action" – view the *naiyāyikas*, the followers of the Nyāya school of Indian philosophy. Their theory is best presented in a subtle manner in the following *kārikā*:

ātmajanyā bhaved icchā icchājanyā bhavet kṛtiḥ |
kṛtijanyā bhavec ceṣṭā ceṣṭājanyā bhavet kriyā || (NK.: 137)

'Desire is caused by the Self, while desire causes volition, volition causes effort and effort causes action'.

In other words, action always follows an intense desire, which is imminent only when we have basic knowledge. Basic knowledge means knowledge of the object intended, the causal mechanism, and the method of application/mode of operation. Therefore, according to the *naiyāyikas*, all these three factors, namely, knowledge (*jñāna*), desire (*icchā*), and volition (*kṛti*) are object-dependent (*saviśayaka*). None of them can be defined/determined without referring to its object. But the striking point is that everything else follows only if we have knowledge and thus knowledge occupies a fundamental position in regard to human action. Since time immemorial serious attention is paid to knowledge in the scientific enquiry of every cognitive event. What is knowledge? There are different opinions found in different schools of Indian philosophy. The *Advaita Vedāntins* consider knowledge primarily to be formless (*nikākāra*), universal objectless (*nirviśaya*), ownerless (*nirāśraya*) and determination-less (*nirviśeṣa*). They accept the reality of pure consciousness, which is eternal in nature and thus not different from the Self. However this is not conceivable in the system of *Nyāya* philosophy. The *naiyāyikas* think that the knowledge is a quality of the Self and thus it is self-owned (*ātmāśraya*). It is object-dependent (*saviśayaka*) and object-determinant (*saviśeṣa*). Knowledge is produced by its causal mechanism (*pramāṇa*) and thus it is *janya* (a product)

SELF-INTIMATION, MEMORY AND PERSONAL IDENTITY

When I am looking at, hoping for, or otherwise thinking about some object, must I be at the same time aware that I am looking at, hoping for, or thinking about it? Is thought, in Gilbert Ryle's phrase, self-intimating? Until relatively recently, it has seemed to philosophers that this is quite evidently the case. Descartes, who is often credited with the origination of the idea, said that "as to the fact that there can be nothing in the mind, in so far as it is a thinking thing, of which it is not aware, this seems to me to be self-evident . . . we cannot have any thought of which we are not aware at the very moment when it is in us" (*Fourth Replies*: CSM II 171). Locke too states that it is "impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so" (*Essay* 2.XXVII.9), and again that "to imprint anything on the mind without the mind's perceiving it seems to me hardly intelligible" (*Essay* 1.II.5). And in Hume we find "all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness" (*Treatise* 1.IV.2). Indeed, it has generally seemed so obvious that in order to be conscious, one must be aware of what one is thinking, that those philosophers who accept the self-intimation thesis include it in their systems without offering any argument at all for its truth.

The Indian Buddhist philosopher Dinnāga (480–540 A.D.), and his expositor Dharmakīrti, not only endorse the self-intimation thesis but give an elaborate argument in its favour. They had to give an argument, since in India, unlike the west, the claim that we are necessarily aware of our own mental states is a radical one. Dinnāga derives his conclusion from certain facts about the nature of memory, and, since memory is so closely tied to the idea of personal continuity, his argument is linked with the Buddhist treatment of this fundamental issue.

1. THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY OF MENTAL STATES

Dinnāga precedes his argument¹ with a discussion of the nature of mental states, wherein he presents the celebrated Yogācāra thesis that every thought or experience has two aspects, an objectual aspect and a

subjective aspect. The theory is an important preliminary to his main argument, for it is in virtue of this theory that Dinnāga is able to claim later that we can indeed remember our own past experiences.

Every cognition is produced with a twofold appearance, namely, that of itself [as subject] (*svābhāsa*) and that of the object (*viśayābhāsa*) (*vṛtti* below §1 k.9a)²

How are we to understand this thesis? That mental states (thoughts, experiences, perceptions, willings etc.) have an 'objectual aspect' is easily understood. It is of the nature of thought that it is object-directed or intentional. This is true as much for dream-thoughts, imaginings and perceptual error as for thought about some existing object. Thoughts have what Brentano called an 'intentional object', which need not be identifiable with any actual object. It is an important part of Dinnāga's philosophical framework, though not an important part of his argument for self-intimation, that the objectual content of a thought not be confused with an external object with which the thought is somehow (e.g. causally) related. For him, *being-of-a-chair* is an intrinsic characteristic of my thought about a chair, part of what individuates it, independently of whether there is a chair suitably related to the thought or not.

It is harder to state precisely what Dinnāga had in mind when he spoke of a cognition's having an aspect of its own, a subjective aspect. It is certainly intended to be an introspectible feature of a thought, which characterises it over and above its being *of* a certain object. He may have had in mind something analogous to a distinction easily drawn for paintings and photographs. A photograph is always a photograph of something, but it also has its own qualities, like brightness, sharpness and contrast, factors which depend on the way the photograph was taken rather than on what it was of. An expert who looks at a photograph and says that it is over-exposed or under-developed, pays attention just to these features of the photograph itself, and may perhaps fail to notice even that the photograph was of, for example, a face. The same is true of paintings: there are many different paintings all of Christ, but what makes one "morbid", another "typically Byzantine" and so on, are the subjective qualities of the individual paintings.

I do not at all mean to commit Dinnāga to anything like a picture theory of mental representation, but simply to illustrate one way in which his distinction between the objectual aspect and the subjective aspect of mental states might be drawn. The reasons Dinnāga gives for drawing this distinction make it clearer what function the two aspects are supposed to perform. He says,

That cognition has two forms is [known] from the difference between the cognition of the object and the cognition of that [cognition] §1 k.11ab:

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The cognition which cognizes the object, a thing of colour, etc., has [a twofold appearance, namely,] the appearance of the object and the appearance of itself [as subject]. But the cognition which cognizes this cognition of the object has [on the one hand] the appearance of that cognition which is in conformity with the object and [on the other hand] the appearance of itself. Otherwise, if the cognition of the object had only the form of the object, or if it had only the form of itself, then the cognition of cognition would be indistinguishable from the cognition of the object.

Dinnāga here introduces the idea that, just as we can think about ordinary objects, so too we can think about our own thoughts. This idea should be sharply distinguished from the self-intimation thesis, which Dinnāga has not yet introduced, that each thought is reflexively aware of itself. The idea here is that we are, at least sometimes, aware of our own thoughts. I can notice that I am hungry; in an unpleasant dream, I can think to myself that it is just a dream; I can be aware of myself perceiving an object in front of me. It is in order to be able to distinguish such second-order thoughts from the first-order thoughts they are about that, according to Dinnāga, every thought must have a subjective aspect as well as an objective aspect. For obviously, in thinking about one of my own experiences, I am not attending to a set of neural impulses or any other physical characteristics of the mental state. I must be attending to an aspect of its content, and that cannot be its objectual content. The analogy with paintings and photographs is again helpful here. A painting of a painting is not the same as a duplicate of the original, and taking a photograph of a photograph is not the same as ordering a second set of prints. The second photograph takes the first as its object, and if the first photo was over-exposed, then the object of the second is an over-exposed photograph. This is perhaps the rationale behind Dinnāga's claim that, when one is introspectively thinking about one of one's own thoughts, the subjective aspect of the latter becomes the objectual aspect of the former. That is, the objectual aspect of a second order thought = the subjective aspect of its first order thought. The double aspect theory of mental states is thus motivated as being the only way by which one can distinguish between thoughts and thoughts about thoughts, the intentional object of the latter being the subjective aspect of the former.

The role assigned to Dinnāga's 'subjective aspect' of thought highlights what I take to be a very important feature of it. Notice that a painting of a painting of Christ is still, in some sense, itself depicting Christ. Similarly, a photograph of a photograph of a chair is itself of a chair. 'Represents' is sometimes a transitive relation. Dinnāga himself seems to acknowledge this when he says that "the cognition which cognizes this cognition of the object has the appearance of that cogni-

tion *which is in conformity with the object*". Some modern writers use the phrase "subjective aspect of experience" to refer to the phenomenological quality of the experience, the 'how it feels' to the experiencer. Although the phenomenological quality of an experience is something over and above its intentional content, we must resist the temptation to identify this with Dinnāga's "subjective aspect". The reason is that attending to the phenomenological quality of an experience will not give one any information as to what the experience is about. That distinguishes it sharply from the "subjective aspect" as Dinnāga conceives of it.³

2. MEMORY

I stated at the outset of the previous section that Dinnāga's double aspect theory of mental states enables him to draw a distinction, essential to his master argument for the self-intimation thesis, between remembering a past event and remembering experiencing that event. So he says,

[That cognition has two forms follows]

§1 *k.11c* later also from [the fact of] recollection -

This [expression] "later also from [the fact of] recollection" refers back to "cognition has two forms". Some time after [we have perceived a certain object], there occurs [in our mind] the recollection of our cognition as well as the recollection of the object. So it stands that cognition is of two forms.

Suppose I witness a plane crash. Sometime later I might remember the crash. I might also remember the vivid perceptual experiences I had at the time of the crash. These are, however, two logically distinct memories, for it is quite possible to remember a past event without remembering experiencing that event. Remembering that *p* does not entail remembering experiencing that *p*. The example I have chosen is in fact borrowed from Malcolm, who uses it to illustrate just this point:

As a matter of contingent fact, one does not always remember one's perception of a past event that one remembers. Suppose I saw an airplane crash and burst into flames. Subsequently I remember not only the crashing of the plane against the earth and the flames shooting upwards, but also the terror and nausea I felt. Would this be a case of my remembering "my perception" of a past event? But suppose that a few years later I still remember the crashing and burning of the plane, but I no longer remember the terror and nausea I felt. Do I still remember "my perception" of the past event? (*Memory*, p. 24).

Malcolm commits here the mistake alluded to earlier, of confusing the phenomenological quality of a perception with that subjective aspect which becomes the object of higher order thoughts about the perception, but is otherwise accurate in his description of a case where one

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forgets the experience but remembers the event experienced. More mundane examples abound. I might remember the details of the 1994 Wimbledon women's final, who won, the individual rallies etc., but have no recollection of where I was or how I came to witness it. Similarly, I can remember someone without remembering meeting them, or remember a quotation without being able to remember reading it before. Dinnāga's point here is that when one does remember experiencing an event, the object of one's memory must be something other than the event itself, for otherwise the distinction between remembering an event and remembering experiencing it would collapse. It is his double aspect theory of mental states which enables him to draw the needed distinction. In particular, it enables him to assert

P1 It is possible to remember past experiences, as distinct from past events.

This will be the first premise in Dinnāga's argument for the self-intimation of mental states.

The argument itself appeals to a further principle about remembering, and we might discuss in it this section on Dinnāga's theory of memory. Here, then, is the first part of his argument:

Self-cognition is also [thus established]. Why?

§1 *k.11d* because it [viz., recollection] is never of that which has not been [previously] experienced.

It is unheard of to have a recollection of something without having experienced [it before]. For instance, the recollection of a thing of colour, etc. [does not arise unless the thing of colour or the like has been experienced].

Dinnāga states here that no past event can be remembered unless it has previously been experienced. This thesis is going to be a major premise in his argument. That memory requires a past experience seems at first to be a tautologous fact about memory, but in fact the thesis needs to be stated with care. I do not remember the Battle of Waterloo, the reason being that I was not present at the time. However, I do remember that the Battle of Waterloo took place in 1815. I remember this because I was taught it at school. What memory of a past event demands is not that one has experienced that event for oneself, but that one has, at some prior time, come to think that it occurred. Thus Malcolm:

The logical grammar of "remember" requires that if I remember *x* then previously I witnessed, learned about, or (in a broad sense) experienced *x* (*Memory*, p. 25).

We must read Dinnāga as having this broad sense of "experience" in mind, and read his thesis as demanding just that a memory whose objectual content concerns some event entails a past mental state or

thought having the same objectual content. This previous thought need not be perceptual. The second premise in Dinnāga's argument is thus that

P2 If S remembers an event then S previously experienced it.

P2 is of course consistent with what we earlier established about memory, namely that it is possible to remember a past event without remembering experiencing that event. For P1 demands only that there occurred some prior experience; there is no demand that that experience is itself what is remembered. The plane crash example is just such a case. The occurrence of a prior experience is a necessary condition for the occurrence of a memory, but from that it does not follow that to remember is to remember a prior experience.

3. DINNĀGA'S ARGUMENT FOR SELF-INTIMATION

In the above quotation, Dinnāga states that the "self-cognition" of mental states is itself established by P2. How is this supposed to follow? We have already shown that it is possible to remember our own past experiences and thoughts (that was principle P1). Taking the remembered event in P2 to be some past experience, it follows that if someone remembers a past thought, then she must have previously experienced or been aware of that thought, in the loose sense of 'experience' introduced above. In other words,

P1 + P2 If S remembers a mental event e then S previously experienced e .

This is a straightforward corollary of P1 and P2. We are still a long way from the self-intimation thesis, that every mental event is reflexively aware of itself, for it remains a possibility that the past experience that I am now recalling was experienced by some 'third-party', and not by that very past experience itself. Dinnāga anticipates just this objection, and the second half of his argument responds to it. He says:

Some may hold that cognition also, like a thing of colour, etc., is cognized by means of a separate cognition. This is not true because

§1 k.12a-b₁. if a cognition were cognized by a separate cognition, there would be an infinite regression -

An infinite regression would result if a cognition were to be cognized by a separate cognition. Why?

§1 k.12b₂. because there is a recollection of this [separate cognition] too.

It must be admitted that this cognition by which the [previous] cognition is cognized is [also] later recollected. So, if it should be that this [separate] cognition is experienced by the third cognition [so that it may be recollected], there would be an infinite regression.

The argument here is ingenious. Suppose that I experience a plane crash, and later recall, not just the crash, but also my experiencing it (call this e). Since, in order to remember any event, I must have previously experienced that event, it follows that I must have had some previous experience of my experiencing of the crash (call this e'). Suppose now that e' is not identical to e . Then an infinite regress threatens. It threatens when we ask, do I also remember e' ? If I do, then an iteration on the above argument proves there to exist some further experience (e''), my experience of my experience of e , and so on ad infinitum.

It is clear that an infinite regress will ensue only if Dinnāga can appeal to some further assumption, an assumption which entails that each subsequent higher order is itself remembered, or at least could be remembered. What can this additional assumption be? What is the meaning of Dinnāga's claim that the cognition of the cognition is also later recollected? Well, one meaning is that it is in principle possible to remember any past experience. In other words,

P3* If S experiences an event x then S can subsequently remember x .

This is an extremely strong claim, but if it were true, it would do the work intended of it. In combination with P1, P2 and a denial of the self-intimation thesis, there would be a genuine regress, an infinite chain of distinct mental events. Can we, however, defend P3*, the claim that I can in principle remember any of my past experiences? In a later section, I will examine one way to motivate this claim, by showing that it is a consequence of Locke's theory of personal identity. Dinnāga, however, is not committed to a Lockean theory of personal identity, and in any case P3* seems to be just false. There is, fortunately, a principle weaker than P3*, which will also serve Dinnāga's purpose. The principle I have in mind is:

P3 If S experiences x at time t_1 then S can subsequently remember x for some time $t_2 > t_1$.

What this states is that I can remember events past experienced for at least a little while after experiencing them, even if I forget them later. P3 is the converse of P2, which states that if S remembers an event x at t_2 then S experienced x at some time t_1 where $t_2 > t_1$.

With P1, P2 and P3 in place, the claim that an experience and the experience of that experience are distinct mental events generates an infinite regress. Suppose that at time t_1 an experience $e(x)$ of some event x occurs. By P1 + P3, there could occur at some time $t_2 > t_1$ a memory $m(e)$ of that experience. Since such a memory is possible, then, by P2, there must have occurred, at some time t_3 in the interval between t_1 and t_2 , an experience $e'(e)$ of e . By hypothesis, $e' \neq e$, so $t_3 > t_1$ (it can't be before, since e' is an experience of e). Then, again by P1 + P3, a memory $m'(e')$ of e' could happen at some time t_4 later than t_3 , and by P2, there must therefore have occurred an experience $e''(e')$ at some time t_5 between t_3 and t_4 . By hypothesis, $e'' \neq e'$, so $t_5 > t_3$. And so on ad infinitum. The combined action of P1 + P3 and P2 serves to generate an infinite sequence of temporally distinct experiences, each one having the previous one as its object.

Diñnāga claims, surely correctly, that such a scenario is impossible. It cannot be the case that, subsequent to any ordinary experience, there follows an infinite chain of distinct higher order thoughts. His argument is that,

§1 k.12cd. in such a case, there could be no motion [of cognition] from one object to another. But actually such [a movement of cognition] is accepted.

Therefore, self-cognition must be admitted.

This final claim reminds one of Zeno's paradox of motion. Zeno argued that an arrow fired at a target can never in fact move. For, in order to reach the target, the arrow must first reach the half-way point, and in order to reach that it must first reach the quarter-way point, and so on. The time taken to reach the target is therefore the sum of an infinite series ($0.5 + 0.25 + \dots$). Zeno's mistake was to assume that infinite series must have infinite sums, but Diñnāga makes no comparable error, unless, that is, it is possible to have an infinite number of thoughts in a finite period of time. If this is indeed impossible, then, subsequent to any experience of one object, there will follow an infinitely long avalanche of temporally distinct higher-order mental events, the mind will be occupied for ever, and will never be able to move on to some new experience of a second object.⁴

The obvious way out of this paradox is to suppose that each experience is reflexively aware of itself (i.e. that $e' = e$). That is to say,

If S 'experiences' e then S thereby experiences experiencing e .

Since the reverse conditional is trivial, we arrive finally at a self-illumination thesis:

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SI S experiences e iff S thereby experiences experiencing e .

This then is Diñnāga's master argument for the self-intimation thesis. It brings to the fore a deep conceptual link between memory and self-intimation. In the final section, I will argue that, in the light of empirical discoveries about the mind, we cannot accept the self-intimation thesis, and will diagnose two places at which Diñnāga's argument fails. The first pays more careful attention to what the infinite regress argument actually proves. Diñnāga has shown at best only that at some point in the chain of higher order mental states, mental states become self-intimating, but he has not proved that ordinary first-order experiences are. I might be in pain without noticing that I am in pain, but I perhaps cannot notice that I am in pain without noticing that I have noticed this. A restricted weaker self-intimation thesis might claim only that higher order experiences at some degree become self-intimating, without claiming that every experience is so. Though much more plausible than the unrestricted version, this restricted version is still stronger than most would accept, and perhaps there is a more fundamental flaw in Diñnāga's argument. I will suggest that it lies in the combination of P1 to P2: although remembering a past event requires a previous experience of the event, remembering that experience requires only the experience itself, and not that that experience is itself experienced.

Before that, I want to look at Locke, whose work on the relation between self-intimation, personal identity and memory is significantly illuminated by Diñnāga's argument. Locke's account suggests an intriguing possibility, that P3, the crucial premise in Diñnāga's argument, is a derivable consequence of certain facts about the nature of personal identity. I want to see if this idea can be defended.

4. LOCKE ON MEMORY, SELF-INTIMATION AND PERSONAL IDENTITY

Locke argues that personal identity, memory and self-intimation are extremely closely allied notions. His thesis is that to be a person is to be a self-conscious being, and that what makes a person the same person at different times is the possibility of remembering and thereby appropriating one's past conscious experiences. The famous passage in which he sets out this view is worth quoting in full:

This being premised to find wherein *personal Identity* consists, we must consider what *Person* stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for

any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present Sensations and Perceptions: And by this every one is to himself, that which he calls *self*: It not being considered in this case, whether the same *self* be continued in the same; or divers Substances. For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls *self*, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists *personal Identity*, i.e. the sameness of rational Being: As far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that *Person*; it is the same self now it was then; and 'tis by the same *self* with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done (*Essay 2.XXVII.9*).

The word 'person' refers to a substance just as long as it is thinking and is aware of itself thinking; a person at one time is the same as a person at a later time just in case it is conscious of that other person's thoughts. What makes me now the same person as the one who earlier this morning caught a train is that I have within me memories of certain past experiences, perhaps of thinking "shall I get some coffee now or wait until I reach the station". For Locke, self-intimation or consciousness is the mark of personhood, and co-consciousness by memory is the mark of personal identity across time. Thus

$S_1 = S_2$ iff S_1 experiences an event x then S_2 can subsequently remember experiencing x .

It is a consequence of Locke's view, that if I subsequently forget my past experiences, then I am no longer the same person as the one who first had them: I can no longer appropriate those experiences to myself. Thus Locke's account of personal identity actually entails the strong principle about memory we considered before, P3*, that I can remember all my past experiences! The reason is that this becomes a definitional property of personal identity, it is what makes it the case that it is the same "I" now who then had those experiences.

Could we then use Locke's account of personal identity to buttress Diñnāga's argument for the self-intimation thesis? There is an obvious reason why this cannot be done, as things stand. The reason is that the self-intimation thesis is already assumed by Locke, indeed it is what for him characterises a person at a time. Any straightforward appeal to Locke's account of personal identity would result in circularity. Nevertheless, the idea that facts about personal identity and continuity might be used to make more robust the third premise in Diñnāga's argument seems attractive. Could we not have a criterion for personal identity, which like Locke's trades on memory, but is not committed to a self-intimation thesis. Earlier we noted that a necessary condition of

remembering a past event is that one has previously come to believe that the event occurred. This need not be by direct experience, but might include hearing about the event, or learning of it in some other way. I remember that Everest is a snow-capped mountain even though I have never seen it; rather, I have read that this is so. It might be thought that this necessary connection between present memories and past thoughts is enough to ground a theory of personal identity, one according to which I make *inferences* about my past thoughts and experiences on the basis of my present memories, rather than *directly* remembering those past thoughts and experiences. In other words,

$S_1 = S_2$ iff S_1 experiences an event x then S_2 can subsequently remember x .

This would be as it were an archaeological theory of personal identity, where one's memories are like the present ruined evidence from which one infers back to the experiences of one's past self. Of course, it is still too strong, in that I can no more remember all the past events I once experienced, any more than I can remember all my past experiences. But, unlike Locke's own theory, it does not seem to depend on assuming that the self-intimation thesis is true. The deeper worry about such an account is whether it is strong enough. Suppose, for example, that I remember that someone asked for coffee on the train, though I do not remember actually asking for it. This does not give me any inferential grounds for identifying myself with the person who made the request! More generally, suppose I remember an action but not my performing that action. Do I thereby have any ground for inferring that the action was mine? I have a distinct memory of a bowl of breakfast cereal being eaten this morning, and infer that I would not have this memory unless it was I who ate that cereal, and in this way appropriate the action to myself. But could I not have gained the very same memory by someone else telling me that they had eaten a bowl of cereal? If the account is to work, there must be a special class of memories for which such inferences are warranted, memories of past events for which it is true that I wouldn't now have them unless I had experienced that event in the past. What could these be?

The real problem with this second account is that it permits a distinctive sort of error, which Shoemaker calls an error due to misidentification. Suppose I remember that a certain event occurred, and infer that *someone* experienced that event. It is now open to me to wonder whether that someone is myself or not. However, if I remember *myself* witnessing some event ("from the inside" as Shoemaker says), there is

no such possibility: "[W]hen I know on the basis of memory that I did so-and-so in the past, it is not the case that I remember *someone* doing that thing and identify that person as myself by what I remember about him ... [W]hen I say 'I have an itch', or 'I think so-and-so', it is not the case that I know this because I observe *somebody* having an itch, and identify that person as myself" (1984, p. 103). If I look through a complex series of distorting mirrors at my own face, it is at least possible that I might see a face and fail to recognise that it is mine – I may fail to identify the face as my own. But, as Shoemaker says, recognising one's own experiences and memories is immune to that sort of error due to misidentification. It is impossible that I might experience a pain but wonder whether the pain is mine or someone else's. Similarly for memories of one's own experiences: it is impossible for me to remember a feeling of pain and still wonder whether it was my pain or someone else's. It is this immunity to error due to misidentification that grounds the close conceptual link between memory and identity, and reveals why the second account fails.

Incidentally, Shoemaker draws another conclusion from this observation, one concerning the nature of self-awareness. He claims that when one is self-aware, one is not presented with oneself as an object at all, for if one were, the possibility of misidentification of oneself could arise: "It is essential to remembering one's past actions and experiences 'from the inside' that one's past self, the subject of those actions and experiences, does not enter into the content of one's memory in the way other persons do" (ibid., p. 103). It seems to me that this fits very well with Dinnāga's dual aspect theory of mental states. In that theory, in a memory of one's past experience, the subject enters via the 'subject aspect', while if one remembers another person, that person enters the memory via the 'object aspect'. In that sense, there is an asymmetry of content between remembering myself doing such-and-such and remembering someone else doing such-and-such. In neither case, do we have a memory in which the "I" appears as an object.⁵

I have been considering the possibility that we might draw upon the insight in Locke's account of personal identity in order to defend P3, the crucial premise in Dinnāga's argument. This idea does not, after all, seem viable. Perhaps, however, the principle in question needs no such elaborate defence. To claim that it is in principle possible to remember any past experience for at least some, perhaps very short, period does not seem so implausible as to need a highly theoretically committed defence.

5. AN EVALUATION OF DĪNNĀGA'S ARGUMENT

The thesis that we are necessarily and reflexively aware of our own thoughts is held nowadays to be true by virtually nobody. Discoveries about unconscious mental activity, about animal and infantile thought, and about sub-doxastic states and tacit knowledge, have largely undermined the once prevalent acceptance of the doctrine. Even Descartes, who is supposed to be one of the doctrine's originators, faced criticism on this score. Arnauld, author of the fourth set of objections to Descartes' *Meditations*, says:

The author lays it down as certain that there can be nothing in him, in so far as he is a thinking thing, of which he is not aware, but it seems to me that this is false.... The mind of an infant in its mother's womb has the power of thought, but is not aware of it. And there are countless similar examples, which I will pass over (CSM II 150).

Descartes' reply is extremely interesting:

I do not doubt that the mind begins to think as soon as it is implanted in the body of an infant, and that it is immediately aware of its thoughts, even though it does not remember this afterwards because the impressions of these thoughts do not remain in the memory (*Fourth Replies*: CSM II 171).

Notice that Descartes draws a link between self-intimation and memory, just as Dinnāga and Locke also do, though he uses it to a very different effect. It is the nature of this link which remains of interest for us, even if we abandon the self-intimation doctrine. For in abandoning this doctrine we are forced to revise other beliefs, one's which, perhaps, we did not expect to have to give up.

A first response to Dinnāga's argument is to notice that by this argument he has not established the full self-intimation thesis, that *every* thought is self-aware, even though it is this that he is indeed arguing for. His argument only establishes the weaker thesis that every thought at some higher order is self-aware. That is enough to break the infinite regress, and, even if it is not as much as Dinnāga himself wanted, perhaps it is a plausible position to adopt. An example frequently cited against self-intimation is the case of a walker who, engaged in intense conversation with his companion, fails to notice that his legs are gradually beginning to ache. During a lull in the conversation, he suddenly becomes aware that his legs are aching. What we should say of this case, perhaps, is that the walker had the pain all the time, but was not aware of it all the time. Yet even if one grants this much, it may seem right to say that when the walker is aware of the pain, he is also aware that he is aware of the pain, and so on. The first step into self-consciousness is not compulsory, but once made consciousness is truly

self-intimating. That a self-intimation thesis weakened in this way would not be acceptable to most of those to have espoused self-intimation is clear (cf. Dharmakīrti's remarks at PV II: 539–540). Descartes states explicitly that

the initial thought by means of which we become aware of something does not differ from the second thought by means of which we become aware of it, and more than this second thought differs from the third thought by means of which we become aware that we were aware that we were aware (*Seventh Replies*: CSM II 382).

That, however, is not an argument against the weakened version.

A more interesting response is possible, however. Dinnāga appeals to two features of remembering, first that remembering a past event requires a past experience of that event, and second that it is possible to remember past experiences, and he draws the conclusion that, in order to remember a past experience, one must have had a previous experience of that experience. Does this follow? The first principle gains its credibility from the thought that the past experience as it were puts one in touch with the event, that we cannot *remember* an event unless there has been a flow of information (perhaps a causal chain?) from it to us. That's why it is absurd for me to say that I remember the battle of Waterloo, and equally absurd to say that I remember that it happened in 1815 if I have never been taught this. The demand for a past experience is for a link between the event remembered and the present memory; but, in the case of one's own experiences, no such link is needed. My past experiences, unlike arbitrary past events, are already causally available to my present memory: there is no work for a further experience to do.

To this, Dinnāga might have said one of two things. He might have said that there is an implicit causal theory of memory at work here, and that this theory is false. More interestingly, he might have said that the line of thought trades on a confusion, the confusion between vehicle and content. My past experience is the vehicle when it helps me to remember a past event; to become itself the content of a memory it must first itself be experienced.⁶ If a response along either or both these lines is possible, then after it comes to seem that Dinnāga's argument is a plausible one, and that its conclusion, the weakened version of the self-intimation thesis, might be acceptable.

NOTES

¹ Others to have examined Dinnāga's argument include Th. Stcherbatsky (1930, pp. 163–168), Matilal (1986, pp. 148–160), and Hayes (1988, pp. 140–142). Dharmakīrti

states: "all thought is self-intimating" (*sarvacittacaittānām ātmasamvedanam*, *Nyāyabindu* 1.9). On Dharmakīrti, see also Caturvedi (1978).

² All quotations from Dinnāga follow the translation of Hattori (1968).

³ Dinnāga's theory of consciousness sharply contrasts here with the Sāṅkhya position to which he goes to some lengths to criticize. The Sāṅkhya theory is, as Schweizer (1993, p. 852) puts it, that "the conscious aspect of subjective experience is entirely disengaged from its semantical or representational form". For Dinnāga's criticism, see Hattori (1968, pp. 52–62).

⁴ See Dharmakīrti, *Pramānavārttika* II, pp. 513–514 (Pandey's edition).

⁵ For a stimulating review of discussions of the issue in non-Buddhist Indian schools, see Taber (1990).

⁶ Chakrabarti (1992, p. 108) turns the criticism on its head: "upon one prevalent version of Buddhist epistemology, one aspect of the preceding mental state is also the object (the *ālambana*), the casual and intentional support of the succeeding mental state. So here we seem to have a peculiar collapsing of the owner and the object of the cognitive state. That may not daunt the Buddhist idealist who professes the doctrine of reflexive self-awareness of individual perceptual states. But it is surely incompatible with realism about the object . . .". However, I fail to see how it follows that the vehicle-content distinction is unavailable to Dinnāga.

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THE ROLE OF FEAR IN INDIAN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BUDDHISM

"May the fearful become fearless and those oppressed
by grief find joy. May those who are anxious be rid of
their anxiety and feel secure." Śāntideva¹

The links between fear and religion have been a valid subject of investigation for scholars in modern anthropology and psychology and writers in search of the psychological origins of religion have had a special interest in this subject.² In the Christian world such links have been highlighted by the prominent philosopher Kierkegaard. Fear often has a religious role in India, too. However, except for a recent semi-scholarly essay on fear and Buddhism nothing has been written on the subject of fear in Indian religions.³ In this article I wish to illuminate certain aspects of fear in the religious thought of the Indian sub-continent. I will focus on Buddhist texts in particular. However, I wish to emphasize that I choose a methodological approach where I look for common themes in the religious traditions of India. These traditions share a world-view that warrants such an approach and I believe that one of the tasks of the historian of religion should be to look for the large themes of the Indian religious universe.

Let me make a few reservations before I continue. The point of departure for the discussion of fear in this article is a specific puzzle in Indian literature that deals with the life of the religious renouncer and the way towards the adoption of this life. I will define the problem in more detail over the following pages. Fear is a vast subject in Indian literature and a number of different approaches could be adopted to the topic and a number of links explored. For instance, it might be fruitful to look at the innumerable associations between fear and sexual desire, between the horrible and the erotic.⁴ Perhaps the most interesting link would be the one leading to Indian drama. The Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata Muni has terrifying (bhayānaka) as one of the eight tastes or sentiments (rasa) that a drama can supply in order to move its public. To the

terrifying sentiment belongs the emotion of fear (bhaya). In the famous chapter on sentiments, the Rasādhyāya, Bharata Muni explains:

"Now (the *rasa*) called *bhayānaka* has fear as its permanent emotion. It arises from such *vibhāvas* as ghastly noises, seeing supernatural beings (ghosts), fear and panic due to the (cries) of owls (or the howling of) jackals, going to an empty house or to a forest, hearing about, speaking about, or seeing the imprisonment or murder of one's relatives. It should be acted out by such actions as trembling of the hands and feet, darting motions of the eyes, the hair standing on end, changing facial color (i.e. going white with fear) or stuttering".⁵

The Nāṭyaśāstra's theory of sentiment has had a substantial impact on Indian thought on emotions at least from the third or fourth century and it is not unlikely that monks and scholars who discussed the role of fear in a religious context had knowledge of Bharata Muni and other theorists' treatment of the terrifying sentiment and its corollary, fear. However, the possible links between the dramaturgical and the religious ideas of fear is an example of one fascinating line of inquiry that I must leave out in this article. I am going to restrict my discussion to one problem, namely the double role of fear in some of the textual religious traditions of India. As will soon become clear, the role of fear in Indian religion and especially in Buddhism seems to be somewhat paradoxical and this is the point of departure for this article. Before we go into this problem, however, I will take a brief look at fear in its more familiar forms, the little fears of the everyday life of renouncer and householder, what may be called *trivial fears*.

THE TRIVIAL FEARS OF MONKS AND HOUSEHOLDERS

Fear and the desire to escape it is a theme in Buddhist Pāli literature. In its trivial sense fear is a factor of both the individual and social life of the Buddhist monk. Fear is one side of the multifaceted emotional complex of every human being and freedom from fear is an aspect of the general calming of the mind which is the goal of Buddhist meditation. The overcoming of fear often becomes a meditative practice. In the chapter on pleasure, Piyavagga, of the Dhammapada several verses explain the interconnection between the pleasant and painful feelings. What is pleasurable (*piya*), affection (*pema*), fondness (*rati*), desire (*kāma*) and craving (*taṇhā*) all lead to grief (*soka*) and fear (*bhaya*).⁶ Typically, when one is free from the pleasurable feelings one will also be free from grief and fear. Overcoming fear is part of the monk's way to detachment from worldly matters. The Dhajagga Sutta says that when the monk recollects (*anussarati*, *sarati*) the Buddha, the Dhamma and

the Saṅgha he will experience no fear (*bhaya*), paralysis (*chambhitatta*) or bristling of body-hair in excitement (*lomahaṃsa*).⁷

In the Bhayabherava Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya the Buddha speaks about overcoming the fears of dark and remote places as an exercise of the mind. He explains how he approached horrifying places like orchard shrines, woodland shrines and tree-shrines on auspicious nights and dwelt there in order to encounter fear.

"And while I dwelt there, a wild animal would come up to me, or a peacock would knock off a branch, or the wind would rustle the leaves. I thought "What now if this is the fear and dread (*bhayabherava*) coming?" I thought: "Why do I dwell always expecting fear and dread? What if I subdue that fear and dread while keeping the same posture that I am in when it comes upon me?" While I walked, the fear and dread came upon me; I neither stood nor sat nor lay down till I had subdued that fear and dread. While I stood, the fear and dread came upon me; I neither walked nor sat nor lay down till I had subdued that fear and dread ..."⁸

There are several different enumerations of things that cause fear in the Pāli texts; many of these are negligible as subjects of scholarly investigation. For instance the Sutta Nipāta says that there are five causes of fear that can disturb the monk, namely, gadflies (*daṃsa*), moths or mosquitoes (*adhīpāta*), creeping animals (*sirīmsapa*), contact with humans (*manussaphassa*) and four-legged beasts (*catuppada*).⁹ In this context fear is discussed as something which must be calmed along with other affects. The Buddha explains to Sāriputta the mind-set which should be cultivated by the monk who settles down far away by the root of a tree, in a cemetery, or a mountain cave. The Sutta-Nipāta, then, just like the Bhayabherava Sutta above, is not talking about an existential fear that makes people renounce the world, but rather minor fears that must be calmed by the monk who is engaged in meditation.

Fear in its trivial sense is also a force that controls social life. Typically, four types of fear are thought to guide the monk in a social setting. The fear of self-reproach (*attānuvāda bhaya*), fear of reproach by others (*parānu bhaya*), fear of punishment (*daṇḍa bhaya*) and fear of lower worlds (*duggati bhaya*) all make the monk avoid bad actions and function as a social being.¹⁰ The fear of reproach by the laity, for instance, seems to have been an important force in the shaping of the Buddhist Saṅgha.¹¹

Fear can be destructive and paralysing. The trivial fear of the common man is not only unprofitable but directly harmful from the perspective of the renouncer. Fear is one of the four motives (*thāna*) out of which people do evil deeds, the Buddha tells Sigāla.¹² Fear as a motivation in the everyday life of the householder is destructive. The gift to the Saṅgha given out of fear (*bhayadāna*) is impure (*aviśuddha*), says the

Mahāyāna literature on giving.¹³ Lamotte suggests that this is because impure attachment or interest of any kind makes the gift impure, while the only pure (visuddha) gift is the one given with complete detachment. However, as I have tried to show elsewhere, there have been tendencies to make giving a more pragmatic activity where all modes of donating produce merit.¹⁴

While fear should not be a form of motivation in the everyday life of the monk or the householder, fear is at the core of religious motivation. Without fear gods and men do not realize the need for religious exertion. Thus, one must discard the wrong fear and embrace the right fear. T. Ling speaks of the fundamental difference between, on the one hand, dangers that it is possible to escape, like armies, mad elephants, yakkhas, etc. and, on the other hand, the great danger of death, personified in Māra which is ultimately inescapable.¹⁵ It is the realization of such great and inescapable dangers – death, birth, old age – that is the basis of the non-trivial fear which is the subject of this article. One must choose the right fear. In the words of the Dhammapada: “They who fear when they ought not to fear and do not fear when they ought to fear, such men, following false doctrines, enter the evil path”.¹⁶ What makes one experience of fear good and another bad?

THE PARADOX OF FEAR

If we start looking a little closer at the role of fear in Indian religious thought it becomes apparent that the subject has a fundamental double-ness to it. On the one hand, fear is the natural state of saṃsāric existence. The basic facts of life – like birth, sickness, aging and death – cause fear in living beings. Conversely, freedom from fear is an important aspect of complete religious realization. On the other hand, fear is a necessary state of mind in the striving to escape saṃsāric existence and achieve freedom. Fear should be cultivated as the basic motivating factor in the religious life. Thus, fear is both a negative thing, from which beings should try to escape through religious exertion, and a positive thing, without which the very same exertion is impossible. In other words, if one starts to look into the ideas about fear in Buddhism and Indian soteriologies in general it soon becomes clear that it is a complex subject.

The double function of fear is perhaps most apparent in Pāli Buddhism and the textual basis of this tradition will provide the most important examples in this article. The Buddha leads his followers from the fear of saṃsāric existence towards freedom from fear. He is the Dispeller of

anguish, terror and fear (ubbegaṃ uttāsaṃ bhayaṃ apanuditar).¹⁷ He is the Bestower of fearlessness (abhayada).¹⁸ But at the same time his function is to create dread in gods and men. When a Buddha arises in the world and teaches the Dhamma the gods experience fear, agitation and trembling.¹⁹ In the Perfection of Wisdom literature (prajñāpāramitā), too, it is a common assertion that the teaching of emptiness (śūnyatā) is too terrifying to be taught to people who have not reached a certain stage in spiritual development.²⁰ What is the difference between the fear that the Buddha creates and the fear that he destroys?

The same paradox can be found in Jainism. According to several medieval Jain authors freedom from fear (niḥśaṅka) is a primary part of right view or belief. For instance, Cāmuṇḍarāya lists seven types of fear: Fear of this world (iha-loka), fear of the next world (para-loka), fear of sickness (vyādhi), fear of death (maraṇa), fear of being without protection (agupti), fear of being without defence (atrāṇa), fear of something unexpected (akasmika).²¹ These kinds of trivial everyday fears are detrimental to the religious life and must be destroyed. P. Jaini has listed fear (bhaya) as one of nine “everyday passion-tinged experiences” which will gradually disappear as an individual becomes more spiritually advanced.²² Thus, fear is a symptom of low spiritual attainment in Jainism too. At the same time it is clear that a certain kind of fear is a prerequisite for success in the religious life. In Jainism *saṃvega* has more or less the same function as in the Buddhist examples below. In some of the medieval Jain authors *saṃvega* has been codified as part of the lists of right view or right belief – *samyaktva* or *samyagdr̥ṣṭi*. Pūjyapāda, the Diagambara commentator of the Tattvārthasūtra – who lived perhaps in the fifth century or slightly later – defined *saṃvega* as the ever-present fear of transmigration, whereas the greatest of the Śvetāmbara authors, Hemacandra, defined *saṃvega* as “the desire for *mokṣa* arising from the realization that the pleasures of gods and men are, in the last resort, unsatisfying”,²³ For the Jain authors *saṃvega* is the unease or fear that arises from the basic facts of life in *saṃsāra*. Thus, both fear and freedom from fear have been listed as right views for the Jains.

In the following I will look closer at the two roles of fear in Indian religion and especially in Buddhism. Firstly, I will look at freedom from fear as the goal of religious striving or as a characteristic feature of salvation; secondly, I will look at fear as a means to religious achievement or as the basis for religious motivation. Finally, I will try to put the double role of fear in the context of the religious history of India. I am going to argue that in Buddhism, from which I take most

of my examples and where the doubleness is most clearly expressed, fear was part of the arsenal of the great missionary movement that spread Buddhism throughout the subcontinent and to Sri Lanka from around the middle of the third century B.C. It is likely that Buddhist missionaries used the induction of fear as a technique to make people more receptive to the new movement and its teaching and, conversely, the dispelling of fear was an effective way of binding fresh converts to the community.²⁴ As I will try to show, traces of such an active use of fear can be found in the Pāli texts. I believe the widely accepted view that Buddhism spread simply because of the exemplary manners of its proponents and the rational and pleasing nature of its teaching is naive.

FREEDOM FROM FEAR AS THE AIM OF RELIGIOUS STRIVING

All men fear punishment and death, according to the Buddha, but the Arhat has passed beyond all fear (*sabbabhayaṃ atikkanto*). This is one of the paradoxes with which King Milinda presents the Venerable Nāgasena in the Questions of King Milinda. But this is not really a paradox, Nāgasena explains, because the Arhat is an exception to the general statement that all men fear death.²⁵ For the Arhat all causes of fear have been cut off. Freedom from fear is a constituent of Arhatship. The Arhat is free from fear and terror (*pahīnabhayaḥherava*).²⁶ As we are told in the verse of Sambula Kaccāna in the Theragāthā, the monk had no fear (*bhaya*) although he stayed in a horrible cave (*bherave bile*) and in spite of a rainstorm which was roaring outside.²⁷ The commentary explains that although all other creatures cry out in fear at the thunder and lightning the *thera* had no fear inside his horrible den because he had achieved insight. In other words he is on the way to Arhatship.

The Buddha himself had many similar experiences with dreadful things. Typically Māra, the evil one, approaches the Buddha in order to frighten him and make him stray from his path. On one occasion, for instance, Māra approaches the Lord in the form of an enormous cobra in order to cause fear (*bhaya*), paralysis (*chambhitatta*) and make his body-hair bristle with excitement (*lomahaṃsa*). The Buddha sees through the plan of his evil adversary and he explains that all living beings may try to frighten him (*sabbe pi pāṇā uda santaseyyuṃ*), and they will never succeed.²⁸ Not only the Buddha Gotama had to struggle with fear in order to achieve perfection. This is a common theme in the life of previous Buddhas as well. In the *Buddhavaṃsa* it is said

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that Buddha Kassapa, the twenty-fourth Buddha, created the flower of fearlessness (*abhaya puppha*).²⁹ The Madhurathavilāsinī explains in its commentary to this verse that the flower is the eightfold way leading to the city of no-fear (*abhaya-pura*) which, of course, is the equivalent of *Nibbāna*.³⁰ It was fear and dread at the sight of old age, sickness and death that made the Buddha Vipassi forsake the world, as I will discuss below. One of the characteristics of a Buddha according to later Buddhist literature both of the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna sects is the four assurances (*vaiśāradya*). According to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* these assurances are the assurance that one has attained supreme comprehension with respect to all *dharma*s, the assurance that he has knowledge of the destruction of the defilements, the assurance that he can fully explain the *dharma*s and the assurance that he can explain the Path leading to definitive deliverance.³¹ These assurances are or entail absence from fear.

"The word *vaiśāradya* signifies "absence of fear" (*nirbhayata*). By reason of the fact that he knows that he has understood all the *dharma*s, destroyed all the defilements, etc., the Buddha is free from fear in the assemblies".³²

The way towards freedom from fear is a central concept in the idea of salvation in Pāli Buddhism. Buddhaghosa concludes his exposition of the four noble truths by giving seven different similes (*upamāta*) of the truth of suffering, its origin, its cessation and the path to its cessation. One of these similes is based on fear. According to Buddhaghosa, the four noble truths can be understood as fear (*bhaya*), the origin of fear (*bhayamūla*), the freedom from fear (*nibbhaya*), and the means to attain this (*tadadhigamupāya*).³³ The expressions *released from fear* (*bhayā pamutta*) and *set free in fearlessness* (*abhaye vimutta*) are descriptions of the *nibbānic* state.³⁴ *Nibbāna* is freedom from fear.

The idea that freedom from fear is an aspect of the highest religious or spiritual attainment is certainly older than Buddhaghosa and indeed older than Buddhism. According to the Chāndogya Upaniṣad gods and men become free from fear and immortal by entering the sound OM.³⁵ Fear is one of the characteristics of the self (*ātman*) according to the Chāndogya and Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣads.³⁶ The self is immortal, free from fear, it is Brahman, says the Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.3.4.³⁷ Reaching the state of no-fear implies realizing the self. In the Praśna Upaniṣad freedom from fear (*abhaya*) is one of the characteristics of the highest stage which only can be reached by meditation on the syllable OM.³⁸ In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad freedom from fear is found in heaven. Here one has no fear of death or old age, Naciketas explains to Yama.³⁹ The Taittirīya Upaniṣad also makes it clear that freedom from fear is

a characteristic feature of the perfected state. "For when a man finds within that invisible, incorporeal (anātmya), indistinct, and supportless essence, the fearless stage on which to rest, then he becomes free from fear. When, on the other hand, a man creates a hollow or a fissure within it, then he experiences fear".⁴⁰

In commenting on this verse of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad Śaṅkara picked up the topic of fear and offered an explication of the nature of fear emphasizing the doctrine of non-duality. One attains fearlessness (abhaya) by recourse to the true essence (sadvastu), Śaṅkara said. One does not attain the cessation of fear through recourse to what is not the true essence. In other words, only by recourse to Brahman does one attain freedom from fear. Fear is produced by someone else, Śaṅkara continued. It is not the case that one's fear is produced by oneself. When one becomes steadfast in one's true being (svarūpapratistha), then one neither sees, hears or discerns anymore. When one sees no other and does not create a splitting (bheda) within the self, one has reached freedom from fear. Then there is nothing outside the self to create fear in the self. It is the idea of duality caused by ignorance (avidyā) which is the basis of fear, according to Śaṅkara and, as we saw above, the Taittirīya Upaniṣad naturally lends itself to this interpretation by stressing that the creation of a fissure (dara) in the self is the cause of fear.⁴¹

The Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, too, suggests that the state of fearlessness is reached when one realizes that there is no other, that there is nothing apart from the self. The first being became afraid, it says, and therefore one becomes afraid when one is alone. "Then he thought to himself: "Of what should I be afraid, when there is no one but me?" So his fear left him, for what was he going to be afraid of? One is, after all, afraid of another".⁴² Verily, Śaṅkara said in his commentary to this verse, fear arises from a second (dvitīya), from another object (vastvantara). This second, the other object, appears only through ignorance (avidyā).⁴³ When one attains the realization that the self is alone, that everything else is caused by ignorance, there is nothing to cause fear anymore. One has reached salvation.

Thus, the idea that freedom from fear is an important aspect of the highest spiritual attainment is present in the Upaniṣads and in the Vedānta as taught by Śaṅkara. When we look at freedom from fear as a characteristic of the goal of religious striving, there are clear parallels in Buddhism, Jainism and Hindu soteriology. When one has no idea of another anymore and when one does not create a splitting or fissure within the self, then there is nothing to be afraid of according to the

Upaniṣads cited above. Freedom from fear is the overcoming of the duality caused by illusion, according to the Advaita interpretation.

Not surprisingly perhaps, there are parallels to this explanation of the origins of fear in Madhyamaka Buddhism.⁴⁴ The spiritual and fervent poetry of the scholar monk Śāntideva, who probably flourished in the eighth century and is associated with the great Buddhist university at Nālandā – is an interesting source for the understanding of the role of fear in this tradition. Indeed, large parts of his Bodhicaryāvatāra can be seen as attempts to induce fear of *samsāra* and a motivation to escape its afflictions. The horrors of *samsāric* existence are graphically described and, most importantly, a sense of great urgency for the religious life is conveyed. How can you lead a normal life when Yama, the god of death, is sizing you up at every turn, when you have entered the mouth of death, while you hear the hellish bellowings and behold the grief-stricken face of relatives? Quaking from terror, your body caked in excrement what will you do?⁴⁵ Of course, says Śāntideva, you must enter the path of the Bodhisattva and exert yourself to achieve perfection.

The Prāsaṅgika tradition of the Madhyamaka, of which Śāntideva was a representative, holds that nothing exists apart from the mind. One possible meaning of dependent origination (*praṭīyasamutpāda*) for the Prāsaṅgikas is *origination in dependence on the designating mind*.⁴⁶ But if fearful objects do not really exist, from where does the fear arise? In the answer to this question Śāntideva reveals a certain affinity with the Vedāntic ideas of the origination of fear.

"So too tigers, lions, elephants, bears, serpents, and all malign beings, and all the guards of hell, ogresses, demons, / All these are bound through the binding of a single mind, and through the taming of a single mind, all are tamed. / Since all fears and incomparable sufferings arise from the mind alone. So it was taught by the Teacher of Reality. / ... Every single thing arises from the evil mind, sang the Sage. So there is nothing dangerous in the three worlds other than the mind".⁴⁷

All fears arise from the mind and when the mind is controlled fear will cease. Śāntideva seems to explain the origin of fear from the existence of mind. Later, however, he summarizes an opponent's argument for the existence of a self, which says that fear demonstrates the existence of an "I".⁴⁸ In other words, he refutes the induction of an "I" from the existence of fear. Also in the Śikṣā Samuccaya, Śāntideva's other great work, it is clear that fear originates in wrong ideas about identity. "Fear arises from the holding on to the self (ātmagrāha)", it says.⁴⁹ The *bodhisattva* who lives in forest seclusion must get rid of the sense of self, achieve detachment and realize that there is nothing to be afraid of apart from what the mind creates.

In Pāli Buddhism too, fear ultimately arises from the mind's involvement with the outside world. There are fundamental differences concerning the reality of the world and the self in Vedānta, Madhyamaka and Pāli Buddhism.⁵⁰ However, in all these philosophies it is the interaction of the mind with external objects that causes fear. Fear springs from acquaintance or intimacy (*santhavāto bhayaṃ jātaṃ*), according to the *Sutta-Nipāta*.⁵¹ The Pāli texts that deal with meditation all stress the importance of detachment from the world and from one's own sense experiences.

The idea of detachment is also part of some of the most important symbols and metaphors of Buddhahood and Arhatship. The lotus is often used as a symbol because it grows in muddy water without getting tainted by its dirty surroundings. Animals like the elephant and the rhinoceros also symbolize loneliness and detachment from the world. The Buddha or the Arhat is often called a *lion*. This is because the lion symbolizes strength and royal power, but also, I think, because the lion lives alone, away from the other animals, it is aloof, separate and completely detached. As I will return to shortly, the Buddha, just like the lion, causes fear but is never subject to fear himself. In the *Sutta-Nipāta* there is a story about the Brahmin Sela – with three hundred followers – who wishes to go and see the Buddha. As they set out Sela tells his companions that they must tread carefully on their way to the Lord, because Lords are hard to approach like lions that roam alone.⁵² The Buddha and the Arhats are unapproachable lions. They are aloof, separate, with minds drawn away from the disturbing sights of the world. The Brahmin Sela tells the Buddha that he is an unattached lion free from fear and terror (*sīho si anupādāno pahinabhayabheravo*).⁵³ Complete detachment is a prerequisite for freedom from fear.

These brief remarks suffice, I think, to conclude that there are clear parallels across the Indian religious traditions about freedom from fear as an important aspect of religious realization. There are also indications that fear is a source of motivation and a prerequisite for religious striving in a range of Indian soteriological traditions. Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* 1.21 indicates that *saṃvega* is a feeling that puts extra energy and commitment into the meditation practice. *Samvega* is here a quality that makes *samādhi* easier to attain.⁵⁴ However, neither Patañjali nor the commentators discuss the nature of *saṃvega* and it is therefore difficult to judge how close it is to the concept in Buddhism or Jainism. I will concentrate on Buddhist material in the following exposition of fear as a means to religious achievement.

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FEAR AS THE MEANS TO RELIGIOUS ACHIEVEMENT

In the *Mahāpadāna Sutta* certain sights made the former Buddha Vipassi aware of the problem of birth, aging, sickness and death and this made him feel uneasy and depressed. These four – birth (*jāti*), aging (*jarā*), sickness (*vyādhi*), death (*maraṇa*) – are all causes of *saṃvega* (*saṃvegavattu*) according to Buddhaghosa. The uneasiness and depression of Vipassi were the religious perturbation of *saṃvega*. According to the *Buddhacarita*, the young Gotama was motivated by the same kinds of experiences. On three pleasure excursions outside the palace he saw an old man, a sick man and a corpse. These sights were illusions created by gods in order to bring about a disturbance in the mind of the prince. His father, the King, was afraid that the prince's tender mind might be perturbed by the sights and he forbade the appearance of afflicted common folk on the royal road.⁵⁵ The King was afraid that the sights of the world might cause *saṃvega* in his son and make the prince renounce the world and adopt the religious life. As the *Thūpavaṃsa* sums up the prelude to the great renunciation, the prince was overcome by fear (*saṃvegajāta*).⁵⁶

The term *saṃvega* occurs several times in the Pāli Canon. In the *Sangīti Suttanta* the Venerable Sāriputta lists *saṃvega*, the agitation over agitating conditions (*saṃvejaniyesu thānesu*), as a point in his summary of the Buddhist doctrine.⁵⁷ In the *Forest Suttas* of the *Samyutta Nikāya*, monks who stay in forests become neglectful of their religious discipline in different ways. One is indulging in wrong and evil thoughts during his siesta, another is falling asleep, while some have excessive contact with the laity. As a consequence, the *devas* of the forests, out of compassion, wish to agitate them (*saṃvejetukāmā*) and address the monks with verses. The idea is that when the monks are properly agitated, when they experience a sufficient amount of *saṃvega*, their religious discipline will improve.⁵⁸ In the *Sayings on the Limbs of Wisdom* in the *Samyutta Nikāya* *saṃvega* is one of the results of meditating on the idea of a skeleton.⁵⁹ Other objects of meditation, which would have the same effect of creating fear and disgust with transient things like the human body, are corpses in different stages of decay.

The same list is found in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* where we are told that the idea of a skeleton (*aṭṭhikasaññā*), the idea of a worm-eaten corpse (*puḷavakasaññā*), the idea of a discoloured or bluish corpse (*vinīlasaññā*), the idea of a festering corpse (*vipubbakasaññā*)⁶⁰, the idea of a corpse full of holes (*vicchiddakasaññā*), and the idea of a swollen corpse

(uddhumātasāññā) are all signs of concentration (samādhinimitta).⁶¹ This kind of meditation is reflection on impurity (asubhakammatthāna). In the Abhidamma the ten impurities – corpses in different stages of decay – are part of a compendium of meditation subjects. Those who night and day follow the teaching (sāsana) of the Buddha always have the realization of impurity (asubhasaññin), says the Itivuttaka.⁶² The Itivuttaka devotes one *sutta* to *samvega*.⁶³ The monk who is possessed of two-things lives at ease and is disposed toward the destruction of the *āsavas*, the intoxications of the mind which trap man in saṃsāric existence. Such a monk is on his way to Arhantship. The two things are *samvega* and exertion (padhāna) which comes as the result of *samvega*.

We saw above that the Buddha is sometimes thought of as a lion in his detachment from the affairs of the world and the lion becomes an important metaphor also in the ideas of the induction of religious fear. An interesting explication of the function of fear in Pāli Buddhism is found in the simile of the lion.⁶⁴ Here the role of the Buddha in the world of gods and men is compared to the role of the lion in the world of animals. When the lion roars all other animals experience fear, agitation and trembling (bhayaṃ samvegam santāsam āpajjanti). They creep into their holes, jump back into the water, run off into the forest or fly up in the air. The king's elephants break their bonds, void their excrements and run to and fro. In the same way, when a Buddha arises in the world and teaches the Dhamma the gods experience fear, agitation and trembling.⁶⁵ They realize that they are impermanent, unstable, not to last and prisoned in a person (mayaṃ hi kira bho aniccā addhuvā asassatā sakkāyapariyāpanā ti). In other words they are subject to the vicissitudes of *saṃsāra* just like other creatures. The function of the Buddha in the simile of the lion is to create fear through his teaching. The content of the Dhamma is intended to evoke fear in those who listen and when this fear is effectively translated into religious motivation one will strive to attain *nirvāna*.

Samvega occurs with the same meaning of an emotional perturbation motivating the religious life in the Prātimokṣasūtra of the Sarvāstivādins. It is part of the pessimistic introductory description of the condition of the world. Everything is in rapid decay, soon men will be like beasts, and the importance of the religious life is growing correspondingly. The monk should cultivate his feelings of affliction and open his eyes to the miseries of the world. *Samvega* is a desired mental state which will make the monks listen attentively to the teaching of the Buddha.⁶⁶

Buddhaghosa enumerates eight causes of *samvega*, the *aṭṭha samvegavatthu*, which should be contemplated upon by the monk

when the mind needs to be encouraged on the path of religion. These are birth (jāti), ageing (jarā), sickness (vyādhi), death (maraṇa), suffering of loss (apāyadukkha), suffering of past and future rooted in the round of rebirth (atīte vattamūlaka dukkha), and the suffering of the present rooted in the search for nutriment (pacuppanne āhārapariyeṭṭhimūlaka dukkha).⁶⁷ Later in the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa spells out the connection between religious motivation and fear in more detail.⁶⁸ Firstly, he looks at knowledge of appearance as fear (bhayatupatthānañāna). To the person who has this knowledge, the formations (saṅkhāra) and their inevitable cessation and dissolution appear, both in the past, present and future, as terrible beasts, lions, tigers, *yakkhas*, *rakkhasas*, etc. Then follows knowledge of contemplation of danger (ādīnavānupassanāñāna), whereby the three types of becoming (bhava), the four great elements (mahābhūta), the five constituent elements (khandha), the six inner and outer *āyatana*, i.e. the sense organs and their objects, the seven types of consciousness (viññāna), etc. appear as terrible dangers such as snakes, murderers, disease, etc. Then, as the result of seeing everything as great danger, comes knowledge of contemplation of dispassion (nibbidānupassanāñāna).

According to Buddhaghosa, then, when the monk meditates on fear he comes to see all formations and all becoming as danger. All forms that life may take are dangers because everything is necessarily subject to dissolution and cessation. From seeing all formations as danger he grows dispassionate. From the dispassion and detachment arises the desire for deliverance. It is a commonplace in the Pāli literature that dispassion and detachment are a prerequisite for – or even a constituent of – religious realization. *Virāga* is often used to gloss *nibbāna*. But in Buddhaghosa's exposition of fear dispassion presupposes fear and is a stage in between fear and the desire for freedom. In fact, says Buddhaghosa, tradition has it that the three kinds of knowledge leading up to the knowledge of the desire for deliverance are essentially the same thing.⁶⁹ The appearance as fear comprises contemplation of danger and contemplation as dispassion. What we are left with, then, is a complex of fear and contemplation of danger leading up to the desire for deliverance or Nibbāna. Religious motivation is in fact a result of fear in Buddhaghosa's exposition.

Mahāyāna Buddhism also has the idea that fear is an essential motivating factor on the way to embracing the path of the Bodhisattva. Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra is apparently meant to induce such motivation. "Realizing that you are like a captive fish, how right it is for you to be afraid right now", and "Out of the fear of suffering, and while

meditating on the praises, one should create desire", Śāntideva says.⁷⁰ In meditating on the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas one should remain possessed of fear.⁷¹ Suffering and fear are indeed constructive and positive things for Śāntideva as long as they lead to the adoption of the religious life.

"The virtue of suffering has no rival, since, from the shock it causes, intoxication falls away and there arises compassion for those in cyclic existence, fear of evil, and a longing for the Conqueror".⁷²

The way from fear to the adoption of the life in religious exertion is described in a vivid and personal manner by the Madhyamaka scholar. Someone who is taken away to have a limb cut off is seized with fear and sees the world in a completely different way. But even this is nothing compared to the fear experienced by the one who realizes the horrors of saṃsāric existence. It is a tremendous fear that transforms his life.

"With cowering glances I search the four directions for deliverance. What saint will deliver me from this great fear? / Right now I go for refuge to the mighty Protectors of the world, who have undertaken the care of the world, the Conquerors who remove all fear. / Trembling with fear I give myself to Samantabhadra, and again freely I give myself to Mañjuṣa. / Terrified I cry out in anguish to the Protector Avalokita whose conduct overflows with compassion. I have done evil. May he protect me. / I have transgressed your command. Now, at seeing the danger, terrified, I go to you for refuge. Destroy the danger, quickly!"⁷³

If we return to the Śikṣā Samuccaya we will find more material that shows how fear was thought to be a determining motivating factor for the adoption of the religious life. Fear is a prominent theme in the praise of the life of seclusion in the forest. The Bodhisattva who has left the world and dwells in the forest observes that the life of seclusion alone does not make anybody an ascetic. Indeed, there are a number of beings who live in the forest – animals, robbers, caṇḍālas – and are nevertheless devoid of ascetic qualities (śramaṇaḡuṇa). So what is the difference between the Bodhisattva and these other forest-dwellers? It is the Bodhisattva's motivation. He must ask himself: To what end have I come into the forest (kimarthamahamaranyamāgataḡ)? The answer is *fear* (bhayabhīta).

"It was fear that brought me to the forest (bhayabhīto'smyahamaranyamāgataḡ). Fear of what? The fear of worldly society, the fear of company; the fear of passion, hatred, delusion; the fear of pride, intoxication, hypocrisy, pain; the fear of praise, envy, and jealousy; the fear of form, sound, smell, taste, touch; I was afraid of the ideas of individuality and possession, afraid of arrogance and of doubt, afraid of the Māra of the elements of being, the Māra of sin, the Māra of death, and the Māra of the gods."⁷⁴

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Śāntideva's list continues. The aspiring Bodhisattva was frightened by different kinds of ideas and feelings of worldly life as well as the prospect of rebirth in hell or other low forms of existence. He concludes: "It was the fear of all such terrible things that led me to go into the forest".⁷⁵

The forest itself, however, is full of fear and dangers and without the right attitude to these fears no advancement is possible for the monk dwelling in the wilderness. A clue to understanding the role of fear in Buddhism is the determination and skill which are needed in order to take advantage of it. For the common man fear is destructive simply because he is not able to employ it in a constructive way. For the advanced monk the opposite is the case. A good example of how fear is thought of as something which must be taken control of and channeled correctly is found in the summary of the five fears. There are future or potential fears (anāgatabhaya), which when contemplated upon (sampaṣṣati) should make the monk live to attain the unattained.⁷⁶ These are about the dangers that may cause the monks' death in the forest. Animals, for instance are, a prominent threat to his safety.

"Take the case of a monk, forest-gone, who reflects thus: I am now quite alone in the forest; and living here alone, a snake may bite me, a scorpion may bite me, or a centipede may bite me, and cause my death; and that would be a hindrance to me. Behold now, I will put forth energy to attain the unattained, to master the unmastered, to realize the unrealized".⁷⁷

The list continues with all the different fears of forest life that may lead to the death of the monk. Interestingly, the fears include not only the threat from animals – apart from poisonous creatures there are lions, tiger, hyenas, etc. – but there is also the fear of social breakdown due to famine and bad crops or the movements of people threatened by robbers.⁷⁸ This reveals how even the forest-dwelling monk in the last instance is dependent on the world for his existence and religious practice. The point of all these different fears, however, is to use them in a constructive way. All the fears that are not yet realized, but which the monk can behold in the future (anāgatabhaya), must make the monk exert himself (viriyam ārabhati) to attain the unattained.⁷⁹ The expectation of horrors should cause a motivating fear that sets the mind firmly on the right path.

It is clear, then, that in Buddhist literature, both of the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna, fear is seen as an important means to religious achievement. However, as far as I have been able to determine, this is not the case in other Indian soteriologies, except, to some extent, in Jainism. Of course, there is a large number of traditions that I have

not been able to look at in this brief survey and a more thorough examination of the role of fear in different branches of Hinduism may prove me wrong. However, if we accept for now the assumption that freedom from fear as the goal of the religious life is a general idea in Indian religions, whereas fear as an essential *means* on the way towards the goal is more or less peculiar to Buddhism, then we may want to ask why this is the case. Why was Buddhism alone in developing the idea of fear as a primary incentive to religious striving? To answer this I think we need to look at the ideas of mission in early Buddhism and the role of fear in missionary activity.

FEAR AND MISSION

From the literature which has been available to me in this study it appears that freedom from fear is an *aim* of religious striving in different Indian soteriologies, whereas the idea of fear as a *means* to religious striving – fear as motivation – is found first of all in early Buddhism and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in Jainism. How did fear come to have this position in Buddhism? We may find a clue to answer this question by looking again at the conversion stories in the early Buddhist literature. R. Gombrich has pointed out that while the term skill in means (*upāyakaśālya*) is of later origin, the skill of adapting the message to the audience is of enormous importance in the Pāli canon.⁸⁰ G. MacQueen has shown that one of the major themes of the *Śrāmanyaphalasūtra* is the Buddha's skill as a teacher.⁸¹ Having quoted passages from the *Upāli sūtra* where the householder Upāli, a lay supporter of the Jains, is converted by the Buddha to the frustration of Nirgrantha Jñātiputra, MacQueen says:

"So the Buddha was accused of knowing an enticing device (or, knowing conversion magic: *avaṭṭaniṃ māyaṃ jānāti*). Whether he knew such or not, there is no doubt but that he must have been a highly skilled teacher".⁸²

In the *Śrāmanyaphalasūtra*, the Buddha employs his skill in means in converting Ajātaśatru and the Buddhist literature gives many other examples of the Buddha's conversion magic. As in the case with the Jaina lay supporter in the *Upāli Sūtra*, the missionary activity of the Buddha often takes place at the expense of other sects and a sense of contest is often reflected in such passages. Fear is an essential part of some of the paradigmatic conversion stories in this literature. The biography of the Buddha himself is the prime example, but fear is also a prominent factor in the conversion stories of other people. This makes it natural to ask the question of whether the emphasis on fear could have something to do with the missionary stance of Buddhism.

In one of the most outspoken expressions of the missionary zeal of the early Buddhists in the Pāli literature, it is evident that fear is used as a means to convert new people to the growing movement of renouncers. In the *Mahāvagga* of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* I.15–20 the Buddha tries to win over a group of matted hair ascetics, *jaṭilas*, to his movement. The Buddha performs many wonders in order to show that he is of greater perfection than his competitors. That there indeed was a certain degree of competition between different teachers of the time seems evident from the stories about people like Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Kesakambalī, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Sañjaya Belatthiputta and Nigantha Nātaputta. However, in the Buddha's competition with the *jaṭilas* his magical powers have little effect. The leader of the matted hair ascetics believes himself to be of greater power and of greater religious perfection than the Buddha and has no wish to give up his current practices in order to join the Buddhists. When every attempt has been made to convert the ascetics, the Buddha finally resorts to his ultimate weapon, namely his ability to induce fear and unease.

"Then it occurred to the Lord: "Now for a long time it will occur to this foolish man, "Truly the great recluse is of great psychic power, of great might; but yet he is not a perfected one as I am". Now suppose I should deeply stir this matted hair ascetic?" (*yam nāndham imam jaṭilam samvejeyyan ti*.) The Lord spoke thus to the matted hair ascetic Kassapa of Uruvelā: "Neither are you, Kassapa, a perfected one nor have you entered on the way to perfection, and that course is not for you by which you either could be a perfected one or could have entered on the way to perfection".⁸³

The Buddha induces *samvega* in the ascetic in order to convert him to Buddhism. This has the desired effect and as a symbol of the Buddha's victory the ascetics cut off their matted hair and throw away their braids, carrying poles and their devices of fire-worship. What we have here, then, is an account of the missionary zeal of the Buddha and his movement in which the creation of fear is the ultimate means to conversion.

If we look at one of the most important stories of missionary activity in Pāli literature – the visit of the Tathāgata to Laṅkā in the first chapter of the *Mahāvamsa* – we get a strong impression of the importance of fear in the spread of Buddhism to new territories. In fact, the *Mahāvamsa* sets the visit of the Buddha to Sri Lanka in the context of the conversion of the *jaṭilas*. During the Buddha's campaign of proselytizing among the matted hair ascetics Kassapa of Uruvelā prepares for a great sacrifice. The Buddha reads the minds of Kassapa and sees that he wishes the Buddha to stay away. This, of course, is part of the competitive stance of the relationship between the Buddha and the *jaṭilas*. Instead of

appearing at the sacrifice of Kassapa, the Buddha begs for alms and eats a meal, and then he goes to Laṅkā because he knows that the island will be a stronghold of his doctrine. When he arrives there is a great gathering of yakkhas living in the island.

"To this great gathering of the yakkhas went the Blessed One, and there, in the midst of that assembly, hovering in the air over their heads, at the place of the (future) Mahiyāṅga-Thūpa, he struck terror (*saṃvega*) to their hearts by rain, storm, darkness and so forth. The yakkhas, overwhelmed by fear (*bhaya*), besought the fearless Vanquisher (*abhaya jina*) to release them from terrors, and the Vanquisher, destroyer of fear (*abhayada*), spoke thus to the terrified yakkhas: 'I will banish this your fear (*bhaya*) and your distress (*dukkha*), O yakkhas, give ye here to me with one accord a place where I may sit down'. The yakkhas thus answered the Blessed One: 'We all, O Lord, give you even the whole of our island. Give us release from our fear'.⁸⁴

The Buddha descends among the yakkhas and dispels their fears and the cold and darkness. Then he preaches to the yakkhas, who are too shaken to put up any resistance, and converts them all to his Dhamma. In short, the Buddha uses certain techniques to induce fear (*saṃvega* and *bhaya*) in the potential converts and when they are sufficiently perturbed he promises to deliver them from their fear and distress. It seems that when the early Buddhists went out to win followers one of their strategies of proselytizing was to induce fear in potential converts and at the same time offer a path to fearlessness. (This is, of course, a pattern familiar to social scientists who study conversion techniques in modern sects.)

This view of Buddhist missionary activity contradicts much of what has been said about the spread of the Buddha's Dhamma both by scholars and by Buddhist texts themselves. It is often said in the Pāli literature that the behaviour of the monks and nuns is supposed to bring satisfaction or pleasure (*pasāda*) to non-believers (*appasanna*) and increase the number of believers (*pasanna*).⁸⁵ N. Dutt's summary of Buddhist missionary activity as relying exclusively on the excellent personality of its propagators and the rationality of its doctrines is typical of a tendency among scholars to see Buddhism, and, more importantly, all its historical and geographical manifestations, as inherently peaceful, tolerant and cognitively pleasing.⁸⁶ M. Wijayarātṇa points out that the Pāli texts constantly emphasize the need for monks and nuns to exhibit exemplary behaviour in front of lay people. "The Buddha's teaching spread thanks to the exemplary conduct of his disciples",⁸⁷ he asserts. E. Lamotte seems to have had an ambivalent view of the early spread of Buddhism. On the one hand he does realize that the Buddhist missionary activity involved zealous persuasion and even straightforward frightening of potential converts:

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"In order to gain the sympathy of the masses, the third century missionaries exploited the eternal themes of popular preaching, suitable for striking the imagination and provoking a psychological shock. The discourses listed by the chronicle struck all the sensory key-points in turn. The missionaries began by commiserating over the wretchedness of humanity, threatened by hell, condemned from all eternity to old age, disease and death, a slave to its own body and senses ... Then they celebrated the joy and peace which a virtuous and zealous man enjoys ..."⁸⁸

Interestingly, Lamotte builds his view of the nature of Buddhist missions in part on the contents of the discourses that the missionaries are said to have preached to the people of different countries and ends up with a picture that is very close to that of the preachers of hellfire and damnation that we are used to from medieval Christianity. However, he does not seem to be very comfortable with this position, for he changes his view in the conclusion to the chapter on the Buddhist missions, when he asserts that "private initiative played its part in the missionary movement, but the efforts of individuals fade before the intrinsic expansionary power of the Good Law which required nothing more than politically favourable circumstances to manifest itself".⁸⁹

I think the idea that Buddhism spread primarily through its own inherent qualities is a naive view of missionary activity. The Buddhist texts themselves do indeed emphasize the exemplary conduct of the members of the *samgha* and the inherent qualities of the Dhamma, but when we try to reconstruct actual Buddhist missionary activity in Asia a blind trust in such assertions is misguided. References to "fire and brimstone preaching" are not at all prominent compared to the references to mendicants who light up the world with their holiness. But this is only what we should expect. The few references that contradict the general impression of peaceful conversions are the most interesting for the scholar. Without going in detail on the complicated matter of textual transmissions⁹⁰ I find it reasonable to assume that a number of references to mission in Buddhist texts might have been invented or revised in order to make the Dhamma seem like the natural religion that people of all countries embrace happily, while in reality it was preached with far more fervent techniques of persuasion.⁹¹ Furthermore, I would like to emphasize that in ascribing the missionary success of Buddhism exclusively to the qualities of the Dhamma and its advocates, scholars adopt, I suspect often unwittingly, the highly questionable position that sees religion, in this case Buddhism, as an autonomous entity, something which exists *sui generis*, and cannot be understood by reference to something outside the religion itself.

As we saw in the simile above, the Dhamma of the Buddha is supposed to make gods and men tremble and shake – like animals hearing the

roar of the lion – and adopt the religious life which leads to freedom from fear. Fear is presented as a fact of samsāric existence just like pain or unease (*dukkha*). We saw above that according to Buddhaghosa the four noble truths can be understood as fear (*bhaya*), the origin of fear (*bhayamūla*), the freedom from fear (*nibbhaya*), and the means to attain this (*tadadhigamupāya*). A characteristic of Buddhist philosophy and soteriology is its stress on the point of departure. The situation of living beings is one of pain and fear, the Pāli texts say, and they explain what this situation entails and how it originates. This emphasis on the point of departure, the situation from which one must seek deliverance, gave early Buddhism a particularly dynamic missionary stance. The sense of urgency created in potential converts through this strategy probably made them more receptive to the missionary efforts of the Buddhists.

The weapon of fear has been part of the missionary arsenal of Buddhists and perhaps other Indian traditions, but again fear is worthless without its negation, freedom from fear, and the ability to induce fear must be seen in conjunction with the ability to relieve fear and soothe the minds of people in distress. The Buddha induces fear and is the bestower of fearlessness (*abhaya*), as the *Mahāvamsa* says. According to Mahāyāna mythology Avalokiteśvara typically bestows fearlessness to terrified beings (*bhūtānāṃ sattvānāṃ abhayaṃ dadāti*) and a common epithet of this popular bodhisattva is *abhaya*.⁹² Another figure of the Mahāyāna pantheon who is associated with freedom from fear is Amoghasiddhi. Amoghasiddhi is one of the Dhyāni Buddhas and is depicted iconographically with his right hand in showing the sign of no-fear, *abhayamudrā*.

We may note that the gift of no-fear (*abhaya*) is an important aspect of the life of the Indian renouncer in the Hindu tradition, too, although here it takes on a very different role. The renouncer must give the gift of no-fear to all beings. The *Hārītasmti*, for instance, prescribes the vow of *abhaya* towards all beings for the person who is about to become a *samnyāsīn*.⁹³ J. F. Sprockhoff has discussed the gift of no-fear in the context of the adoption of the life of a *samnyāsīn* (*samnyāsa-vikāra*). According to Sprockhoff the *samnyāsa*-ceremony has three core elements, among which is the gift of no-fear to all beings.⁹⁴

CONCLUSION

Fear is an essential aspect of samsāric existence and the goal of the life of the renouncer is the stage where there is freedom from fear. Fear

is, in other words, a painful thing from which human beings should try to free themselves. On the other hand, fear is absolutely necessary. Without fear nobody would strive for religious realization. Without fear people would not exert themselves to achieve deliverance from fear.

The point of departure for this article was the initial appearance of a contradiction in the treatment of fear in Indian religions and, in particular, in Buddhism. The solution to this puzzle is the fact that fear has very different functions under different circumstances: it is the talents and discipline of the individual that make the difference. The advanced are able to apply fear in a constructive way, as a motivating factor in the religious life. In those who are not able to channel fear into religious motivation it is just a confusing and destructive feeling creating problems in everyday life.

I mentioned in the introduction that the links between fear and religion have been a valid topic of scholarly investigation in anthropology and psychology in the West. In an essay which attempts to say something about experiences which are so basic to human existence across cultures it seems reasonable to return to a general angle of approach in the concluding comments. We saw that fear of sickness and death was a basic idea in the Buddhist material. If we adopt a bird-view of human religiosity it seems that such fear is a basic factor of human emotional life but that, although it is addressed by religious doctrine, there does not seem to be a straightforward relationship between beliefs and such fear. To put this statement in perspective let us look at some data from a non-Indian context. The relationship between fear of death and religiosity has been the point of departure for a substantial number of social scientific studies in a modern Western, in most cases Protestant Christian, setting. Still, the relationship is an elusive one and no certainty has been achieved as to the exact correlations or the possible causal connections. In the social scientific study of the relationship between the fear of death and religiosity there have been a number of different findings. Some research has discovered negative correlations between religiosity and fear, while other research has found positive correlations, and other research again has not found any significant correlation whatsoever. The confusion is due to different methods, different definitions of fear or religiosity and different samples. One serious shortcoming has been the lack of distinctions between different aspects of fear of death and religion. In the studies that have taken this problem seriously, however, it seems that one can detect a certain negative correlation between religiosity and the fear of at least certain aspects of death. J. W. Hoelter and R. J. Epley, for instance, broke fear of death into distinct dimensions.⁹⁵

By using their multi-dimensional scale they found that religious people are less likely to fear the unknown aspects of death. They suggested that religiosity may serve to reduce these aspects of fear by dealing directly with them through a belief system.⁹⁶ A more recent study by J. A. Thorson and F. C. Powell concluded that people who are more religious are less concerned with death. Those who had more anxiety concerning death were lower in religiosity.⁹⁷ These researchers also used a multi-dimensional scale which brought out some of the subtler points of their findings. For instance, it seems that one reason for the lower anxiety among the more religious is the fact that they look forward to an afterlife.⁹⁸ A negative correlation between fear of death and belief in an afterlife had also been discovered by Osarchuk and Tatz.⁹⁹

If we compare these modern Christian examples with our ancient Indian data we have two large and multifarious religious traditions at different times with fundamentally different beliefs about the nature of life, death and possible afterlives and still one unambiguous parallel between the two is their preoccupation with and anxiety about death. As the Christian cases show, although the belief in an afterlife in heaven may make some people less anxious about death, clear correlations between beliefs and emotions in this area are more or less impossible to find. Fear of death seems to be a universal phenomenon and a prime undertaking of religious doctrines is to address this fear. Still, at least as far as can be determined from the limited samples in this article, fear of death does not seem to vary significantly with different beliefs.

First of all it seems unlikely that the double role of fear identified in Indian – and in particular Buddhist – material is exclusive to the religions under investigation here. I would think that fear could be both an aspect of the miserable state of human beings on earth and at the same time the motivational basis for religious striving independently of the actual belief-system in question. In order to make a full circle we may return to the great Western writer on religious fear, Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard despair and anxiety are key concepts of his religiosity. According to Kierkegaard, the possibility of despair is man's advantage over the beasts because it implies spirit; to become aware of the despair is the Christian's advantage over the natural man, and finally, to be healed of the sickness of despair is the Christian's bliss.¹⁰⁰ By acting on feelings of despair and anxiety and by embracing the Christian message a person can free himself from despair. In other words, despair becomes a motor in a religious process for Kierkegaard. It seems, that the role of fear as a motivating factor in religious life is not especially Indian after all and perhaps we could expect that a more thorough comparative or

phenomenological study of fear in religion would support M. Argyle's and B. Beit-Hallahmi's assertion that just as religious beliefs display similarities across cultures, so do the psychological mechanisms involved in belief, ritual and myth.¹⁰¹

NOTES

- ¹ Śāntideva, *The Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Translated by K. Crosby and A. Skilton. Oxford 1996. p. 140.
- ² See for instance Morris, B. (1994). *Anthropological Studies of Religion*. Cambridge. p. 141ff.
- ³ Weerasinghe, H. (1997). 'Fear: A Buddhist Interpretation'. In *Recent Researches in Buddhist Studies. Essay in Honour of Professor Y. Karunadasa*, Editors Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti, Asanga Tilakaratne and Kapila Abhayawansa. Colombo. pp. 612–629.
- ⁴ For references to this theme in Śaivism see Doniger O'Flaherty, W. (1973). *Asceticism and Eroticism in the Mythology of Śiva*. London. p. 236.
- ⁵ Masson, J. L. and Patwardhan, M. V. (1970). *Aesthetic Rapture. The Rasadhaya of the Nāṭyaśāstra*. Deccan College. vol. 1, p. 54.
- ⁶ Dhammapada 212–216.
- ⁷ Mahāsūtras: Great Discourses of the Buddha. Edited by P. Skilling. Volume 1, Oxford 1994. p. 305.
- ⁸ Majjhima Nikāya I. 20–21. Translated by Bhikkhu Nanamoli edited and revised by Bhikkhu Bodhi (1995). *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*. Boston. p. 104.
- ⁹ Sutta-Nipāta 964.
- ¹⁰ Aṅguttara Nikāya II. 121.
- ¹¹ Brekke, T. (1997). 'The Early Saṃgha and the Laity', *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 20, 2: 7–32.
- ¹² Dīgha Nikāya III. p. 182. Rhys Davids, T. W. and C. A. F. (1921). *Dialogues of the Buddha*, part III, p. 174.
- ¹³ Lamotte, É. (1980). *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*. Louvain la Neuve. V. p. 2249.
- ¹⁴ Brekke, T. 'Contradiction and the Merit of Giving in Indian Religions', *Numen*, forthcoming.
- ¹⁵ Ling, T. O. (1962). *Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil*. London. p. 156.
- ¹⁶ Dhammpada 317, translated by Radhakrishna in Radhakrishnan, S. (1992). *The Dhammapada*. Oxford. p. 158.
- ¹⁷ Dīgha Nikāya III. 148. Rhys Davids, T. W. and C. A. F. (1921). *Dialogues of the Buddha*, part III, p. 141.
- ¹⁸ Mahāvamsa I. 23–27.
- ¹⁹ Saṃyutta Nikāya III. p. 84–86 and Aṅguttara Nikāya II. p. 33–34.
- ²⁰ *The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom*. Translated by Edward Conze. Delhi 1990. p. 320–21.
- ²¹ Williams, op. cit. p. 43. The word *śaṅka*, however, is mostly taken to mean *doubt*, and the negative *niḥśaṅka* may sometimes have the meaning of *freedom from doubt* besides *freedom from fear*.
- ²² Jain, P. (1990). *The Jain Path of Purification*. Delhi, p. 120.
- ²³ Williams, R. (1991). *Jaina Yoga*. Delhi, p. 42.
- ²⁴ This missionary strategy is essentially similar to those used by many modern sects. For instance, social scientists have described how religious groups in America

induce psychological distress in potential converts. When the convert is brought closer to the group he or she will feel a relief which will create strong emotional bonds and make it difficult to break away. See for instance Galanter, Marc (1989). *Cults, Faith, Healing and Coercion*. Oxford. p. 87-97; Lofland, John (1966). *Doomsday Cult*. New Jersey; Balch, Robert W. and Taylor, David. 'Seekers and Saucers: The Role of the Cultic Milieu in Joining a UFO Cult'. In Richardson, James T. (1978). *Conversion Careers. In and Out of the New Religions*. Beverly Hills/London.

- ²⁵ Milindapañho, p. 145 ff. Rhys Davids, T. W. (1925). *The Questions of King Milinda*. London. p. 206 ff.
- ²⁶ Samyutta Nikāya III, 83.
- ²⁷ Theragāthā 189-90.
- ²⁸ Samyutta Nikāya I. 106.
- ²⁹ Buddhavaṃsa p. 64.
- ³⁰ The Clarifier of the Sweet Meaning, commentary on the Chronicle of Buddhas by Buddhādatta Thera. Translated by I. B. Horner. London 1978. p. 386.
- ³¹ Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam. By Louis de La Vallée Poussin. English translation by Leo M. Pruden. Berkeley. Vol. IV. p. 1141-2.
- ³² ibid.
- ³³ The Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa, Edited by C. A. F. Rhys Davids. London 1921. vol. 2. p. 512. The Path of Purification. Translated from the Pāli by Bhikkhu Nyanamoli. Colombo 1964. pp. 586.
- ³⁴ Samyutta Nikāya I. 154.
- ³⁵ *Isāīdasopaniṣadaḥ. Ten Principal Upanshads with Śāṅkarabhāṣya*. Delhi 1978. p. 367, *Upaniṣads*, translated by Patrick Olivelle, Oxford and New York. 1996. p. 101.
- ³⁶ See for instance Chāndogya Upaniṣad 4.15.1. Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.3.21.
- ³⁷ *Isāīdasopaniṣadaḥ*. p. 574, Olivelle p. 169.
- ³⁸ Olivelle, pp. 285-6.
- ³⁹ Olivelle, pp. 232-3.
- ⁴⁰ Translation in Olivelle p. 188.
- ⁴¹ The explication of Śāṅkara's views on fear contained in his commentary on the Taittirīya Upaniṣad is based on the text in *Isāīdasopaniṣadaḥ*. pp. 302-304.
- ⁴² Olivelle, p. 13.
- ⁴³ *Isāīdasopaniṣadaḥ*. p. 648.
- ⁴⁴ General similarities and interbreedings between Vedānta and Buddhism have been treated in some detail by several authors. See for instance Jennings, J. G. (1947). *The Vedāntic Buddhism of the Buddha*. London.
- ⁴⁵ Śāntideva, *The Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Translated by K. Crosby and A. Skilton. Oxford 1996. p. 67.
- ⁴⁶ Williams, Paul (1994). *Mahāyāna Buddhism*. London and New York. p. 61.
- ⁴⁷ Śāntideva, *The Bodhicaryāvatāra*. p. 34.
- ⁴⁸ ibid. p. 120.
- ⁴⁹ Śāntideva, *Śikṣā Samuccaya*, Edited by C. Bendall. The Hague 1957. p. 198.
- ⁵⁰ For an example of how the Madhyamaka sought to refute the idea of the Self in the Vedānta see Qvarnström, O. (1989). *Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective*. Lund.
- ⁵¹ Sutta-Nipāta 207.
- ⁵² Sutta-Nipāta 107.
- ⁵³ Sutta-Nipāta 572.
- ⁵⁴ *Īrasamvegāṇḍmāṇḥ*. Patanjala Darshana of the System of Yoga Philosophy

by Maharshi Kapila. With the commentary of Vyasa and the gloss of Vachaspati Mishra. Edited by P. J. Vidyasagara, Calcutta 1940 p. 25. Translated in Woods, J. H. (1914). *The Yoga System of Patañjali*. Cambridge, Mass.

- ⁵⁵ Canto 3.4. *nivartayāmasa ca rājamārga sampātāmārtasya prthagjanasya / mā bhūtkumārāḥ sukumāraccittāḥ samvignacetā itī manyamānāḥ*. (Trans.: Johnston, E. H. (1935-36). *The Buddhacarita or the acts of the Buddha*. Edited and translated. Calcutta.)
- ⁵⁶ *Thūpavaṃsa. The Chronicle of the Thūpa and the Thūpavaṃsa*. Edited and translated by N. A. Jayawickrama. London 1971. p. 164.
- ⁵⁷ *Dīgha Nikāya III*, p. 214, Rhys Davids, T. W. and C. A. F. (1921). *Dialogues of the Buddha*, part III, p. 206.
- ⁵⁸ *Samyutta Nikāya I*, p. 197ff. Rhys Davids, C. A. F. (1950). *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*, part I, pp. 250 ff.
- ⁵⁹ *Samyutta Nikāya V*, p. 130. Woodward, F. L. (1956). *The Kindred Sayings*. Part V. London. p. 111.
- ⁶⁰ Woodward's translation has left out *vipubbakasāññā*, the festering corpse.
- ⁶¹ *Anguttara Nikāya II*, p. 17. Woodward, F. L. (1952). *The Book of the Gradual Sayings*. Vol. II. London. p. 16-17.
- ⁶² *Itivuttaka*, p. 93. Woodward, F. L. (1935). *The Minor Anthologies of the Pāli Canon*. Part II. London. p. 182.
- ⁶³ *Itivuttaka*, p. 29-30, Woodward, p. 137.
- ⁶⁴ *Samyutta Nikāya III*, p. 34-36 and *Anguttara Nikāya II*, p. 33-34.
- ⁶⁵ The basically identical accounts in the *Samyutta Nikāya* and the *Anguttara Nikāya* differ in how they sum up the contents of this Dhamma. The *Anguttara Nikāya* talks about the Dhamma which teaches the constitution, the origin, the ending and the way to end the existing person or individuality (*sakkāya*) whereas the *Samyutta Nikāya* describes the Dhamma as the teaching of the nature of body (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), activities or coefficients of consciousness (*saṅkhārā*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*). This last list is, of course, a standard enumeration of the five *khandhas* and it seems reasonable to take the *sakkāya* of the *Anguttara Nikāya* too as referring to the *khandhas*.
- ⁶⁶ *acirāḍ ānī manusyanām mṛgasamjñā (bhaviṣyati) tasmat sarvair āyusmadbhir udvignaiḥ samvegam āpannaiḥ tasyānuttaradaśabaladharadharmarājacakravartināḥ paurānsucariakarmavipākanirjātasya mṛṣāvādapaisūnyaparūsyābaddhapralāpavivarjitasya satyānuvartivacā(nasya anvardha)māsāvavādānusāsanam śrotavyam Prātimokṣasūtra der Sarvāstivādin*. Edited by Georg V Simson. Göttingen 1986. p. 2.
- ⁶⁷ The *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosa, Edited by C. A. F. Rhys Davids. London, 1920. vol. 1, p. 135. *The Path of Purification*, Translated from the Pāli by Bhikkhu Nyanamoli. Colombo, 1964. pp. 140-141.
- ⁶⁸ *Visuddhimagga* 645ff.
- ⁶⁹ *Visuddhimagga* 651.
- ⁷⁰ Śāntideva, *The Bodhicaryāvatāra*, pp. 68-9.
- ⁷¹ ibid. p. 36.
- ⁷² ibid. p. 51.
- ⁷³ ibid. p. 18. Certain verses have been left out here.
- ⁷⁴ Śāntideva, *Śikṣā Samuccaya*, Edited by C. Bendall. The Hague 1957. p. 198. Translation in Śāntideva, *Śikṣā Samuccaya*, Translated by C. Bendall and W. H. D. Rouse. Delhi 1990 (first ed. 1922). p. 192.
- ⁷⁵ ibid.
- ⁷⁶ *Anguttara Nikāya III* 100 ff.
- ⁷⁷ *Anguttara Nikāya*, vol. III. Translated by E. M. Hare. London 1952. p. 81.

- ⁷⁸ Aṅguttara Nikāya III. 104. For a study of Buddhism's relationship to the dangers of nature see Schmithausen, L. (1997). *Maitri and magic: aspects of the Buddhist attitude toward the dangerous in nature*. Vienna.
- ⁷⁹ *ibid.* 100ff.
- ⁸⁰ Gombrich, R. (1996). *How Buddhism Began. The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings*. London and Atlantic Highlands, N. J. p. 17.
- ⁸¹ MacQueen, Graeme (1988). *A Study of the Srāmanyaphalasūtra*. Wiesbaden.
- ⁸² *ibid.* p. 261.
- ⁸³ The Mahāvagga of the Vinaya Piṭaka I.20.17. Trans. I.B. Horner.
- ⁸⁴ Mahāvamsa I.23-27. Translation in *The Mahāvamsa*. Translated by Wilhelm Geiger. London 1934. pp. 3-4.
- ⁸⁵ Wijayarantna, M. (1990). *Buddhist Monastic Life*. Translated by C. Grangier and S. Collins. Cambridge. p. 130.
- ⁸⁶ Dutt, N. (1980). *The Spread of Buddhism and the Buddhist Schools*. New Delhi. p. 22ff.
- ⁸⁷ Wijayarantna, op. cit. p. 130.
- ⁸⁸ Lamotte, É. (1988). *History of Indian Buddhism*. Translated from the French by Sara Webb-Boin under the supervision of Jean Dantinne. Louvain la neuve. p. 307.
- ⁸⁹ *ibid.* p. 310.
- ⁹⁰ For some views on the historical value of early Buddhist literature see Brekke, T. (1998). "The Historical Value of the Khandhaka of the Vinaya Piṭaka." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 42: 23-40.
- ⁹¹ A similar point has been brought out in the works of René Girard who says that a typical feature of myths is that they tend to undergo revisions through time whereby references to violence are cut away bit by bit until one is left with stories that seem peaceful if slightly half-baked as in the myth of the death of Baldr in Scandinavian or the birth of Zeus in Greek mythology. Girard, R. (1989). *The Scapegoat*. Baltimore. p. 166ff.
- ⁹² These examples are taken from the *Index to the Saddharmapundarikasūtra*, editor Yasunori Ejima, Tokyo 1985. Vol. 1. p. 76.
- ⁹³ *Haritasmṛti*, 6.5.
- ⁹⁴ Sprockhoff, J. D. (1994). 'Zur "Weihe" des Asketen', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 38: 61-83. See especially pp. 63-63 and pp. 77-80. See also Schmithausen, L. (1997). *Maitri and magic: aspects of the Buddhist attitude toward the dangerous in nature*. Vienna. p. 32, note 66.
- ⁹⁵ Hoelter, J. W. and Epley, R. J. (1979). 'Religious Correlates of Fear of Death', *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion* 18: 404-411.
- ⁹⁶ *ibid.* p. 410.
- ⁹⁷ Thorson, J. A. and Powell, F. C. (1990). 'Meanings of Death and Intrinsic Religiosity', *Journal of Clinical Psychology* 46. 4: 379-391.
- ⁹⁸ *ibid.* p. 386.
- ⁹⁹ Osarchuk, M. and Tatz, S. J. (1973). 'Effect of Induced Fear of Death on Belief in Afterlife', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 27: 256-260.
- ¹⁰⁰ See for instance Hannay, A. (1991). *Kierkegaard*. London and New York, p. 202. Gardiner, P. (1988). *Kierkegaard*. Oxford and New York, p. 111.
- ¹⁰¹ Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin and Argyle, Michael (1997). *The Psychology of religious behaviour, belief and experience*. London and New York. p. 230ff.

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KATE CROSBY

HISTORY VERSUS MODERN MYTH: THE ABHAYAGIRIVIHĀRA, THE VIMUTTIMAGGA AND YOGĀVACARA MEDITATION

... In most areas of Buddhist studies interpretation, analysis and conjecture frequently go far beyond their available evidential base¹

The esoteric practices of Southeast Asian mainland Theravāda Buddhism and the mysterious Abhayagirivihāra of medieval Sri Lanka have been linked by François Bizot and Heinz Bechert. The link is made on the basis of supposed shared material between esoteric Southeast Asian Buddhism and the text variously referred to by the following titles, according to preferred language: *Vimuttimagga*, *Vimuktimārgasāstra*, *Chieh-t'o-tao-lun*,² *Gedatsudōron*, *Rnam par grol ba'i lam* or (*Treatise on*) *the Path to Liberation*. Since the original language of this text is uncertain, I shall refer to it by the English translation of its title, *Path to Liberation (PL)*. This text is assumed by both Bizot and Bechert to belong to the Abhayagirivāsins, an association accepted by them on the basis of the writings primarily of Bareau and Skilling, who have taken to more sophisticated levels this connection first suggested by earlier scholars.³ I see problems both in the suggestion of shared material between Southeast Asian esoteric Buddhism and the *Path to Liberation*, and in the association of the *Path to Liberation* with the Abhayagirivihāra. This article is an investigation of the arguments which initially informed these supposed links and an explanation of my reasons for rejecting those arguments.

The esoteric Theravāda of Southeast Asia is a tradition of non-classical, i.e. non-Buddhaghosa, Theravāda doctrine and practice which has become known to Western scholars primarily through the pioneering work of François Bizot on Cambodian and Thai Buddhism over the past three decades.⁴ In his publications, Bizot refers to these traditions as Mahānikāya,⁵ a generic term referring to Theravāda Buddhism in mainland Southeast Asia outside of the reformist Dhammayutikanikāya founded in 1829 by the future King Mongkut of Thailand.⁶ He also refers to it as non-Mahāvihāravāsin⁷ since the Dhammayutikanikāya derives from the Sri Lankan tradition of the Mahāvihāra introduced

into Thailand in the 15th century.⁸ Neither of these terms is entirely satisfactory, since they are too inclusive. I shall refer to the tradition in question as the *yogāvacara* tradition, since the particular practices under discussion here are the meditation practices taught for the *yogāvacara*, the “practitioner of meditation”, although this term is also unsatisfactory in that it is likewise over inclusive – the term *yogāvacara* is commonly used in post-canonical literature for meditation practitioners without necessarily referring to meditations of this tradition.⁹

The Abhayagirivihāra was a long-standing rival of the Mahāvihāra in medieval Sri Lanka. Founded among a number of other institutions in the 1st century BCE, it soon became the headquarters of a separate lineage of Theravāda that apparently broke away from the Mahāvihāra and subsequently followed a distinct *vinaya*. In other words, the Abhayagiri became a distinct *nikāya*.¹⁰ It came to an end in the 12th century when the Abhayagiri monks were forced to disrobe or seek fresh ordination within the Mahāvihāra *nikāya*.¹¹ While the historicity of the Abhayagirivihāra is not in doubt, the nature of its teachings and traditions remains unknown due to the paucity of extant textual material from Abhayagiri itself or detailed and non-partisan discussion of them in the texts of other Buddhist traditions.¹² Accused by its main rivals of unorthodox teachings and Mahāyāna leanings,¹³ for scholars of medieval South and Southeast Asian Buddhism the Abhayagirivihāra has by this very mystery acquired an irresistible allure as the possible source of heterodoxies and practices which are not validated within the Pāli canon or the known commentarial writings of the Mahāvihāra tradition.

Bechert, in his preface to Bizot's volume on Theravāda *pabbajjā* liturgies, connects the esoteric Theravāda of Southeast Asia and the Abhayagirivihāra tradition of Sri Lanka in the following terms:

It is generally supposed that the Abhayagirivāsins of Sri Lanka, being the main rivals of the Mahāvihāravāsins until the forced ‘reunification’ of the Sangha in Sri Lanka which was brought about by Parākramabāhu I, played a major role in the development of the non-orthodox practices which existed in traditional Southeast Asian Theravāda. . . . Though the Abhayagirivihāra was at certain periods influenced by Mahāyāna doctrines, its main tradition has always remained Hinayanistic [sic]. . . . Thus it is not out of the way if we suppose that the old Southeast Asian Theravāda tradition of the Mons was also somehow connected with the Abhayagiri tradition which was later on replaced by the Mahāvihāra lineages and teachings.¹⁴

Bechert does not give details of possible links between the Abhayagirivihāra and *yogāvacara* traditions, but cites as support, firstly, Bizot's *Le figuier à cinq branches* where “Bizot has argued with good reason that the Abhayagirivāsa school may have been instrumental in

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elaborating the concepts on which the tantric practices are based”, and secondly, the use in North India of Upatīṣya's *Path to Liberation*: “The most important post-canonical doctrinal text of the Abhayagiri monks was Upatīṣya's *Vimuttimaggā*, and – as Peter Skilling has recently discovered – this work was extensively used to describe Theravāda doctrine by the 12th century North Indian author Daśabalaśrīmitra”.¹⁵ Bechert qualifies his proposition by observing that the existence of secret teachings is known to Buddhaghosa in his *Visuddhimaggā*, the most influential text of Mahāvihāra orthodoxy.¹⁶ This suggests the possibility that such texts as those studied by Bizot could have been current within the Mahāvihāra, although “Probably, for want of further evidence, we shall never know which ‘secret’ teachings were hinted at by Buddhaghosa”.¹⁷ Bechert concludes his discussion by pointing out that tantric methodology is a pan-Indian religious phenomenon.¹⁸

Bechert's supposition of a link between the *yogāvacara* traditions and the Abhayagirivihāra is, then, based on two pieces of evidence. These are: a) the link made by Bizot between the *yogāvacara* tradition and the Abhayagirivihāra, and b) the assumption that the *Path to Liberation* is a work of the Abhayagirivihāra and an important one at that, given its presence in North India. The link between these two points is that Bizot observes shared features between the *yogāvacara* tradition and the *Path to Liberation*.

While Bechert does not expand on this supposition in his preface to Bizot's book on Theravāda *pabbajjā* it becomes clearer when he mentions it again in a later article on the medieval *nikāyas* of Sri Lanka. There, in his discussion of the evidence for the doctrines of the Abhayagiri school on the basis of the remnants of its literature, Bechert criticises Kalupahāna for his restatement of the “outdated” opinion that no literature of the Abhayagiri school remains.¹⁹ Curiously, von Hinüber, in his *Handbook of Pāli Literature*, repeats this “outdated” view: “their texts gradually disappeared, and the only Theravāda texts surviving are those of one single *nikāya*, the Mahāvihāra”,²⁰ and appears to cite page 16 of this very article by Bechert as his authority. This is simply a typographic slip, however. Von Hinüber's note here is misplaced and should be positioned after the previous sentence in his text, where he used Bechert as his source for the account of the end of the Abhayagirivihāra as a separate lineage, the topic actually covered on p. 16 of Bechert's article. On the contrary, Bechert's opinion is that “It has been wrongly stated that ‘all the works belonging to the Abhayagiri were destroyed’” and is given on p. 13 of his article. Elsewhere in his *Handbook*, von Hinüber's statement that all the Abhayagiri texts

disappeared is modified in his discussion of the relative dating of the *Paṭisambhīdāmagga*, the *Path to Liberation* and the *Visuddhimagga*, where he appears hesitantly to accept the Abhayagiri origins of the *Path to Liberation*.²¹

Bechert's discussion of the doctrines of the Abhayagiri school is based in particular on the *Path to Liberation*. His assertion of the association between the *Path to Liberation* and esoteric Theravāda on this second occasion is more concretely stated:

Traces of the tradition represented by the *Vimuttimagga* have also been found in mainland Southeast Asian esoteric Theravāda meditation practice as handed down by the local Buddhists of Cambodia, Laos, and northern Thailand in the so-called "ancient *Mahānikāya*" of these countries. This form of Buddhist practice incorporates a methodology which may be described as Tantric, but the tenets have remained those of the non-Mahayanistic Theravāda. In view of the fact, that Theravāda in late mediaeval Indian Buddhism was represented by an evidently non-Mahāvihāra tradition, as we have seen from the *Saṃskṛtāsamskṛtaviniścaya*, it is likely that F. Bizot is right in connecting the indigenous Southeast Asian Theravāda with the Abhayagiri school.²²

Thus Bechert repeats the association of the Abhayagirivihāra with the *yogāvacara* tradition, once more basing it on the presence of quoted material from the *Path to Liberation* in the 12th-century north Indian work, the *Saṃskṛtāsamskṛtaviniścaya* as reported by Skilling,²³ and on the link made by Bizot. We must look more closely at these two pieces of evidence.

Bechert's reference to Bizot leads us to the comments concerning the *Path to Liberation* made by Bizot in his first volume of the series of *Recherches sur le bouddhisme khmer*.²⁴ In his own attempt to contextualize the *yogāvacara* tradition, Bizot's attention had been caught by a passage in the *Path to Liberation*.²⁵ pointed out by Bapat as peculiar to that text in the latter's comparison of the *Path to Liberation* and Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga*.²⁶ Bapat's discussion appears to have fuelled a rumour of an association between the *Mahānikāya/yogāvacara* tradition and the Abhayagirivihāra. Neither Bechert nor Bizot quotes the passage, and indeed they appear only to have had access to Bapat's mention of it rather than the text itself. This passage is the only concrete evidence presented for the asserted association, so I shall quote it here in full, even though it seems to me unremarkable. The passage in question explains two of thirteen ways of mindfulness regarding the body given in the text. The translation of this passage by Ehara, Soma and Kheminda reads as follows:²⁷

Q. How should one reflect on the nature of the body through 'gradual formation'?
A. This body gradually forms itself according to its previous *kamma*. In the first week the *kalala* is formed. In the second week the *abbuda* is formed. In the third week the

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pesi is formed. In the fourth week the *ghana* is formed. In the fifth week five parts are formed. In the sixth week four parts are formed. In the seventh week again four parts are formed. In the eighth week again twenty-eight parts are formed. In the ninth and tenth weeks the backbone is formed. In the twelfth week eight hundred parts are formed. In the thirteenth week nine hundred parts are formed. In the fourteenth week one hundred lumps of flesh are formed. In the fifteenth week blood is formed. In the sixteenth week the midriff is formed. In the seventeenth week the skin is formed. In the eighteenth week the colour of the skin is formed. In the nineteenth week the wind according to *kamma* fills the body. In the twentieth week the nine orifices are formed. In the twenty-fifth week the seventeen thousand textures of the skin are formed. In the twenty-sixth week the body is endowed with hardness. In the twenty-seventh week the body is endowed with the powers. In the twenty-eighth week the ninety-nine thousand pores are produced. In the twenty-ninth week the whole is completed. And again it is taught that in the seventh week the child's body is complete, that it leans back with hanging head in a crouching position. In the forty-second week, by the aid of *kamma*-produced wind, it reverses its position, turns its feet upwards and its head down and goes to the gate of birth. At this time it is born. In the world it is commonly known as a being. Thus one should reflect on the nature of the body through 'gradual formation'.

Q. How should one reflect on the nature of the body through 'worms'?²⁸

A. This body is gnawn by eighty thousand worms. The worm that relies on the hair is called 'hair-iron'. The worm that relies on the skull is called 'swollen ear'. The worm that relies on the brain is called 'maddener'. In this class there are four kinds. The first is called *urukimba*. The second is called *shibira*. The third is called *daraka*. The fourth is called *dakashira*. The worm that relies on the eye is called 'eye-licker'. The worm that relies on the nose is called 'nose-licker'. The worm that relies on the ear is called 'ear-licker'. There are three kinds here. The first is called *rukamuka*. The second is called *aruka*. The third is called *manorumuka*. The worm that relies on the tongue is called *muka*. The worm that relies on the root of the tongue is called *motanta*. The worm that relies on the teeth is called *kuba*. The worm that relies on the roots of the teeth is called *ubakuba*. The worm that relies on the throat is called *abusaka*. The worms that rely on the neck are of two kinds. The first is called *rokara*. The second is called *virokara*. The worm that relies on the hair of the body is called "body-hair licker". The worm that relies on the nails is called "nail-licker". The worms that rely on the skin are of two kinds. The first is called *nana*. The second is called *tunanda*. The worms that rely on the midriff are of two kinds. The first is called *viramba*. The second is called *maviramba*. The worms that rely on the flesh are of two kinds. The first is called *araba*. The second is called *raba*. The worms that rely on the blood are of two kinds. The first is called *bara*. The second is called *badara*. The worms that rely on the tendons are of four kinds. The first is called *rotara*. The second is called *kitaba*. The third is called *baravata*. The fourth is called *ranavarana*. The worms that rely on the veins are called *karikuna*. The worms that rely on the roots of the veins are of two kinds. The first is called *sivara*. The second is called *ubasisiva*. The worms that rely on the bones are of four kinds. The first is called *kachibida*. The second is called *anabida*. The third is called *chiridabida*. The fourth is called *kachigokara*. The worms that rely on the marrow are of two kinds. The first is called *bisha*. The second is called *bishashira*. The worms that rely on the spleen are of two kinds. The first is called *nira*. The second is called *bita*. The worms that rely on the heart are of two kinds. The first is called *sibita*. The second is called *abadabita*. The worms that rely on the root of the heart are of two kinds. The first is called *manka*. The second is called *sira*. The worms that rely on the fat are of two kinds. The first is called *kara*. The second is called *karasira*. The worms that rely on the bladder are of two kinds. The first called *bikara*. The second is called *mahakara*. The worms that rely on the

root of the bladder are of two kinds. The first is called *kara*. The second is called *karasira*.²⁹ The worms that rely on the belly are of two kinds. The first is called *rata*. The second is called *maharata*. The worms that rely on the mesentery are of two kinds. The first is called (*si-*)*ba*. The second is called *mahasiba*. The worms that rely on the intestines are of two kinds. The first is called *anabaka*. The second is called *kababaka*. The worms that rely on the stomach are of four kinds. The first is called *ujuka*. The second is called *ushaba*. The third is called *chishaba*. The fourth is called *senshiba*. The worms that rely on the ripened womb are of four kinds. The first called *vakana*. The second is called *mahavakana*. The third is called *unaban*. The fourth is called *punamaka*. The worm that relies on bile is called *hitasoka*. The worm that relies on saliva is called *senka*. The worm that relies on sweat is called *sudasaka*. The worm that relies on oil is called *jidasaka*. The worms that rely on the vitality are of two kinds. The first is called *subakama*. The second is called *samakita*. The worms that rely on the root of vitality are of three kinds. The first is called *sukamuka*. The second is called *darukamuka*. The third is called *sanamuka*. There are five³⁰ kinds of worms: those that rely on the front of the body and gnaw the front of the body; those that rely on the back of the body and gnaw the back of the body; those that rely on the left side of the body and gnaw the left side of the body; those that rely on the right side of the body and gnaw the right side of the body. These worms are called *candasira*, *sinkasira*, *hucura* and so forth. There are three kinds of worms that rely on the two lower orifices. The first is called *kurukulayuyu*. The second is called *sarayu*. The third is called *kandupada*. Thus one should recall to mind the nature of the body through 'worms'.

Bizot's response to this passage from the *Path to Liberation* indicates that he thinks it closer to the *yogāvacara* traditions of Cambodia than it is to the *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosa, representative of Mahāvihāra orthodoxy. He therefore regards the *Path to Liberation* as significant in his search for the origins of the *yogāvacara* tradition:

L'œuvre d'Upatissa qui serait le plus ancien des deux ouvrages. [i.e. of the *Path to Liberation* and *Visuddhimagga*] et remonterait au IIe siècle A.D.³¹ constitue cependant pour nos recherches un document de première importance. Parmi les trois points obscurs que l'étude comparative fait ressortir, ... le troisième doit attirer tout spécialement l'attention: il soulève le problème de la source d'un passage très détaillé que le *Visuddhimagga* de Buddhaghosa ne fait que reprendre en le mentionnant brièvement. Ce passage se rapporte au développement du fœtus, donné semaine par semaine et à l'énoncé des noms des 80 groupes de vers placés dans le corps humain. Le thème de l'élaboration embryonnaire occupe une place de premier plan dans la pensée traditionnelle khmère. Les manuscrits du Cambodge fournissent également une liste de noms se rapportant à 80 groupes de vers présents dans le corps humain.

Il est remarquable que ces deux points constituent exactement le passage étudié spécialement par M. Bapat. Sans doute représentent-ils à ses yeux la singularité la plus étonnante de l'exposé d'Upatissa. L'énigme que soulève leur provenance se remarque d'autant plus que le reste du texte demeure dans l'ensemble conforme au canon. Pour plusieurs raisons, en partie parce que le nom des vers provient d'une translittération de mots sanscrits et non pâli, mais aussi à cause de l'existence de fragments tibétains du texte, l'auteur envisage l'origine indienne d'un noyau primitif qui aurait subsisté dans l'œuvre d'Upatissa. Ce vestige constituerait précisément l'unique point de l'exposé véritablement commun avec les textes khmers.

Le témoignage d'Upatissa est d'autant plus précieux qu'il provient d'un texte appartenant justement à une secte opposée de très longue date au bouddhisme du Mahāvihāra. Pourtant, sur la foi des données exposées dans le *Vimuttimagga*, la

tradition bouddhique du Cambodge ne descend certainement pas des Abhayagirivāsins. Elle est, par les textes et les coutumes du pays, exprimée avec suffisamment de clarté pour que l'on soit net là-dessus. C'est seulement par la nature du sujet traité pour que l'on soit net là-dessus. C'est seulement par la nature du sujet traité qu'un rapprochement est permis entre la pensée d'Upatissa et la doctrine des anciens Mahānikāya. A l'intérieur même des limites où cette comparaison est possible, l'importance de l'écart reste appréciable, sauf, il est vrai, pour l'énumération du nom des 80 groupes de vers, point sur lequel le rapport est frappant.³²

There are a number of points which must be untangled here. Bizot thinks it of significance that both the *Path to Liberation* and the *yogāvacara* tradition preserve accounts of the development of the embryo and a list of 80 groups of parasites. However, Bizot does not "connect ... the indigenous Southeast Asian *Theravāda* with the *Abhayagiri* school", as Bechert claims.³³ This is not because he doubts that the *Path to Liberation* is an Abhayagiri text, an association he takes as certain, but because the *Path to Liberation* does not provide sufficient information on Abhayagiri doctrine which might be considered unorthodox.³⁴ He does not even suppose that the *Path to Liberation* and Southeast Asian *Theravāda* are directly linked, except for the one passage cited, and even that could be put down to an Indian origin underlying both the *Path to Liberation*, as suggested by Bapat,³⁵ and the Cambodian tradition. In assuming the connection of the *Path to Liberation* and the Abhayagirivāsins, both Bizot and Bechert appear to be writing without the advantage of Kheminda Thera's introduction to and annotation of the translation of the *Path to Liberation* which was published in 1961.³⁶ Bizot seems not to have had access to it at all and does not list it in his bibliography. Bechert is aware of it – "In the meantime an English translation of the Chinese text has been published" – but neither uses nor disputes Kheminda's conclusions which are at variance with his own, as shall be seen.³⁷ Bechert also seems not to have had the advantage of the article on Abhayagiri literature by Norman written in response to Bechert's criticism of his handling of the subject in his overview of Hīnayāna literature.³⁸

Bizot, as we noted above, avoids making a direct link between the Abhayagirivihāra, the *Path to Liberation* and the Khmer Buddhism which is the subject of his research. He is cautious partly because the rest of the *Path to Liberation* appears to be in accordance with the Pāli canon and Mahāvihāra orthodoxy. He is also cautious because of Bapat's conclusion that the original text must be of Indian origin, mainly because the Chinese translation transliterates the names of the parasites from Sanskrit. This is the very passage of relevance for Bizot: "Les seuls passages du *Vimuttimagga* qui représentent un intérêt évident du

point de vue de l'étude comparée des textes en usage au Cambodge sont précisément ceux auxquels M. Bapat assigne une origine indienne".³⁹ The implication is that an Indian substratum may be coming to the surface in the taxonomy of parasites found in the human body, both as found in the *Path to Liberation* and as known in the Khmer tradition.

Since Bizot's argument presumes that of Bapat, we also need to examine the latter. Bapat's theory that the *Path to Liberation* is of Indian rather than Sri Lankan origin⁴⁰ rests on number of considerations amongst which there are two substantive points: that the names of the parasites in Chinese for the most part appear as transliterations of Sanskrit words, and that there exists a Tibetan translation of part of the *Path to Liberation*. Both points are inconclusive, as I shall demonstrate.

His point that the Chinese translation of the *Path to Liberation* transliterates the names of parasites from Sanskrit, indicates that Bapat thought a text of Sri Lankan origin would have been written in Pāli and that the names of the parasites would therefore be in Pāli. This reflects a misunderstanding of the position of Pāli as a language of learning in medieval Sri Lanka. Scientific texts in particular, such as astrological treatises and medical works, preserved both in monasteries and in the hands of laymen, were often in Sanskrit, translated from Sanskrit or written in a Sinhala of which the technical vocabulary was derived from Sanskrit. Thus, for example, the 7th-century medical treatise the *Sārasaṅkṣepa(ya)*, which includes a chapter on parasites (*krimi*) in the human body, circulated in Sri Lanka both in Sanskrit and in Sinhalese translation, the technical terms being Sinhalesed Sanskrit.⁴¹ Since, according to Mahāvihāra tradition, Theravāda commentarial works were preserved in Sinhala until the time of Buddhaghosa, it is also possible that other non-canonical, pre-Buddhaghosa Theravāda literature was written in Sinhala, and the technical terms therefore derived from Sanskrit.⁴²

Bapat's second point is that there is a Tibetan translation of part of the *Path to Liberation*. In fact, there are now known to be two Tibetan translations of parts of the *Path to Liberation*. The translation referred to by Bapat is the third chapter translated into Tibetan in the 8th century under the title *Vimuktimārgadhutagunanirdeśa*.⁴³ In addition to this, an extensive abridged quotation has been found by Skilling in chapters 13–15 of the *Saṃskṛtāsamskṛtaviniścaya* now extant only in Tibetan translation.⁴⁴ This text was written by the 12th-century⁴⁵ north Indian, possibly Mahāsaṅghika,⁴⁶ monk Daśabalaśrīmitra. Bapat writes, "This Tibetan text provides an additional evidence to show the Indian origin of the book. It does not appear to be probable that a text from Ceylon

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was taken over to India and there it was studied in Buddhist schools and that it assumed such importance as to be translated, in part at least, in Tibetan".⁴⁷ The suggestion that the presence of the work in Tibetan translation means that it is of Indian origin underestimates the state of international relations in the Buddhist world during this period. As the centre of consecutively powerful empires, the culture of Bengal was hegemonic throughout South and Southeast Asia. Foreign monks visited to study at its universities and returned home bearing texts. Texts continued to make their way to Nepal and Tibet often via Bengal towards the end of the Pāla-Sena period, with Buddhists leaving for these (and other) regions under the pressure of the encroaching Islamic powers, the demise of the more powerful Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms of north-east India, and the eventual sack of the monastic universities. Contrary to Bapat's assumption, Pāli and Sinhalese texts were among those that made their way to Tibet.

There are accounts of north Indian and Tibetan monks travelling to Sri Lanka, and of Sri Lanka as a stopping-off point for monks travelling between north India and China or Indonesia.⁴⁸ Particularly relevant for us is the story that Guṇabhadra, the teacher of Saṅghapāla who translated the *Path to Liberation* into Chinese, visited Sri Lanka en route to China. There is also the material evidence of both Pāli and Sinhalese texts in Nepal and Tibet. For example, a 12/13th-century Sinhalese manuscript was discovered in the 1920s/1930s by Rahula Sankrityāyana in a Buddhist monastery in Tibet and was later deposited in the library of the Vidyālaṅkāra University of Kelāniya.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the 9th-century fragment of the Theravāda *Vinaya Pitaka* preserved in Nepal, credited until recently by influential European academics with being the oldest Pāli manuscript,⁵⁰ was reported by Bapat himself fifteen years later.⁵¹

While Bapat's arguments for the Indian origin of the *Path to Liberation* do not stand up to scrutiny, there is equally no reason to place its origins in Sri Lanka. As Bapat pointed out, there are no place names mentioned to connect the text with Sri Lanka.⁵² Kheminda, seeking to demonstrate the possible Sri Lankan origin of the *Path to Liberation*, counters this by suggesting that the terse nature of the text excludes the mention of any place names, let alone Sri Lankan sites.⁵³ Kheminda's own conclusion that Sri Lanka is the place of origin of the *Path to Liberation* is, however, based on a single piece of evidence of even greater fragility.⁵⁴ The evidence he adduces is a simile common to the *Path to Liberation*, "As an outcast has no desire for a king's throne", and the *Visuddhimagga*: *nirāso saddhamme caṇḍālukumārako viya rājje*:

"He is as desireless for the Good Law as a *caṇḍāla* is for a kingdom".⁵⁵ Kheminda takes this to be a reference to a particular event in Sri Lankan politics in the 2nd century BCE, concerning Sāliṛājakumāra, son of King Duṭṭhagāmaṇi: "Greatly gifted was he and ever took delight in works of merit; he tenderly loved a *caṇḍāla* woman of exceedingly great beauty. Since he was greatly enamoured of the Asokamāla-devi, who already in a former birth had been his consort, because of her loveliness, he cared nothing for kingly rule' (Mahāvamsa Ch.XXXIII, 2-4). Therefore King Duṭṭhagāmaṇi, after his death, was succeeded by his brother, Saddhātissa, who reigned for eighteen years".⁵⁶ Kheminda proposes "Have not both the *Vimuttimaggā* and *Visuddhimaggā* been making some sort of allusion to this event, which would, no doubt, have shocked the whole land?"⁵⁷ The immediate difficulty with Kheminda's theory is that the political event recorded in the *Mahāvamsa* does not match the simile, where it is the individual, not his consort, who is a *caṇḍāla*. The exception he takes to this simile is shared by Bapat who writes, "Let us note one peculiar fact about Upatissa. He seems to have some kind of contempt for, or low opinion of, a *Caṇḍāla*".⁵⁸ Bapat cites this attitude to confirm his earlier arguments for an Indian origin for the text: "Besides, the references to a *Caṇḍāla*, which we have already noticed, also point to the origin of the book in India, particularly, in South or Dravidian India where there is a very strong prejudice against *Caṇḍālas*".⁵⁹ Admirable as Bapat's social concerns may be, he singles out Upaṭiṣya unfairly. Both he and Kheminda ignore the fact that the *caṇḍāla* is a standard object of comparison in Buddhist texts when mentioning aspiration. The *caṇḍāla* is prescribed by birth occupations which are stereotypically both polluting and harsh, making him both inappropriate and below the sights of anything great. The *caṇḍāla* is in particular found as an example of low birth and as being at the opposite end of the social scale from the king.⁶⁰ Rather than the story from the *Mahāvamsa* the following passage from the Mahāniddeśa is pertinent:⁶¹ *yathā caṇḍālo na paṭibalo rañṇā cakkavattinā saddhim yugam samāgamam samāgantvā yugaggāham gaṇhitum, yathā paṃsupisācako na paṭibalo indena devarañṇā saddhim yugam samāgamam samāgantvā yugaggāham gaṇhitum, evam eva pasūro paribbājako na paṭibalo dhonena buddhena bhagavatā saddhim yugam samāgamam samāgantvā yugaggāham gaṇhitvā sākacchetum sallāpitem sākaccham samāpajjitum. tam kissa hetu? Pasūro paribbājako hīnapañño ... so hi bhagavā mahāpañño ...* The purpose of these passages is not to voice prejudice against *caṇḍālas* or mud-sprites,⁶² but to draw strong contrast between known extremes of opposites as similes for the comparison the author wishes to convey. The sense of this in

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the *Visuddhimaggā* passage is captured in Nyānamoli's translation of the line, "He is as careless of the Good Law as a guttersnipe is of a kingdom".⁶³ Neither Bapat nor Kheminda, then, have either proved or even convincingly argued a particular place of origin for Upaṭiṣya's *Path to Liberation*.

Bizot does not assume a direct link between the embryology in the *Path to Liberation* and the use of embryology in the symbolism of Khmer Buddhism.⁶⁴ As now demonstrated, there is no need for him to base this hesitation on Bapat's assertion that India is the place of origin of the *Path to Liberation*. There is nothing to substantiate or rule out India as the place of origin. Further, the substratum of Indian culture present in both texts ensues from the subject matter: the context of the *Path to Liberation* in question is largely medical, and such medical analysis was found throughout Southeast Asia, including Sri Lanka.

The main doubt expressed by Bizot is the general conformity of the main body of the *Path to Liberation*, aside of the embryology and parasites, with orthodox Theravāda. Pertinent to our discussion, then, is Kheminda's argument that even these two supposed exceptions are unremarkable. He demonstrates that the Mahāvihāra tradition accepted both. He cites a short reference to the stages of foetal development at *Samyuttanikāya* I. 206 and a more detailed description of the stages of the development from its commentary, *Sāratthappakāsinī* I, 300-1.⁶⁵ Kheminda likewise finds references from the canon and the *Milindapañha* confirming the acceptance of different kinds of parasites living on the human body.⁶⁶ These references show that the passages in the *Path to Liberation* highlighted by Bapat do not contain material unacceptable to the Mahāvihāra tradition, and it no longer appears appropriate for Bizot to write, "le rapport est frappant".⁶⁷ Beyond this shared feature, Bizot does not, in 1976, think the *Path to Liberation* pertinent to the Cambodian tradition because "le reste du texte demeure dans l'ensemble conforme au canon".⁶⁸

When we take a closer look at this "shared feature", we find it a disappointing basis for the reported connection between the *Path to Liberation* and the *yogāvacara* tradition, quite aside from the factors taken into consideration above. It is a natural assumption on the part of a reader that the two lists in question must coincide to some degree. This expectation is heightened by Bapat's earlier observation that the *PL* list did not coincide with the list of parasites found in the *Atharva Veda* as well as with some of the old Indian medical works like Vāgbhat's *Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya*, and Caraka and Suśruta⁶⁹ – all the more reason for Bizot to be struck by any coincidence between the Cambodian list and the

PL list. The list of parasites as given in the *Path to Liberation* has been reproduced above from Ehara, Soma and Kheminda's translation. Bizot tentatively records the names of parasites found in the Khmer tradition as follows. The list is compiled by him on the basis of a comparison of different lists reported to him verbally by "several learned Cambodians who knew them by heart".⁷⁰

at the roots of the hair *balam, mahābalam*; in the eyes *vitalanta, tejantā, silavā*; in the nose *mahārūpa gāmino castā middham, sapatā samatthā / samatā samatā*; in the mouth *lohamukhā / lomamukhā, mahālohamukhā / mahālomamukhā, mañjum, mahāmañjum*; in the tongue *usapakkhā mukho, apatali, acola*; in the throat *rambhā, mahārambhā*; in the heart *dantā, ma(hā)dantā, rohvā, mahārohvā*; in the lungs/mesentery *tunnā/ratanā/rattajā, vāradhā*; in the liver *vāyo/balo, gaṅgā, vanā*; in the stomach *khajjarā, saraṇāhajā, mahāsaraṇāhajā*; in the intestines *varasimhū/varantā, mahāvarantā, sippā, mahāsippā, santarasantarā*; in the digestive tract *tilā, verayo, panakā*; in the mucus, fat and sweat *nālā, upabba, vandāpaha, pāṇā, pattā, daṇḍā, pujjā, pakkhā, vimalā*; in the grease *atimanujā semha*; in the muscles *pañṇarajūtātā, lohītā*; in the tibias *yāvatā, lobha/sāta/sotavā*.⁷¹

Of the 84 classes and species of parasites listed in *PL* and the 53 listed by Bizot, there is only one viable candidate for comparison: a parasite of the tongue – in *PL*, *muka* (the same in Chinese transcription as *mukha*) and from the Khmer, *usapakkhā mukho*. There are of course obstacles to a direct comparison between these two lists, as Bizot rightly points out. Firstly, both lists are summary accounts of the taxonomy of parasites, neither covering even the entire range of groups, let alone group members. Secondly, *PL* terms involve the transcription into Pali of a Chinese transcription from the Indic source language, thus constituting a true case of Chinese whispers. Of the Cambodian list Bizot reports "la plupart des noms pāli prêtés à ces groupes sont manifestement corrompus et intraduisibles".⁷² Nevertheless, these difficulties alone do not seem sufficient to account for what is effectively a total lack of correspondence between the two, even in cases where groups are defined by the same body part. It seems then that the only shared features here are the general framework of the understanding that there are a large variety of parasites on the human body and a taxonomy of them organised according to the organ, limb or substance on which they feed. I have already observed that a taxonomy of human parasites is ubiquitous in South and Southeast Asian medical analyses.

Thus far, examination has shown that existing arguments for a link between the *Path to Liberation* and the *yogāvaccara* tradition are not valid. What of the suggested link between the *Path to Liberation* and the Abhayagirivihāra?

As Kheminda's appraisal of the content of the *Path to Liberation* has shown, the text conforms with Mahāvihāra orthodoxy in its embryology

and analysis of parasites found in the human body. Elsewhere, as Bapat, Bareau and Bizot all remark, the text again shows considerable agreement with other texts in the Mahāvihāra tradition. This characteristic of the text has led some, such as Nyānamoli, to suggest that it is a product of the Mahāvihāra,⁷³ while elsewhere the same data is taken to mean that it has to belong to a Theravādin tradition closely related to the Mahāvihāra.⁷⁴ Different opinions and analyses of doctrine are found within the literature of the Mahāvihāra, so the presence of minor differences between the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Path to Liberation* in itself neither implies that they are the product of different schools nor excludes the possibility. The doctrines in question would have to be explicitly excluded or never found in any Mahāvihāra text for us to assume it is not a product of that tradition.

André Bareau⁷⁵ and, more recently and in closer detail, Peter Skilling⁷⁶ have followed Bapat⁷⁷ in focusing on the specific details of the doctrinal elements, in particular the *abhidharma* categories of the *Path to Liberation*, in the hope of establishing its sectarian affiliation. One might suspect that their use of the Pāli title and Skilling's reconstitution of the Pāli equivalents of technical terms found in the Tibetan, when there is no indication that the text ever existed in Pāli, predisposes a particular outcome to their searches. However, the use of the Pāli version of the title was established by Bapat in his well known *Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga, a Comparative Study*,⁷⁸ and was used primarily for the purpose of comparison of like with like, in this case two Sthavira surveys of spiritual practice. Following his title, it has become standard to refer to the *Path to Liberation* by the Pāli name *Vimuttimagga*. Furthermore, Skilling's reconstruction of Pāli terms again is encouraged by his comparison of the *Path to Liberation* with corresponding material in the Mahāvihāra tradition.⁷⁹

Bareau includes a discussion of the *Path to Liberation* and the Abhayagirivāsins in his *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, a survey volume of the branches and subdivisions of Buddhist schools mentioned in the literature and archaeology of the Buddhist tradition.⁸⁰ It is worth noting that, while still an important point of reference, the section of this work on Theravāda was in need of revision even at the time of its publication. Bareau writes, "Jusqu'au XIe s., les seuls vestiges [du bouddhisme] trouvés attestent la présence en Birmanie d'un Bouddhisme mahāyāniste et même tantrique. . . . La Basse-Birmanie fut convertie au Theravāda au milieu du XIIIe s."⁸¹ Contrary to Bareau, our material evidence for Pāli Buddhism in Burma predates the 11th-century by half a millennium, given the dating of the Khin Ba Mound gold

leaves to c.6th century CE.⁸² Earlier evidence for Pāli Buddhism includes clay and stone seals dated to c.4th century CE from Beikthano and Khlong Thom.⁸³ In other words, the material evidence of Pāli Buddhist literature in Burma predates that from anywhere else and they predate any recorded conversion of Burma by Sri Lankan Buddhists.⁸⁴ Furthermore, Stargardt has demonstrated on stylistic grounds that the archaeology shows the influence of the Buddhist culture of eastern India.⁸⁵ The archaeological evidence from the Khin Ba Mound was excavated in the 1920s and was published by Duroiselle in 1930, a quarter of a century before Bareau's survey appeared. While the archaeological report itself might be considered obscure, the material had been used by Ray in his *Sanskrit Buddhism in Burma*, a more accessible work on early Burmese Buddhism published in Paris in 1936. However, in Bareau's coverage of Theravāda, most of which is taken up by a summary of the *Kathāvattu*,⁸⁶ his main source for Theravāda history was a book published over three decades earlier: Eliot's *Hinduism and Buddhism* published in 1921, before the Khin Ba Mound material came to light.⁸⁷ Thus Bareau's starting point on Theravāda was seriously out of date.

The influence of the Mahāvihāra or one of the other branches of Sri Lankan Theravāda on the Pāli Buddhism that produced the above archaeological remains is not excluded.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the evidence also suggests the possible existence of other branches of Theravāda which did not derive from Sri Lanka. The tradition that Mahinda brought Buddhism to Sri Lanka in the time of Asoka, converted the king, Devānampiya Tissa, who in turn founded the Mahāvihāra is a cliché of Theravāda historiography.⁸⁹ It is accepted as fact because of the testimony of Sri Lankan Mahāvihārin chronicles and the presence of archaeological evidence for Buddhism in Sri Lanka from the 3rd-century BCE, even though, as Robin Coningham has demonstrated, the archaeological evidence does not confirm the clear-cut episode of conversion or the centralised, urban pattern of patronage described by the Mahāvamsa.⁹⁰ Rather, the archaeological data suggest smaller rival groups of uncentralised kingdoms patronising non-centralised cave-dwelling monks. In histories of Theravāda, less credence is granted to the parallel tradition for mainland Southeast Asia that Buddhism was brought to Burma at the time of Asoka by Sona and Uttara.⁹¹ This scepticism is due to the lack of archaeological evidence and chronicles for Buddhism of this period on Southeast Asian mainland. Skilling in his article "The Advent of Theravāda Buddhism to Mainland Southeast Asia", points out this lack of information for the early period,⁹² but does not therefore assume a Sri Lankan origin of all things Theravāda in

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Southeast Asia.⁹³ Nor does he assume we should dismiss the tradition of Buddhism arriving during the Asokan period.⁹⁴ He also points out that the new ordination lineage founded as part of 14th- and 15th-century Southeast Asian Theravāda was distinguished by the term *Sīhala-sāsana* and asks, "Might this not suggest that the old tradition did not associate itself with Ceylon?"⁹⁵

Part one of Bareau's *Les Sectes du Petit Véhicule* examines the different lists of schools (usually worked into a total of eighteen) included by different strands of the Buddhist tradition under the general divide between Sthavira and Mahāsaṅghika following the first schism of the Buddhist *saṅgha*. Part two of his work examines the available evidence for these schools, of which the Theravāda is but one. Bareau places the development of Theravāda into his second phase, and states that the tripartite division of Theravāda into Mahāvihāra, Abhayagirivihāra and Jetavanavihāra is a division of Sri Lankan Theravāda.⁹⁶ This suggests some sensitivity to the possible Sri Lankan bias of the records available to us. The basis of Bareau's understanding of the composition of Theravāda is a comparison of the lists of I-tsing in the 7th-century with the information of the Sri Lankan chronicles, which is confirmed by the list of Vinīta-deva in the 8th-century.⁹⁷ The 7th-century Sri Lankan chronicle the *Mahāvamsa* is, however, confining its statements to divisions in the Buddhist *saṅgha* which occurred in India (*Jambudīpa*) and Sri Lanka.⁹⁸ It does not refer to developments elsewhere. We can only conjecture whether or not the chronicler knew of such developments elsewhere or of the absence of such developments elsewhere. What we can say is that his list does not claim to be exhaustive. Indeed, given the original geographic specificity of this division, we might go further than Bareau and confine this tripartite composition of Theravāda, at the time of its development, to the city of Anurādhapura, since each of the three names referred originally to a particular monastery in Anurādhapura, where they were founded. The threefold division does not tell us anything about what else was happening in the rest of Theravāda, or broader Sthavira, world at the time. Even in terms of the situation in Sri Lanka, the view of a tripartite Theravāda made up of the Mahāvihāra, Abhayagirivihāra and Jetavanavihāra is probably too simplistic, as Bechert points out: "It is almost certain that the real *nikāya* divisions in Sri Lanka during the mediaeval period as well⁹⁹ did not always agree with the traditional tripartition. Thus, we know from the *Cūlavamsa* that the *Paṃsukūlika* monks branched off from the *Abhayagirivāsins* during the ninth century"¹⁰⁰ and "Another separate group were the *Lābhavāsins*".¹⁰¹ Bareau also mentions in passing the

Dakḥiṇāvihāra, another branch of Theravāda which developed from the Abhayagirivihāra in Anurādhapura during this period.¹⁰²

On top of this paucity of detailed knowledge of the overall picture of early and medieval Theravāda, Bareau points out the difficulty of the terms Sthavira and Theravāda: "En effet, le mot pâli Theravādin correspond au sanscrit Sthaviravādin, et les premiers savants européens qui l'étudièrent identifiaient les Theravādin avec les Sthavira, ... En réalité, le problème n'est pas si simple".¹⁰³ While the Sanskrit and Pāli are versions of the same term, they do not necessarily have the same referent. Even if the Mahāvihāra Theravāda regards itself as the original Sthavira school from which the Mahāsaṅghika split away in the first schism, there are other Sthavira subgroups and the Theravāda itself shows a long history of development. In his chapter on the Sthavira, Bareau warns, "Nous savons qu'il ne faut pas les identifier avec les Theravādin singhalais".¹⁰⁴

Given the scant knowledge of the early history of Theravāda acknowledged by Bareau¹⁰⁵ and his statement that the Theravāda is not to be confused with the Sthavira,¹⁰⁶ it comes as some surprise that Bareau, in his discussion of the school affiliation of the *Path to Liberation*, nevertheless equates Sthavira with Theravāda and all Theravāda with the three most well-known branches that developed in Sri Lanka.

The difficulty arises in assessing whether Buddhist writers were making a distinction between Sthavira and Theravāda or making the same equation as "les premiers savants européens", for the same linguistic reason. The Tibetan and Chinese (but not the Mahāsaṅghika) lists of Bareau's "deuxième et troisième époque" imply and in some instances explicitly state an identity between the Sthavira and the Sri Lankan Theravāda.¹⁰⁷ It is following them that Bareau himself identifies the Theravāda with the three monastic lineages of Anurādhapura: "Si les Theravādin ne sont pas les Sthavira primitifs, que sont-ils donc? ... En effet, aucune des listes de sectes antérieures à la fin du VIIe s. de notre ère, y compris celle dressée par les Theravādin eux-mêmes, ne mentionne ces derniers parmi les vingt et quelque sectes du Hinayāna. C'est seulement à la fin du VIIe s. que, dans les listes à quatre groupes, on les voit apparaître, formant un groupe distinct à côté des Mahāsaṅghika, des Sarvāstivādin et des Sammatīya". In other words, it is first in the 7th century, two centuries after the translation of the *Path to Liberation* into Chinese, that the Sthaviravādin and Theravādin are equated in such lists. "Ce groupe est reconnaissable aux trois écoles ... des Theravādin singhalais: Mahāvihāravāsin, Abhayagirivāsin et Jetavanīya".¹⁰⁸

Bareau, then, equates Sthavira with Sri Lankan Theravāda and accepts the tripartite division into Mahāvihāra, Abhayagirivihāra and Jetavanavihāra. Even though this is the equation found in lists from the end of the 7th century, for Bareau, the *Path to Liberation* must be the product of one of these three communities, even if it may have been written several hundred years earlier. Of these three branches of Sri Lankan Theravāda, knowledge of all but the Mahāvihāra *nikāya* is scanty and, furthermore, the exact nature of the division between them is unclear. What we do know from the commentary to the *Mahāvamsa* and a surviving single sentence quotation of the Abhayagiri *Vinaya* in the *Samantapāsādikā* is that the Abhayagirivāsins observed a different *Vinaya*.¹⁰⁹ This means that the Abhayagirivihāra represented a separate *nikāya* defined by its observance of a distinctive body of ecclesiastical law.¹¹⁰ This is the only concrete piece of evidence that we have regarding the difference between the Abhayagirivihāra and Mahāvihāra, as distinct from a mass of hazy accusation from the former's detractors and conjecture on the part of scholars. Yet, important as matters of *vinaya* are for the continuity and legality of ordination lineages, they do not automatically imply distinctions of doctrine. As Bechert points out, it is important not to confuse "questions of ecclesiastic law ... with the issue of the continuation of certain doctrinal views".¹¹¹ Therefore the very search for the origins of the *Path to Liberation* in one of these *nikāya* divisions may be falling foul of this confusion. That said, it is also a fact that the sub-commentaries also attribute divergent doctrines, along with a penchant for Mahāyāna teachings, to the Abhayagirivāsins. The distinction between the Mahāvihāra and Abhayagirivihāra was therefore regarded by the *nikāya* authors as concerning more than just ecclesiastical law. However the initial division came about, we cannot doubt that the complexity of institutional and political life would further distinguish the two branches according to geography, patronage, ownership and inheritance. In addition to this, doctrinal difference may also have either been present at the start or have developed subsequently. At present, we do not know the reality or extent of doctrinal divergence between these two or any of the other Sri Lankan *nikāyas*.

Even if we acknowledge the ongoing significance of Sri Lanka in the history of Theravāda, it is hard to imagine that the rest of the Theravādin world was passively awaiting the latest literary product of Anurādhapura, never formulating an independent opinion or expression. While the *Path to Liberation* may have been the product of one of the Sri Lankan *nikāyas*, either in Sri Lanka or elsewhere in the Buddhist world, it also remains possible that it was the product of a Theravāda

(or other Sthavira) school of which we have no concrete knowledge. The *Path to Liberation* was brought to China in 503 by Mandrasena, a monk of Funan, a region which corresponds with part of present-day Cambodia, and Saṅghapāla, the translator of the *Path to Liberation* into Chinese, likewise came from Funan,¹¹² which at least suggests the possibility of the *Path to Liberation* itself originating from Funan.¹¹³

Bareau attributes the *Path to Liberation* to Sri Lankan Theravāda because it lists only a single *asamskr̥tadharmā*, a feature which he suggests is characteristic of Sinhalese Theravāda. Given the paucity of information on non-Sri Lankan Theravāda and the fact that the only extant Theravāda corpus of literature is that of the Mahāvihāra,¹¹⁴ it is difficult to see how Bareau could isolate only Sri Lankan Theravāda as accepting a single *asamskr̥tadharmā* or how he could attribute this position to all Sri Lankan Theravāda. Beyond this, Bareau himself lists other Sthavira schools whose texts are no longer extant and whose position on this question is therefore unknown, e.g. Haimavata and Vātsīputrīya.¹¹⁵ Indeed, he lists the view that there is only one *asamskr̥tadharmā* among the doctrinal positions attributed to the Vātsīputrīyas,¹¹⁶ and observes that Tāranātha records this school as still in existence in the Pāla period.¹¹⁷ We cannot, therefore, conclude that a single *asamskr̥tadharmā* was found *exclusively* in Sinhalese Theravāda or *inclusively* in all Sinhalese Theravāda.

Bareau then points out that the *Path to Liberation's* definitions of other elements are identical to those found in the Pāli *Abhidhammapiṭaka*, especially in the *Dhammasaṅgani* and the *Vibhaṅga*. He notes the definitions are different from those found in the Sarvāstivāda *Abhidhammapiṭaka*, the *Śāriputrābhidharma-śāstra* and the *Satyasiddhiśāstra*. The text is therefore, he concludes, definitely of Sri Lankan Theravāda origin and based on the Pāli canon we know. Again, Bareau narrows the source of the *Path to Liberation* down to Sri Lankan Theravāda, even though we simply do not have sufficient evidence of the Theravāda of other regions or of schools other than the Mahāvihāra to either count or discount them. In other words, the same objections apply to this point as to the last.

Having equated Sthavira with post-7th century Theravāda, and Theravāda with the three most well known schools of Anurādhapura, Bareau follows Bagchi and Bapat¹¹⁸ in attributing the *Path to Liberation* to the Abhayagirivihāra. Bagchi considered the *Visuddhimagga* and *Path to Liberation* to be versions of the same work, the former representing the Mahāvihāra, the latter representing the Abhayagirivihāra.¹¹⁹

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Bareau bases his agreement with Bagchi on an examination of the technical terms found in the *Path to Liberation*. The slight differences between the *Path to Liberation* and the *Abhidhammapiṭaka* lead Bareau to suggest that the *Path to Liberation's* author was using a slightly different recension of the canon. This conclusion ignores the richness of the commentarial tradition which Buddhaghosa used. The Theravāda tradition did not remain static. The works attributed to Buddhaghosa reflect post-canonical development and therefore slight differences in comparison with the *Abhidhammapiṭaka*,¹²⁰ yet this does not lead us to ask "Was Buddhaghosa a Mahāvihāravāsini?"

Since the *Path to Liberation* is unknown from the repertoire of post-canonical Sinhalese works and Dhammapāla, in his *Paramatthamañjūsā*, mentions it as containing a view rejected by Buddhaghosa, Bareau takes this as further evidence that it can not have been composed by a monk of the Mahāvihāra. There are a number of problems with this. Firstly, while we cannot assume we have the entire repertoire of post-canonical Sinhalese works, it is odd that the absence of the *Path to Liberation* among known Sinhalese works does not suggest to Bareau a non-Sri Lankan origin of the text. This blinkered view reflects Bareau's assumption that Theravāda is coterminous with Sri Lankan Theravāda, as discussed above. Secondly, while Dhammapāla cites the *Path to Liberation* as containing a doctrine rejected by Buddhaghosa, he does not claim either that it is a Sri Lankan work or a non-Mahāvihāra work. We can not assume that all Mahāvihāra works fitted in with Buddhaghosa's personal judgement on orthodoxy, and this is particularly doubtful for a work composed before the time of Buddhaghosa.

Having decided that the *Path to Liberation* can not belong to the Mahāvihāra, Bareau concludes that it can consequently belong only to the Abhayagirivāsins or Jetavanīyas, and most probably the former, if one takes into consideration both the importance of the Abhayagirivāsins and the importance of the work, justifiably compared with the famous *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosa.¹²¹

There are a number of problems with this step in Bareau's argument. Firstly, as Norman writes, "It is really not satisfactory, and far from scholarly, to assume that a text must be a product of the Abhayagirivihāra simply because the information or the views it contains differ somewhat from the views found in other Pāli texts".¹²² Further, even if we were to accept the *Path to Liberation* as of Sri Lankan origin, which is by no means proven, its attribution to the Abhayagirivihāra of the known Sri Lankan branches of Theravāda, because of the supposed significance of both text and school, is a flawed piece of statistical

analysis. The significance of the Abhayagiri school to the Mahāvihāra school in the medieval monastic politics of Sri Lanka, surely can not be relied upon to guarantee the survival of one of its texts in Chinese translation and Tibetan quotation, particularly since any association of the *Path to Liberation* with the Abhayagiri was lost by the time of its inclusion in the Chinese *Tripitaka* and the *Samskr̥tāsamkr̥taviniścaya*. On the contrary, it was the very significance of the Abhayagirivāsins to the Mahāvihāra and vice versa that led repeatedly to the concerted destruction of the libraries of one then the other by royal decree in the history of their rivalry for patronage.¹²³ Even if this were not the case, the statistical analysis is still flawed: Are the only footprints of an extinct dinosaur preserved on a petrified beach those of the most 'important' species ever to cross that beach? There does not appear to me to be good reason for excluding the Jetavanavihāra and Dakkhinavihāra of the Sri Lankan traditions. Bareau calls on the "importance of the work" as reason for it having belonged to the most important sect outside of the Mahāvihāra, but was the *Path to Liberation* an important text? The fact that it is "justifiably compared with the famous *Visuddhimagga*" relates to its title, structure and coverage, rather than the significance of it to the Theravāda tradition.¹²⁴ Bareau is attributing retrospectively to the Buddhist tradition our own preoccupation with the unknown origin of the *Path to Liberation* and the enigma of the Abhayagirivihāra, a preoccupation based on the tantalising existence of some information regarding both in comparison with complete silence on other works and schools.

Additional evidence which might be introduced against Abhayagiri for the source of the *Path to Liberation* is the way in which it is mentioned by Dhammapāla. In his commentary on Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga*, Dhammapāla attributes a statement regarding temperaments refuted by Buddhaghosa to the *Vimuttimagga*. His attribution is confirmed by the Chinese version of the *Path to Liberation*.¹²⁵ Yet Dhammapāla certainly does not identify the *Path to Liberation* as an Abhayagiri work even though he elsewhere does cite the Abhayagirivāsins as holders of other rejected views.¹²⁶ This might lead us to conclude that the *Path to Liberation* can not have been a work associated with the Abhayagirivāsins. On the other hand, if the *Path to Liberation* was well known as an Abhayagirivihāra text, perhaps there was no need for Dhammapāla additionally to point this out. Yet if this were the case, one might expect Dhammapāla to have made more use of it as a representative document of the Abhayagirivihāra. Norman goes so far as to suggest it possible that Dhammapāla did not have access to

the *Path to Liberation*.¹²⁷ Since it contains statements attributed to *ke ci* or *anye* by Buddhaghosa which Dhammapāla attributes to the Abhayagirivāsins or leaves unattributed, perhaps Dhammapāla only knew the single detail of the *Path to Liberation*.¹²⁸

Having taken us through his reasons for attributing the *Path to Liberation* to the Abhayagirivāsins, Bareau then draws the following extraordinary conclusions:

If, as seems probable, the *Vimuttimagga* of Upatissa is the work of an Abhayagirivāsin, one may draw a variety of conclusions from studying it. Firstly, the different schools of Sinhalese Theravāda used the Pāli *Tīpitaka* in common, or at least the greater part of it, including the *Dhammasaṅgani* and *Vibhaṅga*. The only criticism of the Abhayagirivāsin on the part of the Sinhalese tradition was that they rejected the *Pārivāra* of the *Vinayapitaka*.¹²⁹ Further, the Pāli *Tīpitaka* was therefore complete by the period in which they [the Sri Lankan Theravāda schools] divided, towards 20 CE, or at least almost so, since at least two of the seven works of the *Abhidhammapitaka* were already at least partially fixed and could serve as the basis of reference for the two schools. If, as the tradition has it, the Abhayagirivāsins incorporated a *Vetullapitaka*¹³⁰ in their canon at a later stage, which may have included some *Mahāyānasūtra*, they nevertheless shared with the Mahāvihāravāsins the totality or almost the totality of the doctrine included in the Pāli *Tīpitaka*, the doctrine which had been rigorously defined by the *Abhidhammapitaka*, with the *Dhammasaṅgani*, *Vibhaṅga* and certainly the larger portion of the *Kathāvattu*.¹³¹

The circularity of Bareau's argument here is obvious. To summarise his entire argument: 'The *Path to Liberation* uses material familiar from the Pāli canon, particularly the *Vibhaṅga* and *Dhammasaṅgani*, so must derive from a Sri Lankan tradition closely related to the Mahāvihāra, which itself is based on the Pāli canon. The obvious candidate is the Abhayagirivihāra. Since the *Path to Liberation* represents the Abhayagirivihāra we can in turn infer that the Abhayagirivihāra used the Pāli canon, particularly the *Vibhaṅga* and *Dhammasaṅgani*, and must therefore be closely related to the Mahāvihāra'.

In other words, Bareau first uses the doctrinal views of the *Path to Liberation* to demonstrate that it comes from the Abhayagirivihāra, although we know virtually nothing about the doctrinal views of the Abhayagirivihāra. Since we know virtually nothing about the doctrinal view of the Abhayagirivihāra, the *Path to Liberation* is our only evidence for them, but fortunately, since it is now an Abhayagiri text, it is fairly informative on the doctrinal views of the Abhayagirivihāra and we can now make hitherto impossible statements regarding the nature of the Abhayagirivihāra on the basis of it. He has used unsubstantiated presuppositions to reach his conclusion and then used his conclusion to substantiate his presuppositions.

Bareau further concludes that the Mahāyāna characteristics of the Abhayagirivāsins recounted by the Chinese pilgrim Hsüan-tsang in the 7th century must have been superimposed on top of the Hīnayānist doctrine included in the *Tipitaka* which remained the basis of their canon, since we now know, on the basis of the *Path to Liberation*, that the Abhayagirivāsins were at first entirely Hīnayānistic.¹³²

We can suggest that Bareau was writing here very much in a mood of speculation. The difficulty is, however, that Bareau's reputation as an authority on Buddhist history is so great that his *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* is treated as a proof text.¹³³

More recently, Peter Skilling has sought to establish that the *Path to Liberation* can be regarded with certainty as an Abhayagirivihāra text in his article "Vimuttimaggā and Abhayagiri: The form-aggregate according to the *Saṃskṛtāsāṃskṛtaviniścaya*".¹³⁴ His argument is based on the attribution of the *Path to Liberation* to the Sthaviras in the *Saṃskṛtāsāṃskṛtaviniścaya* of Daśabalaśrīmitra and on a comparison of some *abhidhamma* categories given in the *Path to Liberation* with corresponding categories in Mahāvihārin orthodoxy as represented by Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimaggā*. In particular, Skilling focuses on the differences in the lists of derived form, the fifth of the ten doctrinal divergencies between these two texts observed by Bapat.¹³⁵ Skilling's arguments are far more detailed and sophisticated than Bareau's and take into consideration the development of the Mahāvihāra school beyond the canonical period. His final conclusions are nonetheless too far reaching.

Skilling's article contains a wealth of information, including the text and translation of the relevant section of the Tibetan translation of the *Saṃskṛtāsāṃskṛtaviniścaya*. I shall therefore isolate the main points in his argument before outlining my reservations.¹³⁶

- i) The *Path to Liberation*, when quoted by Daśabalaśrīmitra, is produced as a representative document of the Sthavira school.¹³⁷
- ii) As a representative document of the Sthavira school it can, according to Skilling, have come only from one of these three: the Mahāvihāra, the Abhayagirivihāra or the Jetavanavihāra.¹³⁸
- iii) The *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*'s list of 23 types of derived form is augmented in Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimaggā* by only one further type, the *hadayavatthu*, to a list of 24. The *Path to Liberation* states that there are 26 types of derived form (*upādāya-rūpa*). It augments the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*'s list of 23 types of derived form by three items: *rūpassa jāti*, *vatthu-rūpa*, and *middha*.¹³⁹

- iv) Skilling demonstrates through an examination of their definition and function that the derived form *vatthu-rūpa* in the *Path to Liberation* may be equated with the derived form *hadayavatthu* of the *Visuddhimaggā*.¹⁴⁰
- v) This leaves *rūpassa jāti* and *middha* as types of derived form found in the *Path to Liberation* list and not in the *Visuddhimaggā* list.¹⁴¹
- vi) Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimaggā* rejects as uncanonical¹⁴² four derived forms, including *jāti-rūpa*, but notes they are listed in the *Atthakathā*, and a fifth, *middha-rūpa*, as the opinion of some (*anye*).¹⁴³ The *Path to Liberation*'s additional two types of derived form are, then, among at least five additional types known to Buddhaghosa but rejected by him in his *Visuddhimaggā*.
- vii) The *ṭīkā* to the *Visuddhimaggā* at this point identifies the "some" who accepted *middha-rūpa* as the Abhayagirivāsins.¹⁴⁴
- viii) Conclusion: the *Path to Liberation* is an Abhayagirivāsin text.

Points i, iii, vi and vii are all statements of fact and points iv and v are convincingly argued. There remain, however, some weaknesses in Skilling's premises and deduction, which we shall now examine.

Skilling (point ii above) begins with the premise that Sthavira is the same as Sri Lankan Theravāda. The text "clearly belongs to the Theravādin tradition".¹⁴⁵ Skilling gives no basis for making this identification, and all the objections which applied to this premise in Bareau above apply here also. The equation of Sthavira with Sri Lankan Theravāda is particularly surprising from Skilling, since he elsewhere is so particular not to confuse the two categories: "By 'Sthavira' I do not mean here the Theravādins of Ceylon, but branches of the early North Indian Sthavira vinaya lineage that were not affected by events in Ceylon. We might call these unreformed or unaffiliated Sthaviras".¹⁴⁶ Similarly Skilling elsewhere, as mentioned above, points out the impossibility of gaining any accurate assessment of the make up of Theravāda, particularly as found in Southeast Asia.¹⁴⁷ Yet although Skilling notes in the same article that the *Path to Liberation* was brought from Funan and translated by a monk from Funan, he can not accept the possibility that it originates from Southeast Asia: "Since none of the other texts brought from Funan are Theravādin, and some belong to the Mahāyāna, the fact that the *Vimuttimaggā* was among them attests only to the availability of that text in Funan: it cannot be interpreted as evidence for a (non-Mahāvihāra) Theravāda presence".¹⁴⁸

Skilling's second major premise is that the *ṭīkā*s are correct in their attributions. There remains some doubt whether *ṭīkā* attribu-

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tions of rejected views in the commentaries to the Abhayagiri school (point vii above) are to be considered sound. Norman lists the possible interpretations of the sub-commentarial attributions of views rejected by Buddhaghosa to the Abhayagirivāsins as follows: Buddhaghosa had access to the views of the Abhayagirivāsins, relations allowed communication between the two either in Buddhaghosa's time or meant that records of those views were available for Buddhaghosa at the Mahāvihāra; alternatively Buddhaghosa's Mahāvihāra sources included the views rejected by Buddhaghosa which by the time of his writing or by the time of the subcommentators had been rejected by the Mahāvihāravāsins and adopted by the Abhayagirivāsins; a further possibility is that the subcommentators were just guessing.¹⁴⁹ One might add here the possibility that the subcommentators, rather than just guessing were deliberately painting the Abhayagirivāsins as holders of unorthodox views to increase the reputation of the Abhayagirivihāra as a hotbed of heresy or to emphasise their own uniformity as resolute keepers of the one true tradition.¹⁵⁰ Skilling notes the doubts about the validity of these references in contrast to the relative vagueness of the commentarial style, but puts this down to commentarial etiquette which leaves the identification of opponents to the commentator. He sees no reason for doubting the *ṅikā* authors.¹⁵¹ A subsidiary premise assumed by Skilling here is that attributions to the Abhayagirivāsins are exclusive, and that a point attributed to them would not also be found elsewhere.

The above premises are unsound and no valid argument can be built upon them. Even if we accept the statements of the *ṅikā* author and the equation of Sthavira with Theravāda, there still appears to be an error of deduction between the statements given and the conclusion that "the *Path to Liberation* is an Abhayagirivāsin text". We need therefore to examine more closely the discussion of the lists of derived form found in the various texts (points v and vi above).

The difference between the *Path to Liberation* and the *Visuddhimagga* is that the former includes *rūpassa jāti* and *middha* in its lists of derived form whereas the latter does not (point v above). They nevertheless both accept the post-canonical *rūpavatthu/hadayavatthu*. Buddhaghosa acknowledges that *jāti-rūpa* and three other rejected terms occur in the *Atthakathā* literature. He relates that *middha-rūpa* occurs in the opinion of *anye* "some". This information, in association with the subcommentarial identification of the Abhayagirivāsins as the some who accept *middha-rūpa* as a derived form leads Skilling to accept the *Path to Liberation* as an Abhayagirivāsin text.

The problems with this stage of the argument seem to me to be the following. The fact that Buddhaghosa reports *jāti-rūpa* and other types of derived form to be in the *Atthakathā* literature shows that he is acknowledging the development of other lists of types of derived form within the tradition since the closure of the *tipitaka*, but is rejecting those developments in establishing a reform which seeks to systematise Abhidhammic analysis on the basis of the authority of the *tipitaka*, a systematisation which, post Buddhaghosa, becomes accepted as authoritative. *Middha-rūpa* comes at the end of this list of the types of derived form he rejects. In this case, the type *middha-rūpa* is not found by Buddhaghosa in the *atthakathā* literature but in the opinion of "some". The "some" could be either fellow Mahāvihārins or people outside of the Mahāvihāra. There is no way of deciding which was the case on the basis of current information. Buddhaghosa could have been rejecting an opinion current within the Mahāvihāra. It is, let it be remembered, only after Buddhaghosa, that Buddhaghosa can be accepted as representing Mahāvihāra orthodoxy.¹⁵² We can hardly assume that he was the only author the Mahāvihāra produced after the early commentaries. Curiously, Skilling warns in a separate, but contemporaneous publication against a too simplistic interpretation of Buddhaghosa's position: "The conservatism of the Thera tradition of Ceylon is often overrated. The *Hadaya-vatthu* (not listed in the *Dhammasaṅgani*) and the developed *bhavāṅga* theory (along with the Theravādin *khanikavāda*) appear only with Buddhaghosa. The great *ācariya* was an Indian monk who almost certainly selectively introduced new material from the tenets of the Indian Sthavira schools: he was not only a codifier but also an innovator, but the latter aspect of his career is too frequently ignored".¹⁵³

The information available to us at this stage leads rather to the following, less dramatic conclusion: Buddhaghosa rejected five types of derived form, four of which were in *Atthakathā* literature, one of which was preserved or current outside of *Atthakathā* literature. The *Path to Liberation* excludes three of these and includes two.¹⁵⁴ The *Path to Liberation* may therefore be regarded either as having been written within the Mahāvihāra tradition before Buddhaghosa became accepted as Mahāvihāra orthodoxy, or as having been written outside of the Mahāvihāra tradition. Since the *Path to Liberation* has been allocated a variety of dates within the first half of the first millennium CE and was translated into Chinese in 515, it must predate or at the latest be contemporaneous with Buddhaghosa. There is therefore nothing to exclude the former of the two alternatives, namely that the

Path to Liberation is a Mahāvihārin text. Circumstantial evidence in favour of it being so is that Anuruddha, the 7th-century author on *abhidhamma* in the Mahāvihāra tradition, uses the term *sabhāva-rūpa* in his *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*. This is the term used by the *Path to Liberation*, whereas Buddhaghosa uses *rūpa-rūpa*.¹⁵⁵ It is anachronistic to assume that the *Path to Liberation* can not be a Mahāvihāra text because a later Mahāvihāra text disagrees with something it contains.¹⁵⁶

Turning to the second alternative, that the *Path to Liberation* was written within a non-Mahāvihārin Sthavira Buddhist tradition, there is no good reason to select the Abhayagirivihāra as our favourite candidate. We even have reason to reject it, given that Dhammapāla cites the *Path to Liberation* without identifying it as belonging to the Abhayagirivihāra even though he expressed familiarity with the latter's literature.¹⁵⁷ Skilling does not substantiate his rejection of the *Jetavanavihāra*. A further doubt regarding the attribution of the *Path to Liberation* to the Abhayagirivāsins arises from Daśabalaśrīmitra. He attributes it only to the Sthaviras, unlike Bhavya who in his *Tarkajvāla* attributes a textual quotation specifically to the Abhayagirivāsins.¹⁵⁸ This surely suggests that if the *Path to Liberation* is an Abhayagirivihāra text, either it was not exclusively so or Daśabalaśrīmitra was as ignorant or doubtful of the fact as we are.

To summarise our findings so far, we have found firstly, that the *Path to Liberation* and *yogāvacara* traditions do not share unique features, as had been supposed by Bizot. Secondly, the evidence and arguments produced for the identification of the *Path to Liberation* as an Abhayagirivihāra text do not stand examination. Since the *yogāvacara* tradition can not be linked to the *Path to Liberation* and the *Path to Liberation* can not be linked to the Abhayagirivihāra, every link in the chain of reasoning which led Bechert, on the basis of Bizot, to associate *yogāvacara* tradition and the Abhayagirivihāra is now broken.

As mentioned above, Bizot, in 1976, was cautious about any possible association between the *Path to Liberation* and the *yogāvacara* tradition. It is Bechert who first postulates such a link with any assurance. Bizot does not expand on the suggested link between the *Path to Liberation* and the *yogāvacara* tradition in subsequent studies. Yet by 1993 he appears to have been sufficiently influenced by Bechert's misreading of his own work to again allow space to the theory. Surprisingly, the space is afforded in his more general, introductory work *Le Bouddhisme des Thaïs*, where Bizot introduces the possibility that the *Mahānikāya* (*yogāvacara*) traditions of Thailand and Cambodia may go back to "Une vieille tradition hybride de Ceylan?", namely the

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Abhayagirivihāra.¹⁵⁹ Bizot retains his former caution: "Les rares textes conservés [de l'Abhayagirivihāra] montrent que leurs commentaires en pāli ne présentaient pas de différence fondamentale avec ceux du Mahāvihāra, en dehors de quelques points spéciaux". It is not clear to which Pāli commentarial texts of the Abhayagirivihāra Bizot refers here. I am not aware of any extant, so I assume he is referring to the *Path to Liberation* or possibly the *Saddhammopāyana*. Bizot accepts the *Path to Liberation* as an Abhayagiri text, as can be seen from his statement "l'audience de l'Abhayagirivihāra fut grande, en particulier dans le nord de l'Inde, puisqu'un de ses ouvrages y servit de référence pur décrire au XIIe siècle la doctrine du Theravāda".¹⁶⁰ This surely refers to the quotation in Daśabalaśrīmitra's *Saṃskṛtāsamskṛtaviniścaya* studied by Skilling, and indeed Skilling's first article on this text is one of the small number of secondary works listed in Bizot's bibliography.¹⁶¹ One of the "points spéciaux" which differentiates the Mahāvihāra from the Abhayagirivihāra is, Bizot states, found in Cambodian manuals of Buddhist practice. It is the listing of parasites present in the human body.¹⁶²

Bizot briefly notes other possible clues of shared characteristics of the Cambodian tradition and the Abhayagirivihāra. One is the tradition of *paṇsukūlika* monks in Cambodia and the existence of a *paṇsukūlika* sect which broke from the Abhayagirivihāra in the 9th century.¹⁶³ The other is the presumed presence of Mahāyāna influences in both Cambodian Theravāda and the Abhayagirivihāra.¹⁶⁴ As Bizot points out, however, there is no way of following the *paṇsukūlika* lead at present, because of lack of evidence: "Un autre indice de cette hypothèse [of the relationship between the *yogāvacara* tradition and the Abhayagirivihāra] réside peut-être dans le fait que certaines pratiques traditionnelles font de tous les moines d'Indochine des *paṇsukūlika*. . . . Ces traditions pourraient avoir leurs sources dans une des plus vieilles "hérésies" cinghalaises, connue précisément sous le nom de *Pānsukūlika*. Malheureusement, rien n'a été conservé sur les thèses de cette école".¹⁶⁵ Bizot does not give any detail of Mahāyāna tendencies attributed to the Abhayagirivihāra or details of the possible links these may demonstrate between the Abhayagirivihāra and *yogāvacara* traditions. It is rather the openness to a range of influences and practices in the two that has attracted his attention: "La tolérance qui les [*nikāya* non-mahāvihāravāsins de la Péninsule] caractérisait à l'origine peut donc aussi bien expliquer leurs différences que leurs ressemblances avec les Abhayagirivāsins de Ceylan".¹⁶⁶ The passage on embryology and taxonomy of human parasites is still the most concrete evidence with leads Bizot to suppose

that the *yogāvacara* practices of Cambodian Theravāda may have existed in Sri Lanka prior to the 12th-century unification of the Sri Lankan *saṅgha* under the Mahāvihāra through the reform of King Parākrāmabāhu. Bizot's more assured statement in his later work may result in part from the confirmation of Bechert.¹⁶⁷

Thus far many objections have denied the possibility of any definite statement confirming or rejecting the suggested links between the Abhayagirivāsins, the *Path to Liberation* and the *yogāvacara* tradition. Beyond this, however, there is a further final and definitive piece of evidence against associating the *Path to Liberation* with the Mahānikāya *yogāvacara* tradition. The *Path to Liberation* explicitly warns against certain possible approaches to mediation:

Mindfully, he breathes in; mindfully he breathes out. He does not consider (the breath) when it has gone in and also when it has gone out. He considers the contact of the incoming breath and the outgoing breath, at the nose-tip or on the lip, with mindfulness. He breathes in and breathes out with mindfulness. It is as if a man were sawing wood. The man does not attend to the going back and forth of the saw. In the same way the yogin does not attend to the perception of the incoming and the outgoing breath in mindfulness of respiration. He is aware of the contact at the nose-tip or on the lip, and he breathes in and out, with mindfulness. If, when the breath comes in or goes out, the yogin considers the inner or the outer, his mind will be distracted. If his mind is distracted, his body will waver and tremble. These are the disadvantages.¹⁶⁸

The meaning of this passage is made clearer by the *Visuddhimagga* which gives the same warning in fuller form. The *Visuddhimagga*¹⁶⁹ quotes the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (I.165), which could also be the source of the statement in the *Path to Liberation*.¹⁷⁰

The navel is the beginning of the wind issuing out, the heart is its middle and the nose-tip its end. The nose-tip is the beginning of the wind entering in, the heart is its middle and the navel its end. And if he follows after that, his mind is distracted by disquiet and perturbation, according as it is said [in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*]. 'When he goes in with mindfulness after the beginning, middle and end of the in-breath, his mind being distracted internally, both his body and his mind are disquieted and perturbed and shaky. When he goes out with mindfulness after the beginning, middle and end of the out-breath, his mind being distracted externally, both his body and his mind are disquieted and perturbed and shaky.'¹⁷¹

All three texts advocate using the sensation of contact of breath going in and out as it passes the nose or lips to become aware of and focus on the breath. They make a distinction between this and following the breath either through the body or outside of the body. The latter is discouraged as it has negative effects, distressing and destabilising the mind and the body. In other words, such practices have the opposite effect of that intended, namely a relaxed body and a calm and focused

mind. The texts likewise disapprove of trying to hold the breath for the same reason.

Now the meditations in the *yogāvacara* texts, including the meditation on breathing, are practised "internally and externally", using precisely the internal extreme of the breath, the navel, and the external extreme of the breath, the tip of the nose, as the extremes of the locations of the paths of whichever *kammaṭṭhāna* is being practised.

The following passages from the *phlūv brah dhamma laṅkā*, published and translated by Bizot in his *Chemin de Lanā*¹⁷² indicate the role of checking the breath and following the breath in the *yogāvacara* tradition, and the effects of this practice on the mind and body of the practitioner. The text takes the form of a dialogue between meditation teacher and disciple during the meditation practice.¹⁷³ The dialogue confirms the intended outcome of the practice.

39.1 Puis le maître fait pratiquer pour pouvoir traverser la mer. Il fait pratiquer le parikamma¹⁷⁴ d'une seule auguste lettre. Il fait pratiquer le parikamma par la bouche de façon rapide et comprimer le souffle de façon lourde.

39.2 Le maître demande: Que dit-on lorsqu'on pratique [jusqu'à] couper le souffle?

39.3 Réponds au maître: Le souffle étant coupé, on dit que la personne est morte.

39.4 Le maître demande: Comment pratique-t-on de façon rapide et lourde?

39.5 Réponds au maître: La bouche pratique le parikamma de l'auguste lettre A. L'esprit s'éprend de l'exercice de bhāvanā. La bouche supérieure se ferme au souffle impétueux, afin qu'il devienne lourd, ne puisse monter, et descende jusqu'à l'anus. Alors on constate que l'anus expulse des gaz et des matières fécales et que l'urètre émet de l'urine.

39.6 Le maître demande: Pratiquant, en combien [de respirations] ont lieu ces expulsions?

39.7 Réponds au maître: Pratiquant, [elles ont lieu] en une respiration.

43.1 Le maître fait pratiquer de façon lourde. Le maître demande: Comment pratiques-tu de façon lourde et rapide?

43.2 Réponds au maître: Je pratique de façon rapide et lourde: l'esprit s'éprend et descend jusqu'à la porte de l'anus; la bouche pratique le parikamma de l'auguste lettre A. Je me mords les lèvres pour ne pas respirer ni laisser monter le souffle; le corps tremble et s'agit de soubresauts. Toutes les veines se raidissent dans la chair. Le souffle recule, devient lourd et descend rapidement. Je me mords les lèvres pour comprimer très fortement le souffle vers le bas; pas de respiration... toujours pas de respiration... Alors le souffle tombe à la porte de l'anus qui reste ferme. Des gaz s'échappent par la porte de l'anus. Je poursuis à nouveau le parikamma jusqu'à l'expulsion de matières fécales par la porte de l'anus. Je continue de pratiquer le parikamma de façon lourde et rapide jusqu'à l'émission d'urine par la porte de l'urètre.

43.3 Le maître demande: Pratiques-tu longtemps de façon lourde?

43.4 Réponds au maître: Je pratique de façon lourde pendant seulement une respiration.

43.5 Le maître demande: Pratiquant de façon lourde que ressens-tu?

43.6 La bouche pratique le parikamma de façon lourde et rapide, et comprime le souffle pour qu'il ne monte pas, en sorte qu'il devienne lourd et tombe à l'emplacement du pied: Des vibrations se propagent jusqu'à la porte de l'anus. Je me mords les lèvres pour ne pas respirer. [Le souffle] devient lourd et descend. Le corps tremble et

la porte de l'anus s'agit convulsivement. Le souffle diminue et descend. Je ressens une grande fatigue. Le souffle ne peut s'échapper. Je suis épuisé. Le souffle fait mouvement arrière et se propulse vers le haut.

43.7 Le maître demande: Pourquoi ressens-tu une grande fatigue en pratiquant le parikamma?

43.8 Réponds au maître: Je ressens une grande fatigue parce que ma bouche pratique le parikamma de façon lourde et rapide.

43.9 Le maître demande: Pratiquant avec le souffle, pourquoi ressens-tu une grande fatigue?

43.10 Réponds au maître: Je ressens une grande fatigue parce que, pratiquant de façon dense et rapide, le souffle se meut avec force.

43.11 Le maître explique: Cette souffrance s'appelle "véritable souffrance"¹⁷⁵ (*dukkha sacca*).

The dialogue continues exploring the effects and explanations of the meditation using breath until the end of the meditation on breathing (*ānāpāna*).¹⁷⁶ It includes a discussion of the inability of the practitioner, as a *puṭhujjana*, to sustain the practice, whereas the Buddha was able to sustain it for seven days and nights.¹⁷⁷ The breath is further described as deriving from the Dhamma since when one pursues the practice described above the breath descends to the "l'emplacement du pieu"¹⁷⁸ at the navel which elsewhere in the text is identified with *vajrāsana* under the Bo tree, where the Buddha first enunciated the Dhamma.¹⁷⁹ As the internal representation of the place of Enlightenment the navel is where the Buddha is created through the use of the *parikamma*.¹⁸⁰ Following the breath externally, the practitioner observes that the breath is straight like a canoe.¹⁸¹ At a further stage in the meditation, the practitioner visualises or sees a monk paddling the canoe across a river to climb mount Sumeru on the opposite bank in order to circumambulate and worship the *stūpa* at its summit.¹⁸²

The passages of the *Chemin de Lankā* cited here are of great interest in their own right. For present purposes, however, they demonstrate the great discrepancy between the *yogāvacara* meditations and those advocated in *Visuddhimagga* and *Path to Liberation*. In particular, the *Chemin de Lankā* teaches that the breath must be suppressed and observed both internally and externally. The purpose is to create the Buddha and Dhamma within oneself and realise the four noble truths. The ability to sustain the practice indicates spiritual advancement. The physical effects on the practitioner nevertheless include the physical distress warned against in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, *Visuddhimagga* and *Path to Liberation*. The method and effects of the *yogāvacara* practices therefore fit the criteria for rejection given in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, *Visuddhimagga* and *Path to Liberation*. Historically, these three texts may be referring to the *prāṇāyāma* meditations of India which have a history back at least to the time of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* and continue to

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be practised to this day. There need be no intended connection by the authors here with the practices of the *yogāvacara* tradition, of which they may have had no knowledge. Yet we can conclude that even if the author of the *Path to Liberation* knew of the *yogāvacara* tradition, he followed canonical sources, as did Buddhaghosa, in disapproving of an important aspect of the meditation practices of that tradition. Therefore, not only does the author of the *Path to Liberation* not show any particular familiarity with the *yogāvacara* tradition of the *Mahānikāya*, he further excludes as inappropriate and dangerous an important aspect of the meditation practices central to that tradition.

Bizot focused on the passage concerning embryonic development and human parasites because he had noticed it among the divergences between the *Path to Liberation* and the *Visuddhimagga* noted by Bapat. Yet far from it being the case that "ces deux points constituent exactement le passage étudié spécialement par M. Bapat",¹⁸³ this was only one of the many divergences observed by Bapat. He gives far greater consideration to *adhidhamma* terminology,¹⁸⁴ such as the inclusion in *PL* of the two derived forms *jātirūpa* and *middharūpa* pursued by Skilling.¹⁸⁵ The *yogāvacara* meditation manuals make much use of *adhidhamma* terminology. Had Bizot been drawn by these he would have observed Bapat's statement, "Upatissa gives six kinds of *pīti*, while Buddhaghosa gives only five".¹⁸⁶ The meditation on *pīti* is the opening practice at the beginning of several *yogāvacara* meditation manuals and, like Buddhaghosa, they give only five *pīti*.¹⁸⁷ While I shall not pursue details of the *adhidhamma* categories of the *yogāvacara* texts here, since I have done so elsewhere,¹⁸⁸ this example serves to illustrate that the *yogāvacara* texts are, in this discrepancy, closer to Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* than to the *Path to Liberation*. Had Bizot happened to focus on this set of the divergences noted by Bapat, rather than on the passage of embryology and parasitology, he might himself have come to quite a different theory, namely that the *yogāvacara* traditions were of Mahāvihāra origin.¹⁸⁹

The initial mistakes of Bizot, Bateau and Skilling were made in relation to short, relatively insignificant textual passages, yet the implications extend far beyond them. The Abhayagirivihāra and the *yogāvacara* tradition are both important, little understood aspects of medieval Theravāda. Were we able to judge its origins and history more closely, the *Path to Liberation* might also prove significant. Since we seek to write history in the face of the overwhelming silence of the witnesses, any scraps of evidence take on heightened significance, especially once verified by

respected scholars in the field. Thus the entire edifice of a broader and generally accepted history is built up on shallow foundations.

The evidence of the *Path to Liberation* and its association with the Abhayagirivihāra have already found both leading and supporting roles in a surprising number of envisaged scenarios. We have already noted their misapplication in Bareau and more recently Bechert above. Let us now observe the roles they are playing in more recent Theravādin historiography.

1. Lance Cousins includes in his survey of the *yogāvacara* tradition a short section entitled "A Product of the Abhayagiri School in Ceylon".¹⁹⁰ Cousins expresses doubt regarding the association of the *Path to Liberation* and the Abhayagirivihāra, and, even if we accept the association, doubt as to whether a product of the Abhayagirivihāra would preclude the presence of similar doctrines within the Mahāvihāra so soon after the two had divided.¹⁹¹ Cousins accepts without question Bizot's link between the *yogāvacara* tradition and the passage on embryology and parasitology in the *Path to Liberation*: "There is one passage related to the *Vimuttimagga* of Upatissa, but it is uncertain whether this was a work of the Abhayagiri school or not. Indeed, even if it is, it may have been written at a date before there was significant doctrinal divergence (sic) from the Mahāvihāra".¹⁹²
2. Sodō Mori uses the evidence of the *Path to Liberation* as an example of an Abhayagiri work to support his assessment of the differences in the minds of the *nikā* authors between the Abhayagirivihāra, Uttaravihāra and Dakṣiṇavihāra.¹⁹³ Since the evidence is not crucial to his argument, there is no need to explore it here. Mori does, however, draw subsidiary conclusions regarding Buddhaghosa's sources on the basis of his observation that not all views observed by Buddhaghosa and attributed by Dhammapāla to the Abhayagiri are found in the *Path to Liberation*: "Of the seven examples found in the *Visuddhimagga*, the quotations from the non-Mahāvihāra fraternities' views for which parallel passages can be seen in the *Gedatsudōron*, the Chinese version of the *Vimuttimagga*, are only four . . . For the remaining three examples . . . no such parallel passages can be found in the *Gedatsudōron*. As is already well known, the *Vimuttimagga*, composed by Upatissa of the Abhayagirivihāra, pre-dates the *Visuddhimagga* written by Buddhaghosa of the Mahāvihāra, and the former text is referred to without attribution as one of the basic source materials for the latter text.¹⁹⁴ Comparative studies of these two doctrinal works have already been done in detail. The *Vimut-*

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timagga was not, however, the only text of the Abhayagirivihāra to have been consulted by Buddhaghosa when he was writing the *Visuddhimagga* . . . Examples 5 and 7 suggest that he made use of some other unknown source of the Abhayagirivihāra, besides the above two texts. It might have been some oral transmission on doctrine or a commentarial work which will be considered later".¹⁹⁵

3. Von Hinüber provisionally finds a patron and date for the writing of the *Path to Liberation*: "In case the connection with the Abhayagirivihāra is correct, one might even speculate that Vim [PL] was written when this monastery enjoyed strong royal support under Mahāsena (334–361/274–301).¹⁹⁶ Von Hinüber cites Skilling 1993b and 1994 as the basis for the association.¹⁹⁷

Skilling, convinced by his own arguments regarding the *Path to Liberation's* school affiliation, has found use for it in a number of discussions:

4. The fact that *Path to Liberation* was brought to China from Funan at the beginning of the 6th century is either "important evidence for the presence of non-Mahāvihāra Theravāda in South-east Asia at an early date"¹⁹⁸ or "attests only to the availability of that text in Funan: it cannot be interpreted as evidence for a (non-Mahāvihāra) Theravādin presence".¹⁹⁹ This latter statement is followed in parentheses by a paragraph on [other] possible evidence for the Abhayagirivihāra in mainland and insular Southeast Asia.
5. Chapter three of the *Path to Liberation* was translated into Tibetan in the 8th century as "The Exposition of Purifying Virtues" (Skt. *Dhutaḡaṇanirdeśa*) and is preserved in the Kanjur, even though it is a *sāstra* and should thus be included in the *Tanjur*. Bu-ston notes that the catalogues classify it as *sūtra* while some classify it as *sāstra*.²⁰⁰ The translators, Vidyākara-prabha and dPal brtsegs, are otherwise known to have worked on Mūlasarvāstivādin *vinaya* texts. These anomalies are noted twice by Skilling²⁰¹ and lead him to suggest that the Mūlasarvāstivādins and other traditions had adopted the *Path to Liberation* from the Theravādins because they had lost their own exposition of the 13 *dhutāṅga*.²⁰²
6. In his *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā*, Yaśomitra attributes the theory of the "heart basis" (*hrdaya-vastu*) to the *Tāmra-parṃīyas* and states that they believe it exists even in the formless realm. While the extant Sanskrit text of the *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* reads *Tāmra-parṃīya*, the Tibetan translation reads *Gos dmar ba'i sde pa = Tāmra-sāṭīya*.²⁰³ Skilling notes that the theory of the "heart-basis"

(*hadayavatthu/vatthu-rūpa*) is "accepted by the Mahāvihāravāsins of Ceylon, and also by the *Vimuttimagga (PL)*".²⁰⁴ Now the Mahāvihārin do not posit the existence of the *hadayavatthu* even in the formless realm. The *Kathāvatthu-atthakathā* attributes the view that form can exist in formless realms (*atthi rūpam arūpesu*) to the Andhakas, and Anuruddha also rejects the possibility of the *hadayavatthu* existing in the formless realm. The Mahāvihārin view is thus clear and Yaśomitra is unlikely to be wrong in Skilling's view. Since the *hadayavatthu* is accepted by the *Path to Liberation*, Skilling regards it as a pan-Sri Lankan theory. There is no evidence that the Abhayagirivāsins or Jetavanīyas rejected the existence of the *hadayavatthu* in the formless realm, the *Path to Liberation* being our only supposed source of their views on this matter. These factors lead Skilling to suggest that we can identify the *Tāmra-parṇīyas/Tāmra-śāṭīya* with the Abhayagirivāsins, Jetavanīyas or "to a branch of the Sthaviras settled in Āndhradeśa, the 'Andhakas' of the *Kathāvatthu-atthakathā*".²⁰⁵

7. The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* and the *Path to Liberation* both state that the twin miracle can only be performed by a Buddha. Their agreement demonstrates to Skilling that this view is pan-Theravādin in contrast to the Lokottaravādin and Mūlasarvāstivādin statements that the miracle can be performed by an arhat.²⁰⁶
8. Since the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* and the *Path to Liberation* both contain similar versions of the 16 natures or characteristics of the four truths, the theory was "early and 'pan-Theravādin'".²⁰⁷ This subsidiary conclusion is adduced as evidence for (but in fact is not crucial to) his final conclusion regarding recently uncovered inscriptions from Thailand: "The Chai Nat inscriptions add to our knowledge of the textual basis of Dvāravati Buddhism. The evidence of the canonical extracts in Pāli (including those known from other inscriptions of the period), which agree closely with the Pāli canon as we know it, in conjunction with exegetical terms or phrases found in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* and with verses found in the works of Buddhaghosa and in later texts, prove with certainty that a form of Theravādin Buddhism was current, perhaps predominant, in the Chao Phraya basin during the 6th and 7th centuries."²⁰⁸

The above examples are all instances where the erroneous conclusions of Bareau, Bizot and Skilling have in turn become the false premises of other conclusions regarding possible events and developments in Buddhism of the mediaeval period. All but one of these examples was written in a period of less than five years between 1993 and 1997.

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Doubtless more will follow. While most of them are the work of Skilling, he has managed to use his premise to support a wide range of conclusions.

The very frequency of repetition that the *Path to Liberation* is an Abhayagiri text will ensure that this 'fact' pervades the next generation of Buddhist historiography. As Norman observes, "In this question of the affiliation of texts, there is a great deal of the Bellman's 'What I tell you three times is true' approach".²⁰⁹ We are lured into accepting such unreliable results as established fact and building upon them. There are a number of interrelated factors conducive to this result. When an author adduces a wide range of detailed evidence for his thesis and presents elaborate and lengthy discussion before reaching each of his subsidiary results as well as his final conclusion, this obscures the broader outline of his argument and deflects scrutiny of its formal validity towards rumination upon fragmented technical and linguistic details. The reader is further encouraged along this route by considerations of the economy of time and effort: in order to move from the detail of a specialised discussion to write broader surveys or establish new advances, we must rely on the validity of our sources. Had we to re-invent the wheel every time we undertook a journey, we would never get very far. While we have the duty to be selective in our dependence, we feel secure in accepting work for one or both of the following reasons: either the author has an established reputation or he displays erudition through detail, language and apparent scholarly scepticism elsewhere. Intermittent or specious scepticism is particularly misleading, for the reader is led to doubt their own powers of intellect through the pressure of their respect for experience, tradition and scholastic erudition.²¹⁰

CONCLUSION

It has been demonstrated in this paper that the suggested link between the *yogāvacara* tradition and the *Path to Liberation* does not exist. In the light of the explicit exclusion by the author of the *Path to Liberation* of the types of meditation advocated in the *yogāvacara* tradition, as demonstrated above, such a link is impossible and should henceforth be dropped from consideration.

It has also been demonstrated that the suggested link between the Abhayagirivihāra and the *Path to Liberation* is neither proven nor probable, on the basis of currently available information. As Norman points out, Bapat's suggestion of a link between the *Path to Liberation* and the Abhayagirivihāra has been oversimplified: "Bapat states

that the *Vimuttimagga* was probably a North Indian text, which was adopted by the Abhayagirivihārins. Bapat does not state that it was an Abhayagirivihārin text, in the sense that it was a product of that *vihāra*.²¹¹ Thus Bapat's inference was far less concrete: "Upatissa must be supposed to have advocated the views which were later accepted by the Abhayagirivādins".²¹² However, I would not even go so far as Norman in concurring with Bapat's statement that "we can simply draw an inference that Upatissa's book was later accepted by the monks from the Abhayagiri school",²¹³ since we have no corroboration in an Abhayagirivihāra source of familiarity with, let alone acceptance of, the *Path to Liberation*. While Skilling has examined the evidence more closely and thrown up interesting details, the same objections to the link between the Abhayagirivihāra and the *Path to Liberation* apply as before. Even accepting the *īkā* attribution, the fact that the Abhayagirivāsins apparently accepted a point found in the *Path to Liberation* does not mean that they accept the entire content of the *Path to Liberation*, let alone wrote it. Skilling's learned analysis only demonstrates some close concurrence and some narrow divergence between Upatissa and Buddhaghosa.

Each time the link between the *Path to Liberation* and the Abhayagirivihāra has been suggested, the same logical mistakes have been made at every stage. Movement from evidence to conclusions has been made with scant regard for sound premises or deduction. Rather, scholars are repeatedly drawn by the glitter of Abhayagirivihāra's non-specific 'otherness'. Their mistakes have in turn begun to spawn further myths. The entire development of the theories examined shows how the alluring mystery of the Abhayagirivihāra has led Buddhologists to write for it and for the *Path to Liberation* a history extending far beyond the evidential basis.

NOTES

¹ Schopen 1996: 585 note 9.

² Taishō 1648. Nanjio 1293. English translation Ehara, Soma & Kheminda 1961.

³ Bizot 1976: 25 and 1993: 26. Bechert in Bizot 1988: 11 and Bechert 1993. Barea 1995. For Skilling, 1987 and 1994.

⁴ See bibliography for some of the major publications by Bizot on this subject. A survey of the publications on this tradition to date is in preparation by the present author.

⁵ or Mahānikāya, e.g. 1981: 4.

⁶ Bizot 1976: 7.

⁷ E.g. 1988: 15.

⁸ Bizot 1992: 26.

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⁹ My reason for preferring this term to those used by Bizot is that my own research has focused on the Sri Lankan branch of this tradition introduced by the Mahāvihāra from Siam in the 18th-century. At that stage it therefore neither concerns the Mahānikāya of Thailand nor can be described as non-Mahāvihārin. The first text of this tradition to be published in Europe was in fact a text preserved in Sri Lanka, given the title of *The Yogāvacara's Manual* by Rhys Davids (1896) in the absence of a known title for the text. In addition to a number of manuscripts containing the text Rhys Davids edited (he believed his manuscript to be unique), two other related texts known from Sri Lanka are the *Amatākaravannanā* and the *Vākkapprakaranna*. The former is closely related to the *Yogāvacara's Manual* while the other is closely related to the first of the two texts published by Bizot as *Le Chemin de Lanka* (1992). An edition and translation of both these works is in preparation by the present author.

¹⁰ This issue is discussed in more detail below.

¹¹ Fernando 1908: 22. The date is calculated as 1164/1165 CE by Gunawardana (1979: 314) on the basis of the Galvihāra inscription.

¹² Three texts have been attributed to the Abhayagirivāsins by modern scholars, but the attribution of each contested. The texts are the *Vimuttimagga* (*Path to Liberation*), under discussion here, the *Saddhammopāyana* and the *Upālipariprcchāsūtra*. Norman 1991 (=1993) has demonstrated that the *Saddhammopāyana* may belong to the Abhayagirivāsins but may equally have been written by a resident of the Abhayagirivihāra after the 12th-century unification of the Anurādhapura *saṅghas* under Parākramabāhu I, if the attribution of its authorship to Abhayagiri Kavacakravartī Ananda Mahāthera by two commentaries on it is correct (Norman 1991: 45–47 = 1993: 211–215). Norman also demonstrates that there is no evidence for the attribution of the *Upālipariprcchāsūtra* to the Abhayagirivihāra, which he would rather, partly on the basis of the order of the *vinaya* rules, attribute to a school of northern India, although he is again careful not to exclude outright the possibility of it belonging to the Abhayagirivāsins (Norman 1991: 44–45 = 1993: 208–211). Norman's discussion of *PL* is discussed below in the main body of this paper.

¹³ Fernando 1908.

¹⁴ Bechert in Bizot 1988: 11.

¹⁵ Bechert loc. cit. Skilling (1987): 3–23. It is not clear to me how this statement supports Bechert's conclusion.

¹⁶ Bechert loc. cit. gives one reference to secret texts in the *Visuddhimagga*. Lance Cousins (1997) discusses this and two further such references in the *Visuddhimagga*.

¹⁷ Bechert loc. cit.

¹⁸ Bechert op. cit.: 12.

¹⁹ Bechert 1993: note 11. D. J. Kalupahana, "Schools of Buddhism in Early Ceylon", *The Ceylon Journal of the Humanities I* (1970) 161. Unfortunately, I have not been able to consult this article.

²⁰ Von Hinüber 1996: 22 and note 82.

²¹ 1996: 126. Von Hinüber also mentions the possible connection of the *Saddhammopāyana* with the Abhayagirivihāra: 203.

²² Bechert 1993: 14.

²³ Skilling 1987, 1993a, 1994.

²⁴ Bizot 1976.

²⁵ *Ibid.*: 25.

²⁶ Bapat 1937, lvi ff.

²⁷ Ehara, Soma and Kheminda 1961: 173–176. The words in italics are indicated as transcriptions by the translators.

²⁸ "Worms" in this translation and "vers" in Bizot is better translated as "parasite", as can be seen from the first type listed here, "the worm that relies on the hair". Sanskrit

krimi, which is commonly translated as "worm", should similarly be translated as "parasite" in such contexts.

²⁹ *kara* and *karasira* are given here as the names of the parasites reliant on the root of the bladder, but above as the names of those reliant on the fat. I assume this is a typographical slip in the translation (Ehara et al. 1961: 175), since it is not remarked upon there.

³⁰ The translators note that only four are listed (Ehara et al. 1961: 175 note 1). Perhaps intended as the fifth kind are the types which live in the lower orifices, given as three subcategories after these four.

³¹ The date of *PL* is uncertain. The only certainly is the *terminus ante quem* established by the translation of it into Chinese by Saṅghapāla in 515 CE century CE. The date of 505 in Nanjio is corrected to 515 by Skilling 1994: 173 and note 1. (Nanjio no. 1293. Biographies of Saṅghapāla are translated from the *kasoden* in Ehara, Soma and Kheminda 1961: XLII–XLIII.) Dhammapāla, who mentions it in his commentary on the *Visuddhimagga*, is likewise dated c. 6th century CE. Dhammapāla is assuming that it predates 5th-century Buddhaghosa. Bapat suggests 1st century CE (1937, xviii).

³² Bizot 1976: 25–26.

³³ Bechert 1993: 14.

³⁴ Bizot 1976: 25.

³⁵ Bapat 1937: 208.

³⁶ Ehara, Soma and Kheminda.

³⁷ Bechert 1993: 13, and bibliographical data given note 13.

³⁸ Norman on Abhayagiri 1991 = 1993. The passage of Bizot under discussion here predates this, of course. Skilling cites Norman's article as evidence for the school affiliation without noting that Norman's conclusions contradict his own (1993b: 138 note 1). Norman's survey 1983. Bechert's review, 1987. For Norman's broader update of 1983 taking into account a range of suggestions and criticism since publication, see Norman 1994.

³⁹ Bizot 1976: 32.

⁴⁰ This theory is preferred by Norman 1991: 48 = 1993: 216.

⁴¹ British library manuscripts Or. 6612(106) and Or.6612(107) respectively, from the Hugh Nevill collection. Printed editions are listed in Somadasa 1993: 367. This volume of Somadasa's catalogue lists the medical and other scientific treatises in the collection. I shall leave aside here the undecided issue of whether or not the Abhayagirivihāra texts were in Sanskrit or Pali. On this Skilling writes, "Had the Abhayagirivāsins adopted a Sanskrit Tripiṭaka, their rivals would surely have been quick to point this out but no such accusation is found in available literature" (1994: 167). Similarly, Nevill "The Dhammaruci priests used Pali, like their orthodox rivals in Ceylon, and we have no record that their books here were kept in Sanskrit, as we undoubtedly should have had, if they had given that loophole for accusation to their adversaries" cited Somadasa. 1989: 111.

⁴² Other possible sources of a text in Sanskrit include mainland and insular South-east Asia. Bapat demonstrates his awareness of Sanskrit in Sri Lanka elsewhere (1942).

⁴³ Skilling 1987, note 28. See the bibliography for this and other articles by Skilling on this text.

⁴⁴ Skilling 1987: 7.

⁴⁵ This date is reached by Skilling through a comparison of Tibetan historical sources and north Indian inscriptions (1987: 12–13).

⁴⁶ Skilling 1987: 15.

⁴⁷ Bapat 1937: liv–lv.

⁴⁸ Some of this evidence is collected by Kheminda (Ehara, Soma and Kheminda 1961: XL–XLI).

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⁴⁹ Reported in the Ceylon Daily News 9 September 1960, cited by Kheminda (Ehara, Soma and Kheminda 1961: XLI note 1).

⁵⁰ E.g. von Hinüber 1991, Gombrich 1994: xxv. The earlier Pali texts preserved in Burma from the c. 5th–6th centuries are mentioned in the discussion of Bareau below. On the archaeology of this earlier material see Stargardt 1995, on the content and palaeographic discussion, see Falk 1997.

⁵¹ Bapat 1952.

⁵² Bapat: 1937: 134. cited by Kheminda 1961, XXXVII. Kheminda, loc. cit. note 2, adds that Bapat wrongly dismisses the name Nārada as an improbable connection.

⁵³ 1961: XXXVIII.

⁵⁴ 1961: XXXIX–XL.

⁵⁵ PTS edition: 54 §2. Translations Kheminda 1961: XXXIX.

⁵⁶ Kheminda 1961: XXXIX.

⁵⁷ Kheminda 1961: XL.

⁵⁸ Op. cit.: xlvi.

⁵⁹ Bapat 1937: liv.

⁶⁰ E.g. *Puggalapaññatti* 52 ff.

⁶¹ *Pasūrasuttaniddeso* PTS edition 177–178. CSCD.

⁶² The *Puggalapaññatti* passage cited above writes that is possible for people both of low birth and of high birth to be either *tama-parāyano* or *joti-parāyano*.

⁶³ *Nyānamoli* 1976: 54.

⁶⁴ Bizot 1976: 25.

⁶⁵ Ehara, Soma and Kheminda 1961: 173 note 3.

⁶⁶ Ibid.: 174, note 1.

⁶⁷ Bizot loc. cit.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Bapat 1937: xxxiv.

⁷⁰ Bizot 1976: 136. My English.

⁷¹ Bizot 1976: 136–7. My summary and English.

⁷² Bizot 1976: 136.

⁷³ *Nyānamoli* 1976: xxviii. Norman 191 = 1993: 208.

⁷⁴ Skilling 1994: 199. Bareau 1955, on which see below.

⁷⁵ 1955.

⁷⁶ 1994.

⁷⁷ 1937: xix ff.

⁷⁸ Op. cit.

⁷⁹ Skilling's remark "The original Pāli is lost" (1997d: 142) belies my interpretation of the possible rationale for his policy of reconstructing the Pāli. Possibly we should regard this statement as a mark of the influence Skilling's conclusion has had on his own writing. He is more cautious in an earlier discussion of the terminology of the *Path to Liberation*: "*Kun nas btus pa*, which I have taken here in the sense of chapter, is equivalent to the Sanskrit *samuccaya*. Since the *Vimuttimaggā* is not available in the original, whether Pāli or Sanskrit, I cannot say whether this term was used in the original text" (1993b: 138 note 4) and criticises Feer for assuming that this and another 12 texts extant in Tibetan were "traduits du pali" (ibid.: 101 with note 1).

⁸⁰ 1955: 241–243.

⁸¹ Ibid: 14.

⁸² Stargardt 1995, Falk 1997.

⁸³ See Stargardt 1990, 329 figure 108.

⁸⁴ See Skilling 1997a: 94–96 for a summary of the early archaeological evidence of Pāli in Burma and Sri Lanka.

⁸⁵ "These highly differentiated sources form a mutually consistent pattern showing that the main inspiration of Pyu Buddhism came from the Sātavāhana and Ikṣvaku traditions of Andhra, extending up the Godavari as well as the Krishna River to sites such as Ter. The capital, Nagarjunakonda, played an especially fruitful rôle in the transmission of Buddhism to the Pyus in the early fourth century" Stargardt 1990: 346–347. Also, Stargardt, paper addressed to the Dept. of Archaeology, Oxford 9 Nov. 1993, and Stargardt 1995.

⁸⁶ Bareau 1955. Theravāda schools: 205–244, summary of Eliot: 208–210, *Kathāvattu* 212–240.

⁸⁷ Ray, Nihar-Ranjan 1936.

⁸⁸ The possibility of a Sri Lankan connection is suggested by the mention of Anurādhapura in an Old Mon inscription from the Nari cave in Saraburi from c.6th–7th century. Skilling thinks it more likely that this is a reference to an unknown local site rather than to the Ceylon capital (or something named after it?) "Whether the reference is to the ancient capital of Ceylon or to a local site cannot be said, although the latter seems more likely: the important point is that the toponym is otherwise known only from Ceylon". (Skilling 1997a: 102) Skilling does not give the reason for his preferred interpretation in this article.

⁸⁹ E.g. Gombrich 1988: 134–135 and 148ff.

⁹⁰ Coningham 1995.

⁹¹ Gombrich op. cit.: 137, "While archaeological and literary evidence proves that the Ceylonese historical account of Buddhism in the island, from Mahinda's mission on, is substantially true, there is reason to be sceptical about the early history of Theravāda in Burma". Mangrai 1976 discusses this reluctance to accept the possibility of an early arrival of Buddhism in mainland Southeast Asia, partly in the context of criticising European colonial historiography and partly as an assessment of the later archaeological evidence and the earliest knowledge of trade routes from India through mainland Southeast Asia. Buddhist chroniclers of a later date elsewhere accept the early spread of Buddhism to these regions, e.g. Tāranātha Ch. 39 (Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya 1970).

⁹² "For the South-east Asia of the early period we do not have any historical records comparable to those of Ceylon: no indigenous chronicles, whether in Pāli, Sanskrit, or in vernaculars survive". 1997a: 93–94.

⁹³ "All told, there is no conclusive local evidence that the early Theravāda of South-east Asia was affiliated with either the Mahāvihāra or the Abhayagiri". Skilling 1997a: 101.

⁹⁴ Loc. cit.

⁹⁵ Loc. cit.

⁹⁶ Bareau 1955: 205.

⁹⁷ Ibid.: 24.

⁹⁸ Geiger 1912, revised edition 1950: 26–27.

⁹⁹ Bechert is comparing the medieval tripartite division of the Sri Lankan *saṅgha* with the modern apparent tripartite division of the Sri Lankan *saṅgha* which does not take into consideration the sub-*nikāyas* which number in excess of thirty (or, come to that, the Buddhist groups which do not fall into *nikāya* Buddhism).

¹⁰⁰ Bechert 1993: 12.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., note 6. Also, loc. cit. "for the Damiḷabhikkhusaṅgha see Gunawardana [1979] 47ff".

¹⁰² Bareau 1955: 241.

¹⁰³ Ibid.: 205.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.: 110.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.: 206.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.: 110.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.: 22–27.

¹⁰⁸ Bareau also equates Sthavira with Theravāda in the case of the 7th-century Chinese monk Hsüan-tsang's descriptions of the residents of various sites in India as 'Sthavira'. This may be justified given the equation in Chinese lists of this date of Sthavira with three Theravāda groups. Less convincing is his identification of the Mahāyāna-Sthavira Hsüan-tsang encounters at Bodh Gaya with members of non-Mahāvihārin Sri Lankan Theravāda, and probably the Abhayagirivihāra, *ibid.*: 208.

¹⁰⁹ Von Hinüber 1996: 22 and 1995: 37. Von Hinüber identifies other possible instances of quotations from Abhayagiri *vinaya*. Quotes from or citations of Abhayagiri texts and doctrines in the commentarial tradition on the Pāli canon of the Mahāvihāra include: Sp 583, 9 ff. (cited v. Hinüber 1996: 22); Mhv-t, e.g. 175,31, 187,7, 676–21 (cited von Hinüber 1996: 92)

¹¹⁰ "A *nikāya* is a group of monks who mutually acknowledge the validity of their *upasampadā*, and consequently, if staying within the same *śīmā*, can commonly perform *vinayakarmas*". Bechert 1993: 12.

¹¹¹ Bechert 1993: 17. The context here is Bechert's response to Gunawardana's reference to the citation of attributions of doctrine to the Abhayagirivāsins in the *Abhidhammatthavikāsin* Gunawardana 1979: 321 (cited Bechert 1993: 16, 17), and to Gunawardana's statement that eight *mūlavihāra* flourished in mediaeval Sri Lanka (Gunawardana 1979: 282–312, cited Bechert 1993–18–19).

¹¹² Nanjio 1882, reprint 1989: 422. Cited Skilling 1997a: 100. The names are reconstructed in Nanjio from the Chinese transliterations in conjunction with the Chinese translations. Nanjio gives Saṅghapāla or Saṅghavarman, while Bareau gives Saṅghabhara, as noted by Skilling (1987: note 2).

¹¹³ This possibility was suggested by Nagai (1917–19: 70). Skilling (1997a: 101) does not accept this possibility as likely, see below.

¹¹⁴ Not taken into consideration here is the "apocryphal" Pāli literature of Southeast Asia which may shed light on non-Mahāvihāra traditions.

¹¹⁵ Bareau 1955: 112ff.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.: 120.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.: 115.

¹¹⁸ See Norman's comments on the misinterpretation of Bapat, discussed in my conclusion below.

¹¹⁹ P.C. Bagchi, 1946–7: 3–4. Cited Bareau 1955: 242.

¹²⁰ An example is the number of derived forms as discussed by Skilling. See below.

¹²¹ Bareau 1955: 242. My summary translation.

¹²² 1991: 47 = 1993: 215. By his wording, "other Pāli texts", Norman is not accepting that the *Path to Liberation* was written in Pāli, but is presumably referring to the *Saddhammopāyana*.

¹²³ Norman 1991: 41 = 1993: 202.

¹²⁴ This supposed significance of the *Path to Liberation* to the Theravāda tradition is perhaps belied by the absence of an extant version or extensive citation of the text preserved by the Theravāda tradition. Bapat demonstrated that the Pāli version published in 1963 by Ratnajoti and Ratnapala was simply a modern Pāli summary of what he had published (Bapat 1972, cited Bechert 1989). I suspect the Pāli summary was originally put together by Soma Thera but not completed before he died. Gunawardana (1979: 22) was unaware of the status of Ratanajoti and Ratnapala's text and regarded it as "a Pāli version which they had discovered at the Asgiri monastery at Kandy".

¹²⁵ *ekacce ti Upatissantheram sandhāyāha: tena hi Vimuttimamme tathā vuttam Vimuttimamma* 221,22. Cited Norman 1991: 43 = 1993: 205 note 8. Norman criticises Bareau's use of this quotation "We must be especially wary of following Bareau

when he claims that Dhammapāla writes of the Vimuttimagga 'comme renfermant une hérésie' (1955: 242). Bareau actually quotes the Pāli of the Vimuttimagga when he states this, which enables readers to see that Dhammapāla says no such thing". Norman 1991: 43 = 1993: 206–207. See also the discussion of Skilling's work below.

¹²⁶ Vimuttimagga 180,18; 315,23; 988,8; 700,26. Cited Norman 1991: 43 = 1993: 206 note 1.

¹²⁷ Norman 1991: 43 = 1993: 206.

¹²⁸ These occurrences and attributions are given by Bapat 1937: xxxvii–xlii, cited by Norman loc. cit., note 2.

¹²⁹ Following Kern, *Histoire du Bouddhisme dans l'Inde* vol. II: 368.

¹³⁰ Following Eliot, 1921: 33.

¹³¹ Bareau 1955: 242–243. My translation.

¹³² Loc. cit.

¹³³ Gunawardana introduces his own survey of views attributed to the Abhayagirivāsins in 19 texts, 1979: 27–32 ("but Bareau was able to utilise only a few of these") with the following courtesy, "The pioneering work of André Bareau is the only systematic attempt made so far to determine the doctrinal position of the Abhayagiri *nikāya*" (1979: 21).

¹³⁴ Skilling 1994.

¹³⁵ Bapat 1937: xxxi.

¹³⁶ My numbering does not correspond to that in Skilling.

¹³⁷ Skilling op. cit.: 175.

¹³⁸ Ibid.: 199.

¹³⁹ Ibid.: 181. Here, as elsewhere in discussion of the *Path to Liberation*, the Pāli terms provided are constructed from the Chinese translation or Tibetan quotation.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.: 181–186.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.: 187.

¹⁴² Ibid.: 186 note 1, points out that the *Dhammasaṅgani* in fact only gives 23.

¹⁴³ *Visuddhimagga* 381 §71, Skilling 1994: 186.

¹⁴⁴ *Paramatthamañjūsā* Bangkok edition 1965, p. 48, 2. Cited Skilling 1994, 188 and note 1.

¹⁴⁵ Skilling 1994: 199.

¹⁴⁶ Skilling 1997e: 101 note 45. However, see Skilling 1993b table 7.

¹⁴⁷ Skilling 1997a.

¹⁴⁸ This contradicts Skilling 1994: 202: "According to *L'Inde classique* (§2147), the *Vimuttimagga* was translated from a manuscript brought to China in about 502 by another monk of Funan. Unfortunately, no source is given. If the information can be shown to be reliable, this would be important evidence for the presence of non-Mahāvihāra Theravāda in South-east Asia at an early date". While Skilling had in the meantime found that Renou and Filliozat could be shown to be reliable (Skilling loc. cit. note 26 for the sources of the information), he gives no indication of reasons for his change in interpretation.

¹⁴⁹ Norman 1991: 41–42 = 1993: 202–204.

¹⁵⁰ Similarly, Gunawardana, "the possibility of omission and even distortion can not be ruled out" (1979: 23).

¹⁵¹ Skilling 1994: 201 and note 1. Skilling's point is particularly reasonable given the proposed dating of Dhammapāla to the 6th century (Buddhadatta 1945: 51), yet the picture is made more complex by the tradition that Dhammapāla resided in the "Badarathavahāra ... in the country of Damiḷas, not far from the island of Ceylon" Bapat 1937: 1 on basis of colophons to a variety of commentaries attributed to Dhammapāla and the *Sāsanavaṃsa*. Skilling does not give his reasons for rejecting this information in his observation on Dhammapāla: "Since the author of the *nikāya* was a learned Theravādin monk writing in *Ceylon*, where we know that the different

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schools lived in close proximity, I see no basis for reasonable doubt, and assume that he is correct in attributing the theory of *midḍha-rūpa* to the Abhayagiri" (1994: 201, my emphasis). Regarding the date, Bapat concurs with Buddhadatta in assigning Dhammapāla to the 6th century on the basis of the following reference to him: "When the famous Chinese traveller, Yuan Chūan, speaks of his visit to Kāñcīpura in South India, in or about 640 A.D., he tells us that Kāñcīpura was the birthplace of Dhammapāla. Although there is no definite proof to show that he was the same as our Dhammapāla, still it is very likely ..." Bapat 1937: li. von Hinüber 1996: 169 writes, "The date of Dhammapāla, remains uncertain. A *terminus ante quem*, however, is difficult to find, for the first certain date is provided by Sāriputta, who knows Dhammapāla's works in the 12th century", but considers the possibility that "Dhammapāla could be dated somewhere about AD 550–600" (ibid.: 171).

¹⁵² This point is clearly accepted by Skilling (1994: 199 §2) but the implications are not applied to his conclusions.

¹⁵³ 1993b: 173. I base my understanding that Skilling was writing both this (1993b) and the "Vimuttimagga and Abhayagiri ..." (1994) articles around the same time on Skilling's notification of the forthcoming appearance of the latter in the former (1993b: 138 note 1).

¹⁵⁴ Skilling demonstrates further close agreement between *Path to Liberation* and *Visuddhimagga*, for example in their understanding of the *hadayavāṭhu/vatthu-rūpa* in contrast to the identification of it as an *indriya* according to an opinion attributed to the Sthavira in Hsüan-tsang's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddha, la Siddhis de Hsuan-Tsang* Vol. I, Paris 1928, 281, cited Skilling 1994: 196.

¹⁵⁵ Skilling 1994: 195. I mention this only as devil's advocate, not because I consider this evidence weighty.

¹⁵⁶ If this kind of argument were admissible, we would be compelled to exclude the *Visuddhimagga* from Mahāvihāra orthodoxy on the evidence of the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*.

¹⁵⁷ This point about Dhammapāla was given in more detail in the discussion of Bareau above. Gunawardana (1979: 23), is aware of the overlap (but not complete concurrence) between points attributed to the Abhayagirivāsins and those found in the *Path to Liberation*, but remains cautious. "The idea that the *Vimuttimagga* is a work of the Abhayagirivāsins seems to have found acceptance among a number of scholars and it is quite likely that this was so. Nevertheless, in the present study, we have listed only those views which our sources have specifically attributed to the Abhayagirivāsins". He gives the views attributed to the Abhayagirivāsins but not found in the *Path to Liberation* separately (1979: 29ff).

¹⁵⁸ Skilling 1997b: 608 and 1993a. Skilling identifies the quotation as a portion of an Abhayagiri version of the *Buddhavamsa*.

¹⁵⁹ Bizot 1993: 26.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.: 111. Skilling 1987. Since Bizot 1993 is intended as an introduction to Thai Buddhism, the footnotes are sparse and it is not always possible to identify Bizot's source for a given statement.

¹⁶² Bizot 1993: 26.

¹⁶³ Discussed in more detail by Bizot 1981: 85–91.

¹⁶⁴ Bizot 1993: 26–27.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.: 26.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.: 27.

¹⁶⁷ The first of Bechert's affirmations of the theory is in his preface to Bizot 1988, given in Bizot's 1993 bibliography. The second of Bechert's affirmations is in his 1993 article, i.e. published in the same year as Bizot's *Le Bouddhisme des Thaïs*.

Bizot lists Bechert 1982, "The Nikāya of Mediaeval Sri Lanka and Unification of the Saṅgha by Parākrāmabāhu I" *Contributions to Prof. A.K. Warder Felicitation Volume*, Göttingen: 1–15, which appears to be the same as Bechert 1993.

¹⁶⁸ Translation Ehara, Soma and Kheminda 1961: 158.

¹⁶⁹ Ch. VIII §197. PTS 280.

¹⁷⁰ The correspondence between *PL* and the *Visuddhimagga*, as well as the source of the *Visuddhimagga* are pointed out by Kheminda (Ehara, Soma and Kheminda 1961: XLV). Kheminda's statement is a little misleading since it implies that the passage in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* begins with the discussion of the navel, whereas the details of what is meant by "beginning, middle and end", by "internally" and "externally" are supplied by the *Visuddhimagga*.

¹⁷¹ Translation Nyānamoli 1976: 302.

¹⁷² While the title of this text suggests a possible connection with Sri Lanka, Bizot construes the reference as mythological rather than geographical, since the myth of Lankā as a symbol of the spiritual goal is found in other texts of the *yogāvacara* tradition (1992: 42). The myth of Sri Lanka as a holy land is also found in apocryphal *jātaka* stories.

¹⁷³ Taken from Bizot 1992: 250ff. Other examples of the *ānāpāna* breathing in this tradition are found in the *The Yogāvacara's Manual* and in the *Amatākaravannanā*, but they do not contain the personalised and detailed description found in the *Chemin de Lankā*.

¹⁷⁴ The *parikamma*, literally the "preparation" is the repetition of a sacred phrase such as *araham*. This ensures success for the practitioner in his meditation. The *parikamma* varies according to *kammaṭṭhāna*. Here the *parikamma* A is used as only a single-syllable *parikamma* can be repeated at sufficient speed to prevent the breath from escaping. This, for the *yogāvacara*, is the practice of single-pointedness of mind (Bizot 1992: 249 §37.1ff.). The symbolism of the syllable, e.g. that the five parts of the ligature A represent the five parts of the *dharmakāya* of the Buddha, is explained in the text (ibid.: 266).

¹⁷⁵ Perhaps better, "vérité sur la souffrance", i.e. the truth of suffering, the first of the four noble truths.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.: 261. Paragraph 52. 11.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.: 256. Paragraph 46.1 ff.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.: 260.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.: 249–252. Section on the mutual origination of the Buddha and the Dhamma from each other.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.: 252 §42.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.: 261 §52.11.

¹⁸² Ibid.: 262 §54.5ff.

¹⁸³ Bizot 1975: 26.

¹⁸⁴ Bapat 1937: xxx–xlii.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.: xxxi. Skilling does not cite this passage of Bapat 1937 at 1994: 181 and 187 when he discusses these two terms, citing only Bapat, *Vimuttimārga Dhutagaṇa-nirdeśa* Bombay 1964, for "other points on which the *Vimuttimārga* disagrees with the Mahāvihāra" in his conclusion (1994: 199 note 3), nor does he list Bapat 1937 in his bibliography.

¹⁸⁶ Bapat 1937: xxxiv.

¹⁸⁷ For example: *Amatākaravannanā* Chapter 1, passim; *Vākkapparakaraṇa* Chapter 1, passim; *Manuel des Maîtres de kammaṭṭhāna pour l'interprétations des signes d'après le manuscrit de l'Auguste Acāry OUN* edited and translated by Olivier de Bernon (I have only a draft of this from 1997 in hand, but understand it will soon be published); *Yogāvacara's Manual* (Rhys Davids 1896: 10ff.), *Le Chemin de Lankā* (Bizot 1992: 48ff.).

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¹⁸⁸ In my unpublished study of the *Amatākaravannanā*. Where comparison can be made, the *yogāvacara* texts tend to conform in terminology, although not in advised practice, with Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga*.

¹⁸⁹ It truly seems to be a matter of focus or emphasis here, since Bizot had observed that the practice of the *Path to Liberation* was in general in conformity with the Pāli canon, but did not remark upon the terminology.

¹⁹⁰ Cousins 1997: 192.

¹⁹¹ The direction of Cousins argument at this stage is an exploration of the possibility of the esoteric *yogāvacara* tradition existing alongside the exoteric Theravāda of Mahāvihāra.

¹⁹² Ibid.: 203 note 14. Cousins gives no references at this point, but must have the passage on embryology and parasitology in mind.

¹⁹³ Mori 1988: 2 and 36.

¹⁹⁴ Thus Mori is completing the unfinished job of the *īkā* author.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.: 34–35.

¹⁹⁶ Von Hinüber 1996: 126 §250.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., note 439.

¹⁹⁸ Skilling 1994: 202.

¹⁹⁹ Skilling 1997a: 100.

²⁰⁰ Skilling 1993b: 139.

²⁰¹ Ibid.: 138–140 and 1997e: 134.

²⁰² Skilling 1993b: 140.

²⁰³ Ibid.: 160.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.: 161.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.: 161–2.

²⁰⁶ Skilling 1997e: 308–309. Skilling's expression is slightly confused: "The *Vimuttimārga* of Upatissa Thera, a manual associated with Abhayagiri school (sic) of the Theravādins, also states that the twin miracle is an attainment of the Enlightened One and not of auditors. Thus there are no accounts of its performance in the Pāli canon (sic)". I think he intends "Theravāda tradition" rather than "Pāli canon".

²⁰⁷ Skilling 1997d: 145.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.: 151.

²⁰⁹ Norman 1992: 46 = 1993: 212.

²¹⁰ That Skilling's attribution is heading towards acceptance is shown by the use of his work by Bechert and von Hinüber. None can be but impressed by the detail and breadth of Skilling's work, particularly if they attempt to use as a reference work his *Mahāsūtras* 2, for which the Pāli Text Society has unfortunately still to include an index. An example of the mannerism which causes the reader to doubt that an author so prone to scholarly scepticism could have succumbed to irrationality in other places is found in the conclusion to the main article under discussion here: "I therefore conclude that the *Vimuttimārga* ... was a manual transmitted by the Abhayagiri school within the greater Theravādin tradition. I use the word 'transmitted' advisedly: there is no evidence to date that Upatissa was a native of Ceylon or that he composed his only surviving work at the Abhayagiri Vihāra. The *Vimuttimārga* may have been composed elsewhere in Ceylon, in India, or perhaps even South-east Asia" (Skilling 1994: 202). A fine, not to say amusing, display of this scepticism is to be found in his assessment of the derivation of the term *Tāmasāṭīya* (Skilling 1993b: 166–167 with note 4).

²¹¹ Norman 1991: 44 = 1993: 208. The prime but not isolated culprit here is Bateau, "M. Bapat, qui a consacré deux études approfondies à cet ouvrage, en conclut qu'il appartient à l'école des Abhayagirivāsin" 1955: 242. Bateau in turn became the source of others' statements to this effect.

- ²¹² 1937: xlix. Cited Norman loc.cit note 2.
²¹³ Bapat 1937: liv, Norman 1991: 48 = 1993: 216.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- CSCD = Chatthasaṅgāyanasaṅgīti edition of the *Tipiṭaka* on Compact Disc published by the Vipassanā Research Institute.
- PTS = Pali Text Society edition.

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SANSKRIT COMMENTATORS AND THE TRANSMISSION OF TEXTS: HARADATTA ON ĀPASTAMBA DHARMAŚŪTRA

In my recent article "Unfaithful Transmitters" (Olivelle 1998) I drew attention to the pervasive mistrust of ancient Indian commentators as reliable guides to understanding ancient Indian texts prevalent among western scholars, a mistrust that spilled over into doubts about the reliability of the textual transmission mediated by these commentators and more broadly into a mistrust of the scribal tradition as such. Drawing on examples of "critical editions" of Upaniṣadic texts, especially Böhlingk's (1889) edition of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, and the readings preserved by the commentator Śaṅkara, I tried to show there that western, primarily European, philologists were often less faithful transmitters of Upaniṣadic texts than the Indian scribes and commentators they so often criticized. Native commentators and theologians did not, as often assumed, carelessly or deliberately change the received texts to suit their doctrinal or grammatical tastes.

In this paper I return to that theme and this time examine closely the manner in which Haradatta, the commentator of the Āpastamba Dharmasūtra,¹ explained and transmitted that ancient text. Just as it is unfair to indict all western scholars because of the excesses of some, so it is not my intention to present Haradatta as typical of all Indian commentators. If the "Orientalist" debate has taught us anything, it is to treat traditional Indian authors as individuals, to restore "agency" to them. They are not all alike; there are good and not so good commentators. Haradatta is one of the best. Yet, I do not think that he is unique or atypical; he is good, but he also represents well the tradition from which he comes.

Haradatta is what we would call today a "close reader" of the text. He does not let even the slightest irregularity, peculiarity, or quirk go unnoticed. He points out the presence or the absence of a *visarga* or an *anusvāra* (something even those of us who dabble in collating manuscripts are prone to overlook), the shortening or lengthening of a vowel, whether an "n" is dental or retroflex, whether a letter is "v" or "b" or "p", and so on. In short, he takes the text he received from the